ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 01110

STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff Appellee, CASE NUMBER:
vs.
Michael Turner White, COURT OF APPEALS CASE NUMBER
AUTIIORIZED AGENT OF: C-090380 and c-090379
MICHAEL TURNER WHITE
RAFFIC COURT CASE: :(In The Matter
"STRAWMAN"
O M/09/TRD/1945A and M/09/TRD/1945B
Defendant Appellant,
^ORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT CASE
UMBER: 09-TRD-00494

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION

OF Michael Turner White AUTHORIZED AGENT OF
: "MICHAEL TURNER WIIITE "STRAWMAN"

Michael'1'urner White Authorized Representative of: (COUNSEL OF RECORD)

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE "STRAWAfAN"
3756 READING ROAD
APARTMENT #307
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, Michael Turner White, PROPIA PERSONA

OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL

RICHARD CORDRAY
;COUNTY PROSECUTOR
CIIRISTOPHER BROWN
NORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT
4645 MONTGOMERY ROAD
NORWOOD, OHIO 45212

GLi ' r i } ` ( i 1' Gi ) UR

UUPFi(:11E :;WUfi'( OF ()Fil()

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF OHIO

TABEL OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE
OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND GREAT GENERAL INTEREST
AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

5-6

STATEMENT OF CASE STAEMENT OF FACTS 7-10

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS 10-17
PROPOSITION OF LAW I
THE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR B1'
REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'S
RESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT PURSUANT
TO THE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

10-12

PROPOSITION OF LAW H
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY
THE TRAFFIC COURT'SREFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE I,SECTION 8, CLAUSE
17 OF TITE CONSTITUTON.

12-14

PROPISITION OF LAW III

THE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING
TO ACKNOW-LEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THE
HIGHWAYS FREELY AND WITHOUT RESTRICTION

14-15

PROPOSITION OF LAW IV
THE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCIIANGE CUTS AGAINST THE
DICTATES OF THE BANKRUPTCY THAT WAS ESTABLISHED IN
1933 AN'D IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JUDGE
MAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER DECISION.

CONCLUSION
PROOF OF SERVICF.
APPENDIX
Notice of Appeal
Appeal scheduling order
Entry Overruling Motion for Transcripts
Entry overruling Reconsideration niotion
Entry Dismissing Appeal as Untimely
Affidavit of Indigency

15-18

18
19
APPX. PAGE
i-6
7
8
9

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLLC PRIVATE AND

GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND 1NVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL OUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

FEDERAL JURISDICTION
It is further refevant to this Memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction that any
violation of the appellant's Rights, Freedom, or Property by the U.S. federal government,
or any agent thereof, would be an illegal and unlawful excess, clearly outside the limited
boundaries of federal jurisdiction. The appellant's standings is that the jurisdiction of the
U.S. federal government is defined by Article L, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S.
Constitution, quoted as follows:

"The Congress shall have the power . . . To exercise exclusive legislation in

all cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILES
SQUARE) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of
Congress, beconre the seat of the Government of the United States, [District
of Columbia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the
consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needful
Buildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers..." [eniphasis added]
aszd Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing fn this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
The definiition of the "United States" being used here, then, is limited to its territories:
Mariana Islands
6) Northern
1) The District of Coluinbia
2) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Islands 8) Military bases within the several states
3) U.S. Virgin
9) Federal agencies within the several states
4 Guam

5) Amcrican Samoa)

It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:
"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a
government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is
distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same
person may bc at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen of
a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be
different froin those he has mider the other." Slaughter House Cases United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS A FOREIGI^T
CORPORATION WITH RESPECT TO A STATE." [einphasis added]
Voluine 20: Corpus Juris Sec. 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441
S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.
This is further confirmed by the following quote from the Internal Revenue Service:
Federal jurisdiction "includes the District of Colunibia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Ainerican Samoa." - Internal
Revenue Code Section 312(e).
In legal terminology, the word "includes" means "is limited to."
When referring to this "District" United States, the Internal Revenue Code uses the term
"WITHIN" the United States. When referring to the several States, the Internal Revenue
Code uses the terni "WITHOUT" the United States.
Dozens, perhaps hnndreds, of court cases prove that federal jurisdiction is limited to the
few federal territory areas above indicated. For example, in two Supreme Court cases, it
was decided:

"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the
territorial liniits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jtuisdiction of the national
government," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.
"We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
4

and to the territory, of which Alabaana or any of the new States were
formed..."
"fBiecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise
niunicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of a
State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."
Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the
territory within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. HaQan, 44
U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.
Likewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specifies that the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to
any of the several States.

Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal contract can obligate nie to
perforni in any manner withoutiny fully infornied and uncoerced consent, likewise, no
federal statutes or regulations apply to me or have any jurisdictiou over me. I hereby
affirm that I do not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States,
and that therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority
over me.

POWERS AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF

UNITED STATES AND STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
All United States and State government officials are hereby put on notice that I expect
them to have recorded valid Oaths of Office in accordance witti the U.S. Constitution,
Article VI:

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the inembers of

the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation to support this Constitution..."

I understand that by thcir Oaths of Office all U.S. and State government officials are
contractually bound by the U.S. Constitution as formulated by its framers, and not as
"interpreted," subverted, or corrupted by the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts.
According to the Ninth Ainendment to the U.S. Constitution:
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitntion, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
Thus, appellant's understanding from these Amendnients is that the powers of all
U.S. and State government officials are limited to those specifically granted by the U.S.
Constitution. And,
further understand that any laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules, and procedures
contrary to the U.S. Constitution, as written by its framers, are null and void, as expressed
in the Sixteenth Anierican Jurisprudence Second Edition, Sectiou 177:
"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the
appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be in
agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to
be valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows:
'The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form
and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for
any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactnient,
and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An
unconstitutional law in leval contemplation , is as inoperative as if it had
never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle
just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.'
'Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it
imposes no duties, confers no right, creates no office, bestows no power or
authority on anyone, affords no protection and iustifies no acts performed
under it...'
'A void act caimot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional
law cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a
6

statute runs countcr to the fundamental law of the land, it is superseded

thereby.'
'No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to
enforce it."' [emphasis added]
and as expressed once again in the U.S. Constitution, Article VI:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreine law of the land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
All U.S. and State government officials are therefore hereby put on notice that any
violations of their contractual obligations to act in accordance with their U.S. Constitution,
may result in prosecution to the full extent of the law, as well as the application of all
available legal remedies to recover damages suffered by any parties damaged by any
actions of U.S. and State government officials in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On March 20, 2009 a police officer badge number 130 for the Norwood Police
Department, Unft 23 and Post 3128, issued a speedhig ticket on form B28 102726-2 for a
matter of jurisdiction under case number 09TRD00494. This states a violation of the Ohio
Revised Code 333.03B, which is a speeding contract. The speed was 43 MPH in a 25 MPH
zone. The summons to appear at the Norwood Mayor's Court was scheduled for March 20,
2009 and a trial was scheduled for April 13, 2009. Upon the appellant stating this to be an
Adniiralty Marititne Court summons the Norwood Mayor's Court judge refused to hear
the case. That judge transferred this matter to the Hamilton Comity Courthouse 100 Main

Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 for April 29, 2009. The Mnnicipal Court is Magistrate Jay
G. Littner and Judge Brad Greenberg hearing the matter of 112-09-TRD-1945 (A) and (B).

Greenberg Court denied the appellant's restricted appearance notice as well as any
and all case law sanctioned to the states by the United States Supreme Court. This Supreine
Court sanction the appellant's liberty interest to travel the lughways without restriction as
a Sovereign American Citizen. And, vehemently announced that the appellant does not
need to possess a driver's license, nor license plates to travel the highways. The Suprenie
Court further enshrined this right as guaranteed; and, if this right is mutilated that
retaliation can be compensated as a violation of the United Sates Constitution and the
Separation of Powers Doctrine. The Greenberg Court decreed the appellant to be in
violation of the Ohio revised Code and sanction a fine of $197.00, which is Federal Reserve
notes that have been sanctioned as counterfeit in State of Minnesota Coirnty of Scott, First
National bank of Montgomery, Planitff vs Jerome Daly defendant. The Justice Martin V.
Mahone,y ruled the Federal Reserve notes are comiterfeit.
Furthermore, the Greenberg strictly ignored the bankruptcy of 1993 and executive
order declared so by President Roosevelt by Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 611.1 and
Executive Order 6260. This information can be retrieved from the following resources:

Bankruptcy of U.S in 1933 & State of EmerQency, War Powers &

TradinIZ with the Enemy Act of 1917
Bankruptcy of 1933
The United States went "bankrupt" in 1933. [President Roosevelt Executive Order 6073,
6102, 6111, 6260;

Senate Report 93-549, pgs. 187 & 594, 19731

In 1950, declared "bankruptcy and reorganization".
Secretary of Treasury appointer receiver in the bankruptcy [Reorganization Plan, No. 26,
5 U.S.C.A. 903; Public Law 94-564; Legislative History, Pg. 59671
The Secretary of the Treasury is the "Governor" of the International Monetary Fund, Inc.
of the
U.N. [Public Law 94-564, supra, pg. 5942; U.S. Government Manua11990/91, pgs. 480-81;
26 U.S.C.A. 7701(a)(11); Treasury Delegation Order No 150-10]
On Oct. 28th 1977, the United States as aCorporator" and "State" declared insolvancy.
State
baiil<s and most other banks were put under control of the "Governor" of the "Fund"

(I.M.F.). 26
IRC 165 (g)(1); U.C.C. 1-201(23), C.R.S. 39-22-103.5, Westfall vs. Braley, 10 Oliio 188,
75 Am. Dec. 509, Adams vs. Richardson, 337 S.W. 2d. 911 Ward vs. Snzith, 7 Wall 447
"Mr. Speaker, we are now in Chapter 11. Members of Congress are official Trustees
presiding
over the greatest reorganization of any bankrupt entity in world history, the United States
government..." -- (Mr. Trafficant from Ohio, Congressional Record, pg. II1303, March
17th,1993)
"...the United States obligations in the International Monetary Fund..." -- Public Law
94-564,
94th Congress, Sec. 10(a)
State of National Emergeney
"Since March 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national
emergency..."
(Senate Resolution 9, 93d. Congress, lst. Session, Foreward, 1973)
"When Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution... (Congressman Beclc,
Congressional Record, Farm Bill, 1933)
"A majority of people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
rule. For
40 years, freedoms and governniental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have in
varying
degrees been abridgeci by laws brought into fore.e by states of national emergeney..." -Senate
Report 93-549 (Introduction) 1973
"The President may: Seize property, organize commodities, assign military forces abroad,
institute
9

Martial Law, seize and control and transportation and conimunication, regulate operation
of private
enterprise, restrict travel, and in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all
American
citizens". -- Senate Report 93-549; Senate Resolution 9, 93d Congress, l st. Session (I11)
1973
See: Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 48, Statute 1, March 9, 1933; Proclamation 2038; Title 12
U.S.C 95(b)
Currently, permanent state of national emergency. -- 22 U.S.C.A. 286d. 1977
See: Executive Order 12919 signed by President Clinton
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 & 1933 (People Declared the Enemy)
Oct. 6, 1917, under the Trading with the F,neniy Act, Section 2, subdivision (c), Chapter
106Eneiny defined "other than citizens of the United States..."
March 9, 1933, Chapter 106, Section 5, subdivision (b) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act of

Oct.6 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411) amended as follows "...any person within the United States.."
Sce H.R. 1491 Public No.l
As a direct result of this bankruptcy, the Greenberg Court is action is de facto and
in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, all of which, suspend administering
jurisdiction to the United States of America and its Sovereign Ainerican Citizens as
Michael Turner White, authorized agent of: MICHAEL TURNER WHITE "STRAWMAN".

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

PROPOSITION OF LAW I
THE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'S RESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT
PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

Every system of civilized law must have two characteristics: Remedy and Recourse.
Reniedy is a way to get out froin under that law. The Recourse is if you have been damaged
under the law, you can recover your loss. The Coinmon Law, the Law of Merchants, and
10

even the Uniform Coinniercial Code all have reinedy and recourse. The remedy and
recourse are found in the UCC. They are found right in the first volume, at 1-207 and 1103. The making of a valid Reservation of Rights preserves whatever rights the person then
possesses, and prevents the loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or
estoppel. (UCC 1-207.7)

In the case sub judice, the appellant his constitutional rights by signing the traffic
citation with UCC-1-207. This same i-ight was fiu-ther demanded when the appellant
appeared in traffic court made a reservation of rights under the UCC 1-207 which goes on
to say, "When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to make a reservation
thereof, causes a loss of the right, and bars its assertion at a later date. (UCC 1-207.9).
further, any expression indicating an intention to reserve rights, is sufficient, such as
"without prejudice". (UCC 1-207.4). thus and therefore, the signing of the traffic citation
and the proffering of this right in the traffic court and in the `connection with the
appellant's autograph, this clearly states a reserve and the right not to be compelled to
perform under any contract or commercial agreexncnt that the appellant did not enter
Icnowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And fnrthermore, the appellant does not accept
the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.'

The Recourse appears in the Uniform Conunercial Code at 1-103.6, which says: The
Code is complimentary to the Common Law, which remains in force, except where
displaced by the code. A statute should be construed in harmony with the Common Law,
unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the Common Law. The Code recognizes
the Common Law. If it did not recognize the Common Law, the government would have
11

had to admit that the United States is bankrupt, and is completely owned by its creditors.
'Therefore, the explicit reservation at 1-207 and insist that the statutes be construed in
harmony with the Conunon Law. In furtherance to the traffic citation, the appellant
requisitions this court to produce the injured person who has filed a verified complaint. To
further cement this deniand the last sentence of 1-103.6, which states: The Code cannot be
read to preclude a Common Law action. Further, the appellant understand that the traffic
court has made a legal determination that the sections 1-207 and 1-103 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which is the system oi'law you are operating under, are not valid law
before this court?' if, the answer to this is affirmative the appellant places this court on
notice that an appeal will ensue regarding this legal determination.

PROPOSITION OF LAW II
TI3E JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY THE TRAFFIC
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AS DEFINED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 17 OF THE CONSTITUTON.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, is quoted as follows:
"The Congress shall have the power ... To exercise exclusive legislation in
all cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILES
SQUARE) as inay, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of
Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, [District
of Colunibia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the
consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needful
Buildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers..." [eniphasis added]
arad Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the

12

United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so cotistrued as to

Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
The (lefinition of the "United States" being used here, then, is limited to its territories:

1) The District of Columbia

2) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Islands
3) U.S. Virgin
4)Guain

Mariana Islands
6) Northern
7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
8) Military bases within the several states
9) Federal agencies witlwi the several states

5) American Samoa

It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:
"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a
government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is
distinct froin the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same
person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen of
a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be
different from those he has under the other." Slaughter House Cases United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN'I' IS A FOREIGN
CORPORATION W1TI3 RESPECT TO A STATE." [emphasis added]
Volume 20: Corpus Juris Sec. 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441
S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.
This mater has further been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows;
"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the
territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
government," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.
"We think a proper exaniination of this subject will show that the United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
and to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new States were
formed..."
"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise
municipal jurisdictiou, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of a
State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."
"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the
territory within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.
13

Lilcewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specifies that the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to
any of the several States. Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal
contract can obligate the appellant to perform in any manner without hini being fully
informed and uncocrced consent, likewise, ito federal statutes or regulations apply to the
appellant or have any,jurisdiction over the appellant. And, the appellant hereby affirm that
he does not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States, and that
therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority over the
appellant..

PROPISITION OF LAW IiI

THE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THE HIGHWAYS FREELY AND
WITHOUT RESTRICTION
LAW AND ARGUMENT
The right to travel is vehemently announced as a secured liberty interest guaranteed
under the first and fifth amendment. The U.S. supreme Court addressd this matter in
Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 encompasses all legal cases for the right to travel.
Therefore, the appellant has a right to travel freely and incumbent, which is the right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Further, the Snpreme Court announced the
Constitution is th supreme law of the land. See, Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (19430 and
can the state convert the right to travel to a priviledge? The answer is negative. No state
can convert a secured right to a priviledge. And, no state can convert ant secured liberty
into a priviledge and issue a license and a fee. Il; any state does such it is unconstitutional,
because no state can pass a law that takes away this secured right.

14

Can a state require the appellant to have a license? The answer is negativc. No state
can require the appellant to possess a license. See, Shuttlesworth v Birminghani Alabama,
373 U.S. 262, (1962). If a state does convert the appellant's right into a priviledge and
issues a license for it, the appellant can ignore the license and a fee and engage in the right
with impunity.
In regards to evillfuhzess: as an evil intent or notion to avoid a known duty or task
under law with a inoral certainty, is the definition of the Supreme court in U.S. v Bishop at
412 U.S. 346. Here, the appellant has relied upon the Constitution and United States
Supreme Court decision to enforce his right to travel freely. This is not the appellant's
interpretation; rather, the interpretation of Byres v U.S., 273 U.S. 28 says it is to he
interpreted in favor of the appellant. See, 16 Am.Jurp.2i, section 97 states:
"then a constitution should receive literal interpretation in favor of the Citizen, is especially
true, with respect to those provision whieh were designed to safeguard the liberty and
security of the Citizen in regard to person and property". Bary v U.s., 273 128. And, "any
constitutional provision intended to confer a benefit should be liberally construed in favor
of the clearly intended and expressedly designated beneficiary". The appellant is tbe
beneficiary of the United States Constitution.

Thus and therefore, pursuant to Boyd v U.S., 116 U.S. 616, ( 1886), this court is to
protect against any constitutional infringement. And, pursuant to Norton v Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, ( 1886) an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is legal contemplation as inoperative
as though it had never been passed.
PROPOSITION OF LAW IV
THE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCHANGE CUTS AGAINST THE DICTATES OF
THE BANKRUPTCY TI3AT WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1933 AND IS IN DIRECT
OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JiJDGE MAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER
DECISION.
15

LAW AND ARGUMENT

THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States Congressional Record, March 17, 1993 Vol. 33, page H-I303
enshrines the bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES is a 38 part docuinent. It is an
established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the
Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719; declared by
President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress m session
June 5,1933 - Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold
Clause dissolved the Sovereign Authority of the United States and the official capacities of
all United States Governmental Offices, Officers, and Departments and is furtlier evidence
that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only. This created a
federal contractual relationship pursuant to this presidential executive order and U.S.
Const. Article I Sect. X , Cl.t with the states and the Office of the Person. The traffic
citation is a security, exchange and violates the presidential executive order, U.S. Const.
Article X, Cl.1.Sectimi. 10.

Clause l: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; eniit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Clause 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall
be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
Clause 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay an,y Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
16

another State, or with a forcign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
sach iinniincnt Danger as will uot adniit of delay
The security of exchange is the underwriting of insurance for the corporate
UNITED STATES mauitenance is the criniinai penalty of $130.00 (one hundred and thirty
dollars) are federal reserve notes, which is explained by the Jeronie Daly, Judge Mahon,y &
The Credit Rivet Decision. In the decision a Minnesota Trial Court's decision holding the
Federal Reserve Act unconstitutional and VOID; holding the National Banking Act
unconstitutional and VOID; declaring a mortgage acquired by the First National Bank of
Montgomery, Minnesota in the regular course of its business, along with the foreclosure
and the sheriff's sale, to be VOID. Meaning, the Federal Reserve uotes are counterfeit and
uncoustitutional. See, First National Bank of Montgomery vs. Jerome Daly, State of
Minnesota, County of Scott, Township of Credit River and Justice Martin v Mahoney,
Credit River township, Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968. Wherefore, the
appellant invokes the United States Constitution Article 7 Section 101ega1 tender that only
gold and silver can originate to pay a debt. Considering the State of Ohio does not provide
gold and silver to the appellant the traffic criminal offence must be absolved. Most
iinportantly, the failure to present the charging instrument is constitutional grounds for a
disniissal with prejudice in this matter, as well as, releasing the order of the court to the
appellant.
PROPOSITION OF LAW VI
THE SEPERATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE
SOVEREIGN CITIZEN WAS SENTENCED IN AN ADMIRALTY COURT OF A
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS IN WANT OF JURISIDCTION.
LAW AND ARGUMENT

17

The State of Ohio is in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, which says
the United States cannot pass legislation mi to the United States of America. Is this true"?
Yes, this is true. The United States Supreme Court opined the following:
"...the Constitutioti divides authority[legislative jurisdiction] between federal and state
goveniments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power." Coleinan v Thompson, 501 U.s. 722, 759 (1991)(BLACKMAN, j.,
DISSEMTINGO. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branehes of
the federal government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v, 1505 U.S. 144, ] 82] Ashcroft,
501 U.S. at 458. See the federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)" [New York v united
Sates, 505 U.S. 144, (1992)].The federal government has no legislative power outside of its
territory. And, this very same law is spoken of by Judge Story, in his treatise on the
Conflicts of law.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for want of jurisdiction, the herein Propositions of Law ought to be
within the spirit of the ancient veils of justice that are crevices of sacred wrinldes that guide
the ageless wisdom of Conimon Law. Most iniportantly, injustice is a threat to justice
everywhere in the universe and the cancer that is spread by injustice ought to be extricated
froni this memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction.

graph of:
ael Turner White Au orized Representative of:
CHAEL TURNFR W-HITE "STRAWMAN"
3756 READING ROAD
APARTMENT #307
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The Sovei-eign Citizen, Michael Turner White, an American Citizen, certify that on
this 5th day of Octobcr , 2009, a true and exact copy of the aforesaid Appellant's notice of
appeal is submitted to clerk of court of the Ohio supreme Court, at 30 East broad Street,
State Office Tower, Columbns, Ohio 43226-0419 with a return receipt pursuant to the Ohio
Criminal Rule 55. And, a receipt is requested by the sovereign appellant as filed and timed
stamped, per Ohio Criininal Rule 55. And, a copy is sent to Norwood County Prosecutor,
Christopher brown, Norwood Mayor's Court, 4645 Montgomery Road, Norwood, Ohio
45212. This Certificate of Service is sanctioned pursuant to Houston v Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
108 S.Ct. 2379, (1988) and sanctioned to 28 U.S.C. 1746. And, is prepared outside of the
UNITED STATES, INCORPORATED.
AVRights Rescrve
C d-207 and UC
ograph of:
hael Turner Vylti'fe, Ainerican Sovereign

Authorized Representative of:

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE-"STRAWMAN

19

APPENDIX

JUDGES:
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR.
MARK PHILIP PAINTER

J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN JR.

SYLVIA SIEVE HENDON
PENELOPE R. CUNNINGHAM
PATRICK DINKELACKER

COURT OF APPEAI.,s
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT

MARK E. COMBS
COURT AnMINISTRATOR

WILLTAM HOWARD TAFTLAW CENTER

230 EAST NINTH STREET

MOLLY LEONARD

CINCINNATI, OHio 45202-2138

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

513,946.3500 FAx 513.946.3412

CHRISTOPHER P. DIETZ

www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt

CUtLror STAFF

STATE OF OHIO,

APPEAL NOS. Co9o379

Co9o38o

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TRIAL NOS.Mo9TRDr9aSiA.
Mo9TRDi9451B

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Defendant-Appellant.

ACCELERATED CALENDAR SCHEDULING ORDER AND CONSOLIDATING APPEALS

Having reviewed the notice of appeal and docket statement filed herein, and pursuant to Local Rule
12(2), it is the Order of this Court that this cause be placed on the Court's accelerated calendar.
It is Ordered that the complete record of this action be filed on or before o7/24/2001).
(See paragraphs one and two of the enclosed.)
The appellants brief shall be filed on or before o8/26/2oon.
The appellee's brief shall be filed on or before 09/29/2009.
(See paragraph four of the enclosed.)
Counsel who wish to submit the appeal to the Court without oral argument should submit a written
request to the court at least three working days prior to the hearing.
Further, the Court hereby sua sponte consolidates the above causes for the purpose of appeal under
the case number C-o9o379
NOTE: Enclosed with this Order are several admonitions. These admonitions should be reviewed.

To The Clerk:
^

'

.\'.

..

e. '

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on June i2. 2ooq per order df'the Court.

By:

(Copy sent to counsel)

Presidin Judge ^^--

IN THE COURT OF APPF,ALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO. C-o9o379

Appellee,

ENTRY SUA SPONTE STRIKING

STATEMENT, PRAECIPE, AND
AGREED STATEMENT FILED ON
JULY 15, 2009

vs.

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's statement,

praecipe, and agreed statement filed on July 15, 2009.
The Court sua sponte strikes the filing as not being in compliance with the
Court's entry of July 7, 2009.

The Court's scheduling order of June 16, 2009 obligates the Clerk of Courts to
prepare and certify the docket and journal entries, thus making appellant's statement
and praecipe moot. The docket and journal entries are to be filed by July 24, 2009.
As stated in this Court's entry of July 7, 2009, the transcript of proceedings
or, in lieu of a transcript, an agreed statement, shall be filed by July 24, 2oo9. The
agreed statement portion of appellant's filing dated July 15, 2009 fails to comport
with Appellate Rule 9(D). Appellate Rule 9(D) requires that the appellant present
his statement to the trial court for its review. The failure of appellant to file the
transcript of proceedings or a properly filed agreed statement by July 24, 2009 may
result in this appeal being dismissed.

To The Clerk:
Enter ug0n ;& Journal of the Court on JUL 1`6 2Q09per order of the Court.
(Copies sent to all counsel)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COTJNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

APPEAL NO.C-o9o379
C-o9o380
TRIAL NO. Mo9TRD19451-A & B

Appellee,

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL

vs.
MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,
Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appeal from the trial court.
'Phe Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for failure of the appellant to
comply with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure to wit: the transcript of
proceedings or an agreed statement under Appellate Rule 9(D) was not timely filed
It is further ordered that a certified copy of this judgment shall constitute the
mandate to the trial court puisuant to Rule 27, Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

To The Clerk:
Enter upon tjieJournal of the Court onlUL 2 9 2009 per order of the Court.
By: (Copy
Presiding Judge

sent to counsel)

IN TI-IE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELILATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

APPEAL NO. C-o9o379

C- 0903 80

Appellee,
ENTRY OVERRULING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.

M:ICI-IAL'L TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's motion for

reconsideration.
The Court finds that the motion is not well taken and is overruled.

To The Clerk:
Enter uponAe Aournal of the Court onAU6 2 62009 per order of the Court.
By:

^^^

Presiding Judge

( Copies sent to all counsel)