Failure in Gaza: Assaf Sharon

Failure in Gaza
Assaf Sharon
SEPTEMBER 25, 2014 ISSUE
Benjamin Netanyahu; drawing by John Springs
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long ago become a shouting match over moral
superiority. With seventy Israelis and more than two thousand Palestinians, most of them
civilians, dead, the latest round of violence in Gaza, too, is being analyzed and discussed
mostly on ethical grounds. But as fighting goes on, moral condemnation will likely do little
to prevent the next round. Understanding how we got to this pointand, more importantly,
how we can move beyond itcalls for an examination of the political events that led up to
the operation and the political context in which it took place.
1.
In Israel, endless controversy over Gaza has overlooked one question: How did we get here
in the first place? Why, after a considerable period of relative calm, did Hamas resume
rocket fire into Israel?
Before the current operation began, Hamas was at one
of the lowest points in its history. Its alliance with Syria
and Iran, its two main sources of support, had grown
weak. Hamass ideological and political affinity with
the Muslim Brotherhood turned from an asset into a
burden, with the downfall of the Brotherhood in Egypt
and the rise of its fierce opponent, General Abdel Fatah
el-Sisi. Egypts closure of the Rafah crossing and the
tunnels on its border with Gaza undermined Hamass
economic infrastructure. In these circumstances, Hamas
agreed last April to reconciliation with its political rival
Fatah, based on Fatahs terms. For example, the
agreement called for a government of technocrats
largely under the control of the Palestinian Authority
led by Mahmoud Abbas.
But Benjamin Netanyahu viewed the reconciliation as a
threat rather than an opportunity. While the separation of Gaza from the West Bank may
not serve Israels interest (namely, effective government in the Palestinian Territories), it
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benefits Netanyahus policy of rejecting solutions that would lead to a separate Palestinian
state. The reconciliation agreement robbed him of the claim that in the absence of effective
rule over Gaza, there is no point in striking a deal with Abbas.
Ironically, it was Netanyahus own choices that drove Abbas to reconciliation with Hamas.
The impending failure of the Mideast peace negotiations led by US Secretary of State John
Kerry in 2013 and early 2014 left Abbas with few political options. Talks faltered as
Netanyahu allowed increased settlement activity on the West Bank and they finally
collapsed when he reneged on his commitment to release Palestinian prisoners. Realizing
that talks were doomed, Abbas signed fifteen international agreements as a head of a
Palestinian state and struck his reconciliation deal with Hamas, as he said he would.
Netanyahu, who never had any intention of making the necessary concessions, as his own
statements would later reveal, was mainly playing the blame game. He saw the
reconciliation with Hamas as an opportunity to criticize the Palestinian president and,
according to one of the American diplomats involved in the peace talks, his aides said that
Abbass strategy showed that there was no difference between him and the terrorists. As
soon as the reconciliation was announced, Netanyahu launched a public offensive against
Palestinian unity and demanded that the international community oppose it. His efforts did
not succeed. Israels friends in Europe applauded the agreement between Hamas and Fatah.
Even the United States announced its intention to cooperate with the unity government,
much to Netanyahus chagrin.
Netanyahu could have chosen a different path. He could have used the reconciliation to
reinforce Abbass position and further destabilize Hamas. He could, in recognition of the
agreement, have encouraged Egypt to open its border with Gaza in order to demonstrate to
Gazans that the Palestinian Authority offered a better life than Hamas. Instead, Israel
prevented the transfer of salaries to 43,000 Hamas officials in Gaza, sending a clear
message that Israel would not treat Gaza any differently under the rule of moderate
technocrats from the Palestinian Authority.
The abduction of three Israeli youths in the West Bank on June 12 gave Netanyahu another
opportunity to undermine the reconciliation. Or so he thought. Despite the statement by
Khaled Mashal, the Hamas political bureau chief, that the Hamas political leadership did
not know of the plans to carry out the abduction, Netanyahu was quick to lay the blame on
Hamas, declaring that Israel had unequivocal proof that the organization was involved in
the abduction. As yet, Israeli authorities have produced no such proof and the involvement
of the Hamas leadership in the kidnapping remains unclear. While the individuals
suspected of having carried out the kidnapping are associated with Hamas, some of the
evidence suggests that they may have been acting on their own initiative and not under the
direction of Hamass central leadership. Regardless of this, Netanyahus response,
apparently driven by the ill-advised aim of undermining Palestinian reconciliation, was
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reckless.
Determined to achieve by force what he failed to accomplish through diplomacy,
Netanyahu not only blamed Hamas, but linked the abduction to Palestinian reconciliation,
as if the two events were somehow causally related. Sadly, this incident illustrates what
we have been saying for months, he stated, that the alliance with Hamas has extremely
grave consequences. Israeli security forces were in possession of evidence strongly
indicating the teens were dead, but withheld this information from the public until July 1,
possibly in order to allow time to pursue the campaign against Hamas.
On the prime ministers orders, IDF forces raided Hamass civil and welfare offices
throughout the West Bank and arrested hundreds of Hamas leaders and operatives. These
arrests did not help to locate the abductors or their captives. Among the arrested were
fifty-eight Palestinians previously released as part of the deal to return the Israeli soldier
Gilad Shalit, who had been a captive of Hamas since 2006.
As part of this ill-conceived operation against Hamas, Israel also mounted air strikes on
Hamas facilities in Gaza. Apparently, Hamas did not take an active part in firing rockets for
more than two weeks, although it did not prevent other factions in Gaza from firing. Only
on June 29 or 30 did Hamas restart the rocket bombardment of Israeli territory, which it
had not engaged in since November 2012. Israel retaliated against Hamas in Gaza and a
vicious cycle began. Netanyahu lost control over an escalation he had instigated. In his
badly misjudged eagerness to blame Abbas and punish him for reconciling with Hamas,
Netanyahu turned a vicious but local terrorist attack into a runaway crisis.
2.
In the first week of July, rockets and mortar shells continued to be fired from Gaza into
Israel. Hamas still denied any involvement in the abduction of the three Israeli youths and
declared its commitment to the understandings reached in November 2012, following an
eight-day Israeli operation in Gaza, according to which Hamas agreed to stop rocket fire
into Israel in exchange for Israel reopening border crossings and allowing goods to be
imported to Gaza.
This time, after the initial operation against Hamas, Israel was clearly seeking a cease-fire,
but refused the terms set by Hamas: releasing the rearrested Palestinians from the Shalit
deal and easing the restrictions imposed on Gaza since 2007. Instead, Israel believed it
could force Hamas to accept the Egyptian-brokered agreement for an immediate cease-fire
on July 4. However, that assumption was based on an inaccurate evaluation of Hamass
position, interests, and capacities, and the mutual fire continued.
On July 8, Israel officially launched Operation Protective Edge with air strikes on Gaza.
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According to Israeli media, one participant in the security cabinet meeting at which the
decision was made warned that Hamas is trying to drag Israel into broader military action.
It serves them. Hamas scores points when it is hit. This observation makes the question
of the operations goals all the more pertinent: What is the purpose of striking an
organization that benefits from being attacked?
In 2009, as head of the opposition, Netanyahu attacked then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
for his weakness and declared that as prime minister, he would bring down Hamas. Similar
statements were frequently made by members of the coalition he later formed. The
boasting, however, was not backed by Netanyahus policy during his five years in office:
not only did he not bring down Hamas, he actually strengthened the organization
considerably by releasing more than a thousand prisoners into its hands to free Shalit. At
the same time, Netanyahus government did all it could to weaken Hamass political
opponentFatah, led by Abbas.
Even as the current operation began, bringing down Hamas was conspicuously not among
its stated aims; instead, Netanyahu offered a vague promise to restore calm to southern
Israel, while Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon stated that the aim is zero rockets. Later,
Netanyahu talked of dealing a tough blow to Hamas to restore deterrence, while some of
his ministers spoke of demilitarizing Gazaa goal finally adopted by the prime minister
three weeks into the operation. The Cabinet member Naftali Bennett, who opposes a
Palestinian state, said that the goal should be to forcefully root out Hamas faith in its
ability to win. His colleague in the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, said
that the operation must endwith the IDF controlling the Gaza strip. No one mentioned
the destruction of tunnels as a goal.
On July 15 the Cabinet agreed to the cease-fire proposal formulated by Egypt, which was
similar to what had been agreed to in the 2012 cease-fire. Hamas rejected the proposal, on
the grounds that it did not meet its terms: mainly, lifting the siege and opening the
crossings. Two days later, thirteen Hamas militants infiltrated Israel through a tunnel near
Kibbutz Sufa. In a sudden about-face, the stated goal of the operation became the
destruction of tunnels from Gaza into Israel. Since Israels statements about its goals were
both vague and shifting, it is not surprising that three weeks into the operation, Israeli
media reported that officers on the ground feel that Netanyahu and Yaalon dont really
know what their objective is.
Lacking clearly defined aims, Israel was repeatedly dragged into situations created by the
other side. Having misread the situation, Israel failed to adequately prepare for Hamass
response to the arrests and assaults on the organizations institutions. Instead, the
government dallied until it felt it was forced to respond with a broad aerial assault. Even
then, it was clear that the government did not desire a ground invasion. That is why it
agreed to a cease-fire without resolving the tunnel issue. It was only after Hamas rejected
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Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty Images
the proposal that Israel launched a ground invasion into the eastern parts of Gaza. Yet
again, Netanyahus expectations would be frustrated. What was supposed to be a short,
focused attack failed to achieve its goals: on July 20, Defense Minister Yaalon said that it
would take two or three days to destroy the tunnels. The job was said to be completed
only two weeks later.
Palestinians watching the removal of rubble after Israeli air strikes destroyed the building across the street, Gaza City, August 26,
2014
False assumptions, miscalculations, and obsolete conceptions robbed Israel of initiative.
Lacking clear aims, Israel was dragged, by its own actions, into a confrontation it did not
seek and did not control. Israel was merely stumbling along, with no strategy, chasing
events instead of dictating them. What emerged as the operative aim was simply to hit
Hamas, which for the troops translates as a license for extensive and unchecked use of
force.
Such aimless display of military power resulted in much unnecessary violence, though it
was also true that Hamas rockets were often fired from civilian centers. Under pressure
from politicians, the military was encouraged to carry out actions whose primary purpose
was to satisfy a need for vengeancea vengeance the very same Israeli politicians tried to
arouse in the Israeli public. One example is the bombing of the residences of Hamass
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high-ranking officialsacts that security experts describe as completely ineffectual.
Another example is the careless and possibly criminal bombing of UN schools on three
separate occasionsschools in which there was apparently no evidence found of Hamas
weapons. This strategic confusion led Yuval Diskin, the previous head of the Israel
Security Agency, to say, three weeks into the operation, that Israel is now an instrument in
the hands of Hamas.
3.
On August 26 an Egyptian proposal for a cease-fireunlimited in time was accepted by
both sides. While the details are not yet public, it seems that any stable agreement will
involve significant easing of the siege, as Hamas demanded from the beginning. Even
President Obama, who supported Israels offensive throughout, now says the blockade
must be lifted. The deal ultimately reached will probably not be very different from the one
that could have been achieved from the start. What the government presents as its main
accomplishment is the destruction of the offensive tunnels into Israel. These pose a genuine
security threat, and eliminating them would certainly be a notable achievement. Yet it is
clear that this was not the objective at the beginning of the operation, and the degree to
which this goal has been achieved is doubtful.
As the operations objective shifted to the tunnels following the infiltration of Palestinians
through one of them on July 17, it seemed as if the threat of tunnels caught everyone by
surprise. Only two days earlier, Israel had been willing to accept a cease-fire deal despite
having done nothing about the tunnels. In fact, the security establishment was well aware
of the tunnels and the threat they pose. Prior to Israels 2005 withdrawal from Gaza,
soldiers were killed in a number of attacks using tunnels in Gaza. In June 2006, Gilad
Shalit was abducted by militants who entered Israel through just such a tunnel. In October
2013, a tunnel was found near Kibbut Ein Hashlosha, and in March of this year, another
tunnel was discovered in Israeli territory, close to the border with Gaza. Defense officials
cautioned many times in recent years that the danger of infiltration by tunnels was real, and
one high-ranking officer explicitly stated that the IDF knew of the existence of forty
tunnels before the [current] operation began.
Yet the existence of tunnels was not seen as a reason for major operations. Ironically, the
most serious threat to Israels security from Gaza (after the successful deployment of the
electronic shield Iron Dome) was all but ignored until the July 17 infiltration. When
ground forces entered Gaza, what they found was a Palestinian version of the tunnels used
in Vietnam by the Viet Cong. Since Hamas was out-numbered and outgunned, its strategy,
like that of other guerrilla forces before it, was to lure its enemy into subterranean warfare
where its relative weakness was somewhat mitigated. This is why some military experts
argue that the tunnels should have been addressed not by a large-scale ground invasion,
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which exposes troops to attack, but by surgical commando operations.
Others argue that the tunnels could have been destroyed on the Israeli end, without needing
to enter Gaza at all. A few even say that it was all an excuseunder pressure from the
right, Netanyahu and Yaalon seized on the tunnels as a justification for a limited ground
operation that would allow them to save political face without too many complications.
The battle over the tunnels was complicated, costly, and its results remain dubious. Though
many tunnels have been destroyed, it now appears that some tunnels remain, and it is close
to certain that new ones will soon be dug. A former commander of an elite IDF combat
engineering company made this clear: Hamas will resume tunneling as soon as we leave,
theyll go back to digging, no matter what.
Israels failure to stop the rockets and to prevent the construction of tunnels underlines the
futility of the strict closure of all exits imposed on Gaza since June 2007. The closure had a
devastating effect on Gazas civilian population, with unemployment now at 40 percent and
80 percent of the population dependent on international aid. Now it has become clear that
the security benefits of the closure are strategically negligible. Although it is possible that
Hamas would have amassed still more military power had the closure not been in place, its
capacities would still be nowhere near those of the IDF. And yet the arms it managed to
accumulate, the rockets it fired, and the tunnels it built under the tight restrictions of the
closure were sufficient to create a crisis.
Thus, while it is important to prevent the arming of Hamas, the closure is of limited
strategic value. Empowering the Palestinian Authority to gradually take control over Gaza
and involving international forces in that project is clearly a better strategy. Rebuilding
Gazas economy could not only ease the humanitarian crisis there, but also benefit Israeli
securityas defense officials have stated. Both have become more difficult following the
violence of the last few weeks.
4.
Operation Protective Edge has been a strategic failure. It gave Hamas a way out of
isolation, providing the organization with an opportunity to show that it could inflict harm
on Israeli cities, kill IDF soldiers, and briefly shut down Ben Gurion Airport. Reinstating
Abbas in Gaza, as was possible and desirable last April, may now have become more
difficult as a consequence of the operation. Despite the heavy toll in human life, the war
accomplished no strategic goal.
Yet this is not an accidental mistake. Israels conduct throughout the crisis has been based
directly on Netanyahus philosophy of conflict management, whose underlying premise
is that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians cannot be solved, but can be
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effectively managed for a very long period of time. This feeble, not to mention defeatist,
assumption is not only wrong but also dangerous, trapping Israel in an illusion that is
shattered time and again. Yet control and stability only exist between each inevitable
round of violence. In fact, recurring rounds of violence are inherent to this approach.
Conflict management means continued Israeli control over the Palestinians in Gaza and
in the West Bank, with the inevitable reality of organizations and factions struggling to
overthrow that control. Under the illusion that the conflict is being managed, opportunities
for change provided by calm periods are squandered. Thus, Israel under Netanyahu did not
use the five years of relative calm following Operation Cast Leadthe Gaza war in
December 2008 and January 2009to take any useful action to improve its position with
respect to Gaza. The government failed to take advantage of Hamass weakness in light of
political developments in the region and willingness to make a deal with Abbas. In these
circumstances, especially given the desperate conditions in Gaza, the inevitable
consequence is periodic violence.
Two alternative approaches exist. One, promoted by the Israeli extreme right, assumes that
the conflict can be concluded by defeating the other side. Palestinian national aspirations
can be controlled by force on one hand and benefits on the other. Proponents of this
approach, spearheaded by ministers Bennett and Lieberman, have been calling for the
occupation of Gaza.
Undoubtedly, the IDF, if it undertakes a large-scale mobilization, has the military capacity
to conquer Gaza and bring down Hamas rule there. However, this strategy will fail even if
it seems to succeed temporarily. Conquering Hamas will not change the reality of Gaza and
displays of military might will not crush legitimate Palestinian aspirations. Given the
desperate conditions in Gaza, another Palestinian power would undoubtedly rise to take
Hamass placeone that may very well be more extreme and dangerous than its
predecessor.
Moreover, effective control over the entire Gaza Strip, as Israel maintained until 1994,
requires a heavy IDF presence deep within Gaza, regularly exposing Israeli soldiers to
harm. Israeli control over Gaza will likely be similar to the conditions that prevailed in
southern Lebanon before the IDF withdrawal: daily attacks and a steady stream of
casualties. This is not a strategy for alleviating violence, but rather for exacerbating it.
Ironically, right-wing demands for war ultimately mean making it easier for Hamas to harm
Israeli soldiers. History has proven the futility of this strategy, whether in Vietnam,
Lebanon, Afghanistan, or Iraq. That is why so few Israelis want the IDF to return to
Lebanon or to Gaza. When the military presented the costs of a strategy of conquest, even
Netanyahus hawkish government rejected it completely.
The idea of managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is illusory, and concluding it by
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force is a dangerous fantasy. The only reasonable strategy is resolution of the conflict.
5.
So long as Hamas is willing to use terror against innocent Israeli civilians and so long as it
refuses to recognize the State of Israel, it will not be a partner for peace. But it could be
partner to interest-based agreements requiring it to modify its behavior, as many academic
and security experts claim. In fact, despite Netanyahus being the most vocal opponent of
dialogue with Gazan terror organizations, it was he who reached two agreements with
Hamas: the 2011 Shalit deal and the 2012 agreement that ended Operation Pillar of
Defense. The only question is whether the latest agreement between the two sides, reached
on August 26, will be limited, fragile, and short-lived, or a stable arrangement that will
improve Israels strategic standing for a considerable period of time.
A long-term resolution with respect to Gaza requires changing its political predicament.
The only sensible way of doing this is to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza, a state whose existence would be negotiated with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) under Abbass leadership. As part of a comprehensive political
agreement, Hamas is very likely to agree to a long-term truce, as its representatives have
repeatedly said. In 1997, its founder and spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin suggested a
thirty-year hudna (truce) with Israel. In 2006, one of its leaders, Mahmoud al-Zahar,
proposed a long-term hudna. Earlier this year, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a senior Hamas
functionary in the West Bank, reiterated the organizations willingness for a hudna and said
the organization was willing to accept a peace agreement with Israel if a majority of
Palestinians supported it. In 2010, in an interview with a Muslim Brotherhood daily
circulated in Jordan, Hamass political leader Khaled Mashal expressed pragmatic views
and willingness to reach an agreement with Israel. In late July, he told Charlie Rose, We
want peace without occupation, without settlements, without Judaization, without the
siege.
All these proposals were contingent on ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. They received no response from Israel. Although
a Palestinian state contradicts Netanyahus ideological commitments and conflicts with his
own political interests, a state is clearly in Israels interest. In fact, conditioning the
establishment of a Palestinian state on attaining comprehensive peace may have been the
greatest mistake by advocates of peace.
The historic conflict with the Palestinians will not be settled by a single agreement.
Reconciliation between Israelis and Palestiniansovercoming decades of bloodshed and
hatredwill require a long process of acceptance and forgiveness spanning years and
probably decades. The armed conflict, however, can certainly be ended. Israel has already
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ended armed conflicts with several neighboring countries: with some, like Egypt and
Jordan, it achieved comprehensive peace agreements; with others, it agreed to other kinds
of accords.
An agreement can be reached with the Palestinians, too: the terms are known and the price
is fixed. Whether it is reached or not is a matter of political will on the part of Israeli and
Palestinian leaders. Unfortunately, Israels current leadership will do anything to avoid this
choice, to the detriment of both peoples.
The war in Gaza is, fundamentally, not about tunnels and not against rockets. It is a war
over the status quo. Netanyahus conflict management is a euphemism for maintaining a
status quo of settlement and occupation, allowing no progress. The Israeli opposition must
distance itself from this hopeless conception and other countries need to reject it. Both
must be done forcefully and before violence erupts once more, and force becomes the only
optionyet again.
August 28, 2014
See Netanyahu: Gaza Conflict Proves Israel Cant Relinquish Control of West Bank, The Times of Israel, July 11, 2014. His press adviser
told Yediot Ahronot that Netanyahu intentionally led the talks nowhere. !
Lately, even some of Netanyahus closest associates have begun to realize that condemning the Palestinian unity government was a mistake.
For example, on July 24, Minister of Communications Gilad Erdan said: We thought the unity government was a very bad thing. Maybe today
we should see it as the lesser of two evilsit is preferable that Abbas oversee the Rafah crossing under Egyptian protection. !
BBC journalist Jon Donnison quoted an Israeli police spokesperson as saying that the abduction was the act of a lone cell, operating
independently of Hamass central directions. He added that Israeli police spokes[person] Mickey Rosenfeld also said if kidnapping had been
ordered by Hamas leadership, theyd have known about it in advance. A similar report on Buzzfeed quoted an anonymous Israeli intelligence
official as confirming that Hamas did not carry out the abduction, adding that he felt the kidnapping had been used by politicians trying to
promote their own agenda. Rosenfeld later denied the statements attributed to him, but BBC s Donnison held firm to his version. The former
head of Israels internal security service (Shabak or Shin Bet), Yuval Diskin, added his own estimation that Hamas was not behind the
abduction: see Julia Amalia Heyer, Ex-Israeli Security Chief Diskin: All the Conditions Are There for an Explosion, Der Spiegel
International, July 24, 2014.
Israeli journalist and Hamas expert Shlomi Eldar had earlier surmised that the abduction was the work of the Hebron-based Qawasmeh family,
which is affiliated with Hamas but operates independently: see Accused Kidnappers Are Rogue Hamas Branch, Al-Monitor, June 29, 2014.
Recently even Israel Hayom (the daily newspaper closely associated with Netanyahu) reported that Hamas did not know about the abduction:
see Yoav Limor, Interim Report, August 1, 2014.
On August 20 a video was released allegedly showing a Hamas official, Saleh al-Arouri, attributing the kidnapping to the organizations
military wing. Whether it was ordered by Hamas leadership or not remains unclear. !
According to some sources, until June 24, Hamas arrested terrorists from other factions responsible for rocket fire on Israel: see Avi
Issacharoff, Hamas Arrests Terror Cell Responsible for Rocket Fire on Israel, The Times of Israel, June 25, 2014. !
On June 29, the IAF attacked a rocket-launching cell associated, according to some sources, with Hamas: see Jeffrey Heller, Netanyahu
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Accuses Hamas of Involvement in Gaza Rocket Fire, Reuters, June 30, 2014. According to other sources, Hamas began shooting only on June
30, after one of its men was killed the day before: see Avi Issacharoff, Hamas Fires Rockets for First Time Since 2012, Israel Officials Say,
The Times of Israel, June 30, 2014. !
According to expert estimates, tunnels can be dug at six to twelve meters a day, an average tunnel taking three months to complete. A former
commander of an elite IDF combat engineering company estimated that a five-hundred-meter-long tunnel would take a month and a half to
dig, and a longer tunnel would take several months at most. !
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