1

BRAZILS EVOLVING SECURITY IDENTITY

Dr. Salvador Raza
The ideas presented in this paper do not represent the position of any institution or
government. This paper responds to the question formulated to the Seminar Brazils
Evolving Security Identity: egionalism and !lo"al #spirations$. The ans%ers address
issues and concerns "eyond the declaratory policy and pu"lished official positions and
guidance. It is rooted in the personal analysis and e&perience of the author' "ac(ed "y open
sources documents and information. In this regard' it challenges the official %isdom and
defies the politically correct$ analytical neutrality of governmental forums not
representing' and in many points opposing' the security and defense sectors interpretation of
information and factual issues.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Brazils strategic security priorities under the presidency of Lula were defined by the National
Defense Policys new decree on July, 200 as! "# the $%azonia, which includes drug traffic, i%pact
of war in &olo%bia, guerrilla groups, etc'( 2# the )outh $tlantic, for its gas and petroleu% resources,
and its role in trade( *# the establish%ent of +rapid deploy%ent forces, and( -# a greater in.ol.e%ent
of Brazils forces in peace/eeping operations'
0he regional security issues and architecture during Lulas ad%inistration were %ore focused on
political diplo%acy, i'e' policy nu%ber four of a greater in.ol.e%ent in peace/eeping operations' 1n
the other hand, the principal focus of President 2ouseffs policy is the de.elop%ent of critical
infrastructure which is related to transportation and the distribution of energy at a national le.el'
$nother i%portant aspect of the 2ousseffs architecture is that her approach will be guided %ostly
towards the usage of pri.ate contractors in order to carry out certain tas/s that were carried out by the
state in the past' &ontrary to for%er President Lulas policies which were focused %ore on political
diplo%acy, President 2ousseffs policies are based on econo%ic diplo%acy, which ser.es as another
for% of soft power'
Brazils critical security interests are not structured in ter%s of regional or sub3regional, but in
relation to se.en security di%ensions, each one defining a set of the%es that dri.e its grand strategy
and policies'
. E!"r#$ %"&'r()$ 4 the security interest of Brazil in this di%ension is to assure the feasibility of the
national energy %atri5 to pro.ide nationwide access to a %ini%u% "20 g67capita7year to support
econo%ic growth ranging fro% *' to '0 per year in the ne5t two decades 820"0320*0#' 0o support
this econo%ic growth, Brazils energy a.ailability is e5pected to increase at a %ini%u% rate of about
'9 percent through 20*0 8the desired le.el is :;7year#'
0his is based on assu%ptions supporting pri.ate energy %ar/et supply and distribution strategies'
0here is a tension a%ongst the rebalance of the %atri5 towards clean and nuclear energy 8and large
.ersus s%all nuclear reactors# and the e5ploration of the possibilities offered by the new deep water
oil fields identified in Brazils %ariti%e platfor%'
$ccording to the <')' =nergy >nfor%ation $d%inistration, Brazils consu%ption of energy in the
global arena ta/es the ninth position and the third in the ?estern @e%isphere, falling right behind the
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<nited )tates and &anada'
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Due to sustained econo%ic growth and de.elop%ent, the consu%ption of
energy has constantly increased in the past years' &onseAuently, it is of %ost utter i%portance for
Brazil to secure its energy sources' =nergy security i%perati.es ha.e dri.en Brazils agencies to
e5plore global gas and oil reser.es that assure costs below the threshold of technology in.est%ents
needed to e5plore its own reser.es within en.iron%ent security protocols' >n this relation, the gas
supply fro% Boli.ia and oil supply fro% Benezuela dri.e appeasing foreign policy decisions, under a
declaratory posture shaped by social 8and socialist under Lulas go.ern%ent# dri.en regional
collaborati.e ob6ecti.es'
*. E!v(ro!+"!) %"&'r()$ 4 the security interest of Brazil is to protect %ini%u% natural resources
reser.es as base for potential future e5ploitation needs in support of li.e 8food, water, and air#' 0his
ob6ecti.e has led choices of en.iron%ent %anage%ent %odels which increase the le.el of ris/
acceptance for %an3%ade natural disasters, whereas pro.iding leeway for econo%ic de.elop%ent
initiati.es within the energy supply pro6ected possibilities'
,. T"&-!olo#$ %"&'r()$ . Brazils technology security priorities ha.e three layered set of ob6ecti.es'
0he first layer enco%passes the efforts to assure the transfer of the production engineering /nown3
how of defense high definition integrated optical and sound sensors, <$B propulsion, precise guided
%unitions, and discrete tactical weapons syste%'
0he second layer of technology ob6ecti.es are associated with enhanced defense syste%s that de%and
integrated design and 6oint operational protocols for effecti.e strategic results, with pri%ary 8and
only# focus on )c>)2 networ/ed3centric platfor%s, associated control software, operational protocols
and peopleware capacity building resources'
0he third layer of the ob6ecti.es relates science with security in the purpose of assuring the nations
8defense related# ability to de.elop econo%ically .iable and scalable applications in! 8"# genetically
enhanced sub3tropical large scale production crops under assured energy balance( 82# $> powered by
large scale 8Auantu%# co%puting applied to co%ple5 si%ulations in sub3water e5plosions and sub3
space platfor%s high3perfor%ance flight syste% design( 8*# ultra deep3water welding( 8-# low3orbit
un%anned .ehicles( 8# control syste%s capability 8C# high3conductor co%posites in %anageable
en.iron%ental conditions( 8:# trans3en.iron%ent high sensiti.ity sensors and patterns see/ers using
enhanced airborne3based sensing and i%aging capacity'
/. K!o0l"d#" a!d I!1or+a)(o! S"&'r()$ 4 Brazils security priorities in the do%ain of /nowledge
%anage%ent and infor%ation security are focused on! 8"# the de.elop%ent of the capability to sustain
applied inno.ation in strategic thin/ing to reduce the doctrine o.erload in planning and %anaging
co%ple5 operations, 82# the de.elop%ent of a defense organizational architecture that aligns %ultiple
agencies decision cycles with readiness and %ultiple7si%ultaneous deploy%ents reAuire%ents inside
the future 6oint strategic co%%and structure, and 8*# the protection of critical cyber infrastructure
related to the )c>)2 operational and tactical reAuire%ents'
2. 3ol()(&al a!d "&o!o+(& S"&'r()$ . Brazils internal stability is based on policies that assure the
continuous cross3cultural definition of political roles, the accessibility of %echanis%s of class
%obility, the stability of the rules for the regular transition of political power, in.est%ents in the
social function of critical infrastructure, and the %aintenance of large conscript based police forces'
0he defense establish%ent in Brazil contributes to the definition of social roles, constitutionally
defends the %echanis%s of class %obility and the transition of political power, by dri.ing in.est%ents
in critical infrastructure and, when reAuired, aug%enting the police capabilities'
4. G"o%)ra)"#(& S"&'r()$ 4 Brazil see/s to %aintain a diplo%atic fra%ewor/ 3 supported by
deterrence capability based on strong potential for ar%y power pro6ection force 3 able to %aintain no
1
<')' =nergy >nfor%ation $d%inistration, +Brazil! Bac/ground, +>ndependent )tatistics and
$nalysis! =>$, http!77www'eia'doe'go.7cabs7Brazil7Bac/ground'ht%l 8accessed Debruary 2", 20""#
3
boundaries disputes in a stable political en.iron%ent in its area of strategic influence' $nd see/s to
use the sa%e diplo%atic fra%ewor/, bac/ed by the capability to deploy and sustain peace forces, to
unfreeze the world power structure, achie.ing a better share of the global wealth'
Based on these principles, Brazils defense and %ilitary strategy is centered in the $r%y capabilities,
with the $ir Dorce in co%bat supporting defensi.e roles, and the Na.y pri%arily in a strategic
%obility role' 0his logic %o.es the e%phasis of 6oint operation fro% co%bat to logistics effort' 0he
Na.y resistance to this strategic concept finds its 6ustification in a se%i3independent Blue $%azon
&oncept, lodge in the =nergy and =n.iron%ental )ecurity Di%ensions, and the $ir Dorce in a se%i3
independent )trategic >nterdiction 2aids aligned with the protection of the critical infrastructure
nested in the political E econo%ic security Di%ension' 0o re%o.e the inconsistency in Dorce Design
and Feostrategic )ecurity Priorities is the locus of the policy for%ulation in Brazils grand strategy'
5. 6'+a! S"&'r()$ 4 2ousseffs go.ern%ent will ha.e to /eep the le.el of social tensions below the
internal crises threshold, pre.enting the spread of urban and possibility of rural .iolence, as well as
pre.enting the disaggregation of the unions go.ern%ent support front, as critical progra%s slowly
de.elop effects to bring low inco%e population into the de.elop%ent %ainstrea%'
$rising tensions are inserted in the contradictions of a hu%an centered policy and a police centered
strategy, and in the budget priority realign%ent fro% defense to security, to address the dyna%ic
realign%ent of causes that produces and defined the co%posite significance of drugs, corruption,
illegal traffic/ing, urban gangs and organized cri%e, associated with the security and defense
redefinition of roles, responsibilities and strategies in borders area control and illegal i%%igration
pre.ention'
QUESTION 1: BRAZILS SECURITY IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAS
. WHAT ARE BRAZILS REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND
DOES LEADERSHIP MATTER? WILL PRESIDENT ROUSSEFFS APPROACH TO
REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND ARCHITECTURE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THE
LULA ADMINISTRATION?
>n contrast to for%er President Lula, President 2ousseff has the profile of a progra% ad%inistrator'
)he thin/s hierarchically' )he is s/illed, co%petent, authoritarian, de%anding, and courageous' @er
political co%petence is based on rationality of public ad%inistration' @owe.er, she is not a higher
strategic thin/er, which %eans that Brazils grand strategy and force design will continue to be
frag%ented and in a way obscure to e5ternal and international obser.ers which are sub6ect to
perceptions and interpretations' 1n one hand, that is beneficial because it generates an uncertainty
which fa.ors diplo%acy' Nonetheless, it also generates inefficiency and confusion in %any internal
actors'
a. Wha !" h# $%&# %' U(!%( %' S%)h A*#$!+a( Na!%(" ,UNASUR- a(. h# S%)h A*#$!+a(
D#'#("# C%)(+!& ,SADC- !( B$a/!&" $#0!%(a& "#+)$!1 2%&!+1?
0he <N$)<2 is part of Brazils diplo%atic fra%ewor/' >t is a bargaining fra%ewor/ rather than
an alliance' $bsent defense capabilities and econo%ic ballast, )$D& frontiers of political
possibilities are li%ited'
>n the absence of a National )ecurity )trategy, <N$)<2 and )$D& ser.ed Lulas Doreign
Policy rather than the National )ecurity Policy and are actually reduced to the le.el of +another,
docu%ent in the networ/ of agree%ents and protocols that co%pose the diplo%atic fra%ewor/'
0he concept of diplo%atic fra%ewor/ pro.ides a useful answer to the role of particular security
arrange%ent, whereas the role of any particular security arrange%ent has no e5plaining power to
superior policy decisions'
0he challenge within <N$)<L is how to balance the silent ad.ance of Brazil in its progression
to the Pacific, which will be fostered by the political and econo%ic stability of its neighboring
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countries, and how to balance Brazils persuasion capacity' <N$)<L role will be sustained in the
undefined nature of a loose security and defense Auasi3alliance, dyna%ic aligning the +union, to
political changes( any atte%pt to %a/e it a %ore robust, structure, 10$)3 li/e structure, is
doo%ed to fail'
3. On issues like combating narcotics trafcking and organized crime,
what drives sub-regional security/defense dialogue and what limits
its efectiveness? What are B$a/!&" 2$!*a$1 !(#$#"" %( h#"# !"")#"?
Low institutional resilience, slow decision cycles, and s%all force ruggedness, housed in a
fractured interagency syste%, powered by obsolete operational protocols inside a policy .acuu%
are li%iting police effecti.eness in co%bating narcotics traffic/ing and organized cri%e'
Narcotics and organized cri%e are contributing to the causes of hu%an security proble%s without
any weight 8+center of gra.ity,# and without any for%al institutional leadership'
0he nature of the issue in Brazil 8recently e%erging out of anthropological analysis inside the
penitentiary syste%# is in contradiction with the %ilitary3li/e logic of the police institutions of
strategizing and planning 8please note the difference a%ongst these concepts#' 0his contradiction,
associated with poor training, lac/ of resources and an archaic 6udiciary and penitentiary syste%s
cannot offer any co%prehensi.e solution to the proble%'
Brazil is a +drug, paradise and an organized cri%e sanctuary, protected by security and defense
forces institutional struggle for power and independency, fostered by corruption and
inco%petence in a leaderless decision3%a/ing en.iron%ent that cannot e.en produce a shared
perception of the structure of the causes( e.en though they agree that the real danger is the
increasing threat of the +slu%s co%ing down the city slopes,'
+. ow real are the #$$%$!" h$#a" #*a(a!(0 '$%* h# 4T$!-3%$.#$ $#0!%(5 ,A$0#(!(a6
B$a/!&6 Pa$a0)a1- a(. h%7 7!&& B$a/!& a..$#"" h#*?
0he 0ri3border is a transit, rest and networ/ing area for terrorists' >n this role, it is an international
%oney laundry depot, basing at least "9 international ban/s branches, and the basis for,
pri%arily, the &hinese and the 2ussian Gafia' 0he regional Dinancial >ntelligence <nits 8D><# are
aware of financial transactions %echanis%s for illegal international cash flow and use this
infor%ation in support of sensiti.e operations'
>t is con.enient for Brazil not to recognize officially the presence of terrorists in the area since all
acti.ities are Aualified as cri%e, and therefore prosecuted under the ci.ilian law, pre.enting the
political conseAuences of recognizing the terrorist status of any national or foreigner arrested' But
actual law enforce%ent actions are precluded by the intricacy of legal and se%i3legal operations
e5ploring national legal loopholes and the nature of the international financial regulations' 0he
continuation of the status Auo fa.ors the fragile Paraguayan regional econo%y and li%ited
international trade, enshrined in the social structure and corruption in the 0ri3border area
countries' Loosely Aualified terrorist acti.ities in the region do not har% the countries, and their
dual use operational %echanis%s support the infrastructure that boosts local econo%y and gi.e
capillarity into national finance syste%s'
.. W!&& B$a/!& +%(!()# % 3)!&. 3$!.0#" a*%(0 $#0!%(a& 2&a1#$"6 a(. 7!&& P$#"!.#( R%)""#''
#(8%1 h# "a*# "a)$# a(. !('&)#(+# !( h# $#0!%(?
During the Lulas go.ern%ent 0he Ginistry of Doreign $ffairs 8>ta%araty# had his resources
o.erstretched to enlarge Brazils area of influence and participation in global issues, correlated
with a loss of prestige, internal conflicts, and a procli.ity to ineffecti.eness' Ga6or diplo%atic
%ista/es rebu/ed its pre.ious perfor%ance records'
0he new >ta%aratys senior political appointees ha.e shown the intention to reestablish lin/s with
retired diplo%ats 8that always ha.e had a strong influence as counselors, a practice that was
abandoned in the Lulas go.ern%ent#' 0he new ad%inistration should produce less ideologically
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oriented foreign policies, but should also produce %ore a%biguous, less asserti.e, and less
co%%ittal postures'
0he restored >ta%araty will %o.e bac/ to the stronghold declarations of principles position,
%a/ing %uch %ore co%plicated to %a/e the =stablish%ent produce co%prehensi.e diplo%atic
positions in issues that de%and the bac/ing logic of a strategy' ?e should ha.e a +play safe,
%ode at larger scale, transferring bac/ to the %ilitary the role in security and defense
paradiplo%acy' 0he new Ginister of Defense 4 Ginister Jobi%s substitute 4 will ha.e a large
influence in shaping the he%ispheric security trends and in the realign%ent of Brazils position in
world affairs'
*. WHAT ARE BRAZILS STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE 4BLUE AMAZON5? WHAT
DOES BRAZIL PERCEI9E AS THREATS:CHALLENGES TO ITS STRATEGIC
INTERESTS THERE?
0he +blue $%azon, is a concept that 6ustifies a %ission for the Na.y' 0he design of the Na.y has
been oriented to the control of the sea, and li%ited power pro6ection capability' >t is based on
applied theory of na.al power rather than on sound strategic i%perati.es deri.ed fro% a net
assess%ent of the role of the Na.y in actionable national security foresight' 0he concepts ha.e
e5ternal consistency with a scenario of an ad.ersary e5peditionary force to the $%azonia area,
led by a %iddle power =uropean country with e%bar/ed air stri/e power capability'
0he Blue $%azon is internally consistent with the historically and culturally planted .ision of the
Na.y of a self3sustained, independent power' 0he concepts disengage the Na.y fro% what occurs
in land, sol.ing the crucial issue of defining the hierarchy of %ission in a 6oint strategy that will
ine.itably subordinate the Na.y to a subsidiary position' Dighting at sea to deny the access of an
e5peditionary force is the core %ission of the Na.y that 6ustifies the nuclear sub%arines and the
new North Dleet'
Brazils %ilitary, to include the Na.ys analytical and foresight capabilities are li%ited and
obsolete' Bery few officers are Aualified for strategic thin/ing beyond the geostrategic paradig%'
0here is no Aualification in the sophisticated reAuire%ents of Dorce Design' Durther%ore, the
capacity of the diplo%ats to create a chain of causality is too fragile' 0here is a need for a refor%
in diplo%acy, as well as in defense' Ne.ertheless, these refor%s are bloc/ed by the obsolete logic
of reflection and the construction of rationality that find a cogniti.e and political co%fort zone in
the Blue $%azon'
Brazil would benefit fro% %ore ad.anced countries cooperation in! 8"# building the cogniti.e
Dorce Design capabilities and its translation in integrated strategic plans and business oriented
policy guidance to the co%ple5 industrial base, 82# creating co%petencies for the transfer and
retention of technology, and 8*# %anaging co%ple5 defense progra%s'
H%7 $#a& a$# h$#a" 2%"#. 31 !(#$(a!%(a& 2!$a+1 : #$$%$!"* % B$a/!&" *a$!!*#
!(#$#""?
&urrent Brazils %erchant na.y is li%ited to a few tan/ers operating with 0ranspetro 8the
transport ar% of federal energy co%pany Petrobras 8NH)=! PB2#' 0o re.ert this strategic fragility
which burdens Brazils trade balance, the %erchant fund 8DGG# is tendering to build -2 ships' >n
this conte5t, prag%atically, global international piracy7terroris% at sea has significance as a
principle' 0he Brazilian Na.y is not prepared, was not designed, and does not include in its core
priorities 8e5cept in a support role under a <N %andate# to fight international piracy and
terroris% at sea in a global scale' Piracy is a rele.ant issue for Brazil as inner waters 8ri.ers and
harbors# and at shore in containers deposits areas, are under the 6oint 8and so%eti%es conflicting#
roles of the Dederal Police, @arbor Police, and Na.y Police' 0he Na.ys )pecial Dorces ha.e well
de.eloped, and intensely researched plans against asy%%etric threats, to include terroris%, in the
critical national harbor areas and sea platfor%s integrated with other agencies and %ilitary
capabilities'
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a. What are the interests of other regional or international maritime
!owers in the S%)h A&a(!+? Wha a$# h# !*2&!+a!%(" '%$ B$a/!&!a( "$a#0!+
!(#$#""?
0he core interest in %ariti%e powers in the )outh $tlantic is to protect the ci.il and %ilitary sea
lines of co%%unications, with e%phasis on the oil flow, and oil fields platfor%s'
Brazil internal lines of co%%unication, the self3sufficiency in oil supply and logistics, and the
possibility of building a strategic air3bridge to refill core %ilitary supplies %a/es the protections
of these sea lines not rele.ant for self defense' 0he protection of international lines of
co%%unication beco%es rele.ant only of the conte5t of %utually supporting alliances capabilities
4 which Brazil endorses with .ery li%ited enthusias%'
3. Wha a$# h# "$a#0!+ !*2&!+a!%(" %' B$a/!&" 2$#-"a& %!& '!#&."? H%7 7!&& %!& $#;#()#" 3#
$#!(;#"#. % ")22%$ "$a#0!+ #(."?
Brazil was able to raise its reser.es and production le.els to achie.e self3sufficiency in oil in
200C' Now Brazil is poised to beco%e a %a6or oil e5porter with the recently disco.ered pre3salt
oil fields' >nitial trend analysis indicated the needs of %ore than <I"0B in.est%ent in research
and de.elop%ent along a "0 year progra%, to prototype and test scalability of %odels to %a/e the
pre3salt oil fields econo%ically E en.iron%entally and technologically .iable' 0he initial tests are
.ery positi.e and pro%ising' >n Gay 20"0 Petrobraz finalized the long ter% test refining the first
batch of pre3salt oil'
Pre3salt in.est%ents will be addressed through the national industry, with technological bottle and
production abo.e the installed capacity open to international co%petition' Petrobraz is %anaging
its in.est%ent portfolio through the energy, technology and en.iron%ent policies' 0here is no
intention to build a parallel structure to %anage the pre3salt re.enues' 0he pre3salt has being
designed as an in.est%ent pro6ect 8albeit a large one# inside the co%panys business %odel,
logistics, and strategy'
Pres' 2ousseffs integrated the board that o.ersaw the de.elop%ent of Petrobraz strategy
integrated into the national de.elop%ent plan' Brazils Ginister of =nergy stated that the pre3salt
surplus of energy would pro%ote regional energy integration spilling o.er to a geostrategic
integration' Difficulties in the process are li/ely to e%erge in a scenario of 2ussia and )audi
$rabia %ar/et control alliance 8cartel#' &urrent 2ussias policy change to increase the e5port of
oil, threating the econo%ic .iability of pre3salt in.est%ent, is a glance of this scenario' Brazil
needs %ore power in shaping global issues to pre.ent such possibilities'
0he GinDef 8Na.y# is re.iewing its force planning reAuire%ents to include %ore assets to
enhance its capability in the protection of resources in the national sea platfor%' 0he Na.y is
rebu/ing the need 8and e.en refusing to consider the possibility# of dis%e%bering a coast guard
fro% the Na.y, which has today both %issions intertwined in its %ission portfolio' >ncreasing oil
royalties paid fro% Petrobraz to the Na.y will beco%e an issue in near future with the 20"0
GinDef refor%s that centralized the budget process'
,. WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL DRI9ERS OF BRAZILS NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND WHAT
ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY?
Brazils nuclear policy is delineated in the National Defense )trategy and its initiati.es are
di.ided into four di%ensions!
"' &o%plete the full nationalization and the de.elop%ent 4 at industrial scale 4 of the
fuel cycle 8including gasification and enrich%ent# and of the reactor construction
technology for e5clusi.e use of the Na.y nuclear3propelled sub%arine progra%'
2' )peed up the %apping, ore searching and utilization of uraniu% deposits'
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*' De.elop the potential of designing and building nuclear ther%o power plants with
technology and capacities that %ay end up under the national do%ain, e.en if they are
de.eloped by %eans of partnerships with foreign co%panies and )tates' <se nuclear
power with criteria and sub%it it to the strictest safety and en.iron%ental protection
controls as a way to stabilize the national energy %atri5, ad6usting the .ariations in
the supply of renewable energies, %oreo.er in the case of hydroelectric power( and
-' >ncrease the capacity to use nuclear power for a broad range of acti.ities'
2
$lso, the National Defense )trategy publication stated that Brazil will not close the pathway
to the +de.elop%ent of its own nuclear power technologies,'
*
>n addition, until nuclear
weapon states do not ad.ance in their own disar%a%ent, Brazil will not follow the
a%end%ents to the NP0'
-
)ince Brazils principal reason for the de.elop%ent of nuclear
energy which it has e5plicitly stated, is not using nuclear %aterial for the creation of nuclear
weapons, its nuclear policies should not change its stance on nuclear non3proliferation'
0he National Defense )trategy also states as security interest the desire to increase the
+support of the Brazilian participation in the $ntarctic acti.ities,'

@owe.er, the e5planation

of such participation is at %ost .ague( it lac/s a clear e5planation of the acti.ities to be
carried out, which should certainly benefit fro% nuclear powered assets'
D!"+)""!%( 7!h $#"2#+ %:
a. B$a/!&" .%*#"!+ ()+&#a$ 2$%0$a* a(. .%*#"!+ &#0!"&a!%( a(. #<2%$ +%($%&"
Brazils nuclear progra% issues are not related to technology but in in.est%ents to increase the
scale of industrial production of nuclear fuel' 0he Na.yJs fi.e steps nuclear progra% has a
dor%ant spin out in energy generation 8%icro nuclear power plants#, regulated in the energy,
technology and energy %atri5 decision' >t also has a foreseeable nuclear sub%arine deli.erable to
the na.al strategy, regulated by the defense budget priorities that reflect political preferences o.er
technology transfer' $nd it also has to /eep the option open for a possible, not necessarily in the
pro.able near future, option for nuclear deterrence regulated by the NP0' 0he %ost i%portant
issue for Brazil is the treat%ent e5e%pted fro% the i%ple%entation of the NP0s $dditional
Protocol, with additional reAuire%ents for inspections by the >nternational $to%ic =nergy $gency
on uraniu% enrich%ent plants and other facilities related to nuclear progra%
0he legislation /eeps the nuclear %ining and industry progra% fir% in go.ern%ent hands, with
the Na.y strongly protecting its technologies fro% industrial espionage' >ncreases in enrich%ent
capacity 8which is perfectly feasible# would place Brazil in a s%all group of suppliers of this
product to the rest of the nuclear centers around the world' >ncreases in uraniu% enrich%ent will
reduce Brazils strategic dependency 8and reduce costs of the nuclear progra%# fro% &anada'
President 2ousseff is loo/ing to i%pro.e relations with the <) and therefore is %o.ing away
fro% the pre.ious support that was granted by for%er President Lula to >ran'
3. "razil-#rgentina relations including "razilian-#rgentine #gency for
#ccounting and $ontrol of %uclear &aterials '#"#$$(
0he Brazilian3$rgentine $gency for $ccounting and &ontrol of Nuclear Gaterials 8$B3$&&#
was established in "KK"with the purpose of the de.elop%ent, ad%inistration and
2
Brazil, National )ecurity )trategy' pg').
https:**%%%.mar.mil."r*diversos*estrategia+defesa+nacional+portugues.pdf
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>bid, ).
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application of the &o%%on )yste% of $ccounting and &ontrol 8)&&&# for peaceful use of
nuclear energy between $rgentina and Brazil' 0he )&&& is a safeguards syste% to .erify that
nuclear %aterials used in all nuclear acti.ities in both countries are not di.erted to purposes
prohibited by the agree%ent, enforced independently both by the $B3$&& and the >nternational
$to%ic =nergy $gency 8>$=$#'
0he syste% is wor/ing properly with %ore than "00 hundred inspections carried out yearly in
both countries, reducing the ris/s of reacti.ating the $23B2 the co.ert nuclear ar%s race of the
"K:0s' 0his effort includes diplo%atic efforts to de.elop a .erification regi%e for the production
and utilization of low3enriched uraniu% for Brazils Na.y, the inspection protocols for the
safeguarded acti.ities at the $rgentinas gaseous diffusion uraniu% enrich%ent plant at
Pilcaniyeu, which was closed down in the "KKC and reopened in 1ctober 20"0'
Brazils concerns is with the ability to protect its indigenous technology for enriching uraniu%
and /eeping effecti.e %echanis%s to apply na.al engineering technology into the de.eloping of a
nuclear propelled sub%arine that would e%power the country with strategy options in %issions
areas foresighted in the na.y plans'
+. %uclear trade and technology transfers
Discussions on this issue %ust be grounded on a solid understanding of the intricacies of the
Brazilians decision process, otherwise it %ay beco%e a discussion on irreducible principles and
national interests, ta/ing to no prag%atic diplo%atic and technical agree%ent'
Brazil does not %a/e a policy distinction between +sensiti.e nuclear assistant,, which includes
nuclear weapons design, weapons3grade fissile %aterial, and sensiti.e nuclear fuel3cycle
facilities, and +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation,, which is related to basic nuclear science and
technology or the production of nuclear energy'
0he Brazilian Na.y nuclear progra% was designed with the +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation, steps
as interi% pro6ects in the goals of a +sensiti.e nuclear assistance, co%prehensi.e progra%, with C
phases, the last one being the nuclear deterrence capability'
Pressed by political i%perati.es, the $r%ys nuclear progra% follows an alternati.e path based on
different technology' 0his rational for this approach is sound, although the decision process does
not follow a rational decision3process, but rather was propelled by internal ri.alries and
co%petitions, i%posing %any difficulties in $r%y3Na.y collaboration, to the e5tent that an
internal nuclear race was o.ertly de.eloped between the $r%y and the Na.y'
Pressed by political i%perati.es deri.ed fro% the $rgentina3Brazil rapproche%ent, and the
transition out fro% the Gilitary Fo.ern%ents, the $r%y discontinued its progra%, /eeping
critical /now3how on the designing and on the technological bottle3nec/s of nuclear bo%bs stored
in research and centers as acade%ic 8albeit classified# /nowledge, that could be e.entually
retrie.ed and restored' 0he Na.y only dropped the
th
phase of its progra%' But pressed by
budgetary i%perati.es, it was only able to autono%ously 8there was not a GindDef ci.ilian3led
centralized budget decision and o.ersight# fund the progra% at a .ery slow rate, with the practical
ob6ecti.e of not losing the capability of de.elop his nuclear propelled sub%arines, which was an
i%perati.e under its strategic plan for control of the sea'
>n ter%s of the transferring3in 8incorporation# of sensiti.e nuclear assistance, the Na.y needs
/now3how transfer on a few design, engineering and control syste%s to e5pedite the industrial
process in "27" years, or the eAui.alent of <I"9 billion in budgetary resource to produce a
nuclear sub%arine' Drance will pro.ide this technology transfer at a cost of <I Billion'
0he decision and control %echanis%s of the Brazilian Na.y transferring3out 8selling or donating#
of sensiti.e nuclear assistance is discussed at higher le.el clearances than at this
paper7conference, being clearly not dri.en by econo%ic circu%stances' 0he sensiti.ity of the
9
decision to beco%e a +capable supplier country, does not preclude, howe.er, the alert for the
conseAuences of the correlation of this type of decision with Brazils Dorce Design initiati.e'
.. %uclear-wea!on-free zone in La!( A*#$!+a a(. Ca$!33#a(
0he policy principles behind the nuclear3weapon3free zone in L$E& 3 0he 0reaty of 0latelolco 3
are sound, easily defended through e5plicit declaratory diplo%acy, and certainly +politically
correct,'
Brazil signed the 0reaty in "KK:' >n 20"0, Lulas National )ecurity $d.isor 8)a%uel Pinheiro
Fui%arLes# said that it was a %ista/e to sign it, because Brazils constitution assigns the right for
the endogenous and autono%ous use of pacific use of nuclear energy, and that Brazils
participation in the 0ratelolco 0reat would be only 6ustified if the nuclear powers reduce their
nuclear arsenals
C
'
0he N)$ speech was pointed out as a foreign policy %ista/e, contrary to Lulas international
posture and co%%it%ent to peace, since it would 6ustify a strong aug%entation of Brazils nuclear
portfolio'
$gainst this position, there is the understanding that Brazils signature assures its co%pro%ise
with international law, recognizing that the 0reaty, albeit i%perfect, has contributed to the global
reduction of nuclear ar%a%ents and the construction of peace in the region' @owe.er, this posture
reaffir%s the position of not signing the $dditional Protocol'
$nother stance defends Brazils right %aintain the capability to proceed fro% the "0; enrich%ent
le.el reAuired for energy production to the K0; that necessary for producing nuclear ar%a%ents'
0here is an o.ert %o.e%ent asserting the need for Brazil to de.elop its nuclear progra% in the
)outh $frican or >sraeli fashion 4 %ilitary nuclear power pro6ection capability'
QUESTION =: BRAZILS APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND
MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
D!"+)""!%( Q)#"!%(":
. Wha a$# h# .$!;#$" %' B$a/!&" a22$%a+h % !(#$(a!%(a& ()+&#a$ ,a(. (%(-()+&#a$-
(%(-2$%&!'#$a!%( a$+h!#+)$#?
D!"+)"" 7!h $#"2#+ %:
B$a/!&" a22$%a+h % *)&!&a#$a& a$*" +%($%& !(+&).!(0 IAEA A..!!%(a& P$%%+%&6 N)+&#a$
S)22&!#$" G$%)2 ,NSG-6 B$a/!&" *#*3#$"h!2:&#a.#$"h!2 !( N%(-a&!0(#. M%;#*#( ,NAM- a(.
N#7 A0#(.a C%a&!!%( ,NAC-6 C%('#$#(+# %( D!"a$*a*#(6 NPT6 M!""!&# T#+h(%&%01 C%($%&
R#0!*# ,MTCR- a(. a" a 2%#(!a& (#7 *#*3#$ %' h# G> G&%3a& Pa$(#$"h!2 P$%0$a*.
0he Auestion %ista/enly assu%es a transiti.ity of assu%ptions, analysis and conclusions a%ong
Brazils nuclear and non3nuclear non3proliferation'
0he declaratory policy is co%prehensi.ely crafted in support of the international nuclear 8and non3
nuclear# non3proliferation architecture' 0his posture was clearly stated by Brazil at the <N in Gay
20"0
:
! NP0 di.ides the ?orld between the ha.e and ha.e nots( the best guarantee for non3
proliferation is the total eli%ination of nuclear weapons( nuclear weapons )tates should renounce
upgrading or de.elop%ent of new ato%ic de.ices( nuclear weapons decrease the security of the
countries that possess the%( nuclear proliferation should be stopped, although containing
disse%ination of /nowledge %ight be i%possible( countries should not be denied the right to peaceful
nuclear acti.ities as long as it co%plies with NP0 and agree with >$=$ reAuire%ents( Brazilian
6
http:**%%%.estadao.com."r*estadaodeho,e*-./..0.1*not+imp)2034-'..php
7
%%%.guardian.co.u(...*"razil5nuclear5%eapons5non5proliferation
10
&onstitution prohibits nuclear acti.ities for non3peaceful purposes( an establish%ent of nuclear3
weapons free zone can help peace and security( and nuclear weapons breed instability and insecurity'
0his declaratory posture is consistent with Brazils position in the Non3aligned Go.e%ent and New
$genda &oalition' Brazil pro%otes e%phatically the New $genda &oalition and the 22
reco%%endations on nuclear disar%a%ent presented on the wor/ing paper'
Notwithstanding, Brazil has the potential to asse%bly the bo%b' >t will need the 6oint effort of the
fissile %aterial, the $r%y bo%b design, and the $ir Dorce deli.ery .ehicle' =.en if there were the
political decision to produce it, the ser.ices collaboration and the technical interoperability of the
ser.ices effort ha.e practically i%possible short ter% challenges' 0he security issue is to build
deterrence capability based on potential capacity, but there is no strategy in place to articulate this
deterrence potential into a grand strategy, because Brazils grand strategy design is by nature
frag%ented, e%bedded in sectorial policies and the national de.elop%ent progra%, designed and
controlled by Pres' 2ousseffs during Lulas ad%inistration'
0here is a large networ/ of docu%ents in the non3proliferation architecture' Brazil ratified in 200C the
protocol against the >llicit Ganufacturing of and 0raffic/ing in Direar%s' Brazil also participates in
the Progra% of $ction to Pre.ent, &o%bat and =radicate the >llicit trade in )%all ar%s and Light
?eapons in all its aspects' $nd ratified in "KKK the Gine Ban 0reaty 81ttawa &on.ention#'
But this architecture, differently fro% the nuclear one, does not wor/ for different reasons' >t is a
%ista/e to use the nuclear non3proliferation logic and political beha.ior to understand or, worse, to
try to 6ustify why, or why it does not wor/s'
>t does not wor/ because there is a disconnection in the nature of Brazils public policy for%ulation
and Brazils interagency operational strategy and tactical actions' 0here is little capillarity
8correlation# effect a%ongst the rule of international law at political le.el and the law enforce%ent
actions at tactical actions'
0his networ/ is part of the diplo%atic fra%ewor/' Brazil supports these treaties politically' 0he
$r%ed Dorces abide by their ter%s, but they ha.e no institutional %ission clearly related to the
enforce%ent of the ter%s of these treaties, and they are irrele.ant to police operations, %ostly because
the incorporation in the co%%on law of international policy initiati.e is slow and cu%berso%e, e'g',
the regulation of guns in Brazil is categorized as restricti.e and the guiding gun control legislation in
Brazil the )tatute of Disar%a%ent 8not a law#( guns in Brazil are regulated by the National $r%s
2egistry' >n Brazil, the %a5i%u% penalty for illicit possession of firear%s is fro% one to three years
prison and a fine( also, pri.ate guns are prohibited in sports arena, churches, go.ern%ent buildings
and schools'
*. Wha a$# h# !*2&!+a!%(" %' B$a/!&" ()+&#a$ 2%&!+1 ,#.0.6 "a(+# %( "a'#0)a$."6 !"
)$a(!)* #($!+h*#( 2$%0$a*6 a(. 2&a(" '%$ ()+&#a$-2%7#$#. ")3*a$!(#"- '%$ ()+&#a$
(%(-2$%&!'#$a!%(?
0here should be no +sensiti.e nuclear assistant, to rogue countries as a conseAuence of the Na.ys
nuclear3powered sub%arines progra% if the international organis%s, as a cautionary and intelligently
diplo%atic beha.ior, /eep the Brazilian go.ern%ent under strictly nuclear control and o.ersight'
0hese initiati.es should also %otion a positi.e contribution to the +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation,' 0he
1=$, through the Depart%ent of Gultidi%ensional )ecurity, will play a /ey role in this regard' >t has
%uch %ore legiti%acy and is politically e%powered to de.elop strategic control %echanis%s
co%ple%entary to the >$== technical %easuring procedures that ha.e produced difficult diplo%atic
conundru%s and distrust'
0he %oti.e behind the nuclear sub%arine is deter%ined by two reasons! 8"# control of the sea to deny
access of a world power centered3e5peditionary force in the $%azon $rea, and 82# the establish%ent
of a persuasion shield based on retaliation' Both of the reasons behind the construction of the Brazils
nuclear progra% i%ply that the threats to which the progra% is directed are to co%bat and are not
11
li%ited to the traditional regional antagonis%s, but rather are considering a %ultiple3front, alliance3
based opposition, typical of threats historically faced by a great power'
0hus, the rise of a nuclear progra% in the region has %ore i%plications on the role a state aspires to
play in the global arena and not the intentions it %ight ha.e for other neighboring states'
8
$s Brazil
%aintains the status Auo power in the region and there is only one other state, $rgentina, that
possesses nuclear capabilities in the region which are %ostly directed to the production of electricity,
there is no threatening i%plications for regional security'
9
@owe.er, the e%ergence of &hile as a third
nuclear3capable country in the region adds e5ponential co%ple5ity to the issue'
8
Garcos D' de $za%bu6a, Gata/e Ma%iya, and @enri J' Bar/ey' Brazil' 6apan' and Tur(ey,
8?ashington, D&! 0he @enry L' )ti%son &enter, 200K#
9
?orld Nuclear $ssociation, +Nuclear Power in the ?orld 0oday,, 7orld 8uclear #ssociation'
http!77www'world3nuclear'org7info7inf0"'ht%l 8accessed Debruary 2", 20""#'