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Menstrual Time: The Sociocognitive Mapping of "The Menstrual Cycle"

Author(s): Johanna Foster


Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 11, No. 3, Special Issue: Lumping and Splitting (Sep., 1996), pp.
523-547
Published by: Springer
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Sociological
Forum,
Vol.
11,
No.
3,
1996
Menstrual Time: The
Sociocognitive Mapping
of "The Menstrual
Cycle"
Johanna
Foster1,2
Despite
the
many angles from
which the
biological phenomenon
now known
as "the menstrual
cycle"
has been
addressed,
no work
explicitly focuses
on
how social
groups actually
draw lines around and
mentally partition
these
complex biological processes
into discrete
temporal
units. This
paper
examines
not the
meaning of
"the menstrual
cycle," per
se,
but
hegemonic
Western
culture's
intersubjective
notions
of
how to carve
up
this
inherently
unstructured
phenomenon
in the
first place. Although sociologists of cognition
have still to
consider this sociomental
structuring of
"the menstrual
cycle"
as a case
of
mental
cartography,
and
sociologists of
time have still to consider "menstrual
time" as a case
of sociotemporality,
I conclude that the mental
mapping
out
of
what constitutes the elements
of
this
rhythm
is a
highly
social act with
serious
implications for
women's lives.
KEY WORDS: menstrual
cycle; menstruation; sociology
of
cognition; sociology
of
time;
so-
ciotemporality.
Menstruation
per
se has no
meaning,
for menstruation
per
se does not exist. Louise
Lander, 1988,
p.
187.
INTRODUCTION
Biology
teaches us
that,
at
regular
intervals,
the levels of ovarian and
pituitary
hormones in the female
body
rise and stimulate the
growth
of
Graafian follicles within the
ovary.
One of these follicles
eventually
matures
as an ovum and is released
by
one of the two ovaries into a
Fallopian
tube.
1Department
of
Sociology, Rutgers University,
P. 0. Box
5072,
New
Brunswick,
New
Jersey
08903-5072.
2To whom
correspondence
should be addressed.
523
0884-8971/96/0900-0523$09.50/0 ? 1996 Plenum
Publishing Corporation
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As the unfertilized
egg
descends into the
corpus
of the
uterus,
hormonal
fluctuations activate the
production
of a membrane
lining
of the uterine
wall within which the ovum becomes embedded. Unless fertilization takes
place,
the
lining
and the ovum detach from the uterine wall and exit the
body
via the
vagina.
Much has been written about this
biological phenomenon
now known
as "the menstrual
cycle." Poetry, religion, mythology,
folklore,
anthropol-
ogy,
and medical science have
repeatedly
taken this natural female
rhythm
as the focus of
inquiry.
Such literatures include cultural
analyses
that in-
vestigate
how women
give meaning
to the
regular changes
in their bodies
(e.g.,
Snowden and
Christian, 1983; Kay,
1986; Martin, 1987; Lee,
1994);
investigations
of associated
rites, taboos,
and
symbolism (e.g., Weideger,
1976; Delaney
et
al., 1978;
Shuttle and
Redgrove,
1978; Golub, 1983;
Sjoo
and
Mor, 1987; Grahn,
1993); description
and debate over the
physical,
psychological,
and emotional effects
(e.g.,
Chadwick, 1932; Fluhmann, 1939,
1956; Deustch, 1944; Maddux, 1975; Dalton, 1983;
Fausto-Sterling,
1985;
Tavris,
1992);
and behavioral effects on women's lives
(e.g.,
Ferdman, 1973;
Snowden and
Christian,
1983).
Such
explorations
include
empirical
studies
examining physiological
and
morphological changes including
amount of
blood loss
(e.g., Haynes
et
al.,
1977);
duration of
parts
of the
rhythm,
such
as the time of
bleeding (e.g.,
Rothstein and Sanchez
Mena,
1975);
the
amount of time it takes for the
egg
to move from the
ovary
to the uterus
(e.g., Bailey
and
Marshall,
1970);
or the duration of the entire
cycle
itself
(e.g.,
Foster, 1889; Treloar,
1974).
Yet
despite
the
many angles
from which "the menstrual
cycle"
has been
addressed,
no work
explicitly
focuses on how social
groups mentally parti-
tion these
complex biological processes
into discrete
temporal
units. Al-
though
science is
relatively
certain about what sorts of
biological changes
take
place
in women's bodies
periodically,
it is not at all certain how to
structure "menstrual" time. For
example,
does "the menstrual
cycle"
consist
of two
parts
or six
parts?
Is the
"postovulatory stage"
identical to the
"pre-
menstrual
stage?" Why
does the
"proliferative stage"
sometimes include
the "menstrual
phase"
but other times not? Does an
egg
have to be re-
leased for "the menstrual
cycle"
to be considered
complete?
Is
"premen-
struation" a more critical
stage
than
"regeneration?" Simply put,
medical
science has
yet
to
produce
consistent mental
maps
that structure collective
thinking
about how
many
discrete
phases actually
constitute "the menstrual
cycle,"
what to call these
phases,
how
long
each of these
phases
should
take,
what must be included in the
cycle
for it to count as a full
cycle,
or
which
phases
of the
cycle carry
the most
significance.
More
fundamentally,
science takes for
granted
that "the menstrual
cycle"
is a
cycle.
In this
paper,
then,
I examine not the
meaning
of "the menstrual
cycle," per
se,
but
524 Foster
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hegemonic
Western culture's
intersubjective
notions of how to
cognitively
carve
up
this
inherently
unstructured
phenomenon
in the first
place.
MAKING "MENSTRUAL " TIME: LOOKING AT
WOMEN'S PERIODICITY THROUGH VARIOUS MODELS
OF TIME
The
conceptualization
of "menstrual" time as akin to a
spinning
wheel
traveling along
the road of a woman's fertile life is the one that carries
the most
currency
in
popular
and medical discourse in the West. Yet there
is
nothing
inevitable about
conceptualizing
"menstrual" time in
precisely
this
way.
Rather,
this time is better understood as a social
invention,
a
result of similar social
processes
of
"making
time" that have
produced
the
"hour" and the "week"
(Zerubavel, 1985).
Each of these
temporal
units is
a
consequence
of what I call sociomental
cartography,
and
suggests
that the
ways
in which social
groups cognitively organize
"menstrual"
time,
like the
organization
of the
week,
is neither an individual
interpretation
nor a uni-
versal
measure,
but a social
process
of
temporal
differentiation.
For
example,
the demarcation between sacred and
profane
time
(Durkheim, 1915/1965:21-33)
is one of several alternative
ways
of
organ-
izing
women's
periodicity
that
betrays
the
conventionality
of "menstrual
maps."
Here,
all social life is constituted
by ongoing
transitions from
pro-
fane moments to sacred
ones,
from unmarked moments to marked
ones,
or as the
inherently
social
process
of
constructing temporal discontinuity
between
ordinary
moments and
extraordinary
moments. As
such,
women's
periodicity might
be structured
by
the marked and therefore sacred mo-
ments when the
lining
and unfertilized
egg
are released from the
body
and
the unmarked and therefore
profane
moments when this is not
occurring
(Fig. 1). Alternatively,
the
rhythm
could manifest itself in a double-extraor-
dinary
beat,
marked
by
the sacred moments when the
egg
is released from
the
ovary
but marked
again
when the
egg
and
lining
exit a woman's
body.
The
profane
moments would thus
correspond
to all other moments in be-
tween
(Fig. 2).3
This
process
of
temporal separation
is never inevitable but
essentially
about the
relationship
between the individual and the
group;
the
drawing
of boundaries between subordinate individual
(profane)
time
and
superordinate
collective
(sacred)
time
ultimately
solidifies the collective
3In stark contrast to this
perspective, Penelope
Shuttle and Peter
Redgrove (1978) argue
that
women's
periodicity
is
by
nature a
bipolar
fluctuation between "ovulation" and "menstrua-
tion,"
and that it is this
bipolarity
that is the root of all social
bipolarities.
Menstrual Time 525
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Foster
Sacred Sacred
1' Profane Profane
egg
and tissue
egg
and tissue
exit
body
exit
body
Fig.
1.
Sacred Sacred
Profane Profane
egg
and tissue
egg
released
exit
body
from
ovary
Fig.
2.
consciousness of social
groups by subjugating purely personal
routines to
collective
patterns (Durkheim, 1915/1965).
"Menstrual" time could also be understood as akin to the
swinging
of
a
pendulum,
or the
repeated
fluctuation between two
polarities (Leach,
1961).
Here,
temporal
differentiation
might
manifest itself not
just
in the
"flipping
of sides" but
complete stops (Leach).
For
example,
the
temporal
period
when the
egg
and tissue exit a woman's
body might
be
conceptual-
ized as
merely
the
opposite
time from when this
activity
is not
occurring.
526
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Menstrual Time
egg
and
egg
and
tissue exit tissue not
body
(on)
exit
body
(off)
Fig.
3.
The
very phrase,
"I am on
my period," implies
that at some
opposite
time,
the
pendulum
will
swing
to a
position
that is "'off'
my period" (Fig. 3).
Social
groups might
understand "menstrual" time not
just
as the con-
struction of
oppositions,
but an
asymmetrical relationship
between these
two
poles
as well
(Waugh, 1982:299).
The
relationship
between two con-
trasting types
of time characterized
by
the markedness of
only
one of these
temporal
elements as endowed with x and the nonmarkedness of the other
as nonendowed with x
(Waugh, 1982:299)
could also be
interpreted
as an
unequal separation
of units into a
temporal hierarchy
where the marked
segment
naturalizes the
superiority
of the unmarked4
(1982:299).
The un-
marked
temporal
element
might
constitute the
ground,
while the marked
temporal
element constitutes a
figure
located on that
ground.
Such
cogni-
tive
mapping might
mark the moment when the
egg
and tissue are released
from the
body
as a
"figure" against
the unmarked
"ground"
when the
egg
4For an
example
of the use of markedness in
naturalizing
social
hierarchies,
see
Wayne
Brek-
hus
(this issue).
527
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Foster
Ground: all other moments
Figure: egg
and tissue exit
body
Fig.
4.
and/or
tissue is not released
(Fig. 4).
Or the moments when the
egg
is
released from the
ovary
and when the
egg
exits the
body
could be
mapped
as discrete
entities,
and all time in between these two
figures
understood
as a
period during
which
nothing significant
occurs
(Fig. 5). Alternatively,
the moment when the
egg
is released from the
body might
be
conceptu-
alized not as a
figure,
but as a marked subset of the unmarked set
(Fig.
6;
Waugh, 302-303).
Unlike in other
models, however,
where the marked
element can be imbued with either
positive
or
negative
moral value
(Durk-
heim,
1915/1965),
as in the notion that both
"god"
and "devil" are marked
and therefore
sacred,
here the marked
element,
or
figure,
or
subset,
is that
which
necessarily
carries social
stigma.
In a
very
different
model,
"menstrual" time could be understood as
discontinuous,
but also linear and irreversible.
Here,
the "menstrual"
rhythm might
be understood as a chain of
unique
events such that the first
drop
of an
egg
is
point
A,
the
shedding
of the
egg
and tissue is
point
B,
and the next
dropping
of the
egg
is
point
C. Or
instead,
the rise in hor-
mones
might
be
point
A,
the maturation of the follicle as
point
B,
the
release of the
egg
from the
ovary
as
point
C,
the next rise in hormones as
528
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Menstrual Time
Ground: all other moments
Figure: egg
Figure egg
and tissue exit
released from
body
ovary
Fig.
5.
point
D,
etc.
(Fig. 7).
Such
mapping
would be
accomplished
without ever
mentally equating
the next
point
in time with
any point
that has come be-
fore
it,
nor
any point
thereafter.
In contrast to this
totally
linear
map
of
time,
women's
periodicity might
be understood as a wheel with
"wedges" positioned
at various
temporal
distances that are
reexperienced
as the wheel
spins.
Points A-D described
above
might
mark the
"wedges"
on this
wheel,
and the recurrence of
"wedge
A' would be the return of the same
type
of
phenomenon
at
regular
intervals,
or the
reexperience
of
typified
events rather than
totally unique
moments
(Eliade,
1959:68-113;
Fig. 8).
Such
reexperiences
of
essentially
the same
type
of time
suggests
that what is
returning again
and
again may
not even be a
typified
event,
but a return of the
very
same
unique
event as
it
first
occurred
(1959). Using
this
conceptualization
of time as constituted
by
"eternal returns"
(1959:90),
the recurrence of
"wedge
A' would be the
return of the
one, first,
or
unique entity
over and over
again.
Lastly,
"menstrual" time could be understood as
rhythmic patterns
that
combine elements of
separation, linearity, circularity,
and
reversibility,
such
as in the model of time as wheels
(cycles) traveling along
an historical road
529
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Foster
Set
L
Subset
Fig.
6.
A
B C D
rise of
ovarian
hormones
maturation
of folliele
release of
egg
from
ovary
rise of
ovarian
hormones
Fig.
7.
(linear progression; Zerubavel,
1985:83-86).
Not
only
would
cycles
them-
selves be
cognitively mapped
into distinct
segments,
but these
segmented
cycles
could rotate
along
historical continuums that are themselves
mapped
into distinct
segments, patterns
that include both
regular
returns at the
very
same time that
they
include irreversibilities. Women's
periodicity might
be
understood, then,
not as the transition between
ordinary
and
extraordinary
a I ~~~~~~~Rl
530
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Menstrual Time
D
egg
and
j
/tissue
exit
body
release
of
egg
from
ovary
C
A
rise of
ovarian
hormone
Imaturation
of
follicle
[ ^
B
Fig.
8.
moments,
or a
swinging pendulum,
but as a
cycle
carved
up
like a wheel
with distinct
"wedges" spinning along
the historical road of a woman's fer-
tile life
(Fig. 9).
This
popular
and clinical
conceptualization
of "menstrual"
time as akin to a wheel
spinning along
road could be
just
one of a number
of
ways
that social
groups might
make sense of natural
changes
in the fe-
male
body.
Whether
thought
of as a
"bipolar beat,"
an "eternal
return,"
or a "menstrual
cycle,"
that these
rhythms
are
socially produced
is further
illustrated,
as I will
show,
in the lack of consensus over how to
partition
the
cycle
itself.
Mapping
Out "the Menstrual
Cycle":
The Creation of
Discrete Entities
To think of
supposedly
isolated occurrences as
constituting
"the men-
strual wheel" involves a
process
of
"making
time" not unlike the manner
in which collectives "make
space":
531
,w
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Foster
D
egg
and
tissue
exit
body
release
of
egg
\from
ovary
C
A
rise of
ovarian
hormone
maturation
of
follicle
B
Woman's
Age
in Years
(Linear Progression)
Fig.
9.
Just as we cut
supposedly
discrete chunks like countries and school districts off
from
ecological continuums,
we also carve
seemingly
insular
segments
such as "The
Renaissance" or "adolescence" out of historical continuums. Such discontinuous
experience
of time is
quite
evident from the
way
we isolate from the flow of
occurrences of
supposedly freestanding
events such as
meetings, classes,
and
shows,
some of which we further subdivide into smaller
though
still discrete
particles-meals
into
courses,
baseball
games
into
innings.
It is also manifested in
our
ability
to create stories with
beginnings
and ends as well as in the
way
we break
down
novels, sonatas,
and
plays
into
chapters,
movements,
and acts.
(Zerubavel,
1991:9)
Yet,
it would be a mistake to assume that medical science is certain about
the distinctiveness of the
"wedges"
of "the menstrual
cycle" (Maddux,
1975:53).
On the
contrary, although
science is
relatively
certain about what
sorts of
changes
take
place during
"the menstrual
cycle,"
there is some
discrepancy
over how
many
discrete
phases (re: "wedges")
best
represents
such
changes.
For
example, during
the 19th and
early
20th
century,
"the menstrual
cycle"
was
thought
to
proceed through
a series of at least four to as
many
as
eight stages (Laqueur, 1992). Today,
"the menstrual
cycle"
is described
in some instances as an
essentially bipolar beat,
the first
occurring
when
-L L~~M
_ -L A
532
Y
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the
egg
leaves the
ovary,
or
"ovulation,"
and the next at the time of bleed-
ing,
or "menstruation"
(Shuttle
and
Redgrove, 1978:29).
At other times
this basic twofold beat is described as two
phases, namely,
the
"proliferative
stage,"
when the follicles in the
ovary
start to
grow
and the "secretive" or
"destructive
stage" (Maddux, 1975)
when the
lining
of the womb starts to
detach. Other accounts find not a
bipolar rhythm
but three discrete
stages,
namely
the
"proliferative,"
the
"secretive,"
and "menstrual
phase"
when
the
lining
of the womb is shed
(Laqueur, 1992). Stranger
still,
others
argue
that the "menstrual
cycle"
is
mapped
as
having
not
two,
not
three,
but four
major stages (Shuttle
and
Redgrove, 1978):
first,
the
"preovulatory phase"
when follicles
ripen
and
mature; second,
the
"ovulatory phase"
when the
egg
leaves the
ovary; third,
the
"premenstrual phase"
when
estrogen
and
progesterone
hormone levels
drop;
and
fourth,
the "menstrual
phase"
when
the
lining
of the womb is shed. Yet others claim five
phases
in
toto,
begin-
ning
with the "menstrual
phase,"
then the
"follicular,"
followed
by
the
"ovulatory phase,"
the "luteal
phase"
when the
body produces
the
corpus
luteum,
and last the
"premenstrual phase" (Asso, 1983). Perhaps
most in-
teresting
is an account from one text that contradicts its earlier
map
to
argue
for six discrete
phases, namely "beginning
of
cycle [sic],"
"follicular,"
"preovulation,"
"ovulation," "luteal,"
and
"premenstrual" (Asso). Finally,
there are those that demarcate six
major phases
but refer to them in order
as
"regeneration," "preovulation," "postovulation," "premenstruation,"
and
"menstruation"
(Fluhmann, 1956).
There is much evidence to illustrate that the
cycle
is a nexus of
proc-
esses sometimes
lumped together
and other times
split apart
into discrete
"natural
phases."
For
example,
an
inherently unsegmented
flow of
physi-
ological changes
is in some cases
lumped
into
just
two distinct
parts
called
"ovulation" and "menstruation" and more
increasingly
into three distinct
phases
with the recent attention to
"premenstruation."
In other
instances,
the same
biological processes
are
split
into several distinct
phases,
such as
when the
"proliferative phase" (e.g.,
Maddux,
1975)
is
separated
into the
"menstrual
phase"
and the "follicular
phase" (e.g.,
Asso,
1983),
or when
the
"stage
of secretion" is
split
into the
"postovulatory"
and
"premenstrual"
phases (e.g.,
Fluhmann,
1956).
At other
times,
the
"secretory stage"
is
split
into the "luteal" and
"premenstrual phase" (e.g.,
Asso,
1983).
Yet it would
be a mistake to assume science has committed a bundle of
errors;
these
differences in how to draw the boundaries around
particular
moments of
"the menstrual
cycle"
are not errors at
all,
but the result of
sociocognitive
mapping.
Not
only
do the literatures reflect
disagreement
over the number of
distinctive
phases comprising
"the menstrual
cycle,"
there is evidence that
the same
"wedges"
of
change
have been
given
different names. For exam-
Menstrual Time 533
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pie,
the nexus of
changes
that occur after the
lining
of the womb has been
shed has been termed both the
"regenerative phase"
and
"postmenstrual
phase" (Fluhmann,
1939;
Cavanagh, 1969),
and the
"postovulatory stage"
has also been termed the
"premenstrual phase" (Fluhmann, 1956).
Such
mapping
is illustrative of an emic
perspective (Pike, 1967), operating
here
as the
ability
of "insiders" to
interpret
dissimilar
signs
as
referring
to an
identical
entity.
For
example,
both
whistling
and
raising
a hand serve to
signal
a taxi
cab,
although
the two actions are
seemingly dissimilar;
this
dissimilarity
makes no difference
"emically" speaking.
On the other
hand,
"menstrual
cycle"
elements that are
actually
some-
what different
biologically
have nonetheless been
given
the same name.
These instances
suggest
not acts of
conceptual splitting
but collective acts
of
conceptual lumping
or the
collapsing
of distinct
processes
into a
single
unit. For
example,
what has been termed the
"proliferation phase"
has re-
ferred to each of the
following
series of
changes:
first,
the
changes
that
occur in a woman's
body
after "menstruation" and
prior
to the release of
the
egg
from the
ovary (e.g., Laqueur, 1992);
second,
to those
changes
that
occur from the onset of "menstruation" and continue until after the
egg
has been released from the
ovary (e.g.,
Maddux,
1975);
and
third,
to those
changes
that
begin
after "menstruation" and continue until the
beginning
of "ovulation"
(e.g.,
Fluhmann,
1956). Despite
the fact that each of these
three instances refers to a distinct set of
changes, again,
all have been con-
sidered
emically
similar.
That such "menstrual
maps"
are
purely
conventional is
perhaps
most
hotly
debated in the
contemporary
controversies in the West over the ex-
istence and nature of
"premenstrual syndrome" ("PMS").
"Premenstrual
syndrome"
has
garnered significant
medical attention in the
past
25
years,
and
significant popular
attention in America since the 1980s
(e.g.,
Tavris,
1992; Martin,
1987).
Yet for at least 150
years,
there has been debate in
Western medical communities over the
impact
of the "menstrual
phase"
on women's mental
health,
and
particularly
on women's
ability
to do
paid
labor.
Interestingly,
this attention to the "menstrual
phase"
as the time of
pathology
has now become refocused on the time before "menstruation"
as the
period
of
danger. Many
feminists are
wary
of the
equation
of
physi-
ological changes
with
psychological,
emotional,
or behavioral
changes given
the
pervasive
use of such
connections,
often
unsubstantiated,
to
justify
the
continued subordination of women. Other feminist critics welcome the re-
cent attention
given
the
history
of collective
ignorance
and denial of such
natural
bodily changes,
even as other feminists
respond
that there is noth-
ing purely
natural about "PMS." Such debates
are, among
other
things,
an
excellent
example
of the current cultural
marking
of what was
formerly
an
unmarked
phase
of "the menstrual
cycle."
Yet none of the
positions
on
534 Foster
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"PMS"
explicitly
addresses the issue in the terms of "border
disputes"
(Zerubavel, 1991:3).
Nowhere in the discourse is there
specific
attention
to the fact that the
very
existence of such a
"syndrome"
relies not
only
on
the
sociocognitive mapping
out of a distinct or discrete
entity
called
"pre-
menstruation" but that this
process
is
part
of a
larger mapping
of "the
menstrual
cycle"
itself. Unlike other "border
disputes"
that reflect chal-
lenges
either to where the line is drawn or to whether it should be drawn
at
all,
the various wars in the West include
both,
namely,
whether to
lump
certain
phases
of the
cycle together
as a
period
where
nothing
distinctive
occurs,
or to
actually split
them off as distinct "islands of
meaning"
(Zerubavel, 1991:5-6).
"Menstrual" Time as Standardized Time: "Allo-Phases" and
"Allo-Cycles"
Not
only
are there
discrepancies
over how
many phases
constitute "the
menstrual
cycle"
and what to call these
supposedly
distinct
phases,
but
there is also contention in the literatures over how
long
some of these
stages
should
last,
particularly
"ovulation,"
"postovulation," "premen-
struation," "menstruation,"
and
perhaps
most
importantly,
the whole "men-
strual
cycle."
Each of these often unbeknownst debates over the
appropriate
amount of time needed to
complete
these
stages,
and even the
"full
cycle,"
are additional illustrations of collective acts of mental
cartog-
raphy, namely
the
lumping together
of dissimilar units of mathematical time
to construct standardized
phases
of "the menstrual
cycle"
as well as to
standardize the rotation of the entire "menstrual
cycle"
itself.
In contrast to the
popular
and often clinical notion that certain
phases
of "the menstrual
cycle"
are not
only
distinct but have a fixed
length,
con-
sider the
following examples.
First,
"ovulation" is allotted
only
one
day
in
some instances
(e.g., Fluhmann,
1956),
while in
others,
three
days (e.g.,
Asso,
1983).
Second,
in some cases "ovulation" is
reported
to occur on
day
14 of a
28-day cycle, implying
that the
"postovulatory phase"
is fixed at
two weeks
(Asso, 1983).
Others
suggest
that "ovulation"
actually
occurs at
variable
points during
the
cycle (e.g.,
James, 1965;
Baily
and
Marshall,
1970).
Third,
the
stage
often called "premenstruation" is sometimes allotted
one week
(e.g.,
Bickers,
1954)
while in other
places
refers to a three-
(e.g.,
Fluhmann,
1956)
or
five-day period prior
to
bleeding (e.g.,
Asso,
1983).
Fourth,
in some
instances,
the
length
of the
bleeding phase
itself is set at
five
days (e.g.,
Asso,
1983);
in other
instances,
four
(e.g.,
Fluhmann,
1956),
and in
others,
seven
days (Shuttle
and
Redgrove, 1978). Empirical
evidence
overwhelmingly suggests
that the
length
of the "menstrual
phase"
is
quite
Menstrual Time 535
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variable,
spanning anywhere
from two to
eight days
in duration
(e.g., King,
1926;
Goldzieher et
al., 1947;
Maclennan and
Maclennan, 1962;
Matsu-
mota, 1962;
Koshi et
al., 1970;
Rothstein and Sanchez
Mena,
1975).
Yet,
regardless
of whether it takes one hour or one
day
or three
days
for the
egg
to leave the
ovary,
these dissimilar units of mathematical time are con-
ceptually lumped together
and called "ovulation."
Regardless
of whether
it takes 14
days
or 17
days
after the
egg
is released for the
cycle
to
begin
again,
dissimilar units of mathematical time are
again lumped together
and
called
"postovulation."
Likewise,
regardless
of whether it takes one
day
or
one week to
complete
the
phase prior
to
bleeding,
these units are each
called
"premenstruation."
And
regardless
of whether the
bleeding phase
takes two
days
or nine
days,
such mathematical
discrepancies
are consid-
ered irrelevant and
lumped together
as the "menstrual
period."
Such evidence
suggests something
called an
"allo-phase" (Pike, 1967;
Zerubavel,
1991:17).
Just as there are emic units of time called "allo-
chrones"
(Zerubavel, 1979:4),
as when both
February
and
August
count as
a "month" even
though August
is
always
at least two
days longer
than Feb-
ruary (Zerubavel, 1991:17),
the same
process
of
temporal clustering
could
produce "allo-phases": despite
the fact that such "menstrual
periods"
that
last two
days
or
eight days
are
obviously
not
mathematically equivalent,
they
are nonetheless understood as identical
segments
of time sociocultu-
rally (Sorokin, 1937-41).
This
process
returns in the
widely recognized,
but
undertheorized,
myth
of "the
28-day
menstrual
cycle." Conventionally
understood to
require
28
days,
medical science has
long
debated
(e.g.,
Foster,
1889)
and now con-
cedes that such a
figure
is
only
an
average, meaning
that it is
quite possible
that no woman has a
cycle
that lasts as
long
as,
or for
only,
28
days (e.g.,
Arey,
1939; Burch, 1967;
Chiazze et
al., 1968; Treloar, 1974;
Bean et
al.,
1979;
Rice et
al.,
1981).
It is also well understood that the
length
of an
individual woman's
cycle
does not remain fixed from one
cycle
to the next
(Gunn
et
al., 1937; Treloar, 1974; Golub,
1992)
nor over the course of her
life
(Vollman,
1956;
Chiazze et
al.,
1968).
Much has been written about the
28-day average
and its
strikingly
close
approximation
to the 29.5
days
of
the lunar
cycle (e.g.,
Gunn et
al, 1937;
Menaker and
Menaker, 1959;
Wat-
son, 1973;
Sjoo
and
Mor, 1987; Grahn,
1993),
a connection
exemplified
in
the shared
linguistic origin
of the words "menses" and "month"
(Bickers,
1954:3; Sjoo
and
Mor, 1987:151). Interestingly,
such works fail to address
the obvious connection between 28
days
and the conventional under-
standing
of the month as
consisting
of
four
weeks of seven
days.
What
pro-
vocative
analyses
of the
relationship
between "menstrual
cycles"
and lunar
cycles
overlook is the manner in which the
weekly organization
of social
life has influenced our conventional
understanding
of both of these
cycles.
536 Foster
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As Zerubavel
argues, "[t]he
artificial nature of social
scheduling
is ... evi-
dent from the sheer fact that so
many
events in our
daily
life are scheduled
for 'rounded off' times such as 'on the hour"'
(1981:9).
That we take for
granted
the
appropriate length
of "the menstrual
cycle"
to be a
neat,
"rounded-off,"
four weeks
(not
32
days
or 27
days)
is more than
just
a
coincidence.
Regardless
of whether women
experience
a
21-day cycle
or a
45-day cycle,
these
cycles
are still
collectively
called "menstrual"-as well
as
monthly-cycles
and
suggest
the existence of an
"allo-cycle." Despite
assumptions
about the naturalness of a
"monthly" rhythm,
it
appears
that
this
understanding
of "menstrual time" is based not on mathematical units
of
time,
but sociocultural ones. Even if the
overwhelming empirical
evi-
dence
against
a "normal"
cycle length
were
disregarded,
the fact that social
groups
call the "menstrual
cycle"
a
"monthly cycle"
in and of itself
betrays
the
conventionality
of "menstrual time"-the
very temporal
unit "month"
is also not a
purely
mathematical unit.
Illustrative of this
phenomenon
of
standardization,
a local radio station
recently encouraged
listeners to call in and discuss
"premenstrual syn-
drome." One caller's
joke
reveals much about collective
understandings
of
the internal structure of the
cycle.
He asked if we had heard about the
club that
opened
for women's
jazz
music: "One week out of the month for
ragtime,
and another week for the blues"
(my emphasis).
Embedded in this
joke
is the
assumption
that both the
"premenstrual"
and "menstrual
phase"
constitute a
week,
not two or three
days,
of the full
cycle.
On the same
show,
a woman noted the
predictability
of the "menstrual"
rhythm by
ex-
plaining
that
"you
can set
your
watch to it"
[meaning
the onset of
bleeding].
"I know it will come either
Sunday night
or
Monday morning" (my empha-
sis).
In the same
breath,
the caller illustrates more
generally
the
assumption
of standardized "menstrual units" as well as an
implicit recognition
that
these units have been constructed
by lumping
mathematical units of time
into sociocultural ones.
THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME:
"MENSTRUAL
"
TIME AND TEMPORAL ANOMALIES
Related to this
phenomenon
of
lumping
mathematical units of time
into sociocultural units is the
cognitive splitting
off of "disordered"
parts
of "the menstrual
cycle,"
not because
they
are inevitable health
problems
but because
they
are threats to
attempts
at standardization.
Although
col-
lective
understandings
of the internal structure of "the menstrual
cycle"
rely
on
"allo-phases"
and
"allo-cycles,"
the existence of the
following
"men-
Menstrual Time 537
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Foster
Table I. Percent Distribution of Women With All
Cycles
Ovulatory During
a Three-Month
Period,
N
=
254a
Age
in Years Percent
Ovulatory
15-19 68.2
20-24 62.0
25-29 87.9
30-34 90.9
35-39 90.9
aData from Metcalf and MacKenzie
(1980)
as cited in Asso
(1983).
strual disturbances" indicates that not all
periods
of
bleeding
or
cycle
ro-
tations can be
lumped together. Apparently,
some
just
do not count.
For
example,
it is
popularly
assumed that "ovulation" and "menstrua-
tion" must occur in the same
monthly cycle
for it to be considered a normal
period.
It is often taken for
granted
that the "menstrual"
rhythm
must
pass
through
both of these
stages
in order for the entire
cycle
to "count" as
normal.
Paradoxically,
medical science is aware of the
phenomenon
called
"anovulatory
menstruation,"
or the natural movement into the "menstrual
phase" despite
the absence of "ovulation" since the last "menstrual
phase"
(Asso, 1983).
Such a
phenomenon
often reflects more than a random miss-
ing
of "ovulation."
Upon
menarche, many girls experience
a consistent
pe-
riod of
"anovulatory
menstruation" that
may
last a
period
of
years (Collett,
1954;
Doring,
1969; Maddux,
1975).
Evidence
suggests
that it is
quite
nor-
mal that the first "menstrual
cycles" may
not include the release of an
egg,
nor
might
the
cycles
that
approach menopause (Doring, 1969).
Aside from
the
patterns
of
"anovulatory
menstruation" that occur at these
"poles,"
a
significant
number of women
apparently experience "anovulatory cycles"
throughout
their lives
(Table I).
Not
only
is it assumed that ovulation must occur at least once to
"count" as a normal
cycle
but "ovulation" must occur
only
once
during
any
one rotation.
However,
some women can ovulate twice in
any
one
cycle,
and some women bleed
quite naturally,
or
"spot,"
either before the "offi-
cial"
period
is
supposed
to
begin,
or after it has
apparently
finished
(Ste-
wart et
al.,
1987:84)
Here,
the same
process
of blood
exiting
the
body
via
the
vagina
is understood as
quite
different from the blood that is excreted
during
the menstrual
period.
In other
words,
from an etic
("outsider") per-
spective,
these
processes may
indeed be
identical, yet
from an emic
per-
spective ("insider"), they
are considered
quite
distinct.
Moreover,
if women
bleed, say,
for ten
days,
this is not considered a
case of what I have termed an
"allo-phase"
but rather considered
bleeding
"too
much,"
or
"menorrhagia."
Likewise,
if women
routinely "skip"
men-
538
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Menstrual Time
"Normal Menstruation"
iodic Interval
Hemorrhage"
or
bleeding
that occurs around the time of "ovulation"
igomenur-lear"or prolongation ofrthe
menstrual
cycle" beyond "average"
28
days
Il LII I
"Polymenu-rhea"
or too
frequent bleeding,
or
intervals shorter than the
"average"
28
days
Fig.
10. Disorders of the incidence of "menstruation." Width of column
represents
du-
ration of
flow;
space
between each column
represents
time between
bleeding; height
of column
represents
amount of blood.
Adapted
from Fluhmann
(1939:168).
strual
periods
and do not
bleed,
say,
for 90
days,
such a
cycle
is considered
"too
long,"
and called
"oligomenorrhea."
Both conditions are considered
malfunctions of the
cycle
even
though
the medical literature admits that
much of this
"irregularity"
is often
natural,
particularly
in the cases of
"anovulatory menstruation,"
or
"spotting" during
"ovulation"
(Fig. 10).
The
strangeness
of
ovulating
twice a
cycle,
or the
dangers
of "inter-
menstrual
bleeding"
is better understood in terms of
"temporal
anomalies"
(Zerubavel, 1981:21-30).
Here,
certain events become
problematic
not be-
cause there is
anything inevitably perilous
or even
peculiar
about them but
I
539
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because
they transpire
at times other than those
prescribed by
convention.
Such "anomalies" are
cognitively disturbing precisely
because
they
are re-
minders that the
temporal rhythms
that
groups depend
on so
readily
to
ensure the smooth
functioning
of
day-to-day living,
such as the
weekly cycle
or the rotation of work
shifts,
are not inevitable
patterns,
but ones that
collectives have themselves
produced.
For
example,
there is
nothing cog-
nitively troubling
about a
graduate
student
working
in a research lab at 10
o'clock on
Thursday night.
Nonetheless,
the same scenario seems
slightly
strange
if it occurs at 10 o'clock on
Thursday night
in a
department
where
graduate
students
routinely
socialize at a local
pub
on
Thursday evenings.
Here the sense of
strangeness
is a result of an event located outside of
the conventional
temporal
framework,
not from
anything particularly
ab-
normal about the
activity
itself.
Similarly,
what is so often
disturbing
about "menstrual anomalies" like
"spotting"
is that such events unmask collective
attempts
to standardize
what are otherwise
highly
variable
rhythmic patterns.
Much of this so-called
problematic cycling
is in
many
cases not a threat to a woman's
health,5
but
rather a threat to collective notions of
temporal regularity,
an alarm that
some event has occurred outside of the bounds determined via sociotem-
poral maps.
Such concern for these
"irregularities"
in the face of uncon-
firmed evidence of inevitable
consequences
for women's
good
health
suggests
that
part
of this
panic
is
again
better understood as a
response
to
calendrical
irregularities,
or those otherwise normal occurrences that are
problematic precisely
because
they happen
at the
wrong
time. Such
"anomalies" reflect a social
process
of
cognitive splitting
such that some
"menstrual"
activity
is
conceptualized
as abnormal in order to normalize
cultural
assumptions
about,
for
example,
discrete
cycle phases
or fixed
cycle
lengths. Ultimately,
such collective
mapping
allows a conventionalized
"menstrual clock" to
masquerade
as a
purely
"natural" clock to which all
women's bodies are
inevitably
set.
SHADES OF REIIEF
The contention that the internal structure of "the menstrual
cycle"
is
a
product
of social invention is evidenced
again by
the
changes
in social
importance given
to these distinct
phases.
To return to the
metaphor
of
cartography,
at various times or in various contexts certain moments of
"the menstrual
cycle"
are described "in relief" or are "colored"
(Brekhus,
5To
suggest
that such "disturbances" are not
inevitably dangerous
is in no
way
to
suggest
that
all
patterns
of "menstrual"
bleeding
should
always
be considered
unproblematic.
540 Foster
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this
issue)
in
ways
that reflect no
change
in the
biological
or
physiological
processes
themselves but rather a
change
in how social
groups collectively
value such
changes.
For
example,
the now
popular assumption
that "the menstrual
cycle"
is
split
into at least two
important parts ("ovulation"
and
"menstruation")
really only
surfaced in the medical literature in the 1930s when
Papanico-
laou
developed
the first reliable marker of the release of the ovum in hu-
man females
(i.e.,
the
Pap
smear;
Laqueur, 213).
The notion of a relevant
period
called "ovulation" was thus not even a consistent
part
of the socio-
cognitive map
of "the menstrual
cycle" prior
to the 1930s.
Ironically,
until
the mid-19th
century,
it was not
"ovulation,"
but
"menstruation,
which
[was
understood
as]
a
relatively benign purging
of
plethora,
not unlike other
forms of
corporeal self-regulation
of estrus in
animals,
marking
the
only
period during
which women are
normally
fertile"
(Laqueur, 213).
Before
Papanicolaou,
"menstruation"
may
have been understood as sacred time
in the Durkheimian
sense,
while all other moments were
relegated
to the
realm of
profane
or
ordinary
time.
Perhaps
with the
knowledge provided
by
the
pap
smear,
the mark of sacred has been afforded to both "ovulation"
and
"menstruation,"
with "ovulation" shaded as the benevolent sacred
given
notions of
compulsory
motherhood,
and "menstruation" as the ma-
levolent sacred.
Recently,
however,
menstrual
maps
are
showing
other
parts
of the
cy-
cle "in relief" in
ways they
have
yet
to do. I am
referring again
to the
"border
disputes"
over "PMS." Aside from those who
argue
that such a
phase
does not
really
exist as
distinctive,
there are those who concede that
such a
stage
does indeed deserve to be
demarcated,
but that it should not
be shown in such "relief." The same critics
might
find it
interesting
that
women never mention
they
are
"preovulatory," only rarely
do
they proclaim
they
are
"ovulating," yet
are more
likely
to talk about "menstruation" and
perhaps
most
publicly
about
"premenstruation." Currently,
there is more
clamor over the
impact
of the
"premenstrual stage"
than even the "men-
strual
stage"
on women's
psychological
and behavior
states,
suggesting
a
shift of both
scholarly
and
popular
attention
away
from the time of
bleeding
as the most relevant
"wedge"
of the
cycle
and toward
"premenstruation."
Now the determinant of "woman" as
naturally
unstable, emotional,
and
even
dangerous
to her
family
and
workplace
can be found in the
phase
just prior
to the time of
bleeding
rather than
actually during
the
bleeding
phase
as was the case
only
a few decades
ago.
It is
possible,
and
alarming,
that such
cognitive rearrangements
are
not about a shift in focus
away
from one
phase
and toward another but
rather a
widening
of the
angle
of vision such that more and more of the
previously
unmarked,
and
irrelevant,
parts
of the
cycle
are
being lumped
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together
as
socially important.
As more and more of the
cycle
becomes
stigmatized,
more and more of women's
daily
lives become marked as
prob-
lematic. As it
stands,
at least two weeks out of
every
month of women's
fertile lives can be
interpreted
as
potentially
onerous,
the "week" of "men-
struation" and the "week" of
"premenstruation." Many argue
that it is not
at all coincidental that such
changes
in the
"shading"
of "the menstrual
cycle"
are correlated with
significant changes
in the status of women in
contemporary
Western
society;
the more
gains
women have
made,
particu-
larly
in the labor
force,
the
greater
is the area of the "menstrual
map"
that
is shown in relief as a
potential
source of "natural"
dysfunction (Martin,
1987; Tavris,
1992).
These different
ways
of
telling
the
"important parts"
of the
story
of
"the menstrual
cycle"
could be understood as historical
changes
in
"plot
structure"
(White, 1978/74). Borrowing
from some historians' notion that
history
is not distinct from
story,
but rather the reduction of
very complex
processes
into
very simple
structures or
formulas,
the focus of the debate
here becomes not the "facts" of "the menstrual
cycle"
but how these facts
are
emplotted
in
particular
narratives.
Competing
historical narratives
plot
chains of events in different
ways
such that in one
account,
event A is
considered most
critical;
in another
account,
event B is the climactic
event;
and in
yet
another
account,
event C is most
important.
The facts or events
themselves do not
change,
but the "tone"
(Davis, 1984:17)
in which these
events are
interpreted may
conflict with other formulas or
may
be reinter-
preted
as
present
conditions are altered. In this
case,
as
present
conditions
are
restructured,
so will the "events" of "the menstrual
cycle"
be
changed
to tell a different
story-another way
of
saying
that the "relief
maps"
of
what
happens during
the
cycle
have been and
may
continue to
rearrange
to reflect cultural beliefs about the
meaning
of "woman."
WHAT'S IN THE NAME?
The
implications
of the
conventionality
of "menstrual time" become
even more evident when these elements shown "in relief" are those that
reinforce the
superior
status of the unmarked elements. A now well-un-
derstood illustration of this
process
is the
ability
of the term "mankind" to
operate
in standard
English
as an unmarked
category
that
lumps together
both men and
women,
while the marked
category
"womankind" refers
only
to women.
Here,
the marked and the unmarked terms reflect the relative
power
and value of men vis a vis women in a
particular
social order. In
this
case,
the social
marking
of the "menstrual
phase"
as the most relevant
period
of the
cycle may distinguish
this
temporal
unit as inferior in com-
542
Foster
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parison
to the unmarked
segments
of the
cycle, particularly
when the un-
marked
portion
is understood to be the
preparation
for
pregnancy,
or
preg-
nancy
itself.
If this is indeed the
case,
then it is
quite paradoxical
that the entire
cycle
is
apparently
named after this
supposedly
marked
phase.
Rather,
this
naming might suggest
that the normative element is
actually
the unmarked
"menstrual
cycle"
or entire set that stands for both the "menstrual
phase"
and all other
phases
while these
remaining
elements within the
cycle
be-
come
split
off as subsets.
However,
the
very
term "menstrual" comes from
"menses" and is a reference not to the location of these
biological changes
(i.e., ovary,
uterus,
vagina)
nor to what controls these
changes (pituitary
hormones,
ovarian
hormones)
nor to its
apparent
functions
past
or
present
(i.e., purging
of excess
fluids, cleansing,
fertilization,
reproduction).
Instead,
this
complex
of
biological processes
is
apparently
named for the centuries-
long
belief that the
rhythmic appearance
of blood is akin to the
cyclical
movement of the moon-hence "menstruation" and "month"
sharing
the
same
linguistic origin.
Thus,
one resolution to this
paradoxical split
between
marked and unmarked
might
come with a reminder
that,
historically,
the
bleeding phase
was
erroneously thought
of as the
only
time that women
could conceive.
Thus,
the
lumping
of the entire
cycle
under the name "the
menstrual
cycle"
would have
legitimated
the
supposed period
of
fertility
as
the
superior
element,
and all other
periods
as inferior.
(Interestingly,
some
argue
that "menstruation" is
actually
an
evolutionary anomaly
in the human
species [Landers]
since for much of human
history, high
infant
mortality
rates and
relatively
short
average
life
spans
would have demanded that ma-
ture females
spent
most of their fertile lives
pregnant
or
lactating
to ensure
the life of the
group, making
the
experience
of "menstruation"
relatively
infrequent perhaps
as late as the 1700s in
America.)
Another
plausible interpretation
of the
naming
of "the menstrual
cy-
cle" after "the menstrual
phase,"
however,
is that the entire "menstrual
cycle"
itself is a
subset,
a marked
entity
in female bodies in
comparison
to
the
unmarked,
and
supposedly superior,
set of
biological cycles
that occur
in male bodies.
Surely,
much evidence
suggests
that men's bodies are also
influenced
by rhythmic patterns, particularly
the
"monthly" changes
in
beard
growth, pain
thresholds,
and testosterone levels
(Landers, 1988:137).
Nonetheless,
over
centuries,
it is
only
the female
body
that has been
marked as
particularly susceptible
to the forces of
"monthly" periodicity,
inevitably
more tied to
nature,
as those bodies outside of rational
control,
and
consequently,
in need of
regulation.
Beliefs that women's
bodies,
and
not
men's,
are
governed by,
for
example,
the
phases
of the
moon,
have
been used to
justify
women's subordination to men as
naturally
rather than
socially produced. Perhaps
the retention of the name "menstrual
cycle,"
Menstrual Time
543
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despite
medical science's admission that "menstruation" is an
extremely
variable
process
and not one that
inevitably
occurs,
like the full
moon,
"once a
month,"
reflects an
attempt
to retain the belief that the male
body
is
naturally
"unfettered"
by periodicity
while the female
body
is forever
bound
by cyclical change.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The construction and enforcement of standardized "menstrual" time
and the
marking
of some
parts,
if not
all,
of "the menstrual
cycle"
as "sa-
cred" has had and
may
continue to have serious
implications
for women's
daily
lives. The standardization of "the menstrual
cycle,"
for
instance,
is
not unlike other
attempts
to control women's
bodies,
such as the construc-
tion of
height
and
weight
charts that normalize fat-free female bodies. In
the former
case,
such standardization
ultimately legitimizes assumptions
that the
category
"women" is constituted not
by sociohistorical/political
practices,
but rather
by
the
supposedly
shared
experience
of a
purely
bio-
logical process. Similarly,
for
instance,
the centuries-old biblical reference
to the time of
bleeding
as "the curse" of Eve's
original
sin is
suggestive
of
not
just any
"eternal
return,"
but to the
hegemonic
notion that "woman-
hood" is
categorically
shameful,
dirty,
even evil. To
give yet
another exam-
ple,
if the
experience
of
"profane
time" is about
living
as an
individual,
while the
experience
of "sacred time" is about
living
as a member of a
social
group,
then such
sociotemporal patterns
will continue to remind in-
dividual women at various
"extraordinary
moments"
(which
are
becoming
more and more
frequent)
that
they
are
part
of a class of
people necessarily
defined
by biological
difference,
and that this
membership currently
carries
negative
social value.
Ultimately,
this
investigation
of the sociomental
mapping
of "the men-
strual
cycle"
is far from
complete:
aside from
discussing
each of these in-
stances of mental
cartography
at
greater length,
I
might
have discussed the
paradoxes
of where such
cycles
are
thought
to
begin
and end or whether
there is not
just
one,
but two or even three
cycles operating simultaneously.
Despite
the
many questions
left to
answer, sociologists
of
cognition
have
still to consider the
way
social
groups
think about the internal structure of
"the menstrual
cycle"
as a case of mental
cartography,
and
sociologists
of
time have still to consider this mental
structuring
of "the menstrual
cycle"
as a case of
sociotemporality.
Yet it
appears
that the mental
mapping
out
of what constitutes the elements of this
rhythm,
so often taken for
granted
as a
purely
natural
pattern
of
time,
is a
highly
social act.
Perhaps
most
importantly,
this
particular
take on "the menstrual
cycle"
as a social inven-
544 Foster
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Menstrual Time
tion makes Zerubavel's more
general argument
that a "discussion of
regular
and routine
sociotemporal patterns"
is not
just
a trivial intellectual
exercise,
but is
necessary
"in order to stress the
point
that a social order is at
stake,
as well as a moral one"
(1976:93).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am
grateful
to Eviatar Zerubavel for
encouraging
me to write this
paper,
and
equally
thankful for his consistent enthusiam at
every stage
of
the
project. Many
thanks to Heather J. Foster for her
graphical
assistance.
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