RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PHILIPPINES AND

ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER

RUL 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION, WHEN
AND TO WHOM ISSUED
RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITION
AND CONTEST FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
RULE 81 BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, RESIGNATION, AND
REMOVAL OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 83 INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL; PROVISION FOR SUPPORT OF
FAMILY
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 85 ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS

1. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA,
MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA vs. GREGORIA VENTURA and HER
HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,
PEDRO D. CORPUZ, G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

Facts:

Maria Ventura illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
Miguel Ventura son of Gregorio Ventura; brother of Maria Ventura
Juana Cardona saving spouse of Gregorio Ventura; mother of Maria Ventura

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his
former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees was
denied by the deceased in his will.

Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not
include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an
illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix
of his will and the administratrix of his estate.

In due course, said will was admitted to probate. Gregorio Ventura died on
September 26, 1955. The appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters
testamentary was issued in her favor. Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of
the estate of Gregorio Ventura.

She filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.
Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura
& Pedro Corpuz and by Exequiel Victorio & Gregoria Ventura. Both oppositions
assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate
and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

But on January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the
approval of the accounts of administration or to have their approval without the
opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria
Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity
of Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination
before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous
children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the
approval of the counts of administration.

Spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed their opposition to the
motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on
the ground that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by
the Court of First Instance as the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, hence,
they have reason to protect their interest. The motion to hold in abeyance the
approval of the accounts was denied.

Four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely:
(1) motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura;
(2) motion to require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property under
administration in a bonded warehouse;
(3) motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of
Administration; and
(4) motion to require her to include in the inventory of the estate certain
excluded properties.

An opposition to said motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel
Ventura and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself.

On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint
motions to require an Up-to-date Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura
to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered withdrawn. The
other two motions were however set for hearing.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura
are:
(1) that she is grossly incompetent;
(2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the
estate in the inventory;
(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious
relations with the appellees;
(4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply
with the Order of the Court requiring her to file her accounts of administration
for the years 1961 to 1963 and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid
Order of December 12, 1963; and
(5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently
performing her duties as an executrix.

The executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration
covering the period 1961 to 1965 which were again opposed by the spouses
Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura
and Pedro Corpuz. On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her supplemental
opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that the joint
supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied or held in abeyance
until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is
finally decided. On June 3, 1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not
been paid, ordered the administratrix to pay the same within 30 days.

On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension of the
proceedings and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to remove executrix
Maria Ventura until after the examination of the physical fitness of said
executrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it ordered the deposit of all
palay to be harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be
deposited in a bonded warehouse to be selected by the Court and the palay so
deposited shall not be withdrawn without the express permission of the Court.
Spouses Exequiel Victorio & Gregoria Ventura and Mercedes Ventura & Pedro
Corpuz filed their oppositions alleging among others that said accounts do not
reflect the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses reported
thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and speculative.

The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the
funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with
the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of
accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered to
remove Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate and in her
place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura were appointed joint a tratrices
of the estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00. Letters of
administration were issued to Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura upon
their qualification.

Issue:

WON the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.
Ruling:

This issue has, however, become moot and academic in view of the decision of
this Court in related cases.

Aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases
involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria Ventura filed by herein appellee
Gregoria Ventura against the other appellees herein Mercedes Ventura and their
father, Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria
Ventura. Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in
1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint be
declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as
the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina.

Subsequently, civil case was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed
Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I.
They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of
Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom
they claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro
Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who
should inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with
Gregorio Ventura.

The lower court rendered its judgment declaring Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura to be the legitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and
Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such legitimate daughters of Paulina
Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties.

Thereafter, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the provisions of the will
of the deceased Gregorio Ventura in Special Proceedings No. 812, which motion
was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona and later by Maria Ventura.
They claimed that the decision in said civil cases was not yet final.

The court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio
Ventura. The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by
executrix Maria Ventura was denied.

Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the orders of the probate court in Special
Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme Court, this Court, through then
Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled that order of approval is an
appealable one, and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is
beyond dispute that the decision in controversy has already become final and
executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot and academic.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the
previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This
would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the
following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.- If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and
Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It
is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the
aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons
to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.

The appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura, Juana Cardona and Miguel
Ventura was dismissed.

2. ROWENA F. CORONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG,
AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO,
GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, G.R. No. L-59821, August
30, 1982

Facts:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which
excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and
the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of
his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a
ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties
in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and
Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and
appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.

Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United
Nations in New York City. Upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.

The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and
prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be
disallowed on the ground that they were procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent was
seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona, petitioner's
husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further
prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special
Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be
protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.

Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also
filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate
children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the decedent; (2)
Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3) Rodolfo Torres,
Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate children of the
deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the decedent.

Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath of office before a Notary
Public.

The Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointing Nenita as
Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico
as Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons
that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first
in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an
interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not
among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that
the next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or
is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the
next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more
than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the
appointment of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents filed
their Opposition. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to a
Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order setting aside the appointment
of Nenita as Special Administratrix and appointing in her stead the surviving
spouse Romarico.

The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Probate Court and dismissed the Petition stating that the Probate Court strictly
observed the order of preference established by the Rules; that petitioner
though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the trust and instead
nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that the surviving husband has
legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the decedent's estate
which is merely part of the conjugal property; and that disinheritance is not a
disqualification to appointment as Special Administrator besides the fact that
the legality of the disinheritance would involve a determination of the intrinsic
validity of the Will which is decidedly premature at this stage.

Petitioner elevated the case to this Court for review on certiorari after her
Motion for Reconsideration was turned down by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should
not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes
probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would
disqualify him from the trust.

The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which
they respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the surviving
husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and unavailing as
the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court and
is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as
between the surviving husband, who was responsible for the accumulation of
the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest
in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct
choice; and that the legality of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot
affect the appointment of a Special Administrator.

Issue:

WON Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator.

Ruling:

Yes. This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into
account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the
considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be
appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will is entitled to the highest
consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality
and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity
demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving
husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate.

En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they
may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to
the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for
the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest
settlement.

The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI was ordered to appoint Nenita F.
Alonte as co-Special Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such
jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.


3. NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,
ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO
GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL
and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL
E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO
DINDO GABRIEL, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992

Facts:

Nine months after the death of Domingo Gabriel, Roberto (son) filed with the
RTC Manila a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that
he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is
fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.. The court
below issued an order setting the hearing of the petition. The court further
directed the publication of the order in Mabuhay," a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.. No opposition having been
filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing, Roberto was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Roberto
as administrator of the intestate estate on a bond of P30,000.00.

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of
the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida
Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the
Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case
between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had
an interest in said estate.

Private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at
P18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989.

Petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed
Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters
of administration issued to Roberto and the issuance of such letters instead to
petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of
the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners.

Petitioners alleged that:
(1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration;
(2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred
over Roberto;
(3) Roberto has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because
he might prefer the claims of his mother; and
(4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by
way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the
value of the estate sought to be administered by Roberto.

The probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they
had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988,
in that:
(1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and
(2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator
is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his
appointment inadvisable under these circumstances.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Said court rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari on the
ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused;
that the fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a
denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and
petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the
order of preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of
judgment, correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari.

Issue:

WON Felicitas Jose-Gabriel should be disqualified from appointment as
administratrix of the decedent's estate

Ruling:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving
spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be
observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion
for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6
of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption
behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest
interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

Under the Rules, the widow is preferred as administrator because she is
supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership.
Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal
partnership. Failure to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days
after the decedent's death is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the
surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said
persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after
the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is
not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her
husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow
from the administration.

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate (Rule
82, Sec. 2). On the other hand, the appointment of Roberto should not be
nullified. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered
with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have
such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to
remove an administrator.

Doctrine: A mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being
no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the
removal of Roberto. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does
not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate. There is no prohibition on having more than one administrator.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of
co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons:
1. To have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented.
2. Where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.
3. Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one
to settle
4. To have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate.
5. When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.

The SC ordered that there be a co-administration of the estate by petitioner
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Gabriel.

4. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA
REYES, PAULINA SANTOS DE PARREO vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO, G.R. No.
L-27657, August 30, 1992

Facts:

Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in
Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
IV. The settlement has spawned a number of litigation which has reached this
Court and includes not only the instant case but also other cases.

The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso who claims
to be a first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular
administrator. Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies,
rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed record on appeal
and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counsel in espousing their clients
claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial.

On January 29, 1966, the Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso
as regular administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special administrator.

Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the presiding judge held
firm "considering that most of the movants have adverse interests against this
intestate estate."

But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so on June 20, 1966,
the court which incidentally was presided by a different judge issued an order
grating the omnibus motion filed by Paulina R. Santos de Parreo.

The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and
Pacita Pasion were declared to be without any right to intervene in the intestate
proceeding and, henceforth they should not be allowed to take part therein.
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura were ordered to return to the estate
the sum of P14,000.00 which they received by virtue of the order of this Court
dated October 2, 1965.

The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to
the order of this Court dated January 29, 1966 was revoked and she was
ordered to render a final account of her administration within 10 days from
receipt.

Paulina R. Santos de Parreno was appointed special administratrix of the
intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes de Santos and upon her filing a bond in
the amount of P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, then letters of
special administration be issued to her.

A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which prompted Gregoria
Aranzanso to appeal the order to this Court.

Issue:

WON lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of Gregoria
Aranzanso as the administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.

Ruling:

No.

It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her
office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the law on
removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads as
follows:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person.
It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, that
Gregoria Aranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir
in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided by
the Rules of Court.

In Paulina Santos, et al. vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, a collateral attack on the
adoption of the two girls was not allowed under the following facts:

When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of her estate. In said petition he
stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as
surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age,
respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator
of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds
she asserted that Simplicio Santos' marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was
bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora
Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents who were then living and had not abandoned them.

The CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed
collaterally in the intestate proceedings. The order was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that
the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto
by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional
defect still open to collateral attack.

Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether
respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement
proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos," this
Court gave a negative answer.

The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does
not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. In fact, in one of her
motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment of the Philippine
National Bank as special administrator. SC held that the intervention of Gregoria
Aranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although
she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls should
succeed. The order of removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator was set
aside. She was reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana
Reyes.
5. PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO,
and ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO,
ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, G.R. NO.
129242, January 16, 2001

Facts:

Troadic Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died
intestate on February 14, 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children, all
are of legal age. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and Tarlac,
including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. In
November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition
with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and
for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted
10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through
counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993
seeking:
(1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993
which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition;
(2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for
dismissal of the case;
(3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of
the oppositors; and
(4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July
20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of
the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing
on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals, but petition was dismissed.

Issue:

WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders
of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright
dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of
the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the
petition but that the same have failed.

Ruling:

No.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually
an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. Consequently,
according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to
dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for
filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein
failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family
prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo
on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of
his said death. The facts of death of the decedent and of his residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose
of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said
petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court,
has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil
action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of
a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. So
it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article 222
of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the
dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the
term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of
the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the
same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action
is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an
excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the
same family.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so
that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.

The petition was denied for lack of merit.

6. ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., G.R. No. L-17759,
December 17, 1962

Facts:

On November 10, 1959, Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales.
Her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin, filed with the Court of First Instance of said
province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of
administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things,
that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of
Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; stating the names,
ages and residences of her surviving heirs.

On June 21, 1960, Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in
representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in
the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that
the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband the movant and
their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine,
all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or
illegitimate child.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged
in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court issued an
order of dismissal.

Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been
denied, she took the present appeal.
Issue:

WON petitioner Isabel V. Saguinsin is "an interested person" in the estate of
deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

Ruling:

No.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has
defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. And it is
well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was
disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on
the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted
children thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing
held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support
thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was
survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children named
Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts which petitioner does not dispute it is manifest that she
is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct
interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is
filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into
account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing
said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of
evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be
conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to
present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the
complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action. In the present case, the
motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was
fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

7. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. FIDEL P. DUMLAO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City,
BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Regino
Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINO
CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY
BASA, G.R. No. L-44888 , February 7, 1992

Facts:

Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for Mindanao, filed a
petition entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino
Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzales, Petitioner
with the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be appointed
as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy.

Judge Echavez Jr. issued an order setting the hearing on the petition and
directing that said order be published and copies of the same be sent by
registered mail or personal delivery to each of all known heirs of the deceased.

The heirs of Regino Canonoy opposed the issuance of letters of administration
filed by Gonzales alleging that:
Gonzales is a complete stranger to the intestate estate of the
deceased.
He is not even a creditor of the estate but an employee of the alleged
creditor (Shell Philippines Inc.), and so he would not be able to
properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of
conflicts.
He is a resident of Davao City, and thus if appointed as administrator of
the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, he would not be
able to perform his duties efficiently.

They propose and pray that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Reginos sons, "be
appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding
letters of administration be issued in his favor."

The trial court, after due hearing, appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator
of the estate of the deceased.

Petitioner Shell filed its claim against the estate of Regino Canonoy and later
amended it but the duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell and interposed counterclaim.

Upon joinder of the issues on Shells claim, the trial court set the pre-trial. The
motion filed by the counsel for the administrator alleges that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the
petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court.

Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the
interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be
alleged in the petition.

Respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious,
dismissed the case. The motion for its reconsideration having been denied by
the trial court, Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

1. WON the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of
administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the
specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person".

2. WON the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for
letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after
having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's
intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate.

Ruling:

1. No.

Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province. These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez.

Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an
interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts.

Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition
must be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to
dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court,
but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration
was affirmed because the petitioner is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.

However, the Saguinsin doctrine is not without exception. An objection to a
petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or
estoppel.

2. Yes.

Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. They instead filed an
Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but
merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez.
The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the
deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate
estate.

The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-
mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:

A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of
Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of
the petition by the latter.

There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case.

It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as
administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's
claim against the estate, a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss and
an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he
interposed a counterclaim.

Clearly, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly
affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in
their favor.

They cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it
may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a
party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape penalty, as held in the case of Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.

The instant petition was granted and the Order of respondent Judge was set
aside.

8. PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES,
RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B.
FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 78590,
June 20, 1988

Facts:

Manolito de Guzman died in Makati and left personal and real properties.

Elaine de Guzman (widow and private respondent) filed a petition for
settlement of his intestate estate with list of creditors, probable value of
property, compulsory heirs, and for grant of letters of administration.

She filed a motion for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under name
of Manolito but were in possession of Elaine's father-in-law, Pedro. On the same
day, court issued an order directing sheriff to notify Pedro of hearing. Elaine
also filed a motion to be appointed as Special Administratrix, which the court
granted.

Court issued an order to assist Elaine in preserving the estate of Manolito by
appointing sheriffs and military men. Pedro resisted when they tried to take the
vehicles on the ground that they were personal properties and he claims that a
near shoot-out occurred. Pedro alleges that he was not given notice of
appointment of Elaine as administratrix and court orders were patent nullities.

Issue:

WON a probate court may act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a
special administrator, for the issuance of a writ of possession of alleged
properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the court has
caused notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ruling:

No.

Facts to be alleged in the application before a court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case for probate of will and administration of properties include
residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts and circumstances.

Court had acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings in the instant case upon
filing of Elaine's petition for settlement because she alleged all the jurisdictional
facts, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 79 ROC.

However, there's a need to differentiate between jurisdiction of the probate
court over the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its
jurisdiction over persons interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person

Probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after
receiving the same, otherwise the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is
void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the
validity of the proceeding in order that no person may be deprived of his right
to property without due process of law.

Notice through publication of the petition is jurisdictional, absence of which
makes court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment. Need for proper notice even for the appointment of a
special administrator is apparent.

No notice was caused to be given by the probate court in the instant case before
it acted on Elaine's motions and deprived Pedro (biggest creditor of Manolito's
estate) of participating in the proceedings as he has similar interest in the
preservation of the estate. Thus, case remanded to lower court for proper
hearing with notice to all.

The instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded
to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with previous notice to all
interested parties as required by law. In view of the voluntary inhibition of the
respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati is
directed to re-raffle the case to another branch of the court. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent. No costs.

9. ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION
CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and
TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

Facts:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow
and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu
with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second
wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament,
where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of
lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a
writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.


Issues:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate
proceedings.

2. WON the CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
residence of the decedent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court,
may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal
domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and
that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the
petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.

Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to
probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be
false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City
court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily,
neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since
under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the
estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,
which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule
only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at
least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

SC reversed the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals was dismissed.

10. ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38,
Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER
GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984

Facts:

Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati
Medical Center on November 27, 1977. Survived by his second wife, Maxine
Tate Grimm and two children, Edward (Pete) and Linda, and by Juanita and
Ethel (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed on January 23, 1959, two wills in San Francisco, California. One will
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of
himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines.

The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his
property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita
Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm
Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will
disposing of my Philippine property.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine in Court of
Tooele County, Utah. Two weeks later, Maxine, Linda and Pete, as the first
parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second
parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed the lawyers
of the parties. It was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated
as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate.

On January 9, 1978, Ethel, filed with CFI Instance intestate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix. On March 11, the
second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the
probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of
his Philippine estate.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine,
Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court
ignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold some of the testators properties. Acting on the
declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers
Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge
Conrado M. Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's
Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12.5%. Later,
Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer.

On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion
for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs
and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was
notified of that motion.

On September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower
court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated
in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside
and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and
two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the
Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that
the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of
merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
or alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch
20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be
heard prior to the petition for probate.

Issue:

WON a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Ruling:

Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is
proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil
Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person
who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to
dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.

The petition was dismissed. The temporary restraining order was dissolved.

11. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ
and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS:

* See page 115 (Herrera)
* Principles:
a. Rule 83, Sec. 3 Allowance to widow and family. Include support even of age
b. Support does not extend grandchildren


CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

1. Hilario Ruiz executed a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL naming 3 heirs:
a. EDMOND (son of Hilario) also named as executor
b. Children of EDMOND
c. MONTES (adopted daughter of Hilario)

2. EDMOND distributed the cash component of the estate to the heirs after
Hilarios death
* Note: Will was not probated

3. MONTES filed petition for PROBATE of the will and for issuance of LETTERS
TESTEMENTARY to EDMOND at RTC 4 yrs. after Hilarios death
* EDMOND opposed on the ground of undue influence in the execution of the
will thereafter withdrawn

4. One of the properties (Valle Verde property bequeathed to the grandchildren)
was leased out by EDMOND
* Probate court ordered EDMOND to deposit to Clerk the rents
* EDMOND complied minus amount for expenses and maintenance

5. Probate court granted MONTES petition

6. EDMOND filed Ex parte motion for release of funds (for the release of
previously deposited rent)
* MONTES opposed and filed Motion for release of funds to certain heirs (to
the children of EDMOND, named heirs to the Valle Verde property)

7. RTC - MONTES wins.

8. EDMOND filed for Recon.

9. EDMOND manifested at Recon. withdrawal of Motion for release of Funds.

10. Despite EDMONDs manifestation, Probate ordered:
a. Release of funds to EDMOND but only such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of his children
(decedents grandchildren)
b. Release of the titles bequeathed to MONTES and the Grandchildren held in
abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of
Notice to Creditors.
c. To submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support before the amount required can be
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors
11. EDMOND elevated the case to CA alleging his children are no longer minors
and are only decedents grandchildren, hence not entitled to allowance

12. CA affirmed RTC

13. EDMOND filed petition for review on certiorari v. CA at SC

Facts:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, all children of Edmond Ruiz and named Edmond Ruiz executor.

Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with
the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond did not take any action for
the probate of his fathers holographic will.

4 years after the testators death, Montes filed before the RTC a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on
the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

1 of the properties of the estate which the testator bequeathed to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - was leased out by Edmond
Ruiz to third persons.

The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court
the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-
year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993,
Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of
the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on
the estate.

Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the
real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.00.

Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion
for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited
with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion
for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the
release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus
ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three
granddaughters.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments which
opposition the court failed to consider

Petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde
property had been renewed for another year.

Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testators three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

Petitioner assailed this order before the CA. Finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the
petition and sustained the probate courts order

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

WON the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority:

1. To grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the
testators grandchildren;

2. To order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
3. To grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling:

1. No.

On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.

Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at
the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless
of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right
and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the
age of majority.

Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and
children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of
their minority or incapacity.

2. No.

As to the order of release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
to the same.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after
the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. The taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid. The
estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or
make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

3. As to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the
will.

The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of
the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration, Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and
to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses for administration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, those portions of the order granting an allowance to the
testators grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private
respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings
below.
12. MAURO P. MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, A.M. No.
2430, August 30, 1990

Facts:

In a complaint for disbarment, Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent Atty.
Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or malpractice committed while
acting as counsel of record of Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as
administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna.

In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract
with the partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS over several parcels of land
included in Zernas estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times.
Villegas was both the counsel of Leong and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS
DE JOSE VILLEGAS.

The complainant, Mananquil was appointed special administrator after Felix
Leong died. Mananquil alleged that the lease contracts were executed under
iniquitous terms and conditions and were made without the approval of the
probate court.

Issues:

1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate courts approval
regarding the lease.

2. WON Villegas should be disbarred.

Ruling:

1. No. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial
executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may,
therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the
court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that
an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the
properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and
prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order
to validly lease real properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannot
be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease
contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

2. No. There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although Villegas should be
suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the
lease contracts involving properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership
of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code in relation to Art.
1491, lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object
of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession are
prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another,
the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct,
hence, suspension for four months.

13. ANA LIM KALAW vs.. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, G.R. No.
74618, September 2, 1992

Facts:

It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. On
June 8, 1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance of
Letters of Administration with the then Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old), Victoria
Lim Kalaw (57 years old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw
(43 years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.

On April 25, 1974, the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim
Kalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary
inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as special
administratrix of the estate of her late father on June 3, 1974. On October 6,
1977, the trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial
administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the
petitioner after the latter took her oath of office on November 11, 1977.

Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting
of her administration of said estate which was granted by respondent Judge
Ricardo Diaz in an order dated December 8, 1982. Respondent judge issued
another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting of her
administration with the express instruction that said order be personally served
upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was returned to the
Court unserved.

Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura
Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their fathers
estate and to appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence on
the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her
administration since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago
in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an
accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof which she did on March 22,
1984. She likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion praying
for her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in rendering said
accounting was due to the fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge
where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted to the
Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a considerable length of
time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after
his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to
render an accounting report.

The trial court rendered a decision finding that Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw
violated the provisions of Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court for not
rendering an account of her administration within one (1) year from date of
receipt of the letters of administration and this constitutes negligence on her
part to perform her duty as Administratrix and under Section 2, Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court, neglect on the part of the administratrix to render her account is
a ground for her removal as an administratrix.

Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order with
the then Intermediate Appellate Court to annul and set aside the following
Orders removing the Petitioner as Administratrix of the estate of the late Carlos
Lim Kalaw. The appellate court rendered a decision denying the petition for
certiorari. However, respondent Judge is directed to require private respondent
Rosa Lim Kalaw to post the appropriate administrators bond within ten (10)
days from notice hereof. Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.



Issues:

1. WON the petitioner violated Section 8, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court?

2. WON the petitioner can be removed on the ground of Section 2, Rule 82 of the
Revised Rules of Court?

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. Every
executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions
of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or
for disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as
the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."

The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within
one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word
"shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise directs
because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for
paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the
case at bar.

Furthermore, petitioners excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding
was pending was vacant most of the time deserves scant consideration since
petitioner never attempted to file with said court an accounting report of her
administration despite the fact that at one time or another, Judge Sundiam and
Judge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their incumbency.

2. Yes.

Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not
purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six
years, which justifies petitioners removal as administratrix and the
appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.



As correctly stated by the appellate court:

"The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule
82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him.

In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground
of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as
administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as required by
Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court."

14. Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE
GUZMAN vs. CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and
HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA, G.R. No. L-29276, May 18, 1978

Facts:

In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners
herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed
Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after
the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who
begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente,
Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo
de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948,
respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they
were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although
they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents
had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to
seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled
and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the
proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered
by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that
petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in
said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the
respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the
petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying
said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their
participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents
to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties;
ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured
by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name
of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the
former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of
the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share
therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:

WON the prescription applies.

Ruling:

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for
partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse
title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they
thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have
brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the
same is tainted with fraud.

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June
25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive
notice to the whole world.

As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:

In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at
least constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants
on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan,
Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more
than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March
1948. He is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and
had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action.
Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after
the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the
remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to
commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9
January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if
only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.