Dr.

Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University

POLITICAL SCIENCE III FINAL DRAFT Indias Maritime Security

SUBMITTED TO: -

SUBMITTED BY:Aditi Mangal Roll no. 11 IIIrd Semester B.A. LL.B (Hons.)

Ms. Monika Srivastava

Contents
Acknowledgement .....................................................................................................3 Introduction ................................................................................................................4 Traditional Threats .....................................................................................................6 Non-Traditional Maritime Challenges .......................................................................8 Piracy Issues: Current Status and Challenges ..........................................................10 Indias Maritime Power ...........................................................................................12 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................14 Bibliography.............................................................................................................15

Acknowledgement
Firstly, I would like to thank my Political Science Teacher, Dr. Monika Srivastava for having provided me with the inspiration and guidance for this project. Without her help this project wouldnt have been possible. I would also wish to thank our Vice-Chancellor who constantly exhorts us to deliver our best at every level. I would also express my gratitude towards my seniors who were a source of constant support and inspiration. Lastly, yet equally importantly, I am grateful to my family and my friends for supporting me all the way through the making of this project. Last, but not the least, I thank God for his grace and divine blessings.

Introduction
Trade is the life blood of a nation and international trade is carried out predominantly through the mode of shipping. India is an emerging economic superpower much of which is attributable to a spirit of entrepreneurship and a visionary instinct inherent in its people. India enjoys a rich maritime heritage in trade and commerce and its associated law is firmly rooted in historical antiquity. India being a major coastal state has numerous public law interests including exercising sovereignty over its territorial seas and sovereign rights over its ocean resources, their exploration and optimum economic exploitation. As a port state India is obviously interested in asserting its port state jurisdiction under international law and effectuating it through port state control of visiting ships. India is also a flag state and a major trading nation. Therefore, commercial maritime interests of India are equally important.1 India is faced with multiple and complex security and strategic challenges. There is political turmoil and instability in the immediate neighbourhood. Maritime security threats and challenges faced by India are very vast and complex. They span from terrorism and piracy to drug trafficking, gun running, illegal immigration, environmental pollution and movement of contraband. There are many constituents of such growth but two essential ingredients are security of energy and trade. As the economy grows, so will these two, on the contrary, if these are hindered in any way, there will be adverse effects on that growth. Both are almost entirely dependent on our ability to ensure their safe movement at sea. Therefore, as India grows economically, maritime security concerns will become increasingly important. This is quite aside from the preparedness that must be maintained to deter threats at sea from possible nation state adversaries. A clear recognition that sea power is an integral part of the country's national interests is, therefore, imperative. The Indian Ocean represents an increasingly significant avenue for global trade and arena for global security. Rising flows of commerce, investment, and people are linking the Indian Ocean nations to each other and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to the rest of the world, more closely.

Proshonto K. Mukherjee, Enhancement of Maritime Law Education in the Indian Context, NUJS Law Review, Vol.4 (2011).

The Indian Ocean has become a key strategic arena in the 21st century. One reason is the growth of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including energy from the Middle East, to provide for their economic growth. But trade is a twoway street and we have witnessed an increasing flow of Asian labor, capital, and consumer goods, particularly to the rich countries of the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, the end of the Cold War and ongoing crises in Iraq and Afghanistan have diminished the importance of the Atlantic Ocean and boosted the importance of the Indian Ocean as a conduit for Western military supplies. As a result, traditional maritime security concerns have become more important. "Nontraditional" maritime issues in the Indian Ocean region are now on the agenda. Forced migration due to rising sea levels and polluted sea water is a problem that all Asian countries have to take seriously in the years ahead if global warming continues. This is paralleled by growing desertification in East Africa leading to food shortages, which in turn would increase migration, much of it illegal. And fishery depletion in the Indian Ocean due to poor monitoring and overfishing has become a serious matter that the international community must address.

Traditional Threats2
Pakistan and China have been in military conflict with India, the former as many as four times, and are the two countries which could pose a future military threat to India; no others are on the horizon. Even with these two, the probability that any of them may want to go to war is not high; however, it cannot be ruled out. Pakistan might well find a short and sharp conflict advantageous in overall terms as this might serve to unite a country fast fragmenting under sectarian and ethnic pressures complemented by burgeoning fundamental Islamist forces.The fact that war with India may be disastrous for Pakistan might be overlooked by its military leadership just as it did in 1971, losing half of its territory, and, in a different way, in1999. Till such time as the Army remains in control in Pakistan, in particular of India related policy, this possibility must be considered real even though the 'modus operandi' of asymmetric operations launched through non state actors, is seen to be more economical with little risk of retaliation. This notwithstanding, the Pak Army continues to seethe with its defeat in 1971 leading to the division of the country and irrational conduct cannot be ruled out. It is, therefore, essential that India maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and needs to remain so; it must also be able to act in support of the war on land. Indian naval ships can already hit targets quite deep in the hinterland with missiles fired from sea and increasing the range of these weapons will enhance this capability. High states of preparedness to cope with terrorist threats, at and from the sea, are a 'non sequitur'. China falls in a different category. Its reasons for initiating military operations against India, if that happens, will be largely strategic, to teach India a lesson, as it were, and to establish its unchallenged dominance in Asia. It already has possession of that part of India it claims its own in the western and central sectors of the boundary. In the eastern region, it has laid claim to Arunachal Pradesh and this could well be the excuse that might be used to initiate any future military conflict. It has built, and is building road and rail infrastructure right across the border which will facilitate speedy movement of troops and logistics; airfields have also been expanded. Events in Tibet following the demise of Dalai Lama might also create some tension. Nevertheless, in the last decade, relations with China have been the most tranquil ever and not just on the boundary. Bilateral trade between the two countries is crossing $ 60 billion and
2

Prem Vir Das, Maritime Power: Key to Indias Security Interests, Aspen Institute India, 10.

rising- even if skewed to China's advantage-making it India's largest trading partner. While it is necessary, for both sides, particularly China, to rectify the mismatches in this trade, its rapidly continuing growth is a positive in the relationship. The two countries interact at many multilateral forums e.g. BASIC, BRIC, EAS and at Climate Change and WTO negotiations. China has also not made much fuss over tests of our Agni missiles which are clearly not Pakistan related. Meetings between leaders of the two countries have been positive. The two militaries have also exercised together in a small way and there have been exchange of high level visits and by warships to ports. This engagement needs to be enhanced; maritime cooperation is the easiest and least problematic and will contribute in toning down the suspicion and deficit of trust that plagues relations between the two countries. A structured mechanism can be put in place to institutionalize the interface. Both countries have mutual concerns in ensuring the safety of sea lanes in the expanded IO space and can work together towards this objective.

Non-Traditional Maritime Challenges

Non-traditional maritime challenges create political, economic, and humanitarian problems and include a diversity of state and non-state actors. Moreover, whereas the hard security questions of the maritime domain remain a familiar problem set for policymakers, they have a much harder time conceptualizing non-traditional, transnational, and human security issues that do not respect national boundaries and which transcend institutional and policy stovepipes. Climate change is of significant importance for the movement of people, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Environmental problems such as sea level rise, desertification, and the submergence of islands have contributed to the environmentally-driven migration of 50 to 200 million individuals and created a new set of migrants, "environmental refugees." With a rise in environmental refugees, additional problems such as health issues, scarce resource competition, and social and ethnic tensions will surface. This is important when examining the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean. Tensions between India and Bangladesh could increase, and could worsen when Bangladesh faces extreme environmental distress. Dunkerley also cited an earlier argument by Zakheim's that the US is always tempted to focus on the most immediate and obvious of their national problems, which usually lead to neglecting more critical, long-term issues. This tendency is only exacerbated by policy elites who are uncomfortable working with non-state, private actors; hence the tendency to ignore such issues. The tension inherent in immigration politics between countries was cited as a case in point. Commander Neil Gadihoke also spoke on the effects of climate change, arguing that the ensuing rise in sea levels will bring a higher frequency and magnitude of natural disasters, more complicated maritime boundary disputes, and health issues to the coastal populations as a result of water damage. Importantly, the armed forces of Indian Ocean countries should expect to bear the brunt of natural disaster response. Civilian agencies in these developing states simply do not have the capacity or resources to respond in a satisfactory manner. Dunkerley also discussed the challenges posed by food. He spoke about marine resources, specifically fisheries, which provide nourishment to much of the Asian population. With an increase in dependency, the global catch is now in trouble fish stocks are becoming increasingly exploited and the number that is overexploited is expanding. He argued that

increasing competition in these areas will intensify bilateral frictions as former fishermen resort to piracy for its more lucrative wages and families migrate en masse for new economic opportunities. This will cause difficulties in an Indo-US dialogue on the strategic environment, as many of the non-traditional challenges are highly sensitive issues with differing priorities for each. Mohan Guruswamy addressed the population growth rate in Asia, citing the high potential for significant grain shortages, and the associated challenges for Indian companies when purchasing land for food cultivation in Africa, where much of the population is starving. Mostly though, Guruswamy addressed trade in the region, citing Indian dependence on trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He also contended that part of Gwadar in Pakistan would become a Hong Kong of South Asia and a major export hub for the Middle East. He emphasized as well that Gwadar Port is not part of a larger "String of Pearls" conspiracy, but rather the cumulative result of many economic developments. To put his colleagues at ease, Guruswamy noted that there are 25 ports in the Indian Ocean in which the Indian Navy can refuel and re-supply within 24 hours Indias own String of Pearls. He recommended working on labor issues to compete with China, increasing foreign investment, and stimulating a domestic debate in order to respond to the potential economic challenge posed by Gwadar.

Piracy Issues: Current Status and Challenges

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp opened the session on piracy with an explanation as to why the Indian Ocean region is an ideal location for piracy. As the region has attracted more capital and tourists, pirates have simply followed the money. Open waters, coastlines that are difficult to penetrate, large distances, crowded sea lanes, and most importantly, failed states, have all created the perfect environment for piracy. Somalia, with an ungoverned coastline as long as the US eastern seaboard, is particularly susceptible as a result. It is well known that a lack of economic opportunity and defunct governance structures provide a breeding ground for pirates. As such, the only long-term solution is to control the land from where the pirates originate. This is the central challenge. 3 Commander Shishir Upadhyaya said that two-thirds of the Indian Ocean is under the threat of piracy. He identified challenges such as the size of the surveillance area and reaction time that have hindered navies from capturing pirates, while inadequate legal mechanisms for the trial of pirates has been an issue on land. He suggested that cooperation between navies and the shipping industries and using private security measures would deter pirates. In the discussion that followed, it was remarked that surveillance costs more and is more difficult to coordinate than the simple payment of ransoms, thus creating an economic incentive for inaction and exacerbating the problems of prevention and response. Participants agreed that piracy is an immediate concern for India, while only a regional concern for the US, and furthermore, only one of minimal interest. One participant argued that it would take a major event, such as the hijacking of a nuclear transit, in order to galvanize a response from the international community. When the question of how to address piracy from land arose, it was suggested that a global convention be held that would clearly outline the circumstances under which multilateral efforts can and should be coordinated. In the third quarter of 2011, maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continued to be dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, specifically the hijacking of merchant vessels by well-armed Somalia-based pirates. By the end of 2011, 214 vessels had been attacked, 31 hijacked (a 14-percent success rate), while eight vessels remained under capture awaiting release
3

Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region: A Workshop Report, Center for the National Interest, (2011).

and of payment of ransoms, 497 seafarers had been held captive, and 10 seafarers had died. Piracy Attack Groups (PAGs) are increasingly well armed, highly motivated by the prospect of very large ransom payments (average payment is currently $5.4 million), and many are using captured merchant vessels as motherships to stage further attacks.4 At the moment, it is too early to tell whether Somali pirates will be willing, or indeed able, to regain the offensive initiative in 2012 and beyond. Currently, three outcomes are plausible: The better-equipped, better-armed, and more experienced PAGs will make concerted moves to attack ships with embarked armed security personnel, using tactical acumen and far greater weight of fire (including the use of heavy machine guns if available) to defeat vessel defenders in a protracted fire-fight. Such hijacking attempts would necessitate that pirates overcome BMP defences. But successful seizures would boost captured vessel inventory and supply more motherships for attacking operations, which could better yield further successful hijackings. The steady proliferation of privately contracted armed security personnel on vessels operating in the HRA, coupled with the limited numbers of decent motherships, will cement the current deterrent effect, and will dilute PAG operational capacity to the extent that attacks and successful hijackings further decline in 2012 and beyond. The current status quo will be maintained. There will be an ebb and flow of attacking rates during the monsoon cycles, and a scattering of successful hijackings of vessels that are either insufficiently prepared with full BMP-4 and/or do not have an armed security team on board.5

4 5

David Michel, Russell Sticklor. Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, (2012) 26. Rupert Herbert-Burns Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean, (2012) 8. .

Indias Maritime Power

As stated earlier, as the premier maritime force in the region, India has both security concerns at sea and responsibility to ensure safe movement across the shipping routes of the IO which needs both capabilities and cooperative interfaces with others. While the Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largest littoral sea power, the numbers of its seagoing platforms has stagnated, even declined in some categories, over the last several years even as those of China have continued to increase rapidly. There are many reasons that have led to this unhappy state of affairs including unjustifiable delays in decision making; inadequate capacities in public sector shipyards has also been, and are, a serious constraint. Until recently, all orders for building of warships have been restricted to defence yards only which are not only overstretched but also suffer from inefficiencies endemic to government undertakings. It is essential that the private sector be brought into play. No doubt, competences required in constructing warships are more complex than those needed for building merchant vessels but a beginning has to be made. Recent measures to farm out some orders to private shipyards are, therefore, a step in the right direction. These yards will need full support from the Navy in terms of close interaction and provision of supervisory personnel on the ground. It is also desirable to selectively follow a 'buy-make' approach in which one or two platforms are purchased outright from a foreign shipyard and the rest four or five of that type built in our own; this will enable faster induction of technology in the yards and of new ships and submarines in the Navy. Routinely ordering all of them to be built locally, on the plea of fostering self-reliance, is a shortsighted measure; it must be realized that older ships have to be scrapped even as new ones are brought in. The challenge is to ensure that the latter process is faster which will never happen unless the suggested measure is put in place. Furthermore, the buy-make approach will promote, and not hinder, indigenous capabilities, and quicker. In this context, recent decisions to build seven new frigates and six submarines in three defence shipyards will, contrary to the exaggerated claims that have been made, have no impact on the force levels of 2020 as none of them will materialize in that time frame, leaving these platforms at the same numbers as today. There is a mistaken belief that Navies and Coast Guards alone comprise maritime power. A country's merchant marine and its ports are equally important elements of its strength at sea. In the last three decades, India's merchant shipping has grown to just 11 million tons from 7 million

tons in 1980; in this same period, China, beginning from the same threshold, has built a fleet of over 80 million tons. From five shipyards until ten years ago, their number has gone up to just seven in India even as China has more than ten times that number. Less than one fifth of our overseas trade is carried in Indian vessels. Similarly, in a country endowed with long coast lines on either side, we have just 13 major ports. These are very disturbing statistics. With India's economy, and consequently, trade growing at the rate that they are, these numbers need to be speedily enhanced. Until recently, this sector was not open to the private sector; happily this selfdefeating approach has now been reversed. Measures are also necessary to encourage private sector shipbuilding through suitable incentives so that merchant shipping tonnage doubles to at least 25 million tons in the next ten years.

Conclusion
India's security interests, in the changing environment, stretch across a broad spectrum which covers geo-strategic considerations arising from the country's size and location, its energy and trade security, traditional threats posed by nation state adversaries, and those that are of a different but equally threatening kind. We have to ensure that we can safeguard our interests across this wide spread. To this menu should be added the ability to respond to natural disasters which visit the IO region more often than they do elsewhere. A mix of capabilities, essentially maritime, is needed, ocean going as well as coastal, supported by a comprehensive and networked information, intelligence and command and control mechanisms. Ability of these systems to withstand sophisticated levels of hostile cyber warfare is equally important. To this list should be added a vibrant merchant marine served by ports that are both quantitatively and qualitatively capable of coping with the escalating need. Finally, to answer the challenges and responsibilities arising from the developing scenario, it is imperative that the nation's diplomacy and its maritime strategies function in sync with each other. A holistic approach is essential if India's sea power is first, built to the required level, and then, exploited consistent with the nation's security interests.

Bibliography
Books, Articles and Reports: Proshonto K. Mukherjee, Enhancement of Maritime Law Education in the Indian Context. David Michel, Russell Sticklor. Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges. Rupert Herbert-Burns Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean. Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region: A Workshop Report, Center for the National Interest. Prem Vir Das, Maritime Power: Key to Indias Security Interests.