Jacques Derrida

The Last of the Rogue States: The ‘‘Democracy
to Come,’’ Opening in Two Turns
I have alieady played a gieat deal with this vei-
lal thing voyou, this idion ol iecent oi nodein
Fiench invention (dating lack only to the nine-
teenth centuiy, to the leginning, theieloie, ol an
uilan society enteiing the age ol industiial capi-
talisn), an idion ol populai oiigin and laiely
Fiench, lut also, in spite ol oi actually lecause ol
all this, an untianslatalle, oi laiely tianslatalle,
inciinination, a soit ol Fiench intei¡ection oi
exclanation, ‘‘voyou!’’ which, I neglected to say,
can le tuined ly neans ol an intonation into
sonething tendei, affectionate, nateinal (ny
nateinal giandnothei used to call ne this when
I was a child, pietending to le angiy with
ne, ‘‘voyou, va!’’ [‘‘you little iascall’’|).
1
I have
played a gieat deal with this woid, which, while
ienaining untianslatalle, nonetheless lecones
in the expiession ‘‘Etat voyou’’ a noie-than-iecent
tianslation, alnost still liand new, laiely used,
appioxinate, franglaise, ol the Anglo-Aneiican
‘‘iogue state’’—that so-veiy-singulai indictnent
I discoveied loi the fiist tine in ny own lan-
guage a little noie than a yeai ago, and doully
associated with the state, when it was announced
altei a calinet neeting that the piesident and
The South Atlantic Quarterly ¡o¡:z[¡, Spiing[Sunnei zooq.
English tianslation copyiight _ zooq ly the Boaid ol Tiust-
ees ol the Leland Stanloid ]i. Univeisity.
324 Jacques Derrida
the piine ninistei at the tine, in spite ol theii ‘‘cohalitation,’’ that is, in
spite ol lelonging to diffeient political paities, had agieed upon the devel-
opnent ol a nucleai weapon ained at conlatting oi deteiiing what the
statenent iead on the steps ol the Elysée Piesidential Palace called Etats
voyous. I have thus spoken a gieat deal ol this woid voyou (loi the woid
itsell is a voyou ol language), ol what has iecently lecone and, such is ny
hypothesis, will ienain loi only a shoit tine still, a uselul slogan oi iallying
ciy loi the coalition ol what aie called Westein denociacies. In this woid
voyou I have thus let appeai ly tuins the noun and the attiilute oi ad¡ective,
a noninal ad¡ective sonetines attachedto a ‘‘who’’ andsonetines accoided
to a ‘‘what,’’ loi exanple, Etat voyou. Foi in the Fiench idion, soneone can
do sonething that’s voyou without actually leing a voyou. And, in legin-
ning, I said successively, you nay iecall, using the woid voyou loui diffeient
tines, sonetines as a noun, sonetines as an ad¡ective qualilying sone-
one oi sonething ol soneone: ‘‘It would no doult le, daie I say, sonewhat
‘voyou’ on ny pait weie I not to legin ly declaiing, yet one noie tine,
ny giatitude’’ (voyou heie qualifies sonething, an attitude). I then added: ‘‘I
would thus le, you night think, not only ‘voyou’ lut ‘a voyou,’ a ieal iogue,
weie I not to declaie at the outset ny endless and lottonless giatitude.’’
(This tine, altei the attiilute ol a sul¡ect, ol a who, the sulstantive le voyou,
un voyou, ‘‘a iogue,’’ designated the sul¡ect, a ‘‘who.’’)
The attiilute voyou can thus sonetines le applied to a sul¡ect that is not
sulstantially, that is, thiough and thiough, oi natuially, a voyou, a iogue.
The quality voyouis always piecisely anattiilution, the piedicate oi categoria
and, thus, the accusation leveled not against sonething natuial lut against
an institution. It is an inteipietation, an assignation, and, in tiuth, always a
denunciation, a conplaint, oi an accusation, a chaige, an evaluation, and a
veidict. As suchit announces, piepaies, andlegins to ¡ustily sone sanction.
The Etat voyou nust le punished, contained, iendeied hainless, ieduced
to a hainless state, il need le ly loice ol law (droit) and the iight (droit)
ol loice.
I an diawing attention to this idionatic distinction letween the ad¡ec-
tive and the noun in oidei alieady to help us think alout the lact that in this
Fiench expiession ol veiy iecent date, ‘‘Etat voyou,’’ which, even il untians-
latalle, as I said, will have leenlut anappioxinate tianslationol the Anglo-
Aneiican rogue state, we do not know exactly how voyou should le heaid oi
undeistood. We do not know whethei it should le, as a sulstantive, linked
ly a hyphen to the sulstantive state, theiely indicating that sone state is
sulstantially a voyou and thus would deseive to disappeai as a nonconstitu-
The Last of the Rogue States 325
tional state oi state ol nonlaw, oi whethei voyou is an attiilute, the quality
tenpoiaiily attiiluted out ol sone stiategic notivation ly ceitain states to
sone othei state that, lionsone point ol viewoi in sone context, duiing a
linited peiiod ol tine, would le exhiliting voyou lehavioi, appeaiing not to
iespect the nandates ol inteinational law, the pievailing iules and the loice
ol lawol inteinational deontology, such as the so-called legitinate and law-
aliding states inteipiet thenin accoidance with theii own inteiests. These
aie the states that have at theii disposal the gieatest loice and aie ieady to
call the Etats voyous to oidei and liing then lack to ieason, il need le ly
ained inteivention—whethei punitive oi pieenptive.
Heie is wheie the piollen ol Etats voyous that I announced in the legin-
ning loins a ieal knot. To undeistand this knot—I an not saying to undo
it—I will lollow three threads ol veiy unequal length. Veiy unequal loi iea-
sons ol econony and so as not to tiy youi patience.
A.
The first thread, the longest, though still little noie than a quick connection,
would le the one that links the question ol what we have called the ‘‘denoc-
iacy to cone,’’ ol what this syntagn night nean, to the cuiient situation:
states accuse othei states ol leing Etats voyous (iogue states). They intend
to diaw the conclusion, the ained conclusion, ol this, nanely, to use loice
to conliont then, in the nane ol a piesuned iight and the ieason ol the
stiongest, accoiding to nodes that we no longei know, in piinciple and in
all iigoi, howto qualily, and which, accoiding to ny hypothesis, aie and will
ienain loievei loieign to eveiy acciedited qualification oi to eveiy accept-
alle conceptual distinction: ainy as opposed to police, engaged in wai (civil
wai, national wai, oi paitisan wai) oi in peace-keeping opeiations, oi else
in state teiioiisn.
Eveiy ‘‘denociacy to cone,’’ whatevei neaning oi ciedit we attiilute to
this expiession, will have to tieat this piollen and its uigency. It is only
in post-Kantian nodeinity that the piollenatic, and fiist ol all the defini-
tion, ol denociacy gets lully inplicated in the tuilulent teiiitoiy ol iela-
tions letween states, in questions ol wai and peace. As at the end ol On
the Social Contract, questions ol loieign policy, ol wai and peace, weie still
excluded, naiginalized oi deleiied in the tieatnent ol the concept and
stakes ol denociacy. This denociacy ienained and still ienains a nodel
ol intianational and intiastate political oiganization on the inside ol the
city. Despite sone appeaiances, it is not ceitain that things have changed.
326 Jacques Derrida
Whethei we lollowthe guiding thiead ol a post-Kantian political thought ol
cosnopolitanisn oi that ol the inteinational law that goveined thioughout
the twentiethcentuiy suchinstitutions as the League ol Nations, the United
Nations, the Inteinational Ciininal Tiilunal, and so on, the denociatic
nodel (equality and lieedon ol soveieign state sul¡ects, na¡oiity iule, and
so on) sonetines seens to lecone oi tends to lecone ‘‘in spiiit’’ the noin
ol this politics ol inteinational law. But this appeaiance is deceptive, and the
question ol a univeisal, inteinational, inteistate, and especially tiansstate
denociatization ienains an utteily olscuie question ol the lutuie. It is one
ol the possille hoiizons ol the expiession ‘‘denociacy to cone.’’ The deno-
ciatic paiadign does not govein the tiadition ol Kant’s tieatise Perpetual
Peace, which it would le necessaiy to iead heie closely, with its concept ol
a ‘‘woild iepullic’’ (Weltrepublik), which is not a denociacy, and its distinc-
tion letween a ‘‘tieaty ol peace’’ (Friedensvertrag, pactumpacis) and a ‘‘league
ol peace’’ (Friedensbund, foedus pacificum), this lattei alone leing capalle ol
assuiing a peipetual peace in a ledeiation ol liee, which is to say, soveieign,
states.
2
All this, we nust nevei loiget, is in the context ol Kant’s clain that
the ‘‘na¡esty ol the people,’’ that is to say, the soveieignty ol the people, is
an ‘‘alsuid expiession’’ (Volksmajestät ist ein ungereimter Ausdruck) (PP ¡6).
Majestas has always leen a synonyn ol sovereignty.
3
Only a state can le oi
have a soveieign. A league ol peoples (Völkerbund) cannot lecone a state
ol peoples (Völkerstaat) oi le ¡oined into a single state. As loi denociacy in
the inteistate oi tiansstate ielations, law, and institutions ol today, the least
that can le said is that it ienains entiiely to cone. It is thus the place ol
which we nust speak: not necessaiily from this place oi in view of this place
lut on the sul¡ect ol the possilility oi inpossilility ol such a place.
In saying that this place (possille, inpossille, oi unlocatalle, lut not
necessaiily utopic) constitutes the place oi the proper place with any chance
ol giving sone weight oi scope to the expiession ‘‘denociacy to cone,’’ I
should in all honesty connit nysell, though I will not do so today, to a
patient analysis ol all the contexts and inflections that have naiked this
soit ol notto that is not even a sentence (‘‘denociacy to cone’’): loi I have
nost oltenused it, always inpassing, with as nuch stulloindeteinination
as indeteininate hesitation—at once calculated and culpalle—in a stiange
nixtuie ol lightness and giavity, with a casual and cuisoiy, indeed sone-
what iiiesponsille, touch, a sonewhat sententious and aphoiistic ieseive
that leaves seiiously in ieseive an excessive iesponsilility.
Each tine, the context and the inflection have diffeied, to le suie, legin-
The Last of the Rogue States 327
ning with what was piolally, though I an not ceitain, the fiist occuiience,
in Du droit à la philosophie, in ¡¸8¸–¡¸¸o. Democracy was theie defined
as a ‘‘philosophical concept’’ and sonething that ‘‘remains still to cone.’’
4
The sane yeai, in the lectuie that lecane the Force of Law, in the couise
ol analyzing in a noie or less, noie and less, deconstiuctive lashion the
alieady autodeconstiuctive discouise ol Ben¡anin in his ievolutionaiy cii-
tique ol pailianentaiy goveinnent and lileial denociacy, I noted that,
lionBen¡anin’s point ol view, ‘‘denociacy would le a degeneiation ol law,
ol the violence, the authoiity and the powei ol law,’’ and that ‘‘theie is not
yet any denociacy woithy ol this nane. Denociacy remains to cone: to
engendei oi to iegeneiate.’’
5
The leeling ol apoietic difficulty affects not only sone supposedly endless
appioach ol denociacy itself, ol the denociatic thing, il one can still say this
(and piecisely lecause ol the autoinnunity ol the sane and the piopei).
This apoiia-affect affects the veiy use ol the woid democracy in the syntagn
‘‘denociacy to cone.’’ That is what I tiied to suggest in Sauf le nom (¡¸¸¡)
with iegaid to the neaning ol sans in the apophatic discouise ol so-called
negative theology, indeed ol a khôra oi a spacing leloie any deteinination
and any possille ieappiopiiation ly a theologico-political histoiy oi ieve-
lation, and even leloie a negative theology, which is always lundanentally
ielated to sone histoiical, and especially Chiistian, ievelation. The denoc-
iacy to cone would le like the khôra ol the political. Taking the example ol
‘‘denociacy’’ (lut we shall encountei with the exanple ol denociacy the
paiadox ol the exanple), one ol the voices ol this text (which is a polylogue)
explains what the locution ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ should alove all not nean,
nanely, a iegulative Idea in the Kantian sense, lut also what it remained,
and could not lut ienain (demeurer), nanely, the inheiitance ol a pion-
ise: ‘‘The difficulty ol the ‘without’ (sans) spieads into what is still called
politics, noials, oi law, which aie ¡ust as thieatened as pionised ly apopha-
sis.’’
6
It is thus indeed alieady a question ol autoinnunity, ol a double bind
ol thieat and chance, not alteinatively oi ly tuins, pionise and[oi thieat,
lut thieat in the pionise itsell. And heie is the exanple, which is ceitainly
not loituitous:
Take the exanple ol denociacy, ol the idea ol denociacy, ol denoc-
iacy to cone (neithei the Idea in the Kantian sense, noi the cuiient,
linited, and deteinined concept ol denociacy, lut denociacy as the
inheiitance ol a pionise). Its path passes peihaps today in the woild
thiough (acioss) the apoiias ol negative theology . . .
328 Jacques Derrida
The othei voice piotests: ‘‘How can a path pass thiough apoiias?’’
Once a iesponse has leen given to this question, the voice again piotests,
iecalling that this possilility seens ¡ust as inpossille, and adds:
So difficult in any case that this passage thiough apoiia seens fiist
ol all (peihaps) ieseived as a seciet loi a lew. This esoteiisn seens
stiange loi a denociacy, even loi this denociacy to cone that you
define no noie than apophasis defines God. Its to-cone would le
¡ealously thought, watched ovei, haidly taught ly a lew. Veiy suspect.
(ON 8¡)
This voice was tiying to insinuate that this was not the nost denociatic
language, that is, the nost connendalle, in which to ieconnend denoc-
iacy. An advocate loi denociacy should have leained to speak to the people,
to speak denociatically ol denociacy.
To this suspicion, the othei voice iesponds ly appealing to a doulle in-
¡unction, one that veiy nuch iesenlles the autoinnunitaiy contiadiction
oi the counteiindication ol which we have leen speaking today, as well as
the piopeily denociatic paiadoxy ol the exenplaiy ‘‘anyone’’ oi ‘‘no nat-
tei who’’:
Undeistand ne, it’s a nattei ol naintaining a doulle in¡unction. Two
concuiient desiies divide apophatic theology, at the edge ol nondesiie,
aiound the gull and chaos ol the Khôra: the desiie to le inclusive ol
all, thus undeistood ly all (connunity, koinè), and the desiie to keep
oi entiust the seciet within the veiy stiict linits ol those who heai[
undeistand it right, as seciet, and aie then capalle oi woithy ol keep-
ing it. The seciet, no noie than denociacy oi the seciet ol denociacy,
nust not, lesides, cannot, le entiusted to the inheiitance ol no nat-
tei whon. Again the paiadox ol the exanple: the no-nattei-who (any
sanple exanple) nust also give the good exanple. (ON 8¡–8q)
Releience is thus nade each tine to the iegulative Idea in the Kantian
sense, to which I would not want the idea ol a denociacy to cone to le
ieduced.
Yet the iegulative Idea ienains, loi lack ol anything lettei, il we can
say ‘‘lack ol anything lettei’’ with iegaid to a iegulative Idea, a last iesoit.
Though such a last iesoit oi final iecouise iisks leconing analili, it ietains
a ceitain dignity. I cannot sweai that I will not one day give in to it.
My ieseivations with iegaid to the iegulative Idea would le, in shoit,
The Last of the Rogue States 329
ol three sorts. Sone concein fiist ol all loi the veiy loose way in which this
notion ol a iegulative Idea is cuiiently used, outside its stiictly Kantian
deteinination. In this case, the iegulative Idea ienains on the oidei ol the
possible, an ideal possille, ol couise, that is infinitely deleiied. It paitakes
in what would still lall, at the end ol an infinite histoiy, into the iealn ol
the possille, ol what is viitual oi potential, ol what is within the powei ol
soneone, sone ‘‘I can,’’ to ieach, in theoiy, and in a loin that is not wholly
lieed lion all teleological ends.
¡. To this I would oppose, in the first place, all the figuies I place undei the
title ol the im-possible, ol what nust ienain (in a nonnegative lashion) loi-
eign to the oidei ol ny possililities, to the oidei ol the ‘‘I can,’’ ol ipseity, ol
the theoietical, the desciiptive, the constative, and the peiloinative (inas-
nuch as this lattei still inplies a powei loi sone ‘‘I’’ guaianteed ly con-
ventions that neutialize the puie eventlulness ol the event, the eventlul-
ness ol the to-cone exceeds this spheie ol the peiloinative). It is a question
heie, as with the coning ol any event woithy ol this nane, ol an unloie-
seealle coning ol the othei, ol a heteionony, ol a lawcone lionthe othei,
ol a iesponsilility and decision ol the othei—ol the othei in ne, an othei
gieatei and oldei than I. It is thus a question ol sepaiating denociacy and
auto-nony, sonething that is, I concede, noie than difficult, indeed in-
possille. It is noie in-possille, and yet necessaiy, to sepaiate soveieignty
and unconditionality, lawand ¡ustice, as I pioposed in‘‘The Univeisity with-
out Condition’’ (zoo¡).
7
This in-possille is not piivative. It is not the inaccessille, and it is not
what I can indefinitely delei: it announces itsell, sweeps down upon ne,
piecedes ne, and seizes ne here and now in a nonviitualizalle way, in actu-
ality and not potentiality. It cones upon ne lion on high, in the loin ol
an in¡unction that does not sinply wait on the hoiizon, that I do not see
coning, that nevei leaves ne inpeace and nevei lets ne put it offuntil latei.
Such an uigency cannot le idealized, no noie than the othei as othei can.
This in-possille is thus not a (iegulative) idea oi ideal. It is what is nost
undenially real. And sensille. Like the othei. Like the iiieducille and non-
appiopiialle diffeiance ol the othei.
z. In the second place, then, the iesponsilility ol what ienains to le de-
cided oi done (in actuality) cannot consist in lollowing, applying, oi caiiy-
ing out a noin oi iule. Wheievei I have at ny disposal a deteininalle
iule, I know what nust le done, and as soon as such knowledge dictates
the law, action lollows knowledge as a calculalle consequence: one knows
330 Jacques Derrida
what path to take, one no longei hesitates. The decision then no longei
decides anything lut is nade in advance and is thus in advance annulled.
It is sinply deployed, without delay, piesently, with the autonatisn attiil-
uted to nachines. Theie is no longei any place loi ¡ustice oi iesponsilility
(whethei ¡uiidical, political, oi ethical).
¡. Finally, in the third place, il we cone lack this tine to the stiict nean-
ing Kant gave to the regulative use ol ideas (as opposed to theii constitutive
use), we would, in all iigoi, and in oidei to say anything on this sul¡ect, and
especially in oidei to appiopiiate such teins, have to sulsciile to the entiie
Kantian aichitectonic and ciitique, sonething I cannot seiiously undeitake
oi even connit nysell to doing heie. We would have to legin ly asking
alout what Kant calls ‘‘the diffeient inteiest inieason’’ (einverschiedenes Inte-
resse der Vernunft),
8
the imaginary (the focus imaginarius, that point towaid
which all the lines diiecting the iules ol undeistanding—which is not iea-
son—tend and conveige and thus indefinitely approximate), the necessaiy
illusion, which need not necessaiily deceive us, the figuie ol an appioach
oi appioxination (zu nähern) that tends indefinitely towaid iules ol univei-
sality, and especially the indispensalle use ol the as if (als ob) (CPR ¡¡¡, A
6qq[B 6;z).
9
We cannot tieat this heie, lut I thought it necessaiy at least
to note, in piinciple, how ciicunspect I would le to appiopiiate in any iig-
oious way this idea ol a ‘‘iegulative Idea.’’ Let us not loiget, since we have
leen talking so nuch alout the woild and the woildwide (mondialisation),
that the veiy idea ol world ienains a regulative Idea loi Kant.
10
It is the sec-
ond ol the iegulative Ideas, letween two otheis that ienain, so to speak,
two loins ol soveieignty: the ipseity ol the ‘‘nysell ’’ (Ich selbst), as soul oi
as thinking natuie, and the ipseity ol God.
Those aie sone ol the ieasons why I, without evei giving up on ieason
and a ceitain ‘‘inteiest ol ieason,’’ hesitate to use the expiession ‘‘iegulative
Idea’’ when speaking ol a to-cone oi ol denociacy to cone. In The Other
Heading (¡¸¸¡), I explicitly set aside the ‘‘status ol the iegulative Idea in
the Kantian sense’’ and insisted at once on the alsolute and unconditional
uigency ol the here and now that does not wait and on the stiuctuie ol the
pionise, a pionise that is kept in nenoiy, that is handed down (léguée),
inheiited, clained and taken up (alléguée). Heie is how the ‘‘to cone’’ was
then defined:
Not sonething that is ceitain to happen tonoiiow, not the denoc-
iacy (national oi inteinational, state oi tians-state) ol the future, lut
The Last of the Rogue States 331
a denociacy that nust have the stiuctuie ol a pionise—and thus the
memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now.
11
All ol this was wiitten in the context ol a seiies ol apoiias and antinonies
to which I cannot ietuin heie.
I should, it seens to ne, claiily a lit lettei heie what still ienains envel-
oped in these gestuies, which will lecone noie liequent and sonewhat
diffeiently inflected in sulsequent ieleiences to the ‘‘denociacy to cone.’’
I shall do this all too quickly aiound five foci.
¡. The expiession ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ tianslates, to le suie, oi calls loi
a nilitant and inteininalle political ciitique. A weapon ained at the ene-
nies ol denociacy, it piotests against all naiveté and eveiy political aluse,
eveiy ihetoiic that would piesent as a piesent oi existing denociacy, as a
de lacto denociacy, what ienains inadequate to the denociatic denand,
whethei neaily oi lai away, at hone oi sonewheie else in the woild, any-
wheie that a discouise on the iights ol nan and on denociacy ienains little
noie than an olscene alili so long as it toleiates the teiiille plight ol so
nany nillions ol hunan leings suffeiing lion nalnutiition, disease, and
huniliation, giossly depiived not only ol liead and watei lut ol equality oi
lieedon, dispossessed ol the iights ol all, ol eveiyone, ol anyone. (This ‘‘any-
one’’ cones leloie any othei netaphysical deteininationas sul¡ect, hunan
peison, oi consciousness, leloie any ¡uiidical deteinination as conpeei
(semblable), conpatiiot, lanily nenlei (congénère), liothei, neighloi, lel-
lowieligious lollowei, oi lellowcitizen. ]ean Paulhan says sonewheie, and
I’nheie paiaphiasing, that to think denociacy is to think the ‘‘fiist-conei’’:
anyone, no nattei who, at the peinealle linit, in lact, letween ‘‘who’’ and
‘‘what,’’ the living leing, the cadavei, and the ghost. The fiist-conei: is that
not the lest way to tianslate ‘‘the fiist to cone’’?
The ‘‘to cone’’ suggests not only the pionise, lut also the lact that denoc-
iacy will nevei exist, in the sense ol a piesent existence: not lecause it will
le deleiied lut lecause it will always ienain apoietic in its stiuctuie (loice
without loice, incalculalle singulaiity and calculalle equality, connensuia-
lility and inconnensuialility, heteionony and autonony, indivisille sov-
eieignty and divisille oi shaied soveieignty, an enpty nane, a despaiiing
nessianicity oi a nessianicity in despaii, and so on).
But, leyond this active and inteininalle ciitique, the expiession‘‘denoc-
iacy to cone’’ takes into account the alsolute and intiinsic histoiicity ol
the only systen that welcones in itsell, in its veiy concept, this expiession
332 Jacques Derrida
ol autoinnunity that is called the iight to sell-ciitique and peilectilility.
Denociacy is the only systen, the only constitutional paiadign, in which,
in piinciple, one has oi assunes loi onesell the iight to ciiticize eveiything
pullicly, including the idea ol denociacy, its concept, its histoiy, and its
nane. Including the idea ol the constitutional paiadign and the alsolute
authoiity ol law. It is thus the only paiadignthat is univeisalizalle, whence
its chance and its liagility. But in oidei loi this histoiicity—unique anong
all political systens—to le conplete, it nust le lieed not only lion the
Idea in the Kantian sense lut lion all teleology, all onto-theo-teleology.
z. This inplies anothei thinking ol the event (unique, unloieseealle,
without hoiizon, unnasteialle ly any ipseity oi any conventional and thus
consensual peiloinativity), which is naiked in a ‘‘to cone’’ that, leyond
the lutuie (since the denociatic denand does not wait), nanes the coning
ol who cones oi ol what cones to pass, nanely, the newly aiiived whose
iiiuption should not and cannot le linited ly any conditional hospitality
on the loideis ol a policed nation-state.
¡. This natuially piesupposes, and this is what is nost difficult, nost
inconceivalle, an extension ol the denociatic leyond nation-state sovei-
eignty, leyond citizenship. This would cone alout thiough the cieation
ol an inteinational ¡uiidico-political space that, without doing away with
eveiy ieleience to soveieignty, nevei stops innovating and inventing new
distiilutions and loins ol shaiing, new divisions ol soveieignty. (I ielei
to inventing heie lecause the to-cone gestuies not only towaid the coning
ol the othei lut towaid invention—invention not ol the event lut thiough
the event.) The discouise conceining the New Inteinational in Specters of
Marx (¡¸¸¡) tiied to point in this diiection. The ienewed declaiation ol
hunan iights (and not the ‘‘iights ol nan and ol the citizen’’) at the end
ol Woild Wai II ienains an essential denociatic ieleience loi the institu-
tions ol inteinational law, especially the United Nations. This ieleience is
thus in viitual contiadiction with the piinciple ol nation-state soveieignty,
which also ienains theie intact. It is ly denociatic ieleience to the Univei-
sal Declaiation ol Hunan Rights that one tiies, nost olten to no avail, to
inpose linits upon the soveieignty ol nation-states. One exanple, anong
so nany otheis, would le the laloiious cieation ol an Inteinational Ciini-
nal Tiilunal.
The Declaiation ol Hunan Rights is not, howevei, opposed to, and so
does not linit, the soveieignty ol the nation-state in the way a piinciple ol
nonsoveieignty would oppose a piinciple ol soveieignty. No, it is one sovei-
The Last of the Rogue States 333
eignty set against anothei. Hunan iights pose and piesuppose the hunan
leing (who is equal, liee, sell-deteinined) as soveieign. The Declaiation ol
Hunan Rights declaies another soveieignty, it thus ieveals the autoinnu-
nity ol soveieignty in geneial.
q. In Specters of Marx, the expiession ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ is inextiically
linked to ¡ustice. It is the ergo oi the igitur, the thus letween ‘‘denociacy to
cone and ¡ustice’’: ‘‘Foi the denociacy to cone and thus loi ¡ustice,’’ as a
veilless phiase puts it in Specters of Marx.
12
This gestuie insciiles the necessity ol the denociacy to cone not only
into the axionatic ol the nessianicity without nessianisn, the spectiality
oi hauntology, that this look develops, lut into the singulai distinction
letween lawand ¡ustice (heteiogeneous lut insepaialle) which, fiist devel-
oped inForce of Law, gets luithei elaloiated inSpecters of Marx inthe couise
ol a discussion ol the Heideggeiian inteipietation ol Dikè as gatheiing,
ad¡oining, and hainony. Contesting that inteipietation, I pioposed align-
ing ¡ustice with dis¡ointuie, with leing out of joint, with the inteiiuption ol
ielation, with unlinding, with the infinite seciet ol the othei. All this can
indeed seento thieaten a connunity-oiiented oi connunitaiian concept
ol denociatic ¡ustice. This discussion, which I cannot ieconstitute heie,
plays a discieet though decisive iole thioughout the look. It could oiient
us towaid the question ol the lutuie: Why aie theie so lew denociat phi-
losopheis (il theie have leen any at all), lionPlato to Heideggei? Why does
Heideggei ienain, in this iegaid as well, still Platonic?
This con¡unction ol denociacy and ¡ustice is also one ol the thenes
ol Politics of Friendship, which, a yeai latei, explicitly says—still without a
veil—‘‘With iegaid to denociacy and with iegaid to ¡ustice,’’
13
linking the
thought ol the to-cone ol the event to the iiieducille ‘‘peihaps,’’ question-
ing this nane democracy ly iecalling what the Menexenus said ol the iegine
undei which the Athenians had lived nost ol the tine, ‘‘a loin ol govein-
nent which ieceives vaiious nanes, accoiding to the lancies ol nen, and
is sonetines called denociacy (demokratia), lut is ieally an aiistociacy oi
goveinnent ol the lest which has the appioval ol the nany’’ (PF ¸¡).
It is heie that a ceitain question gets developed, noie explicitly in Politics
of Friendship than anywheie else: the question of the name, ol what is hap-
pening ‘‘today’’ ‘‘in the nane ol denociacy.’’ I nust le content to signal,
so as then to put a lit finei point on it, the place that then, in the couise
ol a deconstiuctive ciitique ol Schnitt’s conceptuality (notally aiound the
concepts ol decision and wai—whethei inteinational wai, civil wai, oi so-
334 Jacques Derrida
called paitisan wai), opens onto a whole seiies ol questions suiiounding
the ‘‘denociacy to cone.’’ I ask nysell:
Il, letween the nane on the one hand, the concept and the thing on the
othei, the play ol a gap offeis ioonloi rhetorical [I enphasize this woid
loi ieasons that will lecone appaient in a nonent| effects which aie
also political stiategies, what aie the lessons that we can diaw today?
Is it still in the name of democracy that one will attenpt to ciiticize such
and such a deteininationol denociacy oi aiisto-denociacy? Oi, noie
iadically—closei, piecisely, to its lundanental radicality (wheie, loi
exanple, it is rooted in the secuiity ol an autochthonous loundation, in
the stock oi in the genius ol filiation)—is it still in the nane ol denoc-
iacy, ol a denociacy to cone, that one will attenpt to deconstiuct a
concept, all the piedicates associated with the nassively doninant con-
cept ol denociacy, that in whose heiitage one inevitally neets again
the law ol liith, the natuial oi ‘‘national’’ law, the law ol honophilia oi
ol autochthony, civic equality (isonony) lounded on equality ol liith
(isogony) as the condition ol the calculation ol appiolation and, theie-
loie, the aiistociacy ol viitue and wisdon, and so loith?
What ienains oi still iesists in the deconstiucted (oi deconstiuct-
ille) concept ol denociacy which guides us endlessly? Which orders us
not only to engage [I undeiscoie orders and engage lecause I will ietuin
to thenin a nonent| a deconstiuction lut to keep the old nane? And
to deconstiuct luithei in the nane ol a democracy to cone? That is to
say, luithei, which enjoins [ny enphasis| us still to inheiit lionwhat—
loigotten, iepiessed, nisundeistood, oi unthought in the ‘‘old’’ con-
cept and thioughout its histoiy—would still le on the watch, giving off
signs oi synptons ol a stance ol suivival coning thiough all the old
and tiied leatuies? (PF ¡o¡–q, see PF ¡o¡–6)
This did not thus exclude the possilility, oi even the iight, ol peihaps
one day alandoning the inheiitance oi heiitage ol the nane, ol changing
nanes. But always in the nane ol the nane, theiely letiaying the heiitage
in the name of the heiitage:
Saying that to keep this Gieek nane, denociacy, is an affaii ol con-
text, ol ihetoiic oi ol stiategy, even ol polenics, ieaffiining that this
nane will last as long as it has to lut not nuch longei, saying that
things aie speeding up ienaikally in these last tines, is not neces-
The Last of the Rogue States 335
saiily giving in to the oppoitunisn oi cynicisn ol the antidenociat
who is not showing his caids. Conpletely to the contiaiy: one keeps
this indefinite iight to the question, to ciiticisn, to deconstiuction
(guaianteed iights, in piinciple, in any denociacy: no deconstiuction
without denociacy, no denociacy without deconstiuction). One keeps
this iight stiategically to naik what is no longei a stiategic affaii: the
linit letween the conditional (the edges ol the context and ol the con-
cept enclosing the effective piactice ol denociacy and nouiishing it in
landandllood) andthe unconditional which, lionthe outset, will have
insciiled a sell-deconstiuctive loice [I could have in lact said ‘‘auto-
innunitaiy’’ loice| in the veiy notil ol denociacy, the possilility and
the duty loi denociacy itsell to de-linit itsell. Denociacy is the autos [I
would today say the ipse oi ipseity| ol deconstiuctive sell-delinitation.
Delinitation not only in the nane ol a iegulative Idea and an indefi-
nite peilectilility, lut eveiy tine in the singulai uigency ol a here and
now. (PF ¡o¡)
¡. In speaking ol an unconditional in¡unction oi ol a singulai uigency, in
invoking a here and now that does not await an indefinitely ienote lutuie
assigned ly sone iegulative Idea, one is not necessaiily designating the
lutuie ol a denociacy that is going to cone oi that nust cone, noi even a
denociacy that is the lutuie. One is especially not speaking alout sone ieal
inninence, even il a ceitain inninence is insciiled in the stiange concept
ol denociacy to cone. One is not saying what is going to happen oi what
is alieady in the piocess ol happening, as Tocqueville did when he spoke ol
leing ‘‘constantly pieoccupied ly a single thought’’ whenhe wiote his look,
a thought at once iealistic and optinistic. Tocqueville announced, in effect,
in the pielace to the twellth edition ol his look, ‘‘the appioaching iiiesist-
ille anduniveisal spieadol denociacy thioughout the woild.’’
14
This was an
announcement. Tocqueville was announcing not sinply the inninent lutuie
lut, in the piesent, the piesent: ‘‘A gieat denociatic ievolution is taking
place in oui nidst’’ (DA ¡), he says in his intioduction.
As loi ‘‘denociacy to cone,’’ it actually announces nothing. But thenwhat
aie these thiee woids doing? What is the nodal status ol this syntagn that
nanes, in geneial, the ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ without loining a sentence,
especially not a piopositionol the soit ‘‘denociacy is to cone.’’ Il I happento
have wiitten that it ‘‘ienains’’ to cone, this ienaining (restance), as always
in ny texts, at least since Glas, this denociacy in waiting oi as ienaining
336 Jacques Derrida
(en restance), pending (en souffrance), withdiaws lion its ontological depen-
dence. It does not constitute the nodification ol an ‘‘is,’’ ol an ontological
copula naiking the piesent ol essence oi existence, indeed ol sulstantial
oi sul¡ective sulstance.
Now, I would wish to clain that the question ol the olscuie status oi
node ol this phiase without a veil is already political and that it is also
the question of denociacy. Foi ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ can hesitate endlessly,
oscillate indecidally and loievei, letween two possililities: it can, on the one
hand, coiiespond to the neutial, constative analysis ol a concept. (In this
case, I would sinply le desciiling, olseiving, liniting nysell to analyz-
ing, as a iesponsille philosophei and logician ol language, as a senanticist,
what the concept ol denociacy inplies, nanely, eveiything we have ¡ust
spoken alout: the senantic void at the heait ol the concept, its iathei oidi-
naiy insignificance oi its disseninal spacing, nenoiy, pionise, the event
to cone, nessianicity that at once inteiiupts and acconplishes intiinsic
histoiicity, peilectilility, the iight to an autoinnunitaiy sell-ciitique, and
an indefinite nunlei ol apoiias. This would anount to saying: il you want
to know what you aie saying when you use this inheiited woid democracy,
you need to knowthat these things aie insciiled oi piesciiled within it, loi
ny pait, I an sinply desciiling this piesciiption in a neutial lashion. I an
mentioning the woid democracy as nuch as using it.) But, on the other hand,
no longei satisfied to ienain at the level ol a neutial, constative conceptual
analysis, ‘‘denociacy to cone’’ can also insciile a peiloinative attenpt to
win conviction ly suggesting suppoit oi adheience, an ‘‘and yet it is nec-
essaiy to lelieve it,’’ ‘‘I lelieve in it, I pionise, I an in on the pionise and
in nessianic waiting, I an taking action oi an at least enduiing, now you
do the sane,’’ and so on. The ‘‘to’’ ol the ‘‘to cone’’ waveis letween inpeia-
tive in¡unction (call oi peiloinative) and the patient perhaps ol nessianicity
(nonpeiloinative exposuie to what cones, to what can always not cone oi
has alieady cone).
Waveiing letween the two, the ‘‘to’’ can also, at the sane tine oi ly tuins,
let the two ‘‘to’s’’ le heaid. These two possililities, these two nodalities ol
discouise oi two postuies, can alteinate, they can le addiessed to you ly
tuins oi else they can haunt one anothei, paiasite one anothei in the sane
instant, each one leconing ly tuins the alili ol the othei. In saying this
nysell iight now, in cautioning you that I can ly tuins oi sinultaneously
play on the two tuins oi tuins ol phiase, I withdiawinto the seciet ol iiony,
ol iiony in geneial oi ol the paiticulai ihetoiical figuie called iiony. But
The Last of the Rogue States 337
heie is yet one noie tuin, and it is political: is it not also denociacy that
gives the iight to iiony in the pullic space? Yes, loi denociacy opens pul-
lic space, the pullicity ol pullic space, ly gianting the iight to a change ol
tone (Wechsel der Töne), to iiony as well as to fiction, the sinulaciun, the
seciet, liteiatuie, and so on. And, thus, to a ceitain nonpullic pullic within
the pullic, to a res publica, a iepullic wheie the diffeience letween the pul-
lic and the nonpullic ienains an indecidalle linit. Theie is sonething ol a
denociatic iepullic as soon as this iight is exeicised. This indecidalility is,
like lieedon itsell, gianted ly denociacy, and it constitutes, I continue to
lelieve, the only iadical possilility ol deciding and ol naking cone alout
(peiloinatively), oi iathei ol letting cone alout (netapeiloinatively), and
thus ol thinking what cones oi happens and who happens ly, the aiiiving
ol whoevei aiiives. It thus alieady opens, loi whonevei, an expeiience ol
lieedon, howevei anliguous and disquieting, thieatened and thieatening,
it night ienain in its ‘‘peihaps,’’ with a necessaiily excessive iesponsilility
ol which no one nay le alsolved.
B.
With these ieleiences to iight oi law and ¡ustice, I an alieady leginning
to pull on ny second guiding thiead, the one I will cut shoitest. It indeed
conceins the connection letween lawand ¡ustice, these two heteiogeneous
yet insepaialle concepts, lut especially the connection letween law, ¡us-
tice, and loice, paiticulaily inielationto the inteinational and tiansnational
stakes insciiled-piesciiled, pieinsciiled, paiadoxically, in the syntagn
‘‘denociacy to cone.’’ As loi law, ¡ustice, and loice, as loi knowing whethei
the ieason ol the stiongest is always lest, I ask youi peinission to nake as
if, thiough an econonical fiction, we had alieady agieed on the necessity ol
this ieinteipietation oi ieactivation ol an enoinous tiaditional piollenatic
with the question ol iogue states in view. This piollenatic—always open,
alyssal, chaotic—iuns lionat least Plato (loi exanple, lionCallicles’s dis-
couise in the Gorgias oi Thiasynachus’s in the Republic, loth ol which
naintain that the ¡ust oi the iight (dikè, dikaion) is on the side ol oi in the
inteiest ol the stiongest), to Machiavelli, Holles, and the Pascal ol that well-
knownand veitiginous thought that has leenso oltenand so well discussed
(ly Louis Maiin and Geoffiey Bennington in paiticulai): ‘‘]ustice-night . . .
leing unalle to nake what is ¡ust stiong, we have nade what is stiong
¡ust,’’
15
to the La Fontaine ol The Wolf and the Lamb (a couple that goes lack
338 Jacques Derrida
to at least Plato and one that I sulnitted to an inteininalle analysis in ny
seninai this yeai), to the Rousseau ol On the Social Contract (‘‘On the Right
ol the Stiongest: The stiongest is nevei stiong enough to le nastei all the
tine, unless he tiansloins loice into iight . . .’’
16
), and especially, and I insist
on this, to a ceitain Kant whose definition ol stiict iight (das stricte Recht),
whose doctiine ol iight piopei (eigentliche Rechtslehre), inplies in the veiy
concept ol iight the laculty oi the possilility ol a iecipiocal constiaint oi
coeicion (wechselseitigen Zwanges), and thus the possilility ol loice, ol a iea-
son ol the stiongest in accoidance with univeisal laws and consistent with
the lieedonol all.
17
This sinple definition is neant to le puie and a piioii.
It entails at once the denociatic (the lieedon ol eveiyone), univeisality,
the inteinational, and cosnopolitical law, leyond the nation-state (univei-
sal laws). It piesciiles oi authoiizes the legal and legitinate iecouise to
loice (the a piioii necessity ol constiaint), that is, sone soveieignty, even il
it is not ol the state.
We now have availalle to us, altei this inteininalle detoui, all the nec-
essaiy elenents to appioach the knot we spoke ol eailiei and so finally
addiess, ly lollowing oui third thread, what I will piovisionally call the epoch
ol iogue states.
C.
Il the expiession rogue state appeais iathei iecent, the woid rogue, as an
ad¡ective oi sulstantive, has inhalited the English language and haunted
its liteiatuie longei than the woid voyou has the Fiench language and lit-
eiatuie. In use since the niddle ol the sixteenth centuiy, it ieleis in eveiy-
day language, in the language ol the law and in gieat woiks ol liteiatuie,
alieady in Spensei and olten in Shakespeaie, to leggais and honeless vaga-
londs ol vaiious kinds, lut also, and loi this sane ieason, to all soits ol
iiffiaff, villains, and unpiincipled outlaws (‘‘a dishonest, unpiincipled pei-
son,’’ says the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘‘a iascal’’). Fiontheie the neaning
gets extended, in Shakespeaie as well as in Daiwin, to all nonhunan living
leings, that is, to plants and aninals whose lehavioi appeais deviant oi
peiveise. Any wild aninal can le called rogue, lut especially those, such as
rogue elephants, that lehave like iavaging outlaws, violating the custons and
conventions, the custonaiy piactices, ol their own connunity. A hoise can
le called iogue when it stops acting as it should, as it is expected to act, loi
exanple as a iacehoise oi a tiained hunting hoise. A distinguishing sign is
The Last of the Rogue States 339
thus affixed to it, a ladge oi hood, to naik its status as rogue. This last point
naiks the point iathei well, indeed it liands it, loi the qualification rogue
calls loi a naiking oi lianding classification that sets sonething apait. A
naik ol inlany disciininates ly neans ol a fiist lanishing oi exclusion
that then leads to a liinging leloie the law. It is sonewhat analogous to
the wheel, loieiunnei ol the yellow stai, ol which I spoke eailiei. Sone-
thing sinilai can le heaid in the Geinan woid Schurke, which is used to
tianslate rogue in the expiession rogue state, and which also neans ‘‘iascal,’’
‘‘scoundiel,’’ ‘‘ciook,’’ ‘‘thiel, ‘‘villain,’’ and so on.
But wheieas voyou, Schurke, canallia aie used to speak only ol hunan out-
laws, the English rogue can le extended to plants and, especially, aninals,
as we ¡ust noted. This will le one ol the ieasons it has iecently held such
a piivileged position in Aneiican political ihetoiic, as we will show in a
nonent. As an aiticle in the Chronicle of Higher Education notes, ‘‘In the
aninal kingdon, a iogue is defined as a cieatuie that is loin diffeient. It
is incapalle ol ningling with the heid, it keeps to itsell, and it can attack at
any tine, without waining.’’
18
—Tianslated ly Pascale-Anne Biault and Michael Naas
Notes
¡ This essay is a tianslation ly Michael Naas ol chaptei 8 ol Voyous (Paiis: Editions Galilée,
zoo¡), ¡¡¡–¡¡. An English tianslation ol Voyous will le pullished in zooq as Rogues ly
Stanloid Univeisity Piess.
z Innanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, tians. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bolls-
Meiiill Conpany, ¡¸¡;), zo, ¡8. Sulsequent citations aie given in the text, denoted ly PP.
¡ At the loot ol this woid loi sovereignty, Majestas, I add a footnote: like the woid sovereignty,
its synonynmajesty suggests the gieatest in size (majestas cones lionmajus, loi magius,
na¡oi, gieatness, height, supeiioiity, the supiene oi supienacy, that which, like the
superanus ol the soveieign, cones above). Soveieign na¡esty: a question ol size, theie-
loie, as with the denociatic na¡oiity that assuies soveieignty. But it is a question ol
calculalle-incalculalle size, loi il the na¡oiity is nuneiical, the geneial will ol the sovei-
eign oi ol the nonaich cannot le divided. And the One (ol God, ol the nonaich, oi ol the
soveieign) is not gieatei, veiy gieat (conpaiatively oi supeilatively), supeiioily gieat oi
supienely high. It is alsolutely gieat, and thus alove neasuialle gieatness. Highei than
height, inconnensuialle in any case, even il it can sonetines take the loin and have
the supiene powei ol the snallest and nost invisille. In a nodeinity ol nanotechno-
sciences, powei is also neasuied in teins ol how well it neasuies up to the potency ol
the snallest possille. The soveieign One is a One that can no longei le counted, it is
more than one ( plus d’un) in the sense ol leing more than a one ( plus qu’un), leyond the
noie than one ol calculalle nultiplicity.
340 Jacques Derrida
q Du droit à la philosophie (Paiis: Editions Galilée, ¡¸¸o), ¡¡. Tianslated in Deiiida, Who’s
Afraid of Philosophy: Right to Philosophy I, tians. ]an Plug (Stanloid: Stanloid Univeisity
Piess, zooz), z¸.
¡ ]acques Deiiida, ‘‘Foice ol Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation ol Authoiity,’ ’’ tians. Maiy
Quaintance, inDeiiida, Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anid¡ai (NewYoik: Routledge, zooz), z8¡.
6 ‘‘Saul le non,’’ tians. ]ohn P. Leavey ]i., in On the Name (Stanloid: Stanloid Univeisity
Piess, ¡¸¸¡), 8¡. Sulsequent citations given in the text, denoted as ON.
; ‘‘The Univeisity without Condition,’’ in Without Alibi, tians. Peggy Kanul (Stanloid:
Stanloid Univeisity Piess, zooz), zoz–¡;.
8 Kant, ‘‘Appendix to the Tianscendental Dialectic, The Regulative Enploynent ol the
Ideas ol Puie Reason,’’ in Critique of Pure Reason, tians. Noinan Kenp Snith (NewYoik:
St. Maitin’s Piess, ¡¸6¡), ¡q;, A 666[B 6¸q. Sulsequent citations given in the text,
denoted as CPR.
¸ We know the decisive and enignatic iole played ly the als ob in all ol Kant’s thought,
this is especially tiue ol the iegulative Idea. It is a nattei ol consideiing the connections
letween phenonena ‘‘as if they weie the oidinances ol a supiene ieason, ol which oui
ieason is lut a laint copy’’ (als ob sie Anordnungen einer höchstenVernunft wären, von der die
unsrige ein schwaches Nachbild ist) (CPR ¡¡¡, A 6;8[B ;o6), ‘‘as if this leing, as supiene
intelligence, acting in accoidance with a supienely wise puipose, weie the cause ol all
things’’ (als ob diese als höchste Intelligenz nach der weisesten Absicht die Ursache von allem
sei) (CPR¡6¡, A688[B;¡6). ‘‘Foi the iegulative lawol systenatic unity piesciiles that we
should study natuie as if systenatic and puiposive unity, conlined with the gieatest pos-
sille naniloldness, weie eveiywheie to le net with, in infinitum’’ (als ob allenthalben ins
Unendliche systematische und zweckmäßige Einheit bei der größtmöglichen Mannigfaltigkeit
angetroffen würde) (CPR ¡68, A ;oo[B ;z8).
To continue in the diiection I indicated alove ly distinguishing a ‘‘ieseivation’’ lion
an ‘‘ol¡ection,’’ let’s say that I an sonetines tenpted to nake ‘‘as il ’’ I had no ol¡ections
to Kant’s ‘‘as il ’s.’’ In ‘‘The Univeisity without Condition,’’ I tieat the difficult question ol
the ‘‘as il,’’ in Kant and elsewheie, and I piopose anothei way ol thinking this ‘‘as il.’’
¡o ‘‘The second iegulative idea ol neiely speculative ieason is the concept ol the woild in
geneial’’ (Die zweite regulative Idee der bloß spekulativen Vernunft ist der Weltbegriff über-
haupt) (CPR ¡¡8, A 68q[B ;¡z).
¡¡ The Other Heading, tians. Pascale-Anne Biault and Michael Naas (Bloonington: Indiana
Univeisity Piess, ¡¸¸z), ;8.
¡z Deiiida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New Inter-
national, tians. Peggy Kanul (New Yoik: Routledge, ¡¸¸q), ¡6¸.
¡¡ Deiiida, Politics of Friendship, tians. Geoige Collins (NewYoik: Veiso, ¡¸¸;), 6q. Sulse-
quent citations given in the text, denoted as PF.
¡q Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, tians. Geoige Lawience (NewYoik: Haipei
& Row, ¡¸66), lxxxvii. Sulsequent citations given in the text, denoted as DA.
¡¡ Blaise Pascal, Pensées, the Provincial Letters, tians.W. F. Tiottei (NewYoik: RandonHouse,
¡¸q¡), in section ¡, ‘‘]ustice and the Reason ol Effects,’’ ¡o¡, pensée z¸8.
¡6 ]ean-]acques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, tians. Donald A. Ciess (Indianapolis:
Hackett Pullishing, ¡¸8;), ¡¸.
The Last of the Rogue States 341
¡; Innanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, tians. Maiy Giegoi (New Yoik: Canliidge
Univeisity Piess, ¡¸¸6), pait ¡, ‘‘Metaphysical Fiist Piinciples ol the Doctiine ol Right,
Intioduction to the Doctiine ol Right,’’ paiagiaphs D–E, z¡–z6. Oiiginal Geinan text in
Kantswerke, Akadenische Textausgale (Beilin: Waltei de Giuytei, ¡¸68), 6:z¡¡–¡¡.
¡8 Maik Stiauss, ‘‘A Rogue ly Any Othei Nane,’’ in Chronicle of Higher Education, Decen-
lei ¡¡, zooo, B¡¡.