Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5738

February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
1

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street,
Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz2
3
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
th
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 District of
4
Manila where the parties reside.
5

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
6
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the
parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment
case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As
there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to
7
discipline respondent.
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings
and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared
and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month
9
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. This was adopted
10
and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that
Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened
11
while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not
covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160

12

governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit
of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law
with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
13
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor,
the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members
of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and
the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words,
they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang
14
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself

grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session
hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
15
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that
they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time.
16
In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The
Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
17
concerned. Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or professionor be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount
duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is
enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
18
bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
19
legal profession.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
20
oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution.
He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty.
Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P.
SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE
KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and
ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
1
account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
2
and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
3
reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March
25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
4
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs
assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
5
bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29
of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17,
1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages"
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui
Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan,
Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and
Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
6
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among
7
others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all
these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
8
9
with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that
10
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs

liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify
11
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
12
during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
13
14
retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth
15
Division. In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion
16
to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed
that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
17
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
18
Civil Procedure. The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which
he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to
respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory,
19
thus res judicata does not apply.
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts
of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or
collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was
directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific
pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of
the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a
single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct,
but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be
fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
20
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential
New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight
statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal
educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad
outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new

level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field
Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit
prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation
behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client
property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law.
Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion
21
of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers.
They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses,
the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time,
the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century,
bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
22
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code
of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA)
23
1908 Canons of Ethics.
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public
respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons
24
1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life
and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
25
government service." These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a
client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
26
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation
27
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. For several years, the
ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions.
28
In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent29
interest representation conflicts." The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers
largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that
30
later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides,viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in
a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and
31
1937, respectively.
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
32
Ethics.
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful
revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and
effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part
because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful
in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their
employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
33
Responsibility. The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
34
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. In the case of Canon 9, DR

35

9-101(b) became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model
36
Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by
DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted
new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct
standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance
and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the
rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
37
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. In particular, the ABA did away with Canon
9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as
38
well as the norms indefinite nature.
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect
the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
39
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded,
has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before theSandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the
metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar
Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he
was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
40
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure
of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central
Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy
Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then
Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio
T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said
memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized
or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner
of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the
petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar
is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure
of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate
an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately
take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve
a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court
shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary
Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the
same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued
by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of

Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond
executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it
will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall
be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term"matter" and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different
from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not
involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its
owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points
of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie
41
between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.

42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
43
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
44
proceedings. We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist
where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which
he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule.
MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial.
We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of
respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years.
None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to
assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially
by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its
DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of
various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end
without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling
effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The
observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer
present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
45
practice. Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most
men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted
46
years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. Indeed, "to make
47
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the
tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in
48
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." Even the United States Supreme Court found no
49
quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has
long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
50
which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. At the very
least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as
highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only
51
the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified
52
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of this prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of
knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official
positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks
53
this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take
54
a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence." The case
at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly
stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives
him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of
the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise
his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
55
members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the
56
57
accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No
less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any

detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek
58
to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
59
Professional Conduct and some courts have abandonedper se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an
actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in
60
the case, and the public.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who"switch
sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee maycompromise
confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As aforediscussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is
nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is
no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of
Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK
and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank
offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et
al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
61
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. The example given by
the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged
62
with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of
63
employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies." Prof. Morgan, however,
64
considers this concern as "probably excessive." He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel
secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers
consistently confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least
65
qualified or least vigorous advocates." But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is
no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
66
officials" or their "clout." Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale
for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or
67
her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." More, he contends that the concern
can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make
significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their
former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or
intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the
68
appearance of favoritism."
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court,
and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP
and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division
of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7022

June 18, 2008

MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality,
abandonment and willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her
1
cases and soon their lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she
2
3
fell in love with him. He said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her temptations. Thereafter, they lived together as
4
5
6
"husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997, and on March 12, 1997, their daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and
7
since then he failed to give support to their daughter.
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented their daughter's birth and baptismal certificates,
and the photographs taken during the baptism. She testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did
not think he was already married. She also testified that she was willing to compromise, but he failed to pay for their
8
daughter's education as agreed upon. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to see Ms.
9
Samaniego.
10

In his position paper, Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter. He also admitted his indiscretion;
however, he prayed that the IBP consider Ms. Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with his wife and children.
He further reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
11

In Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law for his refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP also admonished
him to be a more responsible member of the bar and to keep in mind his duties as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration

12

with prayer for us to reduce the penalty, to wit:

Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the disposition of the Honorable Commission on
Bar Discipline, herein respondent most humbly and respectfully begs the compassion of the Honorable Court and
states that the gravity of the penalty imposed and meted out, depriving herein respondent to earn a modest living
13
for a period of six (6) months, will further cause extreme hardship to his family of ten (10) children.
We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree
of morality required of a member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he
was lawfully married and with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that we affirm Resolution No.
14
XVII-2005-138 and deny the prayer for reduced penalty.
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also agree with
the Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair with Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of good moral character as a
member of the bar. We dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniego's charge of abandonment since Atty. Ferrer did not abandon
them. He returned to his family.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his indiscretion which ended in 2000. We have considered such
15
illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. The penalty for such immoral conduct is
16
17
18
disbarment, or indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo
19
v. Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on
the lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of aggravating
circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit
relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting
20
with other women.
In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus we find the penalty recommended by the IBP and Office
of the Bar Confidant as adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

On another point, we may agree with respondent's contention that complainant was not entirely blameless. She knew
about his wife but blindly believed him to be unmarried. However, that one complicit in the affair complained of immorality
against her co-principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari
21
delicto. We must emphasize that this Court's investigation is not about Ms. Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct
22
as one of its officers and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following norms under the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
xxxx
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
xxxx
Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a
resultant hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his
own misconduct.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective upon notice hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his
receipt of this Decision to this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School
(SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him
against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and
unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS
Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before
the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane
Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently
annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal
documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December
1
1987. A Certification dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to
the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period
1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:
2

1. Affidavit of Ownership dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando
Dela Cruz;
3

2. Affidavit dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
4

3. Affidavit dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
5

4. Affidavit dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
6

5. Absolute Date of Sale dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
7

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C.
Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8

7. Sworn Statement dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
9

8. Deed of Sale dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz;

10

9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C.
Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
11

10. Absolute Deed of Sale dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale
Rolando Dela Cruz;

12

dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by

13

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L.
Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
14

13. Conditional Deed of Sale dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A.
Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
15

14. Memorandum of Agreement dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC
Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others
which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the
Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and
malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred
and recommendation.

16

the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in their
complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and the
subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his
notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of
malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for the
following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be
17
suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner
Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Respondent contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents
despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the
18
practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and
he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration

19

of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, that the Bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private
life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
20
another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably
upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of
21
the proper authorities.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Possession of
such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise,
22
"membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before
Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without
seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the
whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent
became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over
the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68.
Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage with
Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been
admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second
marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent
contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the respondents second bigamous
marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment
case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also
exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence
23
- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral
conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
24
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
25
while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly immoral. This
finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been
romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very
intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.

26

27

In the case of Terre v. Terre, respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as shown by the
following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio
and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondents
parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
28

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such as: first, he
abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he
mispresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter. He did
this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is
legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and declared his
abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his
commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
29
penalty could accomplish the end desired. In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is
more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to
the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his commission
as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that
he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason,
notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
30
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The
Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as
31
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a
time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one,
performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents
and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the
proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
32

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera, a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five documents after his
commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of
sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is
33
justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents without the requisite
notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly
committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending
administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and
the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such
stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another
two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5148

July 1, 2003

ATTY. RAMON P. REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not
affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members of the bar.
The Case
1

Before us is a Sworn Complaint filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:
"x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In
addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it was
apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the abovequoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
2
of law for two (2) years."
The Facts
3

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a
Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and
seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga
City. Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money
back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by respondent. The
Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then
issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither
appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal
4
5
Complaint for estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC
6
issued a Warrant of Arrest against Pan.
7

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga
City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business
venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the civil action
against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move
for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.
8

In his Comment dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes
as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless, and
that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional
defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically,
Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pans Motion for an Opportunity to
9
10
Submit Counter-Affidavits and Evidence, of the appeal to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend
11
Proceedings.
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa
case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor
Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the
collection suit.
12

The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the
13
Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

14

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP
for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884
on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had filed against respondents client. In his Comment,
respondent himself claimed that "the reason x x x was x x x the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and
consequent damages."
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage
against the estafa case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and
highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the
alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil
Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioners recommendation for his suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
15
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes
upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel."
Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money,
damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was
later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints

16

alleged the following:

"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed to
perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by
violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a Certification under oath
that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against him but
did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a Criminal
Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally
defective and null and void; x x x;
"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to defer for
the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said
plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the
latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner
contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave
17
irreparable damages[.]"
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen
complainants allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his
client did not agree with Prosecutor Salangas resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and administrative
remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed without basis.
Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed
that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of
these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit
shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a
personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions
demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to
18
law, not to harass them.

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their
comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they
deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients
should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
19
recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, but also
constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is
flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit
20
violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just
condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when
21
they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite
conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of
22
professional duty.
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of
law, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar decorum must
at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva
Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
1
2
(IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional
Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
3
Responsibility. The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003,
respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps.
Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin,
MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of
record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision
of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin.
To this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to
say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, its
in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing." Respondent then replied,
"Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your
office since then, but you never bothered to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?" Complainant
responded, "No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision." Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean to
say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to
show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a
4
hearing was taking place.
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and
shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are
harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondents words but
still managed to reply, "I dont even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants
5
window, he again shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the
head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability
6
to command full respect from her staff.
7

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit signed by employees of RTCBambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said
8
employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.
9

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent
10
submitted his Compliance dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil
Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no
explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident,
the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the court of
origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the
11
case be submitted for resolution. Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his nonappearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the
required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the
12
complainant in the same Manifestation.
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of respondents
13
public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for
14
breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely. The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of
15
Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been
counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals
furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is
unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent deliberately
encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good
faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an
officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it
ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
16

As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco, respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring
17
down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8
and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all
18
times.
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges in the
complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated
incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter
19
having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court. We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation
absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty.
Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had apologized to the
complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his
actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting
20
interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional duty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of thisDecision be furnished
the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7036

June 29, 2009

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, CJ.:
1

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a letter addressed to the Court
filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap,
Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and
for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely
monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public
2
shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter to Atty. Quintana directing
him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which
is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and
3
the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents notarized by him had been reaching her office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as
4
evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers
5
License executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.
6

Under Sec. 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond
Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province
of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan
City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty.
Quintanas wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint
7
Affidavit executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.
8

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006, we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.
9

In his Response, Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial
Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged
that the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his
petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not
10
oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary Public issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued notarial
commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge
Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through
letters, pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow
lawyers.
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the
Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because
he was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since
Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of
Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire
Philippines.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive
Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
the Province of Cotabato.

In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,

report and recommendation.

11

we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation,

12

In the February 28, 2007 Hearing before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge
13
14
Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004. Honorata Rosil appears
as one of the signatories of the document as the donors wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as
15
shown by the Certificate of Death issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the
fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired
16
on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same. To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the
17
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of] Title executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato
18
City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss
19
[of] Drivers License executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato;
20
and (4) Affidavit of Loss executed by Santos V. Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap,
Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits of Judge
21
Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2)
22
23
Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss executed by Santos V.
Magbanua. He explained that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of
Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a
lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told
her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did not comply with her
requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility and had nothing against
24
Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, which is a
requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the
IBP, but she did not return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the certification of good standing and
payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to
oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat the same. He also asked
that he be given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his
family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents
prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
26

25

issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to

27

In a Manifestation dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum submitted a Certification and its entries show that Atty.
Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise,
the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per
O.R. No. 610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his
IBP dues.
28

In its Report and Recommendation, the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as
a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2)
years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already outside his
territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
"Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive
Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his
commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not
commissioned thereat to do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he can exercise his notarial
commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of
merit.

xxxx
Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the respondents wife has herself
notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to
notarize documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would
affect his profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held, thus:
"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries"
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.
Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize
documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his
wife, who acts as his secretary.
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata
Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of
Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
"A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules."
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or qualifications of affiants therein,
respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
xxxx
Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to practice his profession including
notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However,
not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public
as specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the
commissioning court by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may
or may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the required qualifications for [a]
Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial
commission, he has no reason at all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to
do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the
authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and responsibilities including
liabilities, if any, of a notary public commissioned or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial
29
jurisdiction.
xxxx
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months
and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the
gravity and number of his offenses.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized
documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired
commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.
The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation
30
of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Notarizing
documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also
31
amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes. Notarizing documents without the
presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
32
Practice, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires
lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he
admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty

of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen
the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial
commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to
perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It
must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that
33
document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.1avvphi1
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.