Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Technical
II
Services
Harry C. Thomson
and
Lida Mayo
StJPbHINIkNULNIUrDOCUWfNTS
DEPOSITORY
NOV
2003
GOVERNMENT OOCUMENTSDEPT^
2003
First
Printed
For
sale
Washington,
DC
20402-9328
SSOP
II
Advisory Committee
(As of
December 1959)
Maj. Gen.
U.S. Continental
University of Wisconsin
Oron
J.
Hale
University of Virginia
W.
Stull
Holt
Brig.
Emory
I.
Wiley
Brig.
Jr.
College
T. Harry Williams
Louisiana State University
C.
Vann Woodward
Forces
Command and
University
Armed
Army War
University of Washington
Bell
Hugh P. Harris
Army Command
Chief Historian
Stetson
Conn
Editor in Chief
James C. Griffin
James R. Hillard
Joseph R. Friedman
Elliot
Margaret E. Tackley
Lt. Col.
Lt. Col.
Dunay
to
Those
Who
Served
Fore^vord
In cost and bulk, the munitions manufactured by and for the Army's
Ordnance Department during World War II exceeded the output of all the
other technical services of the Army combined, and in cost they rivaled that
for the aircraft and ships with which the war was fought. The process of
getting these munitions to fighting forces all over the world
of storing them
until needed, of keeping track of them, and of keeping them in repair
was
almost as complicated as their manufacture. In writing the story of these two
main aspects of the Ordnance mission on the home front, the authors have
its
defense.
Washington, D. C.
JAMES
22 September 1959
Brig. Gen.,
A.
NORELL
U.S.A.
vu
when
Ordnance
Historical Branch.
its
vm
1950,
when
The American
chief in
June 1959.
University, she
Preface
on the role of the Ordnance DepartWorld War II. As the first volume, subtitled
Planning Munitions for War,^ gave emphasis to research and development, this
volume deals with procurement and supply, and the third will describe Ordnance
operations overseas. It is particularly important for the reader of this volume
to bear in mind that the first volume includes, in addition to research and
development, separate chapters on the early history of the Ordnance Department, its organizational and personnel problems during World War II, and its
efforts to conserve scarce materials such as copper, steel, and aluminum. The
organizational charts in the earlier volume may be of special assistance to the
reader not familiar with Ordnance organization. Taken together, the three
volumes deal with every major aspect of Ordnance history in World War II,
and give some attention to the prewar years when the art of munitions making
This
is
in
was sadly neglected. The authors have studiously avoided duplication of material
II,
volumes of the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN
Smith.
Elberton
R.
Mobilization
by
particularly The Army and Economic
In his preface to Charles Ffoulkes' little classic, The Gun-Founders of
England, Lord Cottesloe observed, on the eve of World War II, "In all that
has been written about war, but little mention has been made of the making
of weapons; it is their use which is dramatic and tragic and commands public
WORLD WAR
in other
attention."
The mystery
powder
in the
its
employment
in
explained. Neglect of the armorer's art by historians has been traditional in this
country as well as in England, owing in part, no doubt, to the reluctance of
and furnace.
was reinforced by a strong desire to
emphasize the pursuits of peace rather than the ways of war and to write new
textbooks giving less space to battles and political campaigns and more to
social, economic, and cultural history. Most professional historians of the 1920's
and 1930's systematically avoided the study of both warfare and munitions
scholars to explore the sooty mysteries of forge
After
World War
I,
this reluctance
ix
During World
War
"Merchants of Death."
importance of arms production swept
practitioners
its
II the life-and-death
away
part of the earlier aversion to the subject, and some of the newly
aroused interest in munitions carried over into the postwar years. But it is still
true that, in proportion to its significance, remarkably little substantial material
has been published on the manufacture of munitions. This volume is a modest
effort to redress the balance.
With
Cottesloe's
much
storage,
issue,
and maintenance
comment but
nevertheless
subjects
implied
in
it
not
the
mentioned
situation
in
Lord
has been
the same. If anything, these topics have appeared less appealing and
less written about. Warehouses, pipelines, inventories, parts catalogs
have been
is nothing glamorous or 'exciting about these subjects unless an investigator uncovers fraud or waste. Yet even the most casual student of military
there
affairs
humdrum
activities
disaster.
with obvious exceptions, the same pattern. The Field Service organization,
mainly along functional lines, is reflected in the supply chapters on such
topics as storage, stock control, and maintenance. Co-ordination of the two has
proved as difficult in the writing as it was in actual operation during the war.
Of the procurement chapters all except Chapter VIII were written by Dr.
Lecture, Brig
of the
Department
Army,
XXII) and
the In-
Gen John K.
of the
to
Nov
48,
many
were invaluable
and who wrote most of Chapter VIII on small arms. The entire manuscript was
typed and retyped with great skill and patience by Mrs. Peril Cummings.
In the Oflfice of the Chief of Military History, Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief
Historian, and Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, Editor in Chief of the World War II
series,
in
all
Editing of the manuscript was performed by Carl Brinton Schultz, senior editor,
editor.
Miss Margaret E.
HARRY
Washington, D. C.
22 September 1959
XI
C.
THOMSON
Contents
Chapter
I.
II.
p^gg
INTRODUCTION
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
13
16
Surveys of Industry
Educational Orders and Production Studies
Conclusion
III.
17
19
21
1940-41
Procurement Objectives
24
24
Placing
25
the
First
Orders
Plant Allocations
District-Arsenal-OCO Relations
Creating New Facilities
31
and Difficulties
Engineering Advisory Committees
33
39
Big Business
40
42
32
Criticisms, Delays,
Status of
IV.
27
29
29
vs.
Small Business
xiii
45
46
55
59
64
Page
Chapter
V.
ARTILLERY
Artillery
on
Hand
in
68
69
1940
Production Preparedness
71
74
83
92
95
99
Heavy
100
Artillery
Industry
ARTILLERY AMMUNTTTors
Operations of FDAP
jr-KOUUCTION
105
107
108
*^"^
125
125
130
Technological Advances
133
1944-45
140
144
150
The
1941-43
Crisis of
SMALL ARMS
Aid
to Britain in
154
155
1940
156
160
168
170
Rifle Production
I'l
Carbines
The BAR
Machine Guns
Submachine Guns
The Bazooka Rocket Launcher
178
Recoilless
184
Production Preparedness
Getting the Garand into Production
the Picture
Plants,
188
190
191
193
1940-42
'8
185
Dwindling Reserves
Prewar Plans and Operations
New
'*
182
Rifles
Building
'
181
Miscellaneous Items
IX.
104
Safety
Balancing Production,
VIII.
......
and Terminations
xiv
204
217
Page
Chapter
X.
The Upswing
in
1940
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
241
244
246
247
250
252
254
255
259
262
Engines
Transmissions
Armor
Light Tanks:
M2A4
to
M24
in
1942
265
266
270
280
286
292
XIII.
300
301
Categories of Parts
Spare Parts
in
Ordnance, 1939 42
Spare Parts
in
the
the
After
XIV.
QMC, 1939-42
Manuals
Recruiting and Training Inspectors
General Somers' Role
Inspection Gages
Proving Grounds
Quality Control
Commodity Groups
The
on
and
V-J
...
302
307
309
320
322
323
325
326
326
327
332
339
341
341
343
344
346
348
Training
Statutory Base
Action
1942-45
Merger,
Inspection
XV.
.'
Statistical
222
223
226
231
233
Day
XV
Page
Chapter
XVI.
WORLD WAR
XVII.
351
Facilities
352
354
359
The
The
XVIII.
First
Fiscal
Storage
Facilities
XIX.
Depot Missions
XX.
Implementation of the
A Common Language
of
Supply
STOCK CONTROL
Departures
From
the
379
379
383
386
387
389
391
395
396
396
398
399
401
402
403
405
407
410
410
411
413
415
418
420
The Influence
Redistribution
of
ASF
and
Disposal
XXI.
360
363
366
368
376
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
Means
of Identification
Improvements
in the
Pattern of Distribution
XVI
423
423
429
Page
Chapter
XXII.
MAINTENANCE
Maintenance
at
<
440
442
443
448
450
the Arsenals
Reorganization of
451
455
458
461
Maintenance Shops
Combined Shops
The Reclamation Program of 1944
Trends in Maintenance Engineering
XXIII.
463
CONCLUSION
465
465
472
Looking
to the
Future
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
477
GLOSSARY
479
INDEX
487
Tables
^^S^
No.
1.
Selected Items
From Time
....
25
43
...
49
56
7.
8.
Artillery Available,
9.
Artillery Production,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
30 June 1940
1
July
101
10.
Summary
11.
12.
13.
14.
61
64
65
70
84
of Artillery Production,
148
to the
150
.
...
151
152
^"i'
No.
174
17.
1940-1945
Machine Gun Production, 1940-1945
Small Arms Ammunition Production, 1940-1945
18.
193
242
262
Rifle Production,
15.
16.
181
189
1940-1945
20.
21.
19.
22.
23.
24.
263
290
296
349
1945
Decenjber
...
Charts
1.
ETO
2.
Vehicles,
149
317
1940-1945
Illustrations
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Aboard
Medium Tank M2
War
14
Districts
17
Louis Johnson
71
75
78
M7
A
A
Box
of Bulk
Bomb
TNT
82
89
106
118
119
132
TNT
Works
Into 155-mm.
xviii
133
Shells
139
Page
Saginaw
Gun
Plant
.'
.
157
John C. Garand
161
176
Completed Carbines
177
179
".
183
Rifle
185
201
Lead Slugs
206
209
214
229
236
237
243
258
260
276
278
285
294
298
306
328
353
369
370
374
375
382
384
401
424
J.
Hayes
General Grant
M3 Medium Tank
Assembly Line
2'/2-ton
2 '/2-ton
Tank
Trucks
Amphibian Truck
Half-track Cars
Cartoon by
Light
4x4 Truck
'/4-ton
Dukw,
M3
Bill
M2
Mauldin
Gun
Dope"
441
446
454
Posters
cartoon by
Bill
XIX
CHAPTER
Introduction
"Nobody can
battle
smoke
see
through
this curtain of
member
day," cried a
House
of the U.S.
described
reports
the
the full
weight of the
and roar of
and dive bombers crushing
Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and rolling toward France and the
English Channel
shock became alarm.
Another Representative expressed the genoffensive
great thunder
tanks, artillery,
when he
eral feeling
of
bounds
!"
shouted, "Hell
is
out
came
horrifying possibilities:
that
Hitler
earth. "^
"the
How
last
well
be able to defend
weapons did
it
world of
great
hostile dic-
Democracy on
States
attacked?
What
itself if
have?
May
War Department
on the military appropriations
bill for Fiscal Year 1941. When the figures
came out in late May, on the floor of Con1940, submitted by the
at hearings
large
American
city.
There were
coastcities
all
could be
bombed
out
As
were about 5,000
French 75's left over from World War I,
but nearly all of them were mounted on
Speculations
fantastic a
be
fully
^ (
Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th
I )
Cong., 3d sess., pp. 5916, 6560; (2) Time, May
in
Time,
May
20,
And what
Army
all
number
den,
bombs
were of the
over a
the
ing in
the
current
light type,
12 tons. Little
about
German
weighing only 10 or
tanks;
80-ton monsters.
The Army
believed that
effective
had
The
hunting."
All types of
in
krieg warfare.
The
figures for
blitz-
ammunition
piercing ammunition,
of .50-caliber ball
of Congress
the
on 16
Presi-
May
dollars
lawmakers and the press. But some members of Congress were demanding to know
whether new appropriations would "go
down the same rat hole into which we have
during the last
poured $7,000,000,000
.
of the rifles
Where had
6 years."
that
about
"merely
and
for such
travel ex-
ate
son Confs.
INTRODUCTION
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Aboard Medium Tank M2 of the 67th Armored
Regiment. Officer in left foreground is Lt. Col. Omar N. Bradley. (Photograph taken May
1940.)
and not
^**
to
President's
aircraft,
and,
May
sess., p.
429.
Gen. Malin Craig, "Our Present Military Position," (extracts from final report to SW, 30 Jun
39), Army Ordnance, (now Ordnance) XX, No.
116 (September-October 1939), 89.
^^ Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th
Cong., 3d sess., p. 6165.
^
on
hand. Complete delivery of the weapons
"on order" could not be expected before
most important of
percentage of
all,
weapons were
all
June 94 1.
At the current
actually
rate
of
delivery,
the
$348,228,998 just appropriated for ordnance could not be translated into antiaircraft guns, tanks, field artillery, powder,
and
shells
June
until
1942.
Armored
How
Recalled to
Force.
^*
it
do
in
this
crisis?
more
optimistic
am
terribly disap-
one Senator.
war
Army,"
"Their ambition
to
is
said
get
30 days."
The agency
^^
that
money was
still
made
doubts.
thinking in
if
the
in
Army
procuring,
attitude of the
and numerous
field
Wash-
professional officer.
installations,
major
ters
War
to
Approve
President's
Army and
^^ (i)
cities. ^^
(later
Under
Secretary)
and on
mili-
Navy
tary
matters,
while decisions
as
to
con-
thority
for
12
WDAB,
^^
The
little
au-
27,
LXXVII,
40,
1940, p.
14,
1940
were
the
as
tions for
15 (i)
War).
May
"Editors
p. 17.
II
tracts, financing,
Journal,
Time,
G-4. The line between military and procurement matters was not always distinct.
But as a general rule decisions as to types
and quantities of weapons needed for each
unit of the Army were looked upon as mili-
Editorial,
p. 14.
INTRODUCTION
One of these was Maj. Gen. Charles M.
Wesson, Chief of Ordnance. Another was
Brig. Gen. Charles T. Harris, Jr., who, as
the Chief of the Ordnance Department's
Industrial Service, was the man in charge
of procuring the
he was,
Army
in the
official,
dynamo
"the
of
Ordnance."
Secretary
of
Warthe
Army's
had given
and most
important rearmament task, which was to
put industry to work. Just as nobody expected to fight a war with the small Regular Army, nobody expected the six Ordnance arsenals to turn out more than a
small portion of the munitions that would
him an
Ordnance
installations,
...
the
ar-
them
in
Under
the Fiscal Year 1939 program, eduhad been placed for semi-
cational orders
automatic
rifles,
recoil
shells;"
made by
mechanisms
for
the S. A.
Woods Company
to the
Ordnance conference in General Wesson's office, where it was passed around and
examined with much interest. ^^ Advance
planning enabled Ordnance production to
get off to a fast start before tool and materials shortages and low priorities put a
daily
WashWorld War
first
and 75-mm.
and by the spring of 1940 the results were beginning to come in. In March
General Harris was able to bring a shell
services
staff officers
and
discuss
Ordnance policy.
was the point
tary Service
Low
Countries,
the storage,
distribution,
^'(i)
130-31
and 141-46;
"Industry's Manual of
Report on the Educational
ford,
Arms:
Orders
Progress
Program,"
3711^
Mar
40.
guns,"
^^
yet there
were
tees,
tirely
was
rising.
The coming
of age of air
power had a
impact on the Ordnance Department. Bomb cases and fuzes formed a large
part of the educational orders under the
definite
Year 1940 program ;^^ and, since industry had cut down the time of making
Fiscal
bomb
could
be
expected
Service.
dier general.^^
a few
years
slender, thoughtful
older than
an
professor than
had long
service
Army
in
the
man,
General Harris,
like
a college
He had
officer.
field,
beginning
as Chief Ordnance
Rainbow Division in World
and had recently engineered an
War
I,^^
innovation in
field
by
into an Ordnance battalion. The battalion
was tried for the first time in the spring
1940 maneuvers, and Colonel Grain, on
the scene as Corps Ordnance Officer, saw
^^
that it was successful.
tion
Though
maneupress "more
ful
bomb
fillings
from production
or-
"possibili^^
521 (i)
May
--
Time,
''
Rutherford,
Army
27, 1940,
)p.
19.
seemed to the
unreal than most such playing at soldiers,"
and against the background of Europe's
total war "the U.S. Army looked like a few
* WDAB,
INTRODUCTION
A
few months
later
factory,
aircraft
Committee on
Military Affairs a
bomb
in
kill
it
might
!" ^"
!
Ground
in late
May,
Atlantic
Clipper
scheduled
to
leave
Jr.,
The
fall
of
had
tion
a tank, or
fill
for
20 Editorial,
and
2 8
13
May
6,
ii,
12
19
Apr;
40.
(i) Editorial,
and
121
40.
May
121
27, 1940,
most strenuous
efforts of hard-pressed
men
Ordnance conferences
in the old
Munitions
new Pentagon,
CHAPTER
II
Procurement Planning
Planning for military preparedness
in
World War II
somewhat from planning by Euro-
Secretary of
War, headed
the middle
in
differed
vided
pean military establishments. The differences stemmed largely from two factors:
lack of a munitions industry in this country
army
or large
War
were kept
in
private industry to
Ordnance procurement
rearmament
launched in 1940.^
In spite of the injunction of the National
Defense Act of 1920 to plan in advance for
effort
military supply,
the
War Department
found the climate of opinion in the United
States during the 1920's and 1930's not at
all favorable to such planning.^ The Planning Branch in the Office of the Assistant
pro-
^ (
)
Lt. Col. Gladeon M. Barnes, "Procurement
I
Planning," Army Ordnance, XVIII, No.
103
Maj. Gen.
22-23;
(July-August
(2)
1937),
Charles M. Wesson, "Fundamentals of Preparedness," Army Ordnance, XIX, No. 114 (May-June
1939), 329-32; (3) Col. James H. Burns, "Pro-
WAR
zation,
II
1951)-
may
-
vast
Jr.,
be found in
The
is
discussed
An
inter-
Influence
OCMH
files.
effect of public
partment
The
in
ARMY
IN
WORLD WAR
II
(Washington,
2d
sess.,
28 Apr 48,
p. 292ff.
10
converting
to
war production.^ By
the
spring of 1940 a change of popular sentiment was taking place; the American peo-
more
were demanding more adequate national defense, but they still found the thought
of planning for another war extremely dis-
tasteful.
ple
The
had
1930's
mood by
forbid-
nations.
purchase munitions in
to
had
transactions
basis.
ish
Under
and
to be
on a cash-and-carry
made few
May
commercial in
items. But the
existence of idle factories, tools, and manpower throughout nearly the whole decade
which were
items,
largely
Ordnance
mary emphasis on
.''
The
though
war production.
**
Un-
of
existing
than on building additional plants, and tended to minimize estimates of the probable impact on the civilian economy of a war production program.
gave
It
rise to
the belief,
still
widely held
American
in-
Testimony
ris, Jr.,
WDAB,
in
of Brig.
S.,
OO
IN
1940-1943,
UNI-
WORLD WAR
II
machine
tools,
tion, tanks,
OHF.
indirect, influence
placed pri-
rather
capacity,
It
utilization
-'
Ltr,
CofOrd to ASW, 20 Sep 39, sub: ReadiOrd Dept to Meet the Requirements of
ness of the
"
the
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
Ordnance devoted
far
more
11
attention to
Ordnance
ment
Army
of the
Industrial College,
and
of
it
small
Through its many procurement district offices Ordnance kept officially in touch with
tinny
industry in
all
Army Ordnance
the
semiofficial level,
in
industrial
1939,
on
Association,
promoted public
preparedness.
In
interest
fiscal
year
planning
(including
accounted
for
about
educational
$8,000,000
orders)
of
civilians
compared
planning.
and
ware, to carry on
required
the
for
The importance
the
of
production
of
Ordnance planning
is revealed
Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization,
Chapters II-IV. The library of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has several lectures given
by Ordnance officers during 1940 and earlier years
on the work of the Planning Branch.
WDAB, 1941, H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 98.
^^ See remarks by Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell
effort in the
in
'
industry
explosives
to
of
peacetime
the
$9,275,300 allocated for all War Department (including Air Corps) procurement
planning for that year. In the early months
engineers,
to only
praising
Rpt
of
44,
WD
^'^
Ordnance,
Plans for
New
aware
facilities in
Rpt CofOrd);
Facilities
its
of the
TNT, ammo-
Div, for
Data
p. 185.
for
Ammo
in
an Emergency,
OHF;
(3)
Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, The Ordnance Department, 9 May 41, ICAF; (4) Memo,
CofOrd for ASW, 6 May 40, sub: Additional FaLecture,
cilities
Required.
OO
381/35763
ASW;
(5)
Comm. headed
Rpt
of
WD
OCMH.
Mobilization for War, History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, ig40-rg4
(2)
Ammo
12
powder and small arms and for the operaBy the summer of
1940, thanks largely to the efforts of General Harris, Ordnance had a fairly clear
idea as to the type of new facilities it would
need to produce smokeless powder, explosives, ammonia, and TNT.'^ These plans
and reserve machinery. General Wesson
told the
Truman Committee
in April 1941,
starting the
much
eventually supplying a
larger
and production of
18,000 airplanes. Approval of this plan,
formulated in large part by an Ordnance
officer. Col. James H. Burns, was a big step
forward along the road toward effective in-
force on
dustrial
combat
mobilization.^"
break with
equipment
it
status,
all
made
It
a sharp
for small
Army
increments, for
way
Army.
It
to increase
cleared the
left
to
the future
and adjusting
its
parts. But Ordnance planners found
that there were still many unknown factors
the equation
new
be axailable.
Ordnance maintained
able to produce
of the
six
man-
were not intended for large-scale production in time of war.^" It was estimated that
initial stages of
Mar
struction.
!* (i) Statement of Gen Wesson
before the
Spec S. Comm. Investigating the National Defense
Program, 77th Cong., ist sess., Hearings on S. Res.
71, Investigation of the National Defense Program,
Apr 41. (These hearings, which extended from
March 1941 through 11 June 1948, from the 77th
through the 8oth Congresses, will hereafter be
cited as Truman or Mead Comm., Hearings according to date. The successive chairmen of this
committee were Harry S. Truman, James M.
Mead, and Owen Brewster). A copy of Gen Wesson's statement is in OHF; (2) Interv with Maj
Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr., and Brig Gen Burton
O. Lewis, 13 Jan 53: (3) Min, Wesson Confs, 20
Jun 40. On the development of plans and purchase of machinery, see also (4) Small Arms Ammunition, A H'story of an Industry, 1918-1944,
vol. L ch. 4, prepared by Ammo Br, SA Div, OCO
.
45, p. 6, OHF.
(i) Munitions Program
Dec
31
'
weapons, tables of
equipment, estimated rates of consumption,
in
the arsenals
all
"'
of
30
June
1940
this
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
13
(GOCO)
ed
the
plans.
dressing"
about
principle of
ning in the
manufacturing
ar-
there
James A.
New York
CenUnited
Farrell of the
Radio Corporation of
Lamont, former Secretary of Commerce; and Owen D. Young,
chairman of the board of the General Elec-
of directors of the
America; Robert
boards but
these
tric
P.
district
prob-
when
tricts
it
board
ory
helped
unlock
to
its
advis-
industrial
doors.
^^ (i)
Lectures,
required munitions.
Over-all direction of
the
was
to
be carried on in
the districts.'^
The
a Reserve
offi-
up of prominent
sympathetic,
at
Most
of
^-'
of
in
who were
theory,
OO
and
its
relation
the
to
full-time basis as
districts, see
cer,
officer
cisco.
ian
in
with
are described
in
History of the
Industrial
10
1,
for FY
See also Dir for Procurement
May 39, OHF; Cir 18, The Mission
I
1940.
of the New York Ord Dist, 29 Oct 35, in His-
OHF.
tory of
app. C.
District,
I,
pt.
i,
f^
,y
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
In
the
stages
early
of
15
an emergency,
operating procedures,
established
and
staffs
the
ar-
specifications,
manufacturers.^**
Up
to
The
grant of
an integral part of
plan, and to lend realism to such planning
each district was requested in December
1939 to submit its recommendations covtheless
ering the
first
twenty contracts
by the
The
it
showed names
districts
expected
reports sent in
of
duction
offices
that
of
received
would request
When
item.^^
the.se
facilities
district
assignments
they
allocated to
them
ance inspection by the district offices, coupled with periodic interchangeability tests,
of
product.
In
plants,
The Chicago
example,
planned
Elgin National
fuzes,
to
district,
place
one
to cite
orders
Watch Company
with
for time
Company
for
machining 75-mm.
with Biicyrus-Erie
Company
shells,
for 3-inch
AA
gun mounts, with Stewart-Warner Corporation for metallic belt links, and so on
through the
The
list.^^
QMC
-- Ltr,
Negotiation
CofOrd
of
Wartime
OO
file.
OO
381/3062, copy
-^
Allocated
in
OHF.
facilities
specific
in
War
procure-
16
the plan will bring forth the best facilities
cost, consistent with
was estimated
It
arsenals,
allocated
competitive
facilities
or
bidding
any other
among
facilities
be the
were
rule.
less
recurrence
World War
War Department
of the
confusion
the
of
when purchasing
of
agencies
contracts
a
fixed-price supply
contract to be
32,
used
ment
allowed greater
S.
also considered.
to
of
Each
own
district office
industries within
its
among
to administer
all
its
contracts with
Administration
arsenals.
of
contracts
in-
making
Ordnance
on the
the cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF), which
flexibility in pricing,
were
was
cluded,
(usually
NDAC).2
that manufacturers
that
Ordnance
of
It
cited
bidder,
ished products,
delivered.
schedules.
Secretary of
memo
for
plans of
Ann Rpt
334.9/26. The
23 Jul 40,
the supply services are summarized in
USW FY
OUSW, FY
Br,
2"
in
OO
NDAC,
all
OO
offi-
41,
and
in
41.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
ers
it
17
examine the
and make an award. He went on to
say that this procurement cycle could be
cut from ninety to thirty days for essential
items in an emergency only if the industrial
days to advertise
for
bids,
bids,
restrictions
Surveys of Industry
summer
of 1940 each district ofhundreds of reports of industrial surveys made during the preceding years and kept as nearly up-to-date as
possible with the handful of officers and
In the
fice
had on
civilian
file
engineers
available
for
the
job.
su-
Assistant Secretary of
War,
of
covered
major
War
Louis
Johnson
industrial
the firm's
transportation
facilities,
skilled workers,
availability
of
Ordnance materiel
company might produce in an emergency. Above all. Ordnance was interested
in firms with good management and strong
type and quantity of
the
and
a leader in
ning.
the
men
who
under-
pre-
Wesson
told
early in 1940.
reserve.
in
They
Industrial
"They
College
students
war
our storehouses."
^^
-* Lecture,
Department
Ordnance
Wesson,
Procurement, p. lo. See also Memo, Brig Gen
Harris, Actg CofOrd, for ASW, 15 May 40, sub:
400.12/5908.
Measures to Expedite Proc,
-^ Interv with Brig Gen Burton O. Lewis, 29
Apr 52. The same view was expressed by many
other Ordnance officers in interviews with the
OO
author.
3"
Brig
p.
For discussion of
Gen
239ff.
Harris,
See also
curement.
S.,
Smith,
testimony of
76th Cong., 3d sess.,
WDAB,
18
Before 1940 the process of making insurveys was slow, hampered by
mingham
of
that,
dustrial
lack of interest
facturers
surveying
But
job.
during
the
first
six
months
of
1940 rose
^^
to five hundred.
of industrial sur-
firms
items
of
turn
could
that
Ordnance
storage or issue.
The
out
materiel
complete
ready
for
esses.
The
production in that
ported
on extensive
The
dearth of ma-
fall
of
than
tools
ago.
bids
on
educational
orders
"
was
anticipated
months
six
34
manu-
was
facture
the
1920's
of
important steps to assure an adequate supply of gages for a future emergency. More
than half a million World War I gages were
collected, checked for accuracy, and put in
storage.
During the
1930's
nine
district
to
oratories
were established
it
that
hand
date,
'-
p.
were brought up to
and new gages were procured for
at the arsenals
District, I, p. D-3.
'' History, Birmingham Ordnance
Ordnance
retooling.
that
3,
utilize existing
The educa-
nance planners were aware that the nation's small machine-tool industry would
be swamped in time of war; they realized
that every po.ssible step should be taken to
District.'^'^
tional orders
pt.
I,
''*
pp. 285-90.
Monthly Progress Rpt,
pp. 75-76-
Phila
District,
Ord
Dist,
I,
Jan
District,
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
19
standard items.
allotted
of
same
tory
time,
measures
War
gage
the
that
problem,
World War I,
at all in World
in
orders.
items.
manufacturers
to give
experience
in
selected
producing
and
manufacturing
some
Other supply
program to
aids.
participated
services
the
in
Ordnance
materiel.^^
was
also to
facilities
al
II.
cers
the
it
^^ (i)
History,
OCO,
Facili-
ASW
for
(2) Memo,
Donald Nelson, 21 Sep 40, sub: Project for Expansion of Productive Capacity for Gages, copy
ties
in
Section,
pt.
I,
i;
OHF.
The
^'^
cit.,
of
the
22-26.
pp.
sys-
allocation
See also
perform in time
of war, to promote mutual understanding
between industry and procurement officers,
and the
would be
nished
called
allocated
upon
to
facilities
with drawings,
specifications, descriptions of
and
in
some
manufacture,
83.
The
district histories,
Pittsburgh
cedure
District,
in detail.
allocated,
service
describe
The names
or
appear
services
in
allocations
the
pro-
Alphabetical
Directory
of
feature
of
Ordnance
prewar
Mobilization, ch. III. The histories of the Ordnance districts report on the details of its admin-stration. Many pertinent documents are in OHF.
See also testimony of Brig. Gen. Harris and Col
Rutherford, WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p.
i29ff; Col. Harry K. Rutherford, "Educational
Orders,"
ber-December
1939),
162-66;
117 (NovemBenedict
and
20
After a rather cautious start
in
fiscal
estimated
getting
ahead
all
in fiscal
and
the
Mi
that
educational order
its
saved a
rifle
full
Not
production. ^^
quantity
into
for
time in
year's
companies with educational orders completed them successfully, nor were all holdall
educational
of
ers
production
contracts
orders
later
given
the
same
exactly
for
duction
receive
invitations
bid,
to
negotiation
of
contract details,
ance of
aged by
process
for the
the
district
offices.
The
entire
duction
orders
items.*^
All
the
for
the
told,
same or
similar
educational
orders
aids,
and, by familiarizing
cut
down
rejections
on
later
production orders. ^^
it
edu-
its
also entered
well under
it
way
was suddenly
German
in
the
halted.
victories
in
by Con-
duction orders.
way
Ordnance placed
to proits
last
Ordnance
gram,
in spite of
as
in duration,
of
industrial
proved
its
value
preparedness.^*^
Min
of conf in
Gen Wesson's
office,
Apr
^ (i)
Gen
(2)
p.
Ord
Districts;
Feb 40,
cit., p.
Testimony of Rutherford, 27
1941 H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess.,
(5)
WDAB,
p.
3d
uation of Dunkerque.^^
The
^^
sess.,
p.
History,
I,
p.
Similar testimony may be found in the histories of other districts and in the Report of the
Under Secretary of War, 30 June 1941.
*'Memo, Minton for Amberg, 4 Apr 41, sub:
Educational Orders.
*^ (i) Statement of Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, Truman Comm. Hearings, Apr 41, copy in
OHF. (2) Statement of Wesson, WDAB, H.R.,
77th Cong., rst sess., p. 527, and statement by
Maj Gen Harry K. Rutherford, p. 229.
50.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
into nearly
21
Conclusion
for quantity
War Department
to
pur-
of 1940 General
sional
of
summer
The
on
its
mount importance
"of
para-
to national defense."
*''
when
it
value
declared that
purpose of
OPM's
and will not be dupHcated." *^ But Ordnance and the other supply services never
had enough money or enough manpower
to carry on a fully adequate program of
tion orders.^*'
the
contracts
to
industry
for
approximately
two
years, with
95 percent of it completed
by December 1941. "In general," observed
General Wesson, "it takes approximately
one year to place orders and to get produc-
available.
al
Hester,
ies,
sess,
pp. 555-56.
Dec
41.
22
ceived
and
started
so
money
lized.
that
its
and was
full
allotted
so
was
little
The system
formed the
administered,
effectively
late
plant
of
allocations
exchange
of
information between Ordnance and industry during the interwar years, and,
when
Ordnance
contracts.
But
step
first
the
allocation
toward indus-
backed up by the
and a competent managerial staff in Washington.
Maintenance of the six manufacturing
arsenals as the "Regular Army of production" throughout the interwar years was
one of the most important Ordnance con-
pended upon
their being
paredness. But
it
must
of
industrial
also be
pre-
remembered
is
district ac-
as
ment
date.
made
that,
of the arsenals was not kept up-toAlthough some progress toward modernizing arsenal equipment was made in
War.''^'
time.
first
Before
Three
is
eloquent
magazine
19:^9.
articles
"The Arsenals
American Machinist,
tion" in
significant
subject appeared in
vol.
83,
on
this
Ac(February
in
00
PROCUREMENT PLANNING
when
23
tories
ment
of the
of
1939,
AOA
immediately
businessmen.
did not
government when
elected as
it
its first
pres-
World War
tions in
industry's
bimonthly
brought to
role
in
I.
national
all
defense.
Army
magazine.
members
The
Ordnance,
of the association
in
plans
overnight, nor
in
the
The change
was it complete
had a steady
it
growth.
articles
countless speeches in
try
ness,
thetic,
and frequently
hostile. ^^
Then,
German
in
vic-
^^
Ann Rpt
ASW,
SIV,
1938, pp.
of
19-20.
pp. 2-3.
War
Department, see
Ann
CHAPTER
III
months
of
long-range
program
military
for
the
how
tions of
far
and
the munitions
once but
in varying
intervals.
May and
cesses in
quickly
how
fast the
German
to
suc-
available.
Ordnance
in
June
1940,
there
came
^ Ordnance
appropriations during the defense
period are discussed in Green, Thomson, and
Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter III.
See also Incl to Memo of Harris for USW, 9 Sep
OHF. For a
.,
41, sub: Comments on Study.
brief summary of other measures adopted during
1940 and early 1941, see testimony of the Secretary
of War and the Under Secretary before the Truman Committee, 15 April 1941, pt. i.
- The history of industrial
mobilization during
the defense period, written from the vantage point
of higher civilian or military levels, may be found
in several published works, notably Bureau of the
Budget, Committee on Records of War Adminis.
tration,
1946)
and
rearmament
effort,
thus making
it
difficult
and obfor
the
Economic
Mobilization.
OCMH
Among
the
many
1940-41
25
On Hand
Item
Initial Equipment
for
PMP
July 1940
Light tanks
46
Medium
18
tanks
Initial Equipment
for 2,000,000 men
2116
384
849
279
1404
Heavy tanks
400
AA
162
228
59
Rifles .30-cal.
46,078
Ml
gap,
this
G-4
issued
separately
To
in
as
ners.^
The
tive"
was
target
for
production
"all-important
present
planobjec-
date
initial
PMP
force
was 30 June 1941, and for the 2,000,000man force it was 31 December 1941. For
antiaircraft and field artillery, the corresponding deadlines were six months later
31 December 1941 for the PMP and 30
June 1942 for the larger force. Production
of ammunition was to reach by 30 September 1 94 1 the estimated expenditure
rate of the 2,000,000-man force.
(31
(31
1013 (31
260
144
on hand,
the resultant shortages, and the approved
expenditures. The Expenditure Program
showed how much money was to be spent
fill
Dec 41
Dec 41
Dec 41
Dec 41
Dec 41
Jun 41
Dec 41
952,683
683
(31
6029 (30
519 (31
215, 045(30 Jun 41
14
Many
establish
(31
Directors
(30 Sep 41
Time
hand
it considered most
worked within the framework
the materiel
It
command
a service agency
as
meet, as best
it
desirable.
of
Army
bound
to
co-ordination between
never without
its
rough
spots.*
40, in
*
See
26
Aug
Green,
Thomson,
p.
and
XXIX, and
Roots,
Planning
ch. VII.
26
Procurement
red tape.
and private
Placing these
industry.
and
and complicated
not only because Ordnance was rewas a
later orders
task,
large
own hands"
their
more
expeditious
industry as
of
conducting
and private
means
business.^
up
Only
also because
officers frequently
much work
it
as
was
to give
and
possible,
same time
and
knew
they
volume
Prospective
rose.
blueprints
could
and
bidders
also
specifications
calculate
probable
The
en-
July
immediate
issue
to
manufacturers.
still
The
undergoing
produced
On
lays
yet stand-
new medium
tank.**
caused
by
legal
restrictions
and
in quantity.
The assignment
Memo
Priorities
Admin
Br,
vol.
Memo
10
1.
of
Jul 40,
1941
Proc Program,
381/716 ASW; (2) Replies to
questions submitted to Maj Gen C. T. Harris, Jr.,
28 Feb 45, OHF; (3) Memo, Brig Gen Gladeon
(
Contracts
sub:
FY
OO
Apr
J. McCloy, OSW,
Ord Prod, OO 400.12/2386;
(4) Statement of Maj Gen Wesson prepared for
Truman Comm., Apr 41, OHF. The story of tank
M. Barnes
41,
sub:
for
Mr. John
Status of
development
is
told
in
Green,
Thomson,
and
districts
is
reflected
in
The
test
went
private industry
to act quickly
able on
To
activities.
they
ning, the
ment
on items
or-
tire
Because of
to avoid overloading
required
before
costs
at the
Dept,
May
1945,
I,
ch. 5 (a),
OHF.
manu-
and
an
armor
known
firms
as
plate
General
Motors,
Colt,
less
1940-41
27
powder plant
costing $26,000,000
was
DuPont Company.^"
August ig4o
tion,
in
Ordnance
districts in
World War
II. It
awards
made them
industry but
to
did
make
and
discuss-
OHF.
10(0 Memo, CofOrd
July 1940,
ASW,
FY
Under
Contracts Awarded
the
OO
Ordnance
history
of
the
New York
of these
events as seen by a high-ranking officer of that
district. Chester Mueller, The New York Ordnance
District
presents
picture
District in
Post and
tem, 19 8-1945, 8
1
May
28
The ground
rules to
shells,
for
some
bomb
bodies and
detail
these rules
is
Ordnance program
omy and
were instructed
districts
those
plants
with
existing
cated
to
could
fill
additional
if
orders
was
set to
size of
No
limit
districts
were
specifications,
and
descriptions
cases,
fins,
technics,
shells
was put
plans
to
the
test.
The
results
The
production. ^^
of
procure-
and
ment program got off to a
placed
by early November orders had been
for all ammunition components at a total
fast start,
cost of $190,000,000.^^
All of this
dis-
drawings,
manufacture of cartridge
work
by the small
the
in
stafT of officers
Office of the
(usually abbreviated
and
civilians
Chief of Ordnance
OCO)
and
necessi-
staff.
end of
May
Wesson's
eral
staff at the
Gen1
940
of
as seen
of
the
'^
complishments,
after
and
cited
as
Weekly Rpt
Difficulties).
of
of Ac-
(here-
Accomplishments
56
Army
Regular
3 Reserve officers,
officers,
and 341
civil-
trained
ity
officers
outgrew its
the Munitions Build-
moved temporarily
office
then
award or
Department
but
and procurement
during
became more
employees were
War
disliked
because
they
en-
demanded
it
was suspected,
deliberately entered
less
Navy
favorable terms.
or Air Corps on
more
^*
The
1941
the
difficult,
lost to
Plant Allocations
special-
recruitment
The
industry or to the
competence of district
production engineers tended to decline as
the demand for war production mounted.^
draft.
frankly
contracts
civilian engineers
task
conscious of production
difficulties to
ists,
less
many businessmen
The Ordnance
peacetime quarters in
ing,
29
who had
1940-41
level of
tions for
^ Lt
Ordnance
Successes
and
Failures
District, 5
Sep 47,
Hist,
VII.
Contract Negotiation and Administration,
Ord Dept, May 45, ch. 6, p. 133. See also Hist,
New York Ord Dist, VII, op. cit.
^^ For description of these conditions, see Hist,
New York Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, po. 70-73, and Hist,
Rochester Ord Dist, I, p. 52. The "formidable web
of red tape" surrounding government contracts is
mentioned by Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, The
Industry-Ordnance Team (New York: Whittlesey
Dist,
^^
30
agreement among observers, both then and
Critics
of the
allocation
tended that,
Uke so
many
later.
plans,
it
was
plan con-
other military
war than
the
known
for
had
to supply."
summer
through
try
areas in 1940-41.^^
made
Standing by themselves,
the figures do not show whether the orders
went to allocated companies because they
were allocated or because they were well
established firms ready to take production
a grain
of
salt.
^"
in a
good position
operation in 1941,
Secre-
to observe their
commented
that
well as
many
contracts
Gen
1952-53-
fin;ure
Lecture, Wesson,
May
ment, 9
4.1,
in
lecture,
25 Jul 41.
in selecting contractors
described
History,
in
detail
in
Pittsburgh
is
Ord-
Activities
of
the
OUSW,
May
41,
IGAF,
p. 2.
^^
War
The
II
1-8,
and
as
who was
tary
allocated
of
Quinton,
Under
making surveys
in
officers
gained by Ordnance
at
the
implied in
it
The knowledge
district offices.
plants
that
in
trial
all
was
officers,
the system
of
1940 with
in the
facilities,
many Ordnance
existence
of
adherence to
strict
of available facilities
made
[Ordnance] has
^^
and
to
these
as
data useful in
capacity
^^
1940-41
item saw
of pro-
a certain
OCO
company he questioned
the authority of
the district
of
its
procure-
ment planning
activities.
after a contract
In some cases,
did not
31
deal with
The
by any
means indicate that the arsenals and the
to negotiate contracts did not
ity
did
only
OCO
retain
full
authority
to
make
through
going
the
district
same
The
offices.
complex
items, for development projects, and for
supplies for their own use.^^ During 1941,
arsenals did the
for certain
for
ington
office,^"
and
in
December
Wash-
the chief
Branch dewas
ing a total of
ings.
all
May
94 1 were the
dent authority to
districts
given indepen-
major share
of the
and
OCO
procurement
to turn over to
power
to
place contracts.^^
-" Ltr,
to
ANMB,
i6 Jul
00
381/1479 ASW.
-^ See Ord Dept Cir
135, 16 Aug 41, sub: Ordnance Department Procurement Procedure. For
40,
see
Mueller, op.
116,
ton, op.
-*
cit., p.
)
22.
Memo, CofOrd
for dists, 27
May
41, sub:
Under
OCO
Department.
When
and the
dis-
among manufac-
turers as to
was not
in the
Ordnance
businessman
who
cit.,
and History, Philadelphia Ordnance District, I, pt. 5, p. 30. The friction between the
arsenals and the districts is mentioned in Quinp.
Dist,
^o
I.
p. 1045.
32
still
much
"too
Washington."
negotiating going on
in
^^
By the end
new
New
Creating
of
for
Facilities
facilities
proportion
large
of
Ordnance
the
latter
half of
and
and
explosives
The
tion.
fa-
ammuni-
but through an
pur-
It
One
of the major criticisms of the deprogram made by the Truman Committee of the Senate and the Tolan
Committee of the House of Representatives
was that the War Department had
in 1 94
built new plants needlessly and had failed
fense
ment
comparatively helpless in
officers as
described
Army
war prodemanded that the government build new plants, with all new
equipment, for producing munitions. The
duction and
tons of smokeless
TNT
the Munitions
powder and
Program
of 30
June these
Ordnance signed
new
GOCO
its
first
^^
contract for a
(government-owned, contrac-
DuPont Company
for
construction of a
named
the
procure-
named
Detroit
^-
detailed
summary
of the types of
new
fa-
may
cilities
according to the
consisted of three
parts:
duction
and "plant"
fabrication
Jul 40,
'"
or
if
assembly.
the
was only
Wesson Confs, 5
operation
Min,
OHF.
the
and delayed
shortage,
1940-41
of funds
was a mere
period.
criti-
justified.
category.
that
into
fall
new
For
TNT,
bombs and
shells,
no
artillery
did not
facilities
33
producing
or for loading
there
simply
To
trickle
experienced Ordnance
officers
full
gen-
mass-
that
less
Germany had
started to
conversion. In
Under
were
existing
facilities
suitable
for
Army had
the
of
new
Much
plants
except where
of the criticism of
necessary.
undue
^^
facilities
lost its
mounting demand
for
munitions
of
all
existing
into
companies.^^
rearm
in
it
new munitions
production.
instances the
^^
(i)
S.
Truman Comm.,
i9i-99>
pt.
3,
77th
17
Nov
Cong.,
three
41, pp.
ist
sess.
00
400.12/5853-1/2.
before the Select Comm.,
Statement of
Investigating National Defense Migration, H.R.,
USW
^'^
Dec
23
41.
'^
artillery,
small
arms,
and
tanks,
in
later
the
Army
chapters.
Criticisms, Delays,
and
Difficulties
^^ See
War
College and
Army
at
not
34
But
'**^
years."
to
many
people unfamiliar
slow and
had learned
to
Patterson's Criticisms
As
early as 23
appointed
Assistant
Robert P. Patterson,
Secretary of War,
opened the season of
by writing to all the supply services that reports reaching him indicated
that the procurement program was being
retarded in some instances by four factors:
lack of clear requirements to be met
(
)
I
criticism
by
the
suppliers;
unusual
(2)
military
directed
the
all
take
supply services to
memorandum
to the Chief of
emphasize particularly the
need for freezing designs. He quoted an
fidential
Ordnance
to
who
observer
forces
was due
to their
"The
enemy
best,"
designs.
freeze
to
failure
armed
of the British
of
the
demonstrated
practice
could
as
not
it
."
"*'
was
pressure to change,
to
preach.
designs
and
and
at the
battlefield
predecessor
terson's
"The program
either
as
to
quantities
or types.
...
^^
OHF.
*^
uscript study by
Lag
in
in
Gen Burns' personal file. The slow
progress toward British rearmament in the 1930's
described in Michael M. Postan, British War
is
Production (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
fense,
Office, 1952).
^^
of
40,
freeze
on the
were better than scores of "perfect" tanks on the proving ground, but
whether they were better than 500 "morenearly-perfect" tanks on the field of battle
was a moot question. General Burns tells
the story that on the day after issuing instructions to freeze designs Patterson was
asked to approve a contract for helmets.
"Are these the same old hats we had in
19 18?" he asked. When told that they
were, he refused to sign until a new helmet
design was adopted."*^ In July 1940, Pat-
Ordnance
resist
all
same time
00
OO
mer
1950.
order
in
There can be
most
obtain
to
*^
effective results."
little
turers'
toler-
were sometimes
justified.
The
small-
had
left their mark on Ordnance designs and
designers. The arsenals had produced small
quantities of munitions with the men and
machines available; they never had full
scale operations during the peace years
opportunity
apply
to
the
production-engineering
newest machine
most modern
ideas
or
use
the
tools.
1940-41
35
Department
is
making certain," wrote
General Harris, "that the trends of modern
mass production
very fiber
tice." *^
made
of
organization
its
Ordnance
field
of
shall
tried,
to
and prac-
be sure, and
revealed,
fell
it
short
of
full
success
in
was
There
matter
When
another
also
should
that
not
side
be
to
this
overlooked.
selves
we simply could
not
afford
production-
'^^
The
Ordnance
tion of
From
the
this
it
Ordnance
aware
of the
items.
was un-
in
detail
the
painstaking
efforts
made
at Springfield
ficient
Armory
,to
assure efrifle,
duly
installation
of
a modern
high-
and
impatient
of
critical
Army
The
munition.
cent,
even
rapid-firing
trivial,
gineer, but
it
to
mechanism out
of
*^
sub:
G-4
*'"'
Memo,
of kilter.
designs,
ASW
Progress
in
31773.
Campbell, op.
for
there
Army Munitions
Preparedness,
file
cit., p.
292. Criticism of
Army
'*''
and the
cations, they
36
to
its
production-speeding
safely
be
could
modifications
made
it was
and development
research
the
in relation to
necessary to consult
specialists
was accomplished
This
dustry.
large
in
fiscal
Early in
Ordnance prepared
1941
Ordnance
districts,
most
factors
for
searching
affecting
prompt,
necessity
analysis"
energetic
for
of
and
production
decisive,
a letter
arsenals, plants,
War
for
all
calling
action.'*'*
The
item.
new item
submarines were taking heavy toll of Atlantic shipping, he asked the Chief of
Difficulties,
Ordnance
sub:
to
our
national
existence."
^^
He
urged
*^ Brief
ma-
^'*
and
production
unceasing
bottlenecks.
when he requested
obligate the funds
of
the
fiscal
all
In
SW
Prod.
Apr
of
Ord
year,
Ordnance
be
31
copy
others,
19
Feb 41,
OHF.
in
USW
SW
in History,
Denver Ordnance
ex. 71.
I,
'^ Ltr,
"'^
mendation.
negotiators
OHF
1941,
41, in
Activities;
June
CofOrd and
to
Memos,
(i)
25
break
supply services to
Ltr,
to
effort
may
notes
in
Ord
Plant,
chinery
in-
October 1940.
"a
practically
is
in
on a
war or no war.^^
evitable,
found
ordnance
of
more
production
into large-scale
getting
USW
.
CofOrd,
to
00
20
1.
USW
Apr
^-
Ord Dept
Comm.
No.
3,
St sess., p.
116.
H.R.
Comm. on
Mil
2.
Affairs,
00
400.12/4454.
For discussion of this point see Hist,
burgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 4, pp. 712-22.
41, p. 12,
''^
Spec
14 Jul
Pitts-
brief recital of
time-consuming factors
1940-41
pression
will
bids,
years
con-
ment
tracts
only
usually
the
beginning.
After
was
receiving
his
make
to
his
equipment
might hold up the entire production process for months. For most items of ordnance, manufacturers found
it
impossible
from scratch
production setups.
locomotive
large
to create
had
new
had
the
if
existing
production
new
manufacturing practice,^*
After receiving his government order,
every contractor had also to obtain a supply of materials
not
manageof
pro-
structure
each project."
its
reports
did
convert
occasional
lons
not
of skilled
toll
1940-41
illustrate.
37
many
who
desire to
He
^^
declared that
it
took
place orders as
it
project
for
tank
parts
Management (OPM)
for nearly a
1940
had
to
had to
train them
tors
were to
fill.
hire
for
additional workers
the specialized
In
contractors found
recruiting
that
the
and
jobs they
new
years
workers,
of
de-
5*'
May
mony
1
38
machinery throughout the defense period
and well into the war period. ^^
Because a large share of Ordnance production required the machining of metals
to fine tolerances, the munitions
of 1940 brought a
demand
complicated and
of
grinding, boring,
costly
had
tools
such
as
officers
pos-
it,
among
to
grow
eral
Army
low
priorities,
meet
may become
With
and
large
calamitous."
is
now
critical
^^
program
for thousands
nance
affect other
contractors.
To
^^
description of
the
machine-tool
OUSW,
ANMB
A-i-a, to supplies and equipment for manufacture of machine tools and gages. The second
highest rating, A-i-b, went almost entirely to Air
Corps and Navy items, and included only a few
Ordnance items, chiefly aircraft machine guns and
small arms ammunition. By May 1941 only small
arms and ammunition were as high as the A-i-b
category. See Min, Wesson Confs, 31 May 41, pp.
892-93.
Memo, CofOrd
for
USW,
12
Mar
41, sub:
OO
OO
and compile a
machine
list
of undelivered
tools that
It
other angles.
of
new
possessing
contractors
equip-
39
Campbell,
General
of
most heart-
"the
period."
At the
It
tools,
1940-41
munitions program.
start of the
Ordnance
and
questions
realized that
officers
countless
would
problems
arise
as
civilian
out
Ordnance
1941
directive
nance
tools
ANMB
which
issued a
new
priorities
slightly
position,^^
ma-
ANMB,
or
OPM
to
accede to General
same time
giving lower priorities to some Navy and
Air Corps orders, a policy which would
have amounted to little more than robbing
Peter to pay Paul.^* Whether, in the
at the
be no doubt that
specifications
vision
would require
widespread failure
if
super-
close
to pass inspec-
To meet
checking.
careful
Ordnance
situation
this
twenty-five groups
known
1941,
Engineering
as
Advisory
of tanks
tee,
all
^^
OO
the
Stat Br,
"-
OASW.
ANMB
Priorities
Dir,
correspondence related to
of
Ordnance
Aug
20
41.
this directive in
Priorities Unit,
See also
History
OHF.
*^*
Ord Cir
See
Ltr, 5
Memo
Forrestal for
directing the
from
ANMB
Patterson
Priorities
committee not
cit.,
p.
James V.
and
Comm., 20 Aug
to
15.
yield
41,
to pressure
For discussion of
Army
40
carriages on another,
through
hst
bomb
fuzes,
etc.
and
shells,
rifles,
on down- the
machine guns,
so
representative of in-
long
as
as
the
committees
tion
about
sources
duction techniques.
ommended
that certain
scarce
of
to the
or
pro-
design changes be
official reports
appeared in
criticism
of the
and
articles
in
ficers
mem-
exchanged informa-
materials,
The
materials,
use of substitute
country.
new
within
the
kept
many
made
or
spite of
in
less
trouble,
and took
less
time, to
was
award
it
among many
was beneficial to
Ordnance, for it brought to bear on each
problem topflight engineering talent from
industry. But in the opinion of Brig. Gen.
Gladeon M. Barnes, who was in charge of
subcontracting.
to congested areas,
all
efit
the dis-
answering criticism of
In
this
nature.
War Department
have done
trial
They denounced
much
to
These
copy
of
^"^
engineering
committees
were
the
tion committees
bcll.
*"'''
Ltr, Attorney
in
History,
OHF.
"^ Brig.
cies
Navy
as well as
Army
for placing
John
29 Apr 41,
Branch, Ind Div.,
to
OPM,
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM,
They
and
OPM,
were
reformers bent upon changing
their associations in
not social
sponsibility
re-
as
it
dealt with
of
early
its
1940-41
41
fied to
or subcontractor.
tract Service
1
94
officer to
ice.
ment
allocated facilities
in
par-
the experi-
to turn out
facturers
facilities,
ence,
skill
tomatically
was
demanded
large concerns."
''^
through subcontracting
that small businesses were brought into the
It
largely
tell
them how
did
to
manage
their affairs,
it
To
assist
small businesses
than
five
hundred workers
General Wes-
samples
items,
and
assemblies,
visiting
Ordnance
and components.''^ By
photographs
these rooms,
ufacturing
officials,
of
examining in
detail
and
man-
requirements
discussing
with
manuwished
task
that con-
"^
CofOrd
S.
to
00
USW
WPB
Mr. Knudsen's ties with big industry, and his emphasis on proven ability to produce, delayed the
utilization of small business. Civilian Production
Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War,
P- 31^^ For
an account of this process, and a coldocumentary evidence, see R. F. McMullen, Smaller War Plants: Their Part in the
Ordnance War Effort, PSP Ji, Jun 45, OHF, and
Maj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., Subcontracting
in Ordnance Procurement, a rpt, 18 Jun 42, OHF.
lection
The
of
difficulties
of subcontracting
by
as
seen at the
World War II
New York Ordnance
Produc-
District,
ASW
00
district
services
to buy.
sible time.
42
creased there
contracts to
smaller
years
the
that
Arms
of
made up
the
firms such as
those
New
Corporation,'^^
England Srtiall
Even more impor-
production
subcontractors
as
or
sub-
means
of
evaluating
the
methods em-
types
vehicles actually
quickly summarized.
{Table 2)
In most
not easy to
PMP force of 1,200,000 men. When compared withr the Time Objective issued in
August 1940 the record reveals that, in
to
is
measure, but one investigation of the problem made in the Cincinnati area for ASF
a few months after Pearl Harbor sheds
some light on the matter. "We hunted for
the 'small business' which could take on
prime war contracts with its existing equipment and which is not already at work or
well known to the supply arms and services,"
survey
the
team
reported.
"We
Status of
To what
charge. In
production to date
command
notably
fell
ments.
Among
met
also
the
105-mm.
howitzer
lagged
far
behind
the
1940
the Tolan
^^
For an account of
and OPM level,
NDAC
the
Production
Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War,
pp. 61-63 and pp. 146-47.
"Hist, Boston Ord Dist, VI-VII (Jan-Jun
44), pp. 40-48. See also ch. VII, below.
''"
Cincinnati Field Survey, Apr 42, Contl Br,
ASF, p. 16. See also Memo, Alfred R. Clancy,
ASF Hq, for CofOrd, quoted in History, Cincinnati Ordnance District, I, pt. i, pp. 60-61.
'''
See the Second Interim Rpt of the Select
Comm., Investigating National Defense Migration,
December 19, 1941, H.R., 77th Cong., ist sess.,
see
Civilian
H.R. Rpt 1553, and the reply by Patterson, December 23, 1941, USW file 004.4 Allocation of
Facilities. For high praise of the prewar planning
and the speed with which Ordnance launched its
procurement program in the defense and early war
periods, see remarks by Somervell in Rpt of Conf,
Ord
Ord
Dist Chiefs, 22
Dist, vol.
17.
Apr
43
1940-41
Item
Ml
375,000
217,000
31,000
54,000
9,518
9,057
aircraft)
2,592
171
140
105-mm
Gun, 155-mm
597
Howitzer,
65
2,916
Light tanks
Medium
tanks
1,467
8,124
ammunition
,225,000,000
13,000,000
(rds)
Bombs
397,000
WAR
et al.,
Statistics, a
volume
new
plants
new
facilities
built
had been
created,
teen
government-owned,
ated
(GOCO)
tion
II.
with
new
contractor-oper-
"^
Gadsden,
Springs,
others
into
in
essential
munition
type of government-owned
plant
TNT, DNT,
in
tetryl,
operation,
toluene,
am-
including
anhydrous
seven-
Lake
Denver, Baytown,
Iowa, Kankakee, Weldon
came
production
and
Septem-
Dec
OUSW;
(2) Directory of
25,
20
GOCO
USW
USW
44
pletely
and other
many
factors
delays
different
and
Ordnance encountered
which under
difficulties
must be recorded
things were accomplished with remarkable speed contracts were let, district procurement offices
were activated, new plants were built, the
arsenals began to hum with activity, and
ahead. ^
production
large
in
about
the
production
total
percent
of
1940-45 Ord-
total
War
ment
itself
was given
figures
Depart-
freedom during
all the munineeded. Both were
full
it
felt
limited
the
by
Army
Congressional
appropriations
is
avoided. Nevertheless,
that
the
really
of
it
essential
war
materiel
started
at
By the
nearly a
time
Ordnance was
for
"business
as
usual."
handicapped by having
behind the
Navy and Air Corps, and by having to
meet constantly shifting requirements for
to
take
also
a third-rate priority
difficulty in recruiting
ment experts to
and Washington
As a
result of these
41, StatBr,
20,
15
Nov
OUSW.
OCMH
has not made a passing grade. Overall, the average has been reasonably good." Figures showing
the mounting volume of munitions produced in
1942 are shown in Civilian Production Administration,
the
Official Munitions Production
of
United States, (Washingtion, i May 1947).
CHAPTER IV
not
persons
intimately
acquainted
importance
parent. But a
exact
of
requirements figures
and timely
is
moment's
reflection suggests
weapons and
under way in an
orderly manner until procurement officials
know exactly what types are to be produced, what quantities are required, and
what delivery schedules are to be met.
Only with such detailed information, along
with countless technical specifications and
blueprints, can production engineers determine what plants and equipment will be
that the mass production of
ammunition cannot
needed,
how much
get
will
be
necessary.
of requirements for
each of the thousands of items of equipment needed by the armed forces of the
United States and its allies in World War
scheduling
II,
of
balanced
production
true," wrote a
to
produce,
produce,
to
came
to
help
to
one of Knudsen's
was stated bluntly and
simply: "What do you want?" When advised of the Army's mobilization plan with
its provision for arming an initial protective force of four hundred thousand men
within three months of M-Day, and an
additional eight hundred thousand men
after one year, Knudsen shook his head.
"That's not what I want," he declared.
first
officials,
questions
War
Army and Economic
Department
level, see
Smith,
Supply
Requirements,
OCMH
Files.
similar
63354-
46
"I want to know what kind of equipment
you need for these men and how many
tell
me how
many pieces."^
In World
many
War
civilian-type articles.
I,
combat within a year after the declaration of war, but they had to be equipped
in large measure with munitions obtained
from the Allies. As the preceding chapters
for
have emphasized,
it
produce
intricate
tanks,
artillery,
ments.
From 1940
to 1942 hard-to-manu-
items
"critical"
military
for
supplies.
of
It had the
making de-
ments
"essential" items
as
known
which posed
less
Army, manner
of
its
organization,
its
and
tary
political authorities.^
Once made,
Ordnance
and other supply branches by the General
Staff in the form of numerous lists and
tables on which procurement computations
these decisions were passed on to
The
from
distinguished
as
of the
serious
classes,
but
^
particulary for those in the critical cateit was most desirable that requirements be established as accurately as possible, and long in advance of expected
gory,
1950.
comments
mission
in
to
CPA, Minutes
the
Council
of the
of
nance
STATES ARMY IN
The
need.^
that
fact
the
was
objective
point
during
all
broad
procurement
agreed.
How
this
responsibility
were
the
shape and nature of the requirements problem were determined by a variety of factors can be understood, at least in part,
by looking into the process of forming
policy
making
''
II
deal
1940-1943.
For a detailed analysis of the process as viewed
by the Ordnance Department, see History of the
Materiel Control Division, OCO, Dec 45; Manual
of the Replacement Factor Branch, OCO, 1945;
and PSP 55. All in OHF. For a description of the
process as seen from the ASF level, see ASF Ann
gistics,
"
Rpt
for
FY
FY
Div,
top-level policy
WORLD WAR
Div
file.
for re-
computation
supply
quirements
by
the
which specithe
strength
the
fied
of
Army and listed all
units actually in existence or to be formed
in the near future.^ It was supplemented
by tables prescribing the strength of each
type of Army unit and listing the quanservices
Basis,
tities
thousand different
kinds of units there were thousands of
five
organization,
known
of allowances,
tables
of basic allowances,
and
ment.
for
In
addition,
tables
on
The
step
first
either
lists
of equip-
individually
to
requirements
number
Troop Basis. The
such
number
units
of
company,
the
in
rifles
the
authorized
for example,
number
for
rifle
was multiplied by
number
regiments,
and
so
on
until
of
all
all
of
tabulating
were
tions
stallation
fall of
1940.^
represented
the
Troop
The
machines in the
determined
figures thus
initial
Basis.
The
for
for re-
supply pipe-
recommendations sub-
percentage
as
of
it
worn out,
enemy action.^"
stolen,
or
Finally,
to
lost,
requirement
figures,
destroyed by
arrive
at net
was
special
geographic area.^
ing
tables of equipunits
as tables of
47
basis of a
replace-
"^
For examples, see Table B of Notes on PreProc Review Bd; and Ltr, TAG
sentation
to Chiefs of
Arms and
Troop Unit
Services,
14
May
41, sub:
May
45, ex. 8,
PSP
55, vol. 3.
April 1945, OHF, as follows: "The estimated percentage of equipment in use that will need to be
replaced each month. It includes losses due to
wearing out beyond repair, capture, abandonment,
pilferage, and all other causes except in-transit
attributable to ship sinkings, losses of ceritems of clothing incident to the separation
of personnel from the service, and losses from
such other categories of attrition as may be specifically expected from time to time." For World
losses
tain
War
Bull
38-4-WD, Replacement
are
discussed
in
48
After the
statistical
of
of
it
was an estimate
of supply
number
of the average
rounds
of
that
the
for
down showing
unit the
weapon by
the
number
of such
weapons
authorized for the unit, and then multiplied the total by the number of days for
which supplies were to be provided. Like
War
the
ammunition day
lished by the
was estabrecommenon
of supply
General Staff
and
States
services.
For
train-
tities
per
man were
authorized. ^^
quan-
other elements of
failed to
There were
much
made under any
doubtful that
It is
progress
circum-
require-
*^
Memo, G-4
for CofS, 29
Nov
Rqmts, G-4/32277.
'^The adoption and definition of this term are
described in Ltr, TAG to CG AGF and others,
16 Feb 43, sub: Ammunition Supply Policies,
00 471/1728, copy in OHF. See also Smith,
Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. VI-VIII;
and Rpt on Methods Used in the Ord Dept in
Needs
submitted to Mead
Determining
.,
Comrn. of U.S. Senate, Aug 46, copy in OHF
(hereafter cited as Mead Comm. Rpt). Another
ization of Bases for
specified
many
Department, Ordnance
the
the
The computation
of
Days
armistice most
19 18
OCO
49
Item
Proportion of types
per day
Machine gun,
.30-cal.,
M1917A1
150
80% AP
20% Tracer
"
"
Ml
Rifle, JO-cai.,
Carbine, .30-cal.,
Gun, submachine,
Gun, 37-mm.
Ml
20
.45-cal
AT
10
"
80% AP
"
20%, Tracer
100%
Ball
80% Ball
20% Tracer
90% AP
10% HE
10
90% HE
10% AP
10
50% AP
50% HE (Normal)
30
80% HE
10% WP
10% HS
Howitzer, 105-mm.
field,
Howitzer, 240-mm.
field.
SP mount.
100%
a This proportion of types was approved in principle, but the old figures
(65%
Ball,
HE
Tracer) continued
Source:
Day
ject at the
of
Supply
of
beginning of World
War
II
was
made in 1938
by a board of Ordnance officers headed by
Lt. Col. Clarence E. Partridge. ^^ Based in
part on fragmentary records of World
War I experience and in part on "educated
guesses," it was concerned more with general principles than with exact statistical
the Partridge Board Report
supplemented
by opinion
as
to
present
needs.
No
December
1941, copy in
OHF.
are available."^
38,
WD
.
tics,
ig40-ig43,
p.
301, n. 21.
Memo, CofOrd
OO
50
The day
and
and recommended their reduction, there was no combat experience during the defense period to support the Ordnance view. No change occurred until December 1 94 1 when the day of supply for
.30-caliber machine guns was cut nearly in
half
from 250 to 150 and others were
too high,
The second
difficulty
was that a
single set
Army
Service
Forces directed the supply services to begin systematic collection of data on which
New
in
England,
Caledonia, and
de-
work
of appreciation
far-reaching impor-
The
ments teams
officers,
persistent supply
and build up
its
own
reserve.
The
require-
Theater
lost.
that
insisted
officers
Day of Supply of Ammo Other than AirTheater of Operations, 23 Dec 41, Rqmts
Docs, OHF; (2) Hist of Mater-el Contl Div,
OGO, ch. 4; (3) Mtg of the Ord Bd on Spare
Parts, 27 Nov 41, copy in OHF. See also correspondence on day of supply in Sep-Oct 43 in
collection of requirements documents, OHF, and
Day of Supply correspondence in G-4/20052-67,
^' (i)
craft for
TAG.
^
Bd,
Notes on Presentation
Proc Review
for CG's Overseas Com33; (2) Ltr,
( I )
SW
p.
Ordnance
under constant
pressure to provide adequate supplies at
all times, were far more interested in maintaining an ample supply of everything than
theater
also
WD
PSP
55, pp.
Deputy
1944.
CofS,
.,
in
15-18; (3)
21
WD
Jun 44,
Spec 334,
vol. 2,
G-4.
and
Africa,
among
the
Differences
theaters
South
Europe, North
Pacific.^"
for
Pacific,
factors
seldom
constant
long
for
the
method
nature
of
of reporting
51
ground
made no attempt
multiply
tables
of
units
to
number
the
To
of planes to be produced.
this total
was a
felt
to
sufficient
replacements
quantity to provide
these
for
Al-
weapons.^'*
though considered
in
at
the time
be
to
successful
form of depot
recommended
supplies.
system
stocks.
First
itself,
The
that the
chiefly in the
Partridge Board
first
from
its
more
for
mended
that
distribution
stocks
be pro-
refined
techniques
require-
of
in
Board
Copies are
OCO
Div
FY
Rqmts
in folders
Br,
1944.
21 (i)
Frank, op.
Mead Comm.
cit., p.
22 Hist, Materiel
Aviation Ordnance
-''
distinct
Rpt,
pp.
15-16;
8.
6.
For a more
CG
CG
for
war planes
phase of the
re-
AAF for
detailed statement, see Ltr
8 Jan 43, sub: Basis for Computation.
in
Frank, op.
(2)
127.
cit., vol. 3,
ex. 76.
SOS,
,
copy
52
the same manner as were days of supply for
ground ammunition. In the European theater seasonal rates were used because
lessened
of
air
during
activity
winter
months,^'*
The
bombs and
>
aircraft
varymg
estimated
number
of sorties a
month
for
bomb
bombing
raids
now have
exactly
as
in storage in the
planned.
"We
United King-
McCoy Board
Aubombs
in
sizes.
much
at times being as
men
as half a million
spring
"The
of
Ordnance
1944
complained,
that the
is
not synchronized
is
and deployment
."^^
Anoth-
RAF
since the
the
Deep
cuts in
gust
bomb
As the
ing
air
war mounted
the
Troop
Basis.
units
identifying information
it
was impossible
231
planners
during
World
War
II
WD
Rpt
Proc Review Bd, 31 Aug 43, p.
334, 020 CofS U.S. Army. Copy also in
Levels of Supply and Supply Procedure, i Jan
50,
stemmed from
OO
Mead Comm.,
and copy in OHF.
to
2^ (i)
Fluctuating Requirements
putations
^^ (i) Hist,
Rpt
tion
in
in intensity dur-
restored.'^
It
included
units
When
of troops.
over again.^^
The
figures in
ASF
44,
OCMH
file;
Rpt
(2)
Re-study of Reserves, 13
gram
'^
-"
Memo, G-4
McMullen,
PSP
Oct 44,
for CofS, 17
Dec
vol. 2,
Division,
OHF.
Memo, G-4
ization of
^**
Ammunition
of the
pp. 160-63,
Nov
OHF.
pp. 646-47.
55, p. 142, and ex. 9 in vol.
op.
in
cit.,
3,
Docs.
table applied to
them.^*^
Of
ations in the
Troop
revisions of tables
the
latter
part
of
equipment. During
1940,
in
addition
to
53
revisions of
individual
small,
from square
tions,
the transition
to
triangular
War
II,
equipment
units the
tables.
In terms of
but,
times
re-
was
static.
chine guns
on the
United States and on American bases and
tiaircraft units
tion,
and requirements for antiaircraft
guns and accessories were high. The open
type of warfare encountered in North
The number
and
later
still
demands
the
tillery
topped the
troops
came up
positions in Italy
however
tal
change
small,
in
list
against
for
when
heavy
ar-
American
heavily
fortified
demanded a
revision of to-
regiment
1942
2,099
it
production schedules.
The
to 81
iri
1940,
1,600 in
in
1941,
1,678 in
^'*
Ibid.
Gen LeRoy
Lutes,
ASP, 23 Sep 46, ICAF, and Marvin A. Kreidberg and Lt. Merton G. Henry, Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army, 1775-1945, Dept of the
Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, 1955),
the
ch.xvin.
31 (i) Memo of Lt Col Walter A. Wood, Jr.,
quoted in Frank, op. cit., p. 10; (2) Memo, G-4
for CofS, 17 Dec 40, sub: Stabilization of
Rqmts, G-4/32277; (3) Memo, ACofS, G-4 for
CofOrd, 6 Sep 40, sub: Rqmts for Combat Vehicles, with Incls, G-4/29365-71, copy in PSP
.
55, ex. 6.
32
54
Troop
Basis of
with the
was down
established the
to
Tank
formed.^^
000
in early
half that
wide
situation
strategic
They knew
had
ship sinkings
that
and supplies
overseas
had
through
losses
be
to
geared
to
available
ence frequently
demanded changes
in types
in supply requirements,
consideration of
full
method
There was
tation." ^^
how much
matter of
for the
first
the
also
initially
compu-
practical
could be produced.
were
requirements
Theoretically,
always
means
requirements
reducing
of
that
seemed unattainable.^^
The
sometimes neces-
sitated drastic
ments.
in the world-
shifts
who had
'feeling' of those
aware
of the
war
exigencies of
the
them
that forced
to revise
clusion
con-
is
their effects.
that
that every
modification
equipment
meant
tions of requirements
important,
in
the
elaborate
and
far-reaching
also,
tables
much more
of
became convinced
well in
advance
pro-
They
for
supplying
data
Ordnance production.^*
Over and above all this was an
for
^^
intangi-
Bell
with
many Ord
The ASP;
(2)
Inter%'s
officers.
''''
^'''
Ibid., ch.
'^
I.
Memo, G-4
for CofS,
29
Rqmts (with
G-3 concurrence), G-432277; comments by Gen
Nov
continuing
of
recomputa-
revisions
40, sub:
Stabilization
of
Ammo
Div,
55
this
Troop Basis
by the proper equipment tables, and subMultiplication of a given
traction of stocks
statement of
etical
Army
requirements, but
questions
the
as
following:
What
addi-
tional
What items would be short if a 600,000man Army, plus PMP augmentation, were
to be equipped? What would be needed
at
for
but
only
the
an appropriation
bill,
counted
that
results
it
should be noted,
The Ordnance
grams
allotted to
billion,
$31
appropriated
1940-45
Ordnance approximated
or three-fourths of
for
period.'*'^
Ordnance
putations leading
up
during
Expenditure
series of
com-
Work on
began with a request from
Department Budget Officer in
subject
the
War
September 1939,
land, that
Ordnance
list
42
the
of
the items
it
swift
German
May and
Europe during
victories
in
the
program.
This
^^
For a
would
include in a $250 million program to eliminate shortages of critical items for the
^^
late
Program
OCO-Detroit
ture
first
Ordnance.
funds
all
{Table 4)
approximately
totaling
file.
WD
*^ Memo of
Budget Officer for CofOrd, 6
copy
Sep 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates.
.
in
PSP
'*-
PSP
55, ex.
For detailed
55.
See
2.
[Wood], Background
and Frank, op. cit.
also
I,
of
the
56
Table
third
April
94 1,
enactment
lease,
in
of lend-
Program appeared
just after
million for
Ord-
ammunition.
The fourth covered Air Force and Field
by the
Artillery requirements financed
regular fiscal 1942 appropriation. By far
mostly
nance,
the largest of
was
grams
it
1 941;
munition
for
artillery
25 August
placed major emphasis on amthe
many
discrepancies in
it,
particularly as
He
declared
the
that
took
report
con-
to
approved requirements
make production
order to
schedules,
dated
vehicles
and was
strength of
1,820,000
fifth,
Army
to
in
and combat
based on an
57
By the time the fifth Expenditure Program appeared. Ordnance had been allotted over $6 billion and its procurement
program was well under way. But meanwhile the whole defense effort came in for
a good deal of criticism, some bearing
directly on the problem of Ordnance requirements. Early in September 1941, for
example, Ordnance was criticized because
the bulk of its production was not scheduled for completion before 30 June 1943
and some items such as antiaircraft guns
and armor-piercing ammunition would run
well into fiscal year 1944. There was
complaint that Ordnance was giving new
creation of
already holding
firms
many
items would
fall
far short of
"and is not
items being produced
total
output in
all
areas
is
Increased
essential."
'^^
long and
new production
capacity was a
"in
successive
increments."
The
Ordnance production,
was the problem of
Ordnance
stated the
position in
words that
times
in
the
...
last
fifteen
months
for
most
impracticable to create production capacity without definite orders, especially if extensive subcontracting is to be
used in accordance with existing instructions
of the War Department. Defense Aid orders
have been even more varied, repetitive, unpredictable, and apparently unstudied than
the United States orders, and action in filling the orders has been correspondingly
items.
difficult
It
and
is
unsatisfactory.
The
as exhibit
'*''
Mil
Memo
of
9 Sep 41,
program appears
Prod,
1 1
in
Maj Gen
00
Incl
400.12/5853-1/2.
to
USW,
58
gram
and
services of the
War
Department, to pro-
meet requirements.^^
money appropriated
the basic
as
document
for stating
The
transition
While General Harris was thus appealing for a sound and comprehensive statement of requirements, others in the War
Department recognized that a new approach to the problem was needed,'**' It
was obvious that the Expenditure Programs
were not altogether satisfactory documents
for stating procurement objectives. Because
they were primarily fiscal rather than supply documents they did not list supplies
needed by the armed forces for long-range
planning but only supplies to be bought
with
gram
its
introduction.^^
Many
War
Depart-
not
could
change over-
new
day.^^
according to the
War
Production Board
history,
it
realistic
civilian
agencies to push for adequate defense production. These charges are not fully borne
out by the
official record.
There undoubt-
year.
ma-
new
materiel,
What?
How
***
Incl No. 2 to
USW,
titled
585'^-
the
Memo
of
Maj Gen
Harris, for
Sep 41, sub: Comments on Study EnMil Rqmts and Materiel Prod, OO 400.12/
1/2 and OHF. For similar comments from
9
WPB
for War,
*^ See
office,
level,
page
see
CPA,
Industrial Mobilization
13.
Memo
summary
brief
Maj. Gen.
Richard C. Moore, Deputy CofS, 22 Jan 42, sub:
Army Supply Program, ASF, Rqmts Div 1943,
copy in Frank, op. cit., vol. 2, ex. 21.
of Somervell's views, see his
''"
Summary
Rpt,
Ord
Br,
for
WPB, OHF.
See also
Papers,
6, 7,
^MO
and
12,
dtd
Lecture, Lutes,
helm D. Styer, 16 Jul 42, sub: Equipment ExpenProgram, ASF fofder marked Rqmts Div
diture
prob'em.
'"^
CPA,
War, and
War Department
59
services to
statement o
draw up
requirements
in
in later years.
defense
expenditures,
failed to
win
full
but
approval.
they
The
is
too
had
only quali-
The
^^
evolution of
Program during
Assuming that
victory over
all
War
August 1941
force of 4 million
1940
is
a myth.
Strongest
for
raising
require-
sights came from the British, espefrom Lord Beaverbrook and Prime
Minister Churchill, who came to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. Depending
upon American aid for Britain's survival,
ments
cially
production
men
such as Donald
many invaded
men
that
maximum
had been a
and, in terms of
(i)
Frank, op.
SW,
cit.,
tg40-ig43, ch. V;
call-
''*"'
As
-in
pressure
potential
enemies might require the maximum number of troops the nation could provide, the
^^
94
essential
and early 1942 has been described elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail
here, but a brief sketch of some of the steps
the delay
ch.
sub:
XI;
(3)
(2)
Memo, G-4
Spec Computation.
for
.
60
merits for a force of this size
President
the
calculations be
requested
made
was
in progress
armies.
We
additional
for our
own
that
of munitions to be
The completed
at
war with
estimates for
all
fighting forces but vast quantibe used against the enemy in every
appropriate theater of war, wherever that
to
ties
may be.
the Axis.
these pur-
no
were taken to implement the program
was to be held in reserve for an
The
President
types
five
Ordnance
steps
cific
as
it
emergency.
On
December 1941
the emer-
gency arrived.
For
Army
Harbor may
described as hectic.
The
sixth
fairly be
Expenditure
and
on the
adjusting
actuality
of
program,
details of the
their
calculations
war with
to
the
their midst
letter
The
on 3 January 1942. In a
War
to the Secretary of
victory
achieved in the
over
our
he wrote:
enemies
will
of
then
name
proceeded to
equipment
responsibilities-
four
and
them
of
to
list
spe-
The
War, and
his
days
later,
Ordnance
in
to
own
generals. Reaction
was
goals
these
not
criticism
Commander
in Chief.
enemies,
specific
issued
its
hurried
Program on
all
be
^^
By way
of illustration, see
President, 26
in
Frank, op.
^'
Memo
Dec
cit., II,
of
Memo,
SW
for the
President
to
SW,
Jan 42,
AG
PSP
55,
I,
pp. 91-95.
<
January 1942
61
62
ASP, sometimes
gram,
consisted
of
several
sections
that
but
craft
did
include
guns,
Where requirements
for tanks,
antitank
When
duction.
attended
and other
office,
in helping
the
first
eight
to
six
months
Pearl
after
Harbor.
during
All
this
period
War
officials
of
the
Management and
the
re-
Office of Production
unrealistic
at
set
levels.
Army's
they
computed
in the
set
match the
by the President
in
arbitrarily increased to
Presidential
objectives.
Total
took
the
position
the
that
all
the guns,
the
feasibility
matter
officers
who
of
the
were
they
felt
that
objectives.
In
this
Ordnance
President
and the
the
joined
by
Memo, Somervell
detailed
WD
00
^* (i)
tion;
and more
numerous
conf on the
basic
ASP
cit.,
ASP
is
194:5, ch. 2,
with copies of
pt.
Smith,
(2)
the
of
war.^"'
Describing
the
War
Pro-
Board
duction
Ordnance
billion.*'^
committee
planning
reduction
in
of the
1942 to $9.2
concentrated
officers
fire on
foreign aid
which loomed rather large
requirements,
their
in the over-all
picture,
63
no
argument on this score within the Army.
The prevailing view was expressed by Maj.
Gen. Richard C. Moore, former Deputy
Chief of Staff, who remarked at a production conference in June 1942: "I'll tell you
one thing about Defense Aid they just
guessed the requirements. They never had
a true basis. They didn't have any foundation. They just reached up in the air and
got what they thought the United States
would give them." General Somervell
thorized
lation
needs. There
of
was
virtually
^"
May
January goals
attained, the
under-
the
The
it
authors of
would
re-
quire
was
full
distributed.
Reductions
in
production
and
in part
capacity for
Army
trucks.
equipment
forces.
1942,
ASF
that the
Malaya
Lend-lease re-
mechanized
was provided for the U.S.
few weeks later, in mid-July
less
quirements
small
for
arms
in
ammunition
summer
the
of
''"'
Ordnance views were made plain in the production conferences of 1942 and were repeated by
many retired Ordnance officers during interviews
while this volume was in preparation. For WPB
views, see Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter X; CPA, Industrial Mobilization for
War, part III, chapter 4: John E. Brigante. The
Feasibility Dispute (Washington: Committee on
and Memo,
Public Administration Cases, 1950)
WPB Ping Comm. to Donald Nelson, 17 Mar 42,
WPB PD 212 Prod Programs, NA. The whole subject is reviewed in Leighton and Coakley, Global
Logistics, ig40-rg43, ch. VIII.
'"'"
Memo, Ping Comm. to Nelson, 17 Mar 42.
'''
Review of the Prod Plans of the Ammo Div,
OCO, 19 Jun 42, T652-C. See also Production
Progress and Production Scheduling, p. 7, a rpt
based on the presentation to the WPB by SOS on
;
Dec
lease
42,
are
ASF
64
Table
Decline
in
[In
Type
1942
2j^-ton trucks
Medium
tanks
75-mm. howitzer
40-mm. AA guns
Bazookas
Aircraft machine guns
.30-cal. rifle
Ml
.50-cal. cartridges
65
1942
132,000
1943
66
in-
McCoy Board
As a follow-up
to
the
settled
after
plies,
supplies of
ammunition
that
had accumu-
In view of the
rise
in total
Army
storage
down
month
old
or suddenly increased
caused
types,
sharp
demands
for
fluctuations
in
example was
the emergence of rockets as major Ordnance items, resulting in a steadily rising
curve of requirements for rockets and
requirements.'^
notable
ness
inventories
depots.
of
The
to
McNarney
so-called
Directive
the
heavy
tary
down
artillery to batter
defenses, blockbuster
bombs
huge tanks
targets,
to
fixed
to blast mili-
counter
the
German
provide
fast
overland
transport
in
the
introduction of
came
to be
essence,
demand
status,
including past
tion.
in
the
theaters
of
war.
From
the
production standpoint an
ASP,
it
stated require-
directive,
the re-
McCoy
The background
Requirements
is
Memo, ASF Director of Materiel for ASF, directory 28 Jan 44, copy in OHF.
''*^
PSP 35, I, discusses this topic in some detail.
See also Frank, op. cit., pp. i38ff and Smith,
Army, and Economic Mobilization, ch. VI-VIII.
Since the impact of the new procedures within
Ordnance was
ject
"'''
FY
is
OWMR,
7,
and Memo,
CG ASF
ASF
for Director
file,
67
tions played a
maneuvers necessary
role
line
to keep production in
As
early as
1943 the
as the
War Department
1945, the
continued
after defeat of
Germany
Germany
in early
its
Requirements Division)
ment
of materiel
East.
The
from Europe
to the
Far
what
Europe and
what
May
surplus
materiel
was
serviceable
infantry weapons,
were
in
process
the
Japanese surrender
over.
CHAPTER V
Artillery
weapons were the dark horses
World War II. Less spectacular and
newsworthy than tanks and planes, they
8-inch guns.^
Artillery
of
until the
The
stage.
had been
artillery lessons of
forcefully set
down
World War
in
919
when
ment
of
new
materiel.^
defense period in
sistently
lery
but
ons. Rapid-firing
guns of intermediate
AA defense
cali-
as guns
high-flying
tank
armament
bombers.
was
The
trend
in
more
armor-piercing amall
toward
ment would
artillery
fire.
The ground
forces believed
155-mm. gun
"Long Tom" would be needed. But experience soon exposed the error of these no-
tions.
grad,
or lay
down
a curtain of
No
lery
could provide
fire
before advanc-
World War
Only heavy artil-
lesson of
this.
sustained,
accurately
fire
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning MuniWar, ch. VII. See also History of the
Procurement Activities of the Ordnance Department Since 1938 in Truman Comm. Report, Aug
^
tions for
46,
OHF.
ARTILLERY
69
Artillery
on
Hand in ig40
troops in
standard in 1938.^
The prewar
was made up
slight.^
The
was drawn
tillery
World War
at
years
made during
the lean
exist-
.60-caliber by
Ordnance
in
II.
^
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning
Munitions for War, especially ch. VII; (2) Hist,
Arty Div, Ind Serv OCO, 1940-45, I, sec. 2; (3)
The Development Record in Artillery, draft in
typescript form apparently prepared in Ord Hist
Br in 1945, OHF.
"
Final Rpt, Gen John J. Pershing, i Sep
(
(2)
Rpt SW,
II
Nov
19, pp.
items
most
over from
vance was
for the
left
in
in
OCO,
I, sec. 2.
70
Table
Item
ARTILLERY
11
Inspecting a 75-mm. Pack Howitzer during Third Army maneuvers prior to World
War II. From left, in civilian clothes, are Congressmen J. Buell Snyder, Overton Brooks, and
Francis Case.
aircraft
gun was
flying planes
weapons
to
make good
these deficiencies,
action
of
in
Their tubes were still in good condition but their carriages and recoil mechanisms gave no end of trouble, largely due
Italy.
Production Preparedness
To
with
the
average
cannon
citizen,
displayed
in
familiar
the
only
village
square, these
ing
on
sets
World War
II
top quality
ship,
^^
with
steel
and
tubes
precision
or
demanding
workman-
barrels^^
strong
72
mechanisms
mech-
ROck
made
with
and recoil
and Frankford
supplied fire control instruments. These
four arsenals were prepared in 1940 to do
two things immediately: manufacture and
assemble artillery components on a small
scale in their own shops, and instruct
the
assure
metallurgical
desired
results.
forged
the
then
inch
the
cast
precise
to
rifled
or
rather
rule
dimensions,
than
the
excep-
tion.^^
tors,
pistons
could
that
withstand
extremely
240-mm. recuperator
equivalent
in less
than 4
damage."
built
^^
stopping a
to
more than 50
[traveling at
feet in half a
War
I,
locomotive
second without
gunner's quadrants
but "off-carriage"
di-
complex,
cision-made parts.^^
ervliet
finished guns.
artillery
cast-
carriages
additions to
Army
by year had come chiefly from the Ordnance arsenals, while a few private contractors and the Naval Gun Factory
supplemented on occasion by the Ordnance
arsenals
had supjjlied the Navy's needs.^*'
Equipped in 1938 and 1939 with many
new machine tools and staffed with ex-
were ready
^ Lt. Col.
in
Thomas
account,
see
Munitions igiy-i8
J.
56.
*^
New
Hist,
manufacture of
art.^^
Island
OCO,
op.
cit.,
I,
Truman Comm.
Report. Compare
with the situation in 19 17 as described in Crowell,
sec.
op.
3,
and
cit.
ton, 1953).
ARTILLERY
production.
73
They
well
could
supply
artil-
lery
large
The
hitch
^^
AA
3-inch
gun.
One
the
of
first
four
was
it
than
proved
took to
its
make
the
in
first
less
5.
its
Another educational
Company
for
and several
work on
principally
other
firms,
were awarded
Eastman Kodak Company, and MergenthalerLinotype Company, for telescopes, aiming
circles, and related fire control instruments.
To cover additional artillery items Ordcentrifugal castings,
time
R.
2^
Having
Hoe continued
same
major Ordnance
supplier.^^
^^
New
M.
Wells,
OHF.
ch.
I,
Maj Carl
OHF;
(2)
Hist,
Dist,
100,
statement by Harry M. Tillinghast, chairman of the board of R. Hoe and Co.; (3) Green,
Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for
War, p. 58; (4) Documents in Educational'Orders
file, OHF;
(5) "Welding Plays Top Role in AA
Gun Recoils" by Joseph L. Auer, vice president
R. Hoe and Co., American Machinist, 86 (Nopt.
3,
vember
2*
see
its
historical
report in Hist,
OHF.
74
National Pneumatic Company did the
same for the 37-mm. tank gun, and the
Nash Engineering Company took on the
8 1 -mm. mortar and its mount. Between
educational orders and production studies
Ordnance attempted to stretch its meager
funds over the most important problem
ment and
duction
if
rearmament
the
at
art, carefully
the
arsenals
efTort.^^
tomed
with unaccus-
in
new machine
tools,
and recondi-
lected.
come
and nurtured
in
installed
Though war
company employees
to train
its
United
under way
on something approaching a wartime scale,
as the smoldering conflict in Europe burst
to the
and
were turned on
floodlights
night.
at
Carloads
specialized
of
tors.
educational
production
trifugally
of dollars for
contracts,
orders
and the
received
produce
artillery
gineers
and
tions,
"They
vliet,"
requirements
for
material.
"They
ference.
fellows."
^^
The
and requirements
tool design
and
chinery,
study.
to
When
for
ma-
upon the
experts to
spotlight for a
with a
came
visit
portant
tubes
cast
in the
gun
Watertown be-
source
for
tubes,
of
the
on
months
to help install
new
equip-
Documents
in
Educational
Orders
folder,
OHF.
^^
42, p. 34.
13
Feb
OHF.
-'*
Campbell, op. cit., pp. 44-45. See also History
of the Watervliet Arsenal, XV, particulaHy 1 1 i-
^^
The
on
file
in
OHF
especially ch. 9.
ARTILLERY
75
employees
doubled
production
rose
in
proportion,
its
the arsenals
private
into
production.
The
Ordnance procurement list included cannon of many different sizes, all with complicated recoil mechanisms, carriages, and
fire control instruments. As the type of
manufacturing equipment needed for these
components varied widely, and individual
firms lacked the machinery to make complete guns, contracts did not call for complete weapons but only for certain major
components. As a result, meeting production
schedules
operative effort
demanded widespread
co-
among
all
the producers.
for
ex-
The
II.
in the twelve
and
War
Lomb Company
the sight.
The 37-mm.
the
Sperry
Bausch and
antiaircraft
Corporation
Lomb
for
directors,
Hoe and
3
Oct
and R.
For detailed data, see Hist, Arty Div, Jul 40I, ch. I, Figs. 2 and 3.
45,
76
nisms. All told,
terial
ents of this
been made."
to
have actually
While General Marshall
was speaking, the 3-inch (76.2-mm.) gun
was on its way out in favor of the newer
and more powerful 90-mm. gun being
worn out
in
service.
AA
Guns
bombing plane
World War I
Ordnance had devoted a goodly portion
of its weapons research funds to development and production of a 3-inch AA gun,
with the result that about eight hundred
were on hand in 1940. In peacetime that
ing the early 1900's.^^ After
appeared to be a not inconsiderable- quantity but it was in fact less than the British
had in 1940 to defend the single city of
London.^* Development work of the inter-
war
years
had
in
would gain only enough for three addiby the end of the year,
and four more by the end of 1941. He
referred soberly to "the long and maybe
tional regiments
ma-
appropriations
^^
its adoption in
February 1940.^^ Within a year the 37-
after
37-mm. was
United
in the
States.
But
in February,
aircraft
guns.
sidetrack
the
the
Brig
^^
OO
Gen
parts,
see
History,
Artillery
artillery
Division,
spare
Volume
I,
19B,
1867.
^^ Ibid.
PSP
29,
''
M-D;
Memo, William
14 Jul
(2)
41,
sub:
ARTILLERY
77
In
testing.
the
of
fall
1940,
when
the
manufacture
Army
in this
type air-cooled
and the
production
services for
experts,
February
1941
Ordnance contracted with Chrysler to prepare working drawings and two pilot
models of the gun, and a few weeks later
placed
another
contract
over
the tooling
Navy
the higher
two
pilot
with
Company to do
The first letters
Firestone
the
same
of intent
Navy meanwhile
Safe and Lock
Company
to supply
The complexity
of the
40-mm. carriage
its work among
oilite
instead
the
of
manganese-bronze bushings.
original
tubing
Steel
new
mechanism was employed,
and the carriage was equipped with elecreplaced forged and machined axles, a
type of traverse
instead
tric
steps
^^
CofOrd
for
Characteristics
472.91
marked 40-mm.
^
of
the
AA
37-mm.
PSP
(3)
Bofors Materiel,
(1-17-41);
PSP
Gen
29;
(4)
AG
Folder
OHF.
in
Navy
aircraft
Gun
Carriages,"
firm
Navy
requirements.^^
and were
rifled
at
Watervliet.
The
78
AA Gun
Carriage
in
September 1940.
European practice to speedy quantity production on the pattern of American industry. After the two pilot guns were shipped
to Aberdeen for test in July 1941, both
Firestone and Chrysler began tooling up
and were ready for quantity production
soon
only intermediate
the
AA
37-mm., and
it
continued
in
short
supply.
for the
new gun
totaling only
4 in the
gun
tubes.*^ In the
fall,
with require-
industry
item,
undertake
its
was reluctant
to
cember 94
hundred gun
1
To
five
mechanisms.^"''
A A gun was
adopted
replacing the
3-inch.
in
February 1940,
With requirements
^3 (i) PSP
29; (2) Memo, CofOrd for USW,
19 Dec 41, sub: The Colt Patent Fire Arms Mfg
Co.,
472.54/6972.
< Memo, CofOrd for USW, 18 Mar
41, sub:
00
ARTILLERY
79
made
a firm that
effort
the
and the
(GMC),
Wheland Company,
Oliver Farm Machinery Company.
the
start be-
Corporation
Aircraft
The
Tooling up at the Bendix plant in Elmira, N. Y., was a long, slow process, partly
weapon
i
and ANlow priority
rating of A-i-c throughout 1940. Watervliet helped by leasing tools to Bendix, and
after the fall of France tools ordered in the
United States by the French government
were diverted to Bendix, even after some
M2)
designated
the
carried
AA
(May
PSP
more
demand
powerful
an airthan the
for
29,
Study of
The
90-mm.
of
OHF;
90-mm. AA
relatively
and
20-mm.
AA Guns
Walter G. Finch,
Gun. 19 Feb 42, OHF; (t,)
for CofOrd, 15 Nov 41,
472/
1945),
(2)
Lt
OO
USW
Memo,
1084.
*'''
to
1,200
*^ (i)
story of aircraft
in the late
Ordnance
make some
signed.
Bendix
with
^^
Cannon
AA
had been
turing rights
Production
of the
years.'*^
contracted
$1
for
Machine Division),
gun
interested in the
In September 1940,
contract
for manufaceven before a final
and
fell
(Eclipse
had been
several
for
but
bids,
tive
Memo,
USW
104, folder
so on.
file
*''
(
Ltr,
for
CofAir Corps
to
OUSW
Aircraft,
CofOrd,
12
OO
Apr
and
40,
472.91,
weapons had
been purchased from the French owners in
see
as
large as the
weapons
been
in
tested
37-mm. After
all
known
this
by
sub:
OCM
OCM
OO
NA.
winter
and
May
of
of
20-mm.
Design,
Guns,
Development and
Mi and AN-M2
80
seas.^ To meet
guns for the Air
Corps program, Ordnance brought three
more producers into the picture in the
of
demand
the rising
for
spring of 1941.
CMC
with
International
Harvester for
like
new machinery,
gages,
dies,
and
fixtures.
mm.
and all its subcontractors to go on a 24hour day, 7-day-week schedule until the
shortage was overcome.^* A few days later
Patterson called upon General Wesson to
"bring about promptly a change in management in the Colt Plant." ^^ General
Wesson went to Hartford in person, made
an appeal to the workers for increased
production, and conferred at length with
company officials. General Wesson knew
that the company had taken on so much
war work that it had spread its management dangerously thin. Confident that
Business Machines
thirteen
for U.S.
and
British forces
exceeded forty
which had
weapons for
1941 and was
a head
test
start,
completed
during the
summer
five
of
ready for quantity production in September, but production was temporarily delayed because forgings were not available.
the start
before
Pearl
aircraft
requirements
The
all
Patent
pany,
had
weapon was
Colt's
gun-making
firm, Colt
in the winter of
$4 million
for
' Hist,
Ord
Rochester
Dist,
XV,
bk.
II,
comit
269-
70.
^^ (i)
Barrow, Prod of 20-mm. Automatic
Guns: (2) Barrow, Design, Development, and
Prod of 20-mm. Guns; (3) Hist, New York Ord
Dist,
100,
Review
pt.
5,
sec.
IBM
2,
Corp,
OHF; (4)
OCO,
Mar 42, p. 3.
^- Memo, CofOrd to TAG, 5 May 41,
mm. Automatic Cannon, AG 472.93/2299.
^^ Min, Wesson Confs, 16 Aug 41.
^^ (i) Memo, USW for Wesson, 8 Dec
37-mm.
USW
Aircraft
sub: 37-
41, sub:
Gun,
CofOrd, 15
Development and Production of
37-mm. Gun, M4 (Nov 44), pt. 2, OHF.
^^ (i) Memo, USW for CofOrd, 13 Dec 41,
ExecO file M-Materiel-Cannon; (2) Martin,
Memo of conf at Colt Plant on 17 Dec 41, 19 Dec
41, 00 472.91/1365; (3) Memo, CofOrd for
PSP
for
30, Design,
USW,
Dec
Mfg
OUSW
19
Co.,
son on;
J.
(4)
41, sub:
file
Memo,
The
104, folder
USW
for Brig
file.
Arms
Gen Thomas
ARTILLERY
the
81
in
He
ties,
gratifying.
as
com-
Though
or-
awarded
to
first
its
production. After
Watervliet in
three
pany
and two
Muncie
others
carriages
agreed
to
make
be
^^
filled."
veloped.
'''
Hist,
and
"'
Sale
pgp
AA
28^
Development,
OO 472/3371.
PSP 28.
Memo, ACofS, G-4 for CofS,
Jun
of 75-mm guns, AG 472 (6-1 1-40).
1
40, sub:
82
M3 Medium Tank
Mounting
75-mm.
Gun
delivered
medium
threat of
ber
demands
for
75-mm.
tank
guns
to
drey Machine
Works
Army by the
Adna R. Chaffee,
U.S.
the
Brig. Gen.
left:
of Fitchburg, Mass.^^
472/1084.
ARTILLERY
83
end
i94i.^
artillery
of
had
it
solid
The
First
Year of
War
porarily."'^
of
1941
105-mm. howitzer
fall
War and
to
attack.
the
In his
um
and heavy
were neglected
during the defense period, as were selfpropelled weapons. Only 65 155-mm. guns
were built before Pearl Harbor. No 155-
mm.
8-inch
were
artillery,
howitzers,
produced
or
240-mm. howitzers
because
Army
planners
procure
self-propelled
artillery
until
the
antitank
18,900
on
years.
"^ (i)
War
month.
The
the Secretary of
letter to
PSP
28, III,
75-mm. Guns
M2
and M3,
M3
in June 1941.
ized in May 1941 and the
^^ Typical of the thinking of the time
CofFA
of
to
TAG,
28
Mar
M-Materiel-Cannon;
Hayes, Director
41,
acft
(0 Memo, CofOrd
Delays in
OUSW
and
Use
to
is
be
Ltr,
Made
OO
381/34198, NA.
15 Oct 41, sub:
105-mm. howitzer program, ExecO file
40, sub:
so
.,
for
Gen
Nov
folder marked Guns, AT,
Memo, CofFA for ACofS
(2)
ASF Prod
file,
104,
on;
(3)
SW,
Memo,
Br, to
Brig
USW,
12
G-4, 26 Dec 41, sub: Prod of 105-mm. Howitzers, 00 472.22/1269; (4) Memo, Col Burnett R.
Olmsted for CofOrd, 21 Jan 42, sub: Status of
ExecO file M-MaterielProd
of
105.
.,
Cannon.
'''
Memo, CofOrd for Deputy CofS, 20 Dec
(
451/2846; (2) Memo,
41, sub: SP Arty,
Deputy CofS for CofOrd, 20 Dec 41, sub: Approval of and Expediting of SP Arty Projects,
OHF. For an account of development of selfpropelled artillery, see Green, Thomson, and
Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pages 314-17.
"*
Ltr, President to SW, 3 Jan 42, copy in OO
472/1218. The address on the state of the Union,
6 Jan 42, in Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 Volume, Humanity
on the Defensive, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950) pp.
manned
36-37-
Chief of Ordnance had to report that during the preceding eighteen months of re-
to
procure only
panying
table.
The
mittedly small.
for quantity
production. By the
OO
84
Table
Artillery Production,
Item
20-mm.
37-mm.
37-mm.
37-mm.
37-mm.
75-mm.
75-mm.
75-mm.
3-inch
gun, aircraft-
1,395
AT
AA
gun,
gun,
2,592
504
gun, tank
5,571
gun, aircraft.
390
918
AT
gun,
gun, tank
1,216
howitzer
458
un, field
140
171
597
65
Mortars-
9,518
Cook under
MS
dated 9 Apr 52, of Procurement section, prepared by Richard H. Crawford and Lindsley F.
draft,
mid-January
1942
the
In
Division
Artillery
estimated
program,
that,
it
But
impossible.
words
man
done.
The
it
."
.
planning
the
cannot be done.
they
new
ings
was the
of
out
of
80,000.'^
a total
The
name
of
in
OCO-Detroit
Review
^"
""
national
first
step
(i)
Arty Div, 4
Memo USW
for
office,
Mar
(3)
Mar
ANMB,
.
Cannon;
I.
42, p.
2.
file.
tools
for
no
must be
It
1,363
The
ment.^^
"Let
lack of
only
this situa-
tion after
President's
still
say
with
OO
file
Materiel-
of Arty Div, 4
ARTILLERY
85
AA
Guns
tion
eral
Wesson
stating exactly
to
"We
tive.
believe that
come
materials
machine
if
in exactly as
Col.
tools
and
wanted,
this
Gordon M.
^^
for
in
new
moved
slowly in contract-
he did not
spread too thin the few machine
plants because
want
to
tools
available.
"We
will
get
and
better
quicker
results,"
he observed in midFebruary, "by giving the tools to a few
strong companies." ^^ How to get pro-
The
1942.
AA
list-
for
new
dreds of
the hands of
Motors,
was
prime consideration
in
more
them.'^'^
of this
Beginning
up
January
in
1942,
in
Washington
Sub-Oflfice
to
the
field,
a Fire Control
was created
raised
to
Rpt
Ord-
facts,
Feb
13
42,
pp. 1-2.
''
Rpt Prod Plans, 13 Feb 42, p. 3. See also Rpt
Prod Plans, 15 Sep 42, pp. C and D of Foreword.
^^ Ibid. This report, and others throughout the
year 1942, list all major items and their producers.
Chapter II above describes the roles of districts and arsenals in procurement.
Hist, Arty Div, I, pt. 3, ch. X, XI, XII,
XIII; (2) ODO 231, 27 Jan 42, OHF; (3) History, Cannon Sub-Office, WatervHet Arsenal, 9
^''
'MO
OHF.
vols.,
^^
their
item on the
first
1,600
difficult to
Colonel Wells
ing
problem
Jan 42,
History,
see
More than
102.
Artillery
Division,
made important
a score of firms
OCO,
Mar
Alfred R. Glancy,
AA
as of 2
Volume
Memo,
'30
May
USW
42,
for
ASF
Responsible
29 (2
senal,
followed
for
production
engineering,
and
related matters,
Memo,
42,
Brig
for
USW,
Jun
ASF
''^
May
45),
OHF.
machine
in
tools for
ASF Prod
G1867.
AA
Div, 472.93
86
nance recommended, and higher authorapproved, that the 37-mm. gun be
ities
accepted as a substitute to
40-mm,
deficit in
"This
is
make up
the
jobs
we
output.^"
one of the
tightest
have,"
the
month and
Wheland was
steadily increasing
its
output.
just
and
required
about $20,000,
cost
workmanship
precision
this
is
recently
end of the
year.
Ordnance estimated
that
output
As
if
this
carriages
of
Arsenal."^ It
was
also a
enced
Tank
all
duction
of
equipment.
complicated
Some
of
piece
of
Review
Arty Div, 4
40-mm.
AA
specifications.^"*
the
picture
was
The
brightest spot in
production
of
recoil
mechanisms. In addition to Watertown Arsenal, two old standbys, R. Hoe and Otis
Elevator, were carrying the load for this
42, p. 10;
for
472.93/18.
"^ Mtg on review of prod plans of the Arty Div,
OCO,
13
82 (,)
Feb
Feb 42,
Ibid.;
p.
(2)
1.
42, p. 27.
13
and
Mar
00
new
^" (i)
(2)
sub:
**'"'
Misc.
ARTILLERY
Nelson
87
concluded,
review
to
"is
talk
him about
to
month
its
it."
^^^
In
less
Aircraft
than a
half.**'
Guns
Ordnance estimated
that
behind tanks
lagged
The
lat-
ahead, in
March
to
in half
fact,
convert some of
production to 37-mm.
made
in
Oldsmobile's
AA guns.**^
proof
and
At the end of
firing,
finally
April the
Under
Secretary called
if
proving grounds,
shipping to
ing,
lag
enough
figure of 8g,ooo.
first
one
counted every gun as soon as it came off
the assembly line. But there was a delay of
from ten to thirty days between completion
of guns at the factory and their installation
in tanks. This time was taken up in packhalf of 1942.
to task
during the
all
Time Objective
guns
in
this
armored
with
Ordnance
medium
had
divisions
no
tanks
guns.^
and
stabilizers
special
mounts on
light
on medium
tanks without special mounts,^^ and by
June the number of tanks and guns was
were
tanks,
installed
instead
all
Division
in
February the
nevertheless
reported
tion
it
of
expected to reach
the
its
75-mm. gun by
Watervliet,
and
and
CG
with
ment.
**"
goal.
20-22;
Incls.
(i)
ASP,
Copy attached
Review
Arty Div, 18 Apr 42; (2)
I, 6 Apr 42, copy in OCO-Detroit file.
Review of Prod Plans by the Arty Div,
.
sec.
** (i)
preceding docu-
to
OO
Munitions Program,
Feb 42.
USW
CG
Acceleration of
Tank Armament,
USW
file
104,
Memo,
92 (,)
Clancy,
ASF
Prod
Br, for
USW,
USW
Jun
88
Antitank guns formed a weak segment
in the allied arsenal.^^ Production of the
37-mm.
AT
still
inadequate
output
AT
3-inch
thousand.
carriage
first
by the U.S.
total
consisted of a
The
standard half
chassis,
nicknamed The
ing
its
the 37-mm.''''
57-mm.
late
1941, the
in
Army
track
carrier
for
81 -mm.
the
full
mortar.
years before
Harbor it was never in great demand. These weapons were not produced
in large numbers because they lost out in
Pearl
hicles of greater
maneuverability."
Heavy mobile
artillery
got
started
because
of
its
low
After prov-
Rommel's armor in North Africa, the 05mm. howitzer was followed by the 3-inch
and 90-mm. guns, both mounted on medium tank chassis, the 76-mm. gun on a
special carriage, and smaller pieces down to
To
standardized
U.S.
armor.
It
German
in
tion late in
McHugh et al.,
Mi) Whiting,
^*
Arty, p. 37.
PR-8; (2)
Statistics, Table
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions
for War, pp. 314-17; (3) McHugh, Arty, pp. 3237-
"'(i) Draft Project Report on Light Selfpropelled Artillery prepared by Daniel Chase, Ord
9-2800, Standard
Hist Br, n.d. OHF; (2)
Sep 43; (3) Catalog of
Military Vehicles,
Standard Ord Items, i Mar 44, Tank and Automotive Vehicles. The latter citation' gives numerous references to Ordnance Committee Minutes
TM
(OCM's)
ARTILLERY
89
of
shape but
8-inch
still
field
requirement.
The
delay
with
all
year's
these
Mortars
Mortars, among the simplest weapons
employed in World War II, caused no
major production problems, though diversion of seamless steel tubing to Air Force
production drawings of
adopted standard American threads and made minor dimensional
changes to suit tubes and plates of American manufacture. To distinguish the
French from the American model the latter
senal
this
prepared
weapon
it
was designated
M2.^*' In
January
1940
first
production contract for 1,500
mortars went to the Read Machinery Co.
the
^''
Review
of
in
ASP Rqmts
for Arty,
00
Dec 42,
Scheduling, report by SOS to WPB,
p. 17, ASF 200.02; (2) Memo, CofOrd for CG
SOS, 7 Oct 42, sub: Recommended Revisions in
ASP.
381/9948 Misc. For the development and use of mortars during and after World
War I, see PSP 27, the Design, Development, and
Production of Mortars, Feb 45, vol. 3, OHF, and
the report of Board of Officers appointed by par.
i
142,
SO
00
No. 289-0,
WD,
19 18 (hereafter cited as
OCM
OCM
OHF.
OCM
OCM
90
Standard
Car
rapidly
rose
dropped
Requirements
1944 but by the fall of
Pennsylvania.
Danville,
of
Company
early in
demand
European theater exceeded existing supTo meet the demand for 60-mm.
mortars Ordnance took two steps; it ordered Read and Kennedy-Van Saun to
boost production, and it placed a contract
with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
items with
"T"
designations.^"*
The
only
real
in
The
mortars
production
failed
to
pass proof
firing tests.
Hump
plies.
Over
for
By the end of its first year of war Ordnance could feel that, regardless of what
the future might hold, it was over the
hump in artillery production. The heavy
Production
24,250.^**^
eight
months
equal
to
first
total
preceding years.
production
No
of
the
similar crisis
the
for
three
marked
moved along
its
at a
require-
the
less
extreme fluctuations.^"^
Of four new mortar models procured
Aircraft
in
guns
68,
Antiaircraft guns
Self-propelled
easily
The
made during
Light
field
Mortars
Heavy
field
howitzers
weapons
and AT weapons
-
artillery
14
4,509
42,731
8,751
20,536
10,160
647
the
artillery'
equivalent
of
divisional
or
new 105-mm.
at
fairly
long range.
None
of these
new
i"i (i)
Oct
OO
Col
350.05/15609. For month by month developments,
see Review of Prod Plans, Arty Div.
'"- Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8.
"' Dcscript've data and photograj)hs may be
found in Limited Procurement Supplement to
Catalog of Standard Ord Items and in PSP 27,
'
vol.
2.
The
evant OCM's.
"" Production of the 155-mm. totaled 244; the
105-mm., 500; the 8i-mm. (T27) 850; and the
60-mm. (T18E6),
or,
6,145.
ARTILLERY
On
91
Ordnance had
goals for
the Presidential
that
to report
AA
guns
antitank
for
On
plane production
all
the
credit
side,
al-
makjng 40-mm. AA
and directors and 3-inch AT guns
were put ahead of plants producing 57mm. AT guns and 90-mm. AA guns and
carriages, which were not as urgently
carriages
while,
Ordnance
district
put
offices
tract
more important than the President's objectives was the Army Supply Program
(ASP) that brought together all artillery
Panel
large
ments.
On
ASP
Presidential
called for
directive,
on
finders
items,
for
AA
guns,
other
fire
control
itzers.""'
own
their
tools.
Each
formed a
district
to
help
Machine-Tool
contractors
solve
their
at length
1942
with
Mr. N.
P.
Ordnance
trict
districts.
The Chicago
^''^
dis-
equipment
in all plants
The members
ness territory.
served on a
When
a con-
view
it,
for a
erately successful. In
when
mid-summer of 1942,
had become apparent that there
was no immediate prospect of getting more
tools, Ordnance decided to favor a few
key gun plants where rapid expansion was
most needed instead of assigning new tools
it
urgency
loG
Review
1"'
Campbell, op.
i"*^
Winter,
.^^nalysis
Activities of the
pp. 20-22.
ch. 9.
of
World
War
Dist,
Prod
Sep 47,
II
92
back
in the
eased
As
early as
June
in
each
rifle
barrel, before
dimensions,
final
it
was bored
to
loaded
far
cartridge
to
reported that,
lack of
lery
contribution
to
scrap
national
the
drive
War
days.
shortage
that
To
general
the
materials
the
affected
mills
all
and other
suppliers
were not
inter-
1920's
up
sure
in
to
applying the
150,000
principle
to
ested in them.
fact
scheduling
Production Techniques
Of
all
the
new
refined
or
much
in
the processes
themselves
application to cannon
on a large
first
as
in
manufacture
time."'
Cold-Working (Autofrettage)
In
the
nineteenth
century
the
enough
bore
perma-
strengthened
barrel
in
their
high
pressure
enlarge
production
making artillery
during World War II, two may be taken
as major advances
cold-working and centrifugal
gun tubes. Their
casting
of
novelty, it should be added, was not so
employed
to
techniques
that
nently
Springfield
^"^ (i)
Memo,
heavy
Review
Aircraft,
and
so on.
J.
ARTILLERY
93
in
service,
it
Both
Watertown and Watervliet were producing
cold-worked tubes in quantity long before
Pearl Harbor and continued to do so
throughout World War IL
served
further
a proof
as
test.^^^
Centrifugal Casting
Though
the
the
first
mold was
rotary
patent on casting in a
century
nineteenth
England early in
the Ord-
issued in
before
United
gun production
only
dates
States
from
in the
World
War
serious
casting of
cannon
until
with
centrifugal
1925. In 1918 an
Ohio concern, the Paper and Textile Machinery Company of Sandusky, had submitted to Ordnance for examination three
centrifugally cast steel cylinders and had
been awarded a contract to build a machine large enough to cast the 155-mm.
howitzer tube. In
the
commanding
19 18
to
stages
in
officer
1932.
the
at
mid-20's Watertown
made
known
metallurgical
test.
The
exper-
was
fitted
of cannon from
an accomplished fact. Molten
steel is poured into a revolving mold and
shaped by centrifugal force to the shape of
the mold. The result is a piece of ordnance
superior in many ways to anything heretofore produced." ^^" There were still many
problems to be solved, and rejection rates
remained high, but by 1940 the process
was sufficiently developed to be ready for
cast steel
is
quantity production.
and eventually
On 20 June
Watertown
passed
two
landmarks
in
1944
working up to medium
its
production history:
sizes.
completion of
its
installation of a
centrifugal
not
process
only resulted
in
speedy production and economy of matebut produced a gun that, unlike the
rial
than
crosswise,
properties.
had
uniform
Centrifugal
directional
tended
force
to
to
ity
the
specific
Economy,
simplic-
increase
Watertown from
large
every
"The manufacture
that,
it
^'^
Hist, Watertown Arsenal, vol. 102. This ref'
erence contains an important technical paper, De-
sign
Data
for
Pressure
Watertown
Arsenal,
Watervl'et Arsenal, I.
XV,
pp.
6-7,
and
Hist,
merous photographs.
115 "Whirling Molten
Steel to
Make Gun
Cast-
Scientific
94
and
uniformity
greater
product
of
all
December
In
contracts
Ordnance placed
1941
two
for
contractor-operated
government-owned,
plants
make gun
to
built
Plant in
the
thereafter
The Dickson
blanks.
1944:
"Make no compromise
yet at the
they
of other
for artillery
The work
production
the
of
redesigning the
is
almost endless.
Company
Firestone
40-mm. gun
in
carriage has
host
of
techniques.
new applications
Employment of
for
welding
lathes
that
and machining
saved
of the outside of
valuable
production
gun tubes
time.^^^
The
and casting
saved time and material
plants
but also
much
ing
When
concern.
artillery
to pass.
failed
weapons
final test
In spite of a
lot of
material
is
late
in
1942 that
wrong
^^''
Hist, Watertown Arsenal, vol. 102, including
long extracts from Watertown Arsenal Rpts by
Dickson, Capt Hugh C. Minton, Capt Scott B.
Ritchie, and Lt Steven L. Conner during the
1920's and 1930's and personal notes of Dr. J. L.
Martin, superintendent of production.
ii''
(i) History, Dickson Gun Plant, OHF; (2)
History, Ohio Gun Plant, OHF. The latter contains
a
lengthy memorandum by Maj. Tracy
Dickson, Jr., to
Historical Section, 31 De-
OCO
cember 1943.
''**
with quality
and
zers.^^'
list
such
tech-
ture, too,
The
of
list
production-speeding
cost-cutting,
In the long
War
William
S.
in
ICAF.
guns,
casting
instead
of
forging reduced
the rate of
production.^'''
To
instruments a
and bars
PI).
74-80.
'-'
p.
lor,,
OHF.
44,
ARTILLERY
with
it.
95
a critical situation."
It's
^^^
Pres-
usually
reluctant
their production.
sentatives
the
source
of
be
to
Constant
parts.
efforts
Army
ing of standards.
The
lack of inspection
to
find
substitutes
strategic materials
for
or
critical
and machine
tools
were
had
to
Ordnance
overcome
to
district repre-
this reluctance
World War
II.
but in
to
Instruments for
gets,
measuring
weapons
collectively
instruments
efTective
observing
known
contributed
employment
World War
II,
distant
and
distances,
tar-
in
the
as fire control
greatly
of U.S.
to
artillery
among
the
in
construction,
fire
control
aiming
instru-
and demanded
more exacting machining and more meticulous assembly operations. As the quantities
required of the more complex instruments
were relatively small, and the risks of
telescopes,
rants,
came
Dist Chiefs,
Oct
Conf Ord
1-3 (i)
Dist Chiefs,
Hist,
New
Philadelphia,
Ord
Dist Chiefs,
Dist, vol.
I,
pt.
4,
465; (2) Hist, Arty Div, Ind Serv, OCO, 194045, vol I, pt. 2, ch. VII. For the research and development aspect, see Green, Thomson, and Roots,
Planning Munitions for War, pp. 333-45- for a
description of the manufacturing and inspection
problems with fire control instruments see Inspection and Quality Control, Problems and Solutions,
p.
PSP
13,
cellent
Jun
An
ex-
AA
weapSpecial Text
summary
Ind Serv,
OCO,
1940-45,
vol.
3,
ch.
X,
OHF.
96
handled by Frankford Arsenal. Except on
matters of inspection, the arsenal bypassed
the District offices
contractors,
and
justifying
Districts,
action on the
which were just
of
the
As
far
instruments and
back as 1930 the
and
Eastman
Esser,
Kodak,
and other
eral
binoculars.
step
of
standardizing for
military use
The
existence
in
the
supply
system
of
transfer
at
1942.
''
Of
the
three
main
categories
binoculars
of
and
fire
control
instruments
scopes,
and
directors
plicated
sign,
and
but
it
the
first
was the
least subject to
nevertheless
least
changes
posed
tele-
comin de-
difficult
ODO
1-^ (i)
Div, Ind Serv,
231,
OCO,
27 Jan 42;
vol. 3, ch.
lithographed at
thor,
copy
in
Frankford Arsenal,
OHF.
n.d.,
no au-
ARTILLERY
97
tion
of
binoculars
because
its
resources
critical
precision
Ordnance
therefore
Company
optical
instruments.
ments
prisms,
lenses,
windows,
of
reticles,
optical glass
let
questioned
if
we
to produce satisfactory
alone produce
them
in the
But by the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor the two contractors were producing at
the rate of 8,000 binoculars each per
month. During 1943, the peak year for
production, 245,672 were turned out, in^^^
cluding both old and new models.
Manufacture of panoramic telescopes by
the camera works of the MergenthalerLinotype Company and the Eastman Kodak Company may be taken as a representative
sample of this special field of
Ordnance procurement. As used for artillery fire control, the panoramic telescope
was a periscopic instrument with a head
that could be rotated to permit the observer to look in any direction without
piece. It
was
also, in the
The
company
followed
arsenal
methods to the letter, obtained good results, and was soon asked to take on a
quantity production order.^^^ Meanwhile
an improved model was adopted and a
production contract placed with the East-
leading producer.^^^
Ordnance
was fortunate in its selection of contractors and made a good production record.
The only director produced in large quantities was the M5, based on the British
Kerrison predictor, for the 37-mm. and
40-mm. guns, and the great majority of
M5's were made by the Singer Manufactelescopes, or height finders, but
130 (i) Ibid.; (2) Whiting, Statistics; (3) HisData, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Mansfield, Ohio, in Hist,
torical
p. 42,
Hist,
100,
pt.
4,
OHF.
Dist, vol.
I,
pt.
March
1945,
in
100, pt. I.
133 Eastman
tivities
for the
Rochester
Ord
Hist,
of
War Prod
Dist,
Dist,
1945,
vol.
AcHist,
98
of Elizabethport, N.J.^^^
home
nance
District,
mated
in
turing
As
Company
early
as
assembled to
culations that
94 1,
its
target. Early
company
1939 that
annual produc-
the district
ment
was
officer,
Air
Corps,
Commission
less
"almost resolved
itself
into a
the
Purchasing
British
^^^
ele-
officials
Procurement
prisms,
was one
of the
to
chine
forth,
total
it
at
it
lenses,
New
example,
for
the rate of
production. In the
Nash-Kelvinator
made by
Company and
the
the West-
Com-
mounted
after Pearl
necessary to bring
Harbor and
many
it
became
small manufac-
and the
ranged
with
the
District ar-
Mergenthaler-Linotype
Ord
OHF.
scope
Company.
in
the
production of
fire
control
instru-
Germany,
it
had very
little
capacity for
OHF.
'^"Capt Samuel M. Grafton, The Optical Industry, Mar 45, Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. 100,
pt.
I.
ARTILLERY
99
Company
ment.
in
New York
City,
provide
to
central
control of
Its officers
subcontracts with
many
small
space
eventually
for
optical
delivered
pressings,
some $4
pany
and
million
of
the optical
all
Watch Com-
in
when
prove the performance of instruments under poor lighting conditions was made
mandatory, the
Control
Fire
Sub-Office
increased
ments
to
the
failure
in
artillery
mm.
resistance
of
gun,
which
reached
total of
something
over 20,000.
An
came
Large-scale
inch
rocket
procurement
launchers
of
in
plastic
3-tube
4.5-
clusters
the
dropped to 300 in
altogether
stopped
by 1945.
and
1944,
Meanwhile a new and more powerful AA
weapon, the 120-mm. "Stratosphere" gun,
came into production on a small scale
550 all told. Because it was extremely
heavy and complex it saw little service
overseas, and with the enemy on the de-
instru-
1"
(i) Grafton, op. cit.; (2) U.S. Optical SupCorporation by A. J. Mackay, president of
U.S. Optical Supply Corporation, 6 July 1945,
copy in Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. i.
ply
cold.""
^^**
Ordnance
for artillery
arsenals
and con-
X.
Design, Development
Launchers, Rocket, 3-Tube
i.-!!!
production,
aircraft
producers,
tractors
craft],
and
Production
4.5-inch, A.C.
of
[Air-
100
1944-45, virtually no demands
were heard for additional AA guns.^^" As
Allied planes were armed primarily with
.50-caliber machine guns
and a few with
fensive in
75-mm. cannonaircraft
output
weapons,
of
intermediate
20-mm. and
37-mm.,
came
same with
tank
field
guns,
much
self-propelled
weapons,
and
new
May
was dropped
heavy
artillery,
medium 155-mm.
gun
(or the
the
240-mm.
not
shared
ners. *^^
howitzer) to
by
Army
responsible
The General
plan-
and
field
Though
a few
Army
and
their
manufacture proceeded at a
Then, during the winter of
even these small requirements
snail's pace.^***
1942-43,
were sharply cut in successive revisions of
the Army Supply Program, partly because
of the desire to conserve steel
and
partly
McNair,
Commander
of
Army
the
after
They
dropped
in
all types
of artillery for the 1940-45 period totaled
519,031. {Table 10)
Heavy
Artillery
^*^ (i)
most Ordnance
officers
World War
141
PSP29.
P5P 105-mm. Howitzer M4,
were advocates of
to
Maj Gen
Design, Develop-
The Design, Development and Production of Heavy Mobile Artillery Weapons and Ammunition, Oct 44, OHF.
See also Millett, Organization of the Army Service
Forces, p. 117, and comments by Gen George C.
Marshall in interview with Dr. Sidney T. Mathews and others, 25 July 1949, p. 5, extract in
OHF.
^'**
For an artilleryman's complaint,
Trevor N. Dupuy, "For Men Only,"
Artillery Journal, 32 (Sep 42), 708-12.
Memo,
II
ACofS G-4,
'^^ (i)
From
Russell L. Maxwell,
heavy
see
in
Capt.
Field
Dec
AT,
aircraft,
and
so
ARTILLERY
101
Table
10
519,031
Total
Heavy
Light
7,803
field artillery
field
AT
and
56,616
weapons
116,114
howitzers
27,082
howitzers
156,587
Aircraft guns
49,775
Antiaircraft guns
105,054
Mortars
Source From Whiting,
Ground
Statistics,
Table PR-8.
6-inch howitzers on
railway
duction of
gun mounts
to supply the
and
1943
heavy"
artillery
cized the
Troop
in April
Basis for
criti-
lack of suffi-
its
^*^
small
was authorized on
July 1943,
but the gain was only temporary. In January 1944, in February, and again in
March, General Campbell protested against
increase
spare
of
worn
^''^
ASF
Early in April
headquarters ordered
i^
weapons
USW
USW,
20 Dec 42,
so on. See also
Greenfield, Wiley, and Palmer, Organization of
Ground Combat Troops, pp. 178 and 233.
104
Memo, McCloy
AT,
Guns,
1*''
Quoted
Production
of
and
in
and Ammunition,
1^8
for
aircraft,
p. 17.
CG
Memo, CofOrd
OO
CG
6-Class
Supply
in
ASF
ist
44, in folder
marked
475/19588.
1*0
heavy
next chapter.
ammunition
1944,
side of
p.
6.
For the
102
project
*""
gency."
of
as
The
campaign, where German artillery outranged that of the Allies, had proved the
need for big guns.^^^ In mid-May G-4
issued the specific requirements, all adding
up to enough weapons for 66 new battalions of medium and heavy artillery.^''"
Capacity that had been laboriously built
as
was about
it
April
that, "the
Navy
available to Ordnance.
contractors
who
had
released
where
ity.
^'^^
their
areas
of
forging and
Meanwhile,
else-
machining capac-
way inland
after
the 6 June
1944
landings in France, General Eisenhower
sent back an urgent request for more
powerful antitank ammunition, more tanks
the
to
need.
Truman Committee
1945,
heavy
artillery
going along as
is
Then
may
Due
Ferguson:
Senator
tre-
mostly
to
changes in plan?
Senator Truman:
^^
Due
Memo,
Apr
44, sub:
CG
for
teriel
ASF,
Apr
and Memo,
i
OHF;
Program,
2
44,
sub:
CG ASF
Heavy FA
for
CofOrd,
Apr
OHF.
Memo, ACofS G-4
June 1945,
to
Campbell, 4
CG ASF, 15
400/12103; (2)
CofOrd, 19 May 44, same
CG
sub, 00 400/12103. See also Robert R. Palmer,
Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,
152
(,)
44, sub: Proc
ASF for
Memo,
May
Arty,
for
OO
II
tion.^"'"
special priority
self-
guns.^"'''
of
fire
The tremendously
after the
increased rate
in
1944
to nearly
i5f)
(
same
WPB
14 Jul 44,
riages; (2)
copy
file.
Memo,
ASF Prod Div 473 Gun CarCG ASF for CofOrd, 10 Jul
sub:
M36.
.,
00
OO
p. 6,
WPB
file
210.3,
NA.
ARTILLERY
that
they
found
103
out
aircraft
bombing
Senator Ferguson:
And
contended for
it?
artillery.
les-
vince
2d
^^^ Hearings,
sess., pt.
Truman Comm.,
25, p. 10,884.
S.,
78th Cong.,
CHAPTER VI
Ammunition: Preparation
Artillery
The
settled doctrine of
Army
U.S.
field
were reduced
and high
at
In the
first
something
like eleven
thousand tons
accompanied by a hailstorm
of shells,
bombs dropped by
on
of
were
regularly preceded by hours of methodical
pounding from planes and surface vessels
landings
islands
in
the
I^n
during the
P.
Lucas
officer
Italian
as
raving
against
the
German command
achieve
the
victory
at
all
important
minimum
cost
but
they
ate
up ammunition
at a
Massed
fire
during World
power on the
War II was
summer
summer
of
U.S.
scale
employed
beyond
utterly
Army
in
the
a day's fighting."
like
Worse
still,
only a
Pacific
drive
million rounds.
lives,
goal
in
of
sure
American
^ Maj Gen
John P. Lucas, Diary, vol. II, Italy,
Sep 43-1 Jan 44, OCMH.
^ For
ammunition statistics, see Ammunition
Supply for the European and Mediterranean
Theaters, 15 Aug 45, by ASF Contl Div, OHF.
On the effect of artillery fire on U.S. casualties
see
n.d.,
sub:
OHF.
and
were
there
through
ginning,
educational
and producing
isms.
The
orders,
to
and machining
mechan-
intricate fuze
new
artillery
tion.
Private
exist,
ture of the
process,
there were
no com-
ammunition production.^
efficient plants,
dustrial firms,
far
cartridge
To meet this
Department took
situation
the
steps in the
Ordnance
summer
of
ber
1942.
ment
produced a
wide range of militar) chemicals, and they
loaded millions of shells, bombs, grenades,
rockets, and mines. The plants employed
nearly a quarter of a million workers and
of about $3 billion they
cases,
owned
and
fuzes,
At
components.
other
still
metal
government-
related
peacetime
in
overseas.
All
along
the
line,
inspectors
A Government -Owned
Ammunition Industry
105
shells alone,
if
placed
for
see
Ilsley,
Oct
44,
Facilities
vol.
I,
Comm. headed
pp.
Program
of
the
Ammo
Div,
25-26,
of
by Col
24
Program for IncreasJun 40, sub: Proposed
Gen Burns' pering Production Capacity.
sonal file. Ammunition procurement policy is outPSP I, Contract Negotiation and
lined
in
.'Kdministration, Ord Dept, May 45, ch. 5a.
)
PSP 73, St. Louis Suboffice, Office of the
(
Field Director of Ammunition Plants, Jul 45, by
Ammo Div, Ind Serv, OCO, pp. 3-4, OHF; (2)
Maj Edwin J. Grayson, PSP 18, The Establish-
WD
.
"'
New York,
bined.
the
U.S.
Army's
fire
power between
ment
gram
of
for
Historical
Artillery Ammunition Loading ProWorld War II, Oct 45, OHF; (3)
Aug
Rpt by FDAP, vol. I, Gen Hist,
the
106
in
1941
at
built
for
Ordnance
procurement
program.
Ord-
supplied
plosives
and
large
quantities
of
to lend-lease recipients.
The
value of
Signal
Corps, Transportation
Medical Department.
It
was over
five
ex-
artillery
cal services^
Corporation in 1940.^
Navy
bulk
to the
times
and
illuminating,
phosphorous
shells.
ganda leaflets. All told, Ordnance produced 270 types of artillery shell, and
seventy different types and sizes of bombs.
^
mary
of
Statistical
ASF
Review, World
Activities prepared
Manuals,
Investors Service.
n.d.,
p.
annuals
War
II, a
Sum-
of
Two
Ammunition Production
107
additional features of
production
To
ammuni-
it
is
are
five
lent
fuze
and
other
small
booster,
sential
bomb
body, explosive,
such
and adapter,
of
the
many
primer,
which are
es-
importance in terms of
volume. From the procure-
but of
production
all
as
lesser
ces,
dustrial Service.
shell
merit
special
ammunition
the
note:
pre-
work required on the metal components, and the hazardous nature of powdermaking and ammunition loading. An artillery shell is a delicate and complicated
mechanism packed with two death-dealing
powder charges- smokeless powder in the
case, and TNT or other high explosives in
the shell. Both the brass case and the steel
projectile must be formed to meet exact
specifications. The fuze must be built with
the precision of a fine watch and yet be
strong enough to withstand violent shocks
and sure to function with split-second
accuracy. Its sensitive detonator and boostcision
er
operators. Propellants
and highly
skilled
sensitive
gun crew
and uniformity in the flight of the projecround after round. The TNT or
tiles
other high explosive must be loaded with
extreme care, must remain safe to handle
and store for long periods of time, and then
must explode with terrific shattering effect
at precisely the right moment.
This type of work was obviously not for
tion tests to assure safety for the
their
for example,
and
era
(i)
Memo, Col
Serv,
the
31
Ammo
Div.
Aug
45,
by Maj
PSP
6, 7,
12,
Paul D.
Olejar
(3)
Bill
for
194', PP-
'92-
108
Department
Army
very
Nor
castigated.
did
Ordnance
the
itself,
officers in
many
or
officers
engineers
civilian
plosives
had home
that
offices
in
able
Ordnance was
Finally,
cost.^^
quired to spread
new
its
re-
between
a private concern,"
Wesson
in the spring
have concentrated our plants so as to reduce transportation but it has been neces-
Wilmington.^
The Period
Island.
its
of Plant
Expansion, ig40-42
sary
to
them
out."
yield
demand
the
to
spread
to
^^
Site Selection
^
The
factors.
new ammuni-
was complicated by a
tion plants
At the
variety of
able
regions
interior
set
certain
broad
on
as
limits,
grounds of safety, large centers of population. Next came a whole series of interrelated considerations, such as availability
of water,
made
sites.^'^
choice
of
land
pipes under
needed
for
it.^^
less
in
that
Illinois
Huge
example, the
had
tracts of land
oil
were
ings
were
large
but
because
safety
de-
tion lines
Illinois
loading
twenty-four
and a
lines,
an area of
acres
about one
thousand
size
of
Manhattan
Ammo
the
p.
ARMY
OUSW
New Ammo
for
December
(10
1281-82;
Hearings,
(2)
41, pt. 9, p. 2906, 77th
figures on land costs, see
1941),
17
Sites
American Machinist, 85
Plants,"
Truman Comm.,
Nov
WD
Owned, Sponsored
Mar
selection
Serv,
covered
I,
WORLD WAR
'
eight
of
site
Program
Facilities
Ilsley,
41,
'
OCO.
(
Min
relative
to
of
Conf
SR
71,
in
Wesson's Office,
OHF;
(2)
WDAB,
Bill
Apr
Testimony by
for
H.R., 2d
76th
1,
194
hundred
forced
miles
the
of
Ordnance
to
nation's
modify
its
two
borders
mobilization
The
mands
109
location
of
at least brief
duced a permanent
ammonia
plants
mention, for
shift in
it
de-
intro-
the geographic
center of the
war,
from coal, the plants were built in coalproducing areas, generally near the coke
ovens. Some industrial chemists and Ordnance officers, particularly Maj. John P.
Harris, were convinced that in time of war
enough ammonia for the mass production
of explosives and smokeless powder could
never be produced from coal.^^ The pre-
construct
first stages
of the emergency while
Second Phase plants large, newly constructed plants
were being built. ^"^ This
plan had to be abandoned in 1939-40
because most of the depots were along the
seacoast and were considered too vulnerable to air or sea attack. Further, some
were near large cities such as Baltimore
and Charleston. Another factor practically
completed the wiping out of all plans for
First Phase loading plants. This was the
desire to minimize the effect of enemy air
attacks by spreading plants out over very
the
large areas, with such great distances belines that a bomb dropped on one
would not destroy the entire plant.
The effect of this decision was to double
the distances previously planned between
loading lines, and increase the total area
and total cost of all plants. It also contrib-
tween
line
made
War IV^
record
by
in
World
Ordnance
A Venture
in
Brown, 1946).
site
the production of
gas
plants
of
new ammonia
the
in
WDPMP
OHF. An
excellent
this
whole
OO
in
Two
OHF. The
terest of the
this matter.
latter
reference
tells
in
no
when
clared, "but
it
Harris
gas."
^^
(Tex.),
(Ark.)
material.
their basic
(Kans.
de-
the
and Ozark
were
raw
monia works Buckeye
all
(Ohio), Jayhawk
Morgantown (W.Va.)
make ammonia from coal.
and
),
continued to
dustry
couragement.^^
new
Construction of
plants
was man-
War Department
service
until i6
responsibility
of Engineers.
while Ordnance would choose the operating contractor. In most cases the operating firm helped design the plant,
and
in
tion contractor.
required
To
negotiations
protracted
for
that
fixed-price
would
contracts,
be
the
gineers
committees
of
Congress.^*
The
criticism
may
many
that
Company
Pont
some
TNT,
its
publication
left
at
fault.20
7.
Apr
41, Relative to
for
SR
GOCO
ground
71,
plants
OHF. The
is
legal back-
sketched
OHF. The
by
Col.
Mar
42,
GOCO
official history of
each
Mobilization, ch.
00
Explosives Capacity
for
SW,
29
nitions Prod.
Aug
.
40, sub:
,
Gen
Time Schedule
Burns' personal
of
Mu-
file.
Humble
Oil
Company
refinery.
Iron
for
to build a plant in
Alabama
plant, as
shells.
it
was
111
tion.
During
program
work on
new plants began and the
existing plants was greatly
the
1941
gained
rapidly
twenty-five
capacity
of
expansion
momentum
as
increased.
were intended to
raise
production capacity
4,000,000-man
Army."^ Thirteen of the new plants were
to the level required for a
bomb and
ing,
shell loading,
and one
Five of the
three
eight for
new
and boosters.
ammonia,
plants produced
TNT, two
smokeless powder,
one
addition.
Lease Act in
March
Harbor
program was
doubled, with construction starting on 25
new plants between January and August
1942. Ten were for loading bombs, shells,
fuzes, boosters, detonators, and primers.
Six were for TNT, two for a newer and
more powerful explosive known as RDX,
two for smokeless powder, and the remaining five for ammonia, magnesium, and amAfter
Pearl
monium
picrate.
the
^^
Erection of the
new
facilities
is
some-
TNT, and
auxiliary
chemicals,
and
for
production
though
it
balance
in
was
simplified
In most cases,
Ordnance
plants turned
in
1942
with
production
of
per-
such
it
multiple-purpose
facilities
gave
the
would otherwise
have lacked. Flexibility was essential, for
the situation was never static. As requirements rose or fell, or shifted from one
type of ammunition to another, production
lines had to be shut down, new lines
program a
-3
may
flexibility
it
be found in
Funds Required for Additional Facili381/15444 ASW. See also Memo, Col.
Miles, for Chief ofind Serv, 31 Jan 41, sub:
Monthly Progress Rpt of the Ammo Div. The
sub:
40,
00
ties,
The complexity
of the
program
is
OUSW
file
(Ord Gen).
112
added, or entire plants taken out of pro-
requirements,
in
the
large
bag-loading
The
time.
impossible.
operation
powder
number
of plants
New
levels.^^
Of
twenty-three
new
loading plants
funds became
After that,
available.
and
it
projects
demanded
in
co-ordination
apsites
coming, for
with
The
Quartermaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Site Board appointed by
the Assistant Secretary of
tional Defense Advisory
Bureau
of the Budget,
Commission, the
TNT
and
smokeless
Hercules,
were
staffs
point"
to
"stretched
man
to
new
the
Their
breaking
the
plants.^^
toluene,
picrate,
contracts were
trial
^^
I,
To
For a
list
oil
indus-
refining
was necessary
it
made with
companies.
For
am-
and ammonium
oleum,
monia,
facilities
facilities
new
of
duction
authority between
of
month
to month.
division
laby-
this
bring in
to
companies
Program
of the
Ammo
Memo, CofOrd
for
ASW,
12
Aug
40,
OO
400.-
(3)
Rpt
explosives
related
The
chemicals.
Company
op-
nance
Plant
Tennessee
in
loading
for
which
had helped build Rockefeller Center in
New York and had directed the colonial
restoration of Williamsburg, built and operated the Kingsbury Ordnance Plant. In
selecting such contractors the Ordnance
Department did not attach any great imshells.^''
Inc.,
113
Army on
managerial
ability,
reputation
The
and
all
they needed to
know
shells
Ord-
of the
lessons
it
effectively,
to
company.
With all
the
previous
even
entirely
activity
of these companies,
the
of
known
countered
(CPFF)
the
the
public
CPFF
criticism
construction
33
Metal Components
While new powder,
operation the
explosives,
Ammunition
Division
also
launched a tremendous program for procurement of the metal components of ammunition. The magnitude of this phase of
ammunition procurement is indicated by
the fact that in the single year
steel,
1943 it
second only
41,
OHF;
(2)
PSP
8,
pp.
2-3-
contracts
with
rather
of
little
against
many
for
and
raised
it
idea
plant
scale,
fiscal
financial
such a
contracts.
their
of
expense
protect the
government's
teams of auditors at
each plant checked the company's accounts
directed
consideration to
To
a profit.
interest,
make
failing to
plants
and
of
the
Office
Field
Director of
Am-
114
of metal
literally
hukFor
shells,
and
still
other firms
and
and
were
negotiated
boosters.
arsenals
district
administered by the
and
produced
primers,
adapters,
fuzes,
Contracts
offices
procurement of metal
components was not adequate and was
thrown overboard when war came.^*
Production of all components had to be
carefully planned in advance, and then
schedules had to be adjusted from month
to month to meet changes in over-all requirements. All items had to conform
by the
districts for
many
and
types,
sizes
made
to
it from shot,
which is solid (or has only a small cavity)
and is most widely used in the smaller
sizes for penetrating armor plate. Most
World War II shells, and a large proportion of bombs, contained a high explosive
such as TNT or RDX and achieved their
effect either by blast or by scattering steel
fragments. Driven from gun barrels at supersonic speed, shot and shell carried death
and destruction directly to the enemy.
They formed, in the words of General
Harris, "the
fist
of
modem
lished a
close cen-
efforts,
all
these
lot
of
1940 and
1941.^*'
"
(i) Interv with Col John P. Harris; (2)
Intervwith Dr. Ralph Ilsley, 9 Jun 53.
For detailed data on number of items and
'
'
number
of
draft
see
Div,
memo
OHF.
In the
literal
artillery shell
is
meaning
a
of the term,
shell, i.e.,
it
is
an
not solid
'"'
This section
Ordnance
officers
is
115
Slight
man-
ufacture,
and may be
billets
for
holding
finished
on a variety of
lathes
in
and
hardening
measurements,
over-all
weight,
and
were
not
needlessly
as
precise,
contracts
ity,"
for
trivial to the
pertaining
to
the
item.'*"
"We
he
is
"
files
"How
On
to
113
(March-April,
Judas
it
Priest himself
because
(i) History,
he
not going
is
we saw some
Gadsden Ordnance
of that in
Plant,
OHF
HE
1939). 273-
test firing.
thickness,
to get
artillery shell
cations
example, appeared
and
wall
it
furnaces.^^
side
in
grinders,
variations
explosive.
was
of experimental production
After
high
the
further shaping
inclined to
"The
As an exarnple,
Projectile
in
see. Col.
Flight
Herman U. Wagner,
Effects
of
Eccentric
Wall
^^
Documentation
of a
specific
case
in
the ex-
field
U6
the
Once you
war.
last
lose
control
of
ment."
*"
The
inspection
its
requirements.^^
This
step
shell
some
reveals
the
of
difficulties
in
early in
Pressed Steel
the Pitts-
-mm.
shell,
new production
Tube and Pullman-
methods.
National
Standard
during the
this
there
kind be-
Pittsburgh
area
An
analysis
artillery
of
fourteen
shells
in
mensions.
contracts
the
get
1941,
The
from
difficulties
delay
the
schedule.
The new
Beginning
in
shell.
arsenal
by inspectors
to
of
18,
**
May
43,
OHF.
p.
rate of rejection
August
The
until
for
district
duction.
production
into
Pittsburgh
The
able.
155-mm.
forging
firms that
Hist, Pittsburgh
Ord
and
pt. 4, ch. 6.
^^ Ibid.,
Critical comments on
pt.
4.
3, ch.
methods by a San Francisco district engineer appear in History, San Francisco Ordnance
District, I, pt. 2, ch. 6.
^* Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt.
4, pp.
79, and vol. 100, sec. 10.
778-
bility
shell
forgings
new procedure
for
for
delivering forgings to
the
ma-
arrangement
as
Division
enabled the Ammunition
to keep
close control over forging operations during
the early phase when the forgers encountered many difficulties in meeting specifications.
After these difficulties were surmounted Ordnance told the companies
holding contracts for machining that it
would no longer supply them with forgings
but would expect them to buy directly
from the forging companies. One advantage of this move for Ordnance was that it
chiners
required.
117
Manganese
had
steel
sulfur
steel.
^^
many
This
same problems
the
When
facturers.
large volume,
in
machines
ficient
Lack of
get
to
into
used
in
let
suf-
production.
centerless grinders,
extensively
of
manu-
peacetime
industry,
many
blocked
need
great
from starting
importance was the
contractors
Next
production.
in
heat-treating
for
equipment,
freed the
ing job
ules posed
forgings
varied
slightly
in
outside
dimensions,
to
"round-the-clock"
at
of
life
all tools.
proved
Use
helpful
coolants.
of carbide-tipped tools
did
as
use
liberal
of
^^
One of the most striking contrasts between procurement plans and actual out94 and 1942 appears in records
75-mm. and 105-mm. shell production
put in
of
Pittsburgh
the
in
district.
Before
1940,
tion
the
requirements
list
with
burgh
comparison,
year of war. In
only 598,000
shells
for
the
steel
of
this
*^ Hist, Pittsburgh
Ord
Dist,
I,
pt. 3, ch. 5,
pp.
630-32.
steel
^''
(
May
oil
Hist,
Chicago Ord
56; (2)
41.
Dist,
I, pt.
Gen Merle H.
pp. 48Davis, 27
i,
53.
^
'
Hist,
Chicago Ord
Memo,
118
gun was
fired to
form a
tight-fitting valve
and then
rear,
brass cases,
cans,
looked
certainly
easier to
manufacture
their
problems.
and
easy
make than
was not
required
It
fuzes,
without
special
its
machinery
knowledge of time-tested
full
but
pro-
drawing the
entire
case
from
single
disc.*^
In the
fall
Company
military use
A 500-Pound
for shipment
Demolition Bomb
a loading plant
to
to
ready
be filled
photographic purposes.)
105-mm. gun were scheduled. Actual production in 1942 reversed this proportion,
with only about one million of the smaller
shell
and nearly
for the
first
the War Department approved an Ordnance proposal to build a new governmentowned brass plant in the Midwest to be
operated by the Bridgeport Brass Company
of Bridgeport, Connecticut. Designed to
turn out twenty million pounds of brass
strip per moath, and also fabricate light
and medium cartridge cases, the new plant
was built at Indianapolis and was formally
opened on 15 May 1942.
planned production
Just
as
the
was moving
*^ Hist,
-65 and
Pittsburgh
Ord
Dist,
I,
pt.
4,
pp.
764
ex. B.
UnHke shot and shell, which were generally made of steel, cartridge cases were
normally made of brass. These cases not
ture
^" Detailed
information
installed at Frankford,
at
projectile.
the
Dist,
I,
pp. 82fT.
119
months of 1941, a severe shortage of copper and its alloys developed. Sea transport
was not available to bring in copper from
Chile. The demands of the Maritime Commission and the Navy for copper were
huge, and there was no apparent substitute
for the copper needed in ocean-going vessels. Ordnance was therefore faced with
the problem of substituting some other
metal for brass in ammunition if production schedules were to be met. The choice
fell upon steel, and the widespread efforts
to make acceptable steel cases dominated
the scene for the next two years. As the
manufacture of steel cases has been described in detail in the preceding volume,
resplendent
miracle."
^^
The
ambitious
22,000-Pound Semi-Armor-Pierc-
Bomb
ing
AAF,
Milwaukee, Wis.
Small
Bombs
The
curement
bomb
pro-
the
summer
1944 and
of
in
Rpt
of
1943
it
rose again
in
over
thirty-three
million
of
5^
Rpt
of
7,
Chiefs,
ranged
usually
clusters.
The bombs
in size
pound block
Ordnance procured
bombs for test by the
busters.'''^
a few 10,000-pound
Jul
Chiefs, Rochester,
43,
19
28
OHF.
May
Munitions
something
50
Springfield, Mass., p.
120
States
the
for
British,
but
the
bulk
of
bombs
Through
produced
the
in the
medium
United
of the
States.
bombing
plane,
this
One end
industry in peacetime.
oil
the
of
pipe
spectacular
way
contributed
in
to
ing effect
great blast-
filled
on
Policy
the
bombs with
^"
this
services
committee of
Ordnance handled
the
biggest
share
shells
to
be
nevertheless
bombs
less
to
be dropped
difficulties.
duction
tail.
The
sandblasting
to
to
After
fuze.
the
receive the
remove all
harden the
to be painted
and
plants.
fabrication
to
prescribe the
be followed
by
method
bomb
to
its
of
bomb
thick-
production
much
The
^* On
bomb research and development, see
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions
for
^'^'
quoted
in
Hist,
'"^
Harry S. Beckman, "High Explosive
(i)
Bombs," Ordnance, XXXII, No. 64 (SeptemberOctober 1947), 9B-99; (2) J. B. Nealey, "Seamless Bombs from Steel Plate," American Machinist
vol. 86
(October i, 1942), iii7flF; (3) Interv
with Beckman and Otto C. Pototschnik, 6 Jul 53.
Among the most prominent bomb-producing firms
were A. O. Smith Corporation of Milwaukee;
Harri.sburg Steel Corporation; and National Tube
Company and Jones and Laughlin Steel Company,
made
of sufficiently large
diameter.
Bomb
mg.
war,
beginning
of
demolition
number
the
schedules
for
airplane
facilities
combat
fly
Some were
theater.
held in this
to
drastic cutback
fill
in
therefore
kept
or-
Fuzes
bomb
all
ammunition and
expended by combat troops
ing a round of
effort
ting
it
pletely
wasted
For
if
properly.
portion
reason,
Henry H. Arnold
all
the
in
get-
were com-
this
spent
ammuni-
tion, fuzes
reduction of
them cooperat-
Gl
Of
production
"
or
aspect of the
manufacturers
the
seamless tubes.^^
in
121
of
its
Ordnance had
limited
research
for their
manufac-
facilities
the
in
spring of
1943
when bombs
re-
lines
had
to be set
up
all
over
it
took
seven months to reach 75 percent production on bomb bodies, and at least nine
months
"Requirements
Bomb
R&D
of
WD
lition Bombs, I
i Lewis, PP
'^-
Hist,
Aug
44, vol.
I,
OHF.
19.
Chicago Ord
Dist, I, pt.
i,
ch. 6.
122
common
tabUsh a system of
contours and
in
and
contours
weights
of
point-
ballistics
exacting
tolerances
Because
among
operation
justment of
type
fuze
of
work
for
many
to
the
another/'^
center of this
and in
modern
men
to
from Picatinny
Specialists
the commercial
plants
to
visited
assist
most of
them
in
up equipment and starting production. There was a remarkably fruitful interchange of information and ideas between
industry and Ordnance, resulting in early
production by industry and a constant
stream of new fuze-making machines and
improved production methods. For pointdetonating fuzes some of the early contracts went to companies that normally
setting
produced
electrical
accessories,
ers,
equipment, automobile
gasoline engines,
The
mechanical time
fuzes, containing clockwork mechanisms,
went to established watch and clock manearliest contracts for
To
ufacturers.
speed
delivery,
all
these
set
presses
intensified
the
mechanical
time
fuzes
were
one
Ord-
of the projectile
from
by
required
nance.*^*
the mechanical time fuze M43 were announced. General Campbell and a successful fuze contractor, Mr. Roy T. Hurley
of the Bendix Aviation Corporation, set
out to form an industry integration committee for this purpose. At the end of
companies holding
Frankford
Arsenal, to discuss ways of sharing the
experience of the four firms that were
already in production with the two that
were just getting started.^^ Within four
months the newly formed M43 Mechanical
Time Fuze Committee not only increased
production by about 100 percent but also
introduced improved manufacturing techniques that greatly reduced the cost of the
tives
from
the
six
M43
fuze, plus
fuze.*'*'
Barnes, Weapons of
for War;
(2)
World War II (New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, i947), PP- 83-84.
"^ Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, p. 6off. For a
Munitions
man Kodak,
pp. 47-50,
OHF.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION
visory
committees in
1941
to
M43
with
help
was
fuze com-
it
committee)
carbine
the
operation between
contractors
that
came
coto
123
VT"^
oscillator that
when
it
target.
fuzes
tools,
elements
will
of fuze
was the
II
War
caused the
one
the
of
top-ranking
was a triumph
tion
"Never,
ing.
detonate
shell to
scientific
mass produc-
of production engineer-
perhaps,
the
in
history
of
diffi-
cult to meet." ^^
VT
fuzes
mittee at the
disposition
of
Against
Scientists
Time,
"have
Procurement of
the
and
edge and
skills in
violations of the
tegration
Ordnance
antitrust laws.
Each
in-
''^
Quoted
Team, p. 123.
*^^
For the
Campbell,
in
official
Industry-Ordnance
Ordnance statement
outlining
16.
in
production of the
ference
Pages
trict,
Ordnance
12-13,
Volume
in
I
District Chiefs,
History,
17,
22 April
Ordnance
Detroit
1944,
Dis-
subject of In-
discussed by
Richard F. McMullen in Industry Integration
Committees, OHF, and by General Campbell in
The Industry-Ordnance Team, Chapter 8. The
former reference includes a list of committees and
their members.
A code designation with no significance.
^^ James P. Baxter, Scientists Against Time
(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p.
227. Baxter also describes the development of the
fuze, as does Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, and Ordnance Development Division, National Bureau of Standards, The
Radio Proximity Fuzes for Bombs, Rockets and
Mortars (Washington, 1945).
dustry
''**
Integration
Committees
is
124
VT
use of
while
with
fuzes
antiaircraft
Bureau
Standards
of
guns,
fuzes
By the summer of
the National
concentrated their
of
sufficient experi-
943
large
projectiles
ment
of
first
the fuze
fell
Ordnance
As
it
for final
fuzes
postwar
years.
rangement
The
less
satisfactory
ar-
VT
much
to suggest
smaller
fuzes for
that develop-
fuzes
for
trench
Development
Research and
Scientific
(OSRD) was
requested
45
interest
of
getting
began
VT
grow
to
to
944-
in the possibility
war ended. In
OSRD
March
if
the
Army
put
its
^^
with
terminated in
^1
(0
Fuze
responsibility for parts procurement.^^
Manufacture
fuzes
of
the
31683,
battery-powered
was
942 by WestManufacturing
1
and
Company, Philco Radio and Television
Corporation, General Electric Company,
Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation, Julien P. Friez and Sons, Western
Electric Company, and Rudolph Wurlitzer
inghouse
Electric
Company. Production
Interv with
Sec,
7
Aug
Baxter, op.
Hoyt W.
R&D OCO,
Sisco,
Chief
VT
OCM
cit.,
New Weapons
ch.
XV;
for
Air
Telecon with W. S. Hinman, Jr., Asst DirecOrd National Bureau of Standards, 15 Jul
53. For an account of Signal Corps procurement,
see History, Signal Corps Research and Development in World War II, vol. 4, Project 453-C,
Signal Corps historical files.
'- Ord Development Div, Nat Bur of Standards,
Radio Proximity Fuzes for Bombs, Rockets and
Mortars pp. 30-3 i.
(5)
tor of
''
Boyce, op.
cit.,
ch.
XXIII.
CHAPTER
Ammunition: Production
Artillery
By the summer
of
had
come
ammunition
to
of intensive production
tion
is
tion
Ammunition Plants
(FDAP) in St. Louis.^ Headed by Col.
Theodore C. Gerber, an Ordnance officer
with experience as commander of a
Field
Director
government
(GOCO)
of
owned, contractor
plant,
this
office
operated
administered
the
assistant
chief
FDAP
for
new
facilities,
knew
that legal and administrative problems were inevitable because of the novelty
of the
GOCO
packaging,
inspection,
but
scheduling,
were
responsibilities
1945
FDAP
as
delegated
to
"complete
coordination,
administration,
GOCO
tion" of the
went on
or
these
By
it.
memorandum,
ficial
renovation,
time
control,
and
direc-
it
Am-
never had as
full
ammunition program as
OCO-Detroit had of tank-automotive
procurement. Broad control of scheduling
of production remained in Washington, as
control
did
the
of
authority
changes.
much
St.
to
approve
Louis was
not
engineering
granted
as
VII
arrangement whereby
pri-
FDAP
16 July
division into
ODO
Number 305,
creation is described in Green,
Roots, Planning Munitions for
was authorized by
1942.
The
Its
Thomson, and
War, Chapter IV.
-
History,
45, vol.
I,
p.
7.
Aug
46.
126
procurement
of
plants,
GOCO
plants
tion of
duties, with
activities of the
and
inspectors,
for protecting
sound because
bility
in the
Ordnance commanders
officers
to
demands, were
attention
brought to the
also
FDAP, which
of
served
as
in
"home
the
GOCO
arrangement,
by
control
required
industry
partnership
plants
caused
but
the
in
certain
the
the
dual
government-
ammunition
There
difficulties.
new
personnel.
upon Ordnance officers and civilian technicians. During the construction period,
government representatives at each plant
site handled payrolls, timekeeping, and inspection
of
all
it
caused further
difficulty.
at the plants
One
plant,
for
during three years, each new commander "coming in to get the plant running right." * Most of the contracting
firms directed their representatives at the
sites to work in co-operation with
government
representatives and to
reach practical solutions on the spot rather
than to refer every problem to the home
office. With some firms, particularly those
with no experience in munitions making,
there was criticism that the safety provisions required by Ordnance were too
elaborate, that labor-saving machinery was
not used enough, and that "many decisions forced upon the contractor by direcwere uneconomical and unsound.
tive
plant
the
'
'
Hist,
FDAP,
Key
Pers
Oct
45.
Star
Ord
Plant,
OHF.
nance Plant,
I,
pp.
1-12.
GOCO
motor
and
pools,
As a result
Ordnance
in-process
inspection.*'
number
of
GOCO
ities
was cut
directive
in half.^
not
only
conserved
and reduced duplication but it also promoted greater understanding and confidence between the contractor and the
government.^"
Competition
among
Plants
127
economy
in Washington decided to
problem by recording and
analyzing the cost of operation for each
plant. They believed that once this was
done and the results distributed a spirit
of competition would develop, with every
plant manager eager to make a good showing in the eyes of his home office and in
view of the other plant managers. Pride
was to take the place of profit as an in-
superiors
his
attack
this
centive to efficient
The
of
success
low-cost production.^'
cannot
plan
this
be
"
itself
Ltr,
CofOrd
to
CO's Ord
plants,
New Ord
copy
Facilities,
Oct
Ord Dept
in
Hist,
42,
Field
Corn-
comments
on the "substantial progress" made by Ordnance
in Memo of Director SOS, Contl Div, for CG
SOS, 22 Nov 42, sub: GOCO Ord Plants, in ASF
Contl Div file, folder marked Orgn of Ord Dept
husker
Ord
FDAP.
^ For testimony on this point from one Ordnance officer with wide experience, see Final Report of Maj Vernon L. Keldsen, 22 October 1945,
Key Pcrs Rpts, Alabama Ord Works, OHF.
11 Hist, FDAP, vol. II, pt. Ill, and vol. VIII.
Reports on the comparative standing of the loading plants in August 1943 are conveniently assembled in General Report on Bag and Shell
Loading. For an account of the work done by
the contractors in compiling cost data, see La
Tourette,
128
costs,
production,
lowering
labor productivity,
and sub-
raw
materials.
increasing
steadily
The
cost of
half
while
TNT,
the
for
rate
of
The amount
doubled.
in
was
production
of alcohol required
bomb was
unit-cost level.
(4)
loaded
Plants.
(5)
Shortcomings
There was
also
the
member
of
the
War
21
June 1944. After citing many specific examples of the remarkable savings achieved
by Ordnance and its ammunition contractors,
hind the
still
loading
standards
and
Engel,
in
Ammunition
The establishment of manpower
complished by
J.
quality of the
available
Albert
The high
knowledge
technical
It cost
much
FDAP
loading
(called
"filling"
by the British)
in
Pos-
War
cent.
fol'
stand as the
FDAP accomplishment:
Reduction of cost and conservation of manpower has been outstanding. It has been
'
For
Analysis
broad
a
of
summary,
Ammo
Plants,
see
i
Performance
Jun 45, ex.
the meeting
ally to
OFDAP.
due, in
(
I )
my
The
judgment,
in a large
measure
to:
and experienced
(2)
The
and
contractors selected.
creation of integrating committees
also
the
generally
January
.,
NA.
The
January 1945 a proposed plan for evaluating the performance of TNT works was
prepared, assigning a percentage value to
each basic cost factor and expressing over-
number. But
beyond the
discussion stage before the end of the war
was in sight. ^^
Few of the plants under FDAP supervision ever had a chance to achieve peak
efficiency by operating at capacity over a
long period. In most cases, as soon as a
plant came into production and completed
a few months of shakedown operations, it
all
fall
the
By
of
to
that
feel
In
January
was forced
to
practice
Ordnance
1944
extremely
short-
running
more
for
shut
down
for
it
in
types
unexpected demands
But during the winter of
1943-44 many plants were closed as the
War Department emphasized the curtailthe
in
future.
ment of production. ^^
As noted in the preceding chapter, the
Ordnance Department's management of
the ammunition program was subject to
with
all
many
in
for
bombs,
costs.
all
inspection of
disconcerting.
Be-
efficient plants
it
was not
in
possible
the
full
most
time.
them
be said that
if
not excessive.
The
of The Inspector
who made a special
FDAP in March 1945 exOfficers
tremely liberal."
^^
Though
in
were "ex-
many
cases
^^'
See draft
letter,
among many
in operation
entitled
Index of Operating
Performance TNT
Aug
31
this
Report of
43,
report
concluded
affecting use of
production
may
Loading.
or switch
concentrate
it
General's Department
to
its
No
FDAP,
casts of requirements,
operators.
plants,
least,
terms of
the
for
plant
the
on one score
criticism
contracts
plant
the plants to
as a reserve against
am-
of
on
effect
required
one
than
129
that
"the
condition
most
in load-
OO
334.
130
safety.
The
plants,
where
two
RDX, and
were
reductions
further
order.
in
They
potentially
world.
ceived
over
date
to
$470,000
in
fees.
FDAP
director of
clusions.
They
the
fees
sum payment
It
was not a
for the
pound
Volume
high
fees.
example,
production
One
usually
resulted
in
received
total
of
$12,801,-
operations. In
its
at
1943,
peak, the firm averaged over $600,000
per month in
fees.
Though
had been reduced three times, an inspecting officer in October 1944 still considered
them to be out of line.'^
Sajety
huge
ammunition
at
quantities
of
TNT,
operations
cautions
the
that
ammunition
industry
safety
much
how much
costs or
it
time
it
takes,
want safety and quality." ^^ This attitude was supported by many coldly pracI
tical
present
desire
safeguard
to
the
lives
of
avoided
needed
because
facilities,
they
destroyed
Older Ord-
cost
nance
remembered
officers
the disastrous
Amboy
plant at Perth
took the
over three
Furthermore,
in
of scores
lives
destroyed
badly
Company
hundred
buildings.
market the
in a tight labor
^"
This subject
is
discussed in Smith,
Army and
No
Admin
Taken
FDAP,
at
Cir 142,
the
VIII.
FDAP,
Joint
Conf.
10
.
Aug
.
copy
From
beginning,
very
the
ammunition
was
safety
The
plants.
ex-
pany plant
as a
at Kenvil,
New
Jersey, served
whole industry.
unknown
fact
It
that small-grain
if
smokeless
critical point.
The
layouts of the
were thereafter
health
of
workers.
As a safeguard
TNT
a special
TNT
all traces of
Whenever an explosion
occurred, its cause and prevention were
studied by a flying team of experts and
from
his
warnings
body.
were
immediately
sent
to
all
other plants.
much
of the
war
the
Iowa
Ordnance Plant where an explosion in
December 1941 caused 13 deaths, and
March 1942
worst disaster in an Ordnance plant during World War II occurred at the El wood
Plant on 5 June 1942 when an explosion
in a building where antitank
occurred
mines were being loaded. Forty-eight persons were killed, and property damage
amounted
plosions
to $489,000.
in
perspective
To
we need
to
view
Chicago
Port
explosion
in
July
World War
I,
the accidents at
Ordnance
To
Campbell established
Branch (later renamed the Safety and Security Branch)
in Chicago in July 1942. The new office
was headed at first by Col. Francis H.
Miles, Jr., and later by Colonel Gerber
who was at the same time head of
FDAP.^^ This office reviewed the design
ganization. General
an
of
Explosives
new
Safety
plants
before their
construction,
program
safety
who
to be desired. Be-
another in
131
took 22
lives.
The
22 History, Safety
pp. 12-15
I,
132
Box OF Bulk
TNT
methods. This
latter
In
its
is
nails.
early days
industry."
the
and metropolitan
fire
and
police de-
Works, to
cite
note-
partments.^'^
COCO
plants
surpassing
even
the
traditional
Memo
of Col
and
the training
progress
the
memo. For
livered
in
the
fall
of
office
the
tructiveness
-^
Engel, op.
cit.
Hill, 1944).
Works
133
taking a sample of
TNT for
testing at
an ordnance laboratory.
worthy feature of the World War II record is that more than 95 percent of all
disabhng injuries at ammunition plants
were not due to explosives but to run-ofthe-mill accidents such as falling off a
ladder or being hit by a truck.^^
tinny Arsenal
several commercial
alive some
methods and to
in certain areas.
served
Pilot production
to
lines
keep
at
Frankford Ar-
components.
Technological Advances
and by
of production
had
knowledge
firms
But
small-scale
production
and
intricate
Some
ical
25 (i)
Hist Rpt,
FDAP,
I,
Gen
Hist
Aug 42-
Sep 45, p. 39; (2) Engel, op. cit.; (3) "Shot, Shell
and Bombs," Fortune (September 1945) PP131-36, 260. (4) Rpt on Safety, Incl to Memo,
Gerber for Campbell, 7 May 45, in Safety and
Security Br files; (5) Stat Review World War II,
issued by ASF Contl Div, p. 165. This last reference covers all Ordnance installations and shows
that the accident frequency rate in Ordnance was
far lower than at all other ASF installations.
134
production, nor does
it
always clearly
re-
duction
line.
Ordnance
were well
officers
aware
them
1938-40.
until
much about
Long
before
the
beginning of the emergency period Ordnance experts had seen the need for automatic machines to load detonators, for example, but the problems involved in
designing them were so baffling, and the
prospects of profit so dim, that few machine designers could be persuaded to take
any interest in the matter. The whole list
of World War II technological advances
made under pressure of war would fill a
volume; only a few may be mentioned
TNT,
Reverse nitration of
here.
toluene
RDX, and
pulp,
powder
rocket
these
trinsic
Reverse Nitration of
TNT
To
left.
in the
surprise,
fill
his
TNT
much
instead
When
faster.
of
putting
making
thereby
toluene,
the
into
Colonel Harris
American
They were
cal.
TNT
makers were
skepti-
tion in the
TNT
a trebling of
States.
The
result
was
TNT
quate supply of
bombs and
for
high-explosive
stitute explosive
TNT
ture of
or
shell
plants
as
amatol (a mix-
and ammonium
bomb
came
known
loading
until
nitrate)
new
for
TNT
Quan-
in
of
supplies of
Blandy
was so
the
Navy "with a
shortage
suddenly
teaspoon."
^^
disappeared
But the
when
'^^
( I )
Pro-
(March
Lamed,
Department
official
in
World War
histories
further
vide
conditions.
II,
PSP
17,
OHF. The
I.
pt.
I,
Quoted
pp. 68-72.
in
Memo,
Brig
M. J. Madigan, OUSW,
Madigan files (Ord Gen).
14
135
of
TNT.
contract
cars of toluene to be
eral refineries
oq
affiliates.
its
to SIX cents.
produced
owned by
The raw
the
in the sev-
company and
material
had
to
New
Development of a new means of producing toluene,^" the basic raw material from
which TNT is made, was another highly
significant technological advance of World
War
The importance
II.
of this chemical
half
of
that
the
But the
Assistant
it
all
the
problems
in
regard
to
Jersey before
and the
first
made
Baytown
Ordnance Works, on a site adjacent to
its Baytown refinery in Texas. By October
1942 this plant was producing toluene at
compared with
toluene
total
less
production
States in 1918.^^
the
existing
-^
op.
aviation gasoline.^^
The groundwork
was
laid
I,
for
this
achievement
Arsenal,
tent rights
process
for
53; (2) Report on Explosives Capacity vs. Requirements, op. cit., pp. 13-14; (3) "Shot, Shell
and Bombs," Fortune, (September 1945), p. 260.
Campbell, op. cit., p. 271; (5) Barnes,
(4)
Weapons of World War II, p. 76; (6) Engel,
cit.;
(7)
app. 10,
'"'
Hist,
vol.
45,
p. 25.
interchangeable. Toluene is
name for the compound C7H8
ally
chemical
which, when
the
nitrated,
106.
hundred
entire toluene
33 (i)
for
War,
two
Nov
program
Ibid;
(2)
the
in considerable detail.
History
of
Baytown
Ord
136
RDX
that
The
superexplosive
known
RDX
as
War
11.^*
years but
It
for
hex^mine.^^
(Re-
many
Wood
treatment
bleached
of
with a mixture of
nitric
cotton
and
linters^^
sulfuric acid.
existing
TNT.^^
capacity
But
May
in
production
for
when
1941,
of
the
British
new
RDX
Ordnance Works,
at a cost of
Starting
production
Wabash
attained
over
million
five
was converted
As demands
plant, the
in
$70
million.
November
1942,
capacity of
a monthly
pounds
Wabash
of
RDX
which
RDX
skyrocketed after
Pearl Harbor,
cility,
(NDRC),
enabled Holston by
May
1945
to
support
auxiliary
facilities
that
The
provided
raw material for Holston were the Morgantown Ordnance Works that produced ammonia, methanol, formaldehyde, and hex-
^*
The Ordnance
historical
file
contains a de-
C,
16.
RDX
NDRC
tists
involved
Bengis,
shifting
in
Ammo
^^ Beside
Div,
OCO,
17 Jul 53.
RDX
was produced in
pure form,
three compositions. Composition "A," a m'xture
and 10 percent desensitizing
of 90 percent
agent, was used for press loading. Composition
and 40 percent TNT,
"B," about 60 percent
was used for bombs and other ammunition where
loading was required. Composition "C,"
cast
and 12 percent plasticizer,
about 88 percent
was used to form demolition charges. Lewis and
Rosa, Ammo, i Jul 40-31 Aug 45, p. 39.
^^ For details on the development of the new
process and construction of Holston see Bengis,
op. cit., and History, Holston Ordnance Works,
its
RDX
RDX
RDX
Volume
I,
OHF. The
latter
volume contains
fascinating narrative by Maj. Karl P. Doerr concerning the removal from the Holston plant site
of buried explosive materials left over
War
The
from World
NDRC
contribution is described in
Preparation and Testing of Explosives, Summary
Technical Report of Division 8, NDRC, in OrdReports Section, dtd 1946. This
nance
report also contains an extensive bibliography.
^^ "Cotton linters" are the lint or fuzz remaining on cotton seeds after the cotton has been
I.
R&D
removed.
use,
9ff,
see
OHF.
summer
Ordnance
linters
of 1941
that,
crop
and
it
became apparent
propellants.
of
but
ing,
operation
was a
der^^
powrequirements. Ord-
capacity
137
Double-base
smokeless
pow-
its
rockets
for
was a
undertaking.
difficult
of producing smoke-
The
sired shape.
solvent
As
by evaporation.
used for
solvent
rocket,
lines for
its
pro-
arose
the
sticks
to
time
long
dry out,
required
and the
for
the
distortions
in
period.
situation.
The
use of
powder
bottle-
grains
of
cordite,
the
powder, by
standard
rolling the powder into a sheet, winding
British
still
smokeless
roll,
it
at
sure.
^'^
Rocket Powder
thick-web
is
misleading,
it
is
neither
138
In 94 1 the National Defense Research
Committee undertook study of dry1
extrusion
processes,
as
did
Company under
Powder
the
Hercules
contract
with
at
the
California
Institute
of
up
rocket
steadily
over-all
increased.
One
matically as possible.
was
the
ufacturer
each containrng a
were needed in a single
fuze, and fuzes were needed by the millions, the demand for speedy production
was great. After many failures, R. A.
Jones and Company finally developed a
detonator-loading machine with which 6
detonators,
several
sensitive explosive,
loading
shell-loading
resulting
extensive
employment
and manpower. In
INF was poured
cooled and solidified.
where
it
molten
Mechanization
of
Loading Operations
ammunition, industry and Ordnance made countless improvements. The simple hand fixand machines
Arsenal in
in
use
at
to flow into
was poured.
individually
"(i)
Each
it
when
the next
was thus
each was loaded
shell
and by hand.
Dr. E. H.
Historical
possible.""*
tures
TNT
In
the
new
of
the
great
practically tailor-made as
powder the
in
in
de-
layer
example
macbme
detonator-loading
as nearly autostriking
Picatinny
Rpt
on
Hemingway and
Solventless
E. N. Smith,
Rocket
Powder
OHF.
many
excellent
photo-
139
at Charleston
Ordnance
method the
shells
were loaded
in
groups by
and
to
porosity
all
and
crystals.
As
TNT
must be placed
primers,
in small
detonators,
components.
To
cups or cavities in
boosters,
and other
J.
Machine Company
Stokes
of
Pennsyl-
tinuous
made
After
stream.
had
to
presented
the
pellets
were
be placed in small
booster cups by hand. Not only was it
slow and tedious work, but handling the
they
pellets
health
when
Stokes
the
This
solved
Company produced
rotary pelleting
press
inserted
into
pellets
hazard.
finally
that
automatically
booster
cups
at
speed of 75 units per minute. When machines of this type were put to use
reduced
costs,
by
using
employed
the
in
same type
making pills
of
machinery'
or
candy.
In
-2(1)
Activities,
OHF.
Rpt
i
of
Nov
CofOrd
44,
140
reduction of personnel requirements were
tremendous.^^
by
ammuni-
mand
of
imperfections
Ammunition
powder,
production
and
the minds of
cers.
Ordnance ammunition
offi-
of opera-
Gen. Merle
reduction
in
the
number
of
employees,
"The
rigid but
Hardy when he
"We
don't
we
cause
an
inferior
troops."
when we
let
anything of
"^^
^''
Larned,
(i)
Mfg Gp,
op.
cit.,
(2)
Hist,
Picatinny
I, pt. 2.
OO
Capacity,
file.
'German munitions-makers
conserving
erations
explosives,
Misc Incl
manpower were
and
^^
Speeding
in-
years."*^
the
goals,
up elaborate
Division set
munition was
Arsenal,
and elimination
constant
icals
its
shell
of errors
bomb and
made
^*^
beings."
With reduction
where powder
plants,
human
also
made
rapid
^Rpt
8
Oct
of
43, p. 19,
OHF.
Chiefs,
Philadelphia,
in
quantity
of
needs
each
loading
the
of
matched
exactly
the
But
plants.
such
141
percent of
its
items on
theoretical exactness
for
tain in
easier
were
production
others,
the
of
easy-to-
of
bomb
Shells,
line.
cases,
quantity
production
for
war plant
maximum. To
balance,
and
1941
well
their troubles.
toward un-
December 1941
and other field
Service
The "Short
work
It
was
that
of
not
production of
would have
facilities
did not
possible
to
all
fast
items,
for
through
their
conversion
to
were
many
also
There
the picture
deliveries
production.
at
disposal
its
One
of
the
for
chief
difficulties lay in
The
Division could
institute
tial.
it
means
with the
balancing
satis-
pletely
fied
Am-
Division
"Short
in
^^
miracles.
During the
munition
as the source of
^^
expedite
to
issued
into
during
Industrial
the
came
and that
bodies,
example,
cartridge
still
of materiel.
its
production,
eliminate
to
or
bottlenecks,
tion of certain
plant shutdowns
criticism
of
its
maximum
capacity at
time
when
the
''^
...
(i)
13
Memo,
Dec
Brig
41, sub:
Gen Lewis
for
all
districts.
Acceleration of Prod.
the
Hermon
Ord
of
General
F.
Safford,
Prod,
Somervell
Ordnance comment
on
of 13
28
April
May
1942.
1942
and
the
142
could be applied to another fund only by
period,
casts
The
approval
getting
result
in getting
new
new
lows:
proper description of our present situation is that we are trying to run an arsenal
the size of the United States without the
We
cedure.
are
trying
for each
terms
of
capacity
realistic
theoretical
not
figures,
maximums, and
in
terms
of
of
others.
value of the
PWP
sheets
The
attested to
is
by
With adoption of the Army Supply Program early in 1942 an effort was made by
ASF
to
forecasts
procurement
provide long-range
for
all
types of ordnance.
The
empha.sis
each
order
shifted
increase
for
specific
production
In
the
summer
that the
in
balance.
The
mum
monthly
capacities,
number
and multiplying
months in the
of
1942,
""^
Memo, Chief
Integration
of
Ammo
Div
Committees
for Chief of
Ind
istration,
other
^'*
ammunition production
new
143
were
considered.^^
items
made
kept within
the requirements
by the
set
constituted
FDAP
Downward
of the
revision
Program was
military high
with
all
of production schedules.^^
drastic
reduction
ammonium
nitrate,
of
in
the
loading
require-
demand
for
TNT,
full
made
not yet in
supplies
cuts in requirements.^^
tic
fall
This
Hermon
F.
Safford,
TNT
total of twenty-two
lines at the Keystone,
Pennsylvania, Volunteer, Weldon Springs, and
West Virginia works were closed. The New River
and Mississ'ppi bag loading plants were shut
down as well as the Cactus plant that produced
ammonia, the Pilgrim plant for grinding magnesium, and many others.
sub:
Mar
44,
.'-,.'
ASP.
marked Dirs, Basic Data
Rot of WD Proc Review Bd,
.
respect
to
for
bomb
still
cation with
metal
^"
the latter
certain
Army Supply
so substantial in
half of
ment
in
Cutbacks
impossible to keep
it
other plants,
all
and
these
^'*'
ASF
file
334
WD
Proc
31 Aug 4'5.
Rev Bd, 020 CofS USA.
144
the
North African campaign, a war of movement allowing for little artillery fire, should
declared
that
expenditure
rates
for
an
during
rates
invasion
of
western
Europe.
In
ASF
policy
year ahead.
technical
down
All
services
were
the
told
to
line
the
procure
materiel
items
this policy,
ities
1944.
policy
of
spite
In
other
cases,
facilities
not
cur-
synthetic
rubber,
and aviation
tention of
the
time
required
quirements during
gasoline.
The
Crisis of
ig44-^
The
At the
with
a view to
to expedite
attaining
as
thousand
forty
rounds
of
240-mm.
start the
at the
an almost frantic drive for more production at any cost. As late as the last week
in March 1944 Ordnance, in line with
recent ASF directives, was reviewing the
need for existing plants and recommending
that three bomb- and shell-loading plants
Illinois,
Pantex, and Gulf
be closed
within the next sixty to ninety days and
put in stand-by condition. Illinois had always been a high-cost plant while Pantex
production
reach
to
^''
Memo, CG ASF for CnfOrd and others, 29
Jan 44, sub: 1944 ASP Policies Affecting Prod,
ASF Contl Div files, folder marked Supplemental
Rpt on Implementation of Dir to Deputy CofS,
Jan 44.
'"
Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 25 Mar 44,
sub: Proposal to Close
Loading Plants, and
Incls, 00 334/8206 Misc.
Memo, Hardy for CG ASF, 18 Mar 44,
sub: Rqmts for 240-mm. Ammo, OO 471/3074.
Two memos dated 28 February 1944 are quoted
iri
Dr. Ralph Ilsley, $700,000,000 Facilities Program, Ammunition Division, May 1945, OHF,
pages lo-ii. See also Brig. Gen. Roswell E.
Hardy, "Heavy Artillery Ammunition," Army
Ordnance, XXVII, No. 147 (November-Decem-
'"''
in
ammuni-
145
seventeen
300-ton
600-ton
billet-breaking
twenty-seven
medium
this
far
the
was
for the
largest
155-mm. howitzer
1,303,000
and
ammunition, and
added to the heavy artillery program. The
campaign in Italy, where artillery ammunition and bombs were used in huge quantities against strongly fortified mountain
positions, had forced a change in Army
plans. The new directives required Ordnance to double its monthly rate of heavy
artillery
artillery
ing
ridge cases,
lathes, nineteen
draw
500-ton
presses,
twelve
and
presses,
nosing presses.
All
new
facilities costing
$203
tween
load
built
up
in
to
city
heavy
artillery
ammunition was
the expansion
undertaken by Ordnance after Pearl Har-
Some
to
government-owned plants,
such as Gopher, Keystone, and Weldon
Springs, that had been shut down a few
weeks or months before, had to be speedily reopened and re-equipped, and new
contracts for metal components had to be
placed with industry under very unfavorbor.
of the
able conditions.
had
to be built
fixtures,
and machine
tools
assembled; pro-
be
set
up
new
lines
had to
and in-
Memo, ASF
cisions, see
CG
ASF,
Apr
44,
Heavy FA Program,
sub:
file
at
OCMH
Ammo
'^1
Crisis.
CG ASF
Memo,
sub:
gram,
this
Ilsley,
also
Heavy
for
CofOrd,
00
19
May
Ammo
44,
Pro-
process,
The
Facilities
Program
of the
Ammunition
Division, a 3-volume study, and Ilsley, $700,000,000 Facilities Program of April 1944. For a brief
summary, see Ammunition Division Annual Re-
30 Jun 45,
Artillery
OHF.
146
941-1942,
only
to
be
during
lost
the
facilities in
those coun-
and to arrange for shipment of available machine tools to the United States.
In August 1944 Ordnance reported to the
Secretary of War that manpower was "the
tries
file
with ASF.^^'
On
directed to step
and medium
monthly rate
tion for the
artillery
The
ammuni-
ammunition.
of production
for
to
be
in-
six
hundred thou-
chief of the
Ammunition
Division outlined
expenditure
and
pacity
detailed
about
information
tools,
00
I,
OHF.
documents. See
than Grossman,
power, UNITED STATES
II (Washington, 1959).
ARMY
WORLD
IN
WAR
Memo,
sub: Rates of
OO
OO
i;5639-
floor
of
During the
space,
power,
fuel,
times
1944
its
month
contracts
for
the
program had been placed/" In Jan1945 came new directives for increased production of ammunition for the
75-mm. howitzer, the 75-mm. field gun,
and the 37-mm. antitank gun, followed b)
entire
uary
bide
for
cores
75-mm.
guns
the
to
ranging
from
When
155-mm.
the
these
1945 addi-
program called
$682 million on
facilities alone, divided on roughly even
proportions between metal components on
the one hand and powder, explosives and
^^
loading, on the other.
Production of 105-mm. high explosive
(HE) howitzer ammunition in December
tions
for
the
total
expenditure of
Ordnance
list
in
medium
By the end
come up
1944.
to
One
to
of
expectations
in
December
four months of
first
147
those
of
and
the
then
1945
ammuni-
first
four months of
declined
sharply
after
value
1 944. Over two hundred new items, representing more than one-third of the average
number
of
The new
recoilless
A new
TNT
much
production increased so
that a
expansion
tating
of
acid-making
capac-
ity.""
"Were
tion,
the
frantic
production necessary?"
to
be "yes"
situation
if
as
we
it
the ques-
raise
to
efforts
boost
existed
the
in
winter of
1944-45-
shortages
155-mm. gun
early in 1945,
'^
Ann Rpt
^^
(i)
all
Ammo
$700,000,000
CG ASF
Prod.
p.
7.
Program,
for CofOrd, 27
400.12/
Facilities
.,
OO
i:(827.
Ammo Supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters, 15 Aug 45, pp. 25fr.
^" Ann Rpt, Ammo Div, OCO, Ind Serv, FY
''''
of
Ilsley,
1945,
OHF.
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
148
Table
11
Period
1944
January
,312,000
,327,000
February..
March
,888,000
,708,000
.643,000
,999,000
,938,000
,515,000
,534,000
,006,000
,120,000
April
May
June
July
August
September.
October
November.
December.
,931,00.0
1945
January
65,289,000
67,939,000
77,038,000
82,573,000
78,073,000
53,065,000
37,189,000
16,535,000
February..
March
April
May
June
July
August
Source: Stat
II,
app. A,
p. 7S,
by
ASF
Contl Div,
ammunition on hand
creasingly
OHF.
Ammunition was
lines.
The
rationed,
fire
campaign was a
'^
Quoted
was adequate,
in
and the
at the desired
ammuni-
Ordnance Service
in
ETO, Am-
ARMY
WORLD WAR
Chart
ETO
HEAVY
Thousand tons
Ground
Ammunition
ARTILLERY
400
300
200
100
JJ
Thousand tons
1945
1944
LIGHT
AND MEDIUM
ARTILLERY
750
600
450
300
150
JJ
Ammunition Supply
Department-1
150
Table
12-
Rounds]
1945
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION
Table
13
Rounds]
151
in
ETO,
31
May
1945
152
Table
14
Rounds]
Ammunition
stand on
its
this
^''^
{Table 14)
L53
^^
III.
ments
entered
times:
(a)
the
picture
insufficient
at
ele-
different
volume
of this series.
Cong.,
No.
iio,
pt.
2,
79th
'^ Rpt
of Gen
Bd, U.S. Forces, European
Theater, Arty Sec, Study No. 58, ch. 7, n.d.
CHAPTER
Small
In a war that saw the employment of
huge artillery weapons on a grand scale
and that featured first the "block buster"
and then the awe-inspiring atomic bomb,
weapons rifles,
and machine guns
nevertheless
played an important role
throughout.
Among ground combat
troops, small arms were regarded as valued
personal possessions, usually winning a
place on mythical lists of "the soldier's best
the
smallest
carbines,
friends."
and
most
of
military
pistols,
Their efTectiveness,
versatile
light weight,
made them
simplicity of operation
the
it
as including
all
60-inch
or
less,
rocket launchers
and a few
recoillcss rifles
arms
or,
mc^re
VIII
Arms
whether the weapon could be carried into
combat by infantry troops and could be
fired from the hand, shoulder, or light
support. The dividing line between small
arms and artillery was thus less distinct
than that separating the two classes of
ammunition. With ammunition the diameter
the
of
factor:
projectile
everything
up
arm
another used
rifle,
carbine,
or
pistol.
Small arms also went to sea and were almost as familiar to the sailor as to the
soldier; every warship carried its store of
such weapons, ranging from
pistols to
an-
played the leading role both in plane-toplane combat and in strafing attacks on
surface targets. Easily the most outstanding
aircraft
most
gun
of
the war,
versatile,
the
Chapter
V,
same
it
basic
not
diameter
of
bore
but
was
portability-
See
mortars.
above,
for
discussion
of
SMALL ARMS
155
Navy
the
tiaircraft use."
Army
ment
item,
the
require
and
forges,
consisted
use
dies,
presses,
weapons
fewer and
of
complicated
less
parts
Mi
mechanisms. The
intricate
elaborate
or
devices
control
fire
huge
of
recoil
for example,
rifle,
together with
its
on-carriage
a standard
and
mass produced
planted
in
the
item in 1944.
M3
Thompson as a production
The semiautomatic Mi rifle
in
adopted
bine,
easily
in
Arm-
lightweight car-
production in 1941.^
fire
mass
Nevertheless,
sands.
production
of
Aid
to Britain in
ig40
had
be
to
tolerances.
cut
fire
deviation
to
rigid
be met to assure
could
machined
and
accuracy
to
weapons that
finished
and
could
little
with-
mud, and
that
way
the
fairly quickly in
basic
and
break
designs
standardized
of
1940-42 because
hostilities,
before
and
the
out-
manufacturing
Some
standard
fact,
the
M3
new
the
Mi
rifle,
the car-
Thompson submachine
gun.
The
last,
156
World War
After
some three
I,
and
machine guns had been reconditioned and
put in storage along with machinery for
their manufacture. These reserve stocks
were considered more than adequate to
meet replacement needs of the small
peacetime Army and to equip a larger
force in time of emergency.
Though
serves of aircraft
caused
re-
virtu-
little
con-
cern
Armory and
Arms Company were
Patent Fire
summer
Army
suffered
the
its
all
mer
the
Production Preparedness
million
rifles
forces."''
of
President's
for
call
50,000 airplanes
Com-
soon gave
placency
way
to
alarm,
and
.,
''
immediate increase
arms of all kinds
in the
output of small
was demanded.
But
overnight.
tions,
expansion of
cialized
facilities,
machine
installation
tools,
and
of spe-
recruitment
Apr
Ltr,
40,
CofOrd
00
to
II.
Budget Officer
1.3/7485.
of the
WD,
SMALL ARMS
157
tions of
senals
gun
and
all
ar-
kinds
file
on ground
their
After
Pearl
Harbor,
Winchester Repeating
had gone an order for
Arms
Company
hundred Mi
rifles and to Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors Corporation an
order for five hundred .30-caliber machine
guns. Ordnance had placed an order for
five hundred pistols with the Singer Manufacturing
guns or
small arms
one each for rifles and
machine guns and two for pistols.^ To the
Company
five
of Worcester, Mass.,
which had previously completed its production study on this weapon; a similar
**
and
of Worcester,
Winchester
manufacture
educational order items, but the two
Mass."*
machine guns.^
for
Harrington
the
Company
Richardson Arms
rifles,
to
fortunately
pistols,
proved of
Among
facture"
Armory
were
M2
M2
The educational
Chapter
'"(i)
II,
PP
orders program
PSP
is
76, p.
7.
discussed in
above.
76, pp.
18, 29,
53; (2)
PSP
36, U.S.
Machine Guns, Calibers .30 and .50, Development, Requirements and Production.
940-1 945.
1
158
had
be worked
to
plicated arrangements
satisfactorily
make
pistols
higher priority.
educational
Upon
order.
had a
completion of the
Singer transferred
all
to
substantial
Thompson subma-
neither plant
Richardson contract turned out badly. After two extensions in delivery date owing
to management difficulties and changes
tools
in
canceled
in
finished pistol
the
Protective
Mobilization
rifles
Plan.
In
tract
Though
not part of
^^
Ordnance plans
for
in
way
to
1939-40 helped
in a very practical
Auto Ordnance
The Netherlands
govern-
newly organized American firm with exclusive license to manufacture a new sub-
1921-22.^^
in
"
(i) Hist,
Dist, vol.
lOO, pt.
Jan 47,
OHF,
p. 10.
(i)
H'st.
sign,
wartime
role. After the outbreak of war in Europe
in September 1939, Britain, France, the
Netherlands, China, and other countries
ofTcred contracts to U.S. firms that had
experience in the manufacture of military
weapons or sporting arms. As American
manufacturers were not keenly interested
in munitions production, most such negotiations proceeded slowly during the
winter of 1939-40, and some other com-
its
29; (:0
'
Small
Activities
Lend-Lea.se
OHF.
100, pt.
tries,
Inc.
Inc.
Hist,
Springfield
Ord
Dist,
vol.
Maguire Indus-
SMALL ARMS
\59
arms Company
MarHn
Fire-
New
Haven, Conn.
More important than submachine gun
orders was the foreign demand for Browning machine guns. In the fall of 1939,
when the British government turned to
American industry for manufacture of
these weapons, it soon became apparent
that the Colt
of
Company, holder
of patent
Savage
ated.
rifles,
Arms Company
the
Arms Corporation,
High Standard Manufacturing Company,
and the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company.
plants by the Buffalo
^'"'
For
rifles
the
British
turned
to
the
rifle,
the .303-
known
Mark I) at its
Stevens Arms Com-
as the J.
company completed
quantity
started
its
production
when
first
was
rifle
in
.30-caliber Spring-
was
opening the
rifle
rifles
on hand
to
equip
years
half
Lee-Enfield
Rock
into
get
to
machinery,
Island
on
Using the
production
rifles
could
Springfields
reach
production
of
thousand
one
of
the
British
contract
ma-
this
"'
.50,
Arms
Materiel,
Buffalo
.Arms Corp..
Mar
45,
OHF.
i'(i)
Admin
WDGS
ing
Additional orders
raised
Island
ASW,
up
10
the
Memo, Lt
of
.
Open:
OASW
(2)
foi
make
to
it
the British.
for
for
Wesson
fields
July,
N.Y.,
leased to
ington use
getting
just
half
Ilion,
produce
its
Savage Arms Corporation, signing a contract with it in March 1941 for manufacture of the standard British
to
He
an objection.
finance expansion
of
1,030,228
at
Rock
Lee-Enfields
million
and
also
produced
had
321
16.
160
the U.S.
not at
Army
insisting
if
needed.
The
were
British
all
that
they wanted
only
rifles
of
conceded the
point after a delay of several months and
accepted Wesson's plan. The rental agreement was signed early in 1941, just a few
days before passage of the Lend-Lease Act
under which the Army was later to take
over all British rifle procurement in the
United States. The machinery was quickly
shipped to Ilion where manufacturing got
under way in less than a year, and continued until 28 February 1944.^^
Manufacturing capacity created to fill
foreign orders was an important resource
when the United States began to rearm in
earnest during 1941. But of greater value
were the two Ordnance arsenals, Spring.303-caliber. But they finally
and Rock
field
to share
also
Garand,
run-of-the-mill
compounded by a
were
difficulties
violent public
contro-
newspapers
across
merits of these
controversy
the
the
nation
over
the
third
semi-
Some
old,
critics
superior
to
any of the
semiautomatics;
Garand
history
intense controversy.^**
Officially
designated
"Rifle,
semiauto-
search,
it
had begun
as early as
production of the
new Garand
rifle, and
rearmament grew in
1941 its progress was
as public interest in
1940
and
closely
watched.
early
Getting the
Garand
'" (i)
Plans
into Produrtion
in
the
case
of
the
Julian
S.
SMALL ARMS
161
by an 8-round
could
clip. It
more than
With it
aimed shots
fire
could
soldier
eight
fire
all
Army Ordnance
As-
sociation
torious Service in
Armament
Garand
Engineering.
Three
years
received
an
official
for
later
at Springfield
As soon
Springfield
ing
it
in
quantity, but
Armory was
at
World War
I.
at
proved Springfield
Most
of the
rifles
machine
tools
new
ing
C.
Garand
at
work
in his
model
Merit.^^
Tooling
John
and
the
latter
fires
until
is
the
magazine
is
empty
as
held down.
"Army Ordnance
Medalists, 1941,"
Army
Pa.:
Military
Service
Publishing
162
gages were
equally time-consuming.^^
all
space,
and
operating
cost,
Ordnance
to the extent of
new
equipment and
modern produc-
rifle
quantity
of
substantial.
When
Congress
in
1938 appropriated
Ordnance
antic-
up
plant
during
Armory before
1940,
many
1935.^^
rifle. ^^
erected at the
production
tion
since
engineers from
rifle,
manufacturing
Springfield
Mi
bell,
New
for
Semi-Automatic
i,
p.
Armory Tools
Rifles,"
Machinery,
Up
vol.
-^'
FY
p.
CO
WD
OCO
Budget and
to
Col Haislip,
Clay,
11 1.3/6954.
Legislative Ping Br, 28 Jan 39,
-''
PSP 37, U.S. Rifle Cal". .30 Mi, Hist of Design, Development, Proc and Prod, 1936-45, p.
OO
55'-'
Ltr,
Wesson,
Clason, H.R.,
CofOrd,
May
40,
OO
to
Hon.
Charles
474.2/2960.
R.
SMALL ARMS
at a rate of
the
first
63
Production Troubles
order for
with
as
new
stalled
and
rise
tools
new
orders
were
in-
received,
in
When Ordnance
In the
fall
was being
Winchester
Garand
rifle
made
its
signed,
the
much
of
it
production
first
rifle.
While
the
first
-^
Memo,
necessary tools
Armory,
summer
an alternate bid
$1 million less
assuming use of tools
and equipment being procured under its
educational
order.
On
the
basis
of
this
Winchester received a contract for 65,000 Garand rifles to be completed by June 1942. As the million dollar
reduction in the second Winchester bid
was approximately equal to the cost to the
latter proposal,
Rifle
Activities
Pertinent
1794
Data
Feb
Concerning
1946,
SA
Div,
and
Plant
Ind
Serv,
OCO,
Donald
Mi,
12
Dec
44,
SA
Wesson, Ordnance
Department Procurement, 15 Jan 40, ICAF, p.
The
6; (3) Harold F. Williamson, Winchester
Gun That Won the West (Washington: Combat
Forces Press, 1952), pp. 385-88; (4) Statements
by Col Rutherford and Wesson, WDAB, 1941,
H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., 27 Feb 40 and 12 Mar
40.
Br,
164
many
suggested,
these
of
if
troubles
Garand, a
designer of the
more
But
this
closely
other
rifle,
Ordnance
officers
challenged
it
Matches. The
performance
raised doubts.
these
of
The
rifles
expert
immediately
rifle
who
shots
had assembled for the annual marksmanship contest were accustomed to using the
National Match Rifle, an improved Springfield made with extra care and painstakingly adjusted for the best results in long-
range
shooting.
Garand
Garands
rifles
To
did
these
not
experts
appeal,
the
for
the
make
not
dis-
Garand
the
adjustment.^^
their
aware of
this
an improved gas
tion at Springfield
rifle
insti-
arms shooting
Had
as
the
frankly informed,
Garand had
and opera-
^^ (i)
first
conjunc-
p.
120;
Comments on draft manuscript of this chapter by Maj Gen Elbert L. Ford (Ret.) and Maj
Gen James Kirk. (Ret.), i8 Apr 57, OHF; (3)
(2)
Lecture,
been given
to the public in the fall of 1938 with no
hint of unusual production or performance
difficulties.^^ The first public demonstration came one year later when two hundred Garand rifles were sent to Camp
Perry, Ohio, for use in the small arms
of the
cylin-
it
it,
NRA
ties
"
'
Difficul-
American
14
Mar
40.
SMALL ARMS
165
they
the
Army
and
clear
The
it."^^
up the whole
on the table
rifle issue.
of
This
official
the
suspicious in view
Melvin M. Johnson,
Reserve, had recently brought
USMC
Jr.,
forth
had
rifle
summer
in the
so that
its
barrel could
coupled
action,
with
off the
-set
ammunition. ^^ This
fireworks.
called
reported
Press
in
tee
haustive
After
failing
Army
to
or
behind
study
its
rifles
for
editorial
in
closed
doors."
^*^
from the
questions about the Garand,
test, the NRA published an
to
the
get
answers
April
1940
issue
of
range
bullet
in
together with
favor of the
152-grain bullet.
The
NRA
articles
"one
of
on the
the
subject. Life
greatest
military
^^
its
shorter
urged
129.
Gen-
Arms Di-
eral
OCM
March
22, 1940.
thor
.same
'"
"The Courage
to
November
in
the
55-56.
1940 and 1941, H.R. and
S., 76th Cong., 1st and 3d sess. See also Hearings
on S. 3983, 76th Cong., 3d sess., 14 May 40.
Excerpts from these sources are in OHF.
'^^
it
Garand
ated
article,
the
at the
in
articles
rate
and magazine
rifle
shortcomings
1939.^^
rifle
1939
out
low production
the
This
pointed
December
of
tooled.'^"'
ally
The Army
semiautomatic.
rival
tested toolroom
staff
its
Garand
Life,
Hearings
WDAB,
166
rifle
ted their
by
committees
Congressional
the
before
who
accurate,
insis-
was
tain
in
the
field,
to
other respects?
Senate
app ar
between the test of toolroom models and
large-scale production, and that estimates
of the time required to produce new
weapons in quantity were seldom fulfilled.^^ Meanwhile, a member of the U.S.
foreseen
difficulties
Senate introduced a
nearly always
bill
cited
the
rifles,
Infantry
all
.30-caliber
military
Board's
ma-
spokesmen
findings
that
because
suit-
would protect neighboring communiAdoption of the lower-powered ammunition for machine guns was defended
on the ground that the 81 -mm. mortar
eliminated the need for long-range machine gun fire; that the new ammunition
would permit longer life of barrels and
that
ties.
as Springfield
that,
placing
its
it
Garands,
or
and
the
rifle
controversy
^As examples,
Johnson,
Sr.,
13
see
May
statement
40,
of
before
Melvin
WDAB,
M.
1941,
copy in OHF.
- For
statement of Army views see Memo,
ASW to SW, 30 Aug 40,
474.2/149, and
Memo, Marshall for SW, 23 Apr 40, Hearings,
S. Mil Affairs Comm., 76th Cong., 3d sess., 29
May 40, pp. 82-85. See also Johnson's dispassionate summary in Rifles and Machine Guns,
S.,
'
00
pp. 40-45.
the
dangerous to use
Army
was being
would be unwise
to launch production of a second weapon.
Meanwhile the Marine Corps held off re-
the
to force adoption
conmiittees
of the
May
'
14
Hearings on
S.
3983,
76th
May 40.
Mi) "The Garand
Cong.,
3d
sess.,
XXI, No.
121
OO
SMALL ARMS
:67
would
used
Springfield,
zation that
tion.
The
field
in accuracy, ruggedness,
dability,
but
lead
fast
as
as
the
semiautomatics.
The
breakdown
to
be a serious contender in
the competition.
With
release
of
this
re-
oil
or water in
brewery.
until
The
the
parts
were
short
these
All
were important,
cuts
for
As
and depen-
it
and
result
of
all
these
efforts,
U.S.
troops entered
port
models,
and
output
of
Garands
rose
forged
barrel
blanks
tapered
several small
14-15;
(3)
On
503-12.
Armory,
vol.
following p.
II,
'*'''
145; Davis,
"Rifling
Machinery,
lathe
The
Report
OKD
pp.
thousand. "^^
substituted
with
PSP
Machine-Gun
vol.
OHF.
49, No. 2
Barrels by Broaching,"
59*'
II
Hist, Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk.
(1939-41), pp. 86-105. For a description of
older manufacturing techniques, .see Col. Gilbert
H. Stewart, "Springfield Armory Tools up for
New Semi-Automatic Rifles," Machinery, vol. 45,
No. 5 (July 1939)^^ Brig.
Gen. James Kirk, "Machining the
Garand Rifle," Iron As^e, vol. 151, No. 19 (May
13, I943)> 66-71.
168
sians used
Tokarev
rifle
ex-
they
1940's,
air-
because of
its
war the
a few semiautomatics
were never very effective and
The
But by the
at
it
piece.
foot troops.
a bolt-action
abandoned
Germans produced
but
and
tensively but
many
Mi 940
the
war was
anese semiautomatic in
still
rifle
World War
II
was
tack.
the Picture
to
replace
automatic
the
anti-
ary
One
to
pistol
weapon
the
for
who manned them or carried ammunition for them. The pistol was ideal
soldiers
combat
for
at
point-blank range.
It
was
manning crew-
six
it
marily as a defensive
the effective
range of the
pistol.
with
it
answer."*'
The
distinctive
a carbine
is
a light
pas.sed
the
twentieth
mounted
century,
troops.
carbines
rifle, adopted in
for
both mounted
satisfactory
proved
1903,
had
1938,
develop a .30-caliber
less,
(i)
DA
Soviet
U.S.
Army
to
SW
Jul
Shields,
R&D
Div, p. 4.
History of Small Arms Materiel, U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30, prepared by Maj. H. P. Smith and
William H. Davis under the direction of Mitchell
[1945]. This manuscript study, prepared in the
'''"
rifle
as
The
47, by
Early
early
and
with an accuracy range of three hundred
yards. Ordnance objected on the ground
I,
definition,
as
From
Flintlock to Mi, p. 172; (4) Smith, Small Arms
157-58; (5) PSP 83,
153,
of the World, pp.
Small Arms Development in World War II, Jul
features.
By
Infantry,
gas-
of the
SMALL ARMS
169
moved with
Ordnance requested
urged inventors to improve and resubmit their guns, and invited designers
that such a
this type."'^
Thereafter events
bewildering
speed.
small experimental
lots.''^
model weapons
ing
tests.
trial in
presented for
three did not
the
for
full-automatic
94
tests.
It
who had
94 Ordnance, impressed by
an improved version of Winchester's semiautomatic rifle, asked Winchester to build
a sample carbine of similar design. Fully
occupied with production of the Mi
rifle and other development work, ^Vinchester had not submitted a carbine for
the earlier tests. But in just fourteen days
after accepting Ordnance's invitation to
construct a carbine, Winchester completed
a handmade first model. Though not a
so.
In July
finished product,
it
passed
its
preliminary
tests
fire,
be
strictly
semiautomatic.
Two
of the guns
showed such promise that five toolroom models of each, embodying the improvements recommended after the tests,
were ordered. One was the Bendix Aviation
tested
J.
and
models.''^
''
(i) Record of Army Ordnance Research and
Development, vol. 2, Small Arms and Small Arms
Ammunition, bk. I, ch. 2, Jan 46, OHF; (2)
Design, Development and Production of Carbine,
Cal. .30, Jan 45, by OCO, p. i, OHF; (3) Ltr,
Cofinf to CofOrd, 25 Mar 38, sub: Weapons
and Ammo Carriers, OO 474/3991; (4) Ltr, Cofinf to TAG thru CofOrd, 16 Sep 38, sub: Light
Weapons for Ammo Carriers, OO 474/4246; (5)
Ltr, Cofinf to TAG, 15 Jun 40, sub: Carbine for
through
Infantry Soldiers, with Indorsements
i
7,
00
474.5/120.
bine,
Hist of Small
(i)
Cal.
.30,
170
that set a
new
record for
weapon develop-
September
tests,
mended
for
into
production.
The
first
GMCs
garding manufacturing
quickly agreed to share
November
Inland.
In
placed
large
contracts
and
pistols
revolvers,
56,000
BAR's."''^
In his message to
The
story
told
of
the
by Edwin
development is
Winchester exWilliamson, Winchester
carbine's
Pugsley,
Just as speed
its
knowledge with
1941,
with
Ordnance
both Win-
on
The
Production Contracts
rifles
in
briefly
of
1,600,000
hand,
OO
OCM
OCM
^''''
OUSW,
CofOrd
Nov
for Brig
Gen
Proposed
Site for Manufacture of Rifle, U.S. Carbine, Cal.
675/
.30, Mi, at Inland Mfg. Div.
21 715 Misc.; (3) Ltr, CofOrd to OUSW, 31
Oct 41, sub: Negotiated Contract (re Mi Carbine at Winchester),
160/78532; (4) Hist
of SA Materiel, U.S. Carbine, Gal. .30, pp. 16-'
Rutherford,
sub:
41,
OO
OO
17;
Hist, Cincinnati
(5)
Ord
Dist, vol.
1922-42,
pt.
I,
2,
pt.
2,
Con-
Mi
Government
for produc-
of $886,000.""
the
00
^''
of
OHF.
SMALL ARMS
Congress on 6
Roosevelt
set
171
January
President
1942,
ments
million
for
the
year
the
1942;
rifles
came
by
goal
the
for
production
1944. In addition,
be-
June
million
same 30-month
and a
and five million submachine guns. The grand total was twenty
five million weapons.*'*' Only about onethird of the rifles were for United States
half
million pistols
over
Enfields were
remaining two-thirds
forces; the
five
ands,
Even
some
for
of the
quirements:
Gen. Somervell:
a question. It
up
may
would
just
like
to ask
for
lion people,
...
it
men:
based on
really isn't
it
is
based
on
the
If
To
arms,
demands
times frantic
of friendly nations
this
achievement.
ments were
million
set
rifles,
at
Lend-lease require-
mostly
.303-caliber
Lee-
Rifle Production
^\^orld
War
II
rifle
production in the
Springfield,
the
we
of
tanks.*"'^
po.ssible
appeared high.
change at the production conference on
small arms in February 1942 illustrates
the feeling of incredulity with which some
planners viewed the post-Pearl Harbor refigures
we
So
it.
number
the
for
four
at
them.
General Moore: They are basing that on
a lot of wastage, a lot of short life for tanks,
and of course if a tank goes out, a machine
''"
Overall Requirements for War Munitions
( I
for G-4.
Program, ii Feb 42: (2) Memo,
file 104 Rifles, copy in OHF.
21 Feb 42,
"' Review of Prod Plans of the SA Div, 20 Feb
for G-4,
42. pp. 29-30. See also Memo,
21 Feb 42, wherein Patterson asked for a review
of the huge requirements for small arms, and
Memo, G-4 for USW, 23 Feb 42, wherein Somervell defended existing requirements. Both in
file 104 Rifles, and copy in OHF.
)
USW
USW
USW
USW
172
rifle
(BAR),
than
six million
more
weapon
preferred
its
front-line
the
troops,
the
lot
and
time, materials,
Just as the
first
desperate
need
manpower.
coming off
Pearl Harbor brought a
manufacture.
simplify
on
erances
outside
the
surfaces
permit
to
so
stead of forgings;
completely.
parts
required
less
More
machine-tool time.
Springfields
no
facilities.
an efTective weapon
approved for manufacture in May
1942 as Mi903A3.^'" Another change to
pride,
tor's
As noted above, manufacture of Springrifles for the British got under way
in 1941 at Remington's Ilion plant with
machinery shipped from Rock Island. But
many problems arose. Some machine tools
needed by Remington were not supplied by
the arsenal, and many were badly worn
from previous hard use. Remington had to
obtain hundreds of new manufacturing
field
Rock
newer and cheaper manufacturing processes developed since 19 18 had not been
adapted to manufacture of the Springfield
the
craftsmen had
early
days,
literally
highly
hewn
skilled
parts of the
so
eliminated
It
by bufling instead of
finishing of forgings
was
In
production.
rifle.
speedier
for
Arms Corporation.
niques from
skilled
pieces were
speed
but
still
came
production
later
when
tests
groove
continued
production
without
change.*''^
"- (i)
Hist, Rochester
C'oiitractor
Histories
Ord
Dist, vol.
Summary
100,
Migo;? and
Remington Arms
by Remington Arms Co.,
Ilion
Works
9 May 4',,
Mitchell, Hist,
Materiel,
U.S.
9.
Migoij.'X;}
Co., Inc.,
of the
SA
[3t.
Produc-
Report,
Inc.;
Rifle
(2)
Cal.
.:^o
(3)
Ltr,
Rochester
44,
sub:
Historical
00
(i)
Cal. .30
Mi 903
[1945],
SA
p.
Materiel,
31;
(2)
U.S.
OCM
Rifle
19053,
SMALL ARMS
173
rifles
of Syra-
was
for
to be completed by
Smith-Corona subcontracted with twenty other firms for minor
components. Production was hampered by
the fact that Remington had not completed its redesign work before SmithCorona started production. A continuous
series of design changes marked the production period, with one change order in
July 1943 affecting practically every com-
order for
280,000
December
1943.
ponent."^
By the
fall
Springfields
for
Smith-Corona,
Mi 903
writers.
tors
rifles,
after
completing
234,580
was
1,318,951
Mi 903
rifles
of
all
August
to
ment
apparcntK
on receivers stopped
New
sufficient
ing
the
to
drafting
of
several
experienced
Garand Production
The requirement
In the
fall of
production
of
far short of
of complete interchange-
Garands
day
per
it
fell
It had
and then
meeting requirements.
day,
15 Oct 42; 191 29, 4 Nov 42; (3) Ltr, Maj Sam
Marshall, OCO, to CO, Springfield Armory. 23
Oct 42, sub: Two Groove Rifling for Rifle Barrels,
474.4/802; (4) Juliui S. Hatcher, Hatcher's
Notebook (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service
Publishing Company, 1947), pp. 7, 17.
00
Board,
tion.
in
Production
types.*''
Lag
War
"'
100, pt. 9.
Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, vol.
the
Production at
Contractor Histories Rifle
Syracuse Plant of L. C. Smith & Corona Typewriters, Inc. during World War H, 14 May 45.
by Harold McD. Brown.
"''
(i) Whiting, Statistics, Proc sec, 9 Apr 52,
p. 47; (2) PP 76, Small Arms and Small Arms
Ammunition, Design, Development and Procurement 1917-45. Jun 45, pp. 6-10.
\s an example, see Ltr, Col G. A. Woody,
Springfield Armory, to CofOrd, 25 Feb 41. sub:
''*'
Expansion of
copy in OHF.
Mi
Rifle
Prod,
OO
400.12/4138.
174
Table
15
of
Weapon
Quantity
4,014,731
1,318,951
188,380
1,030,228
6,117,827
sniper models)
Carbines, .30-caliber
^^
such interchangeability was not required.
tional order in
jduring
the
1940-42 period was a major disappointment in the Ordnance record. The weapon's high quality was not matched by a
sufficiently
end of 1943.
^^
{Table 75)
no
single
deficit,
plant
five
for them.
could be offset
Springfields
1942 shortage
by speeding production of
Part of the
and by
As
meet the whole
plants were placed
to be lined up.
could
smaller
of
Fisher
the
Company
Rochester
of Hartford,
Defense
Conn.; and
Corporation
of
Most
Carbines
had
ditional producers
N.Y.*'^
See General Report on Small Arms Produc18 Mar 43, by War Projects Unit, Bur of
the Budget, pt. VII, copy in OHF.
''^
Manufacturing and inspection techniques are
discussed below in Chapter XIV; in Hist, Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk. II, 1939-41, pp. 100104; and in PSP 76. For conservation of materials,
see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planninn
"''
tion,
OUSW
in
History,
Ord
Dist, vol.
100, pt. 3
Contractor
Histories.
SMALL ARMS
typewriters;
175
yet
all
No
cessful.
new
producers
company's plant at
for Saginaw
it.^^
necessary.
Integration Committees
With
so
many
prime
contractors,
production
discussed
problems, and gradually worked out procedures for interchange of ideas, raw ma-
later
signing
tember,
its
contract,
followed
by
of the
Underwood-Elliott-
Fisher and Rock-Ola in November. Although the November 1942 Army Supply
Program made deep cuts in most items,
the drop in carbine requirements was
slight and the need for additional pro-
terials,
took the
name
of industry integration
both of
of
General
whom
Motors
Corporation,
wave brought
the total of
group.
Inland,
producing,
the
became
first
the
plant
leader,
Of
to
this
start
making
its
manufacturing
techniques
along
with
drawings and specifications for tools, jigs,
and fixtures. Because of its close contacts
with gage manufacturers. Inland was
awarded a contract for procurement of
gages for the entire carbine program. ^^ Of
all the carbine contractors, the only one
that failed to produce was Irwin-Pederson.
After this concern experienced many pro-
Manufacturing Co.,
'-
troit
Ord
Dist,
374-Ord-i548
OO
474.5/7279.
Gen James
20
with
Mar
W-
43,
CMC
OO
of
GMC,
marked Hist
of
Carbine Cal.
44,
filed
.30,
OHF.
in
folder
Jul
176
ward C. Franklin
as
in the
(left);
sembled and
tractors.
cuss
six
changes
weeks to
that
dis-
would
speed
district offices
ity
tests
of
inspection
on the standardization
procedures
at
the
various
special
at
ties
the
tested.^*
problem
insistence
of
the
steel
mills,
'
and
activities of the
commit-
SMALL ARMS
177
Completed Carbines,
MI,
.30-caliber
are checked by
company
bly line.
Raw
To
deal
Materials Facil-
lished
and operated
under contract
Brace-Mueller-Huntley, Inc.
contractors,
together
with
The
by
carbine
machine gun
The
orders placed
Raw
:anceled
after the
with the
steel
mills.
iflective.^^
had to be substituted
for carbines.
But
in
for
the deficit
to
make 1944
The end
rate of
pp.
Warehouse
for
Supply
of
00
Steel
for
SA Mfg,
160/1 17290; (3) Planning Sheets, Equipment Sec of ASP, by SA Div, Ind Serv, 15 Jun
42, p. 4
and
15
Sep 42,
p.
1.
178
producing
in
its
M2
The
matic
fire.
called,
carbine,
as
at
it
was
Inland in
April 1944 and at Winchester the following month. By April 1945, with the col-
German
War
left
the
of
contract
first
After award
I.
early
in
1942
this
of
tools,
skilled workers,
and mistakes
But
drawings.^^
production
in
Ordnance
began
early
sight,
Mi
lapse
of
all
resistance
in
fire."^
few weeks
The
BAR
Browning automatic
machine gun was
part
rifle,
after
rifle
part
familiarly
in
1920's
and
the
only
about
placed with
carbines,
IBM
rifles
19 18
Machine Guns
With about 140,000 machine guns
over from World
'"
tion at Springfield
War
I,
the
Army
felt
left
no
New
twenty thousand
list.^^
.50,
in stock.
contract
the
six
requirements dropped
1930's,
diate
Ordnance terminated
and
The
later
May
Jul 44 to
'''*
and
vol.
100, pt. 6.
""Hist,
Dist,
H,
i)t.
i,
[>,-2--]-].
SMALL ARMS
179
urgent
F. Burton,
the 1920's
and
early 1930's.
As time went
the
various
Vickers, Marlin,
given
new
cooled)
one
designations,
and
M1919A4
M1917A1
(water-
(air-cooled).
The
it
World War I
attending a
left:
Val A. Browning.
and William
Edwin
Pugsley,
C. Roemer.
it
made production
studies
on
outstanding
The
AA
'**'
(
vol. I, pt.
IV;
(2) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 178; (3)^?? 36, U.S. Machine
Guns, Cahbers .30 and .50, Development, Requirements and Production 1940-45, Jul 45, pp.
37~38; (4) PSP 36. The latter, a 268-page typed
study,
is
the best
production data.
single
gun
180
Browning guns, both .30-caliber and .50caliber, and contributed to the preparation
of descriptions of manufacture.
Rock Island
installed
In
1939
production
line
guns
at the rate of
twenty
five
per day,^^
Arms Company
of Utica,
all
latest
firms
designs.
Ordnance
Thus,
released
its
machine gun
total
production capacity created during the deperiod for the U.S. Army and its
was considerable. By Pearl Harbor,
Ordnance had contracted for annual production of some 430,000 .30-caliber and
300,000 .50-caliber guns, and ten plants,
including Rock Island, were in production,
piercing,
When
The
Roosevelt
AA
mounted on 37-mm.
"Forget everything
told
his
else,
staff
earlier:
carriages as
Wesson had
zl
gun on every
it
goes,
want a gun
for
.50-caliber
to be followed
by an
new production
for
gun program
aircraft
reached
its
guns,
747,000
at
announced
his "must" program in January 1942, he
called for the production of 500,000 machine guns each year for the next two
years. The War Munitions Program of
President
{Table
fense
allies
incendiary ammunition.
set
to
year
plus
**'
machine guns
Hist,
Rock
Island
Arsenal,
(191B-39),
59-60.
**"
Review
of
SA
Div,
20
Feb
42, p. 20
^'
Memo, USW for Glancy, 4 May 42; (2)
Memo, ASF Prod Br for USW, 9 May 42, sub:
Caliber .50 A A Machine Guns and Mounts; (3)
Memo, Maj Gen Campbell for Glancy, 9 May 42,
(
AA
sub:
Caliber
ASF
(4)
""^
.50
AA
All
in
10 Jan
Prod Div,
Div,
ASF
SMALL ARMS
181
Table
Size
16
IVIachine
Gun Production,
1940 1945
182
the
British Sten
M3
went to another General Motors division, Guide Lamp, with Buffalo Arms
Corporation making the
bolt.
the "grease
gun"
inside
of
the
barrel.
rifling
The
on
barrel's
its
than
less
to
fit
precision-made
Thompson
cheap mass
for
making
unskilled labor,
possessed,
means whereby he
In contrast to the
into a briefcase.
signed
of
the
M3
was de-
production
full
use of
with
stamped
own
its
as a
weapon
prob-
man-
February
planned
1944
instead
of
stopping
as
some
number
of
Thomp-
sons and
Mi's combined.^**
In making M3's, Guide Lamp adopted
an
entirely
new
process
for
rifling
of
many manufacturing
so
his
1943.
After a century of neglect the rocket had
There were
in
it
up,
made
its
original
of the simplest
pieces of
tially of
diameter,
and simple
sights.
When Ordnance
first
the
hooked
more or
less
automatic broach-
23
Development,
inserted in each
vol. 2, bk.
PSP 40;
i.
Statistics, PR-8.
"Novel Methods Speed Manufacture of M3
Submachine Gun," American Machinist, vol. 88,
'*'*
it
(i)
(2)
Whiting,
'^"
Armament
Section
(May
11,
1944).
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 328-30. See also PP 79, The
Bazooka, OHF. Production of rockets is treated in
Chajjter VI, above.
'"'
SMALL ARMS
183
zookas
it
working
models
for
Ordnance;
by
test
Ordnance
did
threw
all its
terials
and
give
approval.
GE
Then
ma-
setting
from
many
with
technical
production
its
departments;
skills
lines;
office
went
to
workers
work
on
and foremen
a hand when-
executives
in
Battlefield
1944.
number
of design
deflectors
to
reports
dictated
protect
the
gunner against
inch bazooka.
to fire the
2.36-
wire to reinforce
it
against detonation of
rocket
stituting
firing
hand
grip,
and, in the
fall
of
1943, the
own
problems,
but,
as
the
bazooka en-
General
Electric's
Bridgeport works,
though making use of more than one
hundred subcontractors, carried the production load almost single-handedly for the
first
two
years,
^^ "Development
and Production of Rocket
Launchers" by the General Electric Co., a con-
100, pt.
I,
pp.
Ord
Dist, vol.
The
Bazooka, OHF, concludes its coverage of this incident by stating that GE met the deadline with
79 minutes to spare! See also John Anderson
Volts at
War (New York:
Miller, Men and
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947), pp. 105-09.
^- Hist,
p. 4.
Springfield
Ord
Dist,
vol.
100,
pt.
i,
184
War
Smaller
production sched-
but
ules,
in
1944-45
an excellent rec-
M9A1
GE
both
GE
launcher.
May
1945
last
months
mm.
recoilless
at
rifles
57-mm. and
Aberdeen
in
75Sep-
stick.
name
did not
fifty
thousand.
^"^
Recoilless Rifles
Though
century
came
old,
draft of
less
its
application
practical
war
rifle
research.
put
artillery
The 57-mm,
fire
power
recoilin
the
new
type
of
weapon
for
the
artillery-type
75-mm.
explosive
shells.
The
rifle
artillery
dis-
no U.S. facilities to
manufacture the 57-mm. weapon were
available, a contract went through the Detroit district to the Dominion Engineering
Works in Canada. An order for the 75's
went to the Miller Printing Machinery
Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., and by
March, 1945, production was under way
reported that
tricts
without serious
one hundred
European
difficulties.
recoilless
theater
Approximately
reached the
rifles
mid-March
in
1945,
six
results.
Before
infantry's
fired
in
of
might
of honors they
"' Ibid.
the
Springfield
third by
'^
(
Cheney Bigelow.
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning
Munitions
for
War,
pp.
;v^o-3i;
(2)
OCM
T15E
OHF;
(:5)
search
ment,
Nov
55,
OHF.
SMALL ARMS
185
S4r
1,238
75's
and 951
57's
had been
on Okinawa,
whole war,
ities
of
were made
at
Flannery Bolt
from
Miscellaneous Items
helmets,
accepted.^^
pistols,
June 1945.
con-
Company
The
The company
il-
took
during 1942 and 1943 to train new workers, acquire needed tools, and build up
production. Just as its production line was
shifting into high gear at the
end of 1943
After
company's order was
production
Avorkers had been laid off and
virtually halted, the company received an
slashed.
the
request
urgent
95
from
Ordnance
in
the
Prod reds
Red
of
vol.
2,
Rene
bk.
R.
3,
Spec
Studler,
Weapons,
"They
OHF;
Give
and Col.
Field-Artillery
XXIX,
-33-
186
spring of 1944 to restore and even increase
its former rate of production.
Ordnance
over-all
mand
requirements,
pistol
but the
de-
remained
strong throughout 1944. Almost two million pistols were produced during the war,
plus 889,000 .38-caIiber revolvers, most of
the latter by Smith and Wesson, Inc.
Among small arms items, not including
ammunition, steel helmets chalked up a
for
nevertheless
pistols
the
of the famous
shallow
switch to a
new
Cord
fair
eventually
manganese
only
324,000
livered
five
special
flyer's
steel.
in
Mc-
problem of
helmets of tough Had-
solved
mass-producing
field
the
1940-41,
million
in
McCord
1942.
de-
Meantime
two years
that
air
of the
of
body movement
for
protec-
out in August
cepted
ment.
the eyes of
ists,
plied
to
fighting
considerable
of the
troops.
satisfaction
from
battle
re-
at a critical time
nance a
freedom
tion.^
war
vests,
also
during the
as experience
ap-
went
last
showed
"'
studies
of
this
subject
in
OHF,
Aitchison
titled
and
(i)
The
Story
for
SMALL ARMS
187
World War
II,
only
air.
the
But
either
the
as
work
Though
far less
was not
same
precision metal
seems only
without them
roseate,
war production would have been more difficult than it was and the eventual production of some two and a half million
machine guns, six million carbines, and
over six and a half million rifles would
have taken much more time.
the
picture
all
exacting
task
that
arms was an
demanded
essentially
CHAPTER IX
Small
Arms Ammunition
World War II the trend toward fasterfiring weapons continued, including all
types and sizes but advancing most among
the
magnitude
duction
of small
may
be gained by comparing
it
artillery
could
automatic
fired
World War
procured by Ordnance
in
would have
turies.
lasted
for
II
{Table ly)
The huge
quantities of
War
ammunition
re-
II dramatically re-
rifle
easily
Mi,
fire
15-round
U.S.
an 8-round
clip
could be
platoon
plane in World
or
War
individual
bombing
II possessed as
much
the
During
could
late
one
matic carbine a
in
insatiable.
Armed
.30-caliber
infantryman could
procurement
shots
of
clip in half
new
hundreds
fire
minute, the
the
nineteenth
it
was not
century
that
until
the
7.
fire
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
Table
17
189
Size
Rounds]
190
or steaming jungle, without malfunctions
nance
and without
demand
formance.
was used
during
the
rounds
ammunition held
in
19 19,
and
1930's,
gradually
small
each year
training
in
1920's
remaining
and the
deteriorated
about one
little
rounds
billion
in
19 19
to
long,
slow
process
of
attrition
was one
munition that
proach of war
developed
shipment of
rifle
with
the
ap-
in
summer
ammunition
of 1940
by
to the hard-
The
transfer of
.30-caliber
138,000,000 rounds of
ammunition
from
slice
nearly 25 per-
United States
stock. A later shipment brought the total
for British aid up to 188,000,000 rounds
before passage of the Lend-Lease Act in
March 1941. The first shipment was paid
for through the U.S. Steel Export Company on a "cash-and-carry" basis; for
the second shipment the British agreed to
release fifty million rounds of new ammunition from their Remington contract to
replace the old ammunition received from
the United States."* But, regardless of the
method of reimbursement, transfer of this
materiel seriouslv
weakened the Ordcent
Just at the
moment
that
Dwindling Reserves
Of
position.
the
aid to Britain.^
the
fall
of
1940 for
existing
OO
bringing
new
191
was a
of
cials
the
ernment
new
gov-
drawn up
name
new
part
Navy
the arsenals.
all
work
relief projects
all sorts,
to
modernize
powder
facilities for
complete new
section.
storage
production,
.45-caliber
and
and
to
.30-
and
build
manufacturing
purchased
also
.50-caliber
The
arsenal
by hunters, farmers,
three
outstanding
examples,
pre-
tion,
cial
(
sentatives
conferred frequently
with
offi-
drew up plans
"^
Abundance
In
model plant
descriptions of manufacture,
and
On Time,
p.
ii.
esti-
This
tion
booklet,
OHF.
The
SAA,
I,
p. 69.
49 and pp. 70-71. See also comments on draft of this chapter by Maj Gen James
Kirk (Ret.), 6 Apr 57, OHF.
^
SAA,
I,
p.
192
made
gency.'^
arms ammunition under the Educational Orders Act in fiscal years 1940
and 94 1. Ten of these went to the Rem-
Britain in
Company
Arms
for
.30-caliber
tracer,
.50-caliber
Western
tracer,
Cartridge
caliber ball
and
Company
for
.30-
made
rounds.
million
educational
production
orders,
but
hundred
course,
education
for
was
of
not
industry;
Although not
small
ington
firms played
U.S.
an important part
portant.^"
ington
in
1939 and 1940. Orders for
machinery that had been developed and
tested at Frankford were placed not only
with the old line companies such as
Waterbury-Farrel and E. W. Bliss but with
builders
many
in
others
who
chinery.'*
most significant
ma-
result of these
of France,
ment had
ment
fall
for
plete
of
com-
made
the
in
preparing American industry for war production. Beginning in 1939, small pur-
New
to
Winchester plant
in
in
Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
of
new
facilities
for
for
making small
making armor-
measures,
specialists,
"SAA,
Arsenal,
I,
in
the
ammuni-
I, pt. I,
'
I,
pp. 2 If)- 6 lists all the production machinery
venders who supplied Ordnance in World War II.
'-'
For details on machinery procurement, see
SAA, I, pp. 20off, and Hist, Frankford Arsenal,
1
I, pt. I,
pp. 35-36.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
Table
18
Year
"
193
194
In reply, General Wesson reviewed the
steps already taken to increase the capacity
Frankford
of
The
plants.
commercial
more new
once, he pointed out, was
over
take
way
only
production at
to
and
Arsenal
the
to gain
contracts
British
with
The
months.
British contracts
for
it
but
posal
to
build
three
new
plants.
They
Wave
of
first
loaded cart-
ridges
estimate.
The
site for
plaint,
miles
roads,
railroad
of
and 15 miles of
a railroad station,
track,
miles
of
fencing.^*
expansion
The
First
Wave
Ordnance drew up
government
(GOCO)
study,
owned, contractor
plants.
followed
agencies,
the
in progress
by
sites
After
much
approval
were
operated
intensive
various
of
selected
Lake
ern
111.
to
Reming-
to be $65,000,000.
Cartridge
(i)
sub:
p.
**
205.
supply
the
under one
SAA,
'''
decision
roof.
The
I, pp. 270-84.
For details on
to
put
subject
all
is
construction
core production
also treated in
First
Wave
plants
195
were
all
in
jor
all
all
during
94 1,
new
while
they
plants could
come
to the rescue.
It
where contractor
personnel were trained in methods of proas a school
also served
was in extremely
was the most critical class
Ordnance procurement. Both
short supply. It
of items in
G 4 and
repeatedly urged
Ordnance
to
War
open new
deterrent
troops."
^^
to
and equipment of
arms plants was given an
construction
situation,
A-
the small
1
-a
priority
May
in
1941,
only
the
in the spring of
ington
plant
operate
to
Lake
Salt
at
which covered
Utah
the
To
City.
staff
thousand
this
acres,
facility,
the
follows:
is
most
critical.
The
existing stocks
quirements.^
General Wesson
and General Somervell that the shortage of
small arms ammunition was being presented to him from day to day and that
company
recruited
and
.45-caliber,
caliber,
SAA,
.50-caliber,
I,
p.
153-
should be noted that small arms ammuniwas only one part of Frankford's responsibility. The arsenal was also a center for development
and production of artillery ammunition and fire
-^ It
tion
control apparatus.
--
Memo,
ASW
for
CofOrd,
10
OO
471.4/504.
Expediting Prod of SA Ammo,
For G-4 opinion, see Memo, G-4 for CofOrd,
23 Sep 40, sub: Prod of SA Ammo. G-4 file
317732^ Memo, Patterson for Wesson, 2 Jul 41,
OO
471.4/1337.
24
Harris,
Ammo,
ping these three plants was a little more than
$250,000,000. SAA, I, table opposite p. 114.
five
Drewry
Memo,
May
00
ANMB
for Brig
sub:
Priority
41,
Gen Charles
(2)
471.4/988;
Ind Serv, 13
for Chief of
SA Ammo,
T.
Rating for SA
Memo, Lt Col
OO
May
41, sub:
47 1.41/ 1002.
196
plants
Twin
scarce
industrial area
experience
Federal
Minn.,
contracted
operate
to
the
Ohio.
ron,
had forced curtailment of its normal operations, this concern was able to place part
of
its
they
pleted,
duction
brought
up
capacity
and
.30-caliber
caliber.""
Steel
total
to
140,000,000
AP
cores for
for
these
new
machine tools and building matewas not easy. For the First Wave,
rials
been built
quickly
even
machine-tool
if
Shortage
.50-
ammunition
all
during
of
management
experienced
was another major bottleneck. It was estimated that in 1940 there were in the
United States less than one hundred men
Willys-Overland Company.
In 1940
brass
able to produce
by the
requirements
tion
all
time
Ordnance
for
time
became more
clearly
apparent.
made arrangements
new brass mills to be
therefore
building four
and
operated
under
cost-plus-fixed-fee
American,
vere.
plants
undertaken, but
in
selection
of
these
sites,
see
memo
for
SAA,
II,
new
brass strip
after
On
-''
record by E.
was
also
became
acute.^^
OO
bell
to
Brig
Gen Charles T.
Harris,
23
Nov
40,
Volumes VIII-IX.
Ordnance
Plant,
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
197
not believe
determining
officers
matter,
many
they
for
the
recalled
failure
ing the
last
this
of
"Dur-
in the
attempted
tion,
records
production
its
of
combined
and the
them ever
felt
its
that taxing
ammunition
capacity would jeopar-
considering
defense
mended
capacity
G-4,
Ordnance
that
at
Colonel
once,
per would be
Hayes
He
difficult
acting
(estimated to cost
Management
facilities
for
to obtain
but did
copper expected to
amount
November
seriously
cur-
tailing
the
Under
Secretary's Office
opinion
his
that
curtailment
of
''OMemo, CofOrd
USW,
for
18
Apr
41,
sub:
00
World War
WD
.
41,
50.
Bd,
28664-104,
26
00
Ref
62.
Hayes,
for
WD
sub:
Ref
II,
Book
i.
OUSW,
for
15
Oct
SAA,
Ammo,
J.
12,
Facilities Bd,
Facilities
all
recom-
create additional
including
then
Harris,
for
by
aid.^^
firmed
and
General
copper.^^
civilian
the
even
in
iterated
without
question"
nearly 18 percent of
of
this
industry beyond
in
led General
He
factor
^^
that,
should be undertaken.
it
Facilities Bd,
.
Ammo,
WD
See also
Memo, G-4
Sep
41,
47 1.4/2 169,
for
198
shortage and pointed out again that existing plants, even operating twenty-four
of incoming
duced by the
doubting the
men
million
in the field
and would
1942. "By reason
struction
in
start
of shipping difficulties
One new
Twin
Company
Cities.
at
AP
Edison
G.
Appliance
E.
to
While
waves.^^
these
were
steps
being
probable that an American army of 4,000000 men will engage in combat within the
and Secretary Patterson redemands for more ammunition. "The combat forces need .50-caliber
ammunition more than anything else," he
wrote late in December. "The need is
There is no time
urgent and pressing.
alone,"
month period
of
lines
will
permit
filling
up the
an additional year."
They argued that no new plants were
.
sufficient
needed,
except
for
possibly
for
items,
new
special
validity of the
their
would not
see
that
four
men
million
combat overseas
in
1942,
Day
of
be reduced by as
much
as
75
percent,^^
November
directive.
To
the Small
and economic-
and
to
expand
new
ones
Pearl Harbor,
doubled
his
to lose."
3*
Memo, CofOrd
for
USW,
OO
WD
8
.
Oct
41, sub:
Ammo, and
00
Memo, CofOrd,
for
USW,
17
Nov
41, sub:.
OO
381/
Ping Rules for the Victory Program,
48577 and ExecO files. See also Ltr, Brig Gen Guy
H. Drewry (Ret.) to Thomson, 26 Jan 54, OHF,
stating, "I thought the small arms ammunition
requirements were unrealistic and excessive from
the beginning."
^" The capacity of each plant had been conservatively estimated in advance without operating
experience to show what might be accomplished
by adapting conveyorized production to previous
Remington and Frankford procedures.
'''
(i) Hist, Core Program, pp. 15-17; (2)
SAA, n,
p.
281.
SAA,
(i)
statement of
I,
this
USW
00
199
Harbor Requirements
services
were
forty-five
of
mid-November
new
facilities,
machine
the availability of
the
tools,
The
came
British
ammunition
them
sidered
but
plants,
"unrealistic
new
in vain to
he remarked
days,"
treason
practically
question
to
later,
"it
was
anything
^^
attitude
among
the
high-level
only
was the
tediously
for
limit.
computations
and generous
estimates.
December and
Day
vealed
the
combat."
Under
^^
this
Commander
Chief,
in
requirements
for
who
of
was
as chief of
responsible for
and
felt
the
that
Presidential
advisers,
were
jitters
suffer-
and were
to
when
that
the
new
plants
came
into pro-
the
^^ Interv with
but
in
accurate
quick
it
thousand
New
Dec
on
referring
Jan 42,
Harris, Jr.,
Hayes
declared
formulated in
December 1941 were "staggering" and were first
presented to Ordnance during a long night conference on 30 December 1941. See also memo
the
new production
in
January
that
to
this
USW
conference,
Hayes
for
USW,
Ammo.
General Drewry's
opinion that the requirements were too high is
expressed in letter to the author, 26 January
1954,
104,
files
OHF.
*^
Dec
the
USW
Memo,
OUSW
Madigan
200
plants were unnecessary,
would be a waste of money and materials,
and would not be able to operate for lack
of copper. But these pleas were out of
tune with the prevailing Washington mood,
and in mid-February, when G-4 commented on the Ordnance memo of 17
NoN'cmber, the existing Day of Supply and
the over-all ammunition requirements were
that additional
"The
upheld.
lines
the
equivalent
three
of
new
These
Fourth Wave,
could produce during 1943 about 5,500,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber or 3,240,000,000 rounds of .50-caliber. G-4 was
plants
new
to
lines,
known
as
of the year.*^
the
ber and
type.
tires,
chusetts,
Allegany
the
Plant
in
Company
Maryland,
U.S.
sin.
new cup
by
operated
plant in
Detroit,
Parker-Wolverine
the
fall.
be
to
Com-
Contrary to
production
been reached. [See Illustration) The designed capacity of these plants was about
twenty billion rounds per year, but their
cali-
lines
^- (i)
Intervs with
Harris,
Jr.,
ExecO
files;
(3)
Memo, CofOrd
for
OUSW,
10
The
80-line
.30-caliber
ammunition,
51
of
to
increase
existing
the
It
lines
was deby
capacity
and by
formerly
made
candy,
textiles,
rubber
For
detailed
reports
of
the
discussions
of
this
SAA,
II, p.
354.
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
Location
Cumberland, Md.
202
maximum
capacity
actual
was
to
close
Coming
Fourth
facture
ments
contract
ton to
Cincinnati, Ohio,
tion,
and
in late
Corporation
body plant
that
"living
thirty billion.''^
to
agreed
to
billion
September,
in
increases in .50-caliber
Wave
Fourth
and
convert
in
idle
the
were more than half built, substantial cuts were made in requirements.
With .30-caliber, for example, requirements for 1942 production were cut back
from 8.6 billion in March 1942 to 4.8
billion in
its
Before
plants
.45-caliber
January
stove." ^^
the
quired for
summer of 1942
Kings Mills Plant was converted to
.30-caliber
carbine cartridges.
Between
The
mitted
Fifth
Wave
the
Company
ville
Plant
for
it
for
one of
As
*^
War
all
other
Cities,
fically
directed
plants.
in
June
to
freeze
their
Interim Rpt on
loss
of
over
thousand rounds
June
1942.*^
one
hundred
in
the single
Magnesium was
eighty-five
month
so
scarce
SA Ammo,
26 Dec 44, by
471.4/
1943 the Scioto
OO
Eau
and
Claire.
^Memo, CofOrd
for
CG SOS
Review
ExecO
Jun
of
42.
Prod Plans,
SA
Br,
16
Dec
42,
file.
^^
Memo, Col Drewry for Chief, Ind Serv,
Jun 42, sub: Prod and Rqmts of SA Materiel,
and attached buck slip, both in OHF; (2) SAA,
I
I, p.
of
as July
1943
tract
of 1942, as
early
^'
178.
Review
T676A.
of
Prod
Plans,
SA
Br,
16
Dec
42,
203
The recommendations
under construction.
Kenosha
Wave.
Kings
Mills
was
shifted
canceled
from
entirely;
.45-caliber
twenty
lines;
to
down
$500
million
for
buildings
and
equip-
made
where the
the
fee
would be
raised
or
to
achieved
in
producing
by industry
foundation for
costs,
effectively.^*
were further
integration
tied together
committees.
The
was
1940 when Remington and Western,
with Ordnance approval and encouragement, agreed to use identical machinery
in the new plants they were to operate.
This was long before industry integration
com.mittees were formally established in
1942. Remington and Western were soon
this co-operative effort
laid in
and
jackets, tools
Rubber,
U.S.
Cartridge,
Kelly-Springfield,
Chrysler,
of-
difficulties,
exchange
information.
of
Arsenal.
Division
Under
in
Washington,
it
Arms
co-ordinated
small
in
St.
GOCO
^'-
(i)
Memo
sub:
Jul 42,
OHF;
incls,
(2)
SAA,
I,
pp.
lySflF;
(3)
Hist,
Six
GOCO
204
work
tries,"
Small
"It
is
various participating
of the
the
states
Arms Branch.
and distinguished."
history
official
indusof
the
^^
representative
was the
GOCO
plants making
was only onefifth the number of artillery ammunition
plants and works, for it included no smokeless powder or TNT plants, no chemical
works like Baytown, nor any loading plants
comparable to Kingsbury or Cornhusker.
As smokeless powder for rifle and machine
gun cartridges was required in comparatively small quantities it was obtained from
the powder plants built for artillery ammunition. High explosives such as TNT
and RDX were not used at all in small
arms ammunition. Nor did manufacture of
small
arms
of
ammunition
caliber
cartridges
making
plants for
cases,
require
shells,
separate
fuzes,
employer of labor
or
four years
it
incendiary types.^^
case, primer,
normally
was
size,
made
and
thousands
of
workers
including
as
many
came
steel
wire,
Description of Manufacture
was
case
except for
The
the
explosive.
it
When
powder
propellent
in
and
the
bullet
by the
struck
ignited
The
case.
slug covered
governing
tions
mouth
had
its
to
of
meet
weight,
soft
and was
the case. Each
small
The
bullet.
of brass and,
of these parts
Each
at St. Louis, as at
sembling
rounds.
the
complete
in
ammunition
was accepted by Ordnance on the day
after Pearl Harbor, and during the next
The number
largest
Louis area.
St.
small
production process.
the
of
steel
rigid specifica-
shape,
lineal
measurements, and exterior finish specifications that had been worked out during
^^ (i) SAA, I,
pp. 342-484; (2) History of all
Committees.
Small-Arms
Industry
Integration
Both volumes contain many letters from small
arms ammunition contractors describing the work
of the committees and praising their usefulness.
See also, for specific data on each committee,
McMullen, Industry Integration Committees.
''
History, St. Louis Ordnance Plant, OHF;
(2) Bullets by the Billion, a pamphlet for employees and visitors issued by the St. Louis i)lant
in 1943, copy in vol. VI of plant history. For
related data on ammunition see
9-1900, 18
Jun 45, and Bullets by the Billion issued by the
(
TM
Operations within the St. Louis Ordnance Plant, largest of the small arms ammunition facilities, may be cited as fairly
OOP
years of experiment
205
rounds
firing millions of
of
proof ranges.^^
came
Cartridge brass
to the
form of long
thickness.
Company's
at East Alton,
111.,
The
of cellophane tape.
first
in the
huge
coiled like
strips
Louis
St.
rolls
operation
Louis was
flattened
it
end of the
and
the
The
step in cart-
that
stamped on
case,
far
It
simultaneously
that
cup
machine
stamped out round disks and formed them
into cups. These cups were then washed,
dried, and placed in furnaces to relieve
stresses and strains developed during the
cupping process. If not relieved, these
metallurgical pressures might cause the
case to crack during later manufacturing
operations
or
during
transferred
later
manufacture
this
Ordnance
storage.
phase of
cartridge
cision
narrow
holes
into
revolving
in
dial
that
ex-
primer.
first
punched a
then
insertion of the
for this purpose
seated
primer
the
pocket,
make
ment
to
during annealing.
of
surface
To wash
rinsed again,
they
The
bullets
to
after
be
annealed,
each operation to
at
St.
Louis
were
The
number
simplest type of
ammunition was
ball,
The
defects;
inside
after
used
present
no difficult manufacturing
problems. But in fact their fabrication in-
cations.
and
with powder
to
proper length,
filled
bullets.
volved a
its
to
into place.
it
water,
cold
the
and
outside
them
diameter,
for length,
and
wall
TM
206
caliber
The
and
essential
.45-caliber
had
material
ball
in
.30-
bullets
was
to be covered with
made
of gilding
operation,
to
making
cartridge
fit.
facil-
a carryover
McQuay-
core-making
sisted of
this
process
in its
ity
to insure
Company
scries of
the
AP
Norris
disks
^^
The
use of the
from
earlier days
when
spherical bul-
World War II
to describe bullets of plain lead, or soft steel and
lead combined, and to distinguish them from
bullets of a specialized nature such as AP, inlets
were standard.
cendiary, or tracer.
It
was used
in
case.
207
filled
with smokeless
mouth was
i.e.,
the edge
into
The
rolled so that
it
part of the
the
of
bit
case
velocity tests
dipped into
The
Louis Episode
St.
it
faulty
AP,
Powder was
Louis
plant
paper,
the
Shells
Pass
as to type
red
Tyson
of the plant
site.
manufacture and
watched for
imperfections that might cause trouble
when a cartridge was fired. With the aid
of mirrors and magnifying glasses some
All along the line of
assembly,
looked
company
for
inspectors
surface
defects
while
others
For
Louis
plant
precision
used
over
sixteen
the
St.
thousand
gages
more than
purposes
inspection
half a million
When
dollars.
through
machine
that
automatically
from each
lot for
thorough inspection
nance considered
known
this
as "quality control,"
made
countless
Ord-
lot.
sampling technique,
ready
sam-
adequate be-
company had
inspections
al-
during
appeared
St,
in
news-
local
"Unfit
Louis Star-Times.
Inspection
Plant
at
Factory
to the St.
of inspection
defects in
some
component
of the
parts of
cartridges
produced
visible."
tion,
still
production
machines.
One
pany's
production
only
the
from
laboratory
Ordnance
small samples
less
than
percent
their
^"'
policies
208
from
each
accepting
ployees
it
lot
asserted
chance"
ammunition before
emthere
was a "strong
of
that
defective
cartridges
were
slipping through unnoticed in the 99 percent of each lot that was not government
Though
inspected. ^^
made
not
public,
dated 31
December 1942 cited complaints by em-
report
of
an inspecting
officer
minor
in-
by
had
told
amount
of aircraft ammunition.^^
neither
tion
The
during
current
the
situa-
announced
commanding
Paullin,
charges
officer,
Lt.
Col.
Charles
S.
held up production.
and
Louis
worse
was
plant
than
at other
that,
if
it
When
the report
tory."
Plant
nor
concluded that
It
St.
Arms
the
through,
tion
tion." *^
possible.
at
better
plants
got
as
inspection
of
the
finished
product
This
the
statement
categorical
critics
at
St.
entirely satisfac-
is
who wanted
to
did
know
St.
was
story
articles.
'
Ltr, Lt
to
TIG,
31
Dec
Louis Ord
OP. Colonel Allen
concluded that "the supervision, control and administration of the Government employees in the
Inspection Department was lacking in efficiency
." and that morale in
and thoroughness
the
Inspection Department was at "an unsatisfactory
low ebb."
''The company placed a statement of its position in all St. Louis papers. Photostats of articles may be found in History, St. Louis Ordnance
42, sub: Spec Inspection of
Plant, OOP. 333. 1 St. Louis
Plant,
Volume
100,
St.
OHF.
St.
''
'
Arsenal.
"'
II
Dec 53;
'94:i-
spent
several
days
'"'
St. Louis Post-Dispatch and St. Louis StarTimes, January 16, 1943, and St. Louis Globe-
Democrat,
if
numerous changes
The
satis-
procedures.
209
in
existing
inspection
Drew Pearson
next day
in a radio
statement
that,
of
Army
opposition,
the
Justice
investigations.^^
its
and predicted
"whitewash"
spite
in
In
Louis General
St.
who has
Army is going
Colonel Davis]
spent his
to white-
We
strongly.
any time."
He went on
J.
the Industrial Service, 1
Haves, Chief of
to 30
July 1942
December 1944.
that
their
them.^^
the
of
charges
grand
jury.
Then
December
in
1943 came the grand jury's report indicting ten persons on charges of sabotage and
of conspiracy to defraud the
St.
government
Louis Ordnance
company and
Ordnance Department.
After studying the voluminous documen-
The
"may
or
may
not have
extenuated the situation" and further observed that evidence submitted later showed
that
extensive
made
improvements
in inspection
had
been
Vision.
the
That the then authorized system of inand delivery to the United States
Ordnance Department by the United States
Cartridge Company was inefficient and
I.
spection
""
son's exact
indicted later.
210
Trial, Acquittal,
and Reform
fully
ammunition
was not a simple, cut-and-dried process
but a long series of checks and rechecks
employing many ingenious measuring and
weighing devices, it was sometimes missystem. Because inspection of
During the
three of the
trial
1944.
defendants
tended that
it
After
superiors.
acquittal
of their
the
of
first
the
filed against
government.
civil
suit
Company,
December
it.
The
government introduced voluminous evidence to show that the company had not
maintained a satisfactory system of inspection and that defective ammunition from
the St. Louis plant had caused aircraft
guns to jam in combat. In the opinion of
the courts, the company had made every
reasonable effort to maintain a satisfactory
inspection system
unauthorized acts of
a few employees.^''
The
facts
of
this
case
point
to
the
extenuating
gency.
The
duction in 1942 may have led some contractor employees on occasion to take short-
cuts
rules.
how
matter
were
dures
foolproof.
also
It
faithfully
observed,
They were
improvement
the
in
Combat
duction.
appears that,
inspection
they
no
proce-
were
not
inevitably subject to
light
first
of
experience
experience
in
North
some
cases
guns jammed. But whether this resulted from faulty inspection at the plant
or from rough handling that broke the
watertight liners of packing boxes and
caused corrosion was never positively detheir
termined.^^
St.
newspaper
sational
charges
suggested.
employee
relations.
Ordnance
officers
felt
that at least
plaints
ployees or from
employees
who
did not
Memorandum
America
vs.
opinion,
United
States
of
OCO
David
L.
Van
Syckle.
arms ammunition
smaIhL
spection
the
at
211
in
in-
Louis plant
St.
up
other plants.
at
When,
example,
for
lots to
many
cases,
by
nized
Branch
new
the
chief
May
in
directive
Small
the
of
1943 when he
establishing
proce-
appear
to
An
^^
plant."
examining
investigator
episode;
of inspection
was made during
resulted
it
and
standards
the
intensive study
St.
Louis
clarification
publication
of
numerous
of
took
its
lations.
In
some
he was having
cutting
too
far
wrong and
is
don't
product.
we
just can't
do
it."
^^
Labor Problems
The
deal
St.
of
difficulty
in
dealing
both
94 1
thousands of
U.S.
Cartridge
workers but
also
and
recruit
to
train
to
own
and
workers
employees,
up
built
training
large
and other
trained
recruited
supervisors,
established
and quickly
new
schools,
work
forces.
many employees
plants.
By July 1943
of
five
^- (i)
17-18;
83-88.
^'
"quality stuff,"
minimum
manpower
forces.
turn out
location of
and
in a city
with a large Negro population provided a
natural setting for problems in race re-
led to
The
Arms
issued a
revised
white
with
labor
Hist,
(2)
Memo,
SAA,
I,
Hist,
Chief of
SA
Br, 4
ist
supp. pp.
Plant,
May
V, pp.
43. cited in
pp. 339-40.
of
the
^'^Rpt of Conf
8
Oct
43, p. 23.
Ord
Dist Chiefs,
Philadelphia,
212
standards of peacetime employment. Nearly
whom had
In
war plants
in the area,
adopted a policy of
of different seniority
lise
systems
FEPC
A
white
for
declared:
racial
quota system
equally as mis-
is
chievous
recruiting
Cartridge
layofTs
hire.
duction
dent.
unit,
The
unit
early
every
its
that,
to recruit
members
of
these
charges
(and
others
and attempted
off
policy.
lay
to
hearings
ing
FEPC
in
company
workers.
in
They abandoned
production
this decision
many
made
By the time
St.
to
abandon
dis-
and
hir-
^"(i)
OHF;
Hist,
(2)
St.
Ltr,
OO
(c); (3)
^"
SAA, L_P.
147-
Spec
00
Inspection
of
much
TIG,
St.
efficiency,
less
show-
efficient,
see
45, sub:
Ord Plant,
14 Jul
Louis
333- 1/2323-
St.
Clipi>ings
c;ises
the.se
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
had
reopened
plant
the
213
the
in
wait
to
early
i95o's."
whole
Conversion from Copper
1941,
copper shortage
the
as
The
Frankford. ^^
lines at
During
steel
to Steel
producing
steel cases
progress
made
in
enough miracle."
in
and
substitution of steel
The
ment
progressed
clad
of
steel
new
of the
jackets
fall
to
so
of 1942 production
But conversion
proved to be a
develop-
swing.
full
cartridge
steel
much more
cases
prob-
difficult
lem.
Frankford
1
94
and
Arsenal
early
succeeded
1942
during
converting
in
the
mer
Ammunition
^"
Belts
As efficient operation
was impossible without
vices
ammunition,
feed
to
of
thorough testing, it was accepted as standard in January 1943, the only small arms
11.^"
World
and
of technical problems,
stemming
is
.30-
a host
in
large
less elastic
The
brass.
during
develop acceptable
brass
task
of
and had
to
to
begin the
converting their
diflficult
equipment and
the
efforts
As soon as
make cases from
brass,
of
copper
steel cases.
the
of
steel.
To
in
the
producer of
principal
.30-caliber
Army
in World
was the Russell Manufacturing
Company, which held a 1916 patent on a
War
""
live
Interv with
(i)
at
Ammo
Louis plant,
St.
SA
and
OCO,
F.
A.
representa-
Lutz,
Ch'cf
than
but
procurement dealt with production of ammunition belts, both fabric and metallic.
Of these two types, metallic belt links were
used chiefly in aircraft guns and fabric
belts in ground weapons until the closing
months of the war when metallic belt
links were issued to ground troops. Though
they appeared to be simple to manufacture,
both types posed troublesome manufacturing problems.
War
small
essential
machine guns
Louis
Sec,
12
Ord
The
Plant.
one brief
ing on its efforts
tains
"*"
Br,
file
of
FEPC
records con-
letter
to
OCM
19493, '4 J'ln 43- -^ detailed statement of the Ordnance plans for meeting the
copper shortage in the fall of 1942 appears in
Copper
"*'-
for
for .-Xmrno
Rpt
of
7.
Chiefs,
Springfield,
214
.50-Caliber
by
fabric
women
in
belt.
After
the
war
concern
this
requirements
with
rising
Army
fast,
during
of 1941,
fall
Ordnance
this
in
Fabric Belts,
an ordnance arsenal.
alternate design
position
Several
to
start
production promptly.
other concerns
.50-caliber
before
belts
also
the
made
fabric
project
was
Pearl
six facilities
factured through
'*'
all
pro-
made
slightly
more
than
half.
PSP
;56,
Production
Ammunition
Oct
45.
of
Belt,
by
SA
Div,
Ind
Serv,
OCO,
manufacturers,
were
deceptively
Each
steel
in
consisted
link
links
appearance.
metallic
simple
215
belt
three
of
small
loops,
other.
the
serting
loops in
cartridge
much
through
the
same manner
the
three
as
one
with
contracts
Rock
industry
Fort
door.
Any number
sembled
belt of
in
this
and could be
and twisted to
rolled
fit
Jackes
pany.
for
the
cartridges
were
the
apart as
fired
origin
of
term
the
"disintegrating
Though simple
links demanded
and heat-ireating
to guarantee fault-
being
sent
inspection
was
acceptance
of
cause
trouble,
that an
as
its
weakest
it
belt
the
field.
Rigid
placed with
for
many
Island in the
link
1930's,
production
were
To
speed
different firms.
lic
tee
was a
brief
contract
cancellation
as
Rock
the
billion.
end of the
^^
Island
States.
Rock
at
and contracts
link
intro-
guard against
that might
to
link.
was
process
single
for
production
speedier
treatment be-
to
ammunition
astronomical
these
to be given a care-
essential
1942-43. To
requirements a
meet
fore
requirements
rose to eighteen
developed
had
combined
excep-
performance when used in aerial combat. If links were too hard they were likely
to break under pressure, and if too soft
they might stretch and cause stoppage of
the weapon. If either too loose or too tight
Harbor,
Pearl
sizes
less
or corrosion on links
After
both
in de-
in
summer of 1941
production of .30-caliber links began at
fell
.50-caliber
links,
slides
Island placed
for
**
'
nitions for
^''
and
(1)
Prod
Ammo
War,
PSP
of
p.
36,
Mu-
426.
Metallic
{},)
M2,
216
Packing Boxes and Cans
The boxes
were
essentially the
War
\\'^orld
with
terneplate
When
M1917
(tin-coated
soldered
shut,
the
sheet
liners
steel).
of
the
dirt,
troops
when
or
bearers
native
to
and,
carry,
to
was that
it
larly tin.
major change
in pack-
summer of
packing am-
ice
The
plants.
repacked.
All during the first half of 1943 Ordnance received frequent reports that the
packing of cartridges in M1917 boxes was
unsatisfactory, whether in waxed paper
cartons
terneplate
or
links
liners.
The
chief
complaints
and
the
was used in
was substituted
for
sealing
tin
in
was
it
and
pletely
engineers
ment
zinc plating
such
materials
paper, and
ing
studied
the
possible
replace-
pla.stic
substitute,
adopted
as
in the
waxed
summer
fiber
was
board,
of 1942, but
it
new
type of container.
com-
Under con-
tract with
ration
manner
as a coffee
can.
including an improved
fifty
pounds.
did
**"
vol.
Red
2,
of
bk.
In
peacetime,
been shipped
most
ammunition
in bulk pack,
had
with troops in
HI, by
manufactured by S.W. Farbtr,
New York Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. i.
as
Inc.,
in
Hist,
of
15
Ammo
Br,
SA
Div,
OHF;
(4)
History
217
was standardized for .45-caliber and .30caliber carbine ammunition early in 1944.
It was extended to other calibers later in
the year
too late to have any effect on
summer of 1944.*^
The best ready-to-use packs were
the
ridges
boxes.^^
and
test
them ioo%."
in the plants
earlier estimates
The
accurate.
*^
the
line
much
smaller expenditure
of rifle
1.4 billion
AEF
the entire
billion
2.5
tional
in reserve in
Day
the
that
of reality."
"^
^Mi) SA Ammo,
Frankford Arsenal,
Red
154; (3)
opment,
^^
of
SAA,
18.
Development, Volume
Surpluses, Cutbacks,
and Terminations
8
its
ears."
The
pipelines
were
filled
Rpt
Oct 43,
*"
'"
of
2, Book 2.
Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia,
p. 22.
On
WD
Chief of Ordnance), Brig. Gen. William E. Gillmore, and Mr. J. Madigan See also comments on
the report by General Somervell in the same file,
and remarks by Brig Gen James Kirk before Small
Arms Ammunition Labor Advisory Committee, 10
Jan 45,
OHF.
218
clusions.
exis-
ing a heavy
terms of production
in
toll
were operating
far below their capacity. The most significant factor in the cost of production at any
plant was found not to be the managerial
because the
costs
plants
skill
by
Ordnance
percentage of
the
plant
rose
re-
and
related material.
1944 when ASF reduced requirements again, three more plants closed
Early in
Denver,
Evansviile,
and Kings
Mills
twelve
original
ing
plants
^St.
and Twin
Louis
several buildings
were converted
Cities
to artil-
when
The re-
lery
the privately
icut.
ments be made
The
gany,
the
remaining plants
owned
plants of the
Reming-
recommended that five plants AlleEau Claire, Denver, Lake City, and
Lowell be shut down and that adjust-
port
to provide
Frankford
capacity at which
EflRciency
at
scrap.
and
the
its
as
maximum
when
sold
but
representatives
operated.
costs declined
supervision
or
storage,
in
Production
caliber
20
of
all
types
of
small
billion in
effect
1943 to 6.5
of the
billion in 1944.^*
1943-44 reductions
is
needed production.^^
down
slowing
and
had begun.
Over-all requirements for small arms ammunition (1943-44 combined
dropped
from the 1943 peak of about fifty billion
in
February to approximately thirty-six
production
billion
in
mer of 1943 Frankford eliminated its second and third shifts and returned to its
traditional role of laboratory for develop-
ment
tion techniques.
others.
stopped,
verted to
ery
When
ammunition production
were promptly conother war uses, and the machin-
the
plants
was transferred
(i)
Arms Ammunition,
July 1942.
also
00
OO
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
shown
219
month-
ly
ammunition
most
and are
closing
the
plants
^^
In reply.
Under
Sec-
regret
that
January 1944
July 1944
513,000,000
172,000,000
retary
210,000,000
168,000,000
310,000,000
51,000,000
July 1943
Cal. .45
and
carbine- 433,000,000
expressed
Patterson
He
defended
chester
out in
These
letters
bulletin
the privately
plants
in
Connecticut
on
the
integral
eral
the effect on
They
newspapers.
made
possible
it
reduce operations
ing
incendiary
enemy
ammunition
and the
planes,
in
down-
Japanese
sit-
announcement of cutbacks
brought sharp criticism from organized
uation
particularly
the
manpower
most
for the
development
backs.^^
of the small
labor of the
The
small
arms
1943-44 cutammunition
the
United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America,
a CIO affiliate. In February 1944 the
union charged that, in selecting plants to
labor,
able
all
considerations
of
efficient
and maintaining
national
down
the
in operation
Ammo
I
1851 (c).
220
most important shift, in terms of quantiwas the decHne in .30-caliber machine
gun ammunition and the rise in .50-caliber. Early combat experience showed that
the smaller cartridge was far less effective,
particularly against airplanes, than was the
.50-caliber. This shift was accompanied by
using comparatively
ties,
demand
a rise in the
cartridges
and
the
for
ridge.
both
for
type, the
for
and
.50-caliber
incendiary
.50-caliber
newer
incendiary
armor-piercing
for
.30-
cart-
armor-piercing-
came
.50-caliber,
into
for
An
output.
the
.50-caliber
came
tracer,
armor-piercing-incendiary-
into production in
1944-45.
of
was
ridges
incendiary
far
cold,
in storage.
stability
check their
to
Less difficult to
man-
entered the
picture
in
pistol cartridge,
new
called
ball
1944
were spherical
ammunition. A development of Western
Company,
Cartridge
much
factured
der.
The
it
could
be
manu-
faster
munition
am-
small arms
little
combat,
in
the
armies
Allied
much
arms ammunition
AEF
the
as
small
expended
lost
the
German
below authorized
they
fell
European
the
in
much
Further,
theater.*''*'
offensive,
levels
of the
ammu-
made
bases sometimes
quantities
had
it
impossible to re-
ammunition,
leftover
trieve
and
great
deteriorated. In explaining
said:
Ammunition is
The powder and
delicate chemical
a perishable commodity.
the primer cap contain
compounds.
If the
ammu-
is
less sensitive
is
and more
likely to
hang
fire.
If
Ammunition
stored
largest small
in
World
The downward
War
trend
of
requirements
""
The most
-27'""
concise
Whiting,
data
Statistics,
Ammunition supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters, p. 3, ASF Contl Div, 15 Aug
following
45,
the
long-awaited
invasion
of
OHF.
221
We
By
end of October
the
1944 supplyincreased
AP
The
shortage of
March
larly for
shortage
the
in
Campbell
that,
General
but
theaters
predicted
production
if
1945
requirements
certain
types.
about
6.5
program
billion
rounds
in
for
first
1944,
12.4
the
billion.
Canada with
rifle,
in
When
at
in
Winchester was
tion
for
the plants.
their
the
for
COCO
plants
St.
Louis,
plus
Lake
Industries,
Ord,
12
Jan
45,
sub:
SA Ammo
471. 4/2381.
'o-'
(i) SA
I
Apr
45,
Progress
WPB,
OO
Stocks,
12
Dec
44,
p.
35,
WPB
WPB
Doc. 317,
210.3R, NA.
Jul
^"-(i) S.\ Ammo, Highlights of Hist,
44-1 Apr 45; (2) First Quarterly Report for FY
Nov 45. These two reports are
1946, SA Div,
supplements to Small Arms Ammunition and are
i
in
OHF.
CHAPTER X
weapon
World War
other
imagination
the
of
of land
II
cap-
soldier
and
armor,
ble
new and
grim
for
of the battlefield.
life
the
ground
bombing plane
lution
in
forces,
as
symbolized
It
did
the
sleek
against
tank
men
critical
times to
and technology.
the
neglect
somenewsworthy
Why, it was asked,
of
less
weapons
of the war.
were
comments from
observers
Unofficial
quick to take up
and trucks
tanks than
of
uncars
produce better
kinds,
all
Germany? In
its
making
particular,
why
than any other item of equipment. Ordnance-procured small arms, artillery, and
'
ammunition
were
generally
praised,
as
asserted
commanders (both
British
and American)
combat
Lorraine
IN
Campaign,
WORLD WAR
604, and in
editorial
in
(Washington,
1950),
p.
Ordnance claims
of
dress
-
Meet
the Test,"
Army
25 May
Tests of
file,
1943,
40
431.3/M.
M4
sub:
Final
Series
Rpt on Accelerated
Tanks,
Gen.
Christmas
for
Congressional
Department."
no
investigation
of
"a
War
credit to the
Meanwhile
many
for
there
own on
its
the battlefield
and
tank experience
II
in
lies
reviewing
failing to
hold
War
223
for
Production
started.
rested
on a
of
solid
century of development
The Mark
action
in
there
was no
building of hand-tooled
his
production
ministry
to
and directed
build
it
but
was
World War
I.
II
in late
use,
War
hour.
T-34
and
man medium
ammunition
and
guns
real
an
two decades
production,
test
only
the
models, some
in
unheard of quantities.^
The problems encountered in British,
German, and American tank production
stemmed chiefly from the fact that, at
the start of World War II, the tank was
hitherto
essentially
tested
tactical
potentialities.
still
Further,
unit
Hanson Baldwin
in
January
caution,
see
"American
Locomotive,"
Fortune
(February
brief
see
Postan, British
U.S. Strategic
224
Yrom 1920 to
1935 no more than thirty-five tanks were
built, every one a different model. The es-
bucket. ^^
1939-40,
up to
'
8 miles an hour."
design and
acceptance
of
its
ume
the
One
same.
tank
recorder of British
1930's
the
in the
Ordnance
tanks
tion.
istics,
between
was
tanks
each
priority.
advisable to
much by
attempt
try in their
of
it
so
high,
as follows:
93
medium tank
of superior design
was
issued,
but
men.'-*
In
the
War Department
plans of the
Tank Corps
since
The
ment down to
armor thickness
to
gave priority
small,
flecting
Tank
this
to
machine
guns,
limited
tanks. ^*'
Re-
Ordnance had no
made no plans for wartime
attitude.
Division,
to
the
1930's,
trast
Company, 1933).
Rock Island Arsenal, I (1919-39).
pp. 61-66; (2) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance
Team, pp. 220-21. In the mid- 1930's, Major
Campbell, later to become wartime Chief of Ordnance, was in charge of manufacturing at Rock
tional Service Publishing
"
(i)
Hist,
Island Arsenal.
" Maj.
Eric
W. Sheppard, Tanks
in
Next
the
War (London:
tanks.
The
'
unit
responsible
for
fighting
Rock
cars,
It
is
(2)
cit.,
ch.
Campbell, op.
1940-45,
Dec
45,
MS
OHF;
and
and
shells,
isms,
for
making
rifles, recoil
only
instruments,
control
fire
mechan-
One went
for tanks.
Works
to the
Van Dorn
Iron
225
and
parts
materials.
The
M2A4
12-ton
pieces
ies.
totaling
parts,
of
not
The
was
made
When ACF
Motors.
by Continental
found that steel mills
armor
of
used in the
tank
light
in
plate required,
it
installed heat-
ahead
dium tank
paredness,
delayed
orders,
the
two
the
start
no
brought
orders
of
Ordnance planned
In time of emergency,
to place
its
railway
built
enced
in
equipment.
Firms
experi-
in
contractors.
pressed
state
of
the
railroad
duction
to
plans
make
provided
that
hulls, turrets,
these
firms
and numerous
made
to be
The
II
first
War
2,000
blueprints
March 1941.^*
The most serious problem
in
As
the early
was change
1940,
much improved
as
cially
the
M3
light tank,
and
known
unofficially
offi-
as
the
industry,
these
were
Further,
schedule,
of
entire order
in
significant results.^"
furnaces to
treating
for
12 (i)
Educational Orders folder, OHF
(2)
Telcon with Brig Gen Burton O. Lewis (Ret.),
;
Mar
8,
Planning,
OCO-Detroit.
16
Jun
45,
dr.
P4336,
OCO-D files.
" (i) F. A.
"Mass Production
nance,
XXL
(2) Hist,
Hist, Phila
Rock Island
Ord
Dist,
.\rsenal,
H,
ch.
5;
(3)
p.
For problems
History,
Tank
226
General Stuart, was adopted, and orders
for it went to American Car and Foundry.
During the next twelve months the 7sided riveted turret of the early model took
on a rounded shape; welding took the place
of riveting; a power traverse for the turret was added; armor thickness was increased; and a gyrostabilizer was installed
to steady the 37-mm. gun while the tank
was in motion. ACF received a steady
stream of engineering change orders during
1940 and 94 1, and, as the contract was
of the fixed-price type, nearly every change
^^
required a change in the contract price.
When the new model (M3A1) was
adopted in August 1941, ACF was directed
1
to switch over to
its
of each proposed
improvement
in
good."
"The
best
is
the
enemy
of the
^'
While
getting
dium
M2's in
fiscal year 1939, Rock Island began work
on an order for 126 mediums of improved
design,
M2A1. But
come
in
1940,
models
in stock. ^^
industry's lack of
ufacture,
The Upswing
In mid-June
in
facilities.
ig40
to
fiscal
94
requirements.
larger
months
expected with
but
as
it
pro-
1,741 to be built
no
difficulty
was
battle-
field
performance against the delay it
would cause in getting tanks to the troops.
It was the eternal conflict that
Under
Secretary Patterson had in mind when he
declared,
production as soon as
possible.
The
larger orders were being considered, Ordnance opposed further production of this
model and urged adoption of a more
powerful tank with a 75-mm. gun and
heavier armor. As a result, the Army had
on hand in May 1940, when the German
Army launched its invasion of western
Europe, only 28 new tanks
18 medium
and 10 light and they were soon to be-
when much
^^For
7,
details, see
Hist,
Phila
Ord
Dist,
I,
pt.
pp. 115-20.
"' Originally designated
War n,
15
Aug
44,
OHF.
'^
May
No.
24, 1940) in
ASF
to be supplied by the
Corporaton and
berson
Wright Aeronautical
Engine
Diesel
diesel engines
events
forcing
of
In
May and
On
10
1940
July
nounced creation
the
U.S.
Army
of a separate
an-
Armored
ognizing the
and formally
rec-
importance of
fast-growing
tanks in warfare.
for
mass production of
all
weapons,
in-
As
early
the
as
first
Knudsen,
week
June,
appointed
in
newly
member of the National Defense Advisory
Commission (NDAC), had looked over
William
the
S.
Ordnance
and
they
to
each
meet
would
emergency
year,
the
for
tank program.
Army,
demand
able
German
the
be
built
locomotives
signed
never
companies,
locomotive
the
that
which normally
whole
at
reconsideration
vinced
227
automobile
industry
big difficulty
be
not
join
to
them.
The
"converted"
to
tank
production
plants. Build-
bile
pp. iA4iflF.
-' For one account of this commission, see Ltr,
Michael Dewar, head of British Tank Commission, to Minister of Supply, London, 10 Mar 42,
in Icks, op. cit. The progress and difficulties of
British tank production in 1940 are described in
Mildred Hanson
Gillie,
Armored
Force,
Thomson,
locomotive
Ordnance
production,
see
District, I, Part 7,
History,
page 103.
Philadelphia
228
build an en-
new
tirely
tank
plant
arsenal
equipped
to
the
in
Detroit
area,
and
designed
specially
make medium
tanks.
On
To meet
quacy.
collabora-
in
new
tank, salvaging
existing
M2A1
British
battle
experience.
weekend.
When
asked
if
he would consider
work on
For
the
first
arrangement some
months earlier with good results, but it
was understood at the time that a com-
an
tried
was
in
and materials.
worked from early morning until
machines,
ings,
They
late
at
on 17
July, Keller delivered his completed estimate to Knudsen in Washington. A tank
arsenal to produce ten medium tanks a
day would cost $21,000,000, and each
tank (complete except for guns) would
night, seven days a week.
Finally,
pletely
on
the
more
per
day.
Reporting
this
conference
to
good proposition
The
to
me."
^''
tion
was lack of a
The
design of the
mm.
first-rate
tank design.
M2A1, mounting
with
the
only a 37-
battlefront
its
inade-
would be
desirable.^*'
-^ Keller's
in
46.
Knudsen's account
War
Production,
Wesley W. Stout,
is
in Lecture,
Problems
in
(Detroit: Chrysler
with
tervs
Lewis,
(4)
sess., pt.
Scrv,
file.
I,
Hist,
I;
ist
pp. 102-03.
Production,
of Tank
Library L48-IH; and
(3) Testimony of John D. Biggers in Hearings,
Truman Conmi., 77th Cong., ist sess., pt. 7, 13
.Aug 41, pp. 2059-61.
-'
Hist, Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D, sees,
(
)
entitled History of U.S. Medium Tank and Brief
History of Medium Tanks from 1939 to 1942;
(2) Brig Gen John K. Christmas, Development of
the U.S. Medium Tanks M3 and M4, 20 Jul 43,
OHF; (3) Icks, Evolution of American and
German Medium Tanks; (4) Chase, Design, Development and Prod of Tanks in World War II,
p. 21;
(5) Lt. Col. John K. Christmas, "Our
K.
T.
Keller,
ICAF,
new
-^'
such
out
17
Mar
Problems
48,
ICAF
229
outskirts of Detroit.
Chrysler
was being
At
negotiated.^^
asked
for authority
as
it
is
right
Warner
and
settled,"
Lt.
sign
to
that work on
once. "As far
the design
Col. Walter
W.
is
be altered at
else that
first."
many
In spite of the
to
close
the
contract
immediate
for
-^
1940.
in
equipping the new tank arsenal and producing one thousand medium tanks of the
new M3 design, soon to be nicknamed the
General Grant. This meant that Ordnance
S.
Rpt No.
the
Div,
in
no,
pt.
Mead Spec
S.
7-
Ad-
Comm.,
79th
7,
p.
Bldg,
and
See
Report of the
Cong., 2d sess., 1946.
ditional
action
building
critical of the
-*
unanimously approved
He
OCO-D,
in
preceding
footnotes. Design and production of the Churchtank in Britain followed the same streamlined
ill
course, as did German production of Tigers and
Panthers.
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
230
telephone, and, along with representatives
equipment companies,
of the railway
fered
Ordnance
of-
Ordnance
as
the
of Chrysler dealers
gift
By
Keller
July,
April,
Works
tive
that
so
brate completion of
like
days
built.
of
refused
M-3
to
design.
permit
contracts with
The United
the
British
American firms
to
States
place
for British-
M3
This
by the
step
British
greatly
and Canadian
simplified
M3
forces.
production
design had
among
early
the three
spirit of
Ordnance
competition
contractors in
own
its
which
had completed
Chrysler,
transmissions,
tank on
its first
cele-
tank a few
first
its
Meanwhile
later.
built
company could
1 1
photo
finish
with
all
same
was a
time.^^
OCO-D
Hist,
It
(2)
"Our
New Medium Tank," Army Ordnance, XXII, No.
Stout,
op.
pp.
cit.,
21-23;
{3)
Christmas,
TAG
AG
section of
torial
127
(July-August
941)
is
1941)-
sub:
see
Ltr,
Tank Commission,
10
Mar
''-
13; (2)
Ltr, Keller to
Ord
Dist,
Thomson,
Gen Burton O.
cit., p.
26.
vol.
Apr
100,
54,
Lewis,
pt.
OHF;
15
Apr
tanks at
1940, and Httle desire to acquire any. Its plans were oriented toward
the start of
toward
an
sending
overseas to
expeditionary
attack strongly
fortified
tions.
force
German
successes
including
size of
work
German
on development of a 60-ton
heavy tank was approved.^^ The M6,
powered by a ,000-horsepower gasoline
engine and mounting a 3-inch gun, was
standardized later in the year, and one
pilot tank was ordered from Baldwin in
August, but production had to wait for
tanks
is
1940 the
Army
for
its
325, mediums
heavies
6,
o.
The
first five
months
were
of 1941
both
uneventful,
tively
ig4i
in
at
rela-
home
and
more American
aid.
The war
against the
and the
fighting
in North Africa were both causing concern,' but they were less spectacular than
events in 1940. For Ordnance, requirements remained steady and production
gained
gradually
tinued
to
ACF
momentum.
produce
light
tanks,
con-
and the
during
supply of machine
this
tools,
period
was
the
with contractors
and
tanks.
They
to
consistently
by
shock of the
was known
posi-
231
'3
00
tanks
OCM
(i)
CofOrd
for
TAG,
service
in
1940.
The
Pz.
Kw.
IV
R&D
232
W.
was
Col. William
tanks.'^
tank
Union
stepped
Roosevelt
into
picture
the
the ability of
American industry
to produce tanks."
^^
all
Secretary Patter-
esti-
this
OPM
officials
Wesson
^^
few days
later,
General
1,400
only
that
stated
the
uled
for
else-
later,
to
was centralized
trans-
American
both
production,
British,
Jr.,
all
and
Ordnance.*^
in
production
speed
President
Roosevelt
When
production
400
medium
1,000
of
and
tanks
light
long holder,
it,
lit
directive:
cryptic
this
tion.^-
Ordnance
way as
thought
conservative
as
leaders,
was bold
the President
their
decision
this
ill-advised.
in
in his,
From
^^
Memo,
Knight,
to
Brig
Gen Christmas,
i6
May
where.''
of
Knight,
Artillery
Division.
short
time
President,
OPM,
headed by
Lt.
Jul 41,
ExecO
^"
bat
to
file.
''
Memo, CofOrd for USW, 25 Jul
Tanks, OHF.
Monthly Prod
41,
sub:
An oddly redundant title as tanks are comThe new division was created by
vehicles.
ODO
183, 29 July 94 1.
(i) Memo, Knight, for Brig Gen Christmas,
I7 Jul
to CofOrd.
16 May 45; (2) Ltr,
451.25/71 13; (3) PSP on Prod Ping,
41,
1
^'
USW
00
OCO-D,
file.
OPM,
vast
scale
friendly
to
powers,
chiefly
ority
upped the
steps
ders,
new
The
figure to 25 percent.
were
to
urge
faster
capacity.
increase
existing
next
tank
or-
orders
come
Pressed
Steel,
and
transmissions
Contracts for
final drives
were placed
Company and
to
armor,
increase
then
their
only
half
capacity
of
launched,
plants
rate
of
for
estimated
tanks in the
Baldwin,
Chrysler,
field
Pressed
,46
light
heavies
tanks
1941 stood as
of
mediums
Effort in ig42
1942, while
At the start of
leaders
all
2,591,
o.^"
The All-Out
cast
re-
medium
producers of
American,
foun-
steel
233
to
Ordnance
reach the
negotiations
tirely
were
new tank
completed
arsenal at
for
Grand
an
en-
238-39.
cit.,
was
M4
medium
tanks per
to cost
pp.
Chase,
101-02;
the Budget, 24
OrdDist,
(2)
Oct
44.
OHF
(3)
Hist,
Chicago
I, pt. 2.
^''
Summary Report
Automotive Materiel,
cember 1945. OHF.
of
Acceptance,
1940-45,
OCO-D,
TankDe-
Whiting, Statistics. A pilot model of the 60heavy tank with a cast hull was accepted
from the Baldwin Locomotive Company on the
day after Pearl Harbor.
*''
Combat
^^(i)
Blanc,
Body Division
WORLD WAR
ARMY
ton
234
"double
it"
suddenly
requirements
the
raised
still
War
of
on
January he
set
the following
Heavy
25,000
19.500
Light
Three days
and touched
of
1943
500
Medium
off a
the feasibility
dramatic gesture to
the
made
new
goals
these
and
On
not
did
they
with
originate
the
Ordnance
Staff
Department.
General
planners working on the Victory Program
were dealing with such big, round figures,
but Ordnance leaders were not. General
Wesson and his staff not only doubted the
Ordnance
munitions.
leaders
assigned
or blame
for the new objectives
Lord Beaverbrook, British supply chief,
and to such Presidential advisers as Harry
Hopkins and Robert Nathan."*^ In support
of this view they cited the conference on
29 December 1941 when Lord Beaverbrook's views were presented to Donald
Nelson and others in the office of Vice
President Henr)' A. Wallace. According to
credit
to
Nelson,
the
British
supply
chief
stated
him
tanks
He made
cope with,
He thinks we should plan
for the production of 45,000 tanks in 1942
.
in
munitions"
instill
allies
but
confidence
in
many
in their
tioned
figures to
gress,
he
is
really try."
Within
clear:
superiority
also
5,000
50,000
20,000
message to Congress
the
also
*^
75^000
30,000.'
whelming
1942
45,000
Total
Mr.
Knudsen's
estimate
of
These exaggerated views were
impressed upon the President who
against
directive.
and
up
do
it
if
they
'^''
presentation
for
Office of Production
to
Management and
the
the
far
list
was
the Detroit
enlarged
Ltr, President to
similar letter
confs,
^"
War,
p.
277.
See
also
for
Robert E. Sherwood,
An Intimate History
and Hopkins:
York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp.
473-74. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey, Germany had only 4,500 tanks in service
not 30,000.
on
June 1941
Sherwood, op. cit., p. 474.
Roosevelt
(New
"'"
building
start
to
reach
tanks
500-per-
November 1942. On a
smaller scale, the Pacific Car and Foundry
Company of Renton, Wash., was to come
into production in 1942. The conferees
concluded that Ordnance had the tank
program well in hand but recommended
adding two more sources for medium
month
rate
in
tanks.^^
made
235
question
tanks,
the
to
as
need
real
for
such
as
British, not
found an
we
proposes that
U.S.
Army
that
of Staff General
Richard Moore. "I think that should be
deferred until this British tank committee
gets over here." The decision was that
Ordnance should "proceed as planned and
no further," and await the joint British-
American
March. ^^
Two
conferences
weeks
later,
scheduled
Colonel
for
Christmas
program.
He
medium
tanks
25,000 in 1942 and 50,000
1943 were good. But, he warned, this
could be done only at the cost of other
in
items, particularly
propelled
mended
artillery.
that
He
therefore
self-
recom-
the
number
propelled
same
months of
1943. But the conference gave no positive
answer to the queston before passing on
to
the
medium
firms at work,
tank.
M3
M4
(General
objectives
could be
some on the
that the
Presidential
guns were
the
critical
components,
made
but
to speed
raised
artillery.
a question
to
the
reasonable-
would supply
light tanks
for
236
Lima Locomotive
at
Works, 1942.
whether
questioned
the
United
He
States,
and the Soviet Union could organand otherwise equip and transport such
huge numbers of tank units, and suggested
that each nation would do better if it
planned to equip more modest forces, perhaps 25 armored divisions each for 1942.
Even this figure was nearly three times
Britain,
ize
the
number
Army
in i942.'''^
Later in
and the
number
British,
artillery.
But
of
conferences to
the
citing
artillery,
gained by the
the
German
President's
"startling
successes
assault artillery."
January
^^
program
weap-
ons in 1942
all
''
U.S.
American,
and Canadian production. A major
product of these meetings was the decision to recommend a program of balanced
production, as Colonel Christmas had
urged. Basically, this meant cutting the
President's tank objectives and boosting
tailed
and self-propelled
As early as September 1941, when
General Wesson was in London, the British had urged the need for self-propelled
those for armored cars
and
(i)
II
Memos of Col
Mar 42, sub:
Objectives for
1942 and
Memo,
Mar
1943:
42, sub:
folder
ASP. The
Presidential Objectives
number
of
World War
Procurement
II
armored
in
divisions
Army throughout
General Grant
M3 Medium Tank
mounted on tank
chassis.
Known
as self-propelled mounts,
riages,
gun motor
car-
served in
many
different roles,
antitank, antiaircraft,
tillery
variously
chiefly
and mobile
as
field ar-
Assembly Line
and not
at Detroit
Tank
Arsenal.
useful.^^
less
"in line
if it
meant
were unsound.
When
basis
of
weapons."^
^^
237
Patterson
were
British
30
Findings
Mar
the U.S.
of
the
Joint
Tank Comm.,
by Col
Christmas,
At a conference
in General Wesson's office late in March,
when the U.S. Tank Committee's proposed changes in the objectives were discussed, Mr. Patterson stated that he could
not report to the White House that certain
items in the program were superfluous
PSP
55,
Jul 45.
Apr 42
in
ASF
238
The
Beaverbrook."
then
conferees
con-
self-propelled
marked
a heavy
that
virtually a light
agreed.
calling
a self-propelled
lery
General
tank."
Clay
General
terson
proposed
mount an
Somervell
"artil-
observed
that the
on the
place
first
terial
needed was
grade
steel.
steel,
"shortages of material
when
in April
embodied most
it
early
of the changes
medium
With the
dropped
quirements
1942
25,000
from
built
added.
on
As
medium
the
tank
to
weapons
were
weapons
chassis
self-propelled
re-
the
net
over-all
effect
was
to
and
to raise the
1943 program
billion,
shift
duction
the
it
to
''^
our production."
and
to
justify
reported
high-
it
April,
in
back
holding
are
reducing
invalidated earlier
it
of
aluminum, and
required. "Even now,"
dence
much
In
ma-
Nickel, copper,
and
list,
Colonel
The
critical
fusion."'^
moved
evi-
requirements,
Ordnance
esti-
rose
January
in
45,000
January
as
by
directed
the
The
failure
in part
1942.
President
in
produce
to
to reduction
material,
irregular
deliveries
of
material,
Of
'^
"''*
parts.*'"
1
for the
,000
Tank
M6. In
were mediums
14,000
tanks,
light
11,420
self-
7,366 scout cars. The total for all comincluding selfbat vehicles combined,
carriers,
armored
weapons,
propelled
cargo
cars,
and German
Meanwhile
under
fire in
critics
citing
Efforts in
came
Commons, with
House
the
of
not
difficulties
those
unlike
March
matter of settling the design for the weapons of war and the relative quantities of
programme
the
civilian
Ministr)'
production rose
but
the
Supply.
trends
British
1942 to 8,611
in
quality
of
of
generals
begin
to
dominated
criticism.*''^
German
tank
time."*
In September
set
1942 Hitler
to be
month
than
less
man
tank
War
of
month by
the end of 1944. Hitler immediSpeer this figure was too low
ately
told
and
called
production
for
sharp
officials
increases
which
regarded as fantastic.
all
necessary measures
branches of the
armament
was
that
production
rose
are
industry
The
from
result
about
" (i) Whiting, Statistics; (2) OCO-D Summary Rpt. pp. XX-XXIV.
'- War-Time Tank Production, Report by the
Select Committee on National Expenditure
.
production in 1942
increased production,
and emphasis on heavier tanks. In January
1942, three weeks after
record
units,
produced
tanks
the
Two
his
ig42
the
directed
also
about 58,000.^^
British
He
239
announcement
of
3,
16, 1946, p. 5.
production
a \car
in
to
then
expand German
running
at
tank
about 4,000
losses his
"' Ibid.
Select
Office.
For
nitions
j'cr H'flr,
ch.
X.
240
9,300 tanks during 1943 to about 17,500
1944, with the monthly production rate
in
dent's
the
objectives,
of the Presi-
pressure
on
T ank- Automotive
The
most important
development affecting U.S. tank production in 1942 was the creation of the Detroit
Tank- Automotive Center (T-AC)
Administratively,
later
named
Office
the
Chief of Ordnance-
(OCO-D).
General Campbell
September 1942 when
responsibility for trucks and other transport vehicles was shifted from the Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance. He had a
dual purpose in mind: to combine truck
and tank procurement in one office and at
the same time decentralize it to Detroit.
Congestion in Washington had reached an
Detroit
both
office
Army
November 1942
Sherman tanks dropped
Center
the
in
from 46,500
105-mm.
The
troyers."
was
tanks
and
21,000
allied
units.
all
changes
requirement for
medium
net
to reduce the
effect
vehicles
of
by more than
Gen.
Alfred R. Glancy, a newly commissioned
asm
Brig.
Army
ization.
'"''
Three
months
after
the
TankAutomotive Center was formed, and nine
"^
of last fall."
USSBS,
op.
cit.
comment on German
Brief
ARMY
WORLD WAR
curement
also
is
T-AC
discussed above
1
CHAPTER XI
Production of Tanks
In a general way, tank building followed
They required
hull,
mount
or
chassis,
the
gas
gun were
giant transmission
third
into place
ted
with
moved
the
slowly
gradually took
shaft
transmission.
its
tracks
had
to rearrange
make room
for
its
them.^ For
its
first
light
tank order, American Car and Foundry installed seventy-five new tools and a series
variety of
Its
adjacent
to
con-
was
Schenectady
Plant
Company,
Aug
which
OHF.
of
45,
242
Table
19
Tank Production by
Facility, 1940-1945
Breakdown of
Facility
Source:
Tabulation dated
14
Jan 46
in folder. Col.
Colby
cli.irts.
OCO
Detroit
lilcs.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
243
a General Stuart
M3
Light Tank
of thicker
armor
fast
plate.
The
Detroit
Tank
that
homogeneous
built
guns,
it was
from the ground up for the sole
purpose of building tanks. But it nevertheless went through a series of rather drastic
changes. Before the arsenal was built,
Knudsen's idea of having it produce its
own armor plate and practically all
other parts
was abandoned, the first step
production.
The
its
installed
own
furnaces for
94 1,
were made
including
plate
decided
Chrysler
in
onto
its
tracks
at
to
rising so
buy
steel castings
its
from
all
the
at
the
was
arsenal
during
famous 30-cylinder
five
Chrysler truck
^ For
a description of arsenal methods, see
Herb, "Tanks for the Democracies Roll from
Chrysler's Arsenal," Machinery, vol. 48. No. 4
(December 1941
).
244
farming out its operations. This was in
accord with Keller's original plans for expansion in time of a real emergency. Be-
tank."
Engines
Tank
fore
the
called
job
experienced
the
all
one
constituted
Ordnance tank
1940,
planned
the
of
had
designers
made
to
by the Guiberson
fense
standard
hardships of World War II production. The
first design was scrapped before wc could
begin. Despite the early start made, the
value of priorities for machine tools and
equipment quickly melted away like snow on
a hot day. Frantic calls for increased production alternated with drastic cutbacks. Disappearance of critical materials held it up.
Sudden changes in design upset ability to
deliver, and broke the i)lanned flow of operations. We never once had all of the machine tools and equipment that our schedules
.
engines
these firms
demand
for
tank, plane,
and
.ships
to
In the
fall
of
under a
engine,
arrange-
license
Early
1941
in
Ordnance
that,
felt
six
for.'''
Ordnance procurement,
gration
role in
''
inte-
eliminate
tion.^
indu.stry
bottlenecks
Beginning with
conmiittee
in
1942,
the
medium
total
of
twenty-
work
of
them
all.
Stout,
Tank\
Are
Mitihty
Fine
Thintis.
and products
of each, based
Aj)r
T-20plants
on production prog-
ress reports.
tank
scribed the
(i)
pp.
"You might
"^
''
eral
Press
release,
(;ian(y,
copy
Dec
in
42,
Hist,
Clommittee
for
Integration
Industry
T.mks, by Maj Louis Antol, Jr.,
i
Medium
Jun
45,
(l'4r;2).
'"For the research and development background on tank engines, see Green, Ihomson, and
Roots, Planninii Munitions for War, pp. aoa-o;}
and jHy-iiOi.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
tracted for,
it
245
doubled
re-
in
manufacture.
a completely
test
new
hand
new
plants for
engines
Substitute
be produced at once,
could
already at
using
in existing plants,
its
that
tools
had
to
CM
twin
diesel,
the
engines and
tives.
They
me
into meetings
Wright
made
this
We
as the
Caterpillar
The
was
later
line
The
picture
make
was further
among
and
diesel
early as April
1942
As
supply.
for tanks
CM
2,500
diesel
re-
gaso-
in
Mem.
May
16
4'",,
sub:
'
00
Mclnerney
'
'
Tanks
in
World War
II,
15
io2fr;
'i')-
Jun
9.'")-
Review
42, p. 8.
TCVD,
19
246
the
He
General Clay.
letter to
War Department
goal was
to use only
the
the half-dozen
He
cited
diesel
air-cooled
versus
the
of
stages
engineering
ment.'' Considering
all
less
the
outset,
"government
free issue"
to
tank contrac-
tors,
picture
and
tank
the
let
buy
builders
ap-
existing
Caterpillar Tractor all came into the program and by the end of 1942 production
had caught up with demand. ^^
Lack of machine tools was at the root
engines,
types.
develop-
all
At
1941-42, as requirements mounted, Ordnance took steps to create monthly capacity for over five thousand medium tank
transmissions.
The Buick Division of
General Motors, the Ford Motor Com-
ASF
factors,
contractors.
engines.
American engines had yet seen extenbattle service, and all were still in
various
other
its
plied
of
own
made
re-
desirable
^^
the
of
delay
transmission
in
production
Transmissions
troublesome
special
larger
easily
manufactured.
Foundry began
tank
were not
production
of
the
light
in
the
noted
in
Company,
Mack Manufactur-
a pioneer in this
field,
and
'
''
ASF,
also
from
Company. The
the
Iowa
Detroit
Transmission
Arsenal
not only
17
OO
470.8/75.
See also Min of Tank Engine Conf hold by the
Director of Materiel, ASF, 29 Jun 4;^, copy in
OO
ch.
107,
2,
2;
summary
100, pt.
iiiciil
ir.iiiis
10,
and Prod
Coinijoneiits.
later
Ltr, Brig
Glay,
for
OHF;
of
For
medium
further
tanks,
The
(6)
Tanks
in
data
see
P.irt
Design, Develop-
World War
on
History,
14.
II,
PE
Mack power
New York
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
247
tor, the
production
firm's
boring
made
In the
mills.
the
first
history of
Mack and
pilot models.
other contractors
could
these
window
characteristics
before the
war was
over.
cast hulls
tours-
into
production.
vulnerable to
the 90 -mm.
Armor
Pre- 1 940 tank production did
little
to
armor
in
World War
The
were made
II.
To
arms
fire
the
were
the best known material, for they had a
hard, bullet-resistant surface and a tough
back. Because the metallurgical composition of face-hardened plates made welding
extremely difficult, the plates were riveted
1930's
these
face-hardened
or bolted together.
As a
result,
plates
tanks of the
fire.^
World War
***
(i) Knight Memo, 16 May
Mack Manufacturing Corporation,
more than
II tanks.2^
47-48.
^''
(i)
tanks,"
-April
Brig.
OHF.
Homogeneous armor
has, insofar
as possible,
and
chemical composition
throughout, unlike face-hardened armor that is
harder on one side than on the other.
-' For an account of armor research and development, see Green, Thomson, and Roots.
Planning Munitions for War, Chapter XIII. For
conservation of alloy steel, see Chapter XVIII.
Progress in armor development is described briefly
the
in
cal
same
physical
Summary
of
the
19-22,
R&D
town Arsenal,
248
or
rolling
when
sloped,
armor.
vantages
delayed
process
its
adoption until
tank
were
hulls
produced,
one
by
other by
Rock
Island Arsenal.^"
way
1941.
M3 medium
the
and the
The most
start
was
find-
showed
firing
test
of
turret
The
casting.
case
for
homo-
had
it
equal
substantially
An
that,
resistance
to
if
properly
penetration
face-hardened
to
The
during the welding process, and to eliminate cracks that appeared in the armor.
Working on
plant
reinforced
Army
made
tried
fixtures
but
the
of
world had
armor except
at points,
To
the
Metallurgical
Ferrous
Board
Advisory
but
the
real
solution
The
lay
in
^^
ever produced.^''
-"-'
in
plate
The
World War
II, vol.
II,
EE Components,
p.
29.
light
Hist,
'
on
hardened armor was so difficult to produce and hard to machine that its use in
the expanded tank program of 1941-42
was out of the question. Building thou-
could
hull,
-'
prompted by
shape
plates
tanks;
History of
OHF.
-'
(i) Chase, PP
cago Ord Dist, I, pt.
-' Hist,
-'(1)
77, pp.
i,
pj).
Chicago Ord
Hist,
Phila
Dist,
Ord
I,
Dist,
pt.
i,
vol.
pp.
100,
i'-,6-57.
pt.
i,
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
ment
new
of a 6-ton
cast
M3 medium
When
described
tank
the
cast
was authorized.
the
resembling
as
tests of
ballistic
was
models
first
excellent re-
adopted
an
as
Henry Disston and Sons, and CarnegieIllinois, expanded their rolling mills. The
corporation not only operated the
latter
bath-
"inverted
showed
hull
249
its
enlarged
armor
plate
Pacific
alternate
type,
welding
or
riveting
together
over
one
its
producer
largest
ton,
in
Washington,
face-hardened
of
United
the
an
enlarged
The
States.
of
Ren-
existing
rounded contours.
hundred separate
In the
ary
fall
1942,
plates
of 1941,
and
castings, but
and again
in
Janu-
castings of
all
The Standard
of Detroit contrib-
came
when
it
be-
made automobile
kinds
all
Company
Steel Spring
bumpers, and
The need
when the
to build a
related equipment.
new
facilities of
Knight Memo, i6 May 45, p. 9. On producof heavy homogeneous plate for the Navy,
see Lt. Cmdr. Buford Rowland and Lt. William
B. Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World
War II, Chapter 3.
-^ For a tabulation of all cast armor foundries,
see ex.
in D. J. Crowley and Lt. W. Cadogan,
Narrative History of Cast Armor Procurement
Program 1940-45, 30 Jun 45, filed in study Development and Procurement of Cast and Rolled
-''
tion
existing cast
armor
plants, notably
Ameri-
armor
steel
also
when production
had
producers,
to
of rolled
be increased, leading
such as Republic
Steel,
Armor
Plate,
OCO-D,
editor's note in
aljo
130,
and monthly
(January-February
1942),
539,
Production Analysis Notes, TCVD, 1942.
D. J. Crowley, History of Rolled Armor Plate
'-"'
OCO-D, Volume
107,
OHF.
250
and machine
from steel mills. '^"
By the time plans for armor production
were well in hand the first cutbacks came
in September 1942. The Army Supply Program published at that time dropped the
requirement for heavily armored assault
tanks, thus reducing the cast armor requirement from about 77,000 tons per
to
harden, straighten,
cut,
rolled
plate
received
month to 57,000. When the over-all program for tanks and other combat vehicles
was further cut in November the armorfelt the effect immediExpansions under way were abruptly
producing plants
ately.
canceled,
review of
In selecting
future needs.''^
plants to be closed
in
produc-
Pennsylvania,
CMC
Cadillac
the
development
automotive industry.
the
in
Ordnance was
test reports on a
model were favorable.
Furthermore, the Cadillac engine was eas-
Cadillac-powered
to
ier
start;
made
it
speeds;
proved
to
easier.
its
M2A4
much
own power
Light Tanks:
of
light
time Commission.^^
Division
way from
the
all
its
Detroit to
five
hundred
engine
its
M24
'"'
(
Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team,
)
227-28; (2) PP 77, p. 75; (:<) Cadillac
I
pp.
terms of
In
tanks led
the
numbers produced,
procession
light
in
1939, 1940,
18-ton machines
Africa in
naissance vehicles.
World War
of
Knight Memo, i6
Warner, Jr., "Changing over
(4)
;.'"j-'if>;
L.
May
II,
45;
(5)
pp.
E.
Tanks," Auto-
to
15
Aj)r
47,
17.
p.
for Lt
Gen
Somervell,
Stopped by Ord,
Folder 400, Rqmts-Gen-1945, ASF Prod Div. See
also Memo, Col C. D. Wiman for Brig Gen
Nov 42, sub: Survey of Problems
Christmas,
Relative to Manufacture of Medium Tanks with
Cast Upper Hull, copy in Gen Clancy's file, ()C()
-D, D56-;h7
'For a listing of facilities and Ordnance i)lans
Dec
14
sub:
42,
Construction
Memo,
T-AC-,
to
CofOrd,
Armor
Plate
Miarkecl
Armor
'
'
Whiting,
folder
Dec
Facilities,
Brig
42,
with
Gen Christmas,
sub:
Incls,
Revision
OHF,
of
folder
Plate Facilities.
Statistics.
in
OCO-Detroit
file.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
251
use the
new automatic
transmission,
which
The
and
in
gate,
its
first
tank.
Quad
Ordnance
one
tional Harvester
Company to
unit. The
an integrated
as
new
paired,
new wiring
in
bankruptcy
concrete
operate them
roof
flooring
was
re-
and
laid,
throughout so that
International Harvester could build a new
installed
M5. In October
rings.^^
The
history of the
demand
be damned"
and a
company placed
designed
cially
for
new equipment
spe-
tank production
was
and
Because
unobtainable.
\'irtually
so
fixtures,
essential
mass production,
to
them
without
first
sent
at
the
did not
tank
itself
parts,
all
building
its
The company
over the
machine
did
Cadillac
start,
jigs
tools,
country
and, as
it
discover sources
housings,
gears,
clutch
and axle
it
drums,
''
parts
set
herringbone
shafts.^^
attitude.
The
M3
to
War
Aug
II, 15
44. All in
OHF.
Prod of Tanks
Memo,
in
World War
Gen Christmas
acting CofOrd, 9 Nov 42,
Light Tanks, Gen Clancy's
Brig
for
347-
II,
pp.
methods
to
War
best
and
files.
'"*
"cost
of
up a "parts
clinic" in its new car show room exhibiting 189 tank parts and inviting potential
suppliers to examine them and quote
prices on such items as oil pumps, axle
supply. In January 1942
Cities arsenal
Quad
Hist,
entitled
Chicago Ord
Quad
Cities
Dist, vol.
Tank
Arsenal,
OHF.
See
John C. Furnas, "Good-by Contract!" Saturday Evening Post, June 2, 1945, p. 18.
also
252
tion
and
over
orders
tool
this
fifteen
at
half the
approximately 20 tons.*"
not
could
Rock
Island
was
at
still
Then
middle of the
summer Ordnance decided upon a major
change of design equipping the tank
with a 75-mm. rather than a 57-mm. gun.
the project.
tanks.
meant
adding
the
redesigning
and
turret
sentially
The
first
es-
December 1942
production
.scaled
in
at
Quad
down and
April
1943,
effect.
Cities
Scheduled
was
then
discontinued completely
completion of only
after
thirteen tanks."^"
Meanwhile
Company
the
Marmon-Herrington
duction
tank,
light
tank,
the
M24.
In
the
spring
of
the
M24
tanks
The
Shift
From Grants
Shermans
The most
duction
in
to
ig42
plans
for
shift
medium
tanks
during
onstrated
the
mediums.
It
unsuitability
went
into
of
existing
production
in
and development
because it was more advanced than the
^^
design that later became the Sherman.
During its initial production, when the
spite of
'''
1944 and
the
in
to the over-all
In
Massey-Harris,
This
entire
(i)
inadequate
Hist,
sec. entitled
eral
4;^
Chicago Ord
Quad
14
of the Budget,
Dist, vol.
107, ch. 2,
Cities
Report on Military
(revised
test
Aug
43),
OHF;
(3)
War
00
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
were being eliminated,
engineering changes were authorized at the
rate of three thousand per month. They
ranged from minor modifications in track
design to major changes in the shape of
inevitable "bugs"
253
The
original
The M4A1
but
M4A2,
early
Soviet
M4
British,
was powered
arsenal,
57-mm. gun
use,
for
Canadian
produced in Canada
The
M4A6
Ram.
often called the Canadian
was powered by a radial air-cooled diesel-
of
later models,
first
Tank
posed
Chrysler engine.
The
designation
Tractor Company."*^
pillar
The armament
of the
M4
tanks intro-
AGF
Sherman tank
as
^'
17.
"Review
May
42.
OCM
file
470.8. For discussion of modifications
desired by the Armored Force, and the production
problems they entailed, see The Design, Development and Production of Tanks in World War II,
sec. EB Medium Tanks, pp. 20-21.
production in the
known
to
*''
in
M4A5
these
in
this
254
M4A3E2 was
the
As pro-
authorized. ^^
duction of the
got
Tank Depots
Ford assembly plants and were well lorail and water shipment. In
December 1942, when work on a proposed
gun plant at Lima, Ohio, was discontinued, the plant was taken over as a tank
depot, soon replacing Toledo. It was operated by the United Motors Service Division
cated for both
CMC. The
of
The
experience
that
strated
was not
it
tank plants to
accessories
arms,
first
install
radios,
demon-
1940-41
of
small
parts,
and
needed
to
delays
getting
in
items slowed
and
tories,
on
delivery
down production
of
spectacle
the
all
such
at the fac-
scores
of
factories
had a bad
parts
Further, as supply of
sories
was the
ment,
not
considered
"On
many
the
more
was
it
the
to
for this
Govern-
rather than
itself
contractors'
plants.
It
facilities
from manufacturers
in
made any
cations needed,
on
lend-lease,
those
for
and
in
January 1942
York Central
New
Toledo
Company
as
its
first
was
rather
than
to be put in tanks
Kingdom
or Russia,
generators,
Army
use
shields, smoke
and a smoke bomb thrower. To
for
its
operation.
at Chester, Pennsylvania,
and the
Mar
guns, see
tank
British
^**
in-
Two
countries.
Div,
Auto-Lite
''
tric
it
special modifi-
In
issued.
overseas
r8-22,
were
when most
lend-
lease.''^"
required items,
vehicles
Kingdom on
The
and other
Ordnance
contractor,
by Ordnance primarily
tanks
processing
for
at
Army
Vehicle Materiel"
disperse
of these acces-
responsibility of the
of
it
on labor morale.
effect
used
installation
make
cit.,
(i)
OCO-D,
p.
44,
229;
vol.
7,
vol
I,
pj).
Oct 44.
to 76-mm.
I.
in Hist,
sec.
vol.
pt.
I;
(3) C. H.
Service Tank
on
Industrial
OHF;
OCO-D, OHF.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
medium
tanks
255
were converted
mine
to
were
converted
prime
to
com-
The
tanks
damaged
arrived in badly
fire
parts from
control instruments,
and other
or
were
individually packed in boxes and stowed
inside the vehicles. Engines were protected
with an internal coating of preservative
oil and an external rust-preventive spray.
exposure to
salt
water.
Accessories
hung
in the
engine
and
to follow
up
all
January, General
Christmas forbade manufacturers to ship
types
of
vehicles
at
1943
parts.
dropped to
November, had
three.^"*
condition after
On-Vehicle Materiel
the shortages on
depots, which had averaged
latest
By March
List.
movers.^^
The
according to the
In
By the spring
of 1943 light
and medium
sixteen
not counting
Quad
which
Cities Arsenal,
producing tanks
stopped
in
The
month
April.
and
equip-
tools,
May
1943 a
representative of the Bureau of the Budget
ment,
was able
In
buildings.
to
report that,
all
con-
things
into
''1
production
W. White, Wartime
of Combat and
Difficulties
the
in
Motor Transport
Production
ICAF,
L48-87.
"'-(i)
Phila
Inspection
Hist,
containing
Depot;
(2)
McCluney
Ord
Dist,
Dir of
vol.
the
104,
pt.
i,
Tank
Chester
Intraoffice
to
Dept Industry
Integration
Comm.
for
Medium
Jun
Tanks, sec. IX, by Maj Louis .Antol, Jr.,
45, P4332. Development and production of tank
tracks are discussed in Green, Thomson, and
Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter X,
and in weekly reports by General Christmas in
i
History,
^'*
OCO-D, Volume
Tank Depot
OCO-D.
107.
sees, of Hist,
256
man
contracts,
no longer necessary
meet
to
falling
re-
quirements.^^
officials
The
estimated
under
contract
tank
Chrysler
the
at
spring
the
in
medium
of
costs
tanks
of
1943
arsenal
to
tracts,
the
for
but.
at
all
and were,
tion
in
fact,
little
more than
duction
all
quarter
last
eliminated
Sherman
capacity was
it
into
production experience.
The
Fisher arsenal
in
the
medium tank
cost-plus-fixed-fee
mated
whole
program.
The
producers,
holding
showed
these
The
cost
not
the
figures
in
were
fees
clearly estimates
They were
generally
when
four
Pullman
Car and
were
Standard,
still
the
sub:
3
9.
Glancy's
'"^
esti-
costs per
1943
(rev'scd
in
contracts,
of
Lima,
Foundry.^^
Ford, and Pacific
These cancellations reduced over-all capacity from approximately 8,000 to 6,600, but
"'"'
arsenal
The
of the
much
."^*
(i)
in
of
the
Budget
Rpt,
Both
OC()-D,
file.
Military
Review,
(2)
Bur
Mar
10
44,
The
MB
War
24 Oct 44,
D50-49 dr
2,
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
rate
production.
of
plants stopped
257
Car and Foundry, Baldwin, and MarmonHerrington in April, and Fisher in October.
By the end of the year capacity was down
to about 4,000
half what it was at the
start of 1943
but still more than double
The
1943-44
some
rose
areas.
rapidly
The output
in
difficulties
spare
of
in
parts
to complete ve-
relation
hicles.'''
duction.
and workers
Similarly,
the
war
other
to
pro-
accumulation
of
and raw materials was becoming a problem at plants where schedules were cut back. Efforts were made to
surplus parts
di\crt
su(
materiel
of
other
to
manufacture of
models
or even
over a period of several months- -to meet
sudden increases in theater demands. In
May 1944, for example, the ASF Requirements Division declared that restudy of the
capacity,
specific
"we should
once
at
medium tanks
The change
as many additional
we can get in 944." ^^
for
as
in
stemmed
calculations
chiefly
from two
to five
*'^
di-
because of changes
in design
The
labor,
stimulating production."
bottleneck
tank
the spring
in
push
""
in
The
developed
that
To
II,
Vehicles.
of
break the
production
in
World War
Chassis
""
I'rocI
of
Tanks
Oct 44.
'"
For
further
discussion
of
spare
sec
parts,
Chrysler
time
senal,
Tank
and Pressed
.'Xrsenal.
Steel
Fisher
Tank Ar-
Car Company.
For a brief summary of produ( tion bottlenecks, see Hiland G. Batcheller, A Report to the
doc. 365,
War Production Board, 14 .Nov 44,
'''
WPB
ASF
'''
Materiel, for
Acting
Wood, 4 Jan 45
Tanks.
sub:
Director
Tanks,
of
ASF
258
M3A3
at
Red River
storage
"remanufacture."
to
ted
early
the
as
summer
Campbell, during a
of
1943
trip to the
General
West Coast,
possibility of contracting
1 his new process the complete overhaul of combat vehicles- was, in the sum-
authorized,
mer
of
1944,
a natural solution
to
the
of
used
criticism of the
Army
resulted
when
irate
the
''^
10
It
was not
quantities
Memo,
Jul
ASF
44,
Director
sub:
Prod Div
file
until
tanks
of
ASF
Prod
473.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
tank condition.^
The
with a thorough
and
overhaul of
its
to start
tank
followed by an
engine, replacement of
reconditioning
tracks,
was
process
cleaning of each
disassembly,
partial
259
the
worn
adding
guns,
improvements made since the original design, and giving the whole vehicle a new
coat of paint. The total cost of remanufacture was estimated to be about half that
of building a new tank. After teams of
bringing
the
total
prohibitively
most
Quad
the
at
Evansville
Tank
Cities
Ordnance
doubtful"
if
by any means.^^
By March the storm had subsided. As
the defeat of Germany appeared more and
more imminent, tank requirements were
cut back and manufacturers received cancellation notices. The planned expansions
at various plants were halted. From the
peak of 2,268 tanks accepted in March,
production declined to about i ,800 in both
April and May and then dropped to 456
increased in 1945
in
By November
July.
had stopped
it
^^
altogethe*-
for
Shift to
Of
Arsenal,
(converted
Plant
components
Ford engines
and torquematic transmissions General
Hayes observed that it was "extremely
done
costly.
critical
Heavy Tanks
ig44-4^
in
all
from production of small arms ammunition), and the Montreal plant of the
American Locomotive Company.**^
By January 1945, the demand for more
CofOrd
try
an
all-out
upon
called
to
make
effort.
types of tanks
"^ (i)
Materiel,
nearly
10,000
heavy
Pershing
(M26)
or
the
Service,
stated
that
the
tanks
former
tank
producers
slow
process
that
ASF
Director of
for
OO
470.8/
53;
11
CG
Memo,
(3)
CofOrd,
13
1940-45,
^
45, p. XII.
Acting Director of Materiel for
Memo,
Tank
^1
45,
^^
to
Prod,
CG
470.8 Tanks.
OO
470.8/1793.
Summary Rpt
OCO-D, Dec
of Acceptance.
XVII. See
Review Recommendations
Divs
OCO-D, Dec
ASF, 24 Jan
Tanks,
Clay,
Overhaul,
ASF
for
Overhaul.
including
States,
of
the
45, p.
Ind
Serv.
also
1940-45,
Rpt
of
the
12
Apr
of Board
Operating
45,
sub:
OO
260
H. Harmon (Baldwin
mounting a 3-inch gun, produced by Baldwin Locomotive Works, is inLt. Col. David N. Hauseman, Brig. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, William
official),
To
we must
demand
for
and
heavy tanks
in 1944-45.'''
much
Seller,
December 1941.
'MO
210-13.
I,
pt.
War
7,
p.
II, pp.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
parts,
vital
261
in the winter of
dent's
program
called
for
1941-42
and
the Presi-
announced in January
five hundred heavy
tanks in 1942 and five thousand in 1943.
Two models of the tank were quickly
standardized and Ordnance contracted
building
Tank Arsenal
as well as
The
British
later
agreed,
apparently be-
Africa,
commensurate
to their weight,
had obso-
tanks,
in
spite
mechanical deficiencies.
of
their
many
trouble.
officials,
its
plan to
'^^
(
History of the
Development
Design,
World War
II,
Tanks;
OCM
(3)
M6
ized the
than
rather
later,
had an
May
18283, 26
hull.
electric drive
42, standard-
had a welded
M6A2, adopted
latter
The
and a
cast hull.
Armored Force to CG
Heavy Tank, copy in
AGF, 7
History of Heavy Tank M6, OHF. The attitude
of the Army Ground Forces toward Ordnance
^" Ltr,
CO
Devers,
Dec 42, sub:
L.
Arty.
Final Rpt,
M6A1, AFB,
Tank M6.
12
Test
Jul
of
43,
Heavy Tanks
copy
in
M6
Hist of
and
Heavy
scribes unsuccessful Ordnance efforts to gain approval for an 80-ton tank, with 8-inch armor and
105-mm. gun.
^o
24277, 29 Jun 44. See also Tank Re-
OCM
port,
1944-45,
OCO-D, DC-Heavy
Tanks,
OHF,
262
PRODUCTION OF TANKS
Table
21
263
Date
264
tank program
M6, launched
a heavy
The
result was
able to
were
that the Germans in 1944
heavy
with
oppose American Shermans
tanks which, though far from perfect, had
much tougher protective armor and more
powerful guns than did the Sherman.
Only then was Ordnance given a green
light
too
Pershing
have
late to
much
of the
effect
on
The
best
way
21
year
Even
tensive
except
as
many
1940, and in
more
tanks than
turned
out
1
Britain
1 94
the
United
States.
or
either Germany
demolish
These figures should serve to
some of the myths that have grown up
around German tanks. They should dem-
tanks as
Germany
onstrate for
Germany.
successes
all
did in
to see that
German
tank
skilled tactical
heavy German
German and
failure of
tive
British production.
considerations
aside,
the
Qualitafollowing
which
use,
of
in
arms.
CHAPTER
XII
some day
historians
label
engine war,"
line
exact but
of
or, if
may
future
the
World War
II the "gaso-
more
they prefer a
more cumbersome
title,
the "in-
war." As the
neared its midpoint,
military forces everywhere, on land, at sea,
ternal
combustion
engine
century
twentieth
the
in
experimental
World War
to
use
and
A-bomb, was
submarine propulsion
the mid-1950's. But in all the leading
harnessed
until
made
were
as jet propulsion
efTorts
in
Although some
field.
for
still
oil
pro-
commonly measured
horse
Two
1940's.
possible,
to put
everyone into trucks, buses, ambulances.
a war of movement.
In
World War
II the U.S.
Army was
its
history
on gasoline-driven
wheels. The purchase of more than three
and a half million motor cars and trucks
not counting thousands of tanks and
to
take
to
the
road
risburg.
Pa.:
Military
Service
development,
on Wheels (HarPublishing Com-
this
War
pany, 1940).
- Chester Wardlow,
The Transportation Corps:
and Operations,
Organization
Responsibilities,
p.
14
and
II
266
and other
vehicles,
and
all
one
In
respect
truck
supply
differed
On 25
Circular 245
ice to
became one
industries,
at once.
War Department
July 1942
was a
of the nation's
but
more stubborn
Transport
officers
for
ideal,
their
most important
standardization
fought so
one of
as
of
the
formally
and development,
maintenance, and
everything
except
research
procurement,
distribution
the
parts
Motor
long and hard
them put it,
problem.
Quartermaster
Corps'
unsuccessful
In the
storage,
virtually
operation
of
the
vehicles,
QMC
The
volumes
STATES ARMY IN
in
THE
WORLD WAR
UNITED
II series
do
QMC
The Quarter-
QMC
Histor-
For discussion of Ordnance vehicle charactersee pars. 87-89 of Westervelt Board Report.
Development of the Ordnance 4-wheel drive truck
^
istics,
The
The
experience of World
War
Army
of
roads,
ford
shallow
value
and be
had shown
streams,
4-wheel
It
drive- used
mainly in Ordnance vehicles and the
need for a 4-speed transmission, maximum
ground clearance, towing hooks and
the
of
pintles,
sturdy
guards,
electric
features."*
the
had
lights,
SAE
OCMH
motor transport.
of
Address by Lt Col Edwin S. Van Deusen bethe metropolitan chapter, S.^E, New York
City, 19 Feb 42, copy in MTS files. Speeches,
P4244. See also Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory,
"Army Motor Transport," Army Ordnance,
XXII, No. 131 (March-April 1942), 731.
" For an able review and analysis of the problem by a leading motor transport officer, see Ltr,
Depot,
Col Brainerd Taylor, CO Holabird
"'
fore
QM
QMG,
to
16
Dec
35,
sub:
Standardization.
articles
and speeches
in
History,
Holabird Ord-
consistently
officers
267
ad-
up on the
"pick
getting
truck
tions,
interpreted
General,
required
by the Comptroller
be
contracts
that
QMC
sign but
few
Army adopt
Nor could
trimmings.
military
the
its
as standard
speed,
to
the
The
delay
in
designed
Class
street."
specially
the
of
intention of
own.
validity of
some
its
its
these
of
of
Army announced
achievements
engineering
latest
not
time the
buying new trucks, scores of .manufacturers submitted bids. Nearly every time a
different company was the low bidder and
War
production in World
into
ease
of
in the field,
They
insisted
would speed,
not hinder, procurement in an emergency,
for it would permit all truck makers to
use parts already in production. They
As a
continued to add
to
its
result,
Army
the
tive
They
left
War
I.
commer-
cial types
made
it
Army
to
grounds.
cepted
It
way
many
wa.s,
of
to
ism or fraud.
It
guard against
favorit-
fill
Rqmts
sub:
20052-56;
Motor
Transport.
G-4/
for CofS,
10
I," Scientific
Jul 16,
Ibid.,
for
(2)
sub:
No. 21
The
contain
files
18, 5
Aug
of the
16.
QM
many documents
standard-
268
At the end
Corps
of the
master
attempted
develop
to
fleet
any way
it chose. In
1928, therefore, the
decided to buy enough commercial
QMC
assemblies
unit
and
axles,
trucks at
its
transmissions,
engines,
two complete
Holabird depot. This was a
so forth
to build
Quartermaster
tested
eighteen truck
Army
all
These
chassis
cording to
each
designed to cover
chassis
requirements.
size,
group
with
groups, ac-
five
major parts
all
completely
eighteen
in
interchangeable.
much
The Chief
of
thought
Staff
it
considered
advances made by
Manufacturers of parts liked the
Quartermaster plan, but many vehicle
manufacturers strongly opposed it.
In September 1933 the views of the
vehicle manufacturers triumphed when
War Department General Orders No. 9
appeared, virtually forbidding purchase of
parts and assembly of vehicles by the
Quartermaster Corps. It was followed in
the spring of 1934 by a decision of the
Comptroller General that further hampered the Quartermaster program by attacking the practice of buying parts for
assembly.'^ The prevailing view was that
tinuous
engineering
industry.
^^
In his annual Report for 1930 The Quartermaster General described the standardization plan,
listed its advantages, and concluded they were
QM
Edgar
Col.
S.
Review,
of
Stayer,
Motor
Military
in
No.
"Kll,
QMG
'iMemo,
bought
DeWitt
General
as
would. '^
(1932), 33.
for
TAG,
Oct
31,
QM
'- Special
Report of the
QMG
sub:
.
on Procurement
copy
in Roberts file.
See also Carstensen, op.
wherein much of General DeWitt's correspondence is cited, particularly his Special Report.
General DeWitt outlined the plan in Hearinns,
WDAB, H.R., 2 December 1932, 72d Cong., 2d
sess.. Part
2i4flr. See also Stayer, "The
i, pages
Year's Advancement in Military Motor TransQuartermaster
Review,
port,"
XII,
No.
(1932), 33, and Maj. E. H. Holtzkemper, Standardization of Quartermaster Corps Motor Vecit.,
that
it
much
entail
too
as
hicles,
Policy,
n.d.,
P4338,
in
folder
OCO-D
marked
Standardization
files.
Moscley,
ization
question, as do the
Standardization.
under 451
the
G-4 memos
cited
Standardization Policy,
QM
above are
NA.
unclassified
Specific
in
files
answers to
451 Proc
QM
A-54540).
13
the
269
of
middle
acts in the
the
barred
tartly
One motor
it.
transport
officer
war nor
fleet,
legally
^^
add to its
the spare parts problem
to
The command-
now
in
1935
360 different models of vehicles
the
Army
involve nearly
which neither
the War Department nor any other authority can control." ^^ Two years later
the Assistant Secretary of War termed the
situation "absurd" and blamed Congress
for requiring the Army to buy from the
lowest bidder.^^ Meanwhile, the German
Army adopted a standard fleet which.
million items of spare parts
in
1930's
1932.
German
was permitted
industry
in
produce
to
the
only
miUtary use.^
to the QMG,
Standardization.
letter
tion
Policy.
subject appeared in
Regulations on the
September 1939,
war
in
just
Europe, they
16
QM
For similar
December
1935,
sub:
Spare Parts
Automotive)
Statement
on
Procurement
(TankPossible Use
for
OCO-D
MS
Quartermaster
Review,
XVIII
(March-April
1939),
7-10;
(5)
German
X,
No.
59
270
any Standard
truck, nor
Fleet.^^
in this
failure
mass production
nents needed for
Class
types-
chassis
five
2-1/2-ton,
4-ton,
1/2 -ton,
and
1-1/2-ton,
7- 1 /2-ton. ^^
As a
ardized about
defense
the
Army
was
wide open
period
their
size.
door was
still
ment
of
The
and
models.
greatly
of
the
to be the
basis
special
tactical vehicles
for
compoand for
of
heavy
1920's,
enlarged
production
trucks.^^
From a
pushed along
up
slowly in the
by measures
at first
The Quarter-
and that nearly sixteen thousand new vehad been purchased during the
hicles
The Defense
Period, ig^g-41
In
tion
to
as
Interna-
of
firm
did
the
Detroit
office
consider
expansion.
of war.
With
It
was
little
mobile
plants
would have
fill.
The
more orders
worst deficiency
Corps and the Public Works Administration. These were all commercial types with
only minor modifications required by the
government. After 1935, when Congress
declared the
World War
vehicles obso-
TAG
--
The
status
of
this
activity
in
May
1940
is
OQMG
"^
Evidence along this line appears in the contractor histories on file in OHF. For example, the
request of the Mack Manufacturing Company for
an educational order to develop capacity for rear
axles and transmissions was denied on the grounds
that in time of war Mack would be called upon to
build on'y dump true' s and fire apparatus f'^r the
Army.
Hist,
Phila
Ord
Dist,
vol.
100,
pt.
12,
For a brief review of the immediate prewar situation, see PSP on Prod Ping, 16 Jun 45.
pp.
1-2.
lete,
Army" was
the
for
in
"remotorization
In
swing.
full
271
of
July
of standard
less
than in World
War
In addition to
I.
monopoly as applied
any particular type of truck." ^
When it enacted Public Law 703 on 2
July 1940 Congress opened the door for
ufacturers a feeling of
to
making awards
own
choosing instead of
the
five
the
mistakes
of
19 17-18.
First,
had
it
tried,
minimum
the
num-
1941
bidding, to keep to a
ers to
CMC
the
Dodge
4x4,
1-1/2-ton,
the
2-
1/2-ton.
advertising
The
purpose,
War
He
were
also
particularly
Memo,
-* (i)
QMG,
Brig
to
QM
pages
OQMG historical
OHF
19-24, copy in
See also Herbert R.
Rifkind, The Jeep
Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps, 1940-42
('943)) PP- 43-45^ copy on file in Historical Br,
Procurement,
titled
and
in
file.
OQMG;
and
Hearings,
WDAB,
testimony
of Craig, 24
1940, H.R. pp. i 1-12.
Jan
39,
copy
in
28 Jan 41,
OHF.
military
of
automotive
terms,
see
Handbook
of
published by
troit, Mich., 1944, copy in
-^
Memo,
QMG
OHF.
ASW, 19 Jun
QM
40,
451
(Proc FY 41). Representatives of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery
concurred in this request. For another such into
T-M
ist
September 1940, the report of a conferthe OASW stated, "It was the consensus
of the meeting that advertising for bids should
not be abandoned in favor of negotiated conto ASW, 13 Sep 40, sub:
tracts." Memo,
late
ence
Proc
as
in
of
QMG
QM
Program- 94 1
1
Supplies.
)
QM
400.13
(Proc
272
its
cross
last
the threshold.^
In that
chance to standardize
Army
to the
as
Army's
It
already in
type
behind schedule.
another,
to
began
to
lag
ran counter
continued as a
between Secretary
Patterson and The Quartermaster General
up to Pearl Harbor. By that time the
procurement pattern was set and Army
trucks had to remain pretty much what
they were. Thereafter it was largely a
matter of continuing to procure models
of
one
production
truck
July
widely as possible.
subject
from
shifted
military
trucks for
it
delay the
discussion
service.^**
the
1940,
trucks on
Management
nounced
a 50 percent cut
-"
^^
tor,
August
in
94
an-
OQMG
to
make them
in
QM
QMG
QM
451-T-M
Roberts
'"
(Proc
SAE,
FY
41),
photostat
in
file.
B.
Gregory,
Address
to
in
Ltr,
TAG
to
QMG,
17
May
40, sub:
XX
Jul 41.
273
the
Assistant
Secretary
of
War
would continue
to be the rule
The
and
negoti-
ing
front
Intricate
axle.
and
steer-
design,
in
its
made
exact
forgings
its
unable to
implement
allocated
plants.
Selection
of
contractors
of competitive
ceived
the
first
major
contracts.
For
re-
1940 the
Ford Motor Company was denied government business because it would not accept
the labor policy adopted by the National
Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC)
and approved by the President, but this
barrier was soon removed.'^'' Among the
more specialized producers were Mack,
Federal, Studebaker, Willys, White, Diamond T, Corbitt, Bantam, Autocar, Four
Wheel Drive,
low Truck and Coach, and Ward LaFrance. Behind these firms
all of whom
assembled complete vehicles were hundreds of parts makers such as TimkenDetroit Axle Company, Bendix Products
Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation,
Most
Components
problems of the
Quartermaster Corps stemmed from the
fact that Army trucks with all-wheel drive
required three important components not
used to any great extent in commercial
trucks
of the production
constant
velocity
joints,
transfer
specifications.^^
pany,
to
^^
WPB
Auxier,
Spec Study No. 17, 1946, pp.
conservation of rubber and other scarce
On
3ff.
see
10
tive,
^''
Memo,
WD
QMG for
QM
USW,
Apr
see
42,
Cir 43
AutoProduction (Detroit,
Manufacturers Association,
1950) (hereafter cited as Freedom's Arsenal), p.
82. See extensive correspondence between Jones,
Motor Procurement Planning Office, Detroit,
and
in the late 1930's, copies in Roberts
Contracting procedures are described in
file.
Memo,
for USW, 9 January 1941. sub:
Procurement Activities under the Various 1941
Appropriations,
400.13 (Proc Program 1941).
Contractor histories in the OHF give detailed data
on most of the manufacturers, including contract
information, specifications, and rate of produc'"'
motive
Mich.:
QM
War
Council for
Automobile
OQMG
QMG
QM
tion.
^'^
For brief description and illustrations of
Bendix-Weiss, Rzeppa, Tracta, and helical joints,
see Lt. Col. William C. Farmer, Ordnance Field
Guide, II, 725-31. For detailed discussion of
constant velocity joint production, see Memo, Col.
Van Deusen for Procurement Contl Div, OQMG,
400.13 (Procurement Program,
4 Jan 41,
QM
QMG
QM
161 M-P (Gear Grinding Machine Company) and Memo, William W. Knight to Knudsen, 16 July 1940, WPB file PD 631.241C. The
Daily Activity Reports and Weekly Progress Reports mention this subject frequently in
1940-41. The achievements of the Chevrolet
in producing joints is detailed
Division of
OQMG
GMC
in History, Detroit
Ord
Dist,
Volume
100, pt.
14.
274
and
earlier plans,
contracts
Transfer
pushed
axle
and
transmission
builders
above peacetime
levels.
Bogie rear axles required heavy
parts not previously made in any quantity
by the automotive industry and also greatly
increased the quantities of axles normally
used. Before Pearl Harbor the Quartermaster Corps arranged for two leading
manufacturers of axles and transmissions
Timken-Detroit and Fuller to expand
their capacity to meet anticipated requirements, but all such expansions took many
months to complete.^
their output far
Company
capacity
also
to
truck demands."*^
The
awarded
in
the surnmer of
were similar
cial designs,
to standard
commer-
was no need for new plants or extensive retooling, and both concerns got
there
into production quickly. The chief bottleneck at the start lack of constant velocity
joints
was broken when Chevrolet and
Fargo went into production of joints to
supplement the output of Bendix and Gear
Grinding Machine Company. Licensing
agreements were worked out to permit
production of the patented items.^**
Workhorse
of the
Army:
the 2-1/2-Ton
38 (i)
OUSW,
Oct
J.
Lawes,
OQMG,
copy
Roberts file; (2) Survey of ASP by
Motor Transport Serv, 8 Mar 42, MTS file.
3^ ( ) Survey of ASP by
Motor Transport Serv; (2) Memo, Maj Ralph G. Boyd to
William L. Marbury, SOS, 7 Apr 42, sub: Fuller
Mfg. Co.,
161
M-AL (Fuller), copy in
FY 1942, MTS
Roberts file; (3) Ann Rpt
files,
P4233, pp. 6^f[; (4) Progress Rpt
MTS, 2 Jul 42, P4229. For a discussion of the
bogie axle, see Sergeant Morgan O'Connor's
"Bogie The Army's Baby," Quartermaster Review, XXI No. 2 ( 94 ) 22.
to
23
41, sub:
Priorities.
QMC
in
QMC
QM
QMG
QMC
^ (i)
Hist, Detroit
Ord
Chevrolet;
Ord PP
in
Downey,
47,
Oct
negotiations
op.
cit.,
"
company
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES
The
275
Heavy-Heavy Trucks
tion of a
rough cross-country
travel,
smooth highways.'*^
The demand
for the
2-1/2-ton was so
it
ranked as
While the
light,
the
largest orders
smallest
orders
went
trucking service
Company
later
the
start
of
would delay
production and would cost
it
new
tooling. Al-
in
the
hundreds
mistakes
years.'*'
make an
vehicles,
so-called
truck
could not
for
were
"^
6x6's.
QM
276
at
in
Antwerp, Belgium,
December 1944.
The
Versatile Jeep
After successful
hicles the
The
truck,
new
only really
better
known
the
as
car
After
of
by
built
the
in
into
The
1930's
as
representatives
Bantam
American
Butler,
of
Pennsylvania/"
the
Ordnance
and studied
Bantam
its
these
cars
product, seventy of
Army
specifications,
Only eleven
feet
vehicles.
Bantam
ve-
quantity,
fast
attention
its
1940 on a lightweight
the
of
jeep.
the
think about
to
focused
car,
summer
Car Company
come
vehicle to
the picture in
tests of
Army was
^*'
The Jeep
Under the
came
reluctant to
the
order with
entire
Bantam, describing
it
with no productive
facilities
277
as
As Willys
meanwhile shown considerable interest in
producing such a vehicle, and were then
portance."
^'^
place a contract
to
subject
to
delivery
acceptable
of
pilot
this
Willys."^
among
it
identical
unable
proved
to
keep
pace
with
fast-
When Bantam
in
observe
to
the
that
preferred to have
company
Bantam
the
model,
it
and
produce in
time of war. Protests came also from proto
labor interests
In newspapers,
some
force.
After rigorous
tests
tural
weaknesses in
many
design changes
standardized.
Bantam,
of
tests that
When
all
Willys,
revealed struc-
three
and
led
to
the
QMC
was author-
on an all-or-none
it
called
Although
by a
narrow margin, the
preferred Ford
as a larger and more dependable producer
and recommended that it be given the
contract. But when the Office of Production Management refused to go along with
for bids
Willys
submitted
the
basis.
lowest
QMC
bid,
QMG
50 Memo,
Richard C.
for Brig Gen
Moore, Deputy CofS, 6 Nov 40,
451 (Proc
398-41-9), copy in Rifkind notes. See also testimony of Col Edwin S. Van Deusen and John D.
Biggers before Truman Comm., Aug. 6, 1941,
77th Cong.,
5*
For
ist sess.,
discussion
QM
pp. i978fT.
of Bantam
production,
see
memo,
Francis H. Fenn, president of Bantam, in Hearings, Truman Comm., Aug. 6, 1941, 77th Cong.,
1st sess., pt. 7, pp. i967fr; also. Van Deusen, pp.
i978ff and Biggers, pp. 2o67fr. An excellent summary of these events appears in Federal Trade
(Washington,
ig4y-48
Commission
Decisions,
QM
December
copy
14
December
pp.
30, 1940
notes;
30,
77-80;
Sub-Comm.
(Proc
451
and
Rifkind
in
(3)
QM
QM
QM
QM
QMG
QM
278
4x4
jeeps
interchangeable
parts.
of
Both
firms,
their
war.''^
Award
of the contract to
Bantam from
Ford excluded
and thus
vehicle
tion.
Bantam was
produce
small
but it built no
Army. Enlistment of big
producers was defended on the ground
that Bantam could never have turned out
jeeps in the quantities needed for World
more
trailers,
War
II.
decision
to the
employees of Willys-Over-
contract
MTD
award
the
jeep
Ord
279
Bantam
naturally
resented
these
After
language.*'**^
Production Lag
All during the defense period truck proin one category or another lagged
behind requirements. As early as October
1948
in
the
and
issued a
"cease and
model
built the
of jeep used in
FTC
investigation
of competition,
All
extensive
eventually
and
claims
us
the
in
Ordnance Department
was developed
and put into production by the Quartermaster Corps prior to the time when Motor
Transport was transferred to the Ordnance
Department on August i, 1942. None of the
credit for this achievement belongs to the
Ordnance Department and it would be presumptuous on our part ever to allow a
shadow of doubt on this point. ... It is a
very remarkable achievement for which the
Quartermaster Corps, and those who worked
fully realize that this vehicle
for or with
it.
We
of
duction
delivery
and
March
in
Secretary
War
of
the attention of
(i)
FTC
Army
account
giving
chief
(New
'S\>rk
.Additional
jn.
7.
79th Cong., 2d
sess.,
p.
7,
the
OCM
QMC
Manufacturing.
OHF;
ter
and Baxter,
14
October
1944,
Scientists Against
OASW,
451-2
itemizes
facturer
Motor
31
Oct 40,
and Auto
OCO-D,
Time, Chap-
XVI.
Memo, Lt Col William C. Young
ing,
(6)
to
^''^
'^'''
Jeep
credit
for Spald-
in
all
delivered to date.
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
280
urging action to bring deliveries more
eral,
In July
Time
Objective/'"
94 1
nation
the
took
measures on
drastic
And
automotive industry
the
all
war production.
Detroit
in
ahead
to issue orders
Of
of pleasure cars."^
many
the
reasons
the
for
lag
in
QMC.
ties
Requirements kept
new
everv'
for
estimate of
trucks
Army
rising with
needs; priori-
remained low;
steel
of
productive
capacity
and labor
some plants.^^
for certain
The program
lacked
momentum
and
transmissions,
axles,
because
Memo,
USW
&
transfer
chiefly
cases
QMC
and the Office of the Under Secre"For the past two years," wrote the
of the Procurement Control Branch
for
QMG.
Mar
file
451.2 Motor
"^
Jul 41,
dr
same
file.
Memo, Maj
(i)
1940.
QMC
tary.
of
^''-
in
chief
cars
and
""
motor
Prod
tor
Motor
OUSW,
Br,
18
Jul
41,
for Direc-
sub:
Vehicles,
QMG
Norman
Charles
19
Proc of
B; (2)
Rates and
for
Time
QMG
QMG
QM
USW
tion
Difficulties,
P4228.
For
25
MTS
January
summary
of
1942,
the situation
files
as
of
November
'
success.
...
."
the
WPB
Dcc 44, p.
7 citing General Limitation Order
L-I-C and L-3-a, both dated
Jan 42. See
also Operations Rpt of WPB Automotive Div, 26
Dec 42, WPB 053.108 NA. Trucks in the hands
1
It
is
felt
of
is
that
long
and dealers were frozen temand then rationed to war industries. Production of special types of civilian trucks was
""^
of
manufacturers
porarily
The
Pearl
First
Year of
War
to
piecemeal
1942,
permitted later.
"'"'
For a critical analysis of the results of this
policy, see Report, Truman Comm., 78th Cong.,
1st sess., S. Report No.
10, pt. 13, 15 Dec 43,
pp. iB-25.
in
281
De-
ried
trucks
year's
troit last
die.
It
production
the
model
greatest
change-
only 7
constituted
percent of the
oxer
in its history.
tion
entire industry
making, confi-
industrial
in
challenge of war.
on wheels,"
When
its
War
Produc-
"When
General
the
Somervell
straight
down our
war
observed
"he ran
^"
capacity
for
to
alley."
Production Problems
hard
"^
Newsweek, February
''"^
cree
aluminum,
still
in
short
steel,
supply,
motive
Council
of
the
Week with
"Detroit's
capacity,
judging
by
titles
War
p.
For a
42.
such
as
the
1942,
p. 17.
<io
Saturday
Evening
November
Post,
21,
1942,
p. 16.
"
Survey of
QMG, FY
tion Difficulties
(3)
p. 4;
QM
1942,
Survey of
QM
p.
69;
ASP
by
(2)
QM
ASP by
1942,
version Job."
industry's
9,
MTS.
titled
QMC
282
tion
was
considering
vell's
and
ities.
The impetus
ally
in
of
The Quarter-
wrote
metal product,"
high
Motor Transport
items,
to
priority
along
get
as
best
Service'^
it
could
had had
an
with
seemed.
it
cases,
constant
make
velocity
QMC
called
for,
along with
economy in
and other rubber
needed steel had to
strict
tires
products. Deliveries of
QMC
mended
that,
the
of
QM
QMG
While the
Ordnance
MTS
QMG
was recommending
re-
to
SPQMC411.5
'^
'''
(i)
1942, pp.
Jul 42.
(Steel).
QMC
Progress
Rpt
Survey of
port Serv,
for
Summary
OQMG
study of truck production goals, and industry was building new plants for pro-
Materiel,
in
to
including
"'
The Transfer
Army trucks by
and had recommended that
abuses in maintenance of
Fur-
transmissions,
joints,
Nearly everything,
of
drastic
axles,
for
area
the
tion?
stafT
the U.S.
-42.
283
research,
the
for
The T-AC,
the
war.
new command
in the
With manufacture
middle
both
of
many components
and
ASF
so
on
mak-
QM
crisis
but
original
Ordnance
ing
first
of
requirements
sky-high
the
dropped considerably,
and were soon to drop more.^^ Production
of bottleneck items was steadily increasing,
and the trend toward procurement of
more and more different types of vehicles
had been halted. '^^ The War Production
'"
CG SOS
(i) Ltr,
to
CofOrd,
II.
It
caused the
to
shift
World War
Ordnance of
thousands of
schools
they
civilians,
operated.
Motor Transport
officers,
The
chief
make
of
the
James
led
to
far-reaching
organizational
establishment
of
OO
020/
Transfer of Motor Transportation.
Cir 245, 25 Jul 42, sub: Transfer of
47; (2)
Motor Transport Activities, par 10, as amended
Cir 267, 8 Aug 42; (3)
by
315, 28 Jul
copy
42, sub: Transfer of Motor Transport.
.
the
of
ASP had
WD
WD
ODO
QMC
OHF. The
in
is
to
be
Risch,
in
ASF
version is found in
Role of the Army
Service Forces, p. 302. The Carstensen version is
the most detailed and comprehensive account
extant. Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell's views are
167-81; the
Organization
42, pp.
Millett,
expressed
in
and
personal
letter
to
Thomson,
XL
Green, Thomson,
see
and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter
IV, and references therein cited.
^ Prod Analysis Notes for Oct 42, by Ping Sec,
the
T-AC
Mfg
Br,
81
organization,
T-AC.
82(0
TAG
QMC
MTS,
Jul 42.
CG SOS
Ltr,
Ltr,
TAG
to
to
(2)
42,
284
still
wooden
to
steel
showed most
a
Steel,
bodies.^''
but
supply,
short
report prepared by
just
cargo
Ordnance
production
in
October
on schedule or
behind schedule. The very
vehicles to be
little
Development work was also nearly complete by the time motor transport came to
Ordnance, and definite steps had been
taken to freeze existing models. In June
1942, after the 1/4-ton jeep had been
adopted and the 1/2-ton truck had been
eliminated
ardizing
favor of the
in
War had
Secretary of
the
eight
chassis,
all
destinations,
Prod
Existing
SPQMP
QMC
pp.
War had
AR
CG
Bodies
(3)
Progress
(4)
Army
OHF
850-
for
December
1941,
QM
Statistics
QMC
2-8.
Detailed
requirements
for
1943
are
to
be
Ltr,
TAG
to
CG,
AGF
AG 451 (6-5-42),
rescinded an earlier
letter on the subject, dated 6 April 1942, AG 451
(4-4-42), MO-SP-M. See also Ann Rpt QMG,
OCO-D,
FY
451
Ping,
42,
Oct
MO-SPOP-M.
AG
Wood
ume XXXVIII,
**""'
sub:
Ltr,
(5)
sub:
Aug
Br,
nonstandard
equipment were to be completed but not
renewed or extended.
contracts
65fr;
41 1.5
8 May 42;
MTS,
Jul 42;
Maintain Truck
(Steel); (2) Survey
further declared
accordance with
42,
QMG,
to
8*
15
QM
25.
by
for
MTS
by
Ordnance Industry
Wood Cargo Bodies, OHF.
T
T
T
White, Corbitt,
in
Made
development,
Committee
ASP
(7)
procurement, and
standardization of wheeled vehicles would
be co-ordinated by the
Technical
all
Efforts
WD
General Motors
General Motors
Secretary of
that
or heavy
Press Release,
(6)
of Steel Annually
Dodge
Diamond
Diamond
Diamond
right
piers
Aug
and Brockway
The
of
crucial
42,
4x4
3/4-ton, 4x4
1-1/2-ton, 4x4
2- 1/2-ton, 6x6
4-ton, 6x6
4-5-ton, 4x4
5-6-ton, 4x4
6-ton, 6x6
swim-
cranes, was a
problem for the Allies in 1942. But
ASF was cool to the idea of taking on a
new and possibly impractical type of special vehicle. Nevertheless NDRC, working
benefit
Rpt by MTS,
1/4-ton,
turned over
for developing a
responsibility
tee
QMC
of
then in production:
the
3/4-ton,
following
The Dukw
16
Jun45.
This
letter
285
Hf'
Noumea.
New
Cale-
closely
architects,
tests that
truck took
its
Ordnance
used
Dukw
qualities
or Duck, from
and from
for 1942,
its
axles. It consisted of
for
for front-
a watertight body on
it
could accom-
Noumea
at
Dukw was
in
March
later.
General
Dukw
to be "invaluable."
reported
the
^"
nick-
amphibious
manufacturer's code
its
for utility,
1943,
^'''
name,
in
successfully
fifty
supplies.
The
NDRG
the
in
Dukw,
Scientists
of
and
are
Against
the development, as
Navy's lack of interest
presented briefly in Baxter,
phase
in
far
Men
in a
218,
Dukw's
War
s''
II.
(i)
OCM
18950,
Col.
286
The
success
combat
test
of
Dukw
the
in
soon led to an
first
its
increase
in
requirements. In
Company that
Manufacturing
Dukw production was "of utmost urgency
^^
Ordnance was
in the war program."
Coach
to
From
ules.
rose to
.Ml
his sched-
1943, production
before
tapering off.
1,316 in 1944
4,508
in
told,
sign changes.
including
substitutions
material, were
save
to
made during
critical
the production
some
did
it
manufacturing
unusual
such as
but
vehicle,
fabrication
of
the
present
problems
tubes
sealed
Dukw was
Crisis in
The
maintenance
in the field."**
Heavy-Heavy Trucks,
1943-45
During the
first
truck production
six
of
1943
at a fairly
XXV,'
(November-December
No.
141
Paraphrase of secret Msg from
Algiers, Eisenhower to Marshall, No. 86, CM-IN
-9804 (14 Jul 43); (5) Ltr, Gen Marshall to
Bush, OSRD, 22 Jul 43, copy in OHF; (6)
Summary Technical Report of NDRC
ch.
4. See also Colonel Van Deusen's folder marked
Amphibian Research in Roberts file. A report on
the Sicilian campaign by Lucas is quoted in
Memo, CG ASF for Deputy CofOrd, 10 September 1943, sub: Report on Motor Vehicles in
Sicilian Campaign,
451/2038.
nance,
'943)) 557;
(4)
OO
to
ASF
double
in
procurement of heavy-heavy
its
35,000. Fighting in North Africa had demonstrated the need for thousands of heavy
trucks to tow big guns
War
be Subject No.
Ordnance
huge
new
" Telg,
on the
justification
for the
were at first
They knew that manufacture
WPB
Nov
"^
requirements,
skeptical. '*"
Co., 27
going
officers,
their superiors
"It's
24 hours a day."
i,
43,
to
ASF
4f)i.2
Memo, ASF
Director of
557; (3) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 14,
Sununary
Contractor
History Chevrolet;
(4)
ch. 4.
Technical Report of NDRC
'" (i) Rpt, Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Springfield,
Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 5, OHF; (2) Memo, Brig
Gen Christmas, T-AC, for CofOrd, 2 Jul 43,
sub: 1944 Prod of Heavy Duty Trucks, with 2
Incls and 2 Indorsements,
451.2/636 (c);
(3) Memo, Rqmts Div, ASF for CofOrd, 26 Jul
43, sub: Proc of Motor Vehicles, Incl to
400.12/9285 (c)
(4) Memo, Brig Gen Christmas, T-AC, for CofOrd, 25 Jun 43, sub: Status
of Proc for
1944,
45 1/ 1692- 1/2
(5)
The Automotive Industry in War Prod.
months
moved along
Then
Steady pace.
struck.
OO
OO
'^
OO
13,
15
also
skeptical.
Dec
43,
78th
287
of
effort
memo on the
Campbell estimated that
the new 1944 schedule would cost about
three quarters of a billion dollars and
would require the labor of 200,000 men for
matter. General
that
observed.
"It
all
we be
is
my
considered
is
One
We
specialized
Ordnance
Mari-
\ehicles."
approved a
in May, were
August when WPB
high-priority farm imple-
production
heightened early
large,
International
that
normally
built
Some, like
were industrial
vehicles.
Harvester,
Among
in
their
Memo, CofOrd
for
CG, ASF,
.\ug
12
43,
OO
400.12/
Program,
9218. The same estimate was made by W. B.
Murphy, WPB Deputy Vice Chairman for Prod, in
Memo, to Krug, 29 Sep 43, WPB PD 631.241.
"' Maj Gen Hayes, Min Conf Ord Dist Chiefs,
Springfield, Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 5- OHF.
""'
Memo, Lt Col George W. White, T-AC for
Mclnerney, OCO, 6 Aug 43, sub: Accomplishment of 1943-44 Truck Program, OO 451.2/
sub:
ment program.
firms
built only a
truck
heavy
^^
civilian
dustry
War
to
is
he
,"
practically."
job
We
opinion
that
Our
gram.
032
1943
The
1.
Truman Committee
criticized
the
lack
of
in
civilian
December
truck
pro-
duction.
"'
Aug
43, sub:
00
9^
Oct 43,
p.
I,
OHF.
Dist Chiefs,
Philadelphia,
288
Ward La
Foundry,
Most
like
of
Mack, they did not make their own engines, axles, and transmissions but purchased them from other companies such as
it
held
month.
In the
and
plants,
new
on, Continental,
The
top
key to
axles,
engines,
and
transmissions,
working
at
full
capacity.
relations all
tion
Indiana, peacetime
.senger cars,
driving axles.
Timkcn-Dctroit,
an
idle
lined
many
delays,
it
finally
took
over
slot
machines
to
St.
after
Louis
nondriving
for
big
trucks,
the
WPB
Production
Consultants
^*
follow-up
For a
and
Trucks,
folder,
file
for 1944.
'*'*
Com-
Dist Chiefs,
Springfield,
Mass.,
p.
132,
in
for
list
urgency
production
the
of
^' (i)
04095,
Automotive
NA;
(2)
Min
Comm.
Prod
of
Mtg
at
files,
631.-
T-AC, 29 Oct
sub:
file
19-B,
over-all
program
production.
Report
of
See
for
also
Chairman
of
civilian
IVar
WPB,
Production
Page 21.
in
1944,
district offices.
289
^''^
for
see
memo
WPB
truck production.
the
"special
shortage
manpower and components were "beyond
power
the
and
rect."
of the
the
of
^^'^
the
for
of
failure
cor-
few days
^"3 (i)
1943.
In
in
the
last
spite
done, the
of
everything
that
could
be
...
bring
and
to
the
new producers
time
required
to
The
sight. Col.
Emerson
L.
Cummings
bluntly
ASF Prod
Nov
18
WPB PD
1944:
is
going to be
Div,
400.12/
ASF, 30 Oct
19-B, 451.2
Memo, CofOrd
for
CG
Situation.
ASF, 30 Oct
Situation with
Critical
^"^ (i)
Manpower
NA.
sub:
43,
631.241 C,
Respect
ASP Prod
to
43,
Prod
Div
of
19-B,
OCO,
for
Proc
Program
OO
Memo,
Dec
00
400. 2/
1
ASF,
in
May
NA.
man
1944
Div,
19B,
No.
78th Cong.,
Prod Comm.,
11
for Prod,
Murphy, 4 Feb
.
Truman Comm.,
pp. 18-25.
of Mtg Automotive
requirements, see
in
43,
Rpt
WPB PD
44,
Dec
WPB
44, sub:
631.2412,
Apr
CG,
for
Situation
Critical
Automotive Equipment,
451.2 Trucks 1943.
All
missions,
Prod,
.
sub:
new year
to
OO
Equipment,
of
10
for
Automotive
(1943);
(3) Rpt of Conf on 1944 Truck Program, 2 Nov
43, by Brig Gen Walter P. Boatwright, OCO-D,
10*
quarter
CofOrd,
Memo, CofOrd
sub:
Equipment,
ponent shortages can be solved, vehicular production in 1944 may not equal the
attained
."^-
10898; (2)
43,
completion of new plants. In fact, wrote General Hayes, "unless manpower and com-
had
that
Bush, Chairman of
E. J.
after
and push
components,
critical
rate
treatment"
Nov
It
directives
WPB
Ordnance Department
automotive industry to
Normandy beachheads,
consolidated their
we can
creasing
290
1944
1943
50.862
^32,014
2,788
4,918
February
2.976
4,189
March
3,038
5,245
April
3,404
4.783
May
4,002
4.574
June
3,800
4,222
July
3,980
2.538
August
4,518
1.545
September
4.888
October
5,566
November
5,555
December.
6,347
Total-
January
_.
the
WPB
Production
Consultants
Com-
WPB
Chairman Donald M.
Nelson that, since truck production was
"sadly behind schedule," someone in authority had to decide what was wanted
most and then had to enforce that decision. "Someone must recognize bottlemittee, wired
necks
given to castings."^"**
directives
treatment,"
Under
the "special
mediate
WPB
problem.^"'"*
This
procedure,
had psychological
It
proclaimed to
in the
as well
all
one of the
WPB
arsenal,
as legal effect.
industry that
compo-
Truck
hicles,
Jun
4.'3-
Trailers,
Nov
43,
way over
all
other
291
traffic,
it
source.
at the
^^^
to July,
initial
enemy
the Allied
resistance
from the south. Hard-driving armunits led the advance that soon
brought about the liberation of Paris and
Paris
of
all
France.
To
kinds.
hamper German
resistance,
over
To meet
ever-lengthening
supply
this
in
The
had
its
truck
re-
demand
constant
for
heavy trucks
to
Road
to
truck
slowly
of 1944 heavy
gained momen-
output,
in
boost
production
totals.
air
also
^^^
and
to
ored
campaign
Italian
The
Prod,
Ltr,
WPB,
to
4,
Jun
WPB
44, sub:
PD
I,
ch.
file
XIV.
CG
ASF,
Vehicles
for
23
Jun
44,
sub:
Cargo Hauling
files
451.2
R&D
file,
OHF.
292
but the chief reason for increased output
was simply the passage of time. No
matter what
else
was done,
bring in
new producers
ponents.
In
the
case
it
took time to
of essential
com-
Standard
Steel
of
to
"You
on and
rise
'^^
ments^
1944
off like
initial
demand
for 67,000.
for
it
ex-
May,
carriers,
fire
gasoline or water,
this area.
in the pro-
weapons
trucks,
remarked,
officers frequently
a spigot."
bomb
delivery
November 1944
As Ordnance
it
panel
rear
drives
give
to
them
When
de-
ma-
chine
gun or
were known
when
built
artillery
light
as
gun motor
primarily
pieces
they
carriages, but,
for
transporting
'''
The
latter
in
large
quantities.
The
and
Louis Ord Dist, V, p. 13, pp. 72101-102; VI, pp. 90-100, VII,
PP- 55-64; VIII, p. 73-80, IX, pp. 90-103. See
also Hist Rpt, Ord Industry Integration Cotnm.
for Axles and Transmissions, 1943-45; Rpt Meeting, APC, 28 Dec 44 (dated 3 jan 45), in APC
file PD 631.04095, WPB files, NA; and monthly
reports to WPB on Critical Programs by Hiland
G. Batcheller, 1944-45, WPB 210.3 R, NA.
'"' (i) Memo, Director Auto Div WPB for Lt
**^Hist,
St.
Ordnance procured
a be-
dump
trucks to
178 pages in
known
fall
of
1943 required
TM9-2800. Among
types were
ambulances,
the better
carryalls.
sub:
'
'
ters
and X.
16,400 half-
These two
with
the
Diamond
Company and
the
International
along
concerns,
Motor
293
Company,
Harvester
produced
ASF
directed
Ordnance
1943 to turn
in
22,837
nance
The
earliest
War
II
track
requirements,
but
otherwise
half-track
During World
ployed
pose
Tractors
to
save
Before
war,
the
commercial-type
for
towing heavy
only
tractors
artillery
trucks
and
were available
weapons, and it
demanded
ditions
specially
designed
ve-
trucks but
struction machinery.
maximum
tire
sizes,
hicles,
and
in
^^^
started production in
ing
the
13-ton
and
18-ton
types
until
1944. Roughly
^^^ (i)
OO
TM
271-81 (2)
^2 Whiting,
;
121 (i)
Weapons
9-2800,
of
sec.
World War
II, pp.
X.
Statistics, p. 42.
OCM
22535,
30 Dec 43;
(2)
OCM
16
OO
Engineers,
Transfer
to
45 '3/ '94- See also correspondence on this subject during October 1942 in Gen Clancy's file,
OCO-D, D 56-347.
Tractors
294
Half-Track Cars M2, built primarily to transport cargo and personnel in combat areas,
nearing completion at the White Motor Company, June 1941.
for
battlefield
progressed,
recovery.
But,
as the
types
war
came
medium
i.e.,
mounted
machine gun on the roof.
.50-caIiber
ing
first
equipment
The
1
ture
mud
a single-boom crane
to Pacific
greater
to
production.
boost
Basically
MiAi
darried
wreckers,
the
6-ton
model was
Car
capac-
ity.'^2
for administer-
Weapons
of
World War
II, pp.
14
Oct
44,
Mack and
by
295
Diamond
the 4-ton by
123
from 1939
vehicles
more than
1945 amounted to
vehicles, counting
Combinations
Truck-f'^ailer
to
million
of
truck
so-called
tractor,
size
size.
shaped
body
axles. ^"*
This type of
to
an
with
either
trailer
variety
infinite
of
and was
could be
fitted
from pigeons
to horses,
Some models
laundries,
served
photographic
mobile
as
or
laboratories,
Still
others
were specially designed for hauling telephone poles, chemical containers, bombs,
radio antennae, gasoline, or ponton bridge
material.
the
same
combination
was
essentially
the
and was
and
semitrail-
of firms participated,
a few hundred
and
The
of thousands.
volume came
biggest
in
the smaller
sizes,
Cerstenslager,
Nash
Willys-Overland
ducers.
Gramm,
all
World War
cost of
II transport vehicles,
tools,
was some-
the
The number
number
of
of
and
making
scores,
subcontractors
^^^
included
ments.
in
could be put
than
It
ment came
trucks of
uses other
list
map
car,
or
trailer
In
the
Kelvinator,
among
larger
Highway,
the
sizes,
Fruehauf,
Tf^ailmobile,
list.'^*'
and
leading pro-
and
^-^ (i) Summary Rpt of Acceptances, TankAutomotive Materiel 1940-45, pp. 113-25; (2)
9-2800, pp. 286-313; (3) PP 47- PP- 54-56.
^'-*
A trailer had two axles and could "stand on
feet." A semitrailer had only one axle
its own
and had to rest on a dolly when not on the move,
or on the truck tractor which pulled it.
TM
^-'
TM
^^^ (i)
Summary Rpt
of Acceptances, TankWhiting,
(2)
1940-45;
Statistics; (3) Summary Hist Engineering-Manufacturing Division, OCO-D, copy in OHF; (4)
Ord Supply Catalog, ORD 5-3-1, Hq ASF, 9
Aug 45; (5) Ordnance Wheeled Vehicle Program
1939-45, prepared by Rqmts and Progress Br.
Prod Div, OCO-D, 28 Mar 46, copy in OHF.
Automotive
Materiel
296
Table
Item
23
of noninterchangeable
components
Many
quickly multiplied.
297
all
planes.
With
the flow of
Dukw,
ECO's on
was
military trucks
with
experience
in
other
areas
war
of
in the
Ordnance
field
and the
vehicles.
Office Chief of
sometimes asserted that truck production in World War II was unduly delayed by the Army's search for perfection.
Prolonged testing and retesting of vehicles
by the technical services and by the combat arms have been blamed for loss of
precious time in getting volume production under way. But the facts do not bear
out this criticism. There was rigorous testing of pilot models, to be sure, followed
by numerous design changes, but the
It is
testing
Minor mod-
the
designed,
jeep
tested,
En-
in Detroit.
sound
principles,
but in
their
many
instances
came from
no explanation
purpose or necessity,
offi-
as to
and without
ignorant of what
and
of
One
^^^
World
^'-''
R&D
MS
Ord
The
"I'll
wuz wrecked in
combat."
models
(2-1/2-ton)
of requirements both in
fell
short
set
299
of course. Countless examples of
mechanical ingenuity in keeping vehicles
running might be cited, but the toll from
neglect and abuse was terrific. Overloaded
vehicles were driven recklessly at excessive
speeds over good roads and bad with the
tions,
that
tion in 1944,
result
it
to military trucks by
with
the
need
for
treating
their
possessing
more mechanical
aptitude
rate.
tires,
at
an alarming
nance discipline, many soldier drivers appeared to consider their position behind
the wheel as an opportunity to demonstrate
both their courage and their powers of
destruction. Bill Mauldin, the Army's satirical cartoonist, once drew a soldier mechanic, possibly from Ordnance, standing
atop a pile of wrecked vehicles and calling
to his buddy, "I'll be derned. Here's one
what wuz wrecked in combat." Much of
the hard usage meted out to trucks was, of
course, unavoidable, but
or not,
added
maintenance.
hicles
to
all
of
it,
avoidable
The
casualty rate
among
ve-
nance
chapter
units
is
so
heavy,
that
separate
lem of spare
parts.
CHAPTER
XIII
connotation.
something
suggests
It
unimportant,
dull,
and
also brings to
mind
the thought of a
wheel on a
uninteresting.
It
fifth
famed correspondent.
Pyle, the
cart,
It
as
is
much
lost
will
delay
pletely misleading
As far as
no exaggeration
particularly
for
In
trucks
and
tanks,
posed
The
gasket that
GI Joe on
is
is
World War
if
nut that
the road
he didn't have
past
spark
items
ical
condensers,
generators,
pumps,
kets, fuel
of
mechan-
tires,
carburetors,
gas-
tities
ran
into
fact that
"When
nance
ofTicer
The
basic
problem
or
my
reason
lies in
truck
years,
less
well off.
Ord-
be written across
will
were
heart."
for
the
does not
spare
Army
blasted
And
simple item
like
categories,
including
tank
for
"like a
usually
different
and tires,
They formed
parts
hoss shay.
millions.
one hundred
as did the Deacon's wonderful onelast
several
the
may be immobilized
Maj Gen
and
OHF.
points;
301
as
such
blies
as
complete
They ranged
engines
or
rear
from delicate
springs weighing a fraction of an ounce
to tank engines weighing more than half a
ton. They had to be produced in huge
quantities and also had to be named,
numbered, packed, and shipped to all
corners of the globe. "Almost anywhere in
the world you can get spare parts for the
family car when it breaks down," Colonel
Van Deusen once observed. "Not so with
an Army truck; it has to take its mechanic
axles.
civilization
may
with
rate
spare parts to
lease countries
If
it.
war the
in
size
it
travels
light
it
Ordnance shipment of
the using arms and lendamounted to more than one
of
When
and trucks were placed beside tanks and heavy guns, the contrast
between commercial design and military
cars
direct supervision.
on the other hand, were designed by industry primarily for commercial sale, and,
before the war, only incidentally for sale to
the government. As wholesale and retail
outlets
plies
all
of spare
Army
locally
and
trucks,
to
half
that
time.
Decades
of
development
fairly exact
parts
through
speci-
same was
keep
For discussion of spare parts supply, numbering, and distribution within the Field Service area,
see Chapter XIX, below. For a brief summary of
the spare parts story, see draft of booklet, Ordnance Spare Parts in Mechanized Warfare, August 1944, copy in P4341, OHF. A much more
detailed account is Clifford and Alspaugh, Record
of U.S. Army Ordnance Combat and
Motor
Transport Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and Operations. Brief historical reports and scores of documents are to be found in OCO-D History of
Spare Parts, Project No. 54, Volumes 43-44,
P4336. See also section on spare parts in Annual
Report Requirements Division ASF, ASF file.
Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, 18 Jan 44, New
''
"'
York, N.Y.,
p. 4,
OHF.
302
day
missions
strenuous
their
day,
after
and
terrain,
rifles, guijs,
While
fired only
hicles.^
had compiled a
specialists,
list
of "essential
combat,
time."
could
rise in
plies available
QMC
Ordnance
to sharply
from commercial
combat
from
the
engineers
With sup-
tion,
outlets, the
other factors.
experience,
make only estimates, taking into account the number of miles the tanks would
known
as
The
"first
parts
on
this list
year parts"
or,
were
because
parts
made
"concurrent parts."
Standard
shop supplies such as solder, welding rod,
vehicles,
as spark
hicles
it
scopes,
Ordnance had
to maintain
of such parts.
It
is
its
own
supply
burden
weapons
for
firmly
rooted
and
in
in
Ordnance, ig^g-42
The Ordnance
tanks
placed
contract
with
for
American
329
light
Car
and
War
War
in
It is also significant in
I,
II
because,
history
of
following
the
vehicular spare
standard
and
currently
with
ment
it
World
parts
Ordnance
parts
as
well
as
for
the
oil
seals,
radi-
vehicles,
these
items
When
Ordnance
depots
occasionally
bought
directly
or
requested
from automoprocurement
district offices.
hicles they
dealers
tive
OO
00
T640-A.
and other rubber products, see Green,
and Roots, Planning Munitions for
War, Chapter XVIII.
^
poUcy,
batteries,
tires. ^
1940.
Spare Parts
plugs,
ator hose,
complete ve-
For
tires
Thomson,
This
stocks.
practice
303
served
well
mounting flow
the
quantities of
many
of
confusion
all
equip-
carburetors or
extra
as
tank
or
guns.
The
and
94 1.
survey in the
industrial consultant,
fall
in
fiscal
1940 by an
Lawrence
S. Barroll,
of
its
parts
policies
and
practices
Many
tion.
conferences
discuss proposed
One
start
was again
called in late in
new
procedures.
^^
between Field Service and Industrial Service. Because of the nature of their functions these two services did not always see
eye to eye on spare parts.^^ Alert to its
duty to keep depots and field units always
well supplied, and mindful of its long experience with the knotty problems of maintenance. Field Service gave high priority to
spare parts.
The
War
half as
additional
machine
was the
When
General
of
complete
calculation of requirements.
parts
that
Service
Field
wanted
for spares,
records
of
" Roy W. Stosch, Spare Parts and Supplies Replenishment, sec. 6 of PSP 63, Stock Control and
Supply Control Policy and Practice, by OCO, Jun
OHF.
45,
all
give
not
demands
plans called
much
of
did
tires
satisfy the
carload
quantities
spare
it
did production of an
ment.
In 1940,
idly gained
did
lists
item.^"
more
by pressure to procure
complete items. Production of a carload of
directly influenced
Memo,
00
The
Field
lists,
1940.
For
Service
see
is
304
be supplied automatically, at least in the
early stages of war. "I did not believe in
blind
were
1939
unfilled.
still
was
of
little
set
chiefs
complete items.
consumption experience."
^*
Lacking ex-
Another
by Barroll
difficulty cited
in his
parts responsibility
ices
He recommended
that
Meanwhile a conference of
and Industrial Service reprecame to the opposite conclusion
arsenals.'^
Field Service
sentatives
that
the
Industrial
responsible
Service
preparing
for
should
parts
be
year
Novem-
Parts
lists
before
the
Industrial
Service
Appointment
of this
in
reported.
Rock
them
direct
language
in forceful
and
way
possible."
^^
compiling
in
parts
lists
new
for
With
the
AGF
light
been
in
tank order
provided
medium
tank,
lists.^*"'
ber
parts
and
the
later
i^Ltr,
to
Thomson, 25 Aug
Harris, Jr.
(Ret.)
OHF.
55,
FS
for
ORDIR
i"
T640-A.
Memo,
00
Lists,
1^ (i)
451.01/98.
Ord SO No.
Wesson Confs,
board were
the
Service,
Nov
Oct
263,
40.
Fiscal Division,
The
and General
in
Office.
The
OHF.
parts
was
giving priority to complete items and was
neglecting parts. He complained that some
orders
placed
with
the
arsenal
in
OOM
'
"
305
still
lists
late
as
item posed
When
its
own
peculiar problems.
reports reached
Ordnance from
Wesson
teletype
to
Rock
Island
sent a
authorizing
im-
"The demand
With many
Ordnance parts
requirements were excessive, and complain-
ished
as
articles
parts production.
given
highest
the
But
the
in April
list
transmissions.
Field
to
in industry to neglect
The Chief
of
Ordnance
1942
trict offices
and
had constantly
combat a tendency
possible." ^^
War
and other high-ranking officials kept almost daily tab on the output of tanks,
guns, and ammunition, and constantly exhorted Ordnance to speed production.
of spare parts,
clearly stated
major items.^^
Ordnance also gave
livery of
attention
close
to
Service,
production to boost
duced
per
day
look
very
well
the
in
cannot
fight this
war with
statistics.
we
.
jectives early in
for
^^
Spare
Parts
for
Feb
26
^^ Barroll
Rpt,
1942, p.
19,
in
**
23
Teletype,
CofOrd
00
41,
file,
sub:
ORDIR
to
CO
PSP
63, ex.
2.
451.25/5199.
OHF.
00
Amberg, 25 Jul
Ltr.
In the early
F. Sadtler for
T640-A.
difficult.
Tanks,
OHF.
44,
sub:
Truman Comm.
306
Wesson
retired at the
General
successor,
made
the
survey.^"
Its
mission
was
to
and
see
they
that
Field Service
Service.
May
Jr.,
1942.
MTS.
the
spring
ASF
formed
the
parts
matter
of
When
1942.
the
newly
troubles
observed
stemmed
Ordnance's
from the fact
that
view of these
mended
facts.
that the
new
In
division
and assigning
duties
its
to
tion." ^*
final
The Spare
Parts Board
authority on parts
lists,
but
was the
its
au-
procurement and
survey of Ordnance in
May
-**
GM
"' (i)
ODO
285, 26
Field Service. ^^
un-
years of persistently
"solve"
to
efforts
307
in a
Ordnance
into
the
parts
transport
ment
parts purchased to
depot stocks.
QMC
The
fill
deficiencies in
systematic procurement of
year spares
first
vehicles.^^
the
until
Spare Parts
in the
QMC,
ig^g-42
Pearl
during
All
War
the
before
years
QMC
made no
World
To
Harbor.'^^
keep
lend-lease
QMC decided to
II the
financial
its
provision for
resources too
were
lists
ve-
hicles supplied
made a
later
lists
part of
to be incor-
The same
domestic
all
the
same design
When
as
commercial
vehicles.
QMC
pur-
vehicles
For Army
were no lists of
basis.^^
there
31
as there
was
for
combat
vehicles.
In the
of 1940, as the
Army's
fleet expanded,
the motor depots
were authorized to build up small reserve
truck
stocks
of
parts
vehicle manufacturers.
experience
of
industry
Transport Division
ders endeavored
to
staff,
depot
comman-
in
ASW,
(2)
Pers Rpt,
Dec
.
QMG
QMG
QM
MS
QM
QM
40,
QM
(3)
Ann Rpt
'''
For
451.01
M-FO
QMG
lease,
Ill; (2)
Corps
see:
Establishes
on
in
OHF;
purchase in the
Ltr No. 8, 28
and Alspaugh, op. cit.,
local
(i)
CliflFord
Ann Rpt
OQMG,
(Holabird), copy
1942.
restrictions
summer of 1941,
Aug 41, quoted in
major source
two years.^^
MTS
QMG
OHF.
stocks of parts procured
in
13
of Repair Parts.
p.
The depot
28 Jul 42;
OHF.
'- See Barroll Rpt,
285,
Chief FS
Island, 6
Jun 45, sub: Stock Contl Activities 1941-45, copy
for
summer
ODO
i,
curement of parts
(0 Change
"' (i)
QMG
Ann Rpt
1942; (2) Stosch, Spare
and Supplies Replenishment, PSP 63, sec.
6; (3) Press Release, OQMG, 4 Sep 41, sub:
Quartermaster Corps Establishes Spare
Parts
Parts
System.
308
commercial experience, "^^ they had to be
revised as time went on to bring them into
line with combat experience of the Allied
nations. They were known variously as
first-year lists, concurrent lists, and United
Nations lists. For export shipment, and also
for a time for domestic use, they were put
up in loo-unit packs, that is, packs with
enough parts in each to maintain one hundred vehicles for a year of wartime servPreparation of United Nations
months
lists
took
of painstaking
completed
the end of
until
while the
hicles
own
thousand
spares.''"
obvious
After
that
As
policy.*^
established
immediately flooded
departed from
its
who
"independents"
ply
parts
vehicle
to
the
to
so-called
manufacturers
claimed
be
to
ju.st
good
as
but
were
original
as
wa.s out
without
Harbor
Pearl
further
first-year
became
it
reliance
of the question,
on
local
for
fleet
spring
the
1942
Director
of
In
the
Motor Transport
in
service.*"
The Mu-
friendly
nations.*'
To
avoid
''^
For detailed comment on the differences between roniniercial experience and military experience, see Memo, Raaen for Amberg, Spec
Asst
disrupting
to
Comm.
SW,
Ltr.
Jul
25
.
copy
in
44,
sub:
Truman
OHF.
'**
commercial
also
the
purchase
parts.*'
ice.'"*
dred
MTS
(i)
Parts
6;
'"*
QM
QMG
berg,
to
or addressee,
Motor
(2) Ltr, Creamer, OQMG,
Supply Depot, Fort Wayne, Ind., 15 May 42, sub:
Misc. Spare Parts Purchases, 1940-41 Vehicles;
(3) Hist, Spare Parts Proc Policy, 1942.
turers,
initiated
OHF"; (4)
Policy, 1942, p. 3.
^''
(i) Statement
Hearings,
by
Mead Comm.,
Hist,
Spare
Boatwright,
pt.
26,
Parts
29
pp.
to Tossy,
Nov
Proc
44,
11927-28;
QM
309
was happy
to
ceiling of
lo percent on parts.
He
soon
for
parts
so-called
addition,
spares were
for incorrect
first-year
list,
and
spares
were ordered as
needed to keep depot stocks up to par. The
weakest link in this chain of supply was
centage
it
list.
usually
60
Calculated as a per-
of the first-year
list,
cies
appeared
in
the
first-year
list
and
curement.
after the
It
was abolished
July
in
in
1943,
favor of
by
actual
records
of
consumption
and
stocks
quarter.^"'
It
should be noted that neither the
Quartermaster Corps nor Ordnance attempted to supply spares for all parts of a
given vehicle.
low
in
most
cases.
In
spares.
The many
bits
and
pieces
that
went into small assemblies such as generwere not issued separately. Nonfunctional parts such as fenders and hub caps were seldom issued at
all,
for vehicles would still run even if
these parts were missing, and replacements
could usually be obtained from other ve-
ators or carburetors
of
parts
In
replenishment
the second-year
be-
number
different
and
make up
the
in
later.**
deficiency
ordered as needed to
calculations
months
six
Nevertheless, the
repair.
first-year
second-year
up or otherwise damaged
hicles .shot
yond
Motor Transport
Ordnance
September 1942,
problem went through
several different phases. At the outset,
from late 1942 to the end of 1943, the
Service with
spare
the
parts
Memo,
(i)
in
Brig
Gen
Brehoii
Somervell,
ACofS, G-4, for QMG, 5 Feb 42, sub: Automotive Parts, G-4/22328-153, and ist Indorsement,
Frink to Somervell, 26 Feb 42; (2) Memo, Frink
for Gregory, 15 May 42, sub: Si)are Parts, copy
in OHF. See also Admin Order No. 51, MIS, 4
Jul 42, in folder marked Whom Do We Buy
From?; Ann Rpt
1942; AG Memo No.
W850-5-42, 24 Aug 42, sub: Automotive Parts
Policy; and Sparc Parts and Supplies Rejilenish-
QMG
ment,
Memo
No.
W-700-;52-43,
AG
July 1943. It is
described in detail in booklet entitled Sparc
Parts Requirements Policy, Procedure and Practice
for Ordnance Vehicles, Sei)tember 1943, T-AC,
copy in OHF". See also Memo, Duffy, OCO, for
ASF, 27 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc
fi
CG
00
451.01/8190; Memo, Howard, OCDD, for Col Phillips Smith, ASF, 8 Mar 44, sub:
Spare Parts Proc Policy, T617; Memo, Col EmerPolicy,
Cummings
Spare
Parts
for
Policy
From?, P4;540.
"'
ment methods,
see
Memo, Raaen
00
for
Amberg,
2'')
Truman Comm.
Spare
Parts
310
demand
for
meet the
to
How
production.
insistent
parts
the
to get
them
as
Mead Committee
in
effort
was
and
distribu-
tion.
his
'*^
serious matter."
advising
Districts
them
that
henceforth,
contractor,
if
the
that
protested
tractors
ac-
corresponding
this
Many
con-
policy
was
lists
Getting
Out Production
speed
spare
for
parts
both
throughout
One
was that
reason
1942.
spare parts carried a lower priority rating
in the
as in
for
requirements
that
had
shot
upward
catch up
complete
for
in
1942
later.
when
necessary to
make
made
Memo, CofOrd
^^
OHF.
Maj Gen Levin Campbell
*^ Ltr,
Keller,
president,
Chrysler
of
Chrysler,
to
request
Corp.,
K.
to
27
T.
Jul
42,
00 45I-25/38333''"'
quoted
42,
the
in "ClifTord
and
Alspaugh,
op.
cit.,
Oct 42,
3. For General Campbell's comments on this
following spring, see Rpt Conf Ord Dist
84.
p.
See also
Ord
Fiscal Cir
162,
17
Chiefs, Detroit, 22
president
difficult
major items unless delivery of the corresponding spare parts was up to date. At the
same time he wrote directly to K. T.
Keller,
extremely
it
production
vehicles.'"
copies
able, he
original
to
par.
upset
also
schedules and
vehicles
leaving spare
changes
of
'"
Oct
42, sub:
OHF.
copy
in
improved
gradually
311
as
re-
into
new
Army
War Department
well supplied,
stocks
spare
of
materiel
issue
initial
types of
chiefly
for
to
which
parts
practice
of
abandoned
ual items.
ordering
in
parts
avoid
in
sets
Each
was permitted
service
second-year
spares
had
been
parts
war
procurement
in
period.
own
its
interests
and
to avoid charges of
Complaints
group.
dustrial
had
fact
in
-'^
Memo,
Spare
parts
Committee turned
of
its
1943 the
attention to the
Ord-
Memo
of
May
44,
in folder
revision
of
T-AC,
Jul 43, in
also O'Neal,
Procurement-Contractual Provisions.
(
Remarks by Maj Gen Thomas Hayes,
Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, New York, 18 Jan 44,
pp. 2-5, OHF; (2) Notes for Spare Parts Mtg,
22 Feb 44, by Wells, in notebook marked Spare
Spare Parts,
'''-
ORDIR, T640-A;
12 May
WD Spec Comm.
Deputy CofS
.
WD
Cir 227,
Jun
334, G-4.
44.
Nov
434, 9
^^*
see
to
Truman
ORDIR, T640-A. On
Parts,
lists,
"''
summer
44.
the
government had
Parts,
Fur-
substantial.
to
stopped in
pattern
cated
motor vehicle
for
annually
was
either
supply.
ment
With roughly
being spent
The
procurement schedules to
overprocurement or short
Truman Committee
created."'^
the
counts.
tinued."^
the
for
CG
ASF,
12
Dec
Jan
WD
See also
Cir
Spare Parts, Proc-
CofOrd
TIG
i
44,
sub:
Memo,
Proc of
Indorsement CG ASF to
copy in OHF, and Memo,
CofOrd for Hayes and Hatcher, 16 Dec 44, same
sub, copy in OHF. The legal consequences of the
new method are treated in Spare Parts Procurement-Contractual Provisions.
Spare
Parts,
CofOrd,
16
and
Dec
ist
44,
312
who were
turers
willing to
quote lower
bought the parts from the original proadding their handling charges to
ducers
the price paid by the government. '^^ It
was
many
of
spark
distribution.
The
track-laying
vehicles
Ordnance
had
ar-
commercial design,
method was
to
the
procure
most natural
from the
parts
vehicle
their quality.
QMC
until the
summer
practice of the
when
of 1942
the
tried for a
short time.''"
es-
is
sential to
necessarily
fit
common, sometimes
Parts
types.
other
called
brake
tubes,
tires,
came
plugs that
spark
or
lining,
in various sizes to
make
or model.
On
'''^
fit
their
As an
Homer K.
illustration,
Ferguson,
OO
ASF,
27
Dec
43,
sub:
Request
for
Info.
QMC
discussion of
OQMG,
CO
OO
policy,
see
Memo,
Barzynski,
QM
QM
313
by
of the
most
Ordnance
telling
officers
in
arguments used
defending the
manufacturers such
as
General
Motors had experienced specialists to han-
hicle
dle
the
job
of
placing orders
parts
for
and
finally
nance did
Ord-
Had Ordnance
attempted
to bypass these firms and purchase directly
from several thousand parts producers, it
would have been faced with the virtually
not.^^
of the
for
inspectors
its
established
032/383, copy
(3)
OQMG
OHF;
in
Lane,
Spare
it.^^
many
small
task
gineering
of
co-ordinating
changes
between
countless
the
en-
vehicle
Parts
Notebook;
Maj
Comm., Hearings on Automotive, Spare
of
Parts in
00
451.01/7977.
'^
See Brief for Processing and Development of
Concurrent and Replacement Spare Parts Orders
Received from Government Procurement Agencies
by Chevrolet Motor Div, GMC, Incl to Ltr, E.
W. Ivey, Chevrolet, to Maj Robert Bruce, OCOD, 16 Jun 44, copy in OHF.
"- Unsigned, incomplete draft of Memo from
OCO-D to CofOrd, 28 Mar 44, sub: Specific
in folder
for the Truman Comm.
Info
marked Purchase Policy, V, P4337. Similar views
appear in Memo, Brig Gen Gordon Wells for
in
Amberg, 25 Apr 44, sub: Specific Info
Lane, Spare Parts Notebook.
6^ (i) Statement by Boatwright, 29 Nov 44,
Hearings, Mead Comm., pt. 26, pp. 11,927-28;
(2) Memo, Col Phillips Smith, Deputy Director
ASF Purchases Div for Browning, Director ASF
Purchases Div, 5 Apr 44, sub: Proc of Standard
Motor Vehicle Spare Parts, copy in folder Whom
.
Do We Buy From?;
Memo, CofOrd
(3)
for
Amberg,
dubbed
The
needs.
in
manufacturers.^"
One
have been required at a time when Ordnance was barely able to recruit enough
00
314
who
of
all
Army
representa-
and also of
a leading industrialist, Arthur G. Drefs,
president of McQuay-Norris Manufacturing Company, who reviewed the whole
parts procurement process in Ordnance at
General Campbell's request. Although offering certain specific criticisms, and urging more direct purchase from parts manufacturers, Mr. Drefs' report in July 1944
stated that the parts industry as a whole
endorsed existing Ordnance procedures
and concluded that, in the time available
to it in 1942-43, Ordnance "could not
have recruited an organization which could
have handled the job with the same effectiveness and at the same cost." ^^
But the picture was neither all black nor
all white. On some parts interchangeable
it was entirely
feasible for Ordnance to
purchase directly from the parts manufacturer. A leading example was the carburetor. Three companies dominated the field
Bendix, Carter, and Zenith
and the
Senate committee counsel, Mr. Meader,
successfully argued that Ordnance could
tives
perhaps with
trouble,
less,
that
could
it
truck
from
Direct
purchase
whenever
became the established Ordnance
the
feasible
parts
manufacturer
But
in
many
not feasible
war.^'"'
was
turers lacked
staffs
ment
had no
business,
governoverseas
facilities for
main-
correctly
was
and transportation
dling
costs,
eliminated
and
simplified
manmanu-
facturer
be
start of the
only
very
as
time
As U.S. Army
units
supplies of spare
that
moved
into overseas
Ordnance
bases,
parts
were inade-
Mead Comm.,
(i)
Hearings,
26, 20
pt.
Nov
44,
00
Nov 45,
Manufacturing Division, OCO-D,
P4332; (3) Hearinfi Before a Sub-committee
i
Howard,
Mar
copy
Col Olaf P.
Winningstad, OCO-D, 11 Sep ^^4, sub: Problems
Involved in Direct Purchase of Parts.
copy
in
OHF;
44, sub:
and Memo,
Spare
CliflFord
Parts.
in
OHF.
for
4.1-
S.,
OCO-D
P4;5;56-
"^
sess.,
2d
315
as
written by Col.
Our
chief
age of
Ward
personal
E. Becker:
headache continues
be short-
to
moving maintenance
fast
letter
wheeled
parts,
vehicles.
Our
maintenance.
Another reason,
however,
is
We
have
lack of maintenance discipline.
rear axles for
trucks "running out of
our ears" but zero stocks of point sets, main
.
GMC
were
they
name
properly
not
or number."*' Unusual
es-
vehicles
.
because
lost
identified by
caused
damex-
Ordnance by
to
investigator
field
excessive
An amusing
who
declared
North Africa
were so imbued with the thought that
water was not fit to drink, and so indoctrinated with the importance of good care
for their vehicles, that they poured wine
ingless.
unpredictable
and
it
ment
resulted
tanks.
Each
feel that
The
my official
^"^
conditions were
of requirements,
all
these en-
set
and was
suitable
spectacular example
Ltr,
Aug
43,
Comm.
''-
Ltr.
to
by W. E. Burnett of
C. Pace, OCO-D, 12 Jan
report entitled Verification of
GMC
OHF.
told
Maj Samuel
See 4-page
Statements Made in Ordnance Spare Parts in
Mechanized Warfare, and Ltr, Burnett to
-D, attn Maj A. E. Hadlock, 21 Sep 44. Both
in folder marked Cost of Spare Parts, P4338.
44.
OCO
316
shipments of hundreds of vehicles.
But the system soon proved too inflexible
for everyday use and had to be abandoned. As Colonel Becker's letter reveals, a
depot might quickly use up all its fastlease
When
came
of
little-used
parts,
To
over
axles.
like
it
in
full
including duplicates of
sets,
all
points
like
left
Under
requisition
needed,
this
and could
issue
them
in
small,
with
cross
all
terchangeable.'^
number
by
parts
references to
Much
of the information
this index.
information
parts.^^
cycle
pounds.^^
tomotive
increased
of
usefulness
the
each part in the supply system and improved service to maintenance companies
in the field. But it was so cumbersome
and complicated that in some instances it
"reposed on the shelves of organizations
throughout the war with very little
~'
use."
When
interchangeability
fects,
usable quantities.
There was
criti-
on
this policy
the
all
types of au-
43,
.
Aug
Parts,
44,
Alspaugh, op.
cit.,
pp. 31-32;
pp. 20-24.
(3)
and
Clifford
Jul
(i)
Ltr,
44,
sub:
20-24.
"'
for CofOrd, 23
by Drefs, T617, ORDGL.
two lo-volume
in
index was published
series designated ORD 15-1 and ORD 15-2.
''^
1st Indorsement, CG Sixth Army to TAG, 8
Jun 48, on DA Ltr, 6 Apr 48, AGAM-PM 451.9
Aug
The
(30
44, sub:
Mar
48).
Rpt
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES
Chart
Spare Parts
tuYiNG FOR
317
Vehicles,
"
Millions of dollars
400
1200
1000
800
600
1940
1944
1945
Total
War
"The transfer of the Motor Transport Service from Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department in
1942 made an uneven break in certain accounts at a time when continued action was more important than
Records of expenditures were not kept separately for several of these years and accordingly
accounting details.
the above annual allocations are strictly in the nature of estimates which we believe, however, are fairly accurate
reflections of actual spare parts expenditures.
Army Ordnance Combat and Motor Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and Operations
1940 to 1945, by OCO-D, Nov 45, copy in OHF. Compiled under direction of Lt. Col. Daniel J.
Clifford and Maj. R. O. Alspaugh.
Source: Record of U.S.
from
Mead Committee
the
Ordnance
from the
tion
officers
December 1944.^^
derived some consolain
officers feel
sion
to
combat
support
troops.
At
first
on spare
vehicle
I
is
parts:
don't
all
the other
with
time
spare parts for kitchen ranges in QMC. We
had a terrible time with spare parts in radio
equipment. We are having perhaps the worst
situation of all in the Engineers with respect
to spare parts for construction equipment
It
is
equally
services.
and
We
tractors.'*
applicable
had a
seas incredible
in
to
terrible
''^
S.
Report No.
Mead Comm.,
78th
Cong., ad
sess.,
Dec
19
Buy From?
^^
Rpt Conf Ord Dist
44, PP- 24-25-
Chiefs, Detroit,
2a
Apr
318
But the
was not
greatly
the
standardized, and in
whole combat and transport vehicles program.^*' Yet parts deliveries were frequently behind schedule, and vehicles
were often delivered with some of their
tools or spare parts missing. For trucks
or tanks at bases in the United States, the
problem was usually not serious. But for
were actually more different types of vehicles in service than in World War I
about 330 as compared to 216. Standing
increased.
ing.
II there
somewhat mislead-
and the
1-1/2-ton,
the
jeep,
fleet
World War
2-1/2-ton
all
World War
II
situation in
made good
for months.
at a
in
larly
Although
slow.
routes, particu-
struck a
more
from
reports
and
overseas
optimistic note in
1944,^^
at the
parts to permit
more
Had
ized
its
Army
the
truck
by World
War
of different
War
mum
II
fleet
in the
1930's standard-
along the
lines suggested
number
makes and models in World
I
experience, the
to a miniof
parts
The number
of
parts to
recommended
combat zone mainte-
troops overseas,
its
abandonment
of all
Mar
(0 Memo,
OO
44, sub:
01/8190;
OCO-D
81(0
for
sub, copy in
Mar
44,
same
Coffey,
Ord
OHF.
Ltr,
Brig
Gen John W.
Hq SOS, NATOUSA,
CofOrd, 24 Jun
44; (2) Memo, Brig Gen Stewart E. Reimel for
CofOrd, 30 Jun 44, sub: Automotive Spare Parts;
(3) Memo, Raaen for Amberg, Spec Asst to SW,
10 Jul 44, sub: Overseas Rpts on Automotive
Parts Supply. All in folder Automotive Parts SupT615. Refply Situation in Combat Areas.
erence 3 summarizes findings and reports from
Officer,
to
many
sources.
See below.
48,
AGAM-PM
451.9 (30
Mar
48).
instead
vehicles
that were
repairing
of
319
those
during
World War
II
had met
all combat
approximately 85 percent of
zone maintenance needs.^'* He therefore
all
Army
damaged
or
cease
worn
its
effort to
vehicles
and
combat zones^was contrary to their experience.^^ In World War II, they declared, the tendency was all the other way,
toward requiring lower echelons
in
tical
or might be torn
Although
means
down
to
attractive
as
among Ordnance
officers
little
with
favor
overseas
solution.
Better
ization of designs,
ords
of
rec-
accumulation
of
interchangeable
Patient
all
to
at-
acknowledged
the
normally issued.
superficially
For
conditions.
difficulties
experience
all
was
The
perform
recommended.
paired at
to
asserted that
They
8* Ibid.
85
Ibid.
8^ 1st Indorsement,
Jun
48, on basic
DA
Hq
Sixth
Ltr, 6
Army
Apr
48,
to
TAG,
AGAM-PM
ETO.
CHAPTER XIV
Ordnance
of
World War
appears at
II
materiel
first
in
glance to
and rejected
The
conform.
to
if
they failed
had merely
to
examine
World War
was
II
Ordnance inspection in
more complicated than this description
Though some inspection was
suggests.
routine in nature, much of it was complex, difficult, and troublesome. Few Ord-
far
Ordnance
inspection
commercial
standard
differed
inspection
from
chiefly
to which Ordnance
Drawings and specifications for guns and ammunition called
for closer tolerances than most commercial
because of the
materiel
work,
was
for
weapon
failed to fire in
loss of life
use
put.
exploded or
an emergency might cause
that
among American
troops, result
effect
manufacture materiel
industry's ability to
Of
they
neces-
a compromise be-
represented
practical.^
of
class
measured with a
and then given the
visually inspected,
of instruments,
actual
firing
at
test of
a small
arms were
spected
variety
in-
specifications.
artillery
ured,
their
paces at a
fire
control
for
the great
special
techniques
precision
required
because of
in
their
as-
each
lot,
plant;
usually
samples
at
of
range
tactical
'
For discussion of
Mueller,
The New
World War
II,
this
near
the
ammunition
the Ordnance
artillery
York
Chapter 12.
Ordnance
District
in
was applied
inspection
to
was subject
that
passage
was applied
production
with the
to deterioration
"In-process"
inspection
various stages
along the
time.
of
at
to check on processes;
line
it
known
"screening"
as
per-
inspection,
out
Ordnance
nonacceptable.
the
Ordnance
tor.
selves primarily
tion,
materiel
offered
by
the
contractor
in
But acceptance
materiel
final
during
manufacture,
before
had
be inspected
to
it
specifications.
all
sorts
of
by
engineers
rejection.
w'th
before
final
acceptance
engineering
to be
or
mixed
familiarity
No
of
the
functioning of
the
end
321
From experience and training, Ordnance inspectors knew that materiel that
deviated from the tolerances set forth in
the drawings and specifications might
function perfectly
or might fail at a
side.
critical
reject
serviceable
on
materiel
the
to
nar-
rowly
even
cerned
tion
artillery
con-
summed
specialist
troops.
it
the matter
up
as
follows:
Conformance
there
exist
to
arbitrary
design
limits
to
implies
that
variations
in
an increase
variation
in
means
am-
munition or an increase
taining
ceptable
items;
variation,
though
there
it
Types
M608
^
of inspection
Inspection Manual.
PSP
13,
Jun
45, vol.
I,
are
described
ch. 6.
in
ASF
322
cil,
stamp,
items,
seal,
some classes of
numbers or serial
or tag. For
identifying
lot
within
on
staff inspectors
its
its
preparedness
inspection
pass
to
stamp,
red rejection
die,
sisting of a large
"X"
or tag con-
seal,
in a circle
with the
words "Ordnance Rejected." All such materiel was carefully segregated to prevent
worked
to
a waiver for
it
or decided to scrap
it
it.
everything
inspect
instances
it
accepted
products
on
the
The
contract-
would take
drafted a
circulated
offices,
of
its
Ordnance in 1935
General Inspection Manual and
it to all the arsenals and district
activities.
followed
revised edition
three
years
by
later
and by manuals on
specific
classes of materiel.
its
districts
to serve as
Ordnance
in-
spection until 1945. One of the most important principles it set forth was that inprocess
inspection
responsibility
tors should,
inspection
to
Ordnance
tors
lieu of inspection
not
only
helped
to
Certification
conserve
inspection
manpower but
spect
Department
Manuals
In
impartiality,
tact,
thoroughness,
business-like
methods
and
of con-
desire of the
prompt and
Inspection
in
inspections."
the
only
government equipment
in
the
plant
or
specific
cases
in
how
items, told
and
They
use.
the
described
323
went to
plants
to
packed
inspect
materiel
was
it
Stretching meager
shipment.
for
contractors'
before
district
caused
many headaches
during the
1938-40 period.
was
tor
look for.
to
that
inspection
a rule, the
of
certain
sufficient.
duced
if
As
quality
remained
re-
consistently
Ord-
known
quality level.
tive
officers
when
Later,
contractors
basis.
Nearly every
qualified inspectors.
district
source
Civil
to
of
supply,
Service,
of their
more.
release
own, were
The
other
through
recruitment
gradually dried
dustry absorbed
rates of
achieved steady
spectors
Though
of
Ordnance retained
in
control over
to
all
the
his
hired
and
tions
the
Chief
close
responsibility
districts
its
first
district's
drawings.
in
June
task of bringing
file
He
for
The Boston
inspector
the
hands
1938
in
egated
of
of
also
specifica-
inspected
lays,
tape,
in
ice
To
help
Ordnance
trict to
permitted,
Other
districts
made
plant
surveys.*
men
to handle
ma-
teriel
Most
districts,
tors
work
in fact, hired
more
inspec-
48,
^ Hist,
This
is
burgh
Pittsburgh
Ord
Dist.
rpt, p.
I, pt. 2,
25, 2
Apr
pp. 175-83.
inspectors.
324
for a 6-weeks' training course/
Each
ar-
on the items
it
repeated
courses
the
trainees arrived.
assigned a few
it
new groups
as
Meanwhile each
of
district
Some
inactive duty
methods; others
spent their terms of active duty in man-
spection
work.
training
in
took
inspection
work
of
fied
districts
satis-
Some
re-
of the arsenals
what they could. ^ The main complaint was that the arsenals encouraged inspectors to use their own judgment in
learn
that
uniformity
never be achieved
mitted to use their
of
The
districts
inspection
could
if
own judgment
in ac-
specifications
cials
complain
could
most of those who attended courses without pay took jobs in industry instead of
working for Ordnance.
In spite of low salaries and other prob-
that
his
products
were
managed
to recruit in-
New
In
resident inspectors.
The
end of 1939
to
492
accounted
inspectors
fourths of
district.
all
for
civilians
Most were
about
employed
in
the
three-
each
in
lower
Civil
were possible
appalling.
by a competitor were accepted. The districts were keenly aware of the fact that
most of their inspectors had too little ex-
col-
Ordnance
possible
"If
it
District reported,
to
handle
the
"it
work
to
secure
would be
with
to
less
higher
rejections.
ing
in
elementary
blueprint
reading,
machine shop
mathematics,
mechanical
practice,
physics,
drawing,
the rank of
Under
Inspector,
CAF-2,
re-
OO
the districts in
York Ordnance
OHF,
particularly History of
New
I,
**
I, pp. 314-28.
"Hist, New York Ord Dist, i (1939-41), pp.
41-55. See also Hist, Philadelphia Ord Dist, I,
pt. 2,
pp. 54-55-
." ^^
In most
districts
the
directed
officer
a commissioned
inspection
staff
and
^^
that
plied
relative.
quality
They contended
best
possible
required by the
325
Army
in
in
the
quantities
able.^^
There was,
tice
the
inspection,
General
Somers
He
assigned to
responsibility
for
co-
among
the district
offices.
Though
all
both quantity
Ordnance
Campbell
inspection
or
in
in the
the
districts.
summer
responsibility
General
of 1942 delegated
to
the
materiel
same
officials
and
quality.
because
Inspectors
commod-
^^ Hist, Philadelphia
Ord
Dist,
I,
pt.
^^
Ord
Dist,
I, pt. 2,
2,
all
p.
56.
phases
see
Hist,
ch. 3.
^^ (i)
OHF;
ODO
55-57-
OHF.
^*
Contl Div.
Apr
42, p.
10,
ASF
326
Inspection Gages
As mentioned
an
in
earlier
chapter,
and
94 1 the remaining
districts
1940
and
all
Ordnance
As the
the
inspection force
period,
scope
of
the
for
some
thirty-five
the
problem:
75-mm.
fuze
shell
shortage
one type of
consisted
of
curement caught up with demand, inspectors were required to submit their gages
to a laboratory at intervals for checking.
its
inspection.
Proving Grounds
early
demands by
1938 and
made
new
own funds
capacity
Ordnance
As the
ments.
further.^
was
the
agency
it
was
Navy.
In
1941
Army and
Ordnance gave another
elements of the
to
machine
tools
*^ Hist
history
still
Erie Proving
I,
War
Section,
Department
capacity for
of
the
Ground adjacent
Serv, OCO,
contains copies of
Ind
'" Ltr,
President
to
I,
pt.
many
SW,
15
Facilities
p.
i,
to
5.
pertinent
This
docu-
in
OHF.
^''
Ltr,
sub:
OHF.
"* Hist
of
the
Facilities
OCO,
Ordnance
vol.
I,
pt.
i.
327
Camp
in
in
May
on 10
proving ground
50,000-acre
Named
Arkansas.
mission
cases,
Year's
had the
fuzes,
propellants,
late in the
war,
shot
on
New
new
prov-
fired
It
Day
it
primers,
testing
cartridge
boosters,
near Hope,
Southwestern,
proof
of
ing grounds
its
came
first
But progress
Aberdeen
did less acceptance testing and devoted
more time to research and development
into service
ments
most
of
the
in
World War
The
develop-
name
traced back to
the year 1924 when Dr. Walter A. Shewhart and his associates in the Bell Tele-
to
the
to
apply
statistical
inspection of large
num-
Work
The
because
it
ammunition as nearly
As Dr. Shewhart's
bers of rounds of
identical
as
home was
possible.
spite
tests,
Picatinny's
interest
in
the
subject
after
munitions.
major and
In
1941,
Simon,
now
of
slow.^"
Control
significant
was
Simon's Pioneering
of
One
in
of the principles
waned
tests.'^
Statistical Quality
of
site
Jefferson
book.
his
See
PP
histories of
western,
OHF.
^^
For an excellent brief summary of the prewar developments, and evaluation of the contriist
butions of Shewhart and
Lt.
Leslie
E.
Simon, see S. B. Littauer, "The Development of
Statistical Quality Control in the United States,"
American Statistician, vol. 4 (October 1950), pp.
14-20.
-^
Reprinted
Manual
E.
in
app.
of
An
Engineers'
Statistical
328
for
test
An
Engineer's
Manual
of Statistical
its
way
into
trial plants.
Simon
illustrated
the
nature
of
the
reflect
the quality of
to
require
that
the
inspection
results in rather
good quality." ^^
Simon's answer to the problem was not
tively
the
show a lower
was
tion
to
reject
buttress
it
the
records that
would
tell
the history of a
expected quality
level,
and would
Simon, op.
cit.,
p.
tell
1.
its
quality oc-
the producer
when
knows
was
This
application
the
for
basis
line of
of
statistical
in
Ordnance
World War
II inspection.^^
making
further use
329
atinny
Ammunition
tion
at
defective item.
of statistical
to
proponents,
their
techniques
these
to
inspection
the
would guarantee
The
minimum
rejection
best that
hope
of
practical
the
for
risk
of
every
any inspec-
was reduction
of
accepting
to
portance of
item
this latter
ing
up enough armor
to
make
suggested by
Ordnance was
shoot-
One
thirty
medium
of
the
first
steps
enlist the
services of
survey
assurance of the
existing
Ordnance
inspection
methods and -recommend ways of increasing their effectiveness by using the newest
techniques of
statistical
The Edwards
was much room
trol
of
methods
materiel
wrote, "that
we must
up
"The hard facts are," he
we must have ordnance and
quality
control.
^^
produced
tice,
production.
approximately
tanks a month. ^*
is
The im-
He
problem.
for
Ordnance by
procedures
in
History,
Birmingham
PSP
Methods
of
Quality
Contl,
Ordnance
42,
sub:
copy
in
13, ch. 3.
330
nance of the highest quality which can be
produced in the quantities which we must
have under present conditions." ^^ The
problem was to determine a level of ac-
and
then
draw
up
ceptable
quality
statistical
and would
Laboratories
armor.
contractors'
sound.
tion
quality control.
statistical
and
civilians
arsenals,
plants,
cers
the
at
Some 220
from the
works,
offi-
district offices,
and
proving
The plan
rudimentary knowledge of the basic principles.^^ One of the main themes stressed
was that inwas the contractor's responsibility. The conference leaders demonstrated that sampling inspection, by
accepting or rejecting large lots on the
basis of small samples, would force con-
The
lected as
quality
se-
control
July 1942.
The method
involved plotting
duced
the
certain
presenting
acceptance.
If
lot
to
Ordnance
for
Ordnance
inspectors
called
the
for
elimination
to
contractors in
of
all
in-
production
re-
if
process inspection
fore
at
number
level
of
the
rejections
exceeded a
-^
George
Munitions,"
D.
Edwards,
"Quality
Control
of
135
42, sub:
OO
pt.
I,
ch. 5.
was able
Division
As a
the
and
Ordnance
result of these
number
million
of
dollars
of
inspectors
accepted
per
producing
ance."
^^
satisfactory
it
to
before
material
Ordnance
accept-
for
ing
winter
the
instances
of
1942-43;
Ordnance reduced
in
some
inspection
Some
Ordnance
The Boston
manpower by
inspectors declined.
conserved inspection
as soon
as
Had
his
it
how
Ordnance would
have been morally bound to accept what
to inspect.
it
done
so
hands
its
free
to
accept
Ordnance kept
or
reject
the
it.^*
way
the
in
quality
control
feeling
its
Army
area.
spection
dures of
all
To
this
Trundle
end it
Engineering Company of Cleveland, Ohio,
to survey existing practices and later prepare the manual. ^^ When they made their
enlisted the services of the
^^ Ltr,
to
Staff.
.
^* (i)
.
its
district
on inspection matters
tor
in
conserve
It
materiel
forty in
presenting
tractors exactly
related efforts,
September 1942 to
about nine in April 1943. While the value
of accepted materiel rose from $500 million in September 1942 to $1400 million
in April 1943, the total number of Ordnance inspectors dropped from twenty
thousand to thirteen thousand. "Such a
record," wrote one inspection specialist,
"can be attributed entirely to Ordnance
dropped from
331
Ordnance
copy
Ltr,
Dists
in
OHF.
to
All
Ltr,
Safford
pp. 6-8.
3* For comparison of Ordnance and Army Air
Forces inspection policies on this point, see Memo
Report by ist Lt D. F. Boyd, AAF Materiel
Center, 30 Aug 44, copy in Inspection Br file.
3^5
Memo of Brig Gen Hugh Minton, ASF Prod
Div, for CofOrd and others, 30 Mar 43, sub: Inspection Manual, copy in 'OHF. See also Memo,
Safford for Resources and Prod Div, ASF, 8 Apr
43, sub: Inspection Manual, copy in OHF.
332
report in the
summer
Trundle
of 1943 the
had become
task." ^
This
"a stupendous and complex
had grown with bewildering speed
from the peacetime year 1939, when the
U.S. Army numbered about 188,000 men,
to the second year of war when the
strength of the Army exceeded 7,000,000
men and annual expenditures for munitions ran into the billions of dollars. "Haste
task
contributes
inevitably
to
confusion,
fric-
and ineflfectiveness," the report continued. As a result it found that there was
tion
urgent
need
improving,
for
simplifying,
of
Ordnance
"inefficient
or be-
handling and
practices
the
of
tractors
ber 1942,
stop
to
when
this
Ordnance
districts,
Novem-
only
the
practice,
type
parts,
how
or where
staff
that this
felt
justified.
pushed
with
forward
statistical
the
quality control
criti-
Ordnance had
adoption
shortcomings.
and
test
Considering
and
without
same
the
all
the
special
technical
reference
process
amples
inspection.
of
It
not
did
undesirable
services,
to
Ord-
much
in-
cite
ex-
Ordnance
it
Commodity Groups
The
real story of
Ordnance
inspection
operating
divisions
of
the
In-
in-
describe the
its
material.
ment
of
techniques dur-
to inspect
of
nance inspection
The
^^
Rpt
dustrial Service.
different.
its
But
this
than
closer
functioning
fire
parts
demanded.
ideal
situation
sentative types.^^
serve as the
ufacturers.^^
rifles,
Rifles at Springfield
333
Still
for
model
it
the
for
of
the
was
far
assembled
from an
In January 1944, with pressure for production eased, Lt. Col. William Gallagher
Armory
The
history
of the
inspection of
rifles
and mapped a vigorous campaign to improve quality. Though no complaints of defective rifles had come in from the field,
the armory determined to improve its
way
progress they
product
In
inspection
the million.
spection
Under
had
to
defects in parts
fired
were
were ignored
satisfactorily
when
if
tested.
Minor
the
All
rifle
rifles
one high-pressure
proof round and twenty or more normal
rounds. A small percentage from each lot
underwent a 6,000-round endurance firing; and a few were disassembled and
checked for interchangeability. But there
test
was no
fired
insistence
with
on
rigid
adherence of
all
McLaughlin Green,
wrote as follows:
armory
historian,
increased
a point
in
every
possible.
After
steps
(
Housecleaning
in
the manufactur-
spection at every
334
inspectors. All
quality
that
quantity.
(4) Periodic checking of manufacturing gages. The general practice earlier had
periodically
it
was hoped
would be eliminated
as
causes of
manu-
arsenal
commander
promptly
ap-
1944.''*^
At the same time the armory's inspecwere divided into two groups: manufacturing inspectors and acceptance inspectors. Complying with the ASF Inspectors
Manual
tion
issued
in
March
1944, the
final
of
The
even when Ordnance had only combat veeach tank and gun
of thousands of
"The complexity
proportions.
of parts as
and
statistically
proach.
." *^
technically
logical
The Ordnance
ap-
inspection
recognized that the procedures developed over the years for inspection of
staff
staff
for
nents
The
acceptance
inspection
or rejection.
sampling
facturing inaccuracies.
The
basis.
two steps
were found to be good, but quality s^ill
did not rise to the level desired by the
Chief of Ordnance. During the early
months of 1945 the armory inspection
staff held weekly meetings to get to the
bottom of the problem. The experts went
over every component, studied its methods
of manufacture, and examined its gages.
But progress was slow and piecemeal with
over-all results of these
'"(i)
H. Davis,
Hist,
PSP
Springfield
37,
U.S.
Armory;
Rifle
(2)
Caliber
William
.30,
Mi,
Procurement
History of Design, Development,
and Production, 1936 to 1945 (Jul 46), pp. 4243,
OHF.
*^
PSP
Though
assuring
of
that
vehicles
Ordnance
properly.
335
also
would perform
conducted inter-
com-
felt
whatsoever."
Ordnance
it
upon
to pro-
also
realized
and
lift
mechanisms.
these
tests,
devices,
The
and
turret traversing
conducted
under the eyes of Ordnance
contractors
To supplement
lines.
These
tests
necessary
as
to
assure
quality
products.
Ordnance
vehicles
tor's plant of
the plants.
such
tests
the
who manufactured
design,
it
to the
as-
was made
all
No
of statistical quality
complicated subassem-
terials
essence
would
With some, ma-
these components.
sional
en-
axles.
fit
many
blies
characteristics
were
the
still
keys
to
others there
were simple operating tests that gave adequate assurance of quality. Most of the
Ordnance tank - automotive contractors
had enviable records in industry for quality production, but some were newcomers
to the business who had little previous
experience in making the parts needed by
and
tubes.
firing of
*^
Maj
spection
-Sep 45,
F.
of
P- 4,
A.
Gitzendanner,
Hist of
Ord
In-
OHF.
336
Ordnance. Inspection requirements had
be tailored to
fit
to
Ordnance and
of
Binoculars,
other
and
directors,
telescopes,
fire
Ordnance
of items for
class
difficult
They presented a
inspection.
wide variety
mechanical,
electrical,
hydraulic,
optical,
Evaluation
accuracy.
the
of
and stain on
was largely a
experienced judgment, as was
importance of scratches,
the
situation
pits,
ard
materiel.
pursued
The
vigorous
tion
of
to
to these
innumerable
difficulties.
problems was the need to
use inexperienced inspectors and to meet
constant demands for speedy production.
"I think no one would willingly sacrifice
or
adulterate
supplies
the
going
to
quality
the
Ordnance
of
fighting
forces,"
Welch, in March
1945. "However, that has to be tempered
Office, Col.
Gordon
B.
with
hesitated
to
circumstances.
too
the early
much
war
all.
period.
forces
.
have
quality
was necessary to
As a result of all
Ordnance accepted
it
materiel
in
Africa in
Section
of
inter-
deficiencies. As measured by
and by the number of defective
control
Some
reports
came
in,
instruments
to the
of
the quality
rose
steadily
defective
materiel,
many
and
dirt
had got
into
As inspection standards
for binoculars were strict, the reports were
puzzling. Even after Ordnance began pack-
the
instruments.
ing
the
riers
instruments
with
silica
gel
in
vaporproof
bar-
number
of de-
Augusta Arsenal
re-
result
of
a chemical
in
^^
unsatisfactory
troops in North
lower the
when
particular cases
at
fighting
of
program
all
these tests
led
Inspection
ment
strength-
matter of
Added
correct the
Division
Artillery
of
To
in the glass.
his stafT.
S2I.
proved that after the binoculars underwent the rain test at the plant they contained minute quantities of water that escaped detection by the inspection measures
then in use. Once these facts were brought
to light, corrective measures were taken,
and reports of defective binoculars dropped
almost to
Most
zero."*^
control
fire
statistical
duced
in small
in-
As a matter
tions.
Control
ons
made
Sub-Office
Along with
quality control.
themselves,
ranked lowest
by
inspected
list
quality
things
of items
control
the
and the
quality of
Ammuni-
ings
and
specifications
tion,
for example,
quantities
is
acceptable."
greater or
less
combat
vehicles.
true
degree of weapons,
and
of trucks
They functioned
in
get out
production.
in
time
The
scarce, the
demand
something on a par with throwing a monkey wrench into the machinery. It caused
loss of time,
played
with
and
labor,
havoc with
was the
this
fact
and it
Coupled
materials,
scheduling.
contractors
that
Ordnance
tol-
were
inspectors
rejecting
to
make
materiel
for
elements conspired
The
result
ideal
and
the practical.
'"
PSP
*''
Hist,
both
and
well, as
Rpt
OCO,
ch. 10.
of
criticisms
and drawings.
41-42.
was pressure to
Ordnance reaUzed that
nowhere
of
weap-
Ordnance
With
was always a gap be-
considered,
instances there
noncompliance
methods.^^
All
excusing
Fire
instruments
Ordnance
statistical
use
little
artillery
control
fire
in the
the
policy
of
many
337
inspections
inspection
of
of
officers of the
Ordnance
in
the
annual
installations
general
made by
338
The most
Ordnance
of
new development in
was the introduction
quality control. Ordnance
notable
inspection
statistical
techniques.
How
suc-
its
efforts
summary statement
by the wartime chief of the Quality Control Unit in the Ammunition Branch appears to be close to the truth
ficient,
*^ Saunders,
"Standardized
Inspection,"
Army
-86,
Box 663.
185
NA
CHAPTER XV
the war.
were
made,
number
the
of
terminated
some
thirteen
its
the
many months
leaving
legacy
after the
of
ill
Armis-
will
and
Con-
its
mouths
after
this
attitude
the
economy
of the war.
at
Army
policymakers
about 60 percent of all business
were dependent, wholly or in
war production, and that most
saw that
concerns
part,
of
on
these
if
making
Under
the
was
herd
OCO,
4 volumes, 30 April
OHF. A
1945,
ters
XXVII-XXIX.
Donald Edwards, Termination of Ordnance Contracts, Jan 43, Historical Study No. 57,
and William Hoyt Moore, Post-Armistice Indusboth
Developments,
trial
1918-20,
Jan
43,
prepared by Bur of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept
-
J.
of Labor,
ORDGL-CR
files.
See also
J.
Grom-
pp.
i45flF.
340
was
it
contracts with
148,000
billion in value,
$47
ment
Ordnance
that
estimated
industry
had
totaUng
contractors
the
to
termination
contract
for
little
thought to
during
peacetime,
problem seldom
the
much
Nor was
arose.
when top
was
priority
placement of orders
with industry. The contract forms s*^andardized by the Army in 1939 contained
assigned
speedy
to
the
September
ground by
Ordnance
1941
In
new
broke
a standard
issuing
clause for
the government,
the
Under
later
No.
Contract
including
i,
backing might go bankrupt while the audiwere at work; for employees the
procedure might result in "unemployment
by audit." ^" Further, cost accounting was
not an exact science or a matter of simple
tors
arithmetic.
judgment
clause
for
It
in
fied,
six
testi-
cost accountants of
cost
shafts
answers."
How
^^
six
Ordnance
different
contributed
00
00
OUSW
**
when
termination
in default,
formula.
their
was not
The
for
by
to a
provision
reimbursed
certified
the contractor
that
the
contractor
the
actual
"all
Contracting
was
be
expenditures
Officer
as
cer
could
certify
that
expenditures
had
'*
OCMH;
(3)
Hist,
Dist,
I,
pt 2,
PP- 96-99-
'
scss.,
pt.
2,
p.
ment by Secretary
solving this
problem
is
illustrated
by
The Walter
Scott Case
mechanisms
for the
lawyers expressed
it.
The paragraph
of the
that the
contract plus
such expenses.
To
and much
with
of
much
the
to
the
in
taken
to
Engine Co.,
Guiberson plant in
Continental Motors
Diesel
Garland,
Co.
Texas,
to
production
for
Although the
of
two Guiberson
for convenience
agreed to
let this
engines.
gasoline
earlier of the
had no
contracts
tion
company
all
expenditures.
The accounting
proportions,"
tic
services
of
the
auditors
fifteen
full-time
nine
for
sums
of
process,
12 (i)
tional
Alfred
B.
II,
pp.
Jr.,
to
Termination
York Ordnance District
Hist,
Contract
124-26;
(4)
Hist,
Ord
Quinton,
Shepherd,
War
Col
Ltr,
22
Mueller, A^^a;
origin
were
steps
Guiberson
the
and
USW,
was
Satisfactory terms
engines,"
gasoline
larger termination
works. In April 1942, when the Army decided to replace diesel tank engines with
in
negotiation.
341
Dist,
I, pt. 2,
(2)
Br;
(3)
New
World
York Ord
Hist,
New York
in
pp. 96-99.
342
tractors.^^
When
called
upon
to
produce
of the
the
for
original
contract,
for
hamper
thus
the
war
effort,
in
the
first
is
the use of a contract device to convert
unliquidated claims not susceptible of exact
demonstration without lOO percent audit
into a new liquidated obligation in the nature of an accord, merging and extinguishing
all prior rights and claims not specifically
reserved. It has all the sanctions and legal
incidents
tract.
^'^
Convinced of the wisdom of this approach. Ordnance laid the whole matter
before the Judge Advocate General in
August and asked for an opinion. Within
three weeks that office and the U.S. Attorney General approved the Ordnance
proposal on the basis of the First War
Powers Act and Executive Order No.
9001, and Ordnance proceeded at once
to settle the Guiberson case by negotiation.
used the services of only
about four or five months.
Thus another major step was taken toward
developing a new Army policy on contract
In the process
Harold Shepherd
it
termination
15 (i)
and settlement
Memo, Col
Br,
contracting parties
contract in any
way
may
agree to
settle
of
contract
provisions
conveni-
for
dr
I.
OO
wide
publicity
to
negotiated
the
settle-
dustry
that,
at
wars
end,
claims
their
final."
343
that
cancellation
fortunes of war,
tached to
by the employees assembled to hear the
news from Col. John Slezak of the Chicago
district. ^^
Explanation that
the
tank,
meant
originally
to be of
close
to
be
light,
had grown
to
thus too
existing
Compared with
The
but the
company used
located
in
many
as
12 different plants
Its
cities.
438 sub-
December
In
proached
the
Ordnance ap1941
International
Harvester
new
type of
tank that then existed only on the drawIt was to weigh twenty tons,
57-mm. gun, and be both fast and
ing board.
carry a
the
proposal,
contracts
totaling
Iowa, naming
Tank
Arsenal.^"
it
the
Quad
Cities
production until
St.
March
1943.
Patrick's Day, just as the
were
Then on
first
tanks
canceled.
It
company and
certain
was
cities
^* (i)
Ord
Fisc
Cir
153,
Oct
42,
sub:
Dec
43.
344
could get on with a tractor order that was
replace the tank contract, the place
to
junkman's
valued
at
inventoried
quickly
public
ment
transfer
to
promptly
were
use
spare
as
subcontractors
parts.^'^
had
to
was
of
by
other
to
Field
Service
Hundreds
be given
help
the
fifteen
company organized
traveling
termination
staff
to the good,
creating
new procedures.^"
Though keenly interested
of
for the
in
in speed, Ordnance did not intend that negotiated settlements would be reached haphazardly
without scrutiny by lawyers, auditors, and
be
and armor
diverted
manufacturers or to
tank
in
to
govern-
other
plate
for
or
sale
and disposed
stock,
own judgment
each case, and there was no need for review of the settlement by any other agency,
of
specialists.
production experts.^"
fact,
in
set
of
rules
was,
in
April
-'-'
time
in half.
The company
settled for
$25
million.^'*
'
Ordnance
Christoffer,
in
"Dis[)osal
of
Contractor-Owned
'
By mid-summer
completed
ated
about
settlements.
Ordnance had
hundred negoti-
of 1943
Cliicago
eight
brief
The
district
offices
re-
audit.
Immediate
were made to
payments
both prime contractors and
partial
subcontractors to tide them over the conversion period. Contracting officers were
Ordnance
summaries
-^'
District,
other
Volume
cases,
102.
see
Foi
Contract
Chicago Ordn.ince
District,
War De-
Termination
OUSW
of
in
the
file.
On
partment
to
Adjustment
termination
Boards,
i')-i7
.August
1943,
New
^(.rk.
-''
rerinination Notes and Data for Use at the
Ro( Hester Mtg of Dist Chiefs, n.d., in file marked
Speeches Delivered by Col Shei)herd. ORDCLC:R files.
"'
became "proChicago
In the
was put
basic philosophy
district the
thus
It
reverse."'
in
into
memo
poHcy
vs.
that
cannot be pro\en
contractor."
In the
by the
ASF
of
helped to
1943
procedures throughout
the
War Department
manual
on
fixed-price
much
that
in
by issuing a technical
termination accounting for
supply
contracts,
closely
fol-
right to re-
which
might include scarce raw materials or usetain
summer
standardize
detail
in
^^
345
termination
his
inventory,
and dispose
he saw
fit.
proceed
He was
with
of
it
as
immediately free to
conversion
to
other
inventory
work
and
Soon thereafter a new section on contract termination was added to the Procurement Regulations as PR 15.'^*^ This
section described the main steps in termi-
-"
Campbell, op
of all
beginning
procedure,
nation
with
the
tered letter
ment
Ordnance
OCO,
cit.,
CG
p.
districts
tractors,
began
his
subcon-
When
settlement.
possible,
contractor
to
out
iron
problems of
and procedure.
Reasonabh explicit rules and regulations governed each
major step in the process, and it was
timing
'^^
through
tailed
counting
both
these
the
de-
termination
ac-
regulations,
provisions
manual,
contractor
of
the
that
and
the
plus
interests
government
of
were
of
for
ASF,
OHF.
Memo
27
Jul
43,
OUSW
The
in
TM
TM
OUSW
'-'
346
government. This was especially attractive
to contractors during the first two years
of the war when they could easily shift to
war work. As
other
given
was
settlements
When
all
further
"no cost"
of
Renegotiation
the
Act.
trade
to
associations,
ruary and
March 1944
contractors
for
Springfield
in
New York
to give
evening classes
the
settlement.'^^
final
December
1945,
more
By the end of
"no
claims"
cases
ac-
well
of
all
o\'er
half
settled."^^
In
November
when ASF
1943,
created
Ordnance officer, Col. David N. Hauscman, and the Office of War Mobilization
established the Joint Termination Board,
Ordnance set up a contract termination
section in the Legal Branch and called in
Col. Dean Witter from the San Francisco
district office to head it. Meanwhile, Ordnance called regional conferences in Chicago, Detroit, New York, and St. Louis
to inform district officials of plans and
policies
New York
the
district
arranged for
was no point
In Feb-
societies.
district
a contractor
staff
talks
there
in
popularity
the
for
encouragement.
official
reason
it
trict offices
University
in contract
termina-
Ord-
tion.
for
many
businessmen's
fairs
The
Statutory Base
own
The
tiation
The Ordnance
districts
created their
basis
of
the
their
members
tion
training courses
staff
for
its
prescribe
to
of
When
this
and
interest
mitting
settlement,
in
termination
claims.
Smith, Army and Economic MobilizaWar Contract Terminations and Settlements, Report by the Director of Contract Settlement to the Congress, 2d rpt, Jan 45, p. 20; (3)
Hist,
Specialists
(2)
Program,
Jan 46, OHF, p. 2.
(i) Shepherd, op. cit.; (2) Mueller, The
Nciv York Ordnance District in World War II,
ch. 9: {[]) Robert T. Gebler, Philadelphia Ord'
districts
'' (i)
tion;
'
sec 4, 2S
'''
tiinirc
District
in
World War II
Philaclel|ihia
Publishing
Company,
1949);
I'older marked Termination-Training.
Wcsti)rook
(4)
Advocate
General's
came up
decision,
to
in
The War
Department drafted
legislation
proposed
ject.
purpose
At
this
in
point,
347
invitations
disallowed
expenditures
of
dustry'
to the
public
the
no
interest.
audit,
"When
testi-
fied,
fairs later
reported out a
Comptroller General
in
representatives
place the
charge of termina-
who
House Committee
Military Af-
bill to
was defeated
testified
War
before
October 1943,
and further support appeared in February
1944 when the Baruch-Hancock report
on postwar adjustment policies was released. It recommended "quick, fair, and
the
in
of terminated war conthrough negotiations by the contractors and the procurement agencies." The
Comptroller General's insistence on detailed audit before payment would, the
settlement
final
tracts
for
industry in disregard of
those other citizens
Government and
bills.
the
who
^^
""
Hearings, H.R. Comm. on Mil Affairs, 78th
Cong.. 1st sess., on H.R. 3022, pt. 2, p. 191. See
also Ltr, Comptroller General to Hon. Andrew
May, 20 Sep 43, and to Hon. James E.
J.
file.
Murray, 20 Sep 43, copies in
'^
to May, 27 Oct 43, printed in
Ltr,
Hearings, H.R., Comm. on Mil Affairs, 78th
Cong., ist sess., on H.R. 3022, pt. 2, pp. 626-27.
See also Ltr, Patterson to Murray, 8 Oct 43, copy
OCMH
USW
in
OCMH
^^
file.
all
its
contract-
working within a well established framework of regulations, and asserted that contract settlements without audit were open
Report
24,
the
1943, p.
Office of
OCMH
Law
to
file;
and Termina-
Manufacturers, copy in
OUSW
file.
348
Action on V-J
signed
1944,
by the
on
President
prescribing
policies
The
in
prompt
from
moval
of
plants,
inventories
act fol-
providing for
re-
contractors'
to
enable
peacetime
business.*^
Regulations
Joint
Termination
War and
issued by the
(JTR)
Navy Departments
in
November 1944
During
July, created the Office of Contract Settlement headed by a director responsible for
set
1945,
Day
the
ASF
Japan's surrender.
standard telegram to
to his subcontractors.^^
be
to
filed
panied by a
contractors,
of
list
to
its
district
offices
and
as
The time
required to
settle
cases
$1-1/2
the
billion.^'
Office
commended
of
In
Contract
February
Settlement
War Department
on its
performance during
the preceding .six months and observed
that the progress made during this period
was "largely due to the continued good
performance of the Ordnance Department
and to the great improvement made b\
contract
Army
the
settlement
Air Forces."
*^
contract
settled.
upon
soon
after 7
as
Japan
p.m. on
arsenals
with
prompt action
surrendered.
Shortly
Ordnance received
a letter from
ASF
to
and the
were terminated
district
of
termi-
Shepherd, op.
'
cit.
Ltr, Hinckley, to
USW,
Feb
45.
(i)
for
Contract
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT
349
Table 24
Initiated
316,067,601,000
Completed
(settled)
9,970,894,000
(with claims)
7,302,799,000
(without claims
2,668,095,000
In process
6,096,707,000
offices
Ord Program,
sec. 4, 23
By the end
was well
Ordnance could sum up its contract settlement record in terms of some thirty-five
thousand fixed-price contracts
most on a no-claim basis for
settled
total
Jan
46, p. 2,
OHF.
subcontractors
the
until
The
Under
serious
that
government setbecame so
situation
Secretary
eral
help.
for
In October
make
settlements of
all
ity to issue
subject.
billion.
tracts
reimburse
contractors
for
expenses
in-
The
Office
of
presented
forecast of
puzzling
questions.
mount up
to a mil-
were slow to settle their CPFF conbecause they feared that agreements
reached with Ordnance or one of the other
military procurement agencies would be
upset later by the General Accounting
Settle-
required
of
Contract
had author-
War
of
all
stemmed
tors
tracts
Office.
problem is discussed on an
with specific details on the Ordnance tank contract with the Baldwin Locomotive Works, in Smith, Army and Economic Mo-
They declined
inventories
or
close
to
their
dispose of their
accounts
with
*^
complex
This
Army-wide
bilization,
basis,
Chapter XXVIII.
final set-
350
until
completed.
lem.*
The
conclusion that
final,
appears sound,
determine
to
were.
the
The
of the
much
left
to
empha-
both parties.
grown weary of
against
to
when
the struggle
representatives
settle
firms
of
in
the
contracts
pitted
with
settlement.
with
utmost
cuts
and
estimates that
erous.
But a
to
accept rule of
these
bring
years
the
Ordnance
and
its
for
tracting officers,
did
they
"fair"
Neither
tors.
the
impossible
is
it
how
to
settlement process
discretion
came
Ordnance contract
and
but
precisely
tlement
thumb
overly gen-
survey by accountants
chief of
result,
them being
profits
try's
natural
ploughshares,
desire
to
beat
swords into
set-
an industrial miracle
in
postwar reconver-
sion.
"' Reasons for the Ordnance Department Not
Meeting the Forecasts Originally Set (Termination of Contracts), 22 Jan 46, apparently prepared by Contract Termination Br of Legal Div,
attached
CofOrd
to
Shepherd,
op.
cit.
13
See
Dec
also
45,
Letter,
OO
160/
19008 Misc.
'^ Memo, CofOrd
for Chief Detroit Dist, 29
Jan 46, sub: Time Required to Settle Termina-
tions, coj)y in
"*
OHF.
War
r|)t,
Jul 46.
CHAPTER XVI
Field Service as a
tribution of
Service
uary
ment
Field
product of
the
revealed
Service
inadequacies
supply systems.
of
The primary
traditional
responsibility
management
Ordnance Department's huge postwar supply of weapons, ammunition, and
Ordnance
at
of four branches
sisted
eral
92
approximately
at
$1,311,000,000.
among
World W'ar
ing
Executive,
Ammunition,
There was some
Supply,
responsibilities
aid in
nance.
W^ithin the
To
duties, Field
its
of the
related materiel,
supplies.
1919.^
World War
II,
and
Gen-
Mainte-
reshuffling
of
and creation
of
new
fairly
sta-
ble.-
of the
new
di-
vision
Ord-
they
Service
Field
had charge
of
all
it
veillance
was
of
making surammunition in
standard
the duty of
nomenclature
lists
(SNL's),
technical
regulations,
tables,
It
and the
reports
commanding
Ordnance
all
that
officers
installations
in
Field Ser\'ice
of
preparing
storage.
also assigned
firing
tables of organization
and
WD
1(0 Ord
General
I,
I9i9-:i9,
I.
- (i)
Green, Thomson, and Roots, Plannimi
Munitions for War, pp. 20, 99; (2) Hist, FS,
Exec Div, vol. II, pt.
(1939-43).
i
352
France, plus a special report prepared by
who had
several
officers
make
a thorough study
supply depots to
of
British
visited
had
recomknowledge
of the chaos of the early months of war;
they recalled the lack of planning and the
almost insuperable difficulty of using an
bers also
mendations their
outmoded
own
system
firsthand
supply
to
modern
a study of the
The
Service
partment
of
Manual
.,
in
for
published by the
1920.
Ordnance work
tions:
was the
Ordnance Field
Provisional
It
in
covered
War Dephases
all
a theater of opera-
of
the
Army;
weap-
depots.^ Because
operations
in
it
the
was desirable
Zone of the
to
have
Interior
The Pattern
Depots and
for
Maintenance
Facilities
The depot pattern grew out of an Armywide realization that new methods of
forwarding supplies to front-line troops
would have to be evolved to meet such
unprecedented conditions of warfare as
those encountered in World War I. General Staff planners in France considered
several choices: "Should all supplies arriving from overseas be stored at the port,
being forwarded as needed, running the
chances of interruption to the rail communication by air attack, storm, or the
changing position of our troops at the
front but minimizing the handling of the
freight? Should it all be shipped to the
vicinity of the troops with possibility of
its
Or
should
Base, Intermediate
it
shifting of the
be divided into
and Advance
storage, in
Advance
termediate
and
ten
in
Base
in
In-
storage?"
ply
'
ice.
Lt. Col.
Division,
Provisional
.
Manual
September
for
1919
1920)
1924),
^
316; n, 298.
James
J.
Harbord,
France
(Boston: Little,
9:56)' p[). 120-2
Booth, op. cit., p. 196.
I
**
latter
the
advance
WORLD WAR
353
depot
feeding
the
Army
After the
the
three
main
of
them
emergency.
spread
out
Intermediate
the
across
country,
Along these
maintained
supplies of
lines the
general
all
types
and
Department and
serve
War
Ordnance
for
and intermediate
of
types.
The
re-
Secre-
ammunition,
depots.
The
latter
and
four
intermediate
war
fire
post-
control
containing
ices
tary
weapons,
so on,
ical supplies,
War Department
depots,
instruments,
tractors,
and
Arsenal in
the
of
other general supplies were stored at proving grounds or at the arsenals where they
'*
Harbord, op.
cit.,
pp. 120-21.
(i)
Booth, op.
cit.,
OCO
1940
to
:5 1
354
San Antonio
depots.
in
Texas
^^
World War
known and
the de-
velopment of new and more complex weapons made necessary an elaborate system of
maintenance. There had to be substantial
base shops in the rear of the armies for
facilities
to
corresponded
to
this
theater-of-operations
served.'"^
service
arms,
small
supplied
ture
to
Military
the
Establish-
To
In
railway
^^
all
materiel
Volume
volumes.
I,
for
example,
listed
ious
carried
number
of
several
digits,
first
of
cific
The
from that
the time of the Civil War.'"
cation differed
little
in
classifi-
use at
'- (i)
Sep
29, Inrl 6,
plies,
The Ordnance
The methods
Provision System
of distributing
weapons
at
'
the beginning of
World War
were as
tained
"Cannon
Army
and
Regulations
artillery
stores con-
of
vehicles,
191 3:
and
'
Manual
of 1919, p.
7.
officers
rei)ortcd
quarterly
011
the
weapons
as-
In
article
the
name,
or
to
the
catalogue
"standard
number
of
WORLD WAR
each
it.
an inexperienced
man
in-
experienced
in
plexity
soon
made
it
identification
have
to
Ordnance materiel,
evident that new methods of
and classification would
and volume
of
be devised,
American
ofhcers
who
studied
the
British
system of supply
in
article.
This was the principle behind the segregation of like stores into groups that re-
versa;
355
specialized
less
skill,
still
there
is
a great
of
to piece together
make
^^
Knowledge
bility.
"provision"
rather
it
classes
went
into
^fter
signed
of
199th R.I. Volunteers, mustered into service January I, 1862. As the company passed through
New York, "Private V. Shiftless deserted, taking
with him his musket and set of accoutrements"
later, at the battle of Gaines' Mill, the muskets,
cartridge boxes, gun slings, bayonet scabbards,
and waist belts of ten casualties had to be written
off because "the Regiment was obliged to retire
from the ground on which they fell." Ibid., pp.
117-19-
1''
of the
Army
Ibid.
''
356
term "provisioning" was defined as estimating requirements, distributing materiel,
and maintaining necessary stocks at the
arsenals,
depots,
was
to
provide
to
system of property
would be assembled
was
to
make
the complete
round. ^^
Groups
es-
The
by
of
Items of general
supply,
Group
various
E,
kinds
and
F, sighting
fire
of
artillery;
control equip-
major items
electrical
closely
linked
set of
The Ordnance
after
and
distribution
World War
of
procure-
placed
all
Ordnance
their
Parts
among
in
another.
one
In
group
its
strict
and
sense a
shortage
in
major item
sufficient
classifica-
documentation. It might be an
normally issued or procured separately, even if not used separately, as, for
example, a fuze for a large bomb or a
tion
materiel;
and parts;
ordnance
establishments, ordnance units, and certain
or
apparatus
Group N, equipment
to avoid
several groups
ment;
units
issued to
-" (i)
Booth, op. cit., pp. 196-200; (2) GenMotors Overseas Operations, General Survey
of the Ordnance Department (May 1942) [hereSurvey], I, 58-59; 175-82,
after cited as
eral
GM
OHF;
OCO
(3)
From
History
article
Generally speaking, an accessory was an arthat was not a jiart of the major item but
was needed to operate it successfully, such as
a cleaning rod for a rifle. PSP 65, Field Service
the
itself,
the
major com-
was a single composite unit consisting of two or more major items, such
as a tank and its gun, or a gun mounted
on its carriage. In ammunition supply a
distinction was made between the complete round, meaning the artillery shell or
bomb or mine loaded, fuzed, and ready to
function, and the component, which was
bination
-'
ticle
Publications,
Engineering
OCO,
Service,
Hambleton,
Draftinii
ment,
Nov 45
19
Branch,
[hereafter
Industrial
cited
as
Room
Regulations,
United States
OHF;
147,
exi)lanation
p.
Administrative
(2)
of the
Ordnance
Depart-
Army (Washington.
1945),
Cir 155, 8 Jul 43. For an
confusion that sometimes re-
WD
sulted
tions,
see
units.
ammunition.
became
from
Groups P through
When
gated in
were
they
obsolete
WORLD WAR
were transferred
groups and segre-
Group
gory,
Z,
captured
for
foreign
357
out";
the
sources
known
anticipated
known
"dues-in";
as
from
all
and
de-
Ordnance Depart-
materiel."'*
as "dues-
receipts
ment
distinction
stores.
called
"standard,"
automotive
like
would be
marked with a number prefixed by four
letters, the last of which was always "X."
These were known as "taxi" numbers after
parts,
the
hardware,
first
number
or
of
tools,
this
it
type,
common
TAAXi.
to other gov-
ar-
The
dates
^'^
were
reporting
of
spread
was semiannually. In
telegraph
the
Group Chiefs
control
central
Washington a
in
of
stock.
If
close
one depot
most of the
Group
if
so,
Chiefs
make
a transfer.
could
-3
was a gen-
PSP
-*(i)
there
If
eral shortage,
65, exs.
Ibid.;
AD
(2)
and AF.
Hambleton,
Hist,
Engr-
1-6,
OHF.
-MO GM
Memo.
Survey,
I,
175-82;
(2)
Hynds
358
Ordnance Provision
lettered
were accurate.
men
He
work
actually in charge of
and
to
inventory of any
storehouse
records
were
inaccu-
rate.-*'
Standard Nomenclature
The
name
Lists
was esCommittee,
composed of representatives of the Techofficial
tablished
by
the
of every item
Ordnance
Industrial, and Field Service Diviand of the using arms. The interested
subcommittee recommending development
work on a new item or adoption of a
newly developed item obtained the nomenclature from a Basic Nomenclature and
nical,
sions,
Chief Engineer,
trial Division.
Artiller)'
Branch, Indus-
The nomenclature
consisted
noun followed by
of the
ment
types),
use of procurement
and
distribution
World War
Ordnance supply
catalog,
and were a
of
the
materiel
in
each
"^
to
-''
(
Ordnance Provision System Regulations,
Jan 45, pp. 4-6, .OHF; (2) Intervs, Grain, 17
I
officials in
the
description
lettered group.
the
rifle,
ment.^'
Sys-
Feb, 3
May 54.
ASF
-^ (i)
and
set
Close co-
detail.^"
in
WORLD WAR
signers,
necessary
provide
to
the
was
officials
information
in
charged
with
preparation
the
of
after
SNL's
1921
at
New Jersey.^**
The Lamp
of
Experience
359
World War
the
tremendous
to
be cleared
of
"The next
The lamp
of experience,
rending experience in
many
guide us."
^^
the Armistice
Ordnance
officers
upon
their
own
thinking of the
influenced the
to
II.
make
In France after
had drawn
Manual
this experience
a heart-
respects, will
a light to
be
be
and
stores,
29
PSP
^ Ibid.
1921), 165.
^' Brig.
Service,"
March 921),
1
165-66.
CHAPTER XVII
New
The
The
first
gation
postwar Congressional
into
the
operations
of
Depot System
investi-
War
the
were not
ideal.
West
Point,
con-
ing
fast.
made
9 18
in
loss
1926 a bolt of
arsenals.
The
The
Ammunition Depot
New Jersey. The
killed a number of
Navy depot, and
at
Lake
resultant
people,
partially
Denmark,
explosions
wrecked the
demolished
ordnance storage and scattered inconthroughout the city. The construction of proper and permanent arsenals
and magazines plainly demanded the
serious attention of the Government. But
the investigators concluded that "as the
for
veniently
present."
tive
lyy^-igoi (Washington,
United States
569-71; (2) Brig. Gen. William H.
Tschappat, "Early History of American Ordnance," Army Ordnance XIII, No. 78 (MayJune 1933), 3:16.
^ (
"Storage of Supplies for the Army,"
Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (January-March 1921),
200; (2) 70th Cong., 1st sess., Doc. 199, Ammunition Storage Conditions (Washington, 1928)
[hereafter cited as Doc. 199], p. 48.
the
1901), pp.
Government
house
and
economy.
The
dangerous
361
and early thirties. As a result, depots became run down. Buildings were old, railroad trackage rusted and inadequate,
highways patched and narrow, docks dilapidated, and equipment insufficient and
largely obsolescent.*^ It was not until the
mid-1930's that the War Department gave
make
serious
War and
of
re-
of the
ammunition
Navy
make
to
storage,
of
a survey
phasis
the
survey
reported
Army
located
storage
States.
It
safe
care
for
and
all
storage
facilities.
and generally
conditions was
the
unsatisfactory
An
Ordnance
of
in
improving
pansion
continental
ammunition
United
to
with
that
1928
re-
and repair
million for
new
construction
Ordnance
at various
establish-
Called an
new
"igloo"
type of
from
it
its
magaresem-
was a low,
* (i)
Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, "The
Lake Denmark Naval Ammunition Depot Disaster," Army Ordnance, VII, No. 38, (SeptemberOctober 1926), 125-29; (2) Col. William H.
Tschappat, "The Lake Denmark Explosion Its
Effect on Picatinny Arsenal," Army Ordnance,
VII, No. 38 (September-October 1926), 131-34.
No. 199,
^Doc.
"
^
p. 7.
29
Stat. 928,
45
May
1928.
Gen. EdSupply System," Mechanical Engineering, vol. 67 (Dec 45Jan, Feb, Mar 46), p. 792; (3) Capt. Albert D.
Lueders, Historical Report on Development and
Doc.
( I )
ward
E.
7-15; (2)
MacMorland,
Construction,
after
199, pp.
cited
Brig.
"Ordnance
as
Lueders Rpt],
p.
in
i,
for
Monograph No.
( I )
8, p.
Board Reports,
Bd Rpts],
exs.
[hereafter
OHF.
12.
War Department
New Ordnance
[here-
History,
Approved Site
Depots.
Dec 44 [here^ter cited as Site
1-13,
OHF;
(2)
Ltr,
SW
to
ibid.
362
manufacturing arsenals
as well as depots.^*' This request, and a
recommendation by the Chemical Warfare Service for rehabilitation of chemical
manufacturing establishments at Edgewood Arsenal, led Brig. Gen. George R.
Spalding, Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, to
the decision that, before any large sums of
money were spent, the War Department
ought to draw up a plan for an ideal system of manufacturing and storage facilities.
The most important considerations were,
ments,
including
avoid
destruction
by
enemy
attack;
Norman F. Ramsey."
The Ramsey Board
tions of climate
as relatively
dismissed considera-
and economy
unimportant;
it
of operation
States,^^
On
On
this
) ,
The Board
prohibitive.
new depot
in central Pennsylvania;
felt
concentrated
on
the Secretary of
War had
laid
down the
M-day
^^ Ibid., ex.
was
for
Bridge, W. Va. This site was later discarded because the remote mountainous country created
problems
field.
CofOrd
Ltr,
26 Dec 40,
Services,
transportation,
and
construction,
there was no level space for an air-
of
labor; also,
Mountains; or
''
Site
'- Ltr,
View
of
00
Bd Rpts,
SW
Hon
Jennings
exs.
Randolph,
to Chiefs of All
tion of Storage
I
to
675/2356 Misc.
Plants,
copy
in
Site
Bd Rpts,
ex.
I.
'
'
to
Prepare Secret
mended
The
load.
363
Board
recom-
Nansemond, and
the
France brought about mounting appropriations for defense, that any considerable
expansion of storage facilities was pos.sible.
submitting
report
this
Pennsylvania,
stored
at
to
War
the
ammunition
Nansemond, and
ammunition
East
not for
if
for
Thus
shipments.^'
prewar
much
planning
the
G-4
of
in the
standpoint
Protective
gators
of
War
that
had
when
and,
of
depot
its
considered
there
that
"faulty concentration of
establishments
board."
I,
very
summer
supply
the
pattern
distribution
developed in World
change
not
did
along
of
1940,
the
in
of
fall
/940
the
for
Bay,
Curtis
Charleston.
when
the
to other storage.^^
summer
ammunition
In
was
still
many Ordnance
the
Atlantic
sea-
'"
in
Europe
would be
size of the
to
store.
Figures on the
G-4
asked the
in
War
Savanna and San Antonio could be expanded to bring the Central area up from
27 to 39 percent, reducing the East from
^5 to 55; but further than that it seemed
impossible to go by expanding existing
depots.^' Money was scarce, even for stor-
'
"'
of
to
TAG,
May
"'
Memo,
for CofS,
Brig
PMP Revision
the
ex. 27.
*'
Ltr,
Bd
Rpts,
'**
to
1938, Site
CofOrd
gic Storage of
sub:
of Oct,
Memo, CofOrd
New
OO
6001/ 1386.
^'^
Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 171-79.
-" Memo, G-4, 6-29-49, sub: Instructions for
Computation of Additional Critical Items Required for a Force of 2,000,000 Men, copy in
Col James K. Grain, Diary, OHF.
364
The
ammunition storage
estimates for
He
estimated
magazines,
$81,208,000
and
$12,750,000
85,000
Lt. Col.
for the
acres at
for
igloos,
and
procurement of land
auxiliary
buildings,
making
a total of $93,958,000.^^
For
general
Field
supplies.
storage planners
had
Service's
a figure of $1,310,-
materiel
specially
in
built
The
warehouses?
first
The
added.
ply storage
For
all this
put
into
general
for
that
figures
the
Chief
Crain, whose
of
Field
Service,
World War
Colonel
experience had
He
supplies."^
But
would appear
in
the
exact
the break-
careful planning by
Ordnance
storage ex-
for
the
ordnance storage.
Nowhere was
tion
Memo,
-1
timates
went
General Staff
were based on storing approximately $655,000,000 worth of critical items, half the
that
total aniount.
to
the
and were
to
be
to
be
strategical-
unknown to Ordnance,
Munitions Program of 30
Chief
perts to
to
the
down
of
acting on a basis
estimates,
nessee,
Ammo
OHF.
nature, weight,
considerations,
strategic
manded
in
365
igloos or magazines,
ample acreage
to
isolation
lo-
There was
little
igloo design,
it
would
do.
The amount
much
in
for
if
located
Ordnance plans for storing general supplies had rougher going. Unlike ammunition, such supplies as weapons, tanks, and
spare
parts
commercial
in leased
facilities
or in tempo-
was
contemplated in the Protective Mobilization Plan under the assumption that upon
mobilization troops would
possible
to
as soon as
a theater of operations.'^
discussions of the
30 June,
move
In
Munitions Program of
President
Roosevelt
asked
the
War Department
for
assurance that
full
favored
it.'"'
many
Commercial
tages.
serious disadvan-
buildings
were
scat-
management
many
difficult;
of the
vehicles
ground
or
required
that
car
level.
storage
Important
guns
and
carriages,
artillery
control
fire
at
the
in
instru-
OO
Ammo
Ammo
Ammo
on Program
of
30
Jun
(2)
Ltr,
Ammo
OO
pots, and
-^ (i)
QMG
pp. 14-16.
29
Watson, Chief of
^^ (i)
Staff, p.
Memo, Hughes
79.
QM
and Distribu-
366
tanks,
storage
rifles,
experts
ment ought
to
be stored in permanent,
which it could be
houses
general
for
supplies
the
at
pro-
ammunition depots; for this purpose more than six million dollars worth of
land had been appropriated.^^
jected
fireproof buildings, to
reserve
the
for
future.
From
The
Within the
First
the
more expensive
than construction.'*^
Strong representations by the Ordnance
Department convinced G-4 that leasing
strategic
War Department
limits
set
the late
in
by the
1930's the
corners
of
United
the
for
States,
FY
000
warehouses and only $245,000 for leasFor land, the sum of $800,000 was
ing.'^*
Ordnance
computed 80 acres
allotted.
for
the
storage
experts
had
close
to the
great
maneuver area
of the
Ordnance
Memphis
to
be strategically
safe.^^
was
to
build
permanent ware-
ish,
increased
the
percentage
in
the
^- (i) Ibid.;
(2) Memo, 23 Jul 40, sub: Defense Supplemental Estimates FY 1941 Based on
the
Grain, Diary.
'^ (i) Personal Ltr,
25 Jul 50;
Jul 40.
^* Ltr,
age,
AG
Estimates
gram
^^''
of
(2)
in
Wesson's
11
to CofOrd,
O'Clock Gonfs, 15
SW
ex. H.
^^ Memo,
FY
30 Jun 40.
Monograph No.
8, p. 28.
^^ Grain, Diary, 28, 29 Jul 40.
'"^
New
in
Watson, Chief
of Staff, p. 183.
Memo,
(i)
23
plemental Estimates
Jul
FY
40,
1941
sub:
west.^"
ment,
the
for
western
common one
War
Depart-
proposal
the
was presented
sites
the
to
Chief of
Assistant
367
Staff
G-4
in
all
manufacture of
would
roundabout railroad hauling.
mean
long,
But Ordnance planners stressed the posthat the war might extend to the
sibility
They
Pacific.
To make
mine exact
locations
areas. Colonel
field
within
Crain brought
distance
safety
in
site for
an
the
as
came
after
Crim revealed
that
by
investigation
The
School.^*'
Alabama,
Anniston,
of
selection
an
zone,
general
from the
the
in
experts, Lt.
commanding officer of
Ogden Ordnance Depot, and Maj. Lemuel
in training.*^
On
new
the
all
depots con-
P.
for
construction
and operation
costs;
it
should
cool
climate
to
promote
safety,
and
The
latter
substitution of
depot,
later
site
named
for the
Portage.
*o (i)
Ltr,
CofOrd
TAG,
to
21
Jun
sub:
40,
OO
00
633/34-
*-
Memo, CofOrd
May
41,
sub:
Gen Crain
Exec
for
H.R.
Mil
Gen Charles
Harris,
USW,
Comm.
Affairs
Brig
the
to
Maj Gen
to
Ammo
Chief of Ind
26
.
Div, for
Serv,
Jan
39, sub:
Plans for
Ammo
Storage Depot,
*^ Ltr,
western
CofOrd
to
OO
TAG,
Ammo Depot, OO
^'(i)
Crain,
Lueders Rpt,
ex.
Diary,
Aug
40, sub:
New
633/69.
21
633/95.
17
Jun
40,
OHF;
(2)
K.
*''
Aug 40, sub
{1) Ltr, CofOrd to TQMG,
Survey for New Ammo Depots,
633/44 Misc
(2) Lueders Rpt, ex. L; (3) Ltr, Lt Col Ittai
A. Luke to Col Robert N. Bodine, i6 Aug 40,
201/404, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 55,
OHF; (4) Proceedings of a Board of Officers
i
OO
OOD
368
sorb
November
igloos
1941.'*^
Army-Navy
Joint
Ammunition Storage
and the Ordnance
all types of ammunition
(JANASB)
Board
be used in
all
Uncertainty as to standard
was "one
igloo
The
tration
buildings,
and
ground
magazines
to
several
serve
as
abovetransfer
earth
between
mounds
had
to
igloos.
be a distance of 400
Unless there were
some
afforded
spread of grass
protection
The
fires.
against
the
was
that
when
doubled
the
necessary
had
convened
at
orders of
CO,
The
Program
four
pro-
of the
had
design
feet
each
to
was
be staggered
at least
800
OO
""*
I
Lueders Rpt,
November
^' (i)
exs.
I, J,
K, L; (2) Time,
Conf
Crain,
QMG,
Ord
gram,
to
QMG,
OO
Umatilla Ord
675/361; (7)
Depot,
OO
633/266 Misc.
THE
np:\v
depot system
369
made
expansion."'^
plain
the need
For the
fiscal
for
year
Oreg.
and
1
War
of
acquisition
of
depots."'
for
in
'"'^
Wesson's
(i)
Ammo
dorsement
line
and secondarily
from Boston to
Coast depot and terminal, primarily as a
defense measure. There was at that time
no ammunition shipping point on the Gulf.
The region seemed important to Ordnance
planners,
possibility
victorious,
for
they
did
not
discount
the
that
Ltr,
21 Mar 41.
TAG, 23 Jan 41, sub:
Program for FY 1942 and ist InMar 41, 00 471/887/115; (2)
1
O'Clock Confs,
CofOrd
Storage
23
to
Ammo
ex. 43.
Rpt,
(i)
p.
Bd Rpts,
Interv, Grain,
4;
(3)
ex. 90.
Ltr,
17
TAG
to
370
in the
eastern Kentucky-southwestern
ginia area.
From
both,
in the
West Vir-
reasonably rapid
It
was
little
New
longer.
one
damage by
ural causes, or
an explosion.
ports
saboteurs, nat-
survey of
revealed
only
site
cilities,
isolated
to
the
site
spot
"
for
Depot
W.Va.,
Site
00
OCO
(i) site Bd
ACofS G-4,
ex. 92.
of the levees to
(i)
Memo,
Site
Bd Rpts,
ex. 66.
SYSl
EM
371
storage in the
made
To
authorized in
in a
matter of days/'"
find
primarily for
suitable
bomb
site
in
the
East,
An
site
airfield
made
made
possible by
could be built
if
necessary on
less
opposi-
with
sites."-
In the
summer
cluded
amount
of
$84 million
in-
of
eral
Deitrick
investigate
to
several
that
sites
chosen
over
tract
in
south
central
Pennsylvania because
tive,
'''*
Ltr,
Bd
Luke
it
TAG
to
thru
OCO,
Mar
sub:
of
Officers,
OHF;
4,
Lida Mayo, 19
to
7,
(5)
Personal Ltr,
May
54,
OHF.
QMG
Ammo
two sites
-Maryland-Pennsylvania area, of about
fourteen thousand acres each, was speeded
by the prospect of additional funds for
Depot
New York
OO
675/8730.
Memo, CofOrd for AGofS G-4, 26 Jul
41, sub: Locations for Additional Ammo Depots
and Ocean Shipping Facilitier,
675/13163
Misc.; (2) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 90; (3) Wesson's 11
O'clock Gonfs, 8 Aug 41.
in
State,
"MO
OO
372
struction costs. The Chief of Ordnance and
The Quartermaster General concurred in
and
these recommendations,
vember
Secretary
the
of
No-
early in
War
gave
his
approval.*'^
in
construction
the
in
story
Blue
of
Grass
ended
suspend
all
Town and
G-4
decided
to
explore
further
the
south
site of
probably be
as
less.
much
On
at
Charles
protest
many
were descendants
Many were
Mennonites and Dunkards who were opposed to war even for defense. But the
also
of the farmers
there
others."^
all
opposition
"^ (i)
by
the
local
Site
USW,
to
Bd
Rpts,
ex.
TAG
Bd Rpt,
Nov
Ammo Depot,
Ky., AG 681
MO-D,
0-7-41)
88;
copy
Memo,
Intraoffice
(3)
in
Site
Ammo
of
OCO
QMG,
Ammo
to
Rpts, ex. 90; (5) Ltr,
25 Aug
Depot Site in
41, sub: Survey of Proposed
W.Va.,
675/15745 Misc., copy in Site Bd
00
41,
was found near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. General Grain and Major Deitrick
considered that it had some advantages
o\er Charles Town: it was some four
thousand acres larger, could more easily
be expanded, and was farther from the
town- a safety consideration. Although
the cost of construction would probably be
greater because the terrain was more rolling, the cost of land acquisition would
was
of
""
been
came from
Governor Arthur H. James, Senator James
Davis, and Representatixe Harry L.
J.
Haines. Not only was the entire area more
productive and more thickly settled
with
some eight hundred people as opposed to
about fifty on the West Virginia site but
differently.
letters of protest
had
there
as
mid-December.**'
poured in
to the President, the Secretary of War, and
the Chief of Ordnance. Landowners objected to being forced out in the middle of
winter, and to losing their homes, live-
stock, dairies,
citizens
Town. Telegrams
Lueders Rpt,
I
Town,
(2)
ex.
Q.
Dec
Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4,
pub: Proposed .^mmo Depot Site at Charles
(
OO
Ltr,
to
675/23993;
Chief FS, 6
Ammo
Memo, Col
Chamberlain, .Actg
Gen Richard
Moore), 15 Nov 41, sub: Proposed Ammo Depot,
Charles Town, W.Va., G-4/3 1866-2, copy in
93;
(3)
ACofS
Site
"
Bd
for
Deputy
S.
J.
CofS
(Maj
Memo, CofOrd
(i)
sub:
Projjoscd
Ammo
for
SYSl
EM
373
On
Ordnance
Depot.'"'** The speed with which negotiations were pushed through was one cause
of community resentment against Letterkenny, "the ammunition dump," as it was
called locally. There were others. This
depot, one of the largest in the whole Ordnance system, needed more than five thousand workers and drained the countryside
of manpower badly needed at sowing and
harvesting time. There was no large city
near enough to supply a pool of labor. And
the antiwar sentiment of the community
was hardly conducive to good morale
for Letterkenny
boundary hnes
among
One
the workers.
depot employee,
gentleman
McClellan Flora, was
suspended from his church because he put
on an Uncle Sam suit and sold War Bonds.
In time, public relations improved, but
they were always a problem and hampered
depot operations to an extent that had
not been foreseen."**
an
chin-whiskered
elderly,
named George
Petition
in
B.
Protesting
Vicinity
copy
of
Site
addition
Kentucky
the
to
and
gram
of the
large
rockies,
site in
movements from
and also meet the
needs of the Air Corps. Second priority
went to the expansion of Ogden and the
construction of the two plateau depots,
the
San Francisco
area,
enough
to
make
possible
Quartermaster's
the
office,
transcontinental
representatives
and
railroads,
of
local
In
Site
Bd
Rpts,
ex.
Ammo Depot, Chambersburg, Pa., G4/31886-2, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 98; (9)
Ltr, SW to Hon Arthur H. James, 2 Jan 42,
G-4/3 866-2, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 99;
for
(10)
Memo,
TAG
an Ammo Depot,
copy in Site Bd
Brig
sub:
Pa.,
Gen
Site
for
USW,
18
Dec
AG
for
an
Ammo
Depot,
in Site
Bd
Chambersburg,
Rpts, ex. loi.
"8(1)
Bd
Site
Rpts,
ex.
99;
(2)
History,
Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, vol. I, From Beginning Through 31 December 1942, p. 8, OHF.
"'
Lt Col A. G. Erpf and Lt Col E. D.
(
Mohlere, Report of a Visit to Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania [Aug
44], ASF 200.02 Contl Div files; (2) Min, Conf
of Depot Comdrs, FS Div, Ord Dept, 25-26 Aug
I
Div,
I,
OCO
p.
and
17;
(3)
QMG,
Ltr,
Dec
Rpt of Bd
2
(2)
OQMG
Hist, Storage
to
TAG
thru
Incl,
with
Bd to Select Site
Dir From SW dated 4 Sep 41
Ammo Depots Southeastern Colo.-Western
for
Kans. Area, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 105.
I
374
western
In
the
eastern
at
California-
arid
'"
(
Site
Bd
Rpts, ex.
105; (2)
ist
Indorse-
ment,
to TAG Through QMG, 8 Dec 41,
to TAG, 8 Dec 41,
and 2d Indorsement,
682/145, copies in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 106; (3)
3d Indorsement, AGO to CofEngrs, 16 Dec 41,
sub: Bd of Officers, AG 681 (i 2-2-41) MSCD, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 107; (4) 4th Indorsement, CofEngrs, to OCO, 23 Dec 41,
682/145, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 108.
^- (i) Sierra Ordnance Depot, vol. I, History
Through 1942 [hereafter referred to as Sierra
OCO
QMG
00
OO
Hist], pp.
I,
4,
Through
OCO
Officers,
with
Ammo
OHF;
and
(2)
QMG,
Ltr,
OQMG
Incl,
to
TAG
41, sub: Bd of
to Select Sites
Dec
Rpt of Bd
2
killed in
Construction
sub: Proposed
Incl, Memo,
Western Nev., with
Claude L. Coray to Col Edward M. George, 29
Oct 41, sub: Ord Storage Sites near Susanville,
Depot.^^
for
ex.
114;
Zone IX
Ord Site
Calif.,
Depots
(4)
to
Ltr,
QMG,
30
Zone
Oct
QM
41,
00
Rpts, ex.
32, sub:
Purposes,
''
(i)
copy
Site
Bd
Bd Rpts,
in Site
R[5ts, ex.
ex.
105;
16.
(2)
Ltr,
Con-
375
Major
at Sierra
highways, and
Range
of
habited
Utah.'-'
pansion of
QM
Denver Ord
QM
Incl, Ltr,
QM
ex.
QM
Oct
41,
sub:
Prospective
Bd Rpts,
ex.
12.
Camp
Ord
Sites
(Ammo
acres
report
on
the
four
sites,
War
dated
'MO
QMG,
Plant to QMG, 24
Constructing
Denver Ord Plant to Constructing QM, VIII Constructing Zone, 24 Oct 41, sub: Inspection of
structing
Calif.
lands.
sites,
Incl,
Ltr,
He
OQMG
to
TAG
through
OCO
and
Dec 41,
Rpt of Bd to
2
Southwestern
S.
Site
Bd Rpts,
OQMG
QMG,
Rpt
of
376
to
the
in
in
site
On
Arizona.
abeyance
until
investigated
Flagstaff-Prescott
area
of
suggested
memorandum
place.
that,
sidered
that
its
location
in
the
central
ammunition stocks. "'^ With the enlargement of the old East Coast depots and
Benicia Arsenal the ammunition storage
program was virtually complete.^"
and found a
M.
the area
Depot.
It
became
Navajo
Ordnance
'^
Taking stock
situation
at
of the
ammunition storage
beginning of
the
Opening
would
still
the
1942,
G-4
even
be a shortage of 15,479,-
3,635,000
men. Nothing
like
this
seemed
storage
in
constructed at once.
of
feet
sites.
deferred
He
""
Site
Bd
''MO
WDGS
Ltr,
OCO
G-4
OO
of additional construction
advisable,
that,
amount
the
at
ammunition depot
all
about
Depots
"
201
New
struction
the
Colorado,
status
be
00
'
Arsenal,
OO
ACofS G-4,
Arsenal,
OO
Gen Grain
to
633/2348;
8
Dec
Maj Gen
OHF.
foothills
it
to
difficult
377
grade
the
an instance
cited
in
was cut off because floods had washed out the railroad
tracks
mounds
there
served as barricades,
that
and
road
the
to
town,
nearest
Har-
and
the fear of the damage an explosion might
^^
do in a more or less thickly settled region.
The vast Western depots, on the level
floor of a high mountain valley or on a
wind-swept prairie, with orderly and acces-
sible
eye
could
see
against
of brush fires,
background
of
snow-covered
isolation,
isolation
manpower.
Prewar planning, based on defense
the continental United States, had
various
of
rials
The
depots.
kinds
great size
affected
in-
of
By 14 January 1943,
of
new
the
and complexity
all
of the sixteen
new ammunition depots had been acti\ated. They had cost altogether about
$367
million.
Among
civilians. ^^
tion,
sites.
the
decision
made
depots with
operate the
to
placed
highest
priority
on
strategic
trunk lines
to
areas
to
be
served,
of Chief
Land
for
Blue
Grass
Ordnance
re-
*^
Depot
histories in
OHF.
OCO
^- Interv
Service
History
Field
with Col Carroll Deitrick,
i,
Plans and Operations, vol. I, pt.
From i June 1942 to January 1943
P&O,
( I )
I],
p.
92,
OHF.
of
Re-
Nov
Gen
OHF.
^^
vol.
31 December 1942, p. 3,
"3 (i) Hist, P&O, I, 92-121.
86 (i) Ltr, Col Robert Sears,
Through
I,
Basic History
OHF.
senal, to
brought
ities
in,
facil-
of a town.^^
As an example
(i)
Ordnance
officer
378
Depot, for example, cost about $150 per
that for Sierra about nine cents.*^*^
acre
each.''^
contained;
called the
first
eight depots,
the second,
An
interesting sidelight
and location
amount and
on the
as
variety of the
military
wildlife
they
reservations
they
called "B."
East,
fox,
populations of deer,
bear,
when
and
Hills there
became
most of the
administration buildings, warehouses for
inert supplies, and like construction were
of permanent type; but at the "B" depots,
Sierra, Navajo, Letterkenny, Sioux, Black
Hills, Tooele, Blue Grass, and Pueblo,
most construction was of a type called
materials
critical,
"mobilization," designed to
size
was the
In the
opossum,
The western
pheasant.
coyote.
At Black
and
ringnecked
elk,
were two
alliga-
tors, wildcats,
24-25 and
(i)
Hist,
exs. 3, 6.
Ltr, Brig
7
Jan 42,
sub:
Maj Gen Grain to Mrs. Constance McLaughlin Green, 27 Aug 50, OHF.
sonal Ltr,
In
acreage
the
depots
were
almost
other supply
stallations
services.
acres.''*'
The
Monograph No.
''-
Public
8, Plate V.
Information Br, OCO, Background
Information on Ordnance Field Service, Apr 53,
OHF.
CHAPTER
XVIII
needs,
all its
Ordnance
faced
four
find-
meshing
into the Ord-
adjusting
Army
The
sys-
constantly
to
Serv-
theaters.
existing
bama, was
location
was
named
depots,
one
in
the
southeast
to
Anniston,
the
site
for
Ala-
new
for
its
maneuver
and adjacent land was
purchase
if
traditionally
As noted in the preceding chapter, Ordnance did not build many warehouses in
939-1 940 for storage of general supplies,
or "combat equipment" as such materiel
was beginning to be called. Its main effort
had been directed toward ammunition
storage. But with the rising tide of war
production, actual and planned, in 1940,
Ordnance was allotted $7,244,000 for
warehouse construction in fiscal year
94 1. This appropriation was divided
three ways: $2 million was to be used to
add 500,000 square feet at Ogden Ordnance Depot and the rest was to be divided very nearly evenly between two un-
at
as
supply storage.
depot
selected
site
great
center
One enormous
for
general
warehouse,
under
The
its
forty
at
Og-
den
in the fall of
removed
AG
Ltr,
to
SW
112.05
to
first
(9-19-40)
Rpt, ex. H.
- (i) Anniston Hist, pp.
10-14, 44; (2) Grain,
Diary, i Oct 40.
2 Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, vol. II
( 1939-43),
p. 306.
380
March
Months before the new facilities at
Ogden, Anniston, and Rock Island were
ready, it became evident that space for
allotted
for
new
at
Letterkenny,
called Defense
1942.^
named War
increased
tion to
meet
In the
summer
arose
to be
the
of
new problem
1941
amount
materiel
of lend-lease
was
that
to
move
it
In July
94
the
Ordnance Department,
to
million
Red
Anniston,
River,
sum was
of
feet of
space
allotted
eight Defense
out.
Aid
Aid.^
Ordnance was
to
Aid depots, a
the
at
total of eight
open
and
ommended
There was also in contemplation the utilization of commercial warehouses and the
end of permanent-type construction.*^
The War Munitions Program of
February 1942 set extremely high production goals for tanks, artillery, and other
the
at
new
program. Ordnance
fiscal
ammunition
and
Many
strategic location.
were
in the
ideal
for
of
them
They
storage.
and plenty
had
facilities
storage.
equipment.^
Preliminary
estimates
new
office
by
es-
ary to consolidate
activities
all
depot construction
that
of acreage.''
Not
course, for
interested
in
That
the
fall,
the
Ordnance
and Indiana
the
began
to
which
the munitions would
area
in
about 75 percent of
be produced
to regulate the flow of lendlease supplies to ports; G-4 contemplated
placing much of the new production of
weapons and tanks, along with supplies of
other technical
.services,
in
it
presentation.
War Department
Ohio,
of
all
these
eleven
of
depots.
them,
Ogden
History,
Arsenal,
pt.
I,
(19:^9-42),
PP- 53-54'
Monograph No.
"
(i)
Sep,
Mi)
sub:
Ibid.;
Oct
8,
pp. 28-30.
Jul.
18
41.
I^tr,
Depot
(2)
SW
to
Storage
Chief of Engrs,
Program
14
Feb
42.
681
(2-9-42) MO-D; (2)
Somervell, ACofS G-4, for CofS, 17 Jan 42. sub:
Depot Storage Program, Supplemental FY 1942,
AG 681 ( i-i 7-42) G-4 323 15.
" Monograph No.
8, p. 30.
See rh. IV, above.
''
381
store
theater-of-operations type.
duction
ity.
that
account,
and
the war
materials
Letter-
both
ing
amounts
types
at
in
approximately
equal
gate,
Navajo,
Black
Hills.^"
Blue
Grass,
Seneca,
tanks
and combat
vehicles
that
Staff reversed
its
earlier
decision
to
pointed
out
to
War
the
Department.
March 1942
consideration
first
tion,
fire
that,
down
because
was economy
critical materials,
of light
walls only
in
ware-
frame
without
construction,
On
concrete
June
Departments and the
Board set up rigid rules for wartime construction. It was to be "of the simplest
type, just sufficient to meet the minimum
requirements." Thus any additional confloors.
struction
1942 the
Ordnance
existing
at
depots,
sible.
such
construction,
as
concrete
blocks,
used if
material was not
critical in the area concerned and if its
cost would not run more than 15 percent
could
be
the
and
of the
be
Warehouses of
some flimsy
material, such as plywood, and were not
much better than tents. They were not
suitable for housing certain types of Ordnance materiel, as the Chief of Engineers
'" (i)
Ltr,
CofOrd
to
TAG,
P&O
n],
ex. 69,
OHF.
582
Open-Type
Stor-a.ge
Sheds
(rigrd
ai
IiuL, Sep-
iember 1943.
Army
Hills.
into
and
Schenectady. New York. Some of it went
into old-line repair arsenals such as Augusta, where Ci\-il War caissons had to be
moved out into the open to make room
Ne%*-
Cumberland,
Pennsylvania;
Blue
Pueblo.
Letterkenny.
Grass.
Red
Navajo,
or
authorized,
ment
space.
Pueblo.
Red
Letterkenny,
-\nniston,
^- 'i;
to
CG
-42
Hist,
P&O,
.\AF. et
al.,
MO-SPAD-M.
com-
SW
AG
Jun
P&O
feet in
Nov
40.
]^lay 42.
RKMSIOXS
IX
had
ammunition magazines and igloos.^'
Early in 1942. when Ordnance storage
383
Army
in
in
resen^es.^'
officials
ply
history
stocks
The A. ,^ ..... ./
Quartermaster Facilities
.
into
war
reser\es
Nobody knew
at the time to what extent the great am!7iunition depots would be drawn into the
late at the
end
of the war.
war
When
Ordnance
the
midsummer
Department in
from the
received
of
1942
Quartermaster Corps the responsibility for
motor transport vehicles.-" the storage
came with
that
facilities
War Aid
the
new
mission
motor
motor supply depots, eleven
motor supply sections at Quartermaster
depots, and one motor reception park. At
the disadxantages
distribution
^"^
picture.
tribution aside
and
Problem^
of
dis-
would become
these
acute in
keenly
felt
in
came to be
combat equip-
of isolation
the case of
later
felt
were more
by isolated locations and
the lack of skilled labor resources than
were the ammunition supph operations at
included
depots, eight
four
bases,
area, in
seriously hindered
open
six
was
There were maintenance
because the buildings had been
some
storage.-^
difficulties,
^'
Yet the fact that the Ordnance Department combined equipment storage with
stitute
General Staff
supply ser\ices
of
for
filling
when
the
requisitions
^''
Monograph No.
1"^
Me>-ns Rpt.
^^ (i>
J.
p.
5.
Aug 45
OHF:
2'
Its
[hereafter
Jun
Ltr.
to
Maj Gen
Storage
Operations December 1941-December 1945. pp34-36. 269-71; (2) Memo, Lt Gen Somervell
for CofOrd. 9 Mar 43. sub: .Assignment of Space,
SPOPN 400.24 (3-9-43): (3^ Depot histories
OHF.
-'^
For
became
-^
Monograph No.
time
Sep
OHF.
i]. p. -I.
^* Personal
in
first
II.
Plate V.
Storage Branch, pL
Through Dec 43
Br. II
8.
Histor>- of
or stopping places
at
least
points""
other
for
site
reconsignment
Chapter XII.
S. Plate
V.
> ^
S55<z
-5-5
5:s
o^
5<.3L50^<>ru:>rJ:l^zZa.JiJi
>:Q-
5 o"5
o,
i?
wo;
-US
o pj
o =_
o o 2 "~j-i -Z V '"=
OoO
Jr-S"o-5
= -
tl
?^
~^
O O Q.O
8-St
32'5"S'S^'',2?o
oo'000-^oA'*
ofTiee
or
little
\oirs
bulk
for
they
storage,
reser-
lacked
bins
ufactured;
after
extensive
disadvan-
rewarehousing
Ordnance well.
Rossford formerly named Toledo became
the master depot >for automotive parts and
programs,
they
served
St.
Missouri;
Louis,
Fort
Wayne, near
Detroit,
lanta,
was space
there
The
for
in
added
up
facilities,
tools
to
beginning
when most
the
1942
the
fall
of
program
would
be
1942
under
delivered.
385
Against this load the Ordnance Department could count on using some space
that
gasoline
had been
minimum
ical effect
of
officers
keep such
.storage
at
on
Ordnance
aid
to
the
labor.^^
storage
specialists,
experienced
who were
with
the
motor transport
and the reservists who continued to come into the Army from the
automobile industry, worked throughout
1942 and into the summer of 1943 to
mesh the Quartermaster motor bases and
depots into the Ordnance distribution
sy.stem. They consolidated the two Atlanta
installations, the motor base and the motor
supply depot, to form the Atlanta Ordnance Depot. In Texas they moved the
Normoyle Ordnance activities to San Antonio Arsenal, forming the San Antonio
Ordnance Center. At Pomona, California,
they turned over the buildings and facilities of
Pomona Ordnance Base to the
Desert Training Center, which was run as
a theater of operations with an Ordnance
base. All the motor transport bases were
designated depots, and two were renamed.
their service
"(i)
nom'C
Systems
Hist,
P&O,
I,
Mobilization
to
Meet
(Discussion), p.
ASF
History,
Storage
386
Lewis in Washington became Mt.
it from other military activities at the Fort Lewis installation, and for the same reason Fort Devens
Ordnance had
Fort
cluded
Rainier to distinguish
Massachusetts
in
more,
in
M. Whittemore.^^
Reallocation of Space by
its
storage
States,
non-Ordnance
or other
depots
in
territorial
installations,
areas,
and
two
storage
warehouse space, more than eight million square feet of shed space, and about
fifty-two million square feet of open storage. Some two million square feet were
of
devoted
and
to
packing,
repairing.
shipping,
was
receiving,
overbuilt
it
in
by
was
inequitable
ASF
of
that
that
distribution
In the
space.
of
only
Army
the
co-ordinated
also
among
space
redistributed
technical services
the
of
Depart-
27
the
depots
went
to the
two
fall,
were
Army
of the
released:
War
Aid
motor
trans-
Little
Rock
The
functions of both
made
Army
had
clear by a survey
depots
magazine
space.^*^
ASF
planners
con-
P&O,
'-''Ann
Rpt
-^
ASF
I,
of
pp. 19-27.
FS
Hist, Storage
for
FY
1944,
Opns, pp.
p.
5,
13, '^0-34.
OHF.
in
vannah
in
and Sa-
Virginia, Atlanta
Loma
in
to
67.7
sheds,
warehouses, 55.2
in
and 31.2
After this
were
to 65.3 in
period
a few
to
open
contraction
of
in
64.5
storage.
^^
there
readjustments.
Facilities
once
part
of
in-transit
Day
storage
lasting
only
from
V-E
On
the
whole,
the
Ordnance
storage
387
depots
reservoir,
and
area,
transship-
Red
camps,
posts,
stations,
was
Jacinto
and
primarily
air bases.
San
transshipment
Coast,
East
emphasis
number
shifted
overseas
to
of depots of
all
supply,
in
own
mands
of
much
larger than
in
in
their
areas.
Generally the
came
"Mi)
Br,
I,
area
"reserve,"
became
"distribu-
tion." ^^
Hist,
38;
p.
(3)
Hist, Storage
for
FY
1944,
PP- 4-5-
early planning.'"^^
OCO
2"
FS Storage Div, vols. Ill, IV, V, VI,
January 1944 to 31 March
VII, History from
i
of Distribution
ning of
1945, p.
2.
^^
Monograph No.
''
Seech.
8, pp. 40-41.
below.
^' Hist, Storage Br, I, pt. 11, Depot Missions,
pp. 22-32.
XX,
388
titude
and Black
like
Sierra,
Pueblo,
Sioux,
it
In
December 1942
the
tained the
germ
bution
depots
ought
be
to
to
kept
to
with
requisitioning
ber of
ing
scarce.
Getting
rid
of
excess
stocks
free
Master
Supply depots
would be shipped into Reserve Storage
depots, on a bulk basis. Obsolescent items
would be concentrated in one depot.'**'
capacity
of
the
pattern
some
of the large
new ammunition
War Aid
depots
For example,
in
missions that took place in 1943. The planon the premise that distri-
ners proceeded
of the
^^
I, pt.
I.
ex. E.
was
to
be
the
requisitioning
ports
of
supplies
supplies,
point
embarkation
except
those
tools,
the
for
for
eastern
parts
all
wheeled
of
and
and
a kind of reservoir
In the
distribution
the
and
depot for all
equipment, with one exception tools and
equipment for tanks and tractors were to
come from Lordstown, the distributor for
this kind of materiel to all service commands and ports of embarkation except
those on the West Coast. The substitution
of Letterkenny would free Raritan to be
parts,
389
for
autombile
sense
Letterkenny
the
in
everything needed;
supplied
south,
transport
Atlanta
furnished
motor
and
Anniston
every-
materiel
Wayne and
Ft.
everything
else;
in
this
Rock
and
in
St.
materiel
transport
the
in
importance
or export
filler
tion:
and
Hampton
and
Roads;
New
Charleston;
embarka-
New
Atlanta
Orleans;
Red
Red
Ogden
as did
line,
full
Island
southwest.
serving
stemmed
within
New
From
commands
Charleston
depots
category of distribution
River
York,
serving
Anniston
serving
fluenced the
April of
still
this
early planning
the
in-
in the
of
depots:
and
arsenal.
were the "special stock" depots that carried parts for major items that were in
limited supply because they were substi-
For
supplies,
through
four
major
types
situation
depots
through
the
major
type.
distribution
Louis issued
and
half-track \ehicles
The
major
'^*^
were the
largest in
number.
"
Ibid.
38 (i) Ord
390
There were twenty-two in all. Five of them
were Ordnance sections in ASF depots,
five were 1940-41 war-reserve depots such
as Black Hills and Sierra, nine were former
motor transport or War Aid installations,
and three were old-line Ordnance depots.
Of the latter, in a reversal of roles, Au-
now
gusta was
of
the
support
filler,
Known
"advance"
depots, they temporarily held boxed or
crated parts and tools until the Ports of
Embarkation called for them on movement
orders. Others had processing layouts to
tic
depots.
retail,
assemble certain
sets,
classes
crate
of
it.
materiel
into
and
also
at
new depot
this shift
on the
vehicle parts,
decided that
export
filler
less
it
specializing in
certain
lines.
Two
of the
master depots had been shipping for export direct to ports for some time, Lordstown for tools and Rossford for automotive
parts.^"
With
as
Assembly and
combat
vehicles,
depots
depots,
rather
in
the
than
distribution
spring
of
or
filler
General
1944
to
weapons
parts,
general purpose
^y
FS
'*"
(i)
Haute,
Atlanta. Depots
B and
E,
OHF;
(2)
Apr
44,
sub:
Master Depot Distribution Plan for Tank-Automotive Parts and Tools, OHF; (2) Hist Storage
Br,
I, pt. I,
bilities
Monroe,
Anniston, Blue Grass, Aberdeen, Ogden,
and the Ordnance section at Columbus
at Fort
General Depot.'*^
Campbell
General
believed
the
that
391
equipment for automatic weapons of 20mm. and above, and for field artillery; for
the same materiel, excepting wheeled vehicles and K and L items, it was a filler
depot to the Charleston Port of Embarkation.''*'
problems."
such
car,
^^
But
Dodge
as
by
stocking
make
ran
Chevrolet,
or
to
operate
the
master depots
strictly
as
broken
M411
cartons
or
ASF Manual
boxes.
May
Instability in
Depot Missions
of
last
it
came
first
into
pat-
1945,
Processing Overseas Requisitions, required
that
of
Procedures
for
if
Ordnance
that
and
wholesale
retail
operations
place on
July
1943
it
became
the dis-
and
1943, Letterkenny
assist
Army
One
missions
is,
it
were not
master, distribution,
of
defined.
clearly
installation,
filler,
or storage type
ball
were
loads
of
depot
and supplies
Command
hicles,
depot
and L
the
materiel,
supplies
in
to
ware-
Fourth Service
for tracked and wheeled vefor
rolling
for
and
materiel
and
^
*^
p.
392
houses while back orders were accumulat-
was not
Early
in
1944
yet stored."
depot
the
took
*''
over
Ordnance
the
ascribed
An
study
and ceased
Raritan's
filler
responsibilities
targets
for
materiel.
be shipped,
important change.
materiel
and
and semi-
to
impossible
to
forecast
or
the
rate
at
and major
ton.^^
items.
planners
storage
at
relieve
stallation,
away
taking
parts
certain
supply
func-
tions.'*
Ordnance Department
stability
failed
to
achieve
in
justified;
deplete
they
when
stocks
it
was not
through
were necessary
at
possible
attrition;
times and
but
often
rewarehousing,
Some rearrangement
was doubtless
tribution
But
it is
some
early in 1943,
the congestion at Raritan might have been
foreseen.
And
if
Chevrolet or
better
heavy
burdens on the
depots."*^
When mission changes were
made, Ordnance tried to keep interdepot
movements of materiel to a minimum,
placed
bility
*''
Hist, Letterkenny Ord Depot, vols. II, III,
IV, V, History for the Period i January 1943
thru December 1943 (hereafter cited as Hist,
Letterkenny, 1943), p. 4.
^ Hist, Letterkenny Ord Depot, X, History, i
January 1945 through 31 March 1945, pp. 5-7.
^9 (i)
Ann Rpt
FS
of
for
FY
file.
for FY 1944, p.
(2) Hist, Letterkenny, 1943, p. 7.
^^ FS Supply Bull 2-15, I Apr
43, p. 12.
5 2
Ann Rpt
PSP56,
of
FS
304;
ex. B.
5^ (i)
Col.
into effect.
perienced
W.
had gone
C. Gamrath, an ex-
Ordnance supply
feel-
officer,
on
shift-
393
The Ordnance
cation
of
"The methods
of distribution of ordnance
to be a target of many
'experts' within the Ordnance Department,
within Headquarters ASF, and from indus-
seemed
supplies
am
it
In
ers.
War
progressed,
alteration
the pattern
in
began
ice
comprehensive
planning
of
to
The
perma-
the
facilities
workload
that
and
To
desirable in.stallations,
which would be
distribution
after
of
spon.sibilities
depots,
war would be
One was the correct
the
with
distribution
The
World
it
efficiency
upon the
well.
ammunition,
of safe storage of
tracts
were
ideal,
but
much
left
in
va.st
desert
terms of labor
to develop
own
its
system of distribution
the
readily redistributed by
ASF
in
the
1943
On
importance to
this score,
efficient
operations.
supplies
tion
as
to
re-
depot
work-
start
Though some
ASF
supply they
^'^
of
availability of civilian
its
II,
nature
the
depots,
and
facilities,
^t
Memo,
Lt Col
W.
C.
Gammth,
Chief. Sup-
OHF.
Ann Rpt of FS
Pers Rpts,
'^
for
FY
1945, p. 14.
394
nance discussed
ing.
But
it
CHAPTER XIX
of the
according to the
^\'a^ II,
fa(
Field
efTorts,
jiersistent
War
II.
In spite of
Service
did
not
of identifica-
that
so
the
and
dejjot,
could
pr(>i)lem
parts.-
official
in
Washington
all
fhe
the
mainly
human and
fare
or
human
faulty
part,
ordinarily
small,
negligible,
war-
might
missing
inexpensive,
that
and
immobilized
commander
tank
place a
part.
it
spare
fore
seeing to
or
it
that the
or where. There-
man
in
essence of supply."
With each
the
sense
in the field
when he needed
the
part
when
parts control
in the
emphasis
the
reinforcement.
cl.iturc
identif).
and that
future
than the
break or
concerned spare
material
the
of
it
of
had
was "the
or
guns,
lot
other
physical
he
identified.
MBCA
ing Agency,
jiiocuremcnt.
Medaris,
Ltr,
14
They
suggested
might be read
in
that
the
art
of
war
Tanks.
^ Brevet
Lt. Col. George C. Shaw, Supply in
Modern War (London: Faber and Faber,
Limited, 1938), p. 303.
396
what was
were often
wrong, because of differences in cUmatc,
terrain, and operations in a world-wide
war; and for newly developed items there
was no maintenance experience at all.''
certain
parts,
Shortages developed in
though in general the tendency was to
provide too much rather than too little.
The spare parts required to maintain one
hundred medium tanks for one year
filled twenty boxcars. For one jeep, Ordnance undertook to stock and furnish
parts
to
last
"enough"? The
1.006
different
seemed
than
But
year.
best estimates
spare
a total that
parts,
though actually
large,
it
was
less
spare
their
1940 that
manage
involved a
It
new
spare
parts
of
accounting
electrical
made by the
chines (IBM)
International
apparatus
Business
Ma-
Corporation.
the
regardless
of
one organ-
and that
this or-
distri-
The Chief
Ordnance approved
of
recommendation
the
He
agreed to the
and
on
Barroll
December 1940
build up a new
16
to
employed
Parts and
for
1940.
parts,
ganization
spare
all
Accessories
to
by
handled
quired
were
parts
them.*^
able to get
space,
or
enough experienced
even supplies.
help, ofTice
Furthermore,
it
A New Spare
Parts Organization
The Use
In the late
nance
summer
of
Lawrence
Sweden of General Motors Overseas Operations,
to
make a study of Ordnance
Department
Assistant Secretary of
the
spare
parts
IBM
that
'
initial
IBM Machines
requested
procedure for
of
War had
machines be
This problem
is
discussed
proposed
installed
above
in
in
all
Chapter
IV.
"
351. 358, 363Barroll Rpt, 1942, pp. 5-7. Mr. Barroll also
criticized the Ordnance system of depot commodity specialization; for example, he believed
that ]jlacing most tank parts at Rock Island Arsenal, small arms parts at Springfield, and so on,
''
two weeks
left
enemy sabotage or
**
40; (3)
''
offensive measures."
Ibid., p. 8;
Ord
Office
Memo
8.
Oct
depots. Considered
397
much more
flex-
ible
record-keeping,'" and
the
the
War
Department.
Secretary
Assistant
IBM
On
War
of
Corporation be given
installing
a directive from
all
that
assistance in
machines, on a rental
its
the
basis,
the Chief of
chines to
operations
control
involved
ticles,
since
for
major
items,
represented
included,
spare
This
parts.
the
ar-
only
about
eight
IBM
rental
than
rather
sales
Col.
basis.''
IBM
Corpora-
Almost
than
at
speed-up.
tight
manpower
difficulty of obtain-
ing,
tors.
Another obstacle to
grew out of the failure
for
sity
more
smooth
operation
converting a commercial
system
operation
before
fully
military
to
some
in
it.
degree.''
The greatest problem presented to Ordnance by the machine system was that of
adapting to it the numbers hitherto used
procurement, and
requisitioning,
for
dis-
ally
Lawrence
used
thought that the decision to use the machines was good, because he believed that
number
coming
SNL
off
the
ever-mounting
production
flood
could
lines
not
be
in
an
Nomenclature
Lists
the Group
letter,
the
and
designation
B8
mark
kept
new
^'^
"
tion
Stauffer,
QM
Opns,
159. This
p.
'
^^'
(i) Hynds Memo; (2)
pp. 160-65, 178-79, 187-88.
Stauffer,
op.
cit.,
398
B 47058. In
the
spring
of
The
Field
1941
mark
of identifying
as the universal
and reporting
stores.
means
But a
fact
that something
had
it
became evident
be done to improve
to
according to a survey
that
of 1942 by General
made
in the spring
BECX3G,
because they
fell
in
field
of
Some
alphabet.
sary.
^"^
In this
parts usage by
maintenance echelons.
The
elements.
SNL
first
consisting
of
It
three
erations.
among
recommendation,
over
sponsible
Control
letter
digits,
SNL. Thus
to the
its
particular
number assigned
bayonet catch was B008-0 1-00030,
the item code
that
for
For
the
the
job
of
assigning
item
code
included
The coding
items
coming
operation,
off
which
production
was
gigantic,
the
the
officials
as
to
GM
agreement, even
who made
spare
merely
set
parts
up
for
operations
directly
or
operations. ^^
Division
The
was abolished
Parts
in
July
staff of
was
"still
remained to be accomplished
(0
History
Number)
of
in
much
"future
Col W. C. Gamrath,
Number (Item Stock
[hereafter cited as
Gamrath, Hist],
17
May
(2)
Gamrath,
Hist, pp.
:5-4;
'" (i)
Meyns Rpt;
399
Effects of the
forth
set
Tank-Automotive
the
policy,
At
this
stage
critical
Army
planning,
Service
control
parts
in
Forces
directed
that
weapons
on two grounds:
vehicles,
control
as well as
first,
it
com-
the
number
of
and, second,
IBM
it
employees
Washington,
in
of the
transport vehicles
central place.^^
but
Ordnance
Department had considered moving to Detroit
the
major item units handling
weapons; at that time the pattern of the
T-AC as a product center had not fully
it
that
of
some 80,000
Before
stock control.
Ordnance
merger,
handled
the
total
of
To
Supply
The move
of distribution
installations
munition.
The
henceforth
the
Ordnance
am-
those
handling
planners
intended
except
W^ishington
office
crystallized.^^
But
this
further
separation
of
spare
believed
place,
that
the
real
reason
for
Change
Barroll Rpt,
i,
1942, p. 9; (2)
ODO
285,
28 Jul 42.
'-'
(i) Hynds Memo; (2) Memo, Maj Gen
Julian S. Hatrher to CofOrd, 5 May 1945, sub:
Rpt of Activities in World War II [hereafter
(i)
Aug
that
"'
would
'-'^
49,
OHF.
Barclay Rpt.
Meyns Rpt.
400
was that "spare parts have been placed in
rigid, inflexible grouping that we
such a
now
find
it
is
how
^^ He
regardless of
might be."
parts
had remained with their major items, as
provided in the Ordnance Provision System Regulations, the move of Group G,
the automotive items, to Detroit "could
have been accomplished with scarcely a
pointed out that
ripple to
it
was,
if
operations
^^
As
disturbance
the
Field
to
now
their
stores
reports
move
number of
In the
trained
The
needed.
badly
Section
When
lost
the
50 percent of
Army and
others
transferred
power
much
the
situation
as
it
was
the
at
moment.
Moreover, the records were not accurate because depots frequently reported
parts under wrong code numbers.'^" The
drawings
ing
and
fire
for
control
its
job.
small
The
arms,
instruments
lists
of
engineerartillery,
were
and
not
refer-
and
Supplies
Section,
who
had
of
to
other
The man-
situation
Section
protested that
it
could not
on a lower
less
Parts
ceiling.
supply
much
^^
required
understanding of
as
engineers.
tribution cards
its
and Supplies
who were
people
Parts
'^"^
manpower,
in
sympathetic
this fact in the War Department and the x\rmy Service Forces
would have helped solve Ordnance's problems. But as late as the fall of 1944 the
Mead Committee found that neither the
Army nor the Navy recognized "the extent
of the paper work and bookkeeping work
required in order to maintain the flow of
-^
Hynds Memo,
-'
Ibid.
p.
i8.
Mcyns Rpt.
"'
Memo,
'
^''
S.
401
Hatcher
From
left.
Col.
James
The Chief
materials."
authority
The
avail-
^^
Crisis
and
L. Hatcher
Early in ig43
Brig. Gen.
critical.
Late in
had stated that "distribution is rapidly becoming our number one consideration." ^^
An avalanche of supplies was coming from
the factories, and some more efficient way
had to be found to get them to the users.
office at
Chavin.
S.
movements were
Big-scale troop
just get-
under way. Complaints about Ordnance spare parts provision and distribution began to come from the using arms,
ting
The
and
General,
Inspector
Service
Army
the
reports
Disability
Forces."^^
from
the
seriousness
Raphael
the
of
analyses by
stressed the
situation.^^
ASF
Torch
At
Barclay Rpt.
^"^
Stauffer, op.
3^0
CofOrd,
PSP
I
sess
cit., p. 4.
63, ex.
May
18,
Memo, Col
Sadtler to
Adequate Provision of
Maint Div, Hq ASF, Mainte-
43, sub:
History.
pp.
66,
114,
OCMH
'''
Lawrence
S.
Barroll,
Back
of
Depot Comdrs'
Reduction
at
402
changeover to a different
scheme had necessitated
retraining thousands of workers and cre^**
ated "an almost hopeless confusion."
In a nationwide radio broadcast on
in
the
1942,
parts identification
March
eral
ASF, Gen-
^^
Hatcher as
Chief of Field Service. He also had Field
Service operations reviewed by his personal
advisory staff, Messrs. Baruch, Lewis H.
Brown, Benjamin F. Fairless, and Keller,
to which had been added Mr. Fowler
Maj. Gen.)
McCormick,
Julian S.
president
International
of
and
of
B.
Sears
Edwin Hutchinson
of
To
porting system
to
General Campbell in February 1943 replaced Brig. Gen. Harry R. Kutz, whose
health had not been good, with Brig. Gen.
(later
replace the
many
The second
decentralize
stock
relieving
basis,
it
difficult to
and impossible
control
to reflect
was to
on a product
step
Chrysler
Parts
Numbering
OCO
numbering systems
were being used. In addition to Ordnance
drawing numbers, taxi numbers, and Federal Stock Catalog numbers, there was still
another number that might be stamped
on the part the manufacturer's number,
up at the depots. Investigators surveyed two typical depots, Atlanta for automotive parts and Augusta for weapons
parts. Analysis of some seventeen thousand
back-order, items showed that poor records
were responsible and that the depots and
the Tank-Automotive Center shared the
blame equally. Most of the trouble in the
depots was caused by failure of the store-
in
piling
keepers
to
identify
items
in
stock.
by the
The
Tank-
different
No
less
than
parts
***
Ruppenthal,
Logistical
Support
of
the
OO
OO
Team,
pp.
E.
MacMorland
14
Apr
HE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY
403
motor vehicles to the Ordnance Department, and by the fact that more and more
automobile companies were manufacturing parts for tanks.
Most
would be that of
manufacturer, and this
likely
it
automobile
fact
(taxi
manufacturer's
were
primarily
some extent
in
the manufacturer's
many
requisitions,
for
also used
especially
manufacturers'
catalogs
in
the
IBM
system.^^
This item
stock
number
reporting.
three
possible
There
were,
therefore,
numbers
stockkeeping
in
procurement numbers,
and the fact that parts were procured
under one number and stored under
another and might be requisitioned under a third
contributed immeasurably to
addition
four
to
the confusion.^''
Interchangeability of Parts
the
and
stores
number
ing the
numbers
part
individual
of
parts
or
The
inating interchangeability
and dissem-
information on
and urgency
of the
wartime task
The em-
on
than
^^
distribution;
(i)
Method
of
Sadtler,
25
also
FS Key
Rpts
in
OHF.
Aug
Pars
52;
(3)
Rpts and
Hynds
Memo.
Key
OCO-D
See
Pers
404
when
the
transferred to the
of relating
and
The Ordnance De-
other
Ordnance
items.
work even on general purpose vehicles. The task was made more difficult
by the proprietary interests of some manwith
who
ufacturers
refused to
make
their in-
Ordnance
program to
spring
revamped.^"
taxi
system
resulted
in
the
the
reports by this
complished
Branch,
depot
little,
T-v\C,
and
in April the
called
Supply
conference
of
Motor Transport
installations to
map
if
ommended
that
committee
at
nesses there
except
materiel
items.
But
Federal
Stock
Catalog
it
piece
seven digit
ber.
the block of
5'499'999^
num-
assigned
to
numbers,
5,500,000
to
to
out
men recommended
common
classification code,
digit
Ordnance
number be
***
Jr., Spare
E-12; (2) Ordnance Spare Parts in Mechanized Warfare, Aug
44, pp. 18-21; (3) Comments on draft of this
chapter by Brig Gen John A. Barclay, Apr 57,
(i)
Parts
History,
24 Jun 44,
ex.
Stock
OHF.
*^ (
)
E. J. Almquist, History of Engineering
Administrative Branch
later Engr and Inspection
Br Executive Division, 20 Nov 45, OHF; (2)
Gamrath, Hist, pp. 5-6; (3) Wells Bd Rpt.
drawing number, piece mark, manufacturer's number, or any other, and that this
405
B numbers 6,000,000
to
numbers, 6,500,000 to
6,899,999 and to E numbers, 6,900,000 to
6,999,999.^^ Thus, the new number for a
part stamped with A-277276 would be
to
5,999,999,
6,499,999,
^^
-^
Consequently on 14 September
Ordnance issued a reDepartment
Order No.
of
Ordnance
vision
Ordnance
numexisting
scrapped
69. It
bering systems and provided for the
effect,
ing drawings,
consecutively to
new Ordnance
aJl
The next
tration
of
new
system.
The Board
making
of
rules
for
to
revised order
numbering
new
almost every
part.
became
and interchangeability
The
gram.^'*'
Implementation of the
to a subordinate
lery
of
the
tive
their
practical.
Number
size.
part
factor
Section
headed
by
Col.
Harry
B.
Hambleton."***
staff
began
depots,
at Detroit, a suboffice
From
the
new system
the
Engineering
Stock
Number
that
to the
Number
all
identical
or
an
might
carry, such as that of the part manufacturer, unit manufacturer, or the old taxi
number. The Branch began the preparathe
interchangeable
list
part
of
Ordnance
'*^
It will be noted that "C" drawing numbers
were assigned lower stock numbers than "B"
drawing numbers. Wells Board Report, pp. 4-8.
"'
(i)
^^
ODO 69,
ODO
ODO
1-5, including
Br, pp.
406
one
the
part,
number
with
or
number stamped on
correspond'ng
numbers
the
numbers
in
two
sections,
stock
of
15-1 was
15-2 on
Twenty-two thousand sets
were printed and distributed to users such
as bases, depots, and stock control points.
stock numbers.
nomenclature, was
cipal
blocks of the
ORD
ORD
the
600,000
to 750,000,
demand become
be
and
The
distributed.
and
and
Items,
was needed
list
equipment resulted
tool
publication
that
realization
had the
had to
so great
ORD-5,
of
ORD
Stock
a
for
in the
List
of
ORD
ing Numbers.
fact that
5,
listing the
made
official
necessary by the
Number was
Washington)
Parts
Number
Control Section,
to the
OCO-D,
under the direction of the Engineering Administrative Branch. But it was woefully
short of personnel. Strenuous efforts by
Colonel Hambleton and Major Buhl resulted in the employment by contract of
employees of a commercial firm, SmithHinchman and Grylls. From this source
there were added to the Section a day
averaging forty-four persons and a
night shift of about forty-eight. These
shift
made
of
depots,
Field
Section also
Service's
had
Machine Records
on a contractor,
to rely
and
early
lists
for
were
1945
and
tanks
and for
wheeled combat
ORD
Nobody claimed
ing
system
^^ (i)
known
vehicles,
4- 1 and
was
ORD
related
and
respec-
14-2."*^
that the
perfect.
Campbell,
of
purpose
general
chassis
tively as
interchangeability
vehicles
Spare
Parts
Hist,
ex.
F-4;
-45; P- 34.
OHF.
^'^
(2)
(i)
PP
Sergeant,
pp.
35-39;
IX (March
1945).
(2)
The
7-17;
Ordnance
407
was a com-
it
that
the
enthusiastic response
requests for
all
"met
with
led to
many
had
publication
and
its
ices.
at
Controversies
foreseen.
tions
such
matters
as
of
SNL
Number;
the proper
and the
information;
for the
bility
responsi-
of
fixing
The
over
components
the correct
method
arose
item."'*^
impediment to smooth opthe new plan was the inaugurain 1944 of the Master Depot
greatest
eration of
tion early
all
parts
The new
Number
Stock
incorporating
number connected
Official
the
which
in
lowed
which
by
all
the
was
essential to
changeability
data.''*^
ORD
and
tempts
complicated problem."
previous at-
all
answer
to
this
*'"
A Common Language
of
Supply
it
automobile
industry,
make
of
ORD
of
experience
15, the
report noted
of
Ordnance
materiel,
it,
and the lack of
wartime employees,
the forefront another problem
to
Ordnance Part
ASF
The complexity
in
Ford,
Cross Reference
it
SNL
vehicle,
that
Unfortunately
cessful.
brought to
among
of identification
individual
weapon
or vehicle.
ceedingly
difficult
to
solve.
for the
changes
'"'*
'^'
Apr
''
Item
in
PP
(2)
ODO
43-45.
19
45.
Griffenhagen
and
Identification,
vol.
Associates,
I,
sec.
IV,
Report
p.
13,
on
ASF
Ibid.
">
Memo, Hatcher
of Activities in
408
merous other opportunities for misunderstanding. Sometimes an item had no more
accurate
name than
aration of a
clature List
The
just device.
prep-
to
but
were
lists
confusion
in
brought up
nomenclature
distribution
solution
ity
for
services.^^
promising
of responsibil-
nomenclature
and
and numbering
description
article
ASF
of
systems should
old
during the
The
war.*'*'
for
all
that
felt
revision
be attempted
only co-operative
ASF
sponsibility,
the
assistance
the
of
of
increas-
Catalog had
be readily
Stock
the
Section. ^^
ministrative
made
The
new
unit
and
ser\'ices,
failed
to
Treasury's
the
cataloging
staff
Each
system.
mand had
service,
to
bureau,
establish
its
and com-
own
system,
was costly in
manpower and money. According to one
up an organization that
would control nomenclature and model
numbering and co-ordinate the work of
design offices, stock control offices, and
the Ordnance Technical Committee.
bility
of setting
The need
for devising a
Army
After some
pre-
ASF
Service
Forces.*'^
make
Reporting
31
"-(i)
(2)
Arsenal,
Major Items
conf, lo-i
'''
ODO
Major
Combinations.
''^
ASF Rpt
*'
Griffenhagen
Identification.
105, p.
I.
and
The
had received from Colonel Davies, Colonel HamRoger H. Hemion, Major Coopes
and Maj. John A. Mathews of Ordnance and
commended the Ordnance Department, especially Hemion, for its work on cross reference, I,
bleton, Lt. Col.
iv-v.
"''
CG
Memo,
Brig
ASF, 29 Nov
for
Item Identification
and Cataloging Program, ASF Contl Div Files.
"MO
sub:
Hambleton,
i4-'5-
45,
Hist,
1945, p.
Engr-Administrative
257;
(2)
Br,
pp.
409
cataloging
in
World
War
II
cost
the
start
Truman,
Congress,
the
military
After
May
departments,
1948
the
and
catalog
*^^
Bd
Lecture, Lt
Point, 8
Jan 5
files.
"9
MBCA
Newsletter,
R&D
CHAPTER XX
Stock Control
A
sential
to
preparation
the
of
accurate
achieve
full
usefulness
was
war
the
final
came
known
report
of
Army
Service
within
erations
terior."
the
Zone
of
the
In-
Departures
From
the
Unfortunately,
in
office staff in
Washington,
staff
had
to
clerks.
responsibility to
Furthermore,
there
the
money allotted
for stock control purposes was infinitesimal,
in
proportion to the immense dollar
value of Ordnance stores.^ Between 1920
period between wars the
the
by
Logistics in
War
II,
Final Report of
USW
WDGS,
World'
Army
1947, p. 79.
Interv, Kahlert, 30 Jul 52.
SCD
Hist.
and CofS
Proc
Div,
I
'
STOCK CONTROL
411
in-
The
volved.^
confusion
some Ordnance
that
caused
resulted
won-
stock controllers to
concentration
all
of trained persons
the
time
until they
staff,
special
training
decentralization,
1943.^ Colonel
More
for
made possible orderly and efficient operation when the emergency came. The quesAlthough the
Ordnance Provision System Regulations
were not rescinded, remaining in effect
throughout World War II, Ordnance supply experts whose memories went back to
tion
remained
World War
theoretical.
in their essentials."
One
they
created,
distribution
and the
Ord-
Chief of
the
in
functional
product
basis,
be
as
basis,
decentralized
had been
on
Divisions.
dustrial
successfully
In-
spares
technical
place
all
skill
Ordnance
activities
connected
argued that
this
of operations
plan would
from
lift
the burden
them
to
perform better
and super-
set
whereas
the Ordnance Provision System used one
set of records for both procurement and
distribution. Another was the separation
of spare parts from their major items.
Both actions were taken in the emergency period before Pearl Harbor. The
effects of these innovations, the problems
of records for
ice,
to
Assistant
was
this line
for
But
by the velocity of war activities."
other supply experts pointed out that
sufficient time had not been allowed to
organize
control
Sadtler,
and
stock
of
nance for
prepare
there
By Decem-
only,
solutions
to
the
'
Meyns Rpt.
'
SCD
Meyns Rpt.
Hist, p. 22.
Memo, Raaen
to
(2)
Statistics
and Progress
Br.
412
concept
center
proximately
six
was not followed, but the Chief of Ordnance did decide to set up Field Service
suboffices that would administer stock
control,
super\'ise
storage,
and direct
maintenance operations for certain types of
materiel. The first was at Frankford Arsenal. On 23 August 1943 Frankford received responsibility for fire control and
formerly performed at
December
was
T-AC, and on
assigned
stock
31
control
kind.
at
of
Rock
and arsenals
parts,
ment
and end
and
tool equip-
The
hundred
control
all
fifty
was
large
system
problems,
at
No
automatically
but there
decentralization
ment almost
and involved.
could
is
brought
once.
stock
solve
evidence that
about
improve-
After only
ninety
for
than
t\Ao
weeks,
as
familiarity
down
broke
organization
the
small
into
groups handling no more than two thousand items and provided records that gave
complete distribution
the
ment
fire
By the
that
felt
and
antiaircraft materiel.^
fall
of
the
results
completely
operations,
and he planned
process as fast as
V-E
Rock
ations for
major items
artillery
as well
meantime he thought
^" (i)
period.
critical
transfer to
mobile
Service
to continue the
it
After
justified
Field
decision to decentralize
his
ODO
85, 23
as
arms and
In the
parts.
some
that
of
the
108, 24
ASF
Dec 43;
(5)
ODO
20 Jan 44;
(6)
'
'")2;
(4)
Vorberg
Ri)t.
STOCK CONTROL
413
sion
bilities
ment Order
clarifying the
responsibilities
Ordnance supply
Rock
Frankford
and
way
establishment
the
of
the
of
"The
his
conversations with
members
War Department
thing
only
General Staff:
have not heard any
was
about
complaints
weapons."
spare
parts
for
'^
spare
As
tion.'^
volume
Ordnance
The
of
^'*
is
in-
tools,
and
equipment,
ac-
model types procured and scheduled between 1942 and 1945, as compared with
$3 billion for small arms and $4 billion for
artillery and fire control items.
the
x-Xt
end of December 1943 Ordnance was
pa\ing more than $100 million a month
^'^
for
these
figures
it
light of
Ordnance "inconceivable
of
to
at Detroit
tools
^"
considered
master
using
automotive
Automotive
supplies.
parts
spare
some of the
was re-
distribution,
lieved
matters,"
the
for
paper work
of
size
worked with
replenishment,
parts
'" (i)
Sadtlcr,
Personal
Ltr,
23
Maj
Oct 44,
Gen
in
Levin
folder,
Correspondence;
(2)
Campbell,
to
Gen Campbeirs
ODO
10-44,
Oct
44.
''
Interv, Sadtler, 25
"
Min, Spec
ASF
200.02.
^' Interv, Sadtler, 25
"' Ord
Spare Parts
Aug
Aug
Staff"
52.
Aug
in
ASF
52.
Mechanized
Warfare,
44, p. 10.
'^Ltr,
Henry
Sayler,
Gen
414
intended
planners
master
that
depots
own
new
Parts
Interchangeability
Pro-
Numbering and
inadvisable
same
several
for
parts,
made
after
in
the
depots.^^
field,
"home"
the SafTord
into
catalog. Citing
its
become converted.
finally
Col.
Waldo
E.
was stagger-
Laidlaw of the New York Port of Embarkation testified during the committee investigations that, "I have never talked to
anyone from the highest echelon that I
the
fundamentals
parts supply.
One
of
automotive
thing the
upon
of
Colonel
Clifford
of
members
the
spare
of
problem
OCO-Detroit,
felt
man-
to
one
best
that
experience
in
World War
ply,
we used
II, especially
automotive sup-
May
27
in
44,
June 1944,
Campbell, Spare
ex. F-4,
Comm.
22 SafTord
Parts
Hist.
24
Mead Comm.
Rpt., p.
8.
Subcomm.,
p. 80.
"* Min
in
of
Comm.
to
of CofOrd-Detroit, 6
pp.
8-10,
in
Gen
file,
and
MacMorland
Numbers
file.
'^ Ibid., p.
9.
^''
OCO-D,
STOCK CONTROL
415
Provision System
of
^'
operation."
to
camps and
The Influence
of
ASF
in
Forces
ceiNcd,""
"stock
official,
"'^
ASF
was con-
control
preparation
the
of
manual
posts,
for
camps, and stations. Appearing in tentative form in March, the manual was also
a directive.
It
ASF,
in
services.
Each
of these
chiefs
was
to
ventory
procedures,
and
distribution
maintain an
or-
stock
set
levels at
and
supervise
in-
the
redistribution of stocks to
efficient
result,
not
Commands
the Service
credit side,
By
early
and
stations
to
establish
because this
move
a stock control
^'
mo\e
Memo, W.
for processing.^^
reluc-
agency
tant
same
later.
new
stations.
Exec
TM
^*'
R-116].
3- (i)
Jan 44,
p.
33,
(4)
2;
OHF;
ASF
Control.
(i)
(2)
(3)
Cir 10,
ICAF R-116,
28-29
sec.
44,
143-45:
VIII, 8 Jan 44, sub: Stock
pp.
Officers,
p.
130,
2;
(2)
.Ann
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
416
out of the United States for the invasion
equally
was
of one stock
in the opinion
Field
officer
"No.
Service's
control
"'^
job"
Once
came
the parts
for
shipment to Europe.
clear
projection
TM
supply
all
ASF
In
operations.
instructed
the
July
technical
1943
services
to
formula that
Maximum
Distribution
provided
for
Level
(MDL)
stock,
working
consisting
stock,
minimum
of
and provisions
for
that
levels
rigid
"^^'
War Department
1944 the
was expected
It
would vary; no
in the
United
States.
In February
Of
few special
was
to be carried in depots,
this,
.stations.
and
overseas,
strategic,
duction.
contingency,
When
utility,
and pro-
levels
and
ASF
May
became
It
1944 revision of
Nor
levels.
was
the
future
uneducated
guess-
simple
enough.
projection
Careless
or
into
of orderly
supply.
teriel
out of stations.
ASF Supply
The phasing
revision
in
for
^^
levels of
Von
Jul
sub:
43,
p.
14.
CG ASF
Memo,
3!^
TQMG
for
Depot Stock
Levels,
and
others,
400.291,
13
QM
files.
67,
Comm.,
S.
Report No.
10,
78th Cong., 2d
sess.,
20,
pt.
D.
at.,
ASF
Lt Col F.
tribution Pattern,
et
of requirements by months
immediate future and by quarters
the years ahead was one of the most
for the
and 15 days
depots and
future.^^
in
on
except
in transit between
This meant, in effect,
that depots might maintain a 60-day supstations,
ASF
authorized an
in a
cases,
the
figures
hand
the
into
38-220
demands
became
that
correct
necessary for
Stock Levels
it
time went on
as
(4)
STOCK CONTROL
417
demand
required that
all
factors for
reserves,
data,
and
ASF
demand, by
so on.
officials
the
future
from production,
the amount of stocks on hand, and anticipated returns to stock. Reliable data were
the essence of the whole operation. As a
high-ranking ASF officer, Lt. Gen. LeRoy
Lutes, stated after the war:
were balanced
deliveries
procedures was
ice
uniform.
The
that,
to
achieve
have
to rewrite
of the
of
identical
data.^^
In
general,
uniformity,
were not
they
manuals and
sonnel; they contended that
would
retrain per-
were
errors
in
war.
still
ob-
maintained that
the
part
they
that
the
of
Manual
41 3-1
1945.
putting the program into
appear
In the meantime
August 1945.
planners, discover-
until
ASF
turned
their
attention
ventory procedures.
nance worked
On
closely
to
improving
project
this
in-
Ord-
The
in
draft of the
manual was
an Ordnance depot;
in
its
test-checked
final
form,
May
''''
'0
Ibid., p. 6.
^^ (i)
418
radically
made came
late in the
war. During
fiscal
year
control
on
controllers
and
problems of redistribution
disposal.^'
to
Redistribution
and Disfxnnl
ary 1944.
ASF program
for
lexcls
.\vSF set
1944
June
in
summer
depot
parts. ^^
maximum
at ninet)
ings
spare
and
the
of 1944 the
reduced
to
sixty
November
1944
quantities above
Normandy
successes
maximum
days.
Early
in
stock levels
land-
of
the
level
was
Manual 416
directed
this lexel
that
of
stockpile
would ha\e
to
Com-
to
the
own
over,
stockpiling
was
discontinued.
was
scrap-collection
ASF
tribution
Oct
44, sub:
ventories: {4)
FS Ann Rpt FY
1945, p. 21.
to be
depots.^^'
moved out
Later,
the
of dis-
work
of
*-
1943, p. 240.
OCO
44)^
^
In
was
tional needs,
P- 26.
PSP
p.
6:5, sec. 5,
pp. 4-5
and
exs. 1-14.
ASF Manual
Apr 45; (3) ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945,
240; (4) FS Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 2;^.
(i)
M413,
ASF,
materiel
^''
rector
all
that
late in
Ibid.,
exs.
15-23;
(2)
ID
^''
Lt Col John A. Barclay, Chief Parts &
Supplies Sec, Supply Br, T-AC, Disposition of
Obsolescent Materiel, Transcript of Talks, Depot
Comdrs' Conf,
1:5-14
Apr
STOCK CONTROL
4H)
supply
and they
unnecessary
procure-
helped
prevent
to
ment/
stocks
to
to
to
made
ice
Forces
or
disposal
property;
Ordnance
materiel.^"
nomenclature,
and
SNL
The
then
determined
truly
excess.
whether the
Thereafter,
item
disposal
was
action
depended on whether the excess stock consisted of principal, or major items, for
convenience called P items, or of secondary
items
and
control
parts,
termed
point
supplies,
tools
The
reported
items.
items
at
ing
Ordnance
prior
made
office
and S
items,
it
which
To
'*'
set
stocks
accurate
troops
equipment
their
for
overseas
to the stations.
turned in
Because of
lack of time or lack of the technical knowledge required for identification, the turnin figures were often inaccurate. Sometimes, rather than perform the necessary
paper work, troop units abandoned their
excess equipment, in one instance dumping
it on a neighboring farm and in another
the depots,
mixed
lots
as
tion
^^i)
44, in
(2)
serviceability
to
Ltr,
Col Ely
Gen Campbell's
ODO
Revision
2,
to
20 Jul
44, p. 10.
98-44,
i
Oct
was meaningless
ODO
(3)
44;
107.
'*
accessories,
equipment
stock
^'"(i)
ODO
1945, p. 246.
Oct 44;
107 Revision 2,
i
(2)
Mar 45.
ASF Contl Div
OHF;
(2)
ODO
32-
45, 22
52
Div
files,
OCMH.
420
when
careless
transit.
in
thrown
gages.
in
One package
received at
delicate
Red River
The
ASF
1945 succeeded in consolidating the nuinstructions into four basic documents, including two manuals in which
terms such as disposition, redistribution,
merous
ganization
fruits
V-J
for
disposition.
The
would come
after
property
these efforts
of
day.^
Command
pile
up
in
materiel. ^^
As
began to
Ordnance depots from posts,
stocks
hoard, the
was
first
moving them
step in
out,
'''
also serious.
official,
ASF
Stock Control
number
(i)
Jbid.,
p.
10;
(2)
Maint Conf,
16
'' Ibid.,
p. 39.
hazy and sometimes conflicting regulations from above made the task of reporting excess stocks extremely difficult.
By
of
"'^^
the
summer
of 1945 there
hundred separate
War
""
Jbid.
Conf,
16
p. 35.
ASF
sec.
1942-45,
158,
ASF
STOCK CONTROL
dustry,
set
control
all
of
fall
up
new
organization
Sent to Detroit
parts.
when
1942
421
in
to
the
the Tank-Automotive
summer
made
IBM
neces-
machines
IBM
set
up a new system
Ordnance
of parts identification
The change-over to
the new item stock number lagged behind
production and was swamped when more
to suit the
than
machines.
came
summer
automotive
Ordnance system in
the
of 1942. For this reason, and
because of inability to keep up with the
records at Detroit, the stock control machinery was on the verge of a breakdown
by December 1942.
items
into the
ice
these
types
remained
of
control pomts,
materiel.
But
there
for
still
first
and from
months of
vehicle spare
experts,
up
set
with
consulting
master
industrial
depots
stocking
make
was helpful
plan
in
of
some
new
respects
but
numbering
system that had in the meantime been
evolved by the Ordnance Numbering
conflicted with the
parts
Board.
machines were
doubtless necessary to keep records current; but here again there was not adequate planning. Instead of adapting the
Electrical
to port,
again
The assignment
941
accounting
of
from factory
nance,
new number
of a
it
all
for
the
tion
of
form nomenclature of
all
important
increasingly
items,
and unibecame
throughout
the
kinds.
all
at
level
camps, and
ment of
manual
stations,
stock levels.
and
The ASF
in
posts,
in the establish-
stock control
poned
after
until
the
war.
Generally
an Army-wide appreciation of
the need for effective stock control and the
speaking
World War
II
of
much
iar
reliance
only
dure.
with
Some
felt
a better solution
to the
422
problem caused by Army inexperience in
would be the assignment of
Army officers to commercial concerns for
stock control
training
in
peacetime.^*^
The
success
of
experiment in decentralization by
commodity, the stock control points, lent
set of records.
the
weight
to
proponents
of
the
product
is-
60 (i)
Memo, Maj W.
OCO
L.
8 Oct
Kelly to Chief Stock Contl Div FS
45 sub: Final Report of Key Personnel, in FS
Key Pars Rpts (hereafter cited as Kelly Rpt).
CHAPTER XXI
Ammunition Supply
The
ammunition
control of
problems
peculiar
sented
strategic considerations
under
tighter
control
than
other
sup-
small
Army
but also to
was
tion
to get
first
considera-
it
of
of Identification
of
explosives.
supplies.
Means
stocks pre-
because
to
spare
of
parts.
it
Soldiers
did in the
drab, yellow
meant high
filler.
On
olive
explosive, purple
meant
incendiary.
problem
in stock
down
to
Because of
the War Department policy of keeping
tight control of ammunition, none could be
shipped from Ordnance depots other
cut
the time
in transit.^
than
interdepot
transfers
without
ap-
War Department
vision,
Ordnance Department,
OCO
19-27; (2)
FS,
Ammo
ex.
1
(') Brig Gen Harry R. Kutz and staff, The
Mission and Operation of the Field Service Di-
decisions
I.
2(0
Ltr,
Distribution
Misc-D
p.
I,
SW
of
to
CofOrd,
Ammo,
AG
18
471
Dec
41.
sub:
(12- 15-41)
43,
OHF.
424
During
Seventh
the
Sicilian
campaign
Army complained
to
the
Ord-
the
was
was
The
best
to
efforts
to
and
By
ity of
mixed
ETO
lots.
fall,
ships arriving in
ual
the
Soldiers Looking
to
Up SNL Numbers
The
lot
lot
number was
fied a quantity of
essential. It identi-
type of ammunition
specific
standard
number.^
loaded and
to
as
was an ingenious
The AIC
achieve
TM
reason
all
lot.
''
II
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
item
was
such
listed,
as
425
Ti
the
third
weapon
in
requisitions, shipping
accountability records,
documents, property
and all other docu-
munition
stocks.^
IBM
change-over to the
reporting
made
the
system of stores
instructions
and
tant to
know
was
vitally
impor-
at
depot,
94 1, there was no
to find out
Section
wanted
become
of
the
ceived constant
camp, or
efTective
port.
Before
procedure for
loading
by telephone, then
awaited
what had
out
find
to
and they
informarequests
from ports they had
shipment
re-
for this
to
tion, particularly
make
by telephone.
This clumsy procedure was streamlined
in the summer of 1941 on the recommendation of two members of the Supply
Section, Lt. Col. Samuel L. Smith and
Mr, Arthur Hinchcliffe. Under the new
system, prompt reports came in to Washington showing the status of shipment at
every point. At the time of loading the
plant sent to Washington a notice of availability, an Availship, followed by a report
of transfer to Field Service and shipment,
inquiries, often
a Transrepship.
of
arrival,
The depot
Reparrive,
ammunition went
a
port,
report
sent in a report
forth again, to
shipment,
of
camp
or
Repship.
all
ex.
in
depots were
Exec
Rpt
Oct
Hist,
(2)
8;
to
of
reports
Stores
stocks
cited
of
in-
Section
"
it
The Supply
the
depots.
With ammunition
Preparation of these
destination.
Ammo
as
of
Chief of
Key
of
Pers,
Smith
28
May
45,
FS Key
Pers
Rpts
FS,
Rpt];
(3)
ODO
sub:
Final
[hereafter
122-44,
i?
44.
^
Hist, Ammo Supply Div, p. 28;
(2)
Chapter XX, above.
8(1) Smith Rpt; (2) Rpt of Maj. Richard T.
(
Burroughs,
OHF
426
stock
prepared on
records
machines.
Monthly
quarterly for
less active,
Elliott-Fisher
active
for
groups,
and semiannually
for
SNL
tained his
own
summer
Col.
forces,
on;
these
ammunition
had
balances
credits,
and
so
to
be
turn
in
In the
would be encountered
and there would be less difficulty in identification. But this advantage was more
than offset by the fact that for ammunition
the total stock on hand for any one item
had to be broken down into various refor fewer changes
area.^*'
IBM
over,
and the workload was not evenly distributed. One commodity group, for example,
the S group handling primarily bombs and
work
a time
at
having a
lull.
this
survey,
saved manpower.
tightening
also
one means of
reporting
procedures.
It
stores
was
the
since
assistance
of
the
As a
stocks.
result,
much
reports took so
and
useless
cedures.
and
established
better pro-
tried
then
Stores Reports
Soon
supplies
in
IBM ma1941
the
several depots.
But
this
successful.
early attempt
The
ammunition than
to
representatives
of
all
first
the supervision
system had
explained
"
Smith Rpt.
'"
Procedure, in
Manual
Accounting
tric
Supply Records.
The
Machines
Ammo
Stock Control
Application of Elec-
to
War Department
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
427
in
September
Ordnance
in depots.
ASF
1943
to cut
Then
ports were
coming
in.^^
1943
summer
IBM
in-
brought
about a reorganization of the Inventory
Control Unit to bring into one group, the
the
stallation
Records Group,
before,
activities
all
devoted to
the
ble
War
production schedules for tabulating equipled to rationing by the War ProducBoard and stricter control by ASF.^"
Faced with the order to cut down on
the machines in the depots, General Campbell decided to apply it to ammunition
ment
tion
rather
than
turned
the
general
He
supplies.^^
preparation
re-
manual system, effecDecember 1943. Forms were redesigned and distributed to the depots,
and Major Burroughs had to begin another
program of education, conducting a 3-day
conference at Blue Grass for
Eastern
all
depots and
at
The manual
ammunition depots
war,
and,
thanks
procedures,
the
for
for
to
the
rest
to
consolidation
in
The
the
of
continued
come in satisfactorily.^*
The next objective was
of
Western.
Major Burroughs'
reports
stores
reports
to
improve the
Washington.
verted
organization
of
the
Stock
Control
(for-
came
group
to
it
that
day.
move
was
solution
to
out of Washington. ^^
The A4ove
Philadelphia
to
ammunition
of
Ogden
The new
The Chief
tive
IBM
the Records
^^ (i)
and
of
All
Staff
Administrative
Business Machines,
Memo,
(3)
CO ASF
for Di-
ASF
11
Mar
Contl Div
43,
files,
sub:
413.51;
Ord
^'(i)
i
Jul 43-31 Dec 43, OHF; (3)
Arsenal, vol. V, i Oct Through
Ordnance Depot,
History,
31
Ogden
Dec
1 5
'*
psp
428
a
field
office
Ammunition Supply
of the
the
Office
To
known
Ammunition Supply
(PASO), the new group was at-
renovation. ^^
this organization,
Philadelphia
day courier
service.^^
The assignment
thirty-three
chines
made
of
WAC's
to
detachment
operate
the
of
ma-
ammunition were
lessening in importance.
work. After
its
V-J Day
the
Group
it
reports to x\SF
in
provement.^
tion.
An
all
a matter
for the
Whenever
and
recording
procedures
gathering
for
new
records result-
approach
trial-and-error
reports.
was
This
extremely
figures
exceedingly
difficult.
The
first
efforts
failed.
all
Rpts.
tion
training,
ODO
ODO
>Mi)
361, 26 Nov 42; (2)
17
-44, 20 Jan 44.
* (i) Smith Rpt; (2) Maj Henry B. Davidson, Personal History, 8 Oct 45, FS Key Pers
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
429
The second
costly in
tribution
in the Pattern
subject to
amount
In 1940 and early 1941, American strategists were thinking in terms of defense.
training
The
depots
and
ammunition.
Working independently, each group received reports of production on its own
type of ammunition from manufacturing
plants and found a depot to store it, without regard to instructions issued by other
groups. As a result, some depots would
become overstocked or would face a
sudden, heavy workload with little notice.
Depots were equipped for handling a
certain amount of ammunition, expressed
in carloads to be moved in and out each
handling each
T,
day.
type
of
If
quired
its
ditional
it
became evident
that prewar
Consequently, in the
summer
of
central
group
to
It
to
of
be
the ordinary
distributed
to
troops
for
make
it
available or credit
to a certain
the
quantity
account.
honor
desired
for
the
shipping
lend-lease
the
also instructed to
instructions
of
the
master Release
move
the
(QMR)
ammunition
and eventually
to
to
the designated
port of exit.^^
fell
it
items,
Regulations
of Distribution
All
dis-
requisitioning in
controlled
Improvements
toward improving
sense, because
step
The
was that
where the stock was earmarked
the depot
23 (i)
Smith Rpt; (2) Davidson Rpt; (3)
Burroughs Rpt; (4) Interv with Col Samuel L.
Smith, 4
- (i)
Aug 53.
PSP 64,
Ammo
MR
Ammo
51;
(3)
PSP
64,
pp.
430
might be
at
great
from the
distance
Chambersburg,
at
shipping
ally
versa.
by the
War Aid
close
check on shipping
tickets
One
requests.
The
N.J.^*"*
1942
ship
to
all
their materiel out of a depot within fortyfive days after the date of its availability.
Otherwise it would be returned to Ordnance stock. Very often shipment abroad
meet the
sailing deadline
in
time to
and had
to
be
the
cost
explosives
of
from
shortage of ships
made
ports
and sailing dates uncertain; lack of information from overseas headquarters made
uncertain the
name
be shipped.
War
ice's
materiel,
lend-lease
dollars.^^
Upon
Aid
Section
could
find
Lend-Lease Shipments
requiring
was approxi-
it
Philadelphia
to
Letter-
and,
so,
if
could
cancel
out
the
the
Hist,
p.
Ammo
252;
(2)
PSP
64, p. 'jg.
2 (i) PSP
64, p.
man,
nance
p.
2.
"Ammunition
Diiiest,
XXVH
No.
10
(October
1945),
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
authority
of
release
for
foreign government,
it
431
materiel
to
issued a credit to
fice
to
when
that
stocks, with-
shipping instructions,
it
Ord-
notified the
nance Department, giving the port of export and the date when the materiel
War
PASO
system for
War Aid
at the
credit
shipment of standard
The
The
May
1943.
tion there
Ordnance depot
the
nearest the
port of
Notwithstanding its simplicity and' feasibility the plan was not adopted until the
spring of 1943. A survey had to be made
showing the wastefulness of the old scheme
distribution,
outside
Transportation
Forces,
Army
Corps,
Service
and
origin
had
number
to
be
known
could, be
before a shipping
assigned;
another was
member each
of the
Purchasing
crosshauls
authority
conserve
manpower and
the meantime.
British
sys-
tem might well be applied to other technical services. It was so successful that it
was extended that fall to nonstandard
items, bulk explosives, and chemicals.^''
Training Ammunition
new
Not long
gested
Carlisle
for
after the
War Aid
to
moded
transportation. In
the Philadelphia
facilities,
labor,
the
War
in
exit.
of
in
first
WD
29 (i)
Cir 12, 7 Jan 43; (2)
55-58, 61-62, 75, 79-85-
PSP
64, exs.
432
of the Mis-
to the
ing the
the
to three factors.
First
65 percent
desir-
roughly
mum
restrictions
three factors,
sending
the
the Distribution
ammunition
to
the
nearest
user.^"
But the restrictions made efficient routing all but impossible. An investigation by
Captain Carlisle of all shipments from
plants to depots and from depots to using
services during January, February, and
March of 1 943 uncovered some striking examples of crosshauling and backhauling.
For example, 2,000-pound bombs produced at Ravenna, Ohio, were shipped to
a depot at Anniston, Alabama, and reshipped to the New York Port of Embarkation; 1,000-pound bombs produced
at McGregor, Texas, were shipped to
Seneca, N.Y., and then to the Charleston
Port of Embarkation.^^
An
analysis
maps showing
of
these
It
and
of
new
ammunition items
re-
all
of as a complete
sissippi
distribution
common
ports;
all
river
would
ammunition
were
spring of 1943 by
representatives of
Army
Service
discussed
during
the
Forces,
Army
Air Forces,
its
requi-
Ammunition Supply Branch directed shipment from the nearest depot or loading
plant. In
plied to
ever-increasing
'"'
(i) Memo, Chief Supply Sec for Exec Asst
FS, 5 Feb 43, sub: Cross Haul in Ammo Movements, ex. 28 of Hist, Ammo Supply Div: (2)
Maj Hollis M. Carlisle, Terminal Report, 9 Oct
[hereafter cited as
45, FS Key Pers Rpts,
Carlisle Rpt]
(3) Smith Rpt.
^^ Memo, Chief Supply Sec to Maj. Edgar Tiner, Captain Mullikin, and Capt. Frank Eccles, 2
Mar 43, sub: Analytical Study, ex. 29 of Hist,
Ammo Supply Div.
'(i) Carlisle Rpt; (2) Ltr, Chief of FS to
CO's All Ord Ammo Depots, sub: Flan of Ammo
Distribution and Supply, 5 Apr 43,
471/1904
OHF
tances traveled by
sulted in a
findings
OO
-31''''
Ammo
Supply Div,
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
method
of
433
ammunition
distributing
allo-
The journey
was
bondale,
of
to the user
May
wasteful. In
bombs
500-pound
depot
shipped a consignment
Illinois,
at
the Ordnance
which in turn
to
Utah,
Tooele,
shipped them to a
Navy depot
was no
Army
explanation
thab
it
at
Haw-
real reason
depot.
simplified
The
bookkeep-
manammunition
If the
had
been shipped directly from the plant to the
Navy depot, $1,506 per car would have
been saved in transportation cost and the
Navy would also have been able to take
ing hardly justified the cost in time,
training
Exact savings
in dollars
and man-hours were difhcult to calculate, but a rough estimate indicated that
over 100,000 man-hours were saved in
September by eliminating the necessity to
load and unload cars at depots, not taking
into account the labor that would have
restencil or mark boxes,
dunnage in cars, and fill out papers.
Another important economy was in the
been required to
place
estimated
transit
depots.^''
crating
Direct Shipments
The
ments
for
operation saved
approximately
$70,000 on a single shipment of fortyfive carloads of 105-mm. ammunition. In
policy of
directly
and the
obligation
effect
to
against
until
the
stocks
user
it
the
an
rather
co-ordination
'
'
PSP
64, p.
(i) Hist,
Carlisle Rpt.
'"'
6.
Ammo
Supply Div.
j).
90;
(2)
434
maximum
moved
ammunition destined
American troops overseas than it was
for ammunition sent to training camps or
Navy, because speed in overseas
the
shipments was of greater importance. No
great harm was done if a shipment was a
sirable in the case of
for
camp or
make a port
Navy depot;
first
deadline
if
had
it
failed to
it
to
be shipped back
at great
lost
to the
A new
most.
it
among
procedure
all
up
in
September
bound
tion
Corps
in the fall of
co-ordination.
better
made
to cut
down
the
responsibility
with
that
and
definitely
to
on
Division,
rather
Ordnance was
Major
ties of plants,
of
Carlisle's assistant,
Capt.
and
so on.
When
he received
The Chief
of
and
He found
dustrial Service.
operation.
Ports
to
ing
of days in
deal
formation.
number
more
giving
specified,
shipments
to
1943 resulted in
Agreements were
center
quantities
priority
agencies.
set
exact
the
an
plants
new
the
An
excellent
important
In-
produc-
at the
of
spirit
by-product
coof
of
Direct
shipments
port
climbed
steadily.
Con-
CofOrd
Ltr,
Distribution of
trol
Division
was responsible
for
deter-
ments,
'"'
to
ACofS G-4,
Ammo
23
for Training,
Nov
43, sub:
and Indorse-
00 471/33664.
CofOrd
to Chief of Transportation,
Port-Bound Ammo Shipments,
and Indorsement, 7 Dec 43, OO 400.37/4145;
(2) Calhoun Rpt
(3) Hist, Ammo Supply Div,
23
(i) Ltr,
Nov
43,
sub:
pp. 83-85.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
435
until
all
di-
if
the
all
least
ity
which
of Wingatc,
cost
approximately
say
Of
economy
time,
in
figured
at
was the
ten
days
1944
and spring of 1945, this saving was an
important factor in theater planning in
combat
areas.
"*"
pile
up
Zone
that
adequate
lacked
One way
prevent
waste and to economize on storage was to
provide better control of issues by the
Office, Chief of Ordnance, so that no more
to
boring installation.
With both objectives in mind, two Ordnance stock controllers, Lt. Col. Samuel
L. Smith and Maj. Joseph Rollins, after
with
consultation
method
in the
representatives
ASF, proposed
of
the
a change
of issuing training
ammuni-
tion.
forces
report every
camps
facilities.
amount
the
at
storage
month
in
of Interior
of
As
effective as the
preventing
training
long
hauls
between
in
depots,
the
solve
stocks
could
conceivably
crosshauls
and
result
in
backhauls,
unnecessary
type
waste that stock controllers had been
ing
to
avoid.
An
especially
the
store
The
it.
area depot,
reviewing the
would have authority to ship directly from its stock all less-than-carload
amounts and all items for which there
was an urgent need. The report would
report,
Ordnance, for supply of the larger quantiwhich would be scheduled for ship-
ties,
of
try-
troublesome
(i)
CofOrd
to
Supply Div.
"' (i)
lisle
Rpt.
f:0 Car-
436
ment
directly
all
requisitions
the
offi-
possible.^^
month.
next
When
cers of the
felt
the
that
the
it
Ordnance
Post
Officer.
trol
The
AGF
counterproposal was to
Ground
he con-
Forces
storage
reported
to
Transportation Officers.^"
One
AGF, was that the post authorwere allowed to keep ammunition for
of
first
the
in,
the
any
30-day period
mitted b\
ities
plies.^'^
Under
were
finally reported to
excess.
excess-
Ground Forces
around
to
various
commands
for
the
pectedly.
At a later date
be gi\en
tf)
the Ser\i(e
ASF
Gommand. As
finalK
\vorked
Major
'1
(i)
Mill,
Conf
SC
of
(2)
-I
JANASB,
to
CG
vol.
Ill,
ASF, 25 Jan
G-4
45,
Ammo,
tion of
Training
4-,.00
47'/:?.^7.
Ltr, CofOrd
)
"
sub:
.111(1
files;
(3)
Ltr,
CofOrd
to
sub:
CG
ASF, 23 Feb
Training
OO
45,
Ammo,
471/38884: (2)
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
437
amount
Long after V-J Day, training ammunition was still being issued on the wartime
this
tions
various
the
to
Ordnance
services.
This
theaters.
air,
munition,'**'
They recommended
that for
all
each
service,
AGF
beginning
similar
used
those
to
by
1944, be included in
in
The
step
first
step the
control,
G-4,
General
to
Staff,
was an estimated
total
of
of
lists
ETOUSA
shipped to
them
reviewed
CofOrd
to
CG
ASF,
ment
Jun
William
C.
Admin Br
4;^,
OO
Young
Jun
sub: Plan
and Indorso-
45,
Ammo,
Chief,
OCO
Rqmts Sec
Staff
Serv
WD
overseas
ammunition
Service
Field
had
that
lots
all
and
carefully
offer
pre-
been
to
NATOUSA,
in
co-operation
order
frequency
of
were sent
to the
two theaters
to scrxe
as
turn of ammunition.
technical
safe
It
and
efficient
urged
Ordnance
assistance
G-4
on
also offered
problem
the
of
to reconsider
its
policy of
ammunition
locally,
War Department
segregation,
packing,
storage of explosives
Ltr,
permit
Ordnance could
But
desired.
from Theaters
pared
excesses there
ground am-
it
they
of Excess Stocks
NATOUSA
of
all
the program.'*''
Return
left for
terials in
^^
outgoing shipments.
Planning
stocks in the
1944 on
and empha-
regulations on the
for
the
reception
excess
of
ex. 65.
438
that ports should be used that were not
engaged
actively
outgoing
handling
in
near
ton;
From
and
facilities
on
ports
sorting
service
or
at
near
the
shipments stopped
materi-
decreased
or
ally.''^
From
the ports,
ammunition would be
process
iber,
tion
to
quality
make
for
long-
War
The
final
term storage as
Reserve.
returned stocks.
the
current
An
expected cutback in
production
of
600,000 tons
the
summer
of
1944 the
several
in
November 1944
cers
with
Port
Ordnance
of Port
Ordnance
of
representatives
the
Offi-
depots.
Am-
ment
Philadelphia
the
to
theaters
for the
return.''"
obtaining shipping
instructions
from the
The
''^
effectiveness of the
Ordnance De-
storage available.'*^
Beginning
*" Ibid.
""'
Hist,
Amnio Supply
Burroughs Rpt.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
and
439
an accurate record
from production. In
the opinion of Col. William C. Young,
Chief of the Ammunition Supply Division
from June 1942 to August 1946, the first
objective was well met; the second was
livery
to maintain
The
reasons
for
the
Service
trial
enough
of
and Field
personnel
Service,
for
the
and
lack
necessary
paper work. Complete adjustment of records was never possible. Yet partial reconciliation
number
by
of crosshauls
developing
effective
techniques
for
effort.'^
Aug
failure
to
achieve
ing;
completely
Some
accurate
others
^2
46,
79-84-
Final
CHAPTER XXII
Maintenance
In the hot sun of a September day in
1 92
lina,
esting experiment in
and
mobility.
The
Army mechanization
51st Artillery
Regiment
Camp
neighboring
Jackson to
Camp
Eus-
first
its
Virginia, six
own power.
The convoy was an
Rumbling
streets of
heavy
impressive spectacle.
eight
8-inch
howitzers
GPF
{Grande Puissance Filloux) guns, each towed by a 10ton tractor. There were twenty-one additional tractors
more than half of them
lo-ton types
and 240 trucks carrying
tentage, equipment of all kinds, machinery for repair work, and spare parts. Accompanying the artillerists was a detachment of Engineers to repair roads and
bridges and an Ordnance company to keep
the guns, howitzers, tractors, and trucks in
running order. As the great procession
ponderously moved north on the long
journey, much of it over narrow dirt
way
stared
night,
when
artillery
repair
machine
shop
electric
truck
and
lights
another war
of such
itself
from
complete
a
its
generator
Ordnance
thirteen
ordnance:
At
company, blacksmith's
baggage
the
for
The
tractor.
drawn by a lo-ton
spectators
marveling
an
anvil,
acetylene
another
torch
saw
at
skillfully
working
using an
tractors
with
soldier
the
Exactly one
month and
into
leaving
all
rolled
of 22
MAINTENANCE
441
of
the
abiHty
of
Field
in a sense a
Service
an
then
less
World War
I.
and supplied by the Ordnance Department, came into being as a result of study
by the board of officers appointed by the
chief
Ordnance
officer of the
AEF,
Brig.
in
France immediately
World War
I.'^
In addition to fixed
War
cessful conclusion
I.'
Mexican border
used by the
AEF, but
first
in
in
improxised on
had been
France only the
igi6,
Field Artillery brigade had rated an Ordnance company. The Infantry depended
on the small arms section of that company
and, for first aid repairs, on small detachments of three or four men that were
often called on to perform duties other
than their specialty. In one case Ordnance men washed the trucks of the ammunition train because the train commander ordered them to do so.^
after
field,
army
in the
maintenance companies, the light maintenance company to accompany the division, and the heavy maintenance company
at corps and army level. These performed
the
to
limit
of
the
capability
all
of
their
of time axail-
'
Coin[)any,
CO
32ncl Oicliiancc
"Ordnance Maintenance En
Army Ordnance,
II,
No.
ii
"
Interv, Grain, 17
Feb
54.
''
See Gh.
266-69.
XVI,
above.
for
Route.""
(March-.Ajiril 1922),
442
technical
exercised
over
supervision
maintaining
in
storage materiel worth
about $500 million, exclusive of ammunition, a figure comparable to the $471,355
spent on materiel in the hands of troops.
The
in storage of
life
the
tion
Camp
the
all classes
The maintenance
field."'
responsibility
of
the
new
of
design
with
an eye
to
maintenance, the preparation of Modification Work Orders (MWO's) for the correction
of
the
defects,
determination
of
tools,
equipment.
of
Jackson to
On the march
Camp Eustis in
made
of repairs
detailed
from
1921
list
of
and
to tractors
it
to
the
engineers
mechanism gave
able to
tell
trouble,
pared Modification
plied
to
all
Work Orders
materiel
of
that
was
that ap-
particular
also use-
in
ful
Harmon,
Maintenance,"
"Ordnance
No. 4 (January-March 1921),
A.
Schimclfenig, "Ordnance
C.
167-73;
(2)
Service Stations," Army Ordnance, II. No. 1
(March-April 1922), 260-62.
(i) Manual of 1919, pp. i4-:ii; (2) Fred A.
*
nance.^
( I )
Army Ordnance,
Maintenance
almost unlimited.^
at the Arsenals
I,
''
Following World
War
a general overhaul of
had to be
the Ordnance maI,
there
McMahon, "Maintenance
Bragg," Army Ordnance,
returned
dition that
it
at
Camp
Ajiril
Activities
II,
at the arsenals.
Rock
enormous
materiel,
tance
from
shops
organized at
Proving Ground,
and Erie Proving Ground." In 1924 the
special
for
Nov
7
"
42.
Harmon,
op.
cit.,
pp. 172-73.
MAINTENANCE
number
443
of parts that
would be needed
for
Ordnance
planners
aware
were
took to the
men
that
time
economically
economy or convenience.^"
of the peacetime work of an
Ordnance maintenance company stationed
at an arsenal is afforded by the 33rd Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance), at
Rock Island Arsenal, organized 1 April
92
from the Ordnance detachment at
the Arsenal. Its peacetime strength was 2
officers and about iio enlisted men. The
only company at the Arsenal, it was comtions of
An example
field,
Rock
At the training
Corps Areas they
checked materiel in the hands of troops;
repaired, replaced, and issued all necessary Ordnance stores and equipment; and
at the close of camp prepared the stores
and equipment for winter storage. When
of
at
camps
of
the
Island.
three
company moved
the
the
into
field,
its
baggage,
contained
rest
toolroom,
cargo.
carry-
and
and one
equipment,
five
carrying parts,
^^
containing a kitchen.
Reorganization, of
States
nance
its
mess
it
maintained
in
Decem-
ber 1936 to study Ordnance manufacturing and storage facilities in the United
reviewed
also
facilities
main such
the
trated
arsenals
at
Ordnance mainte-
few
of
should be concen-
manufacturing
the
Maintenance En
(March11,
April 1922), 268; (2) Ord FS Bull 5-1, 2 Jan
30, sub: Field Service Modification Work Orders
and
Method;
own
types
of
materiel;
those
in
the
electricians.
The company
materiel
stored
the
Arsenal but
fur-
nished
various
stations
thirty-seven
men
of
the
33rd Ordnance Company were on detached duty throughout the year. During
the
summer
company
"
Route,"
Gibson,
"Ordnance
Army Ordnance,
(3)
Ord FS
II,
No.
Bull 4-2,
11
Aug
41, sub:
OO
I,
Through December
1942, p. 198,
OHF.
'
444
among
establishments as seems to be
field
^^
The members
tests that
division.
new
triangular
to create a mobile,
minimum of
One means of reducing
of the
turning
their
organizations
semi-
into
noncombat
troops.
nontactical
ters for
logistical
maintenance
for
support. ^^ Yet
demands
were sure
increase,
to
and
greater
firepower
meant
anization,
to
parts,
had
carry
the parts on
welded to
where they were needed. The answer to
the problem of mobility was to simplify
and reduce the equipment of the machineshop and welding units. This effort, which
continued throughout the thirties, was
aided by such commercial developments as
fit
the
power
take-ofT
permitted
that
lar
organization at corps
strengthened.
One means
place
making the
to serve
as
pool
to
support
all
the
as corps troops to
In
centralized control.
of
most of available personnel had been observed in World ^Var I by Col. James K.
Crain, who was Ordnance Officer of the
Eighth Corps Area from 1934 to 1939 and
later became the first wartime Chief of
l"'ield Service. In IVance he had obserxcd
that the French Fllevcnth Corps put all
ordnance companies of the corps in one
Each
division retained
panies
ied
in
the
the
question of the
number
of
men
and amount
nance
1937
in the
tests.
It
'-
Ramsey Bd Rpt.
the
nance,
84-88;
XX,
No.
116
(September-October
19:59),
(2) History of the Field Service Maintenance Division, vol. I, From July 1939 to December
94 1 [hereafter cited as Hist, Main! Div,
1
^'
Inlerv, Crain, 17
Feb
54.
MAINTENANCE
445
vantage.
artillery
only a small
ofTiccr
in
tools,
since
battalion,
consist-
of
three
Continuing study of
this
new
organization
several types.
Ordnance
the
ways
1940-41
of
officers
tactical
who
participated
using the
battalion
to
in
several
best
ad-
that
is,
Planners tried
unit.
dated corps
Ordnance shop,
the
in
consoli-
which
like
companies, such as
were grouped together
sections,
and
it
mand,
was
the
officer.
diflferent
men
Friction
groups,
work
under a system that involved dual comdifficult for the
that of the
company
officer
to
and the
own
sections.
The
consolidated-shop
the companies;
quarters, that
their
'" (i)
Speech,
Brig
Gen
Edward
E.
Mac-
maneuvers studied
specializing the
having an artillery
company, an automotive company, and
so on. But this conflicted with the concept
of the company as a balanced maintenance team to support a rapidly moving
XXi, No.
bases."
Some advocated
companies,
12:5
Ordnance
(November-December 1940),
208.
Sergeant, I, No. 2
(February
1941), 65-66, and No. 6 (June 1941), 254-56;
II, No. 3 (September 1941)
170-71. and No. 4
(October 1941), 202-12.
446
at the
April-May 1940
exercises
of a
^^
group of orphans/'
considered
the corps
command
Ordnance
The
observers
of the battalion by
be a distinct
provided a close
between all Ord-
officer to
advantage because it
working arrangement
nance units and with the corps general
The equipment
was
trucks,
of
an Ordnance
considerable:
3
trucks,
repair
major shop
trucks,
small-arms
repair
trucks,
battal-
artillery-repair
automotive-repair
emergency-repair
20
trucks,
32
instrument-
cluding light
In 1942,
action
sive
all
when
made
made of
manpower and every ship-ton.
Ground Forces concluded that
available
Army
economy could
^*'
trucks,
5
small-parts
were
staff.
ion
best
Officer,
IV
Army
be
Monroe
Corps,
achieved
Bricker,
by
Corps Ord
"Ordnance
in
the
XXII,
No.
Greenfield,
MAINTENANCE
447
and pool-
in
needed
at
and not
times
all
the
what
just
oc-
casionally
was applied to the corps,
which General McNair considered to be a
tactical, combat unit; and the pooling, in
the sense of massing units under higher
headquarters for servicing of lower com-
place at
army
both
combat
tion as a small
summer
of
Army
troops.^"
recommenda-
recommended
1942, he
of Ordnance regiments, and his plan was approved. ^^ During 1942 four regiments, the
301st, 302d, 303d, and 304th, were activated, and the 305th was partially acti-
the
organization
organizations
such
the
as
commerNational
reorganized
into
designated
Ordnance
individual,
Base
numericalK
Armament
ganization
North Africa
Urban
Niblo,
Corps,
organized
Ordnance
1942 Col.
Officer
provisionally
an
of
II
Ord-
nance Group consisting of several battalions. It was more flexible than a regiment,
for battalions could be added to it or
detached from it as the situation demanded. It was so successful that several
groups for operations at army level became
the accepted practice throughout the war.
By April 1944 the Ordnance Group had a
Table of Organization and Equipment.
Going a step further, Niblo and others
advocated an Ordnance brigade to control
the groups, but this proposal failed to win
approval."'
There was a
mental
brief experience
organization.
with regi-
General
Grain foresaw the need for a new type of
operate
In
unit
to
that
would be required
the
1941
large
supply
overseas.
bases
When
-" Greenfield,
of
pp.
-76.
-' (i)
Mayo, The Ordnance Department:
Ordnance Overseas; (2) Greenfield, Palmer, and
Ground Combat
Wiley, The Organization
of
'^''oopj, pp.
357-59-
-'-
'"'
OHF.
-^ Ann Rpt ASF
for
FY
1943.
448
An
war
for
was the
grades and
men. Pay
mechanics
to
had been
maincreasingly
complicated
repair the
teriel could not be recruited. A General
Staff survey in
1929 found Ordnance
personnel inadequate for work in the field,
and as late as FY 1938 approximately 90
percent of the maintenance funds allotted
ratings
Ordnance
for
so
to
low that
Ordnance
enlisted
skilled
of
ofTicers
salaries
of
attracted
many
Ordnance depot.
Sometime in the i930's the term echelon
came into use to describe these levels of
maintenance. The work performed by the
line organization was first echelon; that
done by the Ordnance maintenance companies was second echelon; and that in the
rear was third echelon."' A study of
maintenance problems
expand,
^"
the
possibility
company,
chanics,
in the field
responsibilits
for
The
make minor repairs, replace enand supply parts; and the fourth
major
truck, or other
-''
(i)
Incl.
13
the
slightly
more
difficult
repairs
The work
tools or parts to do
was turned over to Ordnance specialists
in the field. The Ordnance men could pertion did not
have the
made
in
according to the
and
rifle,
adjustments
skill
mechanical
of
tools
trained to
maintenance
suggested
that
battalion,
necessary
gines,
assigned
1941
to
listed
The Army
in
it
de-
mechanics.""
civilian
of the best
to
Ordnance en-
corps areas,
sent
arsenal, or
pay the
was
to
SW
to
All
20 Sep 29,
Chiefs of Branches
Spec Survey of the
and Burs,
Aug 29, sub:
Mil Establishment; (2)
OCO Annual Summary, Ordnance Digest of Activities, Including a
Summary of Principal Operations Fi'^cal Year
'9:5^, OHF; (3) Lecture, Maj Gen Charles M.
Wesson, Operations of the Ordnance Depa'-tmcnt, 12 Nov 38, Army War College, p. 14, OHF.
i
WD
-" (i)
terv with
Grain, Diary, 27 Jun ^o, OHF; (2) InMaj Gen James K. Grain, 30 Jun 49,
OHF.
"MO
From
T.AG, 6
in Site
-'''
May
Bd
Hertz Rpt.
MAINTENANCE
449
using organization
by
performed
maintenance
simple
the
the
individual or the
ment
were
elon.
medium mainte-
recoil
and supplied
sions,
parts
to
lower
the
Fourth echelon, commonly referred to as heavy maintenance when armament work was meant, was done in fixed
echelons.
and semifixed shops serving a specific geographic area. Its major function was the
rebuilding of major items by using serviceable assemblies and subassemblies that
were
stock
in
cannibalization.
be obtained by
could
or
mainte-
echelon
Fifth
supply.
shop
tion.^^
ASF
maintenance
Ordnance
They
considered
experts
its
adherence to
felt
too inflexible in
materiel,
known
as organization
the
of
was
The work
in the
and
fourth,
third,
class
was
maintenance; that
fifth
echelons
more
effective
if it
fourth
and
fifth
compartmentation of
echelon
work,
arguing
service maintenance.^*^
The echelon
to
established
persons
certain
places;
the
in
pre-
guiding principle
parts,
the
capabilities
of
per-
AR
29 (i)
Div, II, pp.
Powell, U.S.
Maintenance,
Powell MS],
Army
in
16
Jan
p.
2,
World War
OHF;
II,
[hereafter
50
(3)
ASF
Statistics:
cited
Staff
as
School
Proce-
dures,
23-24
OHF.
"Who Does
Those ExasperMaintenance," The Ordnance
33; (2)
or,
Echelons of
(February 1943), 142.
Sergeant,
ating
450
that
if
cither;
a fourth echelon
within
subject
MacMorland
Ordnance.
the
were
echelons
field,
and
General
necessary
base.'^'^
that
only
three
organizational,
was excellent
and declared that, "No effort should be
made to change this to such terms as
organizational, field and base." ^*
perienced officers
even
require
The
of
transfer
to
Ordnance
the peak
war
years
1944-45,
of
the
Service
task. In
the
repair
and overhaul of automotive equipment accounted for more than 75 percent of the
total man-hours spent on the maintenance
of Ordnance materiel.
More than a
million transport vehicles were transferred
to Ordnance in 1942. The magnitude of
the maintenance problem is suggested by
""'"'
makes of
three hundred
ent
cars
different models.^"
'^'
drivers
their
Few
have
Automotive Maintenayice
that
operators' licenses.
facilities.
Problems
irresponsible drivers,
at
the
new
Work
on the development
Often by the time maintenance information on new projects was
receipt of information
new
of
items.
received,
vehicle
transferred
the
Unit
Technical
of
the
A. Heileman,
Sep
54.
''
Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, lo Dec 54.
^ Ordnance Lessons Learned in the U.S. -U.K.
MTOUSA
-and
I
to
Ltr,
War
'''
II,
Powell
'"
Hist,
^"
Memo,
MS,
Maint Div,
SW
E (Maint), ropy
'^
OHF.
Hertz Rpt.
II, p. 50.
for GofS,
in
22
Nov
41,
QM
451
MAINIENANCE
451
within
made
short
possible to expedite
it
MWO\s
and
medium maintenance
(or corps)
North
in
Africa,
it
was usual
for
line
be backed up by additional
to
divisions
army
under
units
In combat, beginning
control.
One
of
the
maintenance
earliest
en-
combat landings. This entailed modification of existing vehicles so that they could
and improvement
of the
design of
ian
program
make
"even
dix'ision." ^^
dent
But
company could
broken
down
the
in
the
light
often
take
vehicles that
trucks
of
maintenance
care
the
of
period of time,
that
of
the
infantry
di-
sary third
echelon maintenance.
sions occasionally,
forced
b\'
the
The
and other
would have to be
services
of
five
divisions,
made by
a group
Inspec-
showed
tor General,
were
vehicles
me-
of
The
steering
dry
batteries,
tires
were badly worn, cupped, and improperly mounted. There was no reason to
that
and
it
would other-
wise
make
in-
divi-
rein-
nondixisional
''''
OCO-D
(i)
Hist,
Maim
Div, pt.
i,
vol.
22,
Parts
-D Key
^o
Pers Rpts.
PSP
(i)
57, pp.
16-30; (2)
ASF
Presenta-
i-i
pp.
(3)
MS, C.
I
'-Ibid.
*' (i)
Ltr,
McNair
AGF
files
Morland
'^
to
to
Dec 42,
400.402/-GNGDS;
I'homson. 10 Dec 54.
Hertz Rpt.
sub:
(2)
Ord Maint,
Ltr.
Mac-
452
blame the unit commanders for not enmaintenance discipline,
stricter
and concluded: "When unit commanders
realize that a motor vehicle is a fighting
weapon, the greater part of motor transforcing
*^'
to
including
Army
monthly
publication
preventive
officers
The
the
civilian advisers
assistance
of
and
portation
terial,
several
located, in-
recommended
applicants.
men had
who
and
classified,
the
field.
effective immediately;
called
mendation
of
Committee, ap-
War
to
the
War
viser
embryo
stage."*"
of
concern
and
Scrx'ice^'
to
Ordnance
Field
it
of motor
August 1942 Field
Service organized a Preventive Maintenance Section and placed under it a unit
to handle the Civilian Automotive Advisor
Program; a maintenance engineering unit
was charged with the preparation of standard preventive maintenance procedures
and with the publication of Army Motors
and technical manuals.
The men directing the Civilian Automoti\c .Advisor Program devoted their first
tention
after
the
assignment
vehicle responsibility. In
efforts
to
visers
and
thorough
recruiting
then
to
better
gi\'ing
indoctrination
in
qualified
ad-
more
them
Army
pro-
The
and
provided
better
supervision
in
the
field. By Juh
1943 these cixilians, whose
numl)ers had increased from six hundred
to about sixteen hundred, were working
was
no barrier; and as
civilians they did not have to accompany
their assigned units into combat areas, but
could be reassigned to train newly actidisability
ical
vated
units."*^
'^'OQMG, Comments on
the
Rpt on Motor
ber-December
''*
to
(i)
94
OCO-D
), ,'593.
Preventive Maint
Summan-.
pp.
Hist.
Maint Div.
II,
pp. 66-68.
MAINTENANCE
453
theater
ETO,
them
quest
of
34
the
Ocean Area,
in the Pacific
2 in
measurable value'*
the war. After
train
lems,
sened.
own
its
need
the
for
to
automotixc prob-
in
cixilian
adxisers
les-
''"
over-all
plain
program
accordingly began,
close liaison
in
of education
to alert
and
users
Ihis
conservation.
inxolxed
magazine
cartoons,
posters,
the
use
of
and
articles,
Ordnances
Prexentixe
Maintenance
improxed the format of Army
MotoT'i and stepped up the circulation. A
peak of 2
,000 x\ as reached in August
Branch
preventive
steps to
In
promote
Noxember
'"''
fall
of
other
all
^''
In the
at
troop
fall
of
lex'cl
both
xvas essential.''
and AAF,
of
critical
the
to
including
Marine
the
in
Lt
OCO-D
19
Oct
Oct
45,
D. Scholcy.
Monroe F.
Key Pers Rpts.
Col
Weill.
!!
''^
''
Scholey Rpt.
(i) Weill Rpt; (2) Hist, Maint Div.
iog; {]) .\nn Rpt FS FY 1944, p. 12.
'-
II.
p.
(i)
69-70;
(2)
W. Hcrrington.
Dec
serxiccs,
Final Reports of Lt E.
and
4-,.
ma-
program
xvent
00
of
that
is
But
percentage
using arms
''
in the
1 he
1945.
A.
ASF
of critical items.
i-,70:
ii4.!'.
(;5)
42.
CG ASF
4;^
Ltr.
sub:
Lack
Equipnietit,
Maint Div
^''
of
ant!
Indorsement
files. 4',i
Weill Rpt.
Oct
41,.
ASF
454
No
oi)stacle
that he
may meet
Which
K:
It
fEancJivcrsJoeCbpctocikataDk
Uode Sam,
ycni
can
knk
g<sS.
As
far Joe,
h^ a pcrmaocnt
blank/
^^^'''IttNDlEEOUIPMEIIT RIGHT
In addition to the magazine, the Branch
new
troops,
every
design
two weeks.
The
tures.
such
rhymes
as:
''^
eraFs
that
ofiTice
declaring
reported
Ordnance
that
officers
was extremely wasteful and undisciplined where maintenance was concerned. He seemed inherently extravagant
and irresponsible. If an American driver
had trouble with his carburetor he imsoldier
demanded a new
even
mediately
though the only trouble was the malfunction of one small part. Vehicles left along
Now
!'"''
'^
he.se
nothing
maintenance
officer
in
could
take
discipline.
NATOUSA
the
A
in
place
General
April
of
StafT
1943 ob-
bad.
almost
without
Service
units
exception
reported that
vehicles
one,
pre-
in acci-
Hist,
Maint Div,
iio,
and
ex. 33.
Div
files.
400.4 Maint.
MAINTENANCE
unguarded were cannibalized
the roadside
by
almost
the
users
455
every
grease
to
Failure
passer-by.''^
of
clutch-release
the
caused
division
critical
times;
of
loss
failure
of
the
vehicles
tank
at
crews to
lock the
case the
Commanding General
responsible
to
fell
$50
each
and
fined those
the
failures
zero.*"'"
show
Some
themselves
maintenance.
In
one
theater
experts.*"'^
the
fact
down
settling
to smoother,
more
efficient
operation.
deadline,
of
not
only
because
of
disregard
also
Maintenance Shops
One
nance
of the
first
after
indoctrination
deadlined \ehicles
down
to
one-tenth of
ASF
^''
Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman, Deputy Director of Opns, ASF, for Director Stock
Contl Div, 24 Aug 43, sub: Survey of Organizations, Admin, Supply and Procedures of the North
African Theater of Opns. ASF Maint Div files,
400.4 Maint.
''"
'"'
ASF
(i)
CofOrd
ASF
CG
CG
""
Jun-Nov
44.
ASF,
for
CG
OO
456
was that
vehicles
of
in
hundred
taining
miles con-
thousand
These Ordnance Ser\ ice (lomShops performed hea\\ mainte-
vehicles.
mand
in
cities,
buildings
the\'
two
usually consisted
for
shop opera-
two
separately;
trated
instead
of
scattered;
and
labor
distri-
all
ments,
was a
serious
problem.
But.
al-
Commanders
Ser\ice
impractical,
tion
considered consolida-
mainly
because
the
The Chief
of
in the
ofTer
formulation of
Commander had
ice
Jul)
1942 third and
maintenance had passed
from the old Corps Areas to the newly
formed Service Commands; the geographical boundaries were about the same, but
responsibilit\
In
echelon
fourth
Commands,
the Ser\'ice
as field agencies of
was separation
xehicle repair
of
the two
The
ser\-
''^
New Orleans,
dr G 104.
La.,
p.
18,
ASF
18
Dec
Contl Div
42,
files,
''^'
Memo. Col James L. Keasler for a Col
Maint,
Campbell, 18 Aug 42, sub: Ord and
(
QM
in
exs.
binder.
to
Hist,
Gen
Dec
Hist;
Maint
(2)
sub:
Div
Ltr,
OCO-D
CofOrd
to
1942-45,
CG
First
00
OO
00
OO
OO
M AINTENANCi:
control stock levels, his eiricicncy
to
trict
457
as
much
of their
as possible."*^
As one
Chief
(lomniand.
do
to
solution
problem,
the
to
Ordnance considered
of
the:
contract
concluded that the districts ought to operate as sub-bases under the control of the
operation.*'"
base coniniandcrs.
this
To
the objection
that
nmch
Army
in
and other
Ordnance
At
ASF and
conference,
representatives agreed
con-
to
Commands, with
to the Service
the under-
re-
and
tions
The
instruction.'"
of
letters
representatives finally
would
utilization of
ods,
uniform quality.''
Service
Command
Shops
to the
Ordnance
strengthen
much
the
as possible
greater control of
integration
better
Service
Commands
and
to give
ASF
field
of
as
them even
problems. Yet
automotive mainte-
program
Ordnance
training
for
summer 1943
capacity.
reasons
for
this
There
were
situation:
(i)
two
main
much
of
Mnno,
'''
TIG
for
Brig
CG
Gen
SOS,
Div
Philip
Jan
Oct-;
11
i
Brown. Deputy,
Maint InDec 42. ASF Maint
E.
sub:
4',,
i
400.4 Maint.
Millett, The Or^unizatidu
files,
''"
and Role
of
the
p. :}2i.
CG
00
SC's.
020/776, copy
'5
March
Maint Div.
''>
I,
History
[hereafter
1944
Ill], ex.
7.
in
From
FS Maint
January 1943
Hist,
i
cited
Hist,
as
OHF.
Ibid.
Memo
'"
Red,
for
(Gen)
Shops
194:!.
files,
MacMorland
635
con-
ComMacMorland to
Thomson,
10
" Memo,
ASF,
for
Dec
sacrifice.'"
Ltr.
54.
Heilcman,
Deputy
Director
Opns,
Echelon Automotive
Routing Slip, Heileman for Maint Div
(Col Conrow), both in ASF Maint Div files,
folder 63', Shops (Gen) 1943. See also ASF Gir
Sep 43, sec. II, Transfer to SC's of Fifth
76,
Echelon Automotive Maint Activities.
Fifth
Memo
458
I'.ITcTtivc
November 1943
three of the
collaborated
the
in
solution
technical
of
that
lems."
SIX
closed
of their shops.
work
to local
for overhaul at
Red
River.^"^
For armament the Ordnance Department had full responsibility for all fifth
echelon work. For tanks and combat vehicles it had responsibility for such fourth
echelon maintenance as could not be handled
in
Service
Command
shops
or
trol
instruments, and
fourth
echelon
all
tools,
responsibility
third
rested
equalization
and
with
The co-operation of the Service Commands with Ordnance was "a source of
gratification"
to General
MacMorland.
the
he recorded
loads,
Commands "were
the Service
all
im-
of
'"''
Combined Shops
Consolidation of Post Ordnance Shops
with
Ordnance
the
Command
Service
much more
solidation.'^
Ordnance,
Quartermaster,
^^''
for
whether
Engineer,
or
sponsibilities, Hist,
Maint Div,
Ltr,
bilities, Hist,
^''
30-3
"''
Ltr,
MacMorland
Ltr,
CG
43,
AGF
Div
flics, 4^,1
Apr
Armored Force
Automotive
sub:
4:5,
10
in
pp.
'
work
of
and
interchanges,
by
supply
problems,
43,
16
Apr
Maint,
4:5,
to
CG
.^ i
Mar
May
Indorsements,
43, and 25 May
ASF,
and
Mar-Aug
43.
in
ASF Maint
MAINTENANCE
other
technical
459
service.
was
It
like
who
the
turned
their Royal
shop operations to
Engineers
and
Mechanical
(REME). It would include an automotive
shop, an armament and instrument shop,
over
all
Electrical
a clothing
trical
or
technical
without
.service,
co-
was
inevitably
ineflTicient
planners
use
felt
duplication
of
of
men and
cfTort
tools.
and
.\SF
be effected.
Accordingly,
in
Ma\
Arm\'
materiel
mands and
of
all
technical
services
"'^
Com-
Knox would
Fort
fied at
Di\'ision
mand
ment
give satisfactory
He recommended
the
commands
service
services;
in
fact,
or
the
technical
History of
Library.
of
Stations,
Maint
both
(W2io-2.'-)-43).
CG
.Xctivif'es
in
ASF
ASF;
at
(4)
Camps,
Div files.
Posts,
Maint
Memo, CofOrd
and
635
for
WD
460
tion,"
seemed
it
ASF
the
to
historian,
com-
The
technical services
maintained that, since they were responsible for the development, procurement, and
provision of spare parts for equipment,
they ought also to have responsibility for
men
belonging to one
plies
ought also
was
as
Serxicc; they
in the British
not
control
shop operations,
to control
with
case
the
own
their
Field
supply.
own
operations
detriment of the
the
to
In North Africa
the
Commanders
practical
difliculties
in
see
operating
little
need
nance problem, he believed, was an Ordnance problem; the solution was to concentrate
on economies in Ordnance
maintenance.^^
Some
Ordnance
other services
of the
thetic
to
them
to
The
in
Inspector
could
not
belief at
General's
be oxercome,
ASF
extending to
representatives,
in
spite
of the
^^ Hist.
^- Ltr,
mand
of
pointed
the
out
the
great
disparity
between the amount of Ordnance maintenance and that of any other technical
service. At the Camp Hood shops, for
example, there were 417 Ordnance shop
employees as compared with 68 for Quartermaster and 13 for Signal. At Fort Knox,
four
out
Ordnance
of
the
six
supervision,
shops
were
undci
''
(i)
ASF Maint
MacMorland
to
Thomson,
Ltr. Somervell to
CC
10
Dec
54.
Maint Activities at
and Indorsement, 24
y\ug 43, ASF Maint Div files. 635 (W2 10-2543); (2) Ltr, Donovan to CO ASF, 19 Aug 43,
suii: Consolidation of Maint .Xctivities at Posts.
Camps, or Stations, 19 Aug 43.
Hist, ASF Maint Div, p. 128 and ex. A.
^'
(1) Ibid., yy. 133; (2) Intcrv with Heilcman,
Sep 54; (3) Memo, Conrow, Director Maint
Div. .\SF, for Director of Supply ASF, 10 Jun
44, Sub: Rumors Tending to Undermine Morale
within Combined Shops at Posts, Camps and
Stations, and Memo for red. ASF Maint Div
sub:
43,
Posts,
Consolidation
Camps,
or
of
Stations,
'^
'
fik-s.
63", Shc)j)s
Jun-Dec
1944.
MAINTENANCE
461
commanding
commands and the
as
Ordnance was
services.
service
and
Third.^*"'
of
ig44
Forces
1943 defined
it
to usefulness
Command
repair.*'^
also
tools,
components
by repair, refabrica-
thereof,
Troops departing for the invasion of Europe left mountains of damaged weapons and vehicles at posts, camps,
and stations; at the same time a trickle of
unserviceable but repairable materiel was
coming back from overseas.
program.
The need
for
definite
enough new
enormous demands
1944
made
of
to pro-
meet the
the European theato
it
**"
(i)
responsibilities
of
technical
supervision
of
the
work.
manders
to
mand
shops.
ered that
This
Comand
to
manv
Hist,
(i)
ASF Maint
was
This
vehicles.
Div, pp.
142-45; (2)
Jul 45.
Gen Somervell
to
CofOrd and
others,
(2)
18
Dec
the Service
Hist.
WD Cir 207,
spare parts
inability
trucks
Ordnance
shops and
purpose
general
of
Ltr, Lt
duce
ter
in the
Command
Service
'*"
reclamation
(i)
Jan-Mar 44.
Monograph No.
Ourisman,
Final
Rpt,
8,
4 Oct
p.
82;
45,
(2)
Col
OCO-D
B.
Key
(3) Min, Ord-SC Conf, Maint, StorStock Contl and Reclamation, 8-9 May 44,
Pers Rpts:
age,
OHF.
p. 43^'
(
for
PROCUREMENT
462
y\ND SUPPLY
dependence
on commercial facilities for combat vehicle
repair in 1945 is revealed by the fact that
private organizations accounted for only
scale
transport
of
seas
vehicles
Command shops.
Late
in
1943
had
motor
experts
for
^*^
Ordnance maintenance
turn
to
shipment over-
their
attention
shift
es-
to
rebuilt in
carriages,
ASF
preferred Service
The
program
Command
Shops.
Memo, Conrow,
"-*
( I )
ASF,
provided
originally
preference be given
mand
The
to
tablishments.''^
first
that
Com-
to Service
ment
-44, 24
Vehicles.
''(i)
May
Memo,
Brig
Combat
Rehabilitation of
44, sub:
CG OCO-D,
12 Jul
manufacture."'
it
became
L.
would have
be
to
overhauled
to
meet
work
OO
by Service
burdened with
or
oxcrhauling
Command
the
transport
shops
tremendous
vehicles."^
already
job
of
Before
vehicles
were repaired
at
commercial shops.
Var
Rehabilitated
Combat
dence re Rehabilitation
Ch. XI, above.
''
'
'''
Program:
13.
]).
83.
(4)
See
also
MAINTENANCE
Trends
463
Maintenance Engineering
in
correct
safety
prepared
and functional
Products
faults,
Correction
and
Reports."^
To
teams,
reached the
Ordnance
frequently,
some experts
felt,
extensixe
field
designers did
modifications
were necessary. These observers were convinced that if designers gave more attention to easy removal of parts for repair
and replacement the problems of field
maintenance would be greatly simplified.
field,
first
United
to
troops
in
training
the
in
States,
Among
materiel.
^*^'*
contributions
to
the
preventive
mainte-
and
and
lubricants.
(EEPL's) was
also
methods
of getting
1943
ASF
in
maintenance
factors,
estimating that
ap-
Improvements
maintenance
in
when
the Chief of
were
Ord-
the
'"
centers
of technical
information, mainte-
plants
and
looked
the
designs
the
of
new
materiel
the
suboffices
procedures
for
studied
methods and
preventixe
maintenance,
also
issued Modification
Work Orders
to
CofOrd
FS Ann
graph No.
"
Alen,
In addition to
shoulders of draftsmen."'^
anahzing
over
FS Ann Rpt,
(i)
Capt Arthur G.
Aug
8, p.
78; (3)
PSP
p.
57, pp.
10; (2)
I
of
Mono-
10-12.
46,
464
nance materiel; the conducting of
correct faults;
tests to
of Modifi-
cation
the
to
so
field
MWO
extremely
the
trol
central
difficult
if
and to have a
on the modification per-
involved
parts
control
formed.
An example
the
of
parts
difficulty
is
General Campbell
wrote to General Hughes, Deputy Theater
revealed
in
letter
when
is
it
designs,
all
make
bugs and
in the
be applicable to the
will not
and
Then we
will
our
then
start." ^"^
In
troubles,
the
OCO-D's Maintenance
study
of
all
as
year
last
usual,
will
the
war,
of
made
Division
work orders
parts
latest tractor
issued
and
a
in
possible
the office
^"- Ltr,
process,
functioning
the
of
the
were
materiel
canceled. ^"^
A
of
all
phases
many Ordnance
specialists
that
tighter
evaluation
of
various
theories
on
such
cheaper
in
many
cases to replace a
it
was
dam-
and the
to
Maj Gen
Everett Hughes,
Dec 43, Gen Campbell's
13
Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material).
i''MO
Needham Rpt;
(2)
OCO-D
Maint
p. 3.
Plan.
Mar
48,
ASF, 24 Jan
both
Col
OHF;
Contl Div
Stock
in
Policy;
ASF
(3)
ASF,
for
Director
of
Supply,
ASF
Charles R.
Depots, 10 Sep 45.
sub:
Petticrevv',
Ordnance
Floating
CHAPTER
XXIII
Conclusion
who viewed
the
Ordnance
Department
defeat
of
the
wartime leaders of the Ordnance Department looked back upon their achievements
with a keen sense of satisfaction. They
they had
fully
made
a significant,
if
felt
not always
Harris
No
less
the
offices
War and
ASF
served in
that
many
in
team
players.
Ini-'-ustry-Ordnance team,"
was
"results
far
to gain
thus introduc-
wide currency
cism
Ordnance
to "the Science-
seas
others
for
conceded
StafT supervision
ing
credit
areas
still
allotting
who had
much
headquarters went
of
World War II. In reviewing the adin weapons made during the war
science,
Secretary
Assistant
Lend-Lease Administrator,
spoke highly of Ordnance procurement
plans and operations, but in postwar interviews he expressed disappointment that
Ordnance leaders had not been sulTicicntly
vances
of
the
of
the
provide
in
'
the
Orthi.iiHc
volume
SI
in
De[)artment:
pref)aration
Ordnance
in
the
forn;
The
Overseas,
scries
WAR
UNITED
II.
466
In any attempt to re\iew and evaluate
the
Ordnance record on
the procurement
The Ordnance
district
been established
offices
had
in 19 18 to reliexe the
first
con-
that
cials in
i92o\s
of the
limits
offices
of
with
military
their
and
unusual
combination
leadership
civilian
kept
and through
Army Ordnance,
interest in
it
its
industrial preparedness
the training of
Ordnance
maga-
helped foster an
and
in
reserve officers.
Army
almost
of
production,
"
single-handedly
while
civilian
in-
in
munition,
version
again
huge contracts
with industry, but they were in existence
and were rapidly expanded.
arose
for
Outside the
placing
offiicial
hierarchy,
but
of
(headed
by
Benedict
Director of Munitions)
dustrial preparedness for
of
the
Nation's
wartime
promote "inwar as being one
Growell,
to
strongest
guarantees
of
and
tanks.
the
arms ammunition
for
CONCLUSION
467
During an assessment
delay.
as to
how
the
of the value
may
well arise
experience
the
World War
of
II
itself.
came
more
daily
urgent.
from
Quartermaster
fer
the
Ordnance
of responsibility for
the
of General Barnes,
it
energetic
gave recognition to
space
made
in the de\elopment of
weapons. At the other end of the developmcnt-procurcment-supply chain were the
perspective
technology
activities
with scores of
new
of Field Serv-
storage depots,
bookkeeping operation,
problems of organization and
Other new developments on
tional side were the steady
vast
and more
the
of
Ammunition
Plants.
factors
task,
demanding
that
it
long
operations
storage depots
and
trend toward
be broken up into
in
town,
it
the organiza-
delegation
the
world.
in the
and complex
management.
more
and
district offices, and the creation of new
field agencies such as OCO-Detroit and
decentralization,
To
Ordnance Department
the
warehouse operator
largest
ice
great variety of
enormously compli-
\'ehicles,
made Ordnance procurement equal in dollar value to the procurement of all the other technical services
and
modern
expanded
other organiza-
greatly
Corps to
motor trans-
maintenance, and
Under
the trans-
tional
Division.
No
civilian-type
important
most
one
decentralizing
ufacturing
arsenals
Watervliet,
The
before
the six
1942.
"old line"
Springfield,
Frankford,
were
man-
Water-
Picatinny,
examples
of decentralized operations under centralized supervision. After the procurement
district
historic
built up their
and assumed authority
offices
1940-41
contracts,
they,
too,
staffs
to
in
make
represented a major
by the Chief of
Ordnance. They placed a large measure of
procurement authority in the major indelegation
of
authority
close to
the
contracts.
The
other
side
of
the
organizational
Forces,
provide for
super\ision
the)
all
created
new Army
early in
1942 to
to
more
which
468
.servers that
commanding
less
general,
a Somervell decision.
essentially
On
the
it
who,
little or no
procurement
and supply of munitions. Yet one of the
worst mistakes made by Ordnance itself
their
in
technical
early
the
in
much
opinion,
knowledge
of
had
the
too
Ordnance
pride
production
studic:^
and
at
rearmament dri\e by
saving the all-important commodity, time.
In spite of objections raised by some obthe
start
of
the
letter,
the
well conceived
Ordnance
serxices.
than
Had
in
the
other
in
technical
more
and more funds to work
of their efforts would have
public support
with, the results
One
Wesson and
his
staff
accept
to
in
the
1940-41
Ordnance procurement. In an
economy where priority ratings were more
important than money, the Ordnance Designed to
notable
\ation in
spread
^Vorld
use
of
tractor-operated
and
government-owned,
(GOCO)
facilities.
conPlants
needed
and
to load ammunition. As there were no
civilian plants that could readily be converted to these purposes, nor any appreciable opportunity for commercial profit in
the peacetime manufacture of military
ammunition, such plants had to be bu'lt
b\ the government if they were to be built
at all. Broadly speaking, the experiment
works
chiefly to
with
of
this
type
GOCO
facilities
were
explosives
was highly
success-
CONCLUSION
469
Ordnance managed
ful.
compe-
to recruit
strictly
it
it
The main
ing costs.
liberal
make
GOCO
contracts
too
criticism of the
permitting
in
contractors
to
profits that
to services rendered.
The
record
tion
Army
war, top
and
artiller),
in
aerial
demand
for
it
came
late
"blitz" basis.
Ordnance
at the
considered
end of World
of
ment;
rated
but
others
all
They
recognized
the
it
its
matter
the
Some
Number
11.
in effect,
determine
production
long-range
goals,
tion
approved only
study of
all
overestimates
of
careful
after
Among
the
mistaken
The
goals
shock
both early
of Pearl
Harbor was
tanks.
still
and
fresh
British
but here
Army
it
that
staff
Given a
set
its
relatively free
Ordnance
needed.
built
ASF
sights
hand
more
then stepped
in
depots
in,
too high.
1940-42,
than it
redistributed
and
distribution system.
its
Ord-
importance.
vast supply
was an
ex-
deal with.
No
great
difficult problerri to
how
War
as
tremely
this
requirements
One problem
On
in the course of
same.
ment
and turns
events.
to
foreseen twists
it
470
dry
storage
had
to
The
in
such areas.
in
On
top of
all
efficiency
over.
of
1943
the
The
trucks.
to the
The
with
trouble originated
Quartermaster
during the
1930's
Corps'
to
and
losing
battle
standardize
Army
Ordnance Department
in the latter
few special
control devices.
new fire
Ordnance had many years
of experience on
for
such as
articles
replacement
which
to base
parts.
As a
its
estimates
result,
the
field
mainte-
Racket,"
Ordnancemen dubbed
as
this
Some
parts
for tools.
On
procurement
the
side.
Ordnance
as high
priority
complete items.
enough but
The
as production
principle
of
was sound
it
particularly as
at the start
forecasting.
How
far to
go
in the direction
CONCLUSION
of supplying
all
471
of
When
it
received
all
types
unresolved
vehicles
summer
groundwork for a
truck procurement program;
Pearl Harbor steps had been
laying
large-scale
soon after
the
the
war
alternative types.
effort.
By the
fall
of
1942
new term
World
in
of
recommending
responsibility
September 1942,
in one respect:
the worst of the procurement crisis was
over. The Quartermaster Corps had gone
transport
in the
War
II.
It
in essence, as old as
war
itself
the mainte-
Had Ordnance
all
2-1/2-ton
amphibious
tion
the
truck,
Dukw.
1/4-ton
and
the
The
one
the
jeep,
2-1/2-ton
serious
lack
was
in
in
the
heavier types.
Among
operation
among
all
other industries,
of
world.
the
to
to
parts
Army
during the
of millions of
1940's,
raw
and the
recruits led
influx
by inexpe-
ment maintenance.
sponsible
spirit
profligate
pervaded
and
many
irre-
units.
472
of the war that stood out above all others,
from the maintenance point of view, was
that troops must learn maintenance discipline as well as combat discipline. Illness
and death caused by disease can cripple
an army as effectively as wounds inflicted
by shot and shell; vehicles with broken
springs or burned out bearings caused by
neglect or rough handling can halt an advance just as surely as damage from enemy
make
action.
and
On
the procurement
front,
Ord-
the
peace
without
suffering
Though Ordnance
officers
noteworthy.
certainly
ment
Ordnance procure-
officers
small, without
corruption. In
all
any
show
employee
Ordnance
during the
because
1920's
the
need
for
new
inspection
methods was not urgent and partly because few Ordnance officers were enthusiastic about statistical sampling techniques.
But, with the coming of war production on
a tremendous scale, the theories of Col.
Leslie E. Simon and others were put to the
test, in a few limited areas at first, and
then with gradually widening usefulness.
In
its
Ordnance
a record of which
it
could
audits.
community but
also
helped
the
nation
taint of graft or
other
seldom men-
it
many
to
de-
gations of irregularities
Here, as with so
war
postwar
pression.
inspection.
wartime pro-
in
Ordnance
officer or civilian
from
Ordnance procurement
criticized on the ground
slow, too cumbersome, or
profited
it
double
was
that
dealing.
sometimes
it
was too
too favorable to
The
mistakes
made
simply took
least that
it
for
was expected
of them.
Long
before the
Campbell gave
war was
o\ er.
General
form
Ordnance
Department should
matter
As the outcome of the war became apparent I considered that it might well be of
great value to the future of the Department
and of value to the Army and the country
if a Board composed of men who had been
through the Ordnance job from the declaration of war, and who were to continue as an
active part of the l^cpartinent until the
CONCLUSION
473
lines,
successful
front."
general
comment
to six
ofTiccrs,
and
branches.
.stafT
The
Military
as
activities of the
Depart-
with
\\a\s
conmiittees
and
means
of
of
Congress,
sign
obsolescence."
to
to
and
studx
strengthening
the
The
six
Ordnance
Artillery
Frankford -Arsenal
Fire Control
.^rms
Ammunition
Indiana Ordnance
Ammunition
Troop Equipment and
Works
Augusta Arsenal
Miscellaneous Supplies
Tank
Detroit
.\rsenal
Vehicles
known
Campbell
Ltr,
4:i,
Prod,
sub:
.\SF.
to
Thomson,
Memo CofOrd
See also
for
OO
CofOrd,
for
Sep 49,
CG, ASF,
400.12/9396, and
21
Aug
43,
sub:
OHF.
13
Aug
Memo CG,
Prod,
OO
400.1 2/9461.
ization of the
Mar
44,
OHF.
474
the product types of organization, but with
far greater emphasis than had ever before
along
been given to decentralization
proposed
services
product lines. The five
for the Office of the Chief of Ordnance
were functional in nature, but they were
be
to
limited
strictly
to
staff
work and
The
main operating divisions. Just as the TankAutomotive Center had become a decentralized and semiautonomous organization
specializing
tion,
and
in
the development,
produc-
broad class
proposed Product
distribution of one
materiel, so each
Center was to become a decentralized
headquarters specializing in one class of
ordnance.
of
The broad
principles
of
the
Product
Center idea were accepted by many Ordnance officers during the 1944-45 period,
but there were differences of opinion as to
how the six proposed Centers should be
administered. In March 1944, for example,
when General Hayes was asked to comment on the Harris Board's preliminary
he
report,
declared:
think
"I
that
the
its
specific
Board
down
laid
"The
exist.
any war
zation
was
The
change.
ganizational
The
mended
that
to
how
they will
the
that
tralization
third
principle
Department should be
Centers.
of
"can be
obtained only by retaining the Technical
Services as entities in the postwar organi-
am
prosecution
successful
fundamental
certain
recommenda-
of
lines,
operations
Harris
Board
Ordnance
or-
with decento
also
Product
recom-
be
continued as the procurement agencies of
the
Districts
bosses,
Chiefs of
i.e.,
six
this
Services except
all
."'
''
General Barnes
Se[)teinl)c-r ic)4r,
commerc
''
as to
vvliii
Ordnance
in.stallations
wercr
"
best
iai
counterpart."
for
US'!
as
Product
Clenters.
Mrmo,
Mcnio,
I'rodiK
Ormaiiizatioii of
OHF.
1
CONCLUSION
475
Army
Service Forces.
The
Ordnance Department
rectly
in
ASF
the
the
that
technical
services
we
if
tried
to
destroy
all
that sentiment
ices
knew
outstanding work
war and
for
quality
of
He
in
had done
organizing production
noted
specifically
CampbelTs
General
high
the
perform-
ance.
the complete
abolishing
merging
within
all
ASF,
services and
reorganization of the
of the technical
ASF
the
headquarters.^
development,
All
re-
and
procurement
activities of the technical services would
have been centralized in one ASF division,
search,
all
and depots,
ASF
after
rejection
this
diametrically
opposed
were
ASF
pro-
the
supply
in
of
all
the
posals,
basis
of
Commands
ally situated.
General Somervell and his staff vigorously pushed this reorganization proposal
during the summer of 1943, but when it
it
was a grave question whether the improvement would outweigh its concomitant disadvantages in the creation of bad feeling." ^ Stimson knew from experience "how
deeply imbedded in sentiment the services
of the Engineers,
are
in
the
the
conclusions
to
just
of
of
technical
all
arsenals,
months
three
Ordnance Districts,
would have been ab-
transportation in another,
establishments
up a
war
in full
the
each
agreement
randum
'
For a description
of
this
of
plan,
see
Millett,
the
Army
Service
Forces, Chapter
but was not accepted by the Under SecreWar. This plan would have retained the
names of the technical services but would have
vision,
tary of
474
the product types of organization, but with
far greater
along
been given to decentrahzation
product lines. The five services proposed
Ordnance
were functional
to
be
limited
strictly
were not
The
six
to
stafT
were
work and
main operating
Tank-
of
and
producbroad class
proposed Product
the development,
specializing in
tion,
distribution of one
materiel,
so
each
was
to
become
Center
headquarters specializing
March
he
Harris
am
i.e..
of
"The
exist.
any war
principle
prosecution
successful
of
"can be
obtained only by retaining the Technical
Services as entities in the postwar organieffort," the report stated,
War
Centers should be
The
Department.
second principle was that the peacetime
zation
of
the
'
think
"I
Chiefs of
to
all
."'
fundamental
certain
Board's preliminary
declared:
down
laid
com-
Board
class
to
that
the
recommenda-
one
specific
in
of
administered. In
its
decentralized
principles
the Product
Center idea were accepted by many Ordnance officers during the 1944-45 period,
but there were differences of opinion as to
report,
In addition to
to
The broad
ment on
troop equipment.*"
ordnance.
how
''
how
they will
ganizational change.
was
that the
The
of
third
principle
Department should be
lines,
operations
Centers.
The
Harris
mended
that
the
to
Board
Ordnance
or-
with decenalso
Product
recom-
Districts
be
Services except
General Barnes
to the
most desirable locations for the six proposed Product Centers. In September 1945
six committees were appointed to study
this matter and make recommendations
as to which Ordnance installations were
best suited for us*! as Product Centers.
These committees agreed with the recom-
CONCLUSION
475
by wiping out the distinction of the services with their insignia, etc."' Stimson also
knew that the technical services had done
outstanding work in organizing production
for war and specifically noted the high
quality of General Campbell's performance. He therefore opposed "stirring up a
hornet's nest right in the middle of the war
are
tfiey
Army
of think-
The
Service Forces.
rectly
ASF
the
in
the
that
technical
services
basis.
abolishing
merging
within
all
of the technical
ASF
the
headquarters."
All
re-
and
development,
search,
ASF,
services and
reorganization of the
procurement
activities of the technical services would
have been centralized in one ASF division,
all
all
that sentiment
three
after
diametricalh
opposed
of
conclusions
were
ASF
pro-
to
the
the
technical
all
supply
in
posals,
that
basis
of
Commands
in
ally situated.
General Somervell and his stafT vigorously pushed this reorganization proposal
during the summer of 1943, but when i(
its concomitant disadvantages in the creation of bad feeling." ^ Stimson knew from experience "how
master are
people
that
in
the
memories
belonged
just
the
reorganization plan by the Secretary
ASF
of
rejection
this
Ordnance Districts,
would have been ab-
of
and depots,
destroy
time, the
all
arsenals,
to
same
transportation in another,
establishments
tried
we
if
to
of
all
the
in full
the
each
agreement
randum
'
For a description
of
this
plan,
of the
see
Millett,
Army
Service
Forces, Chapter
but was not accepted by the Under SecreWar. This plan would have retained the
names of the technical services but would have
vision,
tary of
476
merit.'"*
revamp the organization of the Department along such lines while the war was in
progress. As a result, no major changes
occurred before the surrender of Japan in
August 1945. Even then there was no
to
of
stafT,
a gradual
consolidation
of
were no longer
needed.
After the war the
Ordnance Department
months
was widely
that had
blasted Hiroshima and Nagasaki had ushthe closing
felt
ered in a
new
of 1945
atomic
the
that
it
bombs
in the history of
forces
miraculously
possibilities
of
unleashed
long-range
rockets
and
Was
the era of
to be of
Were
in the future?
lution,
dicted,
planning?
Of what
war production
be
again
possible
to
quantities of supplies in
World War
overseas?
II
concentrate
great
of the
the
all
six
ever
huge depots
home
or
experience
of
either
type,
Would
to
it
at
that
immediately
answers
forthcoming.
It
confronted
and
baffling,
The
situation
unlike
that
when
was
some
in
following
respects not
Armistice
the
of
leaders could
their
left-
the
remember
experience
them with
faith
little
they found
hend the magnitude
nations;
during the
it
in
1930's
had
leagues of
of the
little
heed to philo-
sophical principles; they turned their attention to the immediate problems at hand,
began to pick up the scattered pieces left
by the departing armies, and worked to
new
science
of war.
"
444.
C;iiny)hrll.
p.
Bibliographical
As a
World War
on
II
this
Note
volume, the authors turned
and un-
nance Historical
Files
(OHF). Here
known
war
Ord-
to the Historical
as the
Ordnance and by
scores of
Ordnance
staff
field
offices in
installations,
including arsenals, depots, district offices, proving grounds, plants and works,
and decentralized headquarters such as OCO-Detroit and the Field Director
of Ammunition Plants in St. Louis. They were made on a quarterly basis for
the war years 1942-45) those from the older installations include introductory
sections outlining the prewar history, some going back for more than one
hundred years. In spite of their uneven quality, these reports were of inestimable value as records of riiajor events and as accounts of the more important
problems and achievements. Their appended documents, photographs, maps,
charts, and statistical tables were particularly useful to the historians, as were
some of the historical narratives prepared by contractors to supplement the
histories of the Ordnance district offices.
Closely related to these periodic reports are many historical monographs
;
These
by
monographs had been prepared during the war, or soon
members of the Historical Branch or by specialists in other branches of the
Office Chief of Ordnance. Each monograph covers a longer time span than do
the individual quarterly reports and endeavors to treat a broad topic in analytiafter
its
close,
cal fashion.
tives
narraat the
end of the war by Ordnance officers and civilians to describe their wartime
experiences. Of comparable importance are the minutes of General Wesson's
regular
o'clock conferences at which he discussed with his staff the major
problems facing the Department during the 1940-42 period. For Field Service
in the 1940-41 period. Col. James K. Grain's diary was invaluable. Of special
importance for the chapter on motor transport vehicles was the collection of
notes and documents assembled by Herbert R. Rifkind of the Historical Branch.
1
Offiice of
ical
The Quartermaster
Branch.
After exhausting the
OHF
collection of retired
Ordnance
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
478
records, dating
Office.
this
volume, however,
this
collection
of
records was transferred to the custody of the Federal Records Center, Region
3,
memos, reports, conference minutes, and the like were voluminous and
were not always systematically arranged for ready reference. For pre- 1940
Ordnance records the authors went to the National Archives. They also made
letters,
War,
the
General
Army
The
the former
files
Service Forces,
Motor Transport
The
the
G-4
Under
Division of the
Secretary of
War Department
volumes known
Quartermaster Corps
Historical Studies proved useful, and the hearings of Congressional committees
were invaluable. The authors also consulted copies of lectures, committee reProduction Board.
ports,
Armed
series of
as the
Military History. One of the. most useful works for the purposes of the present
volume, produced by the latter Office, was The Army and Economic Mobilization, by Dr. R. Elberton Smith, published in 1959.
Special mention needs to be
the bimonthly publication of the
The
Historical
is
way
or another to material
first
published
in
Army
Ordnance.
Final and most rewarding sources for the authors were interviews and
correspondence with persons who held key positions during the war, whether in
Ordnance
all
of
whom had
industrial contractors,
notes,
of the
Glossary
AA
AAF
Army
ACF
Antiaircraft
Air Forces
Acft
Aircraft
ACofAS
ACofS
ACofOrd
Actg
Acting
Assistant Chief of
Ordnance
Admin
Administration
AEF
AF
AG
AGF
Adjutant General
AGO
AIC
191 7-18)
Air Force
Army Ground
Forces
App.
AR
Army
Arty
Artillery
ASF
ASP
Asst
Assistant
ASW
AT
Antitank
Ammo
ANMB
Ann
AOA
AP
APG
APG
API
BAR
Regulation
Assistant Secretary of
Br
Browning automatic
Board
Branch
Bull
Bulletin
Bur
Bureau
Bd
CG
Commanding
Cir
Circular
War
rifle
general
480
Civ
Civilian
CO
Co.
Commanding
Company
CofAC
CofAS
officer
CofEngrs
Chief of Engineers
CofFA
Cofinf
Chief of Infantry
CofOrd
Chief of Ordnance
CofS
Chief of
Comdr
Comm.
Commander
Conf
Conference
Cong.
Congress
Contl
Control
Contr
Contract
CPFF
Cost-plus-fixed-fee
DCofS
Dev
Deputy Chief
Department
Development
Dir
Directive
Dept
StaflF
Committee
Dist
District
Div
Division
of StafT
DNT
Dinitrotoluene
Doc.
Document
Drawer
Dr
DRB
EAM
ECO
Ed.
Editor
Educ
Educational
EEPL
Engr
Engineering
ETO
ETOUSA
EUCOM
Ex.
Exhibit
Exec
Executive
Dukw
E.xccO
Executive Office
FA
Field Artillery
FDAP
Field Director of
FEPC
President's
Fi"
Figure
Ammunition Plants
Committee on Fair Employancnt
Practices
GLOSSARY
481
Fisc
Fiscal
FM
Field
FS
Field Service
FTC
FY
G-3
Manual
Fiscal year
ment General
War
War Department
G-4
GAO
GE
General Electric
Gen
General
GF
Ground Forces
GHQ
GMC
GO
GOCO
General Headquarters
Gp
Group
GP
GPF
General Purpose
General StafT
General Order
Government-owned, contractor-operated
HE
Hist
History
HP
Horsepower
Hq
Headquarters
H.R.
House of Representatives
Mustard gas
International Business Machines Corporation
H.S.
IBM
ICAF
Incl
Inclosure
Ind
Industrial
Inf
Infantry
Info
Information
Instr
Instruction
Intel
Intelligence
Armed
Forces
Interv
Interview
IOC
JANASB
JTR
Ltr
Letter
Maint
Maintenance
Munitions Board Cataloging Agency
MBCA
Memo
Joint
Depart-
StafT
MDL
Memorandum
Maximum Distribution
Mfg
Manufacturing
MG
Machine sun
Level
482
Mil
Military
Min
Minutes
Misc
Miscellaneous
MS
Manuscript
Msg
Mtg
Message
Meeting
MTOUSA
MTS
MWO
Motor Transport
Modification
Work Order
NA
NADA
National Archives
Natl
National
NATO
NATOUSA
N.d.
No
NDAG
NDRC
No.
Number
NRA
OASW
OC
OCM
OCMH
War
Ordnance Committee
Ordnance Committee Minutes
Office of the Chief of Military History
OCO
OCO-D
Office, Chief of
OD
ODO
OHF
OO
OP
Ordnance Department
Ordnance Department Order
Ordnance Historical Files
Ordnance Office
Ordnance Office Message
Ordnance plant
OPM
Office of Production
Opns
Operations
OPSI
Ord
Ordnance Publications
Ordnance
Orgn
Organization
OSRD
OSW
OUSW
OOM
Army
Service
Office of the
OWMR
Office
Ordnance
Ordnance-Detroit
Under
Management
for
Par.
Paragraph
Philadelphia
Pers
Personnel
PL
Public I^aw
and Development
War
Secretary of
PASO
Supply Index
War
Reconversion
Ammunition Supply
Office
GLOSSARY
483
Ping
Planning
PMP
POW
Prisoner of
PP
Project Paper
PR
Procurement Regulations
Procurement
Proc
War
Prod
Production
PSP
PT
Point detonating
PWP
QM
QMC
QMG
QMR
Red
Quartermaster
Quartermaster Corps
Quartermaster General
Quartermaster Review
R&D
Record
Research and Development
Rds
Rounds
RDX
Rcf
Regt
Reference
Regiment
REME
Res
Resolution
Ret
Retired
Rev
Review
RP
Research Project
Rpt
Report
Rqmt
Requirement
S.
Senate
SA
SAE
sc
Small arms
Sec
Section
command
Navy
SecNav
Secretary of the
Secy
Secretary
Serv
Service
Sess.
Session
SNL
SO
Standard Nomenclature
Order
Special
SOS
Services of Supply
SP
Self-propelled
Spec
Special
SR
Senate Resolution
Stat
Statistical
Stat.
Statutes
List
484
Sup
Supply
Supp.
Supplement
SW
Secretary of
T-AC
Tank-Automotive Center
TAG
TCVD
Tech
Technical
Telcon
Telephone conversation
Telegram
Telg
War
TIG
The
TM
Training Manual
Tng
Training
Division
Inspector General
TNT
Trinitrotoluene
T/OE
Torch
Allied invasion of
TQMG
U.K.
USAF
USSBS
USSR
USW
V-E
Victor)- in
v-J
Victory in Japan
WD
War Department
War Department Appropriations
War Department Budget Officer
War Department General Staff
WDAB
WDBO
WDGS
W.P.
WPB
Europe
White phosphorus
War Production Board
WPD
War
Plans Division
ZI
Zone
of Interior
Bill
and Preparations
The
The
and
and
Strategy: 1
940-1 943
945
Strategy: 1 943-1
The War
in the Pacific
Papua
CARTWHEEL:
and Marshalls
Marianas
Campaign
in the
The
and
Salerno
to
Cassino
to the
Cassino
Alps
II
486
Command
The Supreme
The Middle
olu me I
VrAume
II
East Theater
to
Russia
StilwelVs Mission to
Stilwell's
Command Problems
The Technical
in
CBI
Ser\ices
and
Services, Volurrce II
The
Special Studies
1941-1943
ChronoUjgy:
Rearming
the French
The Wcjmen
's
A rmy
Cf/rps
Become (jOvnrLors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement jor the Army Air Forces
Thui Emph/yment of Segro Tror/fjs
Mcinhattan: The U.S. Array and the Alotnu liornh
Cixnl Affairs: Soldiers
Pictorial
Record
The War Against Cermany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against (Jermany: Eun/fje and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
Index
Aberdeen Proving Ground,
29. 361,
119,
106,
143,
Ammunition,
stocks
Ammonia
Ammonium
Ammonium
nitrate,
134
picrate,
111-12
109-10
Ammunition, artillery
and crisis in 1944-45, 144-50
dollar value
of,
106,
147
COCO
of,
150-53
Continued
1
storage
104
Ammunition
artillery
requirements for,
2
Second Phase plants for, 109
shortage of in ETO, 148, 469
sites for plants, 108-10
117,
Ammunition
107,
114,
125,
Wave, 202-03
Wave, 194-95
Garand
COCO
rifle,
of,
190-93
165
of,
188
207-11
machinery for production of, 191-92
packing of, 216-17
prewar plans for production of, 191-92
quantities produced, 188-89, 219
requirements for, 199-203, 469
inspection
reserves
of,
190
of,
195
of,
steel
types
of,
189,
Ammunition
220
supply, 423-39
433-35
429-39
Lend-lease shipments, 430-31
lot numbers, 424
methods of reporting, 425-26
Ammunition Supply Branch (Division), Field Service, 364, 426, 433, 436, 438-39
direct shipments,
distribution,
488
Anniston Ordnance Depot, 367, 369, 376, 378-80.
382, 389-91
Antiaircraft guns, 61, 76-79, 90, 101
Antitank guns, 61, 81-85, 87-90
Aparejo, 354
Appropriations, 1-2, 24, 44, 55, 363-65
Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives, 128
Arkansas Ordnance Plant, 127
Arma
See Springfield
261, 263
Munitions Board
(ANMB),
19,
19,
23,
161, 466,
478
Regulations, and transport vehicles, 269, 284
Service Forces, 95, 246, 284, 407, 432, 478
Army Supply Program, 61-64, 142
and
and echelon system of maintenance, 449
and excess ammunition, 437-39
and functional organization of technical
transfer of to British, 70
services,
AT
152
348-49
McCoy Board
Report, 65
tanks, 257
386-87
408
motor vehicles
to
Ordnance, 282-
399
226,
228, 252-53
transfer of
100,
260
4.5-inch gun, 83, 100, 152
8-inch gun, 68, 83. 89, 145, 150-52
8-inch howitzer, 70, 83, 100, 145, 150-52, 440
16-inch howitzer, proposed, 101
20-mm. aircraft gun, 79-80, 84, 87, 100, 152
37-mm. AA gun, 70, 75-76, 78, 84-86, 152
37-mm.
gun, 70. 75, 81. 84, 88, 91, 100, 147,
152,
83,
and
475
and heavy artillery, 101
and heavy artillery ammunition, 144-45
and heavy-heavy trucks, 286
and importance of stock control system, 410
influence of on Ordnance Department, 467-69
medium
31-32
Artillery
Army
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
OCO,
Artillery Division,
Army
Army
and
Armory.
after
96,
and
42
150-52, 440
89,
100,
146-47,
INDEX
489
weapons Continued
155-mm. howitzer, 70-71, 83, 88.
240-mm. howitzer, 68, 70, 83, 89,
Artillery
150-52
145,
100,
150-
52
Ashton, Capt. J. D., 352
Assistant Secretary of War, 4-5, 9, 11, 16-17, 34,
See
37, 59, 193-95, 269, 271, 273, 303, 396.
also Patterson.
Robert
P.
Atomic bomb,
6, 476
Attorney General, U.S., 40, 123, 342, 349
Auditing, and contract settlement, 340-44
Bag
260-61, 304
Ordnance, 6, 444-47
Battle of the Bulge, 418
Bausch and Lomb Optical Company,
Battalions,
75,
96-97
Baxter,
110,
Bell
Ward
Binoculars, 96-97
Birkigt type 404, Hispano-Suiza gun, 79
Briggs, Pr.
E.,
315
Lyman
135, 204
J.,
British
352, 355
British
70,
180,
192,
British Ministry of
Bell
158,
Becker, Col.
ammunition, 213-15
Bendix Aviation Corporation,
Belts,
100,
110-11, 155-56,
199
War
Transport, 431
72,
178
490
Bulova Watch Company, 99
Cadillac Motor
Company,
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
Camp
Camp
Camp
Camp
Camp
Ordnance
J.,
designs, 35
1 1
115-16
Chapman, Rep.
Virgil, 372
Charleston Ordnance Depot, 109, 363, 387, 438
Charleston Port of Embarkation, 391
Chase Brass and Copper Company. 196
Chavin, Col. Raphael S., 399
Checker Cab Company, 295
186, 362,
460
Meade, 442
Churchill, Winston
442
Hood, 460
Civil Service
S.,
452-53
INDEX
491
451
Continued
and selection of depot sites, 367, 370-72
and spare parts supply, 303-05
and World War I experience, 352, 444, 466
33rd Ordnance,
Crowley, Patrick
E.,
13
443
Compasses, 96
Competitive bidding, 267
Comptroller General, U.S., 267-68, 347
Congress, 1, 2, 7, 11, 19, 21, 24, 32, 40, 160, 162,
166, 170-71, 360-61, 371
Davis, Senator
CPFF.
110, 113,
127
29-30
ground rules for negotiation of. 28
placement with industry in 1940, 26-27
settlement of, 339-50
speedy placement of, 36
termination of, 339-50
Control Division, ASF, 306, 417, 420
criticism of terms of,
of,
477
Cyclonite,
RDX.
See
James
J.,
372
Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense
Aid depots.
See
War Aid
depots.
371-75
Delaware Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 387
Denver Ordnance Plant, 43, 194, 200. 218
Depots.
types of 378
ammunition, 387
changes in mission of 391-94
cost of, 377-78
evaluation of, 393-94
general, 353, 382
master depot system of, 389-9
overconstruction of 469
for
ammunition
at,
109
supplies, 379-83
254-55
transfer of from QMC, 383-86
types of, 352-53, 387-89
War Aid, 380-81, 383, 385
after World War I, 360
Depression, effect of on procurement planning, 10
Deputy Chief of Ordnance, proposal for, 473
Descriptions of manufacture, 156-57
Desert Training Center, 385
Designs. Ordnance, 34-35, 225-29
for tanks.
492
Des Moines Ordnance Plant, 195, 200, 202, 203,
221
Detroit
Detroit
Tank
Detroit
227-30
produced at, 256
development of, 242-43
construction
of,
cost of tanks
total
production
at,
268-69
L.,
Disston.
Plant, 94
233, 249
Distribution factor, 51
Branch,
Ordnance,
11,
474
"activation" of in 1940, 27
contracting procedures
28
of,
evaluation of, 22
and inspection practices, 325
personnel
of,
Elgin National
Elliott
Watch Company,
Enfield
97-98
District Administration
Company, 254
Elliott
293. 295
Dickson, Brig. Gen. Tracy C., 93
Gun
Electric Auto-Lite
Dickson
Arsenal, 362
Edison G. E. Appliance Company, 198
Educational orders, 5-6, 18-22, 73, 86, 95, 97, 114,
116. 157. 163, 174. 192, 224-25, 468
Educational Orders Act (1938), 19, 192, 323
242
Edgewood
rifles,
56.
156,
170
128,
J.,
132
29
13-16
relations of with arsenals and OCO, 31-32
of,
364, 398
184
return of excess stocks from, 437-39
shortage of ammunition
Division, armored, 53
110,
32,
81
112
73,
96-97
Machine
of,
448-50
The, 327
50
Employment
Practices
13
Fairless,
Benjamin
F.,
402
Eclipse
Ordnance
148-49
Evansville
in,
James
A.,
13
INDEX
493
129-30
Fees, contractors',
and
and
and
and
and
and
of,
351-52
IBM
Edward C, 175-76
establishment
numbering, 402-03
470
Frigidaire Division
Frink, Brig. Gen.
L.,
180
283, 308-09
for,
475
115
111,
Garand, John C,
401
(GMC),
James
169
160-68, 173-74
161,
Garand
336-37
Fire Control Sub-Office (Frankford), 85, 96, 99,
336-37
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 77-78, 90,
94,
First
99
War
Fisher
Flora,
L., 81
Fort
Company, 215
Wayne Ordnance
1,
7,
38,
158,
192
and
fuzes,
122-23
157,
and
392, 419
rifle,
feasibility dispute,
G-3, 52
G-4, 4,
62
102,
145,
193-97,
494
Company, 130
Gillespie, T. A.,
plants
(COCO), 13,468-69.
ammuntion, 105-53
119,
147
L., 372
Half track cars, 88, 292-93
Half Track Industry Integration Committee, 293
Hambleton, Col. Harry B., 405-06
Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 13
Hardy, Brig. Gen. Roswell E., 130, 140, 142, 144
Hare.' Lt. Col. Ray M., 30
Harrington and Richardson Arms Company, 157-
Gen. Charles
13
and
and
and
and
and
Hiroshima, 476
Hispano-Suiza gun, 79
Hitler, Adolf, 1, 223, 239
Hoe, R. and Co., 73, 75, 86
Holabird
Depot, 268, 385-86
Holston Ordnance Works. Ill, 136
Hoover Commission, 395
Hopkins, Harry L., 234
QM
IBM
58
Harris, Maj.
defense of
machine
tool deliveries,
39
plans for
new
12,
facilities,
32
Continued
Igloos,
ammunition
Machines Corporation.
storage, 361,
368
of Technology, 132
Illinois Ordnance Plant, 108, 111, 144
India, requirements team sent to, 50
Indiana Ordnance Works, 32, 110-11,
Illinois Institute
38,
131,
137-
473-74
434, 467
INDEX
495
Joint Aircraft Committee,
20
Army-Navy Ammunition
Joint
368, 436
for
for
M43
Force program,
Manufacturing Division
Initial Protective
Inland
109, 363
iGMC),
169-70,
of artillery, 95
fire
gages
for,
326
manuals
for,
322-23, 334
committees.
Interchangeability of parts, 403-05
Interior, Department of, 367
Internal Revenue Bureau, 350
International Business Machines Corporation, 80,
175,
International Harvester
426
Introduction to the
Knudsen, William
343-44
Company, 178n
Ordnance Catalog (IOC), 358
S.,
16.
35
Korean War,
Company,
International Silver
151
233, 246
Irwin-Pederson Arms Company, 174-75
Isham, H. P., 340, 345
Italian campaign, 102, 104, 145
Gun Company,
Iwo Jima, 104
Ithaca
158,
185
Labor supply,
Lansdowne
truck), 276-79,
295-97
L. C.
496
Lima Tank Depot, 94, 254
Lincoln Ordnance Depot, 390
Lippmann, Walter, In
Little Rock Motor Supply Depot, 385-86
Lloyd, N.
P.,
91
138-40
Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, 2, 4
Loading
plants, 105-12,
lery
weapons.
Mauldin,
Manufacturing Company,
R., 65-66,
Machine
91, 471
18, 28,
McNarney
458-60
Directive, 66
442-43
combined shops for, 458-61
echelon system of, 448-50
at the arsenals,
of,
67
454-55, 471
preventive, 451-55
for Merit,
161
339, 346-47
Milwaukee Ordnance
Company,
184
Mines, 152
Ministry of Supply, British, 239
Minton, Brig. Gen. Hugh C, 257
Missouri Ordnance Works, 110
Mobilization Regulations 4-2 (1935), 461
Modification Work Orders (MWO's), 442, 450-51,
463-64
471-72
neglect
OCO.
299
400
Meader, George, 314
Mechanical Time Fuze Committee (M43), 122-23
Medal
143-44
McCoy Board (1943), 52, 65-66, 143-44
McFarland, Brig. Gen. Earl, 5
Machine guns, 61, 154-56, 159, 170-71, 178-81,
213-14.
See also Small arms weapons.
Machine-Tool Panels,
Bill,
186
355, 431
INDEX
497
New York
New York
QM,
269, 275,
81
438
Nash Engineering Company, 74
Nash-Kelvinator Company, 97-98, 156, 251, 295
Nathan, Robert, 234
National Automobile Dealers Association, 447
National Blank Book Company, 178n
National Bureau of Standards. 24
National Defense Act of 1920, 9, 360
National Defense Advisory Committee (NDAC),
1
National
124,
National
National
National
National
National
National
National
Defense
136,
Research Committee
(NDRC),
138, 284
Match
rifle,
164
81, 87
Chief of Ordnance-Detroit,
297, 467,
Center.
477.
See
also
125-26,
240,
Tank-Automotive
(OSRD). 124
Office of
Official
Oflficial
War
Mobilization. 346
79,
86
16
468
Negotiated contracts, 271-72
Negotiated settlements, 342-50
Negro workers, 211-13
Nelson. Donald M., 59, 86-87, 102-03, 234, 290
Netherlands, orders by, 158
Neutrality legislation, 10
Office
P.,
102,
University, 346
Newsweek magazine, 28 In
Niblo, Brig. Gen. Urban, 447, 450, 465
Normoyle Ordnance Base Shop, 386, 458
Normoyle Ordnance Depot, 415
North Africa, 65, 261-62, 286, 336. 343, 437-39.
451-52
North African Theater (NATOUSA), 437, 454
Numbering, spare parts, 402-03, 470
Numerical Index of Manufacturers' Part Numbers
and Drawing Numbers, 406
Tube Company,
Battalions,
447
Ordnance
Ordnance
Ordnance
Ordnance
Ordnance
Gage
Section, 326
Group, 447
Light Maintenance Company. 451
396,
498
Ordnance Service Command Shops, 456-57
Ordnance Technical Committee, 25, 165, 169,
Polk, R. L.,
238,
items, 419
Pacific
Procter and
Colt plant, 80
demand
for
AA
guns, 79
280
38-39
St. Louis plant, 208
small arms ammunition, 195, 198
tank improvements, 226
termination of contracts. 219, 339
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 285
PauUin, Lt. Col. Charles S., 208
Pearson, Drew, 209
Pennsylvania, University of, 346
Pennsylvania Ordnance Works, 387
Pentagon, 8, 29, 467
lag in truck production.
machine
tools,
mond Ordnance
158, 363,
(PASO),
90,
Pyle, Ernie,
Ordnance Depot,
256
300
Quad
125,
353.
also Inspection.
Depot.
Pistols,
Pittsburgh
Quartermaster Corps
and allocated facilities, 30
and construction of new plants,
Ordnance
District,
113
Pig Point
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Periscopes.
412,
criticism of
tices
artillery
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
305
Parts
Company. 406
18,
ASW,
116-17
9,
Company,
10
174
INDEX
499
Continued
and standardization of vehicles, 266-70
and transfer of depots to Ordnance, 383-86
and transfer of trucks to Ordnance, 64, 240. 266,
Quartermaster Corps
467, 471
Rainbow
Division, 6
Col.
Range
finders.
474
147, 204
Company, 246
73,
27,
Arsenal,
27,
156,
159,
163,
81,
187,
85,
242,
248,
353-54, 467
as center for carriages
and
and
and
recoil
mechanisms, 72
412, 463
53
Replacement
Rock Island
167-68, 170-74
178
Recuperators, 72
Red Ball Express, 291
Red River Ordnance Base Shop, 458
Red River Ordnance Depot, 371, 378, 380, 382,
386-90, 420, 436
Japanese, 68
Johnson, 165-68
Lee- Enfield, 159, 171-72, 174
MI (Garand), 155, 160-68, 170-74
Production of, 171-74
Requirements for, 170-71
Roller Bit
170-71
470-71
and Supply Control, 64-67
for tanks, 232-33, 235-37, 240, 256-59
teams for collecting data for, 50
Requirements Division, ASF, 257
Requirements Division, Ordnance, 51, 67
Research and Development Division, 467
Research and Development Service, proposed, 473
Reserve officers. Ordnance, 29
Reserve Storage depots, 388
Revere Brass and Copper Company, 27. 196
Revolvers, 156, 185-86
Rice, Brig. Gen. John H., 161, 351, 441
Richards, Brig. Gen. George J., 66
Richmond Tank Depot, 254
Rifles, 2, 154, 174, 333-34.
See also Recoilless rifles.
Browning automatic (BAR), 155-56, 170-72, 174,
for small arms,
Reed
Continued
Requirements
172-
and spare
302-05
and
232-39
visit to
Watervliet Arsenal, 74
171,
180,
500
Rossford Ordnance Depot, 385, 389-90
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME),
459
Rubber, shortage of, 281-84
Rudolf Wurlitzer Company, 124
Russell Manufacturing Company, 213-14
Sadtler, Col.
ammunition
Safety, in artillery
plants,
130-33
175,
180
St.
St.
St.
St.
Louis
Louis
Louis
Louis
Dukw
of,
117
114,
in invasion of,
285
109,
Shot, procurement
Sicily,
218, 221
Star-Times, 207-08
363,
387-88,
390
San Francisco Ordnance District, 28, 346
San Jacinto Ordnance Depot, 370, 378, 387, 438
Santa Anna, 370
Savage Arms Corporation, 158-59, 180
Savanna Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 360-63, 387
Savanna Proving Ground, 442
Sayler, Maj. Gen. Henry B., 151
Schedules of Stores Reports, 357-58
184-85
170-71
rifle production, 171-74
and Springfield Armory, 161-63
and submachine guns, 181-82
Small arms ammunition. See Ammunition,
arms.
203
Small Arms Division, Industrial Service, 203
Small Arms Division, Research and Development
Scientists
Scioto
Plant, 218
Seabees, 453
Sears Roebuck and
Company,
recoilless rifles,
requirements
355, 402
for,
small
Service,
Ordnance
and
184
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
AA
58, 62
small
200
Command
shops,
457-59
195,
INDEX
501
Continued
and small arms requirements, 171
and spare parts, 308, 317, 413
and stock control, 401-02
and tank requirements, 237-38
and transfer of motor vehicles, 283, 289, 468
Southwestern Proving Ground, 327
Soviet Union, 59-60, 138, 232, 275
Spare
269
for
categories
identification
interchangeability
and
and
and
and
and
and
reserves stored
controversy, 165-68
and
rifle
rifle
output
at,
2,
161-63
Springfield
Ordnance
Springfield
rifle
District,
184,
234
Standard Form No. 32, 16
Stalin, Josef,
Lists
Teams, 420
sampling.
trol, statistical.
Steel
need of
for carbines,
\16-11
380
Sten gun, ammunition for, 192
Stevens Arms Company Division (Savage Arms
Corporation), 159
Stewart- Warner Corporation, 15
Stilwell Road, 291
See also
Stimson, Henry L., 104, 373, 450, 475.
Secretary of War.
Stock control, 410-22, 471
Stock Control Branch (OCO-D), 412-13
Stock Control Branch (OCO), 415
Stock Control Division (ASF), 420
Stock Control Division (Field Service), 413
Stock levels, 416
Stock List of Items, 406
Stockton Base Shop, 458
Stockton Ordnance Depot, 389
Stokes, F. J., Machine Company, 139
Storage catalogue. World War I, 354-55
Stribling, Col. Simpson R., 146
Studebaker Company, 273, 275, 296
Subcontracts and small business, 41-42
Submachine guns, 155, 181-82, 192
Steese, Col. Charles M., 376,
412
Sunbeam
for.
473
Supreme Court,
U.S., 210
Surgeon General's Office, 131
Surplus materiel, 418-19
Surplus Property Act (1944), 420
Surveys of industry, 17-19, 73, 468
Susquehanna Ordnance Depot, 387
346
Standard Nomenclature
Tables
Tables
Tables
Tables
Tables
of organization, 47, 63
of organization and equipment, 358
Tank
arsenal.
See Detroit
Tank
Arsenal.
502
Tank- Automotive Center (T-AC),
404,
451,
412,
474.
See also
Ordnance-Detroit.
establishment of, 240, 283
and follow-up of truck production, 288-89
Tank Committee, 36
Tank Corps, World War I, 224
Tank depots, 254-55
Tank guns, 81-85, 87-89, 101
Tank recovery vehicles, 253, 293-95
Tank transporters, 293-94
Tanks,
3, 61, 64
223-24, 239, 254, 263
Canadian Ram type of, 253
cost of, 256
2,
British,
criticism of,
222-23
inspection
of,
334-36
light,
Inc.,
113
42
Trucks
amphibian (Dukw), 258, 284-86, 295-97, 471
ban on civilian production, 280-81
Brockway 6-ton, 284
Chevrolet '/2-ton, 274, 284
Chrysler '/2-ton, 274, 284
Class B (World War I), 267-68, 270
Corbitt 6-ton, 284
during defense period, 270-80
1
CMC
storage
of,
292-99
385
transfer of to
Ordnance,
of,
266-72
282-84, 383,
64, 266,
399-400, 467-68
6-ton, 284
War I experience with, 265
Yellow (GMC) 2'/2-ton, 274-75, 284
White
World
Truman, Harry
S.,
Truman Committee,
311-14
Trundle Engineering Company, 331-32
Trundle Report, 331-32
Tschappat, Maj. Gen. William H., 362-63
INDEX
Twin
Cities
503
Ordnance
Plant,
301
VT
136,
66,
143-44, 217
146
See
Office
of
War
Mobilization.
War
War
and
feasibility dispute,
62-63
history of cited, 58
War
War
Star,
165
147
192
Watertown Arsenal,
129,
143
IBM
Department Continued
and preventive maintenance, 451-52
and procurement of trucks, 271-72
and sites for depots, 366-68
and spare parts, 3
and theater requirements, 50-51
War Department Budget Advisory Committee, 380
War Department Circular 245, 266
War Department Procurement Review Board, 65-
Washington Evening
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
War
machines, 397
92, 94-95,
404
Wells Board, 404-05
Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M., 5. 85-86,
and accepted schedules of production,
163, 222
and
and
and
and
and
and
aircraft guns,
180
Colt
Company
504
Wesson, Maj. Cu-n. t'harlcs M. ( '.oiiiinucd
and growth of stafl, '28-29
and legal restrictions on procurement, 16-17
and low priorities, 468
antl machine tools, 38-39
orders highest priority for spare parts, 304-05
anci procurement plans, 12, 15-16
Whittemore,
194
197-98
and production of tanks, 228 3&
and production studies, 21
95,
of,
306
W(x)ds,
194, 196,203,
205, 220-21
Manufacturing Com-
292-93
Whitney,
Eli,
155
^ellc)vv
79, 86
Company,
Wheland Company,
S. A.,
Corporation, 73
Wcstervelt Board, 68
and
Westinghouse Electric
81. 87
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PRINTING OFFICE
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