STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOCKET NO.: CR14-0675616-S SUPERIOR COURT | i GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 9 [state OF Conwacicty AT MIDDLESEX | Plainti : V8: : September 8, 2014 EDWARD F. TAUPIER, : Defendant MOTION 'TO DISMISS The Defendant moves to dismiss all charges of the instant matter by defect of affidavit, absence of cause, absence of criminal act, absence of criminal speech and absence of a victim, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments. On August 29, 2014, Trooper Daniel DeJesus, CSP #494 submitted a false misleading affidavit in application for arrest warrant with willful and reckless disregard for truth. DeJesus failed to inform the court that the alleged victim never received a threat from the accused or that there was no attempt by the accused to communicate his private correspondence to the alleged victim. DeJesus misrepresented partial screen shot of excerpted text obtained from Linda Allard as an ‘e-mail’, at 4. DeJesus failed to statethat the accused had no contact with Allard. DeJesus failed to inform the court that the writings were part of a private e-mail conversation among six persons extending over two] days for which he had reason to know as he interviewed one of the participants to obtain the email address of the accused, as such he failed to disclose the context of the private conversation to the court. DeJesus made false statement at 10. To wit: “With this action, he shreatened Judge Bozzuto with intent to place her in fear of imminent serious physical injury.” ‘There was no “action” as represented by the affiant, only constitutionally protected words extracted from the context of a private conversation. The accused did not threaten any victim; there was no element of “true threat’ as required by law to create criminal speech. The alleged victim was not a recipient of the email, despite having a public email address, which was notably and intentionally absent from the thread. There was no ‘imminent’ condition as the private writings had occurred on the 22™ and DeJesus was claiming ‘imminence’ on the 29", such being a recklessly false claim by the affiant. DeJesus provided an affidavit, in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment, claiming criminal speech without regard for the standards of a ‘true threat’ as prescribed in law. ||Probable cause for criminal speech does not turn on the mere opinion of an incompetent state employee. Despite the uneducated, unqualified opinion of DeJesus, private conversation is a circumstance that does not create an unequivocal, immediate, specificthreat with gravity of purpose and prospect of imminent execution to a party not included in the discussion. There is no probable cause to deprive a person of liberty for protected speech in a private conversation, Withholding such information from the state’s attorney and the court in application for arrest was simply fraud. The Fourth Amendment requires 4 truthful factual affidavit to establish probable cause. Perjurious or recklessly false statements are prohibited in support of a warrant; deprivation of rights notwithstanding. WHEREFORE, the aforementioned having been presented, as required by the Fourth Amendment, in defense of all citizens’ rights, defense of liberty, protection of the Constitution and in great respect for the sacred protection of the First Amendment, such charges be dropped, dismissed and duly purged from public record as the whole matter is simply an ugly embarrassment to the sovereign people of Connecticut. THE DEFENDANT Pro se aeDER Motion to Dismiss, having been duly heard by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED: GRANTED/DENIED. BY THE COURT DATED: JUDGE/ASSISTANT CLERKCERTIFICATION hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was hand delivered this 8" day of September, 2014 to the following: Office of the State’s Attorney One Court Street Middletown, Connecticut EDWARD F. =fMEMORANDUM OF LAW In support of motion to dismiss this memo of law is provided, which merely notes || the protections of the First Amendment, held sacred by the sovereign people of the nation ions of persons such as Daniel and the specifications of the Fourth Amendment. Opi DeJesus are irrelevant in standing against the power of the First. Violation by him of the Fourth is obvious. The accused need not recite what is a hallmark of this country, nor does the court need such education as it is the court’s duty to defend these precious constitutional rights and has no standing to question them. There is no unsettled question to the protection of speech arising from frustration, ranting, venting, political hyperbole. There is no unsettled question of private speech. There is no unsettled question of recipient or victim. There is no cause for the State to invent new construction to criminal conduct involving actions by other than the accused. The court can defer to the First and Fourth Amendments and refer to the following case law in support of the motion: State of Connecticut v. Stephen Jason Krijger, SC18854 | State of Connecticut v. Stephen Jason Krijger, 24 A. 3d 42; dissent by Lavine, J. at 52. | | Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 Watts v. United States, 394 US 705, 09-12, fn2. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165-71 Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F. 3d 1544, 1554