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(Mis)Understanding Chvez and Venezuela in Times of Revolution

J uan Pablo Lupi and Leonardo Vi va s
Interpretations of Lt. Col. Hugo Chvezs ascent and consolidation of power as the president of Venezuela fall into two broad categories. Some reject it as a sort of accident or historical misunderstanding. They wonder how Chvezs self-proclaimed revolution could have taken place on the eve of the twenty-first century in one of the most moderateand resilientLatin American democracies, and they ask how the international community can help counter what they see as the destruction of a long-nurtured democracy. Others praise a revolution full of potential for people left behind by the tides of globalization, U.S.-led capitalism, and corrupt elites. In global terms, they see the Chvez regime as a response to the United States imperial-style attempts to impose its domination; in local terms, they see it as a popular reaction against a corruptand even racistoligarchy that never cared about addressing the poverty of the great majority of Venezuelans. To overcome the extremes of these two interpretations and better understand Chvezs success, it is helpful to look at the emergence of the Chavista revolution within the framework of Venezuelas specific political, economic, social, and historic context. Although categories like populism or authoritarianism are useful to describe what has come to be called Chavismo, this phenomenon has unique features that defy such standard classification. Addressing these peculiarities is essential for a proper analysis of the situation and an understanding of how they often defy conventional wisdom about Venezuela.
Leonardo Vi vas is Executive Director of Latin Roots, a non-profit organization created to address Latino culture and education in Massachusetts. He was a fellow in the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University in 2000. In Venezuela, his country of origin, he was Director of Industry in the Development Ministry, and Executive Director of Venezuela Competitiva. Leonardo has written two books on Venezuelas current political crisis. Juan Pablo Lupi is a doctoral candidate in comparative literature at Harvard University.

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THE UNCOMFORTABLE REVOLUTION

Most critics of the Chavista regime follow post-Cold War paradigms of economic and social analysis. They ask to what extent Chavismo follows the usual development pattern associated with adapting to a global economy, and to what extent it complies with the wave of world democratization that unfolded after the mid-1970s.1 One view of the current derailment of the political process in Venezuela is that it reflects an extended malaise about democracy in Latin America. The best account of this perspective is the United Nations Development Program Report Democracy in Latin America.2 On the basis of a survey conducted in 18 countries, the study contends that democracythough still preferred over other optionshas been losing its vitality as a growing number of people in the region no longer have confidence in its capacity to improve their living conditions. Poverty, vast income inequality, and scarce access to public services still prevail despite the efforts of democratic governments and the ambitious economic reforms of the 1990s.3 Although the malaise explanation fairly describes a real trend, it does not adequately explain the scope of social and political change occurring today in Venezuela. First, a democratic malaise in Venezuela similar to that of neighboring countries does not sufficiently explain the intensity of Chvezs Bolivarian revolution or the popular support it enjoys. Second, this view derives from too broad and structural a perspective, focusing on processes but forgetting the actors, the strategies they follow, and the kind of world they may be seeking. It inappropriately puts leaders as diverse as Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva in Brazil, Nstor Kirchner in Argentina, Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, and Hugo Chvez in Venezuela in the same category. Third, although some interpreted the election of Chvez in 1998 as a democratic setback, the push for a full restoration of democratic rights by a very wide social coalition and the successful call for a referendum are signs of a strong democratic political culture. Whether the government scored a fair victory or whether Chvezs reelection was the result of massive fraud, the great majority of Venezuelans sought an openly democratic method to mend a growing fracture between the government and the opposition.4 A second way to see the Chavista phenomenon is as part of a Latin American curse in which short-lived democratic phases are scattered among more authoritarian trends that continually resurface as fragile democratic settings reveal their shortcomings.5 This argument points to common elements in political crises, such as those of Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Ecuador under Jamil Mahuad, Venezuela under Chvez, and many Central American nations after the conflict-riddled decades of the 1970s and 1980s. It is here that Chvezs critics have posited the best explanation. The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution broadened the executive branch and its legal base; it expanded the presidential term from

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five to six years, allowing for the incumbents immediate reelection; it made the legislative branch a second-rate institution; and it granted members of the military the right to votesomething consistent with most democraciesbut the new constitution also allowed for military intervention in political affairs. In total, these constitutional changes have converted a system that was once a source of stability into a time bomb.6 One collateral result of what former U.S. president Jimmy Carter called a peaceful revolution in 1999 is a reshuffling of relations between the military and civilians into a new order that increases the power held by both the executive and the military. The executive now has exclusive power to appoint the general command of the armed forces, and high military officers have achieved special judicial status not granted to civilians. The judiciary also underwent an overhaul that consolidated power in the executive, with most of the newly appointed judges and magistrates having important loyalty connections to the president and his political movement.7 The implication of these changes is that democracy has not effectively taken hold in Venezuela. There is a permanent risk of an authoritarian backlash, in which the military holds high stakes. However, two clarifications are needed. First, the Chvez phenomenon does not indicate a straightforward recurrence of militarism in Latin America. A case like that of Chvez or Fujimori is the exception, rather than the rule.8 Second, although militarism is intrinsic to the Chvez regime, it is by itself an insufficient explanation for most mechanisms in the new Venezuelan order. A third view looks at the political economy of Chavismo and reminds us that it is neither the consequence of globalization, nor of too-extensive neoliberal economic reforms, but of the opposite.9 However one may evaluate the current situation, Venezuela has undergone few and superficial economic reforms. In fact, the main reason for continued impoverishment is the countrys consistent refusal to modernize the economy. Venezuela is the fifth-largest oil producer in the world and has the largest reserves of oil and gas outside the Middle East; however, per capita income from oil has consistently diminished since the mid1980s.10 In the absence of other sources of foreign exchange earnings, the country has plunged into a long economic slump and has been unable to deliver better living conditions to the majority of the Venezuelan populace. The political economy implication is that the country has fallen into a trap. The oil economy has nurtured a culture in which most Venezuelans believe that the country is immensely rich but dominated by a corrupt elite that has plundered its wealth. Whenever a new political group comes to power, it seeks to redistribute the oil wealth through inefficient state channels, thus hindering the emergence of a robust private economy. Instead of insatiable capitalists rushing to exploit the countrys riches, the opposite seems to be the case: too few capitalists have invested

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in the country, because no other sector can compete with oil on the basis of return on investment. Venezuelas oil syndrome essentially stems from state control over oil production, as is usually the case in Third World oil-producing countries.11 This is both the cause of the high growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s and the main obstacle to regaining them. In Moiss Nams view, Chvez is simply a late result of this syndrome, and his regime has taken petro-state domination to its extreme. However, this economic argument fails to explain one of the most dominant features of Chavismoits strong popular appeal.
LOOKING AWRY: SOME PERSPECTIVES FROM THE LEFT

The figure of Chvez and the turbulent situation in Venezuela have acquired a special significance for the Left. Chvez has become a major reference in contemporary progressive politics for many of the Lefts militants and sympathizers, both moderate and radical.12 He is perceived as the leader of an authentically popular democracy that is finally taking care of millions of people condemned to poverty and exclusion by previous administrations and neoliberal economic policies in Latin America. They see the Venezuelan crisis as an example of the evils of globalization, capitalism, and corrupt minorities allied with U.S. interests. These perceptions are not confined exclusively to the circles of anti-globalization groups or the so-called alternative media. Around the world, intellectuals, scholars, political analysts, non-governmental organizations, and journalists from mainstream media havewith varying degrees of enthusiasm and adhesionexpressed their sympathy for Chvez or appropriated the Venezuelan crisis to advance their own agendas.13 In Venezuela, people from different parts of the political spectrum have been puzzledand sometimes outragedby the way their countrys political conflict is often portrayed abroad. Many Venezuelans judge the portrayals of the crisis made by well-respected foreign scholars, analysts, and media as shockingly inaccurate or distorted. Regrettably, these complaints have often been justified. The situation becomes especially problematic as such distortions are often highly appealing to the public abroad. They have had a powerful influence in shaping how the international community views Chvez and the Venezuelan crisis. Here are a few examples. In World on Fire, Yale Law School Professor Amy Chua cites Venezuela as a prime example of her argument that, in some countries, a free-market economy and democracy can become an engine of ethnic conflagration as ethnic minorities achieve economic domination over the local, indigenous majorities.14 Chua asserts that Venezuela has seen a clash between the mantuanosthe white minority of European descent that has historically dominated both the countrys economy and its politicsand the pardosthe largely destitute and

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brownskinned majority of the population. Chvez rose to power in 1998 claiming to be the champion of the pardos. This depiction of the Venezuelan crisis even made it to The New York Times op-ed page, provoking a mix of hilarity and outrage among many Venezuelans.15 Besides her debatable portrayal of Venezuelas crisis in ethnic terms, Chua employs categoriesmantuanos and pardosfrom the Spanish colonial period and the early nineteenth century to describe a crisis happening two centuries later.16 Whites in Venezuela today are neither mantuanos nor their descendants, but mostly descendants of European immigrants who came to Venezuela during the first half of the twentieth century and mixed with the local population. In Venezuela, unlike other Latin American countries, the status of ethnicity as a marker of social identity inherited from colonial times underwent a radical change after the disappearance of the white mantuano class in the nineteenth century. This should not imply that Venezuela is a color-blind societyit is not. But neither Chuas anachronism, nor the social stratification in countries like Bolivia or Mexico, nor race relations in the United States are adequate models to describe racism in Venezuela.17 Nonetheless, ethnicity can be a very effective political weapon, especially when used with U.S. and European audiences. This explains why President Chvez refers to ethnic clashes in his discourse.18 A testament to the efficacy of this argument is that even a scholar like Professor Chua can be duped into believing that Venezuelas crisis is an example of an ethnic clash, without even a cursory examination of Venezuelan history. Such scholars appropriate this specific crisis to advance a particular agenda and to construct a theory appealing to audiences in the U.S. and abroad. Another example of seductive (mis)representations of the Venezuelan crisis is the award-winning documentary The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.19 In 2002, a team of Irish filmmakers traveled to Venezuela to make a documentary about Hugo Chvez. The government granted them unprecedented access to film the daily activities of the president. By sheer coincidence, the filmmakers were inside the presidential palace as the April 2002 coup unfolded. What was originally planned to be a documentary on Chvez himself instead became a thrilling insiders account of the two-day long collapse and rebirth of the Chvez regime. The film received rave reviews and was presented as a chronicle of the triumph of democracy and social justice over the selfish interests of a privileged minority desperate to use all means at their disposal to regain power.20 For audiences abroad, this message was utterly compelling and convincing. Yet many in Venezuela dismissed the film as a falsification of what actually took place, arguing that it omitted crucial facts and that the editing process distorted the actual sequence of events. This debate has been documented elsewhere, but it is important to point out here how ideological biases are at work in the film and confer its strong appeal.21

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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised is an excellent example of a naive Rousseauism often found in the European Left. Its representation of Chvez supportersdancing to the rhythm of tambores and crying for the return of their presidentcontrasts sharply with its depiction of Pedro Carmona (the business leader and self-proclaimed president for 30 hours), TV hosts of private stations, and other members of the middle class. For the Eurocentric, ethnographic gaze behind the camera, the Venezuelan people are the noble savages living under the oppression of a white-skinned minority that controls the media and selfishly enjoys its privileges without ever thinking about the common good. In the film, Chvez is the messianic ruler who arrived to restore justice, but is violently removed from office by the still-powerful minority about to lose its privileges. This outlook on the crisis exerts a powerful attraction as it mobilizes deeply ingrained myths about the causes of poverty and the evils associated with it. However, the films depiction reveals its shortcomings when confronted with a more balanced view that addresses the peculiarities of contemporary Venezuelan society and history, as well as many of the strange and still-unexplained events of the coup. One of the arguments made in The Revolution Will Not Be Televised namely, that private media produces perverse effectsis ironically applicable in a way unintended by its creators. The coverage and analysis of the Venezuelan crisis by Le Monde Diplomatique (LMD) has been the object of a heated controversy. Since Chvez came to power, LMD has made a series of investigative reports on the situation in Venezuela. Oddly, the perspective of this influential French journal has become a tracing of the official discourse, especially its sectarianism. LMDs vindication of the accomplishments of Chvezs regime is often a reproductionsometimes word for wordof official discourse;22 similarly, the opposition is the object of the very same slurs in LMD employed by Chvez and senior government officials.23 In this sense, the reports and analyses contained in LMD are less the outcome of a thorough journalistic investigation than the uncritical espousing of beliefs assumed beforehand. Thus, LMD has become a powerful propaganda vehicle for spreading the virtues of the Bolivarian revolution among the European public. The common denominator among these three outlooks on the Venezuelan situation is the existence of what is characterized as a binary opposition between a white, rich, and selfish minority on the one hand and the non-white, poor majority on the other. These two poles are in conflict, and their interests are mutually exclusive. Any Chvez policy destined to help the impoverished majority will be against the privileges of the rich minority. Conversely, it follows from the assumptions of these views that all governments before Chvez served only the interests of the minority. These analyses are rooted in long-standing myths about poverty, its causes, and its solutions. Myth also explains the successful spread of such analyses. Their proliferation is the result of a relative lack of knowledge about Venezuelabut

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for its oil and beauty queensamong observers abroad. Any analysis aspiring to depart from the conventional wisdom must necessarily address the historic, economic, and political peculiarities of the country, as well as the power of political myths.
A SCENT OF SULTANISM, MILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION

Chavismo is a hybrid regime with a variety of components playing on different wavelengths, sometimes even contradicting one another. Contrary to the claims of structural transformation underlying most classic revolutions, the Chvez regime has not been shaped by a definite ideology. Consequently, the ensuing political system lacked a blueprint for broad social change and became instead a system constantly in the making, depending to a great extent on the personal vagaries of its leader and an ad hoc mix of policies too often associated with past failures. Over time, the overwhelming domination of a solitary leader fashioned some of the regimes most distinctive features: an extreme presidential regime tainted by what political science literature calls sultanism; a new role for the military in the operation of the political system; and the revolutionary pretensions of the new political forces in power. The Rise of Sultanism The new regime failed to curb the presidential excesses of prior regimes. Rather, the contrary was the case.24 Scarcely a year after his election, Chvez in effect controlled a Constituent Assembly that operated as a quasi-exclusive source of originative power.25 The strengthening of the executive under the 1999 Constitution served to increase Chvezs power by promoting total disruption of the powers of all other branches. Very soon thereafter, the regime crossed the line of presidential excesses into what many perceived as uncharted territory. This new territory, however, is not totally unknown. Over time Chvezs rule has increasingly resembled a variety of regimes grouped under the category known as sultanism. This notion refers to a type of authoritarian regime that emerged in the early- to mid-twentieth century that is characterized by a concentration of power in the rulers hands, a marked personal role in most public decision making, a political system built more on loyalty to the ruler than on an identifiable ideology, a highly polarized political arena that blocks most institutional solutions to a presidential crisis, and an increase in corruption.26 The somewhat authoritarian consolidation of executive power seen under Chavismo took place within the cosmetic framework of a legally constitutional

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regime,27 leading to Venezuelas inclusion in a recent study on semi-authoritarianism by Marina Ottaway.28 Her interpretation of semi-authoritarian regimes after the end of the Cold War fits closely with Chavismo, especially regarding limitations on the transfer of power. Under Chavismo, as under other semi-authoritarian regimes, Venezuela has held elections and allowed political forces to operate with a degree of freedom. Yet, at the same time, it has also created mechanisms that all but guarantee that the Chavista candidates win elections. These mechanisms gave rise to numerous fraud allegations in the aftermath of the August 2004 referendum. The 1999 Bolivarian Constitution, far from solving the institutional shortcomings of prior regimes, aggravated them. Tailored to grant Chvez a long mandate, the constitution created a model of power and decision making based on the concentration of power to a degree rarely seen in previous democratic Venezuelan governments. The sultanesque regime is also characterized by mechanisms that engender loyalty to the ruler, including widespread corruption, increased cronyism, and pork-barrel politics to keep a direct link with voters.29 The use of public funds for the direct support of Chvez followers has become second nature to the regime, through rampant proselytism.30 In December 2000, the regime began creating a vast network of grassroots organizationsor so-called participatory mechanismspromoted from the top down with direct state funding, no financial supervision or accountability, and direct coordination by Chvez or a close follower. When the democratic populations growing discontent with Chvezs omnipotent leadership began to show its muscle, the scene was set for an extremely complex presidential crisis, typical of most experiences of sultanism.31 Not even the institutional procedure of the recall referendum included in the new constitution has removed pressure from the system. The divisiveness within society has not diminished; the governments internal legitimacy remained in question for weeks after the August 2004 recall vote. The Rise of Militarism The Chvez regime is not, strictly speaking, a military regime where the rules of the game are designed and established directly by the armed forces. However, beginning in 2000, the presence of high-ranking officers in the most important governmental posts has been overwhelming-key ministries, state enterprises like the state oil company Petrleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), or state government. Their role has also been fundamental in programs like Plan Bolvar 2000, designed as a social and infrastructure emergency program with nationwide coverage. While the regime counts on the support of an alliance of parties

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on the political front and on cells of activists on the social front, the nucleus of power remains with a selected group of former coupsters now linked through informal mechanisms to the hierarchy of the armed forces. The attempted coup of April 2002 reinforced this trend.32 Revolutionary Fervor Along with the sultanistic trends and the importance of the military as an open political force, revolutionary passion is the third component of Chavismo, serving as both a design and final justification. Given the administrations scant accomplishments after more than five years in power, perhaps Chvezs multicolored revolutionary discourse has made the difference in granting him relatively stable popular support, coming to his aid in moments of political confrontation. Chvezs rhetoric articulates several themes and sources of inspiration and virtually encourages battleground exercises in social confrontation animated by the military spirit as a final reserve of the nation. The same was present in the likes of Perns regime in Argentina or the Peruvian military revolution of the late 1960s. Additionally, Chavismo includes new forms of radical democracy in the participatory and protagonist[ic] version of democracy established in its 1999 Bolivarian Constitution.33 Many among Chvezs supporters are so convinced they are unleashing a revolutionary process that, in the absence of any strategy or international countervailing power to capitalist rule (like that of socialism during the twentieth century), they appeal to mere appearances to advance their revolution. These include garments of a reform-like populist rhetoric or measures with huge electoral appeal like throwing money on the streets. But the clearestand most dangerousmethod of revolutionary confrontation is the denial of the adversary, whose opposition to the regime is considered to be illegitimate and thus makes him an enemy to be eliminated. The Chvez government has become so adamantly opposed to any opposition or criticism from political parties, civil society, or international observers that, following the script of revolution, it promotes deeper and deeper confrontation. This circumstance eventually led Chvezs opponents to engineer his ouster from power as the only political solution to a stalemate. The Foes of Chavismo I: Is There An Oligarchy In Venezuela? Chvez and his supporters, both in Venezuela and abroad, describe the situation in Venezuela prior to the leaders coming to power along these lines: a small and corrupt elite had squandered the countrys wealth while enriching itself, thus condemning the majority of the Venezuelan people to poverty and

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social exclusion. Such discourse has surfed very effectively the waves of the wealthy Venezuela myth depicted by Moiss Nam. Chvezs mission was thus to eradicate the old system responsible for such perversions and redistribute wealth among the poor. A preliminary observation necessary for understanding the situation is that although the elitesleaders of traditional parties, businessmen, the private media, union leaders, employees of PDVSA, intellectuals, and the middle and upper classesare nowadays perceived as an homogeneous block joining forces against Chvez, historically they have behaved differently, especially in the years prior to and after Chvezs accession to power. Although a thorough analysis of the relationships between the state, mainstream political parties, and business leaders during the prior Punto Fijo regime is outside the scope of this paper,34 even a superficial examination of the role played by the state during the last thirty years casts the blame of greedy elites for the ills of Venezuela in a different light. Put simply, in Venezuela, there is no oligarchy but the state itself. As political analyst Carlos Blanco affirms, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 was in practice a statization: the state became the sole owner of the industry and the direct beneficiary of all oil earnings.35 This gigantic and centralized petro-state was to administer and distribute the wealth it derived from oil. To be sure, oil wealth was the engine behind the extraordinary economic performance experienced by Venezuela from the mid-1940s until 1980 and the concomitant improvement in all Venezuelans quality of life; but the system eventually proved unsustainable. The reason has been mentioned: oil economies that base their development exclusively on oil wealth eventually come to a blind alley. The high productivity stemming from a sector with huge profits affects the competitiveness of the remaining sectors through a structurally overvalued exchange rate. At the same time, windfall revenues create an incentive to expand the public sector to gigantic proportions, especially regarding employment. When the proportion of additional income per capita stagnates, this affects the economic cycle, producing high upward boosts and steep declines depending on the level of world oil prices.36 Consequently, there is no longer a stable environment to propel private investment on a large scale; hence, the state can be immensely rich while the country itself is poor. In sum, subject to the influence of an overwhelming state, the private sector in Venezuelafar from constituting an autonomous or powerful elitehas always been relatively weak.37 Private companiesbig and smallare at the mercy of the states reaction to the ups and downs of oil prices: devaluation, currency controls, inconsistent economic policies, and a huge bureaucracy. According to this argument, savage capitalism or globalization bear very little or no responsibil-

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ity for the tribulations of Venezuelas economy or those of the poor. Although formally a market economy, Venezuela is still far from being a full-fledged capitalist economy, much less one integrated with the global economy.38 Under the Chvez administration, the private sectors subjection to the state has acquired a more perverse twist. One of the features of the Chavista strain of populism is a language that criminalizes wealth, especially when it is held or produced by private hands.39 More recently, the government has attempted to reach out to the private sector by offering attractive loans, contracts, and safety from fiscal retaliation in exchange for political allegiance. This stance implicitly establishes the state as the sole legitimate and just purveyor of wealth, hence reinforcing its power: the states role is to redistribute the wealth that belongs to everyone, but had previously been appropriated by a small minority. More dangerously, the state can also take on the role of peoples avenger. Although it is an exaggeration to claim the Chvez administration has purposefully sought to destroy the private sector, its policiesor lack thereofhave done substantial damage. However, much of the blame for the damage inflicted on the private sector since 2002 lies with the business elite itself. The mobilization behind the failed coup of April 2002 and the failed two-month general strike in December 2002 had its strongest leadership in the trade unions and business associations. Why did so many people in Venezuela suddenly entrust people with no political experience whatsoever with a task requiring sophisticated political skills? This brings us to another important and idiosyncratic cause behind Chvezs coming to poweranti-politics and its popularity among the elites. The Foes of Chavismo II: The Media and the Middle Class It is incorrect to say that Chvez has exclusive copyright over the demonization of the elite. The perception of traditional political parties and their leaders as emblems of corruption directly responsible for the sustained decline in Venezuelans quality of life has pervaded public opinion since the mid-1980s and intensified throughout the 1990s. Those responsible for spreading this view across all sectors of the population were not the leaders of radical left-wing parties, but rather part of the very elite against whom Chvez today directs his assaultsthe private media. The syllogism of the most radical breed of Chavismoif you are rich, then you are an oligarch and stand against the interests of the peopleis closely related to another syllogism held throughout the 1990s by Venezuelans from all social classes: if you are a politician, then you are corrupt. Although Chavismo fashions itself as rooted in the discontent of the poor with the rich and powerful elite, the truth is that throughout the 1990s discontent was widespread across the whole

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social spectrum. The condemnation of the military uprisings in 1992 was ambiguous,40 and triggered a powerful media campaign against the political establishment, resulting in the impeachment of former President Carlos Andrs Prez in 1993.41 What was the ideological context of this situation? During that period, the majority of Venezuelans found little in common between the coup attempts and the radical left-wing politics commonly associated today with Chavismo. Rather, a more immediate referent for a military uprising against the increasingly unpopular social democratic Accin Democrtica (AD) president was the dictatorship of Marcos Prez Jimnez (1952-1958). The anti-politics frenzy among members of the middle and working classes, as well as among some anti-establishment business leaders, politicians, and intellectuals was not hostile to the specter of authoritarianism. Many among these elites sympathetically viewed both the 1992 military uprisings and the presidential candidacy of ex-coupster Chvez six years later. Chvez and his fellow soldiers were seen in a perezjimenista light, believing that the remedy for the decadent two-party system was a strong hand that would reinstate the rule of law and economic prosperity.42 In addition to backing from the lower classes, Chvezs 1998 electoral victory was made possible by two factors: the explicit or tacit support of many among those groups that eventually became his most bitter adversariesthe middle class, business leaders, anti-establishment politicians, and intellectualsand the anti-establishment rhetoric of the private media. The animosity toward the old two-party system then was not exclusively a popular affair, but was also shared by the elite itself. Chavez eventually lost much of this support, however, due to the significant gap between his own anti-establishment leanings and those of the majority of Venezuelans who initially sympathized with him. The Subversive Roots of Chavismo When the Prez Jimnez dictatorship fell and Venezuelan democracy was born, the signatories of the Pacto de Punto Fijo deliberately excluded a key political actor in the fight against the Prez Jimnez dictatorshipthe Communist Party. This hindered the participation of the Left in Venezuelas nascent democracy and triggered an armed insurgency that lasted throughout the 1960s. By 1968, the guerrilla fighters had accepted their military defeat, and most of their leaders agreed to form political parties and join the puntofijista democracy. However, one small sector of the radical Left still hoped to seize power by force and took refuge within its own historical enemythe Venezuelan armed forces.43 Chvez and the other members of the failed uprising in 1992 belonged to one of these clandestine cells within the armed forces. In 1982, when the p u n t o f ijista system still enjoyed popular support and the prosperity of the oil-boom craze had not yet begun to fade, Chvez and other army officers founded the

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Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario200 (MBR-200). The ideological basis of the movement was an idiosyncratic mix of nationalism, a leftist refashioning of revolutionary figure Simn Bolvar, and a celebratory reinterpretation of the wars that decimated Venezuela during the nineteenth century. But more importantly, the movement aspired to become a narrative of national re-foundation.44 In this sense, Chvez is not a reformist but a revolutionary.45 Unlike the vast majority of Venezuelans, Chvezs concern was not the decadence of the system but the system itself. This gap between reform and revolution is fundamentally important in explaining both the passionate rejection of, and devotion to, his project.
THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT DELIVER

Venezuelas recent economic and social evolution seems to support the view that the Chvez revolution has not produced a dramatic change in the living conditions of the people for whom it was intended in the first place. The regime may have intended to control all sources of political power under its grip, but there has been no comparable quest to boost production. Neither has there been in the Chavista revolution a systematic plan to address povertya pervasive Venezuelan disease after the mid-1980s.46 During the first three years of its administration, the Chvez government followed prudent economic management and made important gains, especially in controlling inflation. However, by the end of 2001, under pressure from a growing portion of the country that rejected many of his policies, Chvez accelerated many so-called revolutionary reforms that would weaken the private sector. This led to political turmoil and disparate currency policies (such as devaluation and a fixed exchange rate, followed by another devaluation and tight foreign exchange controls) that produced an abrupt downturn of the economy with a great negative impact on the living conditions of most Venezuelans. Besides very passive macroeconomic policies, the management of specific issues, such as education and healthcare, has also been disappointing. The result has been an acute worsening of social conditions.47 Unemployment has soared, devastating most modern regions. Poverty has struck, principally in the big cities, where abandoned children and an army of beggars are part of the daily landscape, and where the lack of security has become one of the main concerns not only of the middle class, but of the poor, who resent it the most. The three national strikes during those years have had a powerful impact on economic performanceespecially the last strike between November 2002 and January 2003 involving the oil industry. Ironically, this somber picture has emerged during times of very high oil prices.48 Overall, however, the inflow of oil wealth to the states coffers has been grossly diminished, causing a decrease in living conditions and forcing growing numbers of Venezuelans to emigrate.

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Herein lies the major paradox of the Chavista rule: despite its revolutionary doctrine espousing a redistribution of wealth and improved living conditions for the impoverished majority, it has produced no major transformations to counter poverty or to expand the countrys wealth. And yet it remains highly popular. Myths and Narratives of National Foundation Part of the historical and cultural significance of Chavismo comes from its appropriation of the figure of Simn Bolvar. To understand it, one must examine the context in which Bolvar functions as a founding myth of the Venezuelan nation-state. The creation of Venezuela as an independent nation-state was not, strictly speaking, the direct result of the independence war led by Bolvar. Rather, Bolvars project was pan-American, and the immediate consequence of the victorious emancipation movement was the creation of the short-lived confederation of nascent republics called Gran Colombia, presided over by Bolvar himself.49 However, Bolvars dream of a united confederation proved to be politically unsustainable, and the first republic to secede and reject Bolvars mandate was none other than Venezuela.50 In this sense, and contrary to conventional wisdom, Venezuela as an independent nation-state is anti-Bolivarian by birth. This break with Gran Colombia was traumatic in many ways. Venezuela was in ruins after years of war. Conflicts among diverse groupsthe old upper classes, a still precarious bourgeoisie, the military, the pardos, and the slaves threatened the viability of the nation. In the forefront of this chaos stood the specter of the liberator Simn Bolvar: killing the father-dictator who had brought independence from foreign rule did not lead to peace or stability but seemed to deepen the dangers threatening the new Venzuelan state. The reaction to this Oedipal crisis was to construct a foundational narrative for the republic by symbolically resurrecting the father figure. In 1842, then-President Jos Antonio Pez ordered the repatriation of Bolvars remains, and Bolvars quasi-divine status as hero, liberator, and political leader of Venezuela was restored after a decade of ostracism. As historian Germn Carrera Damas notes, this served as a powerful political and ideological discourse aimed at unifying the country: Bolvar had already traced all the political aspirations of the Venezuelan people, and the republic and its people were to carry out that program. Since then, the cult of Bolvar has been at the very core of Venezuelas identity as a nation-state.51 He has been successively invoked and appropriated as a founding figure across different eras of Venezuelas republican life. What is his relevance to the decadence of Venezuelan democracy in the 1980s? The end of the oil boom signaled the need for a groundbreaking transformation in the structure and administration of the state. The answer was the creation in 1984 of the

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Comisin Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (COPRE, or the Presidential Commission for State Reform). The COPRE was an ambitious and long-term project that sought to rethink the whole functioning and administration of the state and its institutions, the role of society, and the relationship between the state and its constituents. Its bottom line was simple: the keys to reform were decentralization and the opening of political space for more active citizen participation. Following a cold response from the Lusinchi administration (1984-1989), one of the main COPRE proposals was put into effect in 1989 under the second Prez administration: the creation of the figure of alcaldes (city mayors) and the popular election of local and regional authorities (governors). But despite its sound conceptual basis and accomplishments, the COPRE had a major weaknessit was a technocratic project conceived and promoted from above.52 During the 1990s, in sharp contrast with COPREs technocratic discourse, people saw in the fiery discourse of Chavismo an alternative proposal of groundbreaking reformwhich eventually fashioned itself as a revolution. The COPRE reforms and Chavismo have nothing in common except that both were contemporary proposals for national transformation. Politically, C h a v i s m o proved to have a far stronger popular appeal. It continued the long tradition of appropriating Bolvar to configure a discourse of national re-foundation, but here the appropriation is hyperbolic: it claims to be truer and more authentic than any other; the revolution is Bolivarian and the very name of the republic became, under the 1999 constitution, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The revolution places its leader, Chvez, as the true heir of the symbolic Father of the Nation, and the people who follow him are both beneficiaries and protagonists of the continuation and eventual accomplishment of Bolvars incomplete project.53 It is possible to dismiss Chvezs Bolivarianism as a perverse or fraudulent version of Bolvars thought, or to say that re-founding the state based on fidelity to a nineteenth-century independence hero is an anachronism or plain nonsense. Such criticisms, however, have little relevance when one tries to assess the popular appeal of Chavismo as an instance of Bolivarianism. As Manuel Garca Pelayo argues, the political myth provides a general meaning to complex social situations.54 It imagines and experiences things dramatically, perceiving socio-historical reality as resulting from the muscle and struggles of conflicting powers. Moreover, when political confrontation achieves extreme intensity, it paves the way for substitution of the mythical perspective for the rational, turning the opponent into a compendium of the worst qualities. Populism Redux: Este gobierno es una mierda, pero es mo Identification with Chvez also has more direct and pragmatic sources of allegiancenamely, the policies implemented by the government. After his first

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electoral victory, Chvez created the controversial Plan Bolvar 2000, conceived as an intensive effort carried out directly by the army to look after impending social needs. But like many of the governments initiatives, after 2001 such efforts faded away. From 2002 to 2003, Chvezs popularity plummeted. The government successfully took advantage of the acute political conflict leading up to the recall referendum to reestablish its links with the population. After failing to deliver to those in need by mid-2003, Chvez recreated the strategy under the program Proyecto Bolvar 2000. Once again, the key element was direct delivery of services, but instead of being carried out by the military, it was implemented by civiliansthough fashioned as a military campaign. Special groups took the programs into their own hands, intentionally eliminating ministerial bureaucratic entanglements. In his flamboyant and symbolic language, President Chvez called the programs misiones, alluding to the missionary role of the state under his mandate. These misiones addressed a number of targeted objectives: the illiterate (Misin Robinson) ,55 health care in the shantytowns (Misin Barrio Adentro), and fast track access to a high school degree (Misin Ribas). The misiones enjoyed a special authority status with no accountability to current public auditing mechanisms. Not even the National Assembly has been able to identify the amount or means of resources used. No matter how little public scrutiny the misiones may have undergone or the extent to which they fit into a social policy characterized by ideological concerns rather than by social efficacy, their political effectiveness cannot be doubted. They allowed a weakened government to recover its links with a social base it had recently alienated. The misiones recaptured a key idea behind the governments strategy by saying to the poor: this is your government; we will not let you down; we will not follow bureaucratic procedures, nor will we fail you. The misionesjust like the Plan Bolivar 2000have been imaginative short-term responses, but they have occurred in a vacuum. This can be demonstrated by two related events. The first reflects the philosophy of the government regarding social policy. When Chvez came to office, the previous administration had produced a total overhaul of the social security network after extensive negotiations with the trade unions and business organizations. It provided a mixed mechanism to handle workers contributions to social security, while eliminating the collapsed traditional social security organization. Chvez decided to eliminate the new mechanism, arguing that it was yet another example of neoliberal practices. The Social Security Institute was thus reinstated. An independent assessment of this process has shown the fatal consequences of this setback for Venezuelas public finances and for the users of the system.56 The second example, although not directly linked to social policy, illustrates the foreseeable trend of government policies. Only weeks after the recall referendum, the government, counting on a high price of oil, created two major public venturesa telecom corporation and an airline carrier. Venezuela, like many other

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developing countries, created companies in those sectors during the second half of the twentieth century. They were poorly managed, provided dreadful service, and ended up closing to bankruptcy. They were thus privatized, with different results.57
CONCLUSIONS

Contemporary Venezuela is a paradox58 that allows Venezuelan politics to defy simple explanations. Current analyses of Chavismo are surrounded by a sense of misunderstanding, as they rely on only two antagonistic frames of mind either for or against itboth of which have similar shortcomings. A deeper analysis of Venezuelan history and society leads to very different conclusions about the nature and future of Chavismo. First, the regimes ideologues and international supporters understand Chavismo as an emerging popular movement identified with Venezuelas wretched of the earth, asserting that the regime has been forced into a titanic battle against a local oligarchy and the imperial hand of the United States. Instead, one could argue that although Chavismo has important roots in the resentment of the poor, it emerged out of a broader dissatisfaction with the decaying two-party democracy, especially among those in the middle class who longed for the return of a strongman who could bring back order and prosperity. The private mediacurrently one of the most antagonistic actors confronting Chavismowas also fundamental in generating widespread contempt toward the political trade in general, indirectly benefiting Chvezs bid for power. Furthermore, Chvez himself did not originate as a leader due to popular support or open democratic battles, but from a cell of military conspirators created before the democratic regime began to show its shortcomings. Second, Chavismo is neither the result of a confrontation against a local oligarchy nor a reaction against globalization. The only oligarchy in Venezuela is the statethe sole owner of the oil wealth that has determined the course of the economy for close to a century. In contrast, the private sector is relatively weak. Venezuelas economy is rather closed and not greatly influenced by international factors affecting other emerging countries, such as financial crises. The plummeting of per capita income and the acute concentration of wealth are not a direct consequence of exposure to the global economy, but rather the opposite. Third, a number of opponents to Chavismo have argued that it is turning increasingly authoritarian. They point to the executives control of most sources of power, its arbitrary disbanding of the opposition, and the overarching presence of the military. However, while it is true that the opposition has been systematically harassed, the regime also allows relatively wide-reaching public liberties like free operation of political parties and a vociferous media. The regime is neither truly democratic nor openly authoritarian. Chavismo is thus a hybrid regime that

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fits in the semi-authoritarian category, as it has a democratic constitution and processes but creates mechanisms that prevent the transfer of power. Chvez has scored five victories out of six nationwide electoral events taking place since the 1998 elections.59 However, many Venezuelans remain skeptical about the fairness and transparency of one of the most important of these eventsthe recall referendum. The government sabotaged the appointment of a neutral electoral council until it obtained a sympathetic majority. Then the electoral council delayed the referendum for a year through protracted rules, including the dismissal of more than one million signatures. After the referendum took place and the government claimed victory, a majority of Venezuelans becameand still areuncertain as to what really happened. Although international observers from the Carter Center and the Organization of American States recognized the official results, there have been substantial allegations of fraud occurring either before or during the electoral process.60 Whether the government scored a clean victory or it committed fraud to alter the results, only a small circle has proper knowledge of the results. Given that the elections were fully automated, and only those individuals in the electoral council responding to the government had access to the software and digital handling of the data, it is highly unlikely that the real outcome of the election will ever be known. Fourth, the policies of Chavismo are paradoxical. Defenders claim that the regime is advancing progressive policies in favor of the poor. But government policies have in fact worsened social conditions, especially by increasing poverty and unemployment. Though declining social indicators can be partially attributed to three national strikes, they do not explain the recessive trends in the economy. Not only has there not been a turnaround in social policies to eliminate poverty, but, more often than not, the government has turned to the worst policies of the ancien rgime that long ago proved ineffective when the oil decline began. Fifth, the government has remained considerably popular. Herein lies the major inconsistency in the arguments of the regimes critics. They seem to believe that the combination of bad governance and authoritarian bent suffice to convince the public that the direction the regime is taking is a bad one. They do not seem to grasp the multiple ways Chvez has sought and won the identification of the public with his regime: the current application of the Bolivarian call, from Venezuelas myth of national foundation; the perception of Chvez as a missionary coming to reverse the curse of a rich country plundered by an economic and political elite; and the strong appeal of direct social programs. Paradoxically, Chavismos claim to be in the shadow of the Liberator has proven to be no more than an overstatement: Venezuelas role was more of an accident in the Bolivarian pan-American view of the world than a quest to make true his enlightened utopia in Venezuela.61

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Perhaps the most important lesson these conclusions reveal is that Chavismo has transformed shortcomings into advantages, creating a sophisticated political and ideological machine nurtured by windfall oil revenues. Chavismos arguments have been channeled into a powerful political myth about revolution, thus filling the post-Cold War ideological void seen in the Latin American Left in an important fashion. It is this ideological role that explains both the emergence and staying power of a movement that has thus far defied conventional explanation. !
NOTES
1 For a decade, the standard framework to analyze global democratization has been Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 2 United Nations, La Democracia en Amrica Latina (New York: UNDP, 2004). 3 Ibid., 50. 4 The question of the legitimacy of the recall referendum results has stirred a bitter controversy. We shall not enter into this polemic here. Suffice it to say that, while the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Center backed the results, the opposition coalition and Smate-an electoral watchdog group-have produced a number of reports showing evidence of electoral fraud. Prior to the day this paper was submitted, the government, the electoral authority and the Carter Center had failed to produce a satisfactory answer to the fraud claims. The two most important reports are: Tulio Alvarez, Freddy Malpica, and Jos D. Mujica, Fraude a la democracia, Caso Venezuela (Caracas: Presented to the Secretary General of the OAS, 2004) < http://www.el-universal.com/2004/09/10/pol_esp_10A491791.shtml > (accessed October 4, 2004); and Ricardo Haussman and Roberto Rigobn, En busca del cisne negro: Anlisis de la evidencia estadstica sobre fraude electoral en Venezuela (Caracas: Sumate, 2004). 5 For an exposition of this view, see Guillermo ODonnell and Phillipe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 6 Under the 1961 Constitution, the active military could not vote and had to be politically neutral. 7 The most recent characterization of this process was provided by then-Secretary General of the OAS Csar Gaviria in his report regarding the August 15, 2004 recall referendum in Venezuela. Human Rights Watch has also claimed that the recent enlargement of the Supreme Justice Tribunal in Venezuela amounts to a takeover by the executive. See Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2004). 8 Take, for example, the reelection of the incumbent. This major institutional shift cannot be taken per se as a tool for authoritarian domination. In fact, with the exception of Colombia and Bolivia, reelection is a prominent feature in most newly drafted constitutions in South America; but in Venezuela and Per this change certainly matched the authoritarian bent of both Fujimori and Chvez. 9 See Moiss Nam, The Real Story Behind Venezuelas Woes, Journal of Democracy 12 (2) (2001): 17-31. 10 Ibid., 20. Nam points out that the contribution of oil to the government in 1974 was $1,540 per person (representing more than 80 percent of total fiscal revenues) and plummeted to $200 per person in 1994 (accounting for less that 40 percent of total fiscal revenues). 11 See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 12 The Left is an admittedly vague term that includes actors as diverse as some members of the U.S. Democratic Party to Maoist activists in Paris. To be sure, it is incorrect to say that Chvez enjoys unanimous support from the Left. In Venezuela for example, extreme (Bandera Roja or Causa R) and moderate (Movimiento al Socialismo) leftist parties, as well as some left-wing intellectuals, have expressed their distaste for Chvez. However, it is also true that most of the support Chvez has enjoyed from abroad has come from groups and individuals-both moderate and radical-who identify themselves as sympathizers of leftwing politics; it is this group to which this section refers.

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13 The following provides one example among many: A few days before the recall referendum, a number of well-known intellectuals and artists signed a statement entitled If I were Venezuelan, I would vote for Chvez, declaring their support for the profound transformations in the political, economic, and social system of a country dominated for centuries by the oligarchy and hoping that the Venezuelan people would build the country envisaged by Simn Bolvar. Besides Noam Chomsky and Eduardo Galeano, other signatories included dramatist Harold Pinter, filmmaker Ken Loach, and Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm. 14 Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Doubleday: 2003). 15 Amy Chua, Power to the Privileged, The New York Times, January 7, 2003, A4. 16 The mantuanos were family members of Spanish descent living in Caracas at the time of colonial rule. Only women from this class were allowed to wear a manto (mantle) in the church-hence the name mantuano. Simn Bolvar, the leader of the independence wars in South America was a mantuano himself. Similarly, pardo is a category used in colonial times to designate those who were the offspring of a white person and an African slave. The independence wars impoverished the mantuano class, and the subsequent civil wars that decimated the country throughout the nineteenth century practically erased the system of class and ethnic divisions inherited from the Spanish colony. By the mid-nineteenth century, categories like mantuanos and pardos were no longer used or applicable. Professor Chuas misrepresentation of Venezuelas crisis goes beyond mere anachronism. She claims that Chvez is the countrys first pardo president and that before him all of Venezuelas presidents, not to mention legislators and Supreme Court Justices, were members of the countrys roughly 20 percent mantuanos (Chua, World on Fire, 142). In reality, beginning with Jos Antonio Pez (1790-1873), the first president of Venezuela, and continuing through to Hugo Chvez, the majority of the presidents-dictators, caudillos, and democratically elected leaders-have been racially mixed, just like most Venezuelans. 17 In Venezuela indigenous peoples account for less than two percent of the total population, and the extraordinary degree of mestizaje (mixed ethnicity) among all strata of Venezuelan society makes it notoriously difficult to speak properly about the existence of different ethnic groups. Although a thorough study about race relationships in contemporary Venezuela is yet to be written, a helpful account of the issue in the context of Chavismo is Patricia Mrquez, Vacas flacas y odios gordos: la polarizacin en Venezuela, in Patricia Mrquez and Ramn Piango, eds., En esta Venezuela (Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 2003), 29-46. 18 As part of his effective public relations campaign, Chvez has invited personalities like actor Danny Glover and sports promoter Don King to Venezuela as an expression of solidarity with the African-American community. Rev. Jesse Jackson, Jr. has also publicly expressed his support for President Chvez. 19 This film was directed and produced by Kim Bartley and Donnacha OBrian, 2003. 20 See <www.chavezthefilm.com> (accessed October 4, 2004). 21 See < http://www.11abril.com/index/especiales/chavezthefilm.asp > (accessed October 4, 2004). 22 See, for example, Maurice Lemoine, Avances bolivariennes, Le Monde Diplomatique (LMD), May 2002, 20. For Ignacio Ramonet, director of LMD, Chvezs regime is a government conducting, with the greatest respect for liberties, a moderate program of social transformations and incarnates the only experience of democratic socialism in Latin America. See Ignacio Ramonet, Un crime parfait, Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2002, 1. 23 Maurice Lemoine, for example, qualifies the opposition as a caste constituted by the oligarchy, financiers and the middle classes. See Maurice Lemoine, Coup dtat au Vnezula, Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2002. 24 See Carlos Blanco, Revolucin y desilusin: La Venezuela de Hugo Chvez (Madrid: Catarata, 2002), 251-2, 351-362. 25 See Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 26 See H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, A Theory of Sultanism 1: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule, in H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 27 Chehabi and Linz, 25. 28 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 29 In March 2004, at the regular meeting of the OAS to discuss corruption, Venezuela was the only country that did not allow representatives of civil society to present their allegations directly in the meeting. Transparencia Venezuela, the local chapter of the anti-corruption watchdog group Transparency International, presented the parallel report Comentarios sobre el informe presentado por Venezuela a la Convencin Interamericana contra la Corrupcin (Caracas: Transparencia Venezuela, 2004).

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30 Just to give an example, in the recent recall referendum, all government institutions-including the equivalent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-participated directly in either providing funds for the campaign or paying for political ads. 31 See Chehabi and Linz for a host of examples, particularly in Latin America. 32 The revolutionary rhetoric and the politicization of the armed forces have boomeranged several times, pushing a number of opponents in the high and medium ranks to openly criticize the regime and, in April 2002, to participate in an attempted coup. 33 See Negri. 34 The Punto Fijo regime evokes the long-standing coalition rule established in Venezuela beginning in 1958, which included the main political parties (excluding the communists) that helped to oust the last dictator Marcos Prez Jimnez. As analysts like Coppedge and others have suggested, while contributing to long-term stability, it helped to establish a regime that was strongly dominated by political parties. It has been referred to both in Venezuela and elsewhere as a partyarchy. See Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). The name Punto Fijo (literally fixed point) is incidental-it refers to the name of the residency of former President Rafael Caldera, in which the leaders of political parties Accin Democrtica (AD), Coordinamento dei Professionisti e Imprenditori Peruviani (COPEI), and Unin Republicana Democrtica (URD) convened the pact. 35 Blanco, 116. 36 Asdrbal Baptista has studied this phenomenon for many years. For a summarial argument see Asdrbal Baptista, Venezuela y su petrleo, in Patricia Mrquez and Ramn Piango, eds., En esta Venezuela (Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 2003); see also Tery Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (California: University of California Press: 1997) for the political economy impacts of this model. 37 The private media, however, can be an exception. 38 Venezuela ranked 147 and scored 4.18 (with one being the most free and five being the most repressed), in the 2004 Index of Economic Freedom prepared by the Washington-based Heritage Foundation. Cuba performed better, with a score of 4.08. See <http://cf.heritage.org/index2004test/country2.cfm?id=Venezuela> (accessed October 4, 2004). 39 See Blanco, 111-134. For example, in a discourse given at the presidential palace on February 4, 2002, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the coup attempt against Carlos Andrs Prez, President Chvez criticized the predating oligarchy as immoral, cynical, and hypocritical (129). 40 See David J. Myers and Robert E. OConnor, Support for Coups in Democratic Political Culture: A Venezuelan Exploration, Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 193-212. The authors analyze a research survey conducted in 1993, in which 46 percent of respondents thought that coups were justified on occasion and 59 percent justified the coup attempt against Prez. Significantly, they point out that lowest class respondents, as occupants of Venezuelas ranchos were underrepresented in the sample and that they confined their analysis to middle and working class respondents. 41 This campaign consisted mainly in the overt politicization of journalism, whereby journalists with political ambitions would use the private media to air accusations of corruption against politicians or members of the government, thus becoming a de facto system of parallel justice. Not surprisingly, two of the most conspicuous representatives of periodismo de denuncia were then close supporters of Chvez: the current VicePresident Jos Vicente Rangel and Alfredo Pea, Secretary of the Presidency during 1999 and then-elected mayor of Caracas, turned Chvez adversary. 42 For evidence supporting this view, see Michael Derham, Undemocratic Democracy: Venezuela and the Distorting of History, Bulletin of Latin American Research 21 (2002): 270-289. For an analysis of the relationship between ideological preferences and attitudes with respect to democracy in Venezuela, see Valia Pereira Almao, Cambio poltico radical y actitud hacia la democracia en Venezuela, in Jos Vicente Carrasquero, Thais Maingon and Friedrich Welsch, eds., Venezuela en transicin: elecciones y democracia 1998-2000 (Caracas: RedPol and CDB Publicaciones, 2001), 52-68. According to data from this 1998 RedPol poll on political attitudes in Venezuela, 54 percent of respondents identified themselves with the Right, 23 percent with the Center, and 23 percent with the Left. A poll on the same subject conducted in 2000 by Consultores21 shows similar results. 43 For an account of the links between the radical Left and the military in Venezuela, see Alberto Garrido, La historia secreta de la revolucin bolivariana (Mrida: Editorial Venezolana, 2000). 44 As Christopher Conway notes: Chavismo is sustained by the conceit that it is desirable and possible to erase a century of liberal constitutionalism and restart history through the recovery of an original Bolivarian ideology. Christopher Conway, The Myth of Bolvar in Latin American Literature (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 152-153.

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45 For a detailed discussion of the revolutionary origins of the regime, see Leonardo Vivas, Chvez: La ltima revolucin del siglo (Caracas: Planeta, 1999). 46 There have been several incidental plans, but none have been the result of sound policies. 47 A profile of Economic Performance
Indicator Foreign Direct Investment (1) $US millions Economic Growth (2) % Annual variation Unemployment (3) % Per annum % of total population below poverty line 1998 0.2 11.0 1999 3,290 -6.1 15.0 2000 4,465 3.2 14.0 2001 3,448 2.7 13 2002 1,389 -9.0 18.0 2003 500 -9.5 23.8 (1st Semester)

Poverty (4)

57.6

60.3

72.0

(1) Gustavo Garcia, UN/ECLA/ Foreign Investment in Latin America, Annual Report 2002 (Caracas: IESA, 2004); (2) Venezuelan National Statistics Institute, Venezuelan Central Bank, Center of Analysis & Documentation of the Venezuelan Workers (CENDA); (3) United Nations Division of Statistics & Economic Projects/ECLA; and (4) Matias Riutort, Poverty 1999-2001 (Caracas: IIES/Universidad Catlica Andrs Bello).

48 Oil prices rose from $10.57 per barrel in 1998 to $11.04 per barrel in 1999, then to $25.9 in 2000 and $25.65 per barrel in 2003, with the benchmark Brent crude oil hitting a record peak of $46.80 per barrel by the end of September 2004. 49 Gran Colombia consisted of todays Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. Per and Bolivia (formerly Alto Per, renamed after Bolvar in 1825) were also under Bolvars rule from 1825 to 1829. 50 In November 1829, a popular assembly in Caracas rejected Bolvars authority and named independence hero Jos Antonio Pez as the first president of Venezuela. The secession became official on December 28, 1829. Bolvar died on his way to exile in the Caribbean coast of Colombia on December 17, 1830. 51 The classic analysis of the Bolivarian cult is Germn Carrera Damas, El culto a Bolvar (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1969). More recent treatments are: Luis Castro Leiva, De la patria boba a la teologa bolivariana, (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1987); and Elas Pino Iturrieta, El divino Bolvar (Madrid: Catarata, 2003), which includes a thorough examination of Chvezs appropriation of Bolvar. 52 Carlos Blanco, former COPRE minister during the second Prez administration (1989-1993), describes this limitation thus: It was a project by the elite with little or no popular participation...the reforming strength of the proposal is prone to weaken and the achievements may become vulnerable since they are not assumed as the citizens collective conquests. Blanco, Revolucin y desilusin: La Venezuela de Hugo Chvez (Madrid: Catarata, 2002), 42-43. 53 This idealization of Chvez followers-conferring upon them a more dignified role in the new era-has been the object of much anthropological examination. See Patricia Mrquez, Vacas flacas y odios gordos: la polarizacin en Venezuela. 54 The mythical attitude, i) resists all analytical attempts, [and] ii) holds like a fortress when facing external critique, not allowing breaches because that who concedes to a partial critique, concedes all. Manuel Garca Pelayo, Los mitos polticos (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981), 18. 55 This particular problem was not too extensive, but nonetheless represents the symbolic malaise of the heritage of the prior regime. By 2002, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the adult literacy rate was 92.9 percent. 56 See Marino J. Gonzlez R., Jess Bianco Sosa, Mara Antonia Moreno, and Ricardo Villasmil Bond, Seguridad Social: aportes para el acuerdo (Caracas: UCAB, 2002). 57 The privatization of CANTV, the telecom company, produced a total reversal in terms of quality of service, long-term investment, and tax contributions, but the airline ended up as a bad bargain. VIASA was sold to Iberia, the Spanish state-owned airline, which had problems of its own. Eventually, VIASA was closed down, and its routes were put on the market for others to use. 58 The first reference about the paradoxical nature of Venezuelas political scene in the Chvez era was made by Heinz Sonntag. See Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, The Venezuelan Paradox (Amherst, MA: Unpublished mimeo, 2003). 59 The only event that the government did not win was the signature drive requesting the recall referendum. However, it took the National Electoral Council an entire year to set the stage for the referendum to take place, under full-blown pressure by the government to prevent it. 60 See Alvarez et al., Fraude a la democracia; and Hausmann and Rigobn, En busca del cisne negro. 61 See Luis Castro Leiva, La Gran Colombia, una ilusin ilustrada (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1981).

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