NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA, G.R. No.

179673
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for an applicant for registration of title to land to prove
that the same has been officially declared alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
x x x.

Issues Presented

The issues in this case are:

1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.

Courts Ruling
Section 14(1)[4] of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for
registration of title: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[5]
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[6] There are no
material differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[7] Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of
such lands of the public domain.[8]
Here, the only reason the CA gave in reversing the decision of the MeTC is that
Victoria failed to submit the November 6, 2006 Certification issued by the DENR,
verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, during the hearing before the MeTC. She belatedly submitted it on
appeal.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
statute.[9] The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO.[10] The applicant must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.[11]
The DENR Certification submitted by Victoria reads:
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of
this Conversion/Subdivision Plan of Lot 5176 MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping, Csd-00-000648, containing an area of 17,507 square meters, situated at
Bambang, Taguig City, Metro Manila, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Justa M. de
las Alas for Marissa S. Estopalla, et al., was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Land, under Project No. 27-B, Taguig City, Metro Manila as per LC Map
2623, approved on January 3, 1968.[12]
On July 28, 2010 the Court issued a resolution requiring the OSG to verify from the
DENR whether the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital
Region, Office of the Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services,
who issued the Certification in this case, is authorized to issue certifications on the
status of public lands as alienable and disposable, and to submit a copy of the
administrative order or proclamation that declares as alienable and disposable the
area where the property involved in this case is located, if any there be.[13]
In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR stating that Senior
Forest Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Victorias DENR
Certification, is authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public land as
alienable and disposable land.[14] The OSG also submitted a certified true copy of
Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968,[15] signed by then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., which declared
portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623,
approved on January 3, 1968, as alienable and disposable.
Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems
too hasty for the CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not
formally offered in evidence before the court below. More so when even the OSG
failed to present any evidence in support of its opposition to the application for
registration during trial at the MeTC. The attack on Victorias proof to establish the
nature of the subject property was made explicit only when the case was at the
appeal stage in the Republics appellants brief. Only then did Victoria find it
necessary to present the DENR Certification, since she had believed that the
notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was sufficient.
In Llanes v. Republic,[16] this Court allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification
though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness.
The rules of procedure being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, the Court is empowered to suspend their application to a particular case
when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of
justice.[17] Denying the application for registration now on the ground of failure to
present proof of the status of the land before the trial court and allowing Victoria to
re-file her application would merely unnecessarily duplicate the entire process,
cause additional expense and add to the number of cases that courts must resolve.
It would be more prudent to recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the
matter now.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral
survey of Taguig conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are
carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands
covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a
survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a
public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.
The CA also erred in not affirming the decision of the MeTC especially since Victoria
has, contrary to the Solicitor Generals allegation, proved that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lot continuously,
uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the
early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax declarations covering the land way back
in 1948 that appeared in her fathers name.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that Victoria amply
established her right to have the subject property registered in her name, given that
she has met all the requisites for registration of title under the Property
Registration Decree.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June
19, 2007 decision and the September 11, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals,
and REINSTATES the January 25, 2006 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 74 of the City of Taguig.
SO ORDERED.









Jurisdiction
a. Regional Trial Court /Courts of First Instance (RTC) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. (Sec 2, PD 1529)

b. Pursuant to Sec 34 of Batas Pambansa 129, the Supreme Court issued
Administrative Order No 64-93 dated April 21, 1993, authorizing METC's, MTCC's and
MTC's to hear and decide, Cadastral or Land Registration cases covering Lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots, the value of which does not
exceed P100,000.00 for MTC's and P200,000.00 for METC's.








































G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the RTC in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by CENRO
RTC - rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration
OSG - appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length
of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA - promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan.
Citing theruling in Republic v. Herbieto declaring that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only
on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be
tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land
prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June
12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, I nc. to
support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private
property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by
their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than
30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application
without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
ISSUE: Whether or not an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of
the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HELD:
CLASSIFICATIONS OF LAND ACCORDING TO OWNERSHIP

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
1. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use;
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part
of the patrimonial property of the State.
2. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities
and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Regalian Doctrine(J ura Regalia) - a legal concept first introduced into the country from the
West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
-All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF PUBLIC LANDS ACCORDING TO ALIENABILITY

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands
of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
1. agricultural, 2. timber and 3. mineral.

Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, 1.agricultural, 2. industrial or commercial, 3. residential, 4.
resettlement, 5. mineral, 6. timber or forest, and 7. grazing land, with the reservation that
the law might provide other classifications.

The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into 1.
agricultural, 2. forest or timber, and 3. mineral, but added 4. national parks. Agricultural
lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.
21
The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively
by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE STATE
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with
the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,
and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.
If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law to that effect.
Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

DISPOSITION OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only
as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation
to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino
citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,
36
and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.
37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land
as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the
delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land with an assessed value of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value
of 14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San
Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay
Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.
3

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997.
4
On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997.
5

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998
while the records were still with the RTC.
6

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case
to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than
100,000.
7

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default
8
and commenced with the reception
of evidence.
9
Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are
Tax Declarations,
10
a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,
11
and a Certification from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the
alienable and disposable zone.
12
Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.
13

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,
14
the CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court on appeal.
15
The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently
established the latters registrable title over the subject property after having proven open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself
and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.
16

Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and
raised the following arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND
TITLE.
17

The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The
rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
18
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law.
19
It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
20
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
21

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him"
22
is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We
are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
23
InTijam,
the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed
pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the
merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction.
Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already
precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal.
In Figueroa v. People,
24
we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the
general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to
that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable.
Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the
records were still with the RTC.
25
At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the
delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When
the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested
affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional
question in its Brief.
26
Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it."
27
In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect
that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question
the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of
contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value
of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period
provided under the Property Registration Decree.
28

We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which
shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x
x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.
29
On 18 July
1997, or a day after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting
the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order.
30
While
the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,
31
petitioner
Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting
the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time
between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial
hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting
as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the
performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of
the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its
sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant
has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.
32

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing
on 4 November 1997,
33
within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued
that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five
days from the filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the
Property Registration Decree.
34

Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five
days from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration
Decree, did not affect the courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was
merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of
its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory
would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
35
It cannot be
contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot
assume that the law deliberately meant the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated
as a dead letter."
36
However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the
law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the
application for registration,
37
except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial
hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended
38
that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of
Sale annexed to respondents application for original registration was 160,000,
39
the MTC
did not have jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
as amended,
40
the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is
limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed 100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set
forth in the Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots
where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As
amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots,
the value of which does not exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporations application for registration on 8 January 1998.
41

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in
this case does not exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with
reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides
that the value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first,
by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are
more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
42

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the
records are bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property.
Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this method finds
application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission
as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding
Tax Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for
registration. From the records, we find that the assessed value of the property is 4,330,
1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property.
43
Based on
these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does not exceed
100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find
that the lower court erred in granting respondent Corporations application for original
registration in the absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
44
The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.
45
We held in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered.
46
The applicant must
also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
47

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by
(1) a CENRO or PENRO
48
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
49

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its
application.
50
Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.1wphi1
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that
the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
If respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original
registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is
alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should be
denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of
evidence to prove that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
SO ORDERED.