Democracy Core

Democracy Core..........................................................................................................................1
Uniqueness...................................................................................................................................3
Global Democracy Low...........................................................................................................4
AT: Global Democracy Low....................................................................................................7
Democracy Good.........................................................................................................................8
Democracy Good-Laundry List...............................................................................................9
Democracy Good War.........................................................................................................10
Democratic Peace Theory True..............................................................................................12
Democracy Good Economy................................................................................................14
Democracy Good Environment..........................................................................................15
Democracy Good State Failure...........................................................................................16
Democracy Good Terrorism...............................................................................................17
AT: Democracy Bad Terrorism...........................................................................................18
AT: Transition Wars...............................................................................................................19
AT: Transition Wars Backsliding Outweighs......................................................................20
Democracy Bad.........................................................................................................................21
1NC........................................................................................................................................22
2NC Little Ext........................................................................................................................25
2NC DemocracyWar..........................................................................................................26
2NC AT: Solves War..............................................................................................................28
2NC AT: Democratic Peace Theory True..............................................................................30
2NC AT: Accountability.........................................................................................................33
2NC Transition Wars..............................................................................................................34
2NC Democracy Econ Collapse.........................................................................................36
2NC Democracy Environmental Destruction.....................................................................38
2NC Democracy Bad European Wars.................................................................................40
2NC Democracy Hegemony Collapse................................................................................41
2NC Democracy Terrorism.................................................................................................43
2NC Truth Claims DA...........................................................................................................46
Latin American Democracy.......................................................................................................48
Mexican Democracy Good........................................................................................................52
Uniqueness.............................................................................................................................53
Environment..........................................................................................................................54
Stability..................................................................................................................................56
Demo Promo..........................................................................................................................58
Mexican Democracy Bad..........................................................................................................59
Environment..........................................................................................................................60
Stability..................................................................................................................................62
Demo Promo..........................................................................................................................63
Cuban Democracy Good............................................................................................................64
Environment..........................................................................................................................65
Stability..................................................................................................................................69
Cuban Democracy Bad..............................................................................................................72
Environment..........................................................................................................................73

Stability..................................................................................................................................76
Venezuelan Democracy Good....................................................................................................81
Environment..........................................................................................................................82
Stability..................................................................................................................................84
Venezuelan Democracy Bad......................................................................................................86
Stability..................................................................................................................................87
Enviornment..........................................................................................................................88
Venezuelan Stability Impacts.....................................................................................................89

Uniqueness

Global Democracy Low

Democracy is declining globally in numbers, quality, and public support.
Kurlantzick 11
Joshua Kurlantzick is a fellow for South-east Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Democracy in steep decline around the world. The National. July 15, 2011.
http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/democracy-in-steep-decline-around-theworld?pageCount=0
But the Arab Spring is, in many ways, a mirage. Several nations in the region may
eventually make the transition to democracy - this is hardly assured - but in reality,
democracy is faltering throughout the developing world, from Asia to Latin America, from
Africa to the former Soviet states. In its annual survey, the monitoring group Freedom
House, which uses a range of data to assess social, political and economic freedoms, found
that global freedom plummeted for the fifth year in a row in 2010, the longest continuous
decline in nearly 40 years. In fact, there are now fewer elected democracies than there were
in 1995. A mountain of other evidence supported Freedom House's findings. One of the
other most comprehensive studies of global democracy, compiled by Germany's
Bertelsmann Foundation, uses data examining the ability of democracies to function,

manage government and uphold freedoms to produce what it calls the Transformation
Index. The most recent index found "the overall quality of democracy has eroded
[throughout the developing world] ... the key components of a functioning democracy, such
as political participation and civil liberties, have suffered qualitative erosion ... these
developments threaten to hollow out the quality and substance of governance ". The index
concluded that the number of "highly defective democracies" - democracies with
institutions, elections and political culture so flawed that they no longer qualified as real
democracies - had roughly doubled between 2006 and 2010. The Economist Intelligence
Unit's Index of Democracy only further confirmed these findings. The unit analyses
democracy using categories for electoral process, pluralism, political participation, political
culture, functioning of government and civil liberties. It found that democracy was in
retreat around the globe. "In all regions, the average democracy score for 2010 is lower
than in 2008," it reported. In 91 of 167 countries it studied, the democracy score had
deteriorated in that time period and in many others it had only remained stagnant. Of the
79 nations that it assessed as having some significant democratic qualities, only 26 made
the grade as what the EIU calls "full democracies", while the other 53 were ranked only as
"flawed democracies" because of serious deficiencies in many of the areas it assessed. In
Latin America, Africa, Asia and even most of Africa, coups, which had been a frequent
means of changing governments during the Cold War, had become nearly extinct by the
early 2000s. But between 2006 and 2010, the military grabbed power in Mauritania, Niger,
Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh, Fiji and Madagascar, among others. In many other developing
nations, such as Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines, the military managed to restore its
power as the central actor in political life, dominating the civilian governments that clung
to power only through the support of the armed forces. "It's almost like we've gone back to
the [Ferdinand] Marcos era," prominent Filipino rights activist and lawyer Harry Roque Jr
said, as he waited in his office for the security forces to come and interrogate him. "There's
the same type of fear, the same abuses, the same attitude by the military that their actions
will never face consequences." Support for democracy has become so tepid in parts of the

developing world that many of these coups were cheered: in Niger last year, thousands
celebrated the military takeover in Niamey, the capital, in part because the overthrown
leader had been destroying the country's democratic institutions. Overall, an analysis of
military coups in developing nations over the past 20 years, conducted by David
Silverman, my Council on Foreign Relations research associate, found that in nearly 50 per
cent of cases drawn from Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, middle-class
men and women either agitated in advance for the coup, or, in polls or prominent media
coverage afterwards, expressed their support for the army takeover. Opinion polls also
reveal that the quality of democracy is declining, but also that how the public views
democracy is deteriorating as well. The Barometer Series of polls uses questionnaires to ask
people in a range of nations about their views on democracy. The survey of the African
continent has found declining levels of support for democracy in many countries.
Meanwhile, in Russia, where hope for democracy was high in the early 1990s, today the
New Europe Barometer shows that half of Russians believe it is acceptable to stop having
elections if this decision strengthens the country. Elsewhere, in Ecuador, Guatemala,
Paraguay, Colombia, Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua, either a minority or only a tiny
majority of people think democracy is preferable to any other type of government. Polls
and studies of South Asia have revealed similar dissatisfaction. In Pakistan, roughly 60 per
cent of respondents in a comprehensive regional survey said the country should be ruled by
the army. Even in East Asia, one of the most economically vibrant regions of the world,
polls reveal the same rising dissatisfaction with democracy. In fact, several countries in the
region have developed what Yu-tzung Chang, Yunhan Zhu and Chong-min Park, who
studied data from the regular Asian Barometer surveys, have termed "authoritarian
nostalgia".
Democracy is declining globally.
Puddington 11
Arch Puddington is director of research at Freedom House. Democracy Under Duress. Journal
of Democracy. Volume 22, Number 2, April 2011. ProQuest.
The increasing truculence of the world's most potent authoritarian regimes has coincided
with a growing inability or unwillingness on the part of the world's democracies to meet
the authoritarian challenge, with important consequences for the state of global freedom.
According to Freedom in the World 2011, the latest edition of Freedom House's annual
survey of global political rights and civil liberties, 2010 saw conditions worsen for the fifth
consecutive year. While 2010's deterioration was not as bad as some years', the multiyear
spate of backsliding is the longest of its kind since Freedom in the World was first published
in 1972, and threatens gains dating to the post-Cold War era in Africa, Latin America, Asia,
and the former Soviet bloc. The number of countries listed as Free dropped from 89 to 87,
but more disturbing was the further decline in the number of electoral democracies, from 116
to 115, putting the figure well below its 2005 level of 123. The electoral-democracy roster

has not been so short since 1995. The Table on pp. 22-23 provides the 2010 freedom status
(Not Free, Partly Free, or Free) and political-rights and civil-liberties ratings (with 1
representing the most free and 7 the least) of the world's independent countries, as well as
trend arrows indicating positive or negative shifts that were not enough to cause a country's
ratings to change, but were significant nonetheless. The number of countries exhibiting
declines for the past year (25) was more than double the number showing gains (11). The
most notable changes occurred in Mexico and Ukraine, both of which declined from Free

to Partly Free, and Ethiopia, which dropped from Partly Free to Not Free. Among other
countries showing declines were Cte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Kuwait, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka.
Countries that notched important gains included Colombia, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, the
Philippines, and Tanzania. For the first time in years, the former USSR also saw modest
gains, with improvements noted in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. At the same time,
the region's democracy indicators continued to rank near the global bottom, only slightly
above those for the Middle East. The poor performance of the countries of the Middle East
and North Africa remains a source of concern. The region deepened its multiyear
democratic decline from an already-low baseline. Among the year's troubling trends were:
Violence and organized crime as enemies of democracy: Mexico's decline from Free to
Partly Free was a result of the uncontrolled wave of organized criminal activity that has
afflicted several states. The problem is regionwide. At year's end, Guatemala declared a
state of siege in a part of the country where criminal violence has grown unchecked, and
there is strong evidence that similar problems could be migrating from the Americas to
Africa. The persistent freedom gap in Muslim-majority countries: Despite a few
noteworthy gains, primarily Indonesia's embrace of democracy and civil rights, Muslimmajority countries have failed to make significant progress over the past decade. Only a
pair are ranked as Free, as opposed to 19 Partly Free and 26 Not Free. While practically no
improvements were registered in the Middle East and North Africa, some gains were
recorded in Muslim-majority countries outside the region. The economic crisis
challenging Central Europe's progress: Among the countries worst hit by the global
economic downturn are a number of ex-communist states in Central Europe and the Baltic
region. Although EU influence and the consolidation of democratic institutions have
prevented major regressions, there is evidence of backsliding, especially in Hungary and
Latvia. China's latest pretext for repression: In 2008, Beijing cited the need for security
during the Olympic Games as the reason for [End Page 20] its crackdown on dissidents,
journalists, and others. In 2009, it claimed a need for order around the celebration of the
sixtieth anniversary of the CCP's seizure of power. In 2010, repression was presented as a
response to the hostility supposedly evinced by Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize. The 87 countries
designated as Free in 2010 by Freedom in the World represented 45 percent of the world's
194 polities and almost three-billion people43 percent of the global population. The
number of Free countries declined by two from the previous year's survey . The number of
countries qualifying as Partly Free stood at 60, or 31 percent of all countries assessed by
the survey, and they were home to about a billion and a half people, or 22 percent of the
world's total. The number of Partly Free countries increased by two from the previous year.
A total of 47 countries were deemed Not Free, representing 24 percent of the world's
polities. The number of people living under Not Free conditions stood at slightly over 2.4
billion or 35 percent of the global population, though it is important to note that more than
half this number lives in just one country: China. The number of Not Free countries
remained unchanged from 2009. The number of electoral democracies dropped by one, and
stands at 115. Three countries achieved electoral-democracy status (a rating easier to attain
than Free) due to elections that were widely regarded as improvements over previous polls:
the Philippines, Tanzania, and Tonga. Four countries dropped off the electoral-democracies
roster: Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Sri Lanka.

AT: Global Democracy Low

Democracy is not in retreat the number of democracies have increased.
Nye 8/4 Professor at Harvard University
Joseph S. Nye, a professor at Harvard University, was rated by a recent poll as the most
influential scholar on American foreign policy. Democracys drama in terrorisms theater.
August 4, 2011. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/04/democracy%E2%80%99sdrama-in-terrorism%E2%80%99s-theater/
President George W. Bush was famous for proclaiming democracy promotion as a central
focus of American foreign policy. He was not alone in this rhetoric. Most US presidents since
Woodrow Wilson have made similar statements. So it was a striking departure when US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified to Congress earlier this year about the three
Ds of American foreign policy defense, diplomacy, and development. The D of
democracy was glaringly absent, suggesting a fundamental policy change by President
Barack Obamas administration. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush frequently referred
to democracys benefits for security. They cited social-science research showing that
democracies rarely go to war with each other. But, more carefully stated, what scholars
have shown is that liberal democracies almost never go to war with each other. Indeed, it
might be that a liberal constitutional culture is more important than the mere fact of
competitive elections. While free and fair elections are important, liberal democracy is
more than electocracy. Elections in the absence of constitutional and cultural constraints
can produce violence, as in Bosnia or the Palestinian Authority. And illiberal democracies
have in fact gone to war with each other quite recently, as Ecuador and Peru did in the
1990s. In the eyes of many critics at home and abroad, the Bush administrations excesses
tarnished the idea of democracy promotion. Bushs invocation of democracy to justify the
invasion of Iraq implied that democracy could be imposed at the barrel of a gun.
Democracy came to be associated with its particular American variant, and took on an
imperialist connotation. Moreover, Bushs exaggerated rhetoric was often at odds with his
practice, giving rise to charges of hypocrisy. He somehow found it easier to criticize
Zimbabwe, Cuba, and Burma than Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and he quickly toned down
his initial reproach of Egypt. There is a danger, however, in over-reacting to the Bush
administrations policy failures. Democracy is not an American imposition, and it can take
many forms. The desire for greater participation grows as economies develop and people
adjust to modernization. Nor is democracy in retreat. Freedom House, a non-governmental
organization, listed 86 free countries at the beginning of the Bush years, a total that increased
slightly, to 89, by the end of his term.

Democracy Good

Democracy Good-Laundry List

Global democratic consolidation prevents many scenarios for war and extinction
Diamond 95
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy
in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow
of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause
with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones . Nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the
global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and
openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century
offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do
not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize
themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse"
their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies
do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable,

open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable
climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must
answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.
They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and
because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,
property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which
a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Democracy Good War

Democracies dont go to warpopular accountability checks military adventurism
Sharansky 4
Nathan Sharansky, Israels Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet
dissident, 2004, The Case for Democracy, p. 78-80
So if the majority of people in all societies are inherently peace-loving, then what is so
unique about democracies that keeps them from waging war with one another? The answer
can be found in the political mechanics of every democratic society. Democratic leaders
depend on their people. There-fore they have an enormous incentive to satisfy the demands
of their constituencies if they want to stay in power. In democracies, the personal interests
of the political leadership, even the most venal among them, is effectively tied to
improving the lives of those they govern. Those leaders who are perceived to be delivering
peace and prosperity tend to be reelected, while those who are not tend to be removed from
office. As the United States learned during Vietnam, and the government of Spain learned
during the recent war in Iraq, no democratic government will be able to fight a protracted
war that the majority of its citizens does not support . This is especially true when the costs
of war are felt close to home. If democratic peoples believe there is an alternative to war
whether that alternative is real or imagined is immaterial they will demand that their
government pursue it. And a democratic government that does not heed the will of the
people will sooner or later be replaced by one that does. Thus, the critical factor that
prevents democratic nations from fighting against each other is not values that are particular to democratic peoples but rather the fact that the power of a democratic government is
ultimately dependent on the popular will. When two democratic states are faced with an
issue that can potentially lead to conflict, their leaders, whose own power depends on
citizens who see war as a last resort, will do everything possible to avoid war and reach a
compromise. For this reason, democratic leaders also have a propensity towards
appeasement. Their first instinct is to seek a peaceful solution first, and they are slow to
relinquish this approach. War is almost always seen as an expensive, disruptive last resort,
and few democratic leaders embrace the prospect with anything other than extreme
caution. Indeed, so strong is the popular antipathy to war that democratic societies are at a
disadvantage when confronting threats that require preemptive military action. In response
to their voters, most democratic leaders will be inhibited by a pacific reflex, be slow to act,
and be overly cautious. This propensity for appeasement can be extremely dangerous if
potential threats that could have been nipped in the bud are instead allowed to grow more
dangerous.
Democracy solves great power war more likely to negotiate, and when they do fight they
choose easy targets
Tarzi 7
Shah, Professor of Economic Affairs @ Bradley, Democratic Peace, Illiberal Democracy and
Conflict Behavior, International Journal on World Peace, vol 24
Bueno de Mequita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith are among the few who have sought to
overcome the conceptual dilemmas noted above. Specifically they have provided insights
on the link between institutions and foreign policy choices with reference to international
disputes and conflicts. They find that democratic leaders, when faced with a choice, are

more likely to shift greater resources to war efforts than leaders of the autocratic
governments because political survival of the elected democratic regime demands
successful policy performance, especially as the winning coalition grows. Thus,
democratic regimes tend to have a military edge over autocratic regimes in war because of
the extra efforts required. Also, "democratic leaders only choose to fight when they are
confident of victory. Otherwise they prefer to negotiate ." (22) Bueno de Mequita and his
colleagues conclude, Democrats make relatively unattractive targets because domestic
reselection pressures cause leaders to mobilize resources for the war effort. This makes it
harder for other states to target them for aggression. In addition to trying harder than
autocrats, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typically leads to
domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war when they expect to win .

These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often termed the
democratic peace. Autocrats need a slight expected advantage over other autocratic
adversaries in devoting additional resources to the war effort. In order to initiate war,
democrats need overwhelming odds of victory, but that does not mean they are passive.

Because democrats use their resources for the war effort rather than reserve them to
reward backers, they are generally able, given their selection criteria for fighting, to
overwhelm autocracies, which results in short and relatively less costly wars. Yet,
democracies find it hard to overwhelm other democracies because they also try hard . In
general, democracies make unattractive targets, particularly for other democracies. Hence,
democratic states rarely attack one another. (23)

Democratic Peace Theory True

A preponderance of studies affirm the democratic peace theory
Tessler and Grobschmidt 95
Mark Tessler Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies at
the University of Milwaukee, and Marilyn Grobschmidt, doctoral student in International
Relations and Comparative Politics at Indiana University, 1995, Democracy War & Peace, p.
140-141
Although a number of studies have demonstrated that democracies, in general, are no more
peaceful than non-democratic states (Small and Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Weede 1984),
there is compelling evidence that democracies do not go to war against one another. As
expressed by Rummel, libertarian systems mutually preclude violence, in other words,
violence will occur between states only if at least one is nonlibertarian. By libertarian,
Rummel means those states that [emphasize] individual freedom and civil liberties and
the rights associated with the competitive and open election of leaders (Rummel 1983, pp.
2728). One study providing evidence in support of this conclusion was conducted by
Babst, who examined 116 major wars from 1789 to 1941 and found that no wars [had] been
fought between independent nations with elective governments (Babst 1972, p. 55). In
another investigation, Doyle examined liberal regimes dating back to the eighteenth
century and found that even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars
with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with
one another (Doyle 1983, p. 213). Doyle defined liberal states as polities that are externally sovereign. .. [where citizens] possess juridical rights.. . [and are ruled by a]
representative government (ibid.). A third study was conducted by Maoz and Abdolali
(1989), who reported that while democracies are no more peaceful than other states, they
almost always go to war with nondemocratic regimes, rather than other democracies. There
has been some debate about whether the relationship between democracy and peace is
spurious. For example, arguing that societies with greater wealth have more to lose and are
therefore reluctant to go to war, one analyst suggests that the correlation may be an artifact
of the high level of economic development that characterizes most democratic countries
(Mueller 1989, p. 264). Yet empirical studies report that the relationship between democracy
and peace holds when statistical controls for wealth and other variables are introduced.
Studies by Maoz and Russett (1992, pp. 24546; 1991, p. 30) demonstrate that peace
among democracies cannot be explained by level or rate of development, by political
stability, or by the lack of common borders. Also, with respect to the impact of wealth and
economic development, Ember, Ember, and Russett (1992, p. 575) correctly observe that
this does not explain the peace that existed among democracies prior to industrialization.
Nor does it explain the outbreak of World War II, which pitted advanced capitalist..,
states against each other?
Democratic peace theory is soundthe preponderance of studies and the decline of conflict
in the 90s proves
Halperin 5
Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of
the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 12

Counter to the expectations of the prevailing school, a great deal of research in the 1990s on
the political dimension of conflict has revealed a powerful pattern of a democratic peace.
Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other. This pattern has held from the

establishment of the first modern democracies in the nineteenth century to the present. As
an ever-greater share of the worlds states become democratic, the implications for global
peace are profound. Indeed, as the number of democracies has been increasing, major
conflicts around the world (including civil wars) have declined sharply. Since 1992, they have
fallen by two-thirds, numbering just 13 as of 2003.

Democracy Good Economy

Open democracies are key to the global economy
Halperin 5
Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of
the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 12
What explains the consistently superior development outcomes of democracies? We
outline the conceptual underpinnings of democracys superior developmental performance
in Chapter 2. The reasons are many and varied, but boil down to three core characteristics
of representative government: shared power, openness, and adaptability. Although holding
free elections is what commonly defines democracy, what makes it work is the way it
disperses power. Consequently, in contrast to most autocratic governments, a broader range
of interests are considered on a more regular basis. This increases the likelihood that the
priorities of the general public will be weighed. Indeed, the argument that authoritarian
governments can ignore special interest groups and therefore make deci sions that are for the
overall good of the society is based on a series of highly dubious assumptions. One is that the
unelected leaders in these systems actually have the interest of the public at heart. The

behavior of Fidel Castro in Cuba, Kim Jung-Il in North Korea, Alexander Lukashenko in
Belarus, and Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in Sudan, to say nothing of former Iraqi dictator,
Saddam Hussein, would strongly suggest otherwise. Another assumption is that
authoritarian governments dont have to satisfy their own special-interest constituencies. In
fact, most authoritarian systems are built on the foundations of extensive patronage networks
upon which they rely to stay in power. Although typically shielded from public view, these
networks have enormous impacts on economic opportunity and development. The separation
of powers inherent in a democracy acts as a constant reminder to the public that the central
governments powers are limited. Thus, it encourages the expansionand the independence
of the private sector. This, in turn, fosters a climate of innovation and entrepreneurship,
the engines of economic growth. The multiplicity of influences on the decision-making
process in democracies also leads to more moderate and nuanced policies. This moderating
influence contributes to one of the most distinctive qualities of democratic development
its steadiness. The ups and downs of economic growth in low-income countries are smaller
in democracies. Rather than experiencing alternating bouts of boom and bust, economies in
democracies are more likely to undergo a stable pattern of moderate gains and small
declines. For poor democracies, that quality of steadiness is exceedingly important, for it
means that they are more able than countries run by dictators to avoid economic and
humanitarian catastrophes. For broad segments of their populations, this is the difference
between life and death. Consider this remarkable statistic: 95 percent of the worst economic
performances over the past 40 years were overseen by nondemocratic gov ernments.

Similarly, virtually all contemporary refugee crises have been wrought by autocratic
governments. Although shared decision-making is frequently slower, this process is more
likely to weigh risks, thereby avoiding calamitous policies. When something is going
wrong, leaders hear about it and are forced to take action.

Democracy Good Environment

Democracy is key to environmental protection
Janicke 96
Martin Janicke, Professor of Comparative Policy and Head of the Research Unit for
Environmental Policy at the Free University of Berlin, 1996, Democracy and the Environment,
p. 71
That democracy in general is a better precondition for environmental policy than
authoritarian rule is extremely plausible. There seems to be no need for explanation. From
comparative research we are aware of the poor record on pollution control in the former
communist countries. The previous rightist dictatorships in southern Europe (from Turkey to
Portugal) have also shown similar records. It is also easy on theoretical grounds to develop

plausible hypotheses about the causal connection between successful (or at least better)
environmental policy and democracy. Environmental policy goals are usually in direct
opposition to current economic trends. Oppositional rights are, therefore, an important
resource for the successful formulation and implementation of green policy. Critical roles
for science and the media can also, in this respect, be as important as civil rights or a

competitive party system.

Democracy Good State Failure

Democracy prevents state failure
Halperin 5
Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of
the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 97
Democratic government is also a bulwark against state failurethe collapse of a central
states ability to maintain political order outside the capital city.19 State failure usually
results in violent civil conflict and is typified by the experiences of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Bosnia, and Afghanistan in the 1 990s. A comprehensive analysis of 75 potential
predictors of state failure from 1955 to 1996 found that lack of democracy was one of the
three most important.20 (The two others were material well being as measured by infant
mortality rates and the level of trade.) In other words, the stronger a countrys democratic
institutions, the lower the likelihood that it will become a failed state.

Democracy Good Terrorism

Democracy eliminates the need for terrorism- many non-violent outlets for expression
Li 5
Quan, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?, Department of
Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University,
http://www.psci.unt.edu/jbooks/TerrorBib_files/Statistical%20Studies%20of%20Terrorism/LiDoes%20Democracy%20Promote.pdf
One argument in the democracy-terrorism literature posits that aspects of democracy reduce
terrorism. In nondemocratic societies, the lack of opportunities for political participation
induces political grievances and dissatisfaction among dissenters, motivating terrorism
(Crenshaw 1981, 383). In contrast, in democratic societies, free and fair elections ensure that
rulers can be removed and that desirable social changes can be brought about by voters,
reducing the need to resort to violence (Schmid 1992). Democratic rules enable nonviolent
resolution of political conflict. Democracies permit dissenters to express their policy
preferences and seek redress (Ross 1993). Different social groups are able to participate in
the political process to further their interest through peaceful means , such as voting and
forming political parties (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Since democracy lowers the
cost of achieving political goals through legal means, groups find costly illegal terrorist
activities less attractive (Ross 1993; Eyerman 1998). Wide democratic participation also

has beneficial consequences that remain largely unnoticed in the literature. To the extent
that democratic participation increases political efficacy of citizens, terrorist groups will be
less successful recruiting newmembers in democracy than in autocracy. This may reduce the
number of terrorist attacks in democracy. Within the context of transnational terrorism,
wide democratic participation helps to reduce incentives of domestic groups to engage in
terrorist activities against foreign targets in a country. When citizens have grievances against
foreign targets, greater political participation under a democratic system allows them to exert
more influence on their own government so that they can seek favorable policy changes or
compensation more successfully. Joining a terrorist group and attacking the foreign target
become less appealing options. To the extent that democratic participation leads to public
tolerance of counterterrorist efforts, a democratic government will be more effective stopping
a variety of terrorist attacks, including those by domestic terrorists against foreign targets

as well as those committed by foreign terrorists in the country.

AT: Democracy Bad Terrorism

The claim that civil liberties encourage terrorism is wrong
Li 5
Quan, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?, Department of
Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University,
http://www.psci.unt.edu/jbooks/TerrorBib_files/Statistical%20Studies%20of%20Terrorism/LiDoes%20Democracy%20Promote.pdf
A second argument in the literature claims that democracy encourages terrorism. This is
based on the premise that democracies provide greater civil liberties (e.g., Schmid 1992). By

guaranteeing civil liberties, democracies allowterrorists to become organized and

maneuver easily, reducing the costs of conducting terrorist activities (Ross 1993; Eyerman
1998). Expansive and secure civil liberties also make it harder for the legal systems in
democracies to convict terrorists and for democratic governments to prevent or retaliate
against terrorism (Schmid 1992; Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). As Crenshaw (1981,
383) notes, The desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures. The
hypothesized effect of civil liberties, however, involves two confounding issues. First, civil
liberties may also generate a mitigating effect on terrorism. Citizens enjoying more civil
liberties are more likely to influence the political process successfully. To the extent that civil
liberties reduce political grievances, they may also reduce terrorist activities . Therefore, civil
liberties alone do not help us separate the positive and negative effects of democracy, either
theoretically or empirically. Second, press freedom, as part and parcel of civil liberties, may
induce possible terrorist incident reporting bias and create an additional incentive for
terrorism. The bias in the reporting of terrorist incidents between different regime types has
been widely recognized (see, e.g., Schmid 1992; Eubank andWeinberg 1994; Sandler 1995;
Li and Schaub 2004). Terrorist incidents are more likely to be reported in democratic
countries but less so in nondemocratic ones. This is so because democratic countries place
fewer restrictions on the media, the less restrained news-seeking media in democracies tend
to provide more extensive coverage of terrorist events , or both. In contrast, reporting of such
incidents in nondemocratic countries is heavily controlled and censored . Since data on

terrorist incidents are collected from open sources, one is likely to conclude that
democracies have more terrorist incidents. Even if nondemocratic countries experience the
same number of incidents, observers may never find out, using data collected from open
sources. The reporting bias may falsely cause one to observe a positive correlation between
the level of civil liberties and the number of terrorist events.

AT: Transition Wars

Authoritarianism leads to inevitable recurring transition crises
Halperin 5
Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of
the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 50-51
Adaptability.
Political Stability. An established mechanism for replacing leaders
augments democracies political stability. The recognized legitimacy of this succession process
serves as a deterrent to those who would contemplate unconstitutional seizures of power .
Periodic elections allow for the peaceful replacement of ineffectual leaders, limiting the
damage they can do, mitigating the disastrous effects of their unchallenged policy

assumptions and preventing the institutional sclerosis endemic to governments that remain
in power for prolonged periods or are beholden to special interests. By contrast, in
authoritarian systems, the very narrowness of their claim on power carries with it the everpresent risk that leaders in these systems will be deposed through unconstitutional means. As
Mancur Olson noted, the stability of even durable autocrats is limited to a single lifetime.

Even if a leader isnt overthrown but dies or retires, the succession process must be
reinvented every time. And the absence of a legal mechanism for a transition practically
guarantees unscrupulous behavior on the part of potential successors.

AT: Transition Wars Backsliding Outweighs

Backsliding leads to a far greater risk of war
James Lee Ray, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, April 1997, Journal of
Democracy
Mansfield and Snyder have produced a serious critique, which cannot be brushed aside
with simple, short rebuttals. One comprehensive review of this issue reveals that while it is
true that democratizing regimes are more war-prone than stable regimes, states involved in
transitions to autocracy are even more war-prone. This same analysis also finds that
"democratizing" regimes that do get involved in conflict typically have not moved very far in
the direction of democracy. In other words, they are still quite autocratic. Another detailed
analysis of this controversy finds, again, that transitions to autocracy are more consistently
associated with conflict than are transitions to democracy . And even more to the point, this
second analysis concludes that transitions to democracy are likely to be dangerous only
within a particular context, that is, if the states undergoing such transitions are surrounded
by or have important relationships with quite autocratic states. The implication of this and
other studies is that the "political distance" (or the difference in regime type) is a crucial
determinant of conflict between states. If transitions toward democracy increase political
distances or differences vis--vis surrounding states, then those transitions to democracy
may indeed be associated with conflict. But it is not, apparently, the transitions themselves
that cause the conflict. Such evidence also suggests that it is dangerous to encourage
democratization only if such a policy succeeds in too limited a fashion, leaving newly
democratic states surrounded by more autocratic states.

Democracy Bad

1NC
Democratic peace theory is wrong- democracies do go to war
Layne 7
Christopher, Professor @ TX A&M, American Empire: A Debate, pg. 94
Wilsonian ideology drives the American Empire because its proponents posit that the United
States must use its military power to extend democracy abroad. Here, the ideology of Empire
rests on assumptions that are not supported by the facts. One reason the architects of Empire
champion democracy promotion is because they believe in the so-called democratic peace
theory, which holds that democratic states do not fight other democracies. Or as President

George W. Bush put it with his customary eloquence, "democracies don't war; democracies
are peaceful."136 The democratic peace theory is the probably the most overhyped and
undersupported "theory" ever to be concocted by American academics. In fact, it is not a
theory at all. Rather it is a theology that suits the conceits of Wilsonian true believersespecially the neoconservatives who have been advocating American Empire since the early
1990s. As serious scholars have shown, however, the historical record does not support the
democratic peace theory.131 On the contrary, it shows that democracies do not act
differently toward other democracies than they do toward nondemocratic states. When
important national interests are at stake, democracies not only have threatened to use force
against other democracies, but, in fact, democracies have gone to war with other democracies.

Democracies start more wars- statistical analysis proves

Henderson 2
Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida,
2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 146
Are Democracies More Peaceful than Nondemocracies with Respect to Interstate Wars?
The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether
democracy is coded dichotomously or continuously) and that democracies are more likely
to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained from analyses that control for a host of
political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the onset of interstate
war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level

processes from dyadic level observations as was done in earlier studies (e.g., Oneal and
Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997). The results imply that democratic enlargement is
more likely to increase the probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to
become involved inand to initiateinterstate wars.
Transitions to democracy lead to war
Manfield and Snyder 2
Edward D. Mansfield, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the
Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, and
Jack Snyder, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia
University, Spring 2002, International Organization
In previous research, we reported that states undergoing democratic transitions were
substantially more likely to participate in external wars than were states whose regimes
remained unchanged or changed in an autocratic direction. 6 We argued that elites in newly
democratizing states often use nationalist appeals to attract mass support without submitting

to full democratic accountability and that the institutional weakness of transitional states
creates the opportunity for such war-causing strategies to succeed. However, these earlier studies did
not fully address the circumstances under which transitions are most likely to precipitate war, and they did not take into
account various important causes of war. Equally, some critics worried that the time periods over which we measured the
effects of democratization were sometimes so long that events occurring at the beginning of a period would be unlikely to
influence foreign policy at its end. 7 Employing a more refined research design than in our prior

work, we aim here to identify more precisely the conditions under which democratization
stimulates hostilities. We find that the heightened danger of war grows primarily out of the
transition from an autocratic regime to one that is partly democratic. The specter of war

during this phase of democratization looms especially large when governmental

institutions, including those regulating political participation, are especially weak. Under
these conditions, elites commonly employ nationalist rhetoric to mobilize mass support but
then become drawn into the belligerent foreign policies unleashed by this process. We find, in
contrast, that transitions that quickly culminate in a fully coherent democracy are much less perilous. 8 Further, our
results refute the view that transitional democracies are simply inviting targets of attack because of their temporary
weakness. In fact, they tend to be the initiators of war. We also refute the view that any regime change is likely to
precipitate the outbreak of war. We find that transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely

to generate hostilities than transitions toward autocracy .

Assuming democracy limits violence justifies violence against backsliders

Little 5
(Adrian Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Melbourne, September,
http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/publications/Littlepaper.pdf)
The point at which democratic states decide to exercise violence is then a subjective one, a matter of political decision rather than ethical certainty. Of course, that is a rather difficult
message to sell to a democratic electorate, but nevertheless it represents the realist calculus which impels politicians and governments in their decision to act or not in a violent
fashion. The argument then becomes one of how one decides which violence in both international and domestic politics - is too unpalatable for us to tolerate. In interjecting in the
debate on violence, John Keane for example, contends that we must deal summarily with zealots and fanatics of violence (as opposed to those who use it to achieve worthy
objectives). Thus, when faced with people who simply want to kill, we are justified in using violent methods: Ultimately, if democracy is to be preserved or built in their presence,
they will have to be arrested or, if they resist arrest violently, dealt with by violence (Keane 1996: 90). Whilst Keane may be right insofar as we have to work out ways to deal with

violence can legitimately be used against

those who threaten the democratic values which are established a priori by Keane. It is not
difficult to see how such thinking could be manipulated very easily by those in the world
with power to exercise violence against any perceived threat. Arguably the practical exercise
of this kind of logic is what we encounter in the world today where any interest that is
identified as a threat to American hegemony runs the risk of becoming a legitimate target
for violent retribution. To be clear, this is not necessarily Keanes intention but it is
representative of the practical application of ideas of violence that exist in many liberal
democratic theories today. Part of the power of these populist discourses of the relationship
those who pose threats to society, he provides us with no compass to make that judgement. Instead,

between democracy and violence is their foundation in what seem like self-evident truths.
However, when we unpack these notions their power is much more flimsy than might seem
the case at first sight. Much of the foundation of these ideas lies in a neo-Kantian ethics
which presuppose some kind of consensus over evil and barbarism. This helps to explain the
uncritical and unsophisticated ways in which concepts of evil have been utilised during the
War on Terror. But, as Alain Badiou points out, Ethics is conceived here both as an a
priori ability to discern Evil and as the ultimate principle of judgement, in particular
political judgement: good is what intervenes visibly against an Evil that is identifiable a
priori (Badiou 2001: 8). Thus, for example, if a challenge to Western liberal democracy
through non-democratic means is clearly wrong and the evil method of terrorism is
selected as the expression of this challenge, then any attempt to undermine and weaken
this challenge will be a force for good regardless of the extent to which it must diverge from
the traditional principles of democracy to achieve this end. In this sense Badiou contends that Evil is that from which
the Good is derived, not the other way round (Badiou 2001: 9). The kind of reductivist thinking that underpins contemporary debate about good and evil also affects the rather
narrow way in which democracy is conceived in modern liberal democracy. Democracy is conceived in a limited fashion as a system impelled by the rule of law with elections as the

source of political legitimacy for the exercise of authority. According to this perspective, democracy stands in stark contrast to what it is not, that is, systems where law and authority
operate arbitrarily or through tyranny and coercion. However, the idea of democracy as something which has been achieved is problematic if not anti-political. We see in many
liberal democratic discourses the idea that democracy is something which needs to be encouraged or exported from the West to less politically and economically developed societies.
Increasingly, for example, we see governments in the West couching their terms for aid in the language of democracy and good governance. The implications of this kind of
discourse are clear: the West has democracy, it is a good thing and the rest of the world should follow that lead. This, for its supporters, is an agenda for global peace, good
governance and, usually, the establishment of spaces to allow markets to operate freely. Arguably though, it is an anti-political perspective; it raises no questions about the nature of
democracy in the West and the massive differences between liberal democratic societies. It does not question fundamentally what we mean by democracy or suggest that liberal
democracies need to develop and improve their political systems or socio-economic conditions. It fails to recognise that democracy is an unfinished project (Miller 2002).

2NC Little Ext

Little says backsliding is just political cover for intervention into 3rd world countries with
large amounts of natural resources that refuse to comply with our exploitive policies of
opening trade barrier internationally while erecting them at home- democratic peace
theory legitimizes this violence by claiming that if the 3rd world were only democratic, no
violence would be necessary
This makes violence and war inevitable
Little 5
(Adrian Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Melbourne, September,
http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/publications/Littlepaper.pdf)
As recently as ten years ago violence was often thought to be a neglected concept in
democratic theory (Keane 1996: 6). In the intervening period though, there has been a
growing focus on the relationship between democracy and violence at least partly in
response to the shifting terrain of international politics. In much of this study of the idea of
violence, it is often conceived in terms of what democracy must counteract and suppress.
According to this perspective, violence and democracy are dichotomous phenomena where,
if we have more of one, we have less of the other . In this context democratic theory has
tended to concern itself with the discussion of concepts such as equality, rights and justice
or the appropriate nature of political systems to enshrine these concepts. However, it has
rarely focused substantially on the relationship between democracy and violence. This is
remarkable given the existence of violence in all democratic systems, yet, frequently, we
only see violence discussed in terms of studies of particular conflict-ridden societies where
democracy is perceived to be dysfunctional or inoperative. This gap in the literature on
democracy has become more evident in recent years and new theories have emerged which
attempt to evaluate the linkages between democracy and violence (Ross 2004). This paper
contributes to this rethinking of the democracy-violence relationship by examining some of
the contemporary debates in democratic theory and applying them to the practical
conditions of politics in Northern Ireland. The argument suggests that the failure to grasp
the inherent relationship between democracy and violence has profound implications for the
political organisation of any society. [CONTINUED] Whilst Keane may be right insofar
as we have to work out ways to deal with those who pose threats to society, he provides us
with no compass to make that judgement. Instead, violence can legitimately be used against
those who threaten the democratic values which are established a priori by Keane. It is not
difficult to see how such thinking could be manipulated very easily by those in the world
with power to exercise violence against any perceived threat. Arguably the practical exercise
of this kind of logic is what we encounter in the world today where any interest that is
identified as a threat to American hegemony runs the risk of becoming a legitimate target
for violent retribution. To be clear, this is not necessarily Keanes intention but it is
representative of the practical application of ideas of violence that exist in many liberal
democratic theories today.

2NC DemocracyWar
Democracy causes warA.) Statistical evidence- Henderson says controlling for all factors democracies have been
most likely to go to war- prefer our evidence, it is the only one which controls for
economics, politics and social values
B.) Self-fulfilling prophecy
Chojnacki 6
Sven, Professor @ Berlin Freie, Democratic Wars, pg. 35
Moreover, an active policy of democratization might not only accelerate violent processes
but the norms of democracy and human rights may also be a pretext for pursuing power
interests by military means (ct. Shannon, 2000; Schjelset, 2001). Taking into account the
-growth in military intervention capabilities, unilateral options for action on the part of
powerful states, and the existing power asym- metries in the international system on the one
hand, and the relevance of violent intrastate and substate conflicts for international politics
in an era of interdependence on the other, there is little reason to assume that the number of
military interventions will decrease in the future. A final risk to democratic peace arises

through norm- and value-based demarcation processes and war-promoting patterns of

argumentation vis-a-vis non-democratic systems. The more democratic states identify
themselves in contrast to potential adversaries and the less the cost--benefit argument comes
to hear in the face of technological superiority, the more the risk of war increases (d. Muller,
2oo2a, p. 58). At the same time, it should be noted that superior military capabilities,
normative orienta- tions and global liberalization pressures could be regarded as potential
threats to non-democratic states and regions. This could result in the emergence of new
images of what an enemy is and a 'democracy- specific security dilemma' vis-a-vis the rest of
the world (MUller, 2oo2a, pp. 59-60). The 'clash of civilizations' envisaged by Samuel
Huntington could thus evolve as a self-fulfilling prophecy as it begins to inhabit the security
policies of Western democracies. A policy of democratic interventionism would not only
confront democracies with incalculable security risks but might also undermine their own
nonnative claims.

C.) Non-democracy wars

Daase 6
Christopher, Chair in International Organisation, University of Frankfurt, Democratic Wars, pg.
77
In what follows, I will focus on three reasons why democracies might be peaceful to each
other, but abrasive or even bellicose towards non- democracies. The first reason is an
institutional one: domestic institutions dampen conflicts among democracies but aggravate
conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. The second reason is a normative
one: shared social values and political ideals prevent wars between democracies but make
wars between democracies and non-democracies more likely and savage . The third reason is
a structural one: the search for safety encourages democracies to create security communities
by renouncing violence among themselves but demands assertiveness against outsiders and
the willingness to use military means if enlargement of that community cannot be achieved
peacefully. To illustrate this, I will draw mainly on the United States as an example

following a Tocquevlllean tradition, but knowing that not all democracies behave in the

same way or that the US is the only war-fighting democracy. It is clear that the hypotheses
are first conjectures and that more case studies and quantitative tests are needed to reach
more general conclusions .
D.) Diversionary wars
Daase 6
Christopher, Chair in International Organisation, University of Frankfurt, Democratic Wars, pg.
77
However, there is a contradictory effect as well. Democratic governments are tempted to
use military violence prior to elections if their public esteem is in decline and if they must
fear not being re-elected (Ostrom and]ob, 1986; Russett, 1990; Mintz and Russett, 1992;
Mintz and Geza, 1993). In doing so, they count on the 'rally round the flag' effect, which is
usually of short duration but long enough to make the public forget economic misery or
governmental misbehaviour in order to influence tight elections results in favour of the
incumbent. This diversionary effect of warfare is especially attractive to democracies since
they have no other means at their disposal to diffuse discontent or suppress internal conflict .
Therefore, the use of military force for diversionary purposes is generally 'a pathology of
democratic systems' (Gelpi, 1997, p. 280).

E.) Chain-ganging
Gowa 99
Joanne, Professor @ Princeton, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, Questia
For these reasons, a strategy of enlargement seems ill-suited to U.S. interests in the 1990s
and beyond. The democratic peace seems to be a by-product of a now extinct period in world
politics. In addition, an enlargement strategy threatens to endanger rather than enhance U.S.
security in the long run. It risks engaging the United States in foreign conflicts that it cannot
resolve, and, as a result, it risks the ability of the United States to make credible
commitments when it embarks on interventions abroad. This suggests that a more
traditional strategy based on building common interests might make the United States
better off than a foreign policy designed to construct democracies abroad.

2NC AT: Solves War

Democratic Peace Theory is false and is not supported by history, when national interest is
at stake Democracies will go to war, even with other democracies. Democratic Peace
Theory is neoconservative garbage to justify expanding American empire.
Authoritarian states best keep the peace- one decision maker and natural aversion to
casualties
Elman 97
Miriam Elman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State
University, Paths to Peace Is Democracy the Answer?, p. 495-496
NONDEMOCRATIC REGIME FEATURES HELP TO KEEP THE PEACE. Our cumulative
findings show that nondemocracies do not necessarily apply their internal norms of political behavior to their foreign
relations, and that such domestic norms do not necessarily reduce the chances for international cooperation. For example,
Kacowicz (Chapter 8) notes that both Mauritania and Peru upheld norms of conflict resolution,

compromise, and mediation at the international level, though they ignored similar norms at
home. Our findings suggest that we should not assume that nondemocracies externalize

domestic norms of conflict resolution when dealing with international actors. They
frequently initiate international negotiations and see war as an option of last resort. Thus,
aggressiveness or peacefulness cannot be readily inferred from the degree of violence in a states domestic arena. In
addition, we note that the absence of institutional constraints on leaders can facilitate peace .

Martin Main (Chapter 9) points out that because of the absence of governmental and societal
constraints on foreign policy, Iran and Iraq were able to resolve long standing disagreements
in the 1970s. The freedom of both executives made the negotiation of a peaceful settlement
easier than it might otherwise have been; neither government feared the domestic political
consequences of an unpopular agreement. Similarly, in Chapter 11, Matthews argues that
during the interwar period, nondemocratic Turkey was able to pursue a moderate foreign
policy toward Greece because there were no institutional constraints on the leaders discretion. Had Turkey been more democratic, it would have been more aggressive internationally
because hard-line elites would not have been excluded from the policy making process. Thus, Matthews argues that when
leaders are moderate and prefer peaceful methods of international conflict resolution, nondemocracyparticularly the
absence of checks on the leaders foreign policy choicescan be a force for peace instead of an obstacle. Kurt Dassel
(Chapter 10) also suggests that a sizeable subset of nondemocracies will usually adopt peaceful rather than aggressive
foreign policies. Dassel argues that, in authoritarian states that have unstable regimes, if the military

can use force domestically without jeopardizing its cohesiveness, it will favor repressing
domestic opponents and refrain from international aggression. Thus, Dassel points out that regimes in
which there are few checks on foreign policy decision makers, and in which domestic conflicts are resolved through
massive violence, may be the very states that pursue pacific foreign policies; because force can be used at home, it will
not be used abroad. In short, democratic peace theorists wrongly assert that non-democracies are predisposed to
aggression because of the characteristics of their governments. In this book, we suggest that only some nondemocratic
states will use force abroad; treating all nondemocracies as potential aggressors is misleading.

Democracies cant deter conflict

A.) Deliberation sends mixed signal
Hart 95
Jo-Anne Hart, Associate Professor in the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, 1995,
Democracy War & Peace, p. 39
By signalling a lack of resolve or credibility, the displays of discord and uncertainty that take
place in democracies can similarly undermine a deterrence threat. Some speculate, for
example, that Saddam Husseins perception of American resolve during the 1990 Gulf crisis

was negatively affected by the ongoing American debate about whether to go to war against

Iraq. The Congressional hearings prior to the Gulf War are a good illustration. While
political leaders publicly debated the advantages and disadvantages of sanctions and force
to obtain the liberation of Kuwait, they confronted charges that the debate itself aided Iraq.
Conversely, the ability of authoritarian regimes to deter a challenger is enhanced by the signs
of resolve and genuine public commitment that stem from the secrecy of their decisionmaking process.
B.) Allows nationalism to rule government choices
Rosato 3
Sebastian Rosato, PhD @ The University of Chicago, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
REVIEW, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, vol. 97, issue 4, pg. 11
Second, any public aversion to incurring the costs of war may be overwhelmed by the effects
of nationalism. In addition to the growth of democracy, one of the most striking features of
the modern period is that people have come to identify themselves , above all, with the nation
state. This identification has been so powerful that ordinary citizens have repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to fight and die for the continued existence of their state and the
security of their co-nationals. There are, then, good reasons to believe that if the national
interest is thought to be at stake, as it is in most interstate conflicts, calculations of costs will
not figure prominently in the publics decision process. Third, democratic leaders are as
likely to lead as to follow public opinion. Since nationalism imbues people with a powerful
spirit of self-sacrifice, it is actively cultivated by political elites in the knowledge that only
highly motivated armies and productive societies will prevail in modern warfare (e.g., Posen
1993). Democratically elected leaders are likely to be well placed to cultivate nationalism,
especially because their governments are often perceived as more representative and
legitimate than authoritarian regimes. Any call to defend or spread our way of life, for
example, is likely to have a strong resonance in democratic polities, and indeed the historical
record suggests that wars have often given democratic leaders considerable freedom of
action, allowing them to drum up nationalistic fervor, shape public opinion, and suppress
dissent despite the obligation to allow free and open discussion.

2NC AT: Democratic Peace Theory True

Democratic peace theory is the most fallacious smattering of pseudo-science that exists in
academia today- Layne evidence says that its just neoconservative theology.
Prefer our evidence, theirs is bad:
A.) Subjective interpretation of conflict
Little 5
(Adrian Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Melbourne, September,
http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/publications/Littlepaper.pdf)
However, this type of argument is also given intellectual substance through the work of
commentators such as Michael Ignatieff who contends that: Thanks to the rights they
entrench, the due process rules they observe, the separation of powers they seek to
enforce, and the requirement of democratic consent, liberal democracies are all guided by
a constitutional commitment to minimize the use of dubious means violence, force,
coercion, and deception in the government of citizens. It is because they do so in normal
times that they feel constrained to do so in times of emergency. Otherwise, these societies
will not be true to who they are. (Ignatieff 2004: 16) According to this line of argument
then, democracies only resort to dubious means when they face imminent threats rather
than as a matter of course. But of course, for Ignatieff, this does not preclude the preemptive use of violence. Indeed, he states openly that hitting terrorists before they can hit
you, provided that less risky and costly means are unworkable, is less problematic than fullscale war against states (Ignatieff, 2004: 163). This statement is laden with unavoidable
subjective judgements. It begs numerous questions: how do we decide who terrorists are and
when they are going to hit us? How do we measure the risks of such actions? How do we
trade off workability and cost against the pre-emptive act? In what way do we define
problematic? None of these questions can be answered definitively: is the terrorist a threat
at the training camp or only when s/he straps on the bomb and boards the train? Ignatieff
does not tell us how to measure cost but one might imagine that, with the intersection of
global geopolitics and economic interests, when we talk about cost in this equation we are
not just referring to human cost alone. Even if we are primarily focused on the human cost,
we cannot be sure that is the only factor in the equation used by decision makers.
B.) Political distance and ongoing disputes
Henderson 2
Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida,
2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 146
Are Democracies Less Likely to Fight Each Other? The replication and extension of Oneal
and Russett (1997), which is one of the most important studies on the DPP, showed that
democracies are not significantly less likely to fight each other . The results demonstrate that
Oneal and Russetts (1997) findings in support of the DPP are not robust and that joint
democracy does not reduce the probability of international conflict for pairs of states during
the postwar era. Simple and straightforward modifications of Oneal and Russetts (1997)
research design generated these dramatically contradictory results. Specifically, by teasing
out the separate impact of democracy and political distance (or political dissimilarity) and by
not coding cases of ongoing disputes as new cases of conflict, it became clear that there is no

significant relationship between joint democracy and the likelihood of international war or

militarized interstate dispute (MID) for states during the postwar era. These findings
suggest that the postCold War strategy of democratic enlargement, which is aimed at
ensuring peace by enlarging the community of democratic states, is quite a thin reed on
which to rest a states foreign policymuch less the hope for international peace.
C.) No causal explanations
Brock Geis and Muller 6
Lothar, Professor @ Frankfurt, Anna, Research Fellow @ Frankfurt, Professor of IR @
Frankfurt, Democratic Wars, pg. 4-5
The present volume is motivated by unease about the prevalence of quantitative studies on
democratic peace. Most of the research efforts over the last 15 years have been focused on
hypothesis-testing within one of the established approaches, but we still have no coherent
theory. Statistical tests do not inquire into causal mechanisms, they establish correlations
that can plausibly be interpreted as causation. They do not trace the cause-effect chains that
lead from the independent variable (democracy) to the dependent variable (external
[nonjvlolent behaviour). Quantitative studies have produced a rich store of statistical data
which spell out regularities in the behaviour of democracies; their pay-off, however, is
limited when it comes to explaining war. The regularities are derived from correlations, and

in order to proceed from correlation to causation, quantitative studies produce more

correlations. The respective findings produce hypotheses which formulate a supposed fixed
cause/ effect relationship. The statistics, however, confirm the hypotheses only in a
probabilistic way.) If we look at single cases, probabilistic hypotheses are of little help .
Countries do not initiate a 7S per cent military dispute, and they do not go to war 81 per
cent. They either go to war or they do not. Thus, two questions arise: How can
democracies decide for and against military dispute initiation or war, and which intrinsic
capabilities or attributes enable them to choose one or the other option (though with
different relative frequency)? What are the conditions under which one or the other
option is chosen? Probabilistic formulations which rely on statistical findings have a
propensityto self-immunization. Counter-examples can be disposed of with the 'anecdotal
evidence' argument. This is quite problematic - if the theory has any validity, it should
stand the test of 'salient cases' as wellas random evidence. Salient cases, in our
understanding, are those major events involving the use of military force that have a
decisive impacton the course of history.
Even if theyre right, we shouldnt assume democratic peace theory solves violence- it only
increases the risk of poor policy planning and instability
Little 5
(Adrian Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Melbourne, September,
http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/publications/Littlepaper.pdf)
The politics of violence and democracy in Northern Ireland is an ongoing process without an
end state. Just as Alain Badiou argues that every politics worthy of the name finds its point
of departure in the way people represent their lives and rights (Badiou 2001: 10), so must
every projected idea of democratic politics be grounded in the context of everyday life . In

Northern Ireland, as everywhere else, a democratic politics free from violence is

unrealisable. The Northern Ireland polity is built upon the foundations of violent conflict
and the political identities which contest the democratic arena are derived from that
context. In this sense the thrust of Foucaults argument seems wholly pertinent: the

articulation of a peaceful democratic politics runs contrary to the antagonistic past which
preceded contemporary conditions. Thus, our inscription of the present is always an
articulation of the past. In Northern Ireland this will always reflect the violence of the past
and this is a salutary lesson for democratic theory. Visions of democracy that ignore the
centrality of violence in the past and the present are anachronistic at best and hypocritical at
worst. Moreover, in ignoring the violent foundations of democracy, they have a much greater
propensity to generate further violence in the future.

2NC AT: Accountability

Your impact evidence proves the US will abandon its accountability and democracy
promotion in times of conflict- public checks dont solve
And, accountability just produces knee-jerk reactions to public panic like the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq- it doesnt limit conflicts, except involvement in areas like Rwanda
Democracies abdicate checks and balances in times of conflict
Gowa 99
Joanne, Professor @ Princeton, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, Questia
The third argument that is advanced to support the existence of a democratic peace
emphasizes the role of checks and balances. Yet, nondemocracies may be able to constrain the
ability of would-be renegade leaders to embark upon military adventures abroad about as
effectively as democracies. That is, the crucial distinction across polities may lie in the form,
rather than the effect, of the relevant constraints . For example, some students of American
politics believe that Congress abdicated responsibility for foreign policy to the president
after World War II (see, e.g., Pastor 1976; Schlesinger 1974). In their view, although an

independent legislature existed during this period, it was politically irrelevant. The results
of the analyses in chapter 3 suggest that this phenomenon existed with respect to the use of
force abroad long before the onset of the Cold War. This may be attributed to the fact that
involvements in militarized disputes typically do not produce the strong distributional
effects characteristic of, for example, trade policy. 2 Because recourse to force abroad more
closely resembles a public good, the political process that produces trade policy and that
which generates security policy differ. The latter does not typically precipitate the same kind
of political pressure on heads of states as do trade issues. Thus, political-market failures drive
a wedge between the principle and practice of checks and balances with respect to the use of
force abroad. The empirical foundations of the democratic peace prove to be less robust than
the sheer number of studies in the literature suggest . The analyses in chapter 4 conform in

almost all respects to existing analyses. The one major exception is that the preWorld War
I and the post World War II worlds are examined separately. This approach was motivated
by the fact that these two periods differ considerably from each other in ways that might be
expected to have a strong effect upon dispute patterns (see, e.g., Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz
1979; cf. Hoffman 1990; Keohane 1990).

2NC Transition Wars

Outweighs and turns the affA.) Magnitude- escalates quickly because of a lack of effective diplomatic checks in an
institutionally weak and transitioning state- causes ethnic conflict
Zakaria 3
Fareed Zakaria, PhD in Political Science from Harvard, editor of Newsweek International, , p.
113
Ethnic conflict is as old as recorded history, and dictatorships are hardly innocent in
fomenting it. But newly democratizing societies display a disturbingly common tendency
toward it. The reason is simple: as society opens up and politicians scramble for power, they
appeal to the public for votes using what ends up being the most direct, effective language,
that of group solidarity in opposition to some other group. Often this stokes the fires of ethnic
or religious conflict. Sometimes the conflict turns into a full-scale war.

Extinction
Shehadi 83
Kamal Shehadi, Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, December,
ETHNIC SELF DETERMINATION AND THE BREAK UP OF STATES, 1983, p. 81.
This paper has argued that self-determination conflicts have direct adverse consequences on
international security. As they begin to tear nuclear states apart, the likelihood of nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of individuals or groups willing to use them, or to trade them
to others, will reach frightening levels. This likelihood increases if a conflict over selfdetermination escalates into a war between two nuclear states. The Russian Federation and
Ukraine may fight over the Crimea and the Donbass area; and India and Pakistan may fight
over Kashmir. Ethnic conflicts may also spread both within a state and from one state to the
next. This can happen in countries where more than one ethnic self-determination conflict

is brewing: Russia, India and Ethiopia, for example. The conflict may also spread by
contagion from one country to another if the state is weak politically and militarily and
cannot contain the conflict on its doorstep. Lastly, there is a real danger that regional
conflicts will erupt over national minorities and borders.

B.) Timeframe- any potentially beneficial effect of democracy occurs after the transitiondestabilization occurs rapidly as a result of belligerent foreign policies of new nationalist
leaders
C.) Probability- Mansfield says transition likely because of weak institutions and
expediency of nationalist and belligerent foreign policies- common social values cohesion
requires a history of effective engagement between established democratic states
Transitions undermine future democratic stability- turns the internal link to affs
democratic peace arguments
Mansfeld and Snyder 7
Ed and Jack, Professors, The Sequencing "Fallacy", Journal of Democracy, pg. Muse

There is, however, one key issue on which we may disagree with Berman and Carothers.
We suggest not only that democratization is often violent (Berman's main point), but also
that premature, out-of-sequence attempts to democratize may make subsequent efforts to
democratize [End Page 6] more difficult and more violent than they would otherwise be.
When elections are held in an institutional wasteland like Iraq, for example, political
competition typically coalesces around and reinforces the ethnic and sectarian divisions in
traditional society. To forge liberal, secular coalitions that cut across cultural divisions, it is

necessary to have impartial state institutions that provide a framework for civic action and
a focal point for civic loyalty. Without reasonably effective civic institutions, the outcome in
culturally diverse societies is likely to resemble Iraq and Lebanon. Once a country starts on
an illiberal trajectory, ideas are unleashed and institutions are established that tend to
continue propelling it along that trajectory. A key danger is that premature democratization
will push a country down this path. We highlight the importance of sequencing not because

we are so optimistic about the prospects of engineering a properly ordered

democratization, but because we are so concerned about the consequences of transitions
occurring under other conditions.
Transition emboldens fundamentalists- increases the risk of terrorism and internal conflicts
Bensahel 4
Prepared for the Air Force, Fellow @ the Rand Corporation, Professor of Political Science, The
Future Security Environment in the Middle East
Given the range of potential crises that could emerge in the Middle East, the United States
must carefully consider which policies are likely to produce the best outcome. A critical
issue is whether the United States should promote political stability or whether it should
encourage democratic reform. Experience in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere
suggests that states undergoing the transition to democracy are more likely to become
involved in conflicts with their neighbors. Moreover, democratization in the Middle East
could open the door to nationalist or fundamentalist groups that are opposed to U.S. interests.
In the past, when faced with a choice between preserving the stability of a non-democratic
ally and fostering democratic change, the United States has sided with the incumbent regime .

2NC Democracy Econ Collapse

Democracy collapses the economy
A.) Kills trade and development
Schweller 2k
Randall Schweller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, American Democracy
Promotion, p. 53
First, free trade reinforces competition, and competition produces losers as well as winners.
Fragile democratizing states are under enormous pressure to appease uncompetitive domestic
distributional coalitions by adopting protectionist policies at the expense of the general
national and cosmopolitan interests in free trade. In other words, there is no reason to expect
that developing states will choose free trade and global liberalism over neomercantilist
policies; and, indeed, there are good reasons to expect that they will choose the latter.

Certainly, the shock-treatment approach to capitalism regardless of social consequences

that was adopted by many nations recently liberated from communism placed at risk the
fragile democratizing processes under way in these newly autonomous states. Second,
while liberal democracy requires a market economy, capitalism does not require liberal
democracy. Benjamin Barber correctly notes: The stealth rhetoric that assumes capitalist
interests are not only compatible with but actively advance democratic ideals, translated
into policy, is difficult to reconcile with the international realities of the last fifty years.
Market economies have shown a remarkable adaptability and have flourished in many
tyrannical states from Chile to South Korea, from Panama to Singapore. Indeed, the state
with one of the worlds least democratic governmentsthe Peoples Republic of China
possesses one of the worlds fastest-growing market economies. Capitalism simply
requires a stable political climate and consumers with access to markets. The unstable, even
chaotic, conditions characteristic of emerging democracies are scarcely conducive to the
development of a thriving market economy. Indeed, the interests of capitalism and

democracy especially the process of democratizationdiverge in basic ways: On the

level of the individual, capitalism seeks consumers susceptible to the shaping of their needs
and the manipulation of their wants while democracy needs citizens autonomous in their
thoughts and independent in their deliberative
B.) Autocratic values solve recession
Sartori 1
Giovanni Sartori, Professor Emeritus in the Humanities at Columbia University, The Global
Divergence of Democracies, p. 57-58
Let us turn, then, to the question: Does democracy work best, economically speaking? Many
would boldly answer with a resounding yes. As The Economist puts it, the evidence shows that across scores of
countries and centuries of history, democracy has promoted growth far more effectively and consistently than any other
political system.0 I wish that I could believe that. Alas, what this account completely misses is that growth came with
technological advancement, and that technology is a by-product not of democracy but of the kind of logic and rationality
forged by the ancient Greeks, which eventually gave rise to the scientific spirit and, in its wake, to the prodigious
development of technology that uniquely occurred in the last two centuries in the Western world. It is true that Chinese
civilization was marked by outstanding skills, and for a long time outpaced the West in technical inventions. Yet the
science and technology that modernize todays world never blossomed in other culturesneither in China nor, to cite
another major example, in India. Hence the observed correlation between Western liberal democracy and affluence turns
out to be spurious. Correlations aside, what is the argument behind the thesis of democracys economic superiority?
According to The Economist, one of the main reasons why democracy promotes growth is that it offers the security of

In the wake of the disastrous collapse of Soviettype planned economies, however, even dictators well realize by now that the invisible hand
works better than the visible boot.2 Thus dictators too will find that promoting market
systems and respecting property rights are in their own best interests. As I look around, I see
democracies in growth and democracies that are backsliding, just as I see dictatorships
that are in economic mins and dictatorships that are enjoying economic success. Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea, and now Malaysia as well have engineered their economic
miracles under authoritarian monitoring. And what of Hong Kong, which is not a
democracy but a colony ruled by a British governor? In Latin America, the economies of
Chile and Peru collapsed under democratic rule and owe their comebacks to authoritarian
governance (in Peru, President Alberto Fujimori did wonders for the economy, but at the
property rights that is necessary for capitalistic progress.

cost of suspending and subsequently rewriting a dubiously democratic constitution). The

overall pattern of the region is that military dictatorships and democratic governments have
equally poor developmental records.13 In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
democratization has preceded economic reform and made the latter more difficult . China
under Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, has followed the opposite approachwith
economic liberalization handed down from above under strict dictatorial controland the
success has been remarkable. So the contention that democracy is not only a superior
political system (I certainly concur in that) but also an economic winner is easily
countered by the argument that, given equal market mechanisms, governments that are
spared gridlock and popular pressures are in a better position to promote growth than

governments encumbered by demodemands and demo-distributions. To be sure, as people

grow richer, democracy is one of the things they are likely to demand. But in this argument
it is growth that entails democracy, not democracy that generates growth.

2NC Democracy Environmental Destruction

Democracy destroys the environment several reasons.
Li and Reuveny 7
Li, Prof of poli sci at Penn State, and Reuveny, prof of public and environmental affairs @
Indiana U, Quan and Rafael, The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial Environment
http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219
According to the policy inaction argument, facing environmental degradation, democracy
can often exhibit policy inaction for several reasons (Midlarsky, 1998: 159). First,
democracy seeks to please competing interest groups. As such, it may be reluctant to alleviate
environmental degradation because some groups are expected to benefit (or lose) from
environmental policies more than others. Second, corporation and environmental groups
can fight each other to a standstill, leaving a decision making vacuum instead of a direct
impact of democracy on the environment. Third, when budgets are tight democracies may
ignore environmental problems, perceiving economic issues to be more pressing.

Extinction
Chakkaravarthy 3
Ashoka,
http://www.yorku.ca/bunchmj/ICEH/proceedings/Chakkaravarthy_Q_ICEH_papers_66to74.pdf
The very basis of human survival hinges on the sustainable inter-linkages with the
environment. The present day scenario however, tells a different story. The ever-increasing
problems due to pollution are leading to various environmental hazards that are detrimental
to our survival. In this context, this paper aims to address the various problems vis--vis

human survival and the steps to be taken up in a concerted fashion towards sustainable
development. In future years the population increase will require that the environment of
the world be reviewed as a closed system. Consequently, it is necessary to take an
ecological approach to environmental quality and consider the totality of the environment
with man as part of an ecosystem.
Turns every impact
Homer-Dixon 98
Thomas Homer-Dixon, assistant professor of political science and director of the Peace and
Conflict Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, 1998, World Security Challenges for a
New Century, p. 342-343
Experts have proposed numerous possible links between environmental change and
conflict. Some have suggested that environmental change may shift the balance of power
between states either regionally or globally, causing instabilities that could lead to war.
Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the gap between rich
and poor societies, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the
worlds wealth. Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go

along with agreements to protect the global environment, or that free-ride by letting
other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer temperatures could
lead to contention over more easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging
populations and land stress may produce waves of environmental refugees, spilling across
borders and disrupting relations among ethnic groups. Countries might fight among
themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution.6 A

sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between
nomadic tribes and sedentary farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow
deepening of poverty in poor countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and
ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions, and spawn revolutions and insurgencies. In
general, many experts have the sense that environmental problems will ratchet up the
level of stress within states and the international community, increasing the likelihood of
many different kinds of conflictfrom war and rebellion to trade disputesand
undermining possibilities for cooperation.

2NC Democracy Bad European Wars

Democracy leads to European Wars leads to NATO escalation
Henderson 2
Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida,
2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 73
These results suggest several research and policy implications. First, analysts of the
monadic level DPP should use explicitly state level specifications of their variables in
order to avoid level of analysis problems.8 Second, the results seriously call into question
the empirical underpinnings of the democratic enlargement strategy. Some might interpret
the finding that Western democracies are less likely to initiate disputes and wars as
vindication of the view that these states should embark on a crusade to spread democracy;
however, my findings indicate that democratic enlargement is more likely to fuel increased
interstate war involvement because the spread of democracy will generate more democratic
states, which are more likely to become involved in and to initiateinterstate wars. These
conclusions cast an ominous shadow over otherwise positive developments such as the
democratic transformation of states in the present wave of democratization. They certainly
raise concerns about the efficacy of recent enlargement initiatives, such as the expansion of
NATO, to include several newly democratized Eastern European states. Eastern Europe
remains a volatile region, and the presence of democracy in the new NATO members of
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary may exacerbate the propensity to international
conflict among these states and draw their NATO allies into a larger regional conflict . Layne
(1994: 47) argues that there is little wisdom in [the United States] assuming such potentially
risky undertakings on the basis of dubious assumptions about the pacifying effects of
democracy. The findings from this study provide empirical support for Laynes

skepticism. It appears that for all of its positive value as an egalitarian form of government,
one of the key threats to peace for individual states is the presence of a democratic regime .

Extinction
Khalilzad 95
Zalmay, Washington Quarterly, Spring, LN
With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional
powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of
preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance
could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war
-- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power.

Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance
would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic
and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a
power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold
War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.

2NC Democracy Hegemony Collapse

Democracy collapses hegemonyA.) Disastrous military interventions
B.) Strategic overextension
C.) False sense of security
Layne 94
Christopher Layne, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Fall 1994,
International Security, Kant or Cant, p. 46-49
Those who want to base American foreign policy on the extension of democracy abroad
invariably disclaim any intention to embark on a crusade, and profess to recognize the

dangers of allowing policy to be based on excessive ideological zeal. These reassurances

are the foreign-policy version of trust me. Because it links American security to the nature
of other states internal political systems, democratic peace theorys logic inevitably pushes
the United States to adopt an interventionist strategic posture. If democracies are peaceful but non-democratic states are
troublemakers the conclusion is inescapable: the former will be truly secure only when the latter have been transformed into democracies, too. Indeed, American statesmen have
frequently expressed this view. During World War I, Elihu Root said that, To be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world cannot be half
democratic and half autocratic.43 During the Vietnam War, Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the United States cannot be secure until the total international environment is
ideologically safe. These are not isolated comments; these views reflect the historic American propensity to seek absolute security and to define security primarily in ideological (and
economic) terms. The political culture of American foreign policy has long regarded the United States, because of its domestic political system, as a singular nation. As a consequence, American policymakers have been affected by a deep sense of being alone and they have regarded the United States as perpetually beleaguered. Consequently, Americas
foreign and defense policies have been shaped by the belief that the United States must create a favorable ideological climate abroad if its domestic institutions are to survive and

Democratic peace theory panders to impulses which, however noble in the abstract, have led to
disastrous military interventions abroad, strategic overextension, and the relative decline of
American power. The latest example of the dangers of Wilsonianism is the Clinton administrations Partnership for Peace. Under this plan, the asserted American
flourish.45

interest in projecting democracy into East Central Europe is advanced in support of NATO security guarantees and eventual membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
(and some form of U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine). The underlying argument is simple: democratic governments in these countries will guarantee regional peace in the post
Cold War era, but democracy cannot take root unless these countries are provided with the reassurance of U.S. or NATO security guarantees. In fact, however, East Central Europe
is bound to be a highly volatile region regardless of whether NATO moves east. The extension of NATO guarantees eastward carries with it the obvious risk that the United States
will become embroiled in a future regional conflict, which could involve major powers such as Germany, Ukraine, or Russia. There is little wisdom in assuming such potentially risky
undertakings on the basis of dubious assumptions about the pacifying effects of democracy.

Democratic peace theory is dangerous in

another respect, as well: it is an integral component of a new (or more correctly, recycled)
outlook on international politics. It is now widely believed that the spread of democracy and
economic interdependence have effected a qualitative change in international politics, and

that war and serious security competitions between or among democratic great powers are
now impossible.147 There is therefore, it is said, no need to worry about future great power
challenges from states like Japan and Germany, or to worry about the relative distribution of
power between the United States and those states, unless Japan or Germany were to slide

back into authoritarianism.48 The reason the United States need not be concerned with the
great-power emergence of Japan and Germany is said to be simple: they are democracies
and democracies do not fight democracies. Modern-day proponents of a liberal theory of
international politics have constructed an appealing vision of perpetual peace within a zone
of democracy and prosperity. But this zone of peace is a peace of illusions. There is no
evidence that democracy at the unit level negates the structural effects of anarchy at the level
of the international political system. Similarly, there is no evidence that supports the sister

theory: that economic interdependence leads to peace. Both ideas have been around for a
long time. The fact that they are so widely accepted as a basis for international relations
theory shows that for some scholars, theories are confirmed by the number of real-world
tests that they fail. Proponents of liberal international relations theory may contend, as

Russett does, that liberal approaches to international politics have not failed, but rather that
they have not been tried.49 But this is what disappointed adherents of ideological
worldviews always say when belief is overcome by reality. If American policymakers allow
themselves to be mesmerized by democratic peace theory s seductivebut falsevision of
the future, the United States will be ill prepared to formulate a grand strategy that will
advance its interests in the emerging world of multipolar great power competition. Indeed, as
long as the Wilsonian worldview underpins American foreign policy, policymakers will be
blind to the need to have such a grand strategy, because the liberal theory of international politics defines out of existence (except with
respect to non-democracies) the very phenomena that are at the core of strategy: war, the formation of power balances, and concerns about the relative distribution of power among
the great powers. But in the end, as its most articulate proponents admit, liberal international relations theory is based on hope, not on fact.~ In the final analysis, the world remains
what it always has been: international politics continues to occur in an anarchic, competitive, self-help realm. This reality must be confronted, because it cannot be transcended. Given
the stakes, the United States in coming years cannot afford to have either its foreign policy, or the intellectual discourse that underpins that policy, shaped by theoretical approaches
that are based on wishful thinking.

D.) Anti-American alliances

Zambelis 5
Chris, associate with Helios Global, The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Middle East, Parameters, Vol 35
The spread of democracy to the Middle East will likely be accompanied by serious setbacks
and periods of instability. This instability will come in many forms and have important
implications for US strategic interests in the region and the war on terrorism. It has the
potential to transform the strategic landscape by contributing to the realignment of
traditional alliances and the creation of new power blocs that will challenge the US position.

Enter Political Islam The Bush Administration's vision for a democratic Middle East
presupposes that emerging democracies will be friendly to Washington and be willing to
continue relations on US terms. Although its rhetoric is mindful that democracy in the
region will reflect local traditions and culture, Washington expects that pluralistic
governments will be secular in outlook and open to market reforms. In reality, the spread of
democracy does not guarantee that such governments will come to power . In fact, free
elections will likely empower Islamists of various persuasions, most of which advocate
populist agendas critical of US policy. There is also a danger that elections will elevate
totalitarian or anti-American forces. Elections may even give rise to democracies that will
forge closer ties to Russia, Europe, and China to offset US dominance .

2NC Democracy Terrorism

Democracy causes terrorismA.) Collapses co-operative approaches
Bensahel 4
Prepared for the Air Force, Fellow @ the Rand Corporation, Professor of Political Science, The
Future Security Environment in the Middle East
If anti-American sentiment is as widespread as regimes currently fear, or if it increases in
the wake of the U.S. campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond, political
reform could have a very adverse effect on regional cooperation with the United States. Both
democratization and liberalization enable people to express their preferences more easily,
and if those preferences really are for reduced cooperation with the United States, regimes
will have an increasingly difficult time justifying their current policies. This could lead to
pressure for less open cooperation, especially regarding U.S. military forces stationed in the
region. Regimes may become even more reluctant to reach formal security agreements with
the United States, because domestic audiences see such agreements as proof that the regimes
are incapable of providing security without external assistance. Increased sensitivity to ties
with the United States could also spill over into decreased support for other U.S. regional
initiatives, such as the peace process, anti-proliferation measures, and counterterrorism.

B.) Perception of imperialism

Crotty 5
William Crotty, Director of the ONeill Center for the Study of Democracy at Northeastern
University, 2005, Democratic Development and Political Terrorism, p. 525
Eighth, exporting democratic values and institutions is not easy. This is seen in much of the
world as manifestations of Western culture and as not unrelated to economic expansion and
exploitation, an experience most nondemocratic countries are familiar with and one that
serves to legitimize much of the terrorist rage against the West. The attack against the World

Trade Center, was, in essence, an attack against wealth and the symbol of capitalism. The
Pentagon attack focused on the military. Combined, the worlds wealthiest and most
powerful nation experienced devastating assaults on two of its most proud and
representative symbols. None of this, of course, was by accident; rather, it was the outcome
of long-term, careful, and technically sophisticated planning.
C.) Empirically proven
Carothers 4
Thomas Carothers, director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie
Endowment, 2004, Critical Mission, p. 252-253
One obstacle is the facile assumption that a straight line exists between progress on
democratization and the elimination of the roots of Islamic terrorism. The sources of
Islamic radicalism and the embrace of anti-American terrorism by some radicals are
multifaceted and cannot be reduced to the simple proposition that the lack of democracy in
the Arab world is the main cause. Moreover, any rapid opening up of the closed political
systems in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or even Egypt could well, in the short to medium term,
allow extremist groups to operate more actively and give strength to the wider Islamist

organizations that sometimes feed the extremists. There may be an analogy to the much-

debated relationship between the existence of democracy in countries and the proclivity of
countries to go to war: Although established democracies tend not to fight wars with one
another, countries setting out on the turbulent path from dictatorship to democracy are
often more war-prone. Even the successful achievement of democracy offers no guarantee
that a society will not produce terrorists. More than a few established democracies have
struggled with persistent terrorist threats, whether it is Spain confronting Basque terrorists,
Italy facing the Red Brigades, or Great Britain grappling with the Irish Republican Army.
No risk of a turn- no risk of cooperation or pro-American sentiment
Carothers and Ottaway 5
Thomas, director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Marina, senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the
Carnegie Endowment, Uncharted Journey, pg. 253
Not only are U.S. interests in the region mixed and often mutually contradictory, but the
underlying logic of the new democracy imperative is not persuasive to many Arab observers
Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the current U.S. argument goes, are a threat to the
United States because their disastrous economic policies and repressive politics impoverish
and frustrate their populations, and this in turn creates fertile ground for the growth of
terrorists. In addition, the Wahhabis, who are spreading their intolerant ideology with

Saudi support or at least willingness to look the other way, provide an ideological
justification for the violence bred by poverty and political repression. But the link between
poverty and political repression on the one hand and terrorism on the other is open to
question. The very poor are not usually the organizers of terrorist groups, as an analysis of
the persons responsible for the September 11 attacks makes evident. And terrorist
movements can grow in democratic countries as well-see the Irish Republican Army, the ETA
in Spain, the Italian Red Brigades, and the German Baader-Meinhof gang. Most important,
it is far from clear whether the present autocratic regimes if they were to suddenly open up to
deep-reaching political change, would be replaced by governments inclined to be friendly or
helpful to the United States U S. security and democracy interests, in other words: do not
neatly coincide in the Arab world at least in the short run- and it is the short run that drives
most policy making.

Democracies enables terrorism more than non-democracies

James A. Piazza 08
Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte,
http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/Piazza%20Democracy%20Free%20Markets
%20Terrorism.pdf
Non-partisan, academic studies of the relationship between politically and economically closed
societies and terrorism generally do not support the model Muravchik outlines. In fact, most
empirical studies of terrorism tend to demonstrate a positive relationship between political
democracy and terrorism. The relationship between terrorism and macroeconomic policies of

states whether they are liberal or state-dominated has not been empirically analyzed and so
much less is known about how promotion of economic freedom might affect terrorism. Eubank
and Weinberg (1994, 2001) and Schmid (1992) argue that rather than serving as a bulwark against
terrorism, democratic governance exacerbates terrorist activity by providing a wide range of
avenues through which radicals can advance their political agendas through, propaganda by deed.
Schmid (1992) explains that an open and free media a central quality of democratic governance

 facilitates the communication objective that all terrorist groups have while the system of legal
rights institutionalized in most democracies more effectively shield terrorist suspects and
perpetrators from detection, apprehension and prosecution. Democracies also facilitate
45unrestricted and unmonitored movement of people, creation of free associations and acquisition
of weapons; all of which assist terrorist groups. Moreover, the legitimacy of democratic
government rests ultimately on the publics perception of how well it can protect its citizens, and in
a democracy citizens can punish elected officials at the ballot box for failure to protect the public.
This quality of public responsiveness makes democracies more willing to negotiate with terrorists.
In two statistical studies of the presence of terrorist groups in countries, Eubank and Weinberg
(1994, 2001) validated these propositions in observing that from World War II to 1987, more
terrorist groups were found in democracies than in non-democracies. The researchers also found
that no matter how durable or stable the democracy in question is, it is more likely to have
terrorist activity in it than a non-democracy. Compatible results were produced by Piazza (2007)

in a time-series analysis of Middle Eastern states and to an extent by Li (2004), although his
study did find that while specific components of democracy, such as government executive
constraints, increased the probability of terrorism, democratic participation reduced it. Eyerman
(1998) adds complexity to the question in his empirical study of terrorist acts from 1968 to 1986.
Using a series of statistical analyses, he found that two types of states were most impervious to
terrorist attacks, well-established democracies and entrenched dictatorships. However, new nonconsolidated democracies were actually more likely to experience terrorism in Eyermans study,
producing a nonlinear relationship between terrorism and degree of democracy and dictatorship.

2NC Truth Claims DA

True political accountability and freedom is only possible when we abandon the claim that
democracy stops violence, because we must be willing to accept that true democracy can
decay
Little 5
(Adrian Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Melbourne, September,
http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/publications/Littlepaper.pdf)
According to this view, then, democracy has the constant potential for violence and
upheaval. It is precisely because democracy should not be closed to critical voices that it
engenders the capacity for critical challenge and, with that, the propensity to disintegrate
into open conflict. The discursive constructions that contrast democracy and violence are
trying to pull up the drawbridge around existing conceptions of liberal democracy. By
distinguishing democracy and violence, they serve to cloud the violent tendencies at the heart
of democracies and the often unpalatable activities that served to establish liberal democratic
regimes.

The aff should lose if they fail to justify their truth claims- comportment is the only
question you can really decide with the ballot and outweighs any rollplaying impact
Janmohammed 94
(Abdul R, Professor of English Berkeley, Between Borders, p. 248)
In short, Freire's is a 'border pedagogy', which, however, has some other important
implications that need to be explored. The pedagogic site in Freire's work is clearly utopian
in character. However, its dimensions become clearer if one examines them in light of
Michel Foucault's notions of utopia/heterotopia. Utopias and heterotopias are, according to
Foucault, the two sites that 'have the curious property of being in relation with all other
sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they
happen to designate, mirror, or reflect' (1986: 23, emphasis added). These two sites are
linked with all other sites, but primarily by a relation to contradiction. Established 'in the
very founding of society', heterotopias, like boundaries, are 'counter-sites' in which all the
other real sites that can be found within a culture 'are simultaneously represented,
contested, and inverted.' Like Foucault's heterotopic site - cemeteries, fairs, libraries,
prisons, etc. - the pedagogic site is also a social and institutional space. According to
Foucault's description all these sites are defined as inherently heterotopic. However, it
would seem more accurate to characterize them as constitutionally ambiguous sites, as
spaces that dominant cultures can utilize for the purposes of hegemonic construction and
that oppositional groups can employ for their heterotopian value: all these sites are
potentially heterotopian, but need to be functioned in that manner for their potential to
become manifest. This is true above all of pedagogic institutions, which, as sites centrally
involved in the production and formation of subjectivity, agency, systems of value, regimes of
truth, etc., are deeply invested spaces for hegemonic and counter-hegemonic contestation.
As such, pedagogic institutions are sites where borders are constantly drawn and redrawn borders that define epistemic, ethical, cultural, social, political, economic, gender, racial and
class spaces and that legitimate and valorize them positively or negatively. The pedagogic
apparatuses will thus produce some subjects who are content to remain within the

prescribed borders and others who will violate them, reluctantly or wilfully, painfully or
with pleasure, or, in practice, with a complex overdetermined combination of affects. A

specific variant of the transgressive subject, the 'border intellectual' is simultaneously a

'space' and a subject, is, indeed, a subject-as-space. The transformation of such a border
subject, who is always constituted as a potential heterotopic site, into an actual heterotopic,
specular border intellectual depends upon his/her own agency: only by directly or
indirectly reading the self as a heterotopic border can the intellectual articulate his/her
specular, antagonistic, transgressive potentiality.

Latin American Democracy

Latin American liberalism is backsliding US is key
Allen 9
Michael, Editor of Democracy Digest, Latin America: democracy on a high, but backsliding seen
in authoritarian drift, Democracy Digest, Factiva
Latin America faces a revelatory moment, in the wake of the Honduran constitutional
crisis, writes Jorge G. Castaeda. The episode confirmed a remarkableand certainly
transformative fact: that the United States is no longer willing, or perhaps even able, to
select who governs from Tegucigalpa, or anywhere else in the region for that matter. He
is concerned that a U.S. retreat from the Monroe Doctrine entails a passivity that could
undermine the hard-won consensus on the need to anchor Latin Americas
democracy in a strong, intrusive, and detailed legal framework, while resisting the
threat of populist authoritarianism. Support for democracy is at its highest level since
the late 1990s, according to the latest Latinobarmetro poll taken in 18 countries and
published by The Economist. The survey reveals growing trust in democratic institutions,
an increase in governments legitimacy, and greater social liberalism. But concerns
remain about the robustness of Latin Americas democratic institutions.
Backsliding is always a threat, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said this week, citing
developments in the Americas where we are worried about leaders who have seized
property, trampled rights, and abused justice to enhance personal rule. Three U.N.
human rights experts this week accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of creating a
climate of fear following the arrest last week of a woman judge who ordered the
conditional release of imprisoned banker Eligio Cedeno. There was a time that judges
who failed to follow Chvezs instructions risked being removed from the bench, said
Robert Amsterdam, one of Cedeos lawyers. Judicial independence had been on life
support, but sadly, it is now officially dead. Alberto Arteaga Sanchez, a criminal law
professor at Venezuelas Central University, condemned the unacceptable pressure
being put on the judicial branch by the executive branch. Its a case that
demonstrates the weakness of Venezuelas democratic system, he said. It is imperative
that the U.S. remain actively engaged with the institutions that buttress the emerging
but fragile democratic consensus, Castaeda argues, including the American Convention
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. These structures have
great potential, but they have yet to address some key questions.
Latin American democracy solves global backliding
Fauriol and Weintraub 95 *director of the CSIS Americas program and **Prof of Public
Affairs at the University of Texas Georges and Sidney, The Washington Quarterly, "U.S. Policy,
Brazil, and the Southern Cone", Lexis
The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State
Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now
have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of
democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own
volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club

in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its

efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete
with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are
somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting
democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic
liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of
poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies
by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by
the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the
developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise
progress elsewhere in the world .

Current relations risk democratic backsliding Latin America is a crucial symbol for
democratic success
Hakim 6 - President of the Inter-American Dialogue
Peter Hakim, Is Washington Losing Latin America?. Foreign Affairs 85 no1 39-53 Ja/F 2006.
Wiley Online.
Even more troubling to U.S. officials has been the evolving political situation. Washington
likes to tout Latin America as a showcase for democracy. Democratic politics are still the
norm in the region; only Cuba remains under authoritarian rule. But in the past decade,
nearly a dozen elected presidents have been forced from office, many by street protests or
mob violence. Despite holding elections and plebiscites, Venezuela today barely qualifies as
a democracy. The same is true of Haiti, which more and more is coming to resemble a
failed state. In Bolivia and Ecuador, fractious politics are reinforced by deep social, ethnic,
and regional divisions. In Nicaragua, an alliance of corrupt legislators from the left and the

right has so paralyzed the government that next year's presidential election may restore to
power Washington's nemesis Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. And these are not the only
countries in the region where democracy is under stress and could deteriorate quickly.

Although a majority of Latin American citizens still consider democracy to be the best
form of government, most hold a low opinion of their government and leaders. In many
places, the performance of public institutions, tainted by corruption, has been lackluster.

Judicial systems in the region are mostly slow moving and unfair. Legislatures operate
erratically. Political parties are weaker and less representative than ever. Only a few Latin
American countries, most prominently Chile, have bucked the region's discouraging trends
and made progress in consolidating democratic politics.

1 Democracy now
Jones 12 Professor of Political Science @ Rice
Mark, The Diversity of Latin American Democracy, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11751/the-diversity-of-latin-american-democracy
The recent collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa during the
Arab Spring provides a backdrop to reflect on Latin America's democratic transitions from
authoritarian rule during the "Third Wave of Democratization" as well as to review the
current health of the region's democracies. Compared to the paucity of democracies in
Latin America at the start of the Third Wave in the mid-1970s, the near-universal presence

of democratic regimes today highlights the tremendous democratic progress made in the
region over the past three-dozen years. Nevertheless, within this broader regional success

exists considerable country-by-country variation in democratic experience and quality.

This article will first review the stark differences in the foundations upon which the
region's Third Wave democracies were constructed, with particular focus on the nature of
the democratic transition and prior experience with democratic elections and governance. It
will then discuss the evolution of democracy in the region over the past three and a half
decades. Next it will examine the considerable variance in the degree of democratic
consolidation and democratic quality in the region as of 2012. A final section will draw
some general conclusions about some of the most significant factors that drove the
democratization of Latin America. The article will concentrate on the 19 former Spanish
and Portuguese colonies of the region -- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela -- while excluding a
discussion of democratic transitions and democracy in the region's former British, Dutch
and French colonies. This latter group is dominated by the dozen ex-British colonies,
which with the exception of Guyana have avoided any serious democratic breakdowns
since achieving independence between 1962 and 1983, and at present all possess robust
democratic systems. Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America at the Dawn of the
Third Wave In January 1977, only two of the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese colonies
could truly be classified as democracies. Costa Rica and Venezuela were islands of
consolidated democracy within a sea of dictatorship, with the former continuously
democratic since 1953 and the latter since 1958. A third country, Colombia, was in the
midst of a democratic transition following the end in 1974 of its experience with a quasidemocratic power-sharing pact between the Liberal and Conservative parties, which had
been established in 1958 as a means to help end a decade-long civil conflict. The
remaining 16 countries were governed by military or civilian dictatorships of diverse
stripes. In many cases the dictatorship was relatively institutionalized, with the presidency
and other key posts regularly changing hands, while in others the lion's share of power lay
in the hands of a single personalist dictator who had governed -- or would continue to
govern -- for decades. Examples of the former set of countries include Brazil and Mexico.
In Brazil, different generals occupied the presidency for a fixed term during most of the
dictatorship. In Mexico, a new president from the country's omnipotent Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) assumed office every six years. Nicaragua and Paraguay are
examples of the latter type of country. Nicaragua was governed in 1977 by Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, who had assumed control in 1967 following the death of his brother,
who had in turn taken the place in 1956 of their assassinated father, Anastasio Somoza
Garca, whose tenure had begun in 1936. In Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner had held the
reins of power continuously since 1954 and would continue to do so until his removal by a
military coup in 1989. The Third Wave Democratic Transitions Between 1977 and 1994, 15
of these 16 nondemocratic Latin American countries would embrace democracy , with the
exception being totalitarian Cuba. The nature of the initial transitions from authoritarian to
democratic governance, however, varied tremendously among the 15 countries that became
democracies during the post-1977 period. Several countries experienced gradual, managed
transitions, with Brazil and Mexico two examples of this model. In Brazil, where restricted
elections had been held to select national legislators and local officials throughout most of

the 1964-1985 military dictatorship, these elections became increasingly free and fair over
time. This gradual democratic transition in Brazil, often referred to as the process of
"political decompression," culminated with a fully democratic election in 1986 of national
legislators who would go on to draft the country's 1988 constitution.

Mexican Democracy Good

Uniqueness
Mexican democracy is collapsing- zones of silence
Johnson 13
Tim Johnson, McClatchey News, In Mexico, fears for democracy as threatened journalists curtail
coverage, May 16, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/16/191415/in-mexico-fears-fordemocracy.html#.UcNiW_m1E0M
And the violence has worked. In much of Mexico, local news outlets no longer report on organized
crime or corruption. Analysts call these areas zones of silence , where the lights have gone out on
the dark activities within.
The success of the intimidation alarms advocates of both free speech and democracy . With no news
reports on Mexicos drug and crime problems, citizens find it difficult to stay informed about
what could be life-threatening situations developing nearby. They also cannot effectively
participate in the normal give and take of public discussion that fuels a democracy. The muffling
has been so effective that many Mexicans dont even realize that a near blackout of news on crime
exists in swaths of the country.

If journalists dont act as a viewfinder to say who is winning the contracts, who will become
police chief, if theres no accountability, they can do whatever they want, said Andres Solis
Alvarez, a former crime reporter and author of a self-protection manual for Mexican journalists.
Democracy impossible without totally reformed political parties
Ciriaco 11
COHA Research Associate Carol Ciriaco, July 18, 2011, Democracy in Mexico: The Past,
Present, and Future, http://www.coha.org/democracy-in-mexico-the-past-present-and-future/
However, the actual winner of the 2012 elections will hardly make a difference. Mexico is simply
a new democracy with old partiesthe weakened structure of the newer PAN and PRD allows the
PRI to continue to dominate the political show behind the scenes. Many fear that the reinstallation of the PRI would cause a complete reversion to an authoritarian establishment. The
PRD and the PAN, however, have also begun to practice clientelism as a means of survival. Until
the PRD and the PAN find the strength to go out on a limb and break from the old regimes corrupt
practices, the nation will continue on the same path of regression, regardless of which party
assumes power.

Environment
New study reports improvement in Mexican economy due to policies
OECD 13 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). OECD Praises
Mexicos Environmental Policies but Encourages Better Enforcement and Funding. Pg. 1.

http://www.oecd.org/mexico/oecdpraisesmexicosenvironmentalpoliciesbutencouragesbetterenfor
cementandfunding.html)
In the last decade, environmental sustainability has been recognised at federal level as a key
dimension of Mexicos development. There have also been significant advances in environmental
policy integration. The key issues include:

Key environmental and sustainable development initiatives.

Institutional framework for environmental and sustainable development policies.
Regulatory framework and enforcement and compliance.
Evaluation mechanisms.
Stakeholder involvement.

Mexicos initiative in saving biodiversity was so successful that it is a global template

OECD 13 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). OECD Praises
Mexicos Environmental Policies but Encourages Better Enforcement and Funding. Pg. 1.

http://www.oecd.org/mexico/oecdpraisesmexicosenvironmentalpoliciesbutencouragesbetterenfor
cementandfunding.html)
As a mega-diverse country, Mexicos progress in protecting biodiversity and forest resources is of
global significance. Over the last decade, it has developed a number of statistics and programmes to
promote conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Analysed are:

The institutional framework.

Key trends in biodiversity and forests and other relevant

information.
Policy instruments for biodiversity and forestry conservation and sustainable use .

Mainstreaming biodiversity and forestry in other sectors and policy

areas.

Damage to Mexicos environment to be restored in 20 years (9 years from 2013)

Environmental Technology and Service Opportunities 2. (Environmental Technology and
Service Opportunities, Pg. 1. http://www.calepa.ca.gov/border/Documents/etschapter1.pdf.)
In a recent public statement, Vctor Lichtinger, Mexicos environmental
minister, declared that it would take at least 20 years to restore the damage
created by decades of neglect to Mexicos natural resources and to approach sustainability .11
His statement highlights a gradual change in attitude toward the
environment that has emerged in Mexico over the past decades . Increased

attention to environmental conditions and the related shortage in environmental

infrastructure, such as wastewater treatment facilities and solid waste disposal
sites, is generating a number of new projects that will be financed over the next
five years through the collaboration of agencies and banks at several levels
including federal, state, local, domestic, and multinational development banks. 12
Mexicos environmental agency, the Secretariat for the Environment and Natural
Resources (Secretara de Medio Ambiente y Recursos NaturalesSEMARNAT),
has a total budget of US$1.4 billion for 2002.

Democracies enable for better management of the environment

Li and Reuveny 6. (Pennsylvania State University and Indiana University Joint Study. Democracy and
Environmental Degradation. Pg. 937.)
A second argument is that democracies are more responsive to the environmental needs of the public
than are autocracies (Kotov and Nikitina 1995). This argument works through electoral accountability

and the ability of groups to mobilize

socially, achieve political representation, and inuence public policy making . Democracies hold
regular and free elections, which can bring to power new parties,
including those friendly to the environment (e.g., the Green Party in Germany). In
an autocracy, the distribution of political power is concentrated, reducing the likelihood that
environmentalists will come to power. Thus, environmentalists stand a
greater chance of affecting policy making in a democracy than they do in an autocracy . Of course,
this logic implies that people can also freely elect extreme antienvironmental parties. Casual observation, however,
suggests that such situations do not occur frequently in reality.

Stability
Democracy and a stable society go hand in hand in Mexico
Kathleen Bruhn 2009 Department of Political Science UCSB. PHD Clinical Psychology
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/insights_law_society/PreviewFeat
ur9_7.authcheckdam.pdf
Bythe 1980s, Mexican society had changed dramatically from 1929. A mostly poor, agricultural,
illiterate society became an urban, industrial, and increasingly educated society. The first signs of
this shift emerged in 1968, when a powerful student movement led by high school and
university students demanded more political freedom. Although this movement was crushed by
the Mexican military , it was instructive that pressure for democracy began among the most
educated segment of society. Democratic theory tells us that societies with wealthy, educated
populations are more likely to support stable democracy. Democracy requires a people capable
of reading and interpreting information about candidates and poli-cies. Moreover, educated
people commonly feel that they have the capacity and the right to make such choices. Finally, as
incomes rise, people have more time and energy to devote to political activity. The Growth of

Civil Society.In fact, political activity did increase. By the 1990s, a growing number and variety
of popular organizations operated independently of the PRI. Cities grew so rapidly during
Mexicos development that there were enormous backlogs in public services. Shantytowns
created from salvaged materials sprang up on marginal land. They lacked electricity, plumbing,
or clean running water everything governments are supposed to provide. Neighborhoods
organized to pressure the government for these services. Feminist organizations, environmental
organizations, and human rights organizations were also created by middle-class residents

Mexican democracy creates a stable middle class

Michael Werz 2012 is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress He is a graduate of
Frankfurt Universitys Institute for Philosophy and was professor at Hannover University in
Germany. He is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/06/28/11660/mexicos-hiddensuccess-story
Economic expansion combined with a stable and robust democracy has made Mexico a global
commodity in itself, as it becomes an increasingly attractive place to set up a business or invest

capital. Mexicos recent development reflects a broader shift that Eric Farnsworth, vice president
of the Council of the Americas, has aptly described as The Latin American Spring, a decade of
democratization and economic growth across the Southern Hemisphere. Farnsworth has argued
that time is running out for the United States to reap the benefits of this transformation, because
Latin America is on the move, pursuing partners in Asia, Europe and Africa. The emergence of
Mexicos middle class due to its economic expansion has also converted the country into a
sophisticated hub for high-value commodities, research, and advanced manufacturing. And the
countrys educational progress, emancipation of women, and modern urban culture impact the way
Mexican families plan and conduct their livesvisible, for example, in the rapidly shrinking size

of families. The rise of the Mexican middle class is the single most determining issue of the
intertwined U.S.-Mexican relationship. New middle-class Mexicans are a modernizing force,
demanding rule of law, quality education, and a political voice; members of this group will
determine what Mexico does on the world stage, what it produces, and what it consumes.

Mexicos democratic growth creates a stable economy

Michael Werz 2012 is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress He is a graduate of
Frankfurt Universitys Institute for Philosophy and was professor at Hannover University in
Germany. He is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/06/28/11660/mexicos-hiddensuccess-story
Mexican society has undergone a deep change during its decade-long process of democratization .
The country has enjoyed strong macroeconomic growth, and this year its GDP is growing faster
than that of the United States. But the crucial dimension of Mexicos hidden success story is the rise
of a middle class that is younger, more educated, wealthier, healthier, and more able to integrate
women into the labor force than any previous generation. Although widespread poverty still

exists, write Luis de la Calle and Luis Rubio in their seminal study, Mexico: A Middle Class
Society, Mexico is no longer a poor country. Within a few decades Mexican society achieved
what took over a century when European industrialization created the first modern middle classes
in history.

Demo Promo
Mexico supports a fair electoral process throughout Latin America
DMC 2 (Democracy Coalition Project) http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Mexico.pdf Defending
Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002 Democracy Coalition Project
Perhaps the strongest contribution that Mexico has made towards strengthening democratic
electoral outcomes at home and abroad has come in the form of the establishment of the Federal
Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE ). Until 1994, fraud and manipulation

characterized the Mexican electoral system. In fact, up until that year, Mexico prohibited
international electoral observation missions from monitoring its elections, and did not
contribute to monitoring missions abroad.15 In 1993, however, the IFE was established with
the official mandate of creating a systematic effort to approach, establish links and collaborate
with different institutions and organizations in the international community that are interested or
that specialize in electoral issues.16 This Institute is now considered to be a very successful
model for the region, and has participated in 34 technical cooperation missions in 17 countries
since 1993 and 33 electoral observation missions in 19 countries since 1996.17 Through its
creation Mexico, in a very practical manner, has helped to strengthen democratic processes
throughout the region and the world.

Mexico is committed to promoting democratic ideals throughout the region

through FTAs and the appointment of new leaders within the country
DMC 2 (Democracy Coalition Project) http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Mexico.pdf Defending
Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002 Democracy Coalition Project
In 2000, Mexico signed a free trade agreement with the European Union that contains a
democracy clause, committing all parties to respect democratic principles and human rights and
to promote civil society participation through mechanisms of political cooperation based on the
principle of shared responsibility.24 The inclusion of this clause in a trade agreement
represented a significant reversal for Mexico, accepting for the first time conditionality related
to democracy criteria. With regards to changes in institutions as well as in the official political
discourse, President Fox has increased Mexicos capacity to support democracy in the
international arena by creating a new position of Special Ambassador for Human Rights and
Democracy within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and appointing MariClaire Acosta, a

renowned defender of human rights, to the post.25 The position was later upgraded to the rank of
Under-Secretary of State and is charged with designing official policies to promote and protect
human rights and democracy both in Mexico and abroad.26 Since he entered office, Jorge
Castaeda, Mexicos current Foreign Affairs Minister, has stated the need for Mexicos foreign
policy to shift towards a more active role in the international system, thus placing the country at
the forefront of the world movement toward the protection of human rights a place it
should have always kept.27 In a significant departure from previous official positions, he has
also declared that respect for national sovereignty does not justify overlooking human rights
violations, and that abuses in any nation should be a source of concern for the entire
international community.

Mexican Democracy Bad

Environment
Democracy hurts the environment
Romuald 11. (Democratic Institutions and Environmental Quality: Effects and
Transmission Channels. Pg. 4.

http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/120396/2/Somlanare_Kinda_354.pdf)
Many authors think that democracy

does not favour environment protection. The

implementation of democratic institutions comes with individual freedoms. Desai (1989b)
thinks that democracy doesnt protect environment because democracy is a factor of
economic growth and prosperity, which hurt the quality of environment. Democracy is also
correlated with factors such as property rights and social infrastructures that boost economic
growth.

More autocratic governments better manage their environment

Paehlke 96. (Professor Emeriti B. A. (Lehigh), M.A. (New School For Social Research), Ph. D.

(McMaster). Democratic Institutions and Environmental Quality: Effects and Transmission Channels.
Pg. 1.)

Secondly, Paehlke (1996) thinks that the nature of environment and democracy are different.
Environment is a global phenomena whereas democracy works on national and local levels .
Consequently, environmental problems could not be resolved in an adequate and opportune
way. For example, Heilbronner (1974) supports the idea that global growth of population
threatens environmental quality. Autocratic countries can restrain demographic dynamic
while democratic countries must respect people freedoms.

Democracies have a general disregard for the environment

Romuald 11. (Democratic Institutions and Environmental Quality: Effects and
Transmission Channels. Pg. 4.

http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/120396/2/Somlanare_Kinda_354.pdf)
Finally, we think that when democracy is established, institutions becomes more complex and
rigid. So, Olson (1982) and Midlarksy (1998) claim that lobbying groups are partially
responsible for the rigidity of institutions in mature democracies . In other words, in mature
and democratic countries, the supply of public goods could be reduced by an important
number of lobbying groups which are less or not incited to take care of society interests. They
can try to influence or to control legislative and administrative process. Consequently, public
policies could be less favourable to environment quality when they are influenced by lobbying
groups.

Multiple studies prove the inefficiency of democracy in regards to preserving the

environment
International Studies Quarterly 6. (Pennsylvania State University and Indiana University Joint
Study. Democracy and Environmental Degradation. Pg. 938.)

The view that democracy may not reduce environmental degradation or may even
increase it relies on several mechanisms. First, Hardin (1968) warns about the
impending hazards of unchecked natural resource exploitation and environmental
mismanagement by self-interested individuals and groups. When private property
rights of natural resources are not well dened, as is often the case with the
commons (e.g., clean air, oceans, forests), free individuals or interest groups tend
to over exploit such resources and ignore the damage that their economic actions
inict on the environment. Gleditsch and Sverdrup (2003:70) note that Hardins

Tragedy of the Commons does not encourage condence in the effect of economic and political
freedom on environmental quality.

Stability
Mexico has no positive outlook despite democracy
Riding, Alan. Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans. New York: Vintage, 2011. Kindle
Edition.http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA555291. Mexico, at best, is an underdeveloped and
underachieving country; at worst, Mexico is a near-failing state, despite a democratic system of
government, a growing economy, and close links to the United States. Criminal ineptitude infects
government functions from the local to the national level, and there is little optimism for
improvement in the near term. Faced with corrupt national and local police, the recent presidents

have turned in desperation to the armed forces to help neutralize the drug cartels and stabilize the
country. Fortunately, Mexico's military is among the world's most professional and capable
armed forces. The officers are well-trained and have historically shown no inclination to take
over the government. Though the military did not ask for the mission, army and navy leaders
have embraced new roles in combating Mexico's criminal networks. The Mexican Constitution
prohibits the military from serving outside the borders of the nation without congressional
approval, which makes the military primarily an internal security force . The Mexican armed

forces have adapted well to the needs of the Mexican nation, and the army and navy are among
the most respected institutions in the country.
Continued Democratic governance causes mass political corruption
Mexico: Development and Democracy at a Crossroads. A Markets and Democracy Brief. Author: Shannon K. O'Neil, Senior
Fellow for Latin America Studies. February 2011. http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracycrossroads/p24089. Many worry about the true depth of change within Mexico's political system.

Mexico's formal and informal rules still limit transparency and accountability from the political
class. The blanket prohibition of reelectionwhether for president or local town councilleaves

few incentives for politicians to fulfill their campaign promises. Instead, as they seek higher
office, they must have the support of unelected party leaders. Informally, some of the most
powerful ministries in Mexico, as well as the increasingly influential state governments within the
federal system, have begun to push back against broader transparency and accountability . Denied

or ignored requests under Mexico's freedom of information act are increasing, particularly in the
realm of security. Continued weak democratic governance and a lack of accountability is
perpetuating corruption, and persistent impunity erodes the credibility of institutions.

Demo Promo
Mexico hurts the legitimacy of the election process in Latin America
DMC 2 (Democracy Coalition Project) http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Mexico.pdf Defending
Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002 Democracy Coalition Project
Mexicos steadfast commitment to the principle of a countrys right to self-determination has on
various occasions prevented it from criticizing other governments that came to power through
flawed elections, even when it sent its own electoral observers. In effect, Mexico has lent
legitimacy to shoddy elections by sponsoring observers who remained silent in the face of
electoral malpractices, as was the case in Peru. In May 2000, eight years after his autogolpe,
Fujimori again threatened democracy in Peru by manipulating the electoral process to win an
unprecedented third term in office. Though a member of the OAS, and traditionally supportive
of election monitoring endeavors, Mexico questioned the subsequent attempt by some member
governments to take action by invoking OAS Resolution 1080.13 Mexico further urged the Rio
Group to abstain from issuing a statement about the election one way or another . Foreign

Minister Rosario Green stated that my governments stance is that the topic of elections falls
solely and exclusively within the view of the citizens of Peru, thereby supporting Perus
requests to the OAS to refrain from responding in any way that it considered an unwarranted
violation of its sovereignty.14 The PRI government in Mexico likely was influenced by the fact
that its own presidential elections were scheduled just two months later, and did not want a precedent to be set whereby the OAS
could actively intervene in the outcome of a countrys elections. Mexico had had its own
democratic credentials scrutinized in the past, owing to perceived political manipulation by
the PRI for many years, and the events in Peru set off alarms about the potential consequences
of any post-election crisis in Mexico. Thus, Mexico advocated for a regional non-response to
the 2000 presidential elections in Peru, citing concerns of the OAS becoming an election
police that had the authority to decertify results. In contrast to its strong position in Peru,
Mexico largely abstained from the OAS response to flawed elections the same year in Haiti,
which were widely criticized both within Haiti and by the international community

Cuban Democracy Good

Environment
Cuban transition to democracy will signal environmental commitment
Air University 97 The Intellectual and Leadership Center of the Air Force A National Security
Strategy for A New Century May 1997 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-97.htm
The end of armed conflict in Central America and other improvements in regional security have coincided with remarkable political and
economic progress throughout the hemisphere. Our hemisphere enters the twenty-first century with an unprecedented opportunity to build a
future of stability and prosperity building on the fact that every nation in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic and committed to free market
economies. We are advancing regional security cooperation in a variety of ways, such as bilateral security dialogues, Organization of American
States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas initiatives, regional confidence and security building measures, exercises and exchanges with key
militaries, and regular Defense Ministerials. As co-guarantor of the Peru-Ecuador peace process we have brought the parties closer to negotiating
a permanent resolution of the decades-old border dispute. And, we are working to ensure a successful passage of stewardship of the Panama
Canal to the Panamanian government. The principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking,
organized crime and money laundering, illegal immigration, and instability generated from corruption and political or social conflict. Bilaterally
and regionally, we seek to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking which poses a serious threat to the sovereignty, democracy and national
security of nations in the hemisphere. As part of our comprehensive partnership with Mexico, we continue to increase counterdrug and law
enforcement cooperation, while in the Caribbean we are intensifying a coordinated effort on counternarcotics, law enforcement and gun
smuggling. The 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami produced hemispheric agreement on a package of

measures that included continued economic reform and enhanced cooperation on issues such as the
environment, counternarcotics and anti-corruption. Celebrating the region's embrace of democracy and free markets, the
President used that historic event to commit the U.S. to a more mature and cooperative relationship with the
hemisphere. The Summit's centerpiece was the leaders' commitment to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 and other
steps to ensure that democracy's benefits are shared by all. The Summit brought a surge in hemispheric cooperation
on issues such as energy, financial integration and the environment where U.S. agencies have used the Summit
Action Plan to establish new relationships with their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts. The
hemispheric response to the 1996 coup attempt in Paraguay--a response led by the OAS, members of the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and the U.S.--also demonstrated the degree to which our democracy and economic integration agendas have become mutually
reinforcing. Having opened a new chapter in U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, we must carry forward the momentum to the
1998 Summit in Chile and continue building towards the Miami vision of an integrated hemisphere of free market democracies. The
Administration seeks to do its part in advancing this vision by consolidating NAFTA's gains, obtaining congressional fast track negotiating
authority and negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement with Chile. At the same time, we must be sensitive to the concern by some small
states, such as those in the Eastern Caribbean, about the impact of an increasingly integrated and more competitive hemispheric economy. To this
end, we must make progress on achieving the benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to help prepare that region for participation in the
FTAA. Our ability to sustain the historic progress of the hemispheric agenda depends in part on meeting the challenges posed by weak
democratic institutions, spiraling unemployment and crime rates, and serious income disparities. In many Latin American countries, citizens will
not fully realize the benefits of political liberalization and economic growth without regulatory, judicial, law enforcement and educational
reforms, as well as increased efforts to integrate indigenous populations into the formal economy. Regarding Cuba, the United

States remains committed to promoting a peaceful transition to democracy and forestalling a mass migration
exodus that would endanger the lives of migrants and safety of our nation. While maintaining pressure on the regime to make political and
economic reforms, we seek to encourage the emergence of a civil society to assist transition to democracy when the change
comes. A growing optimism among Cubans that positive change is possible also helps discourage illegal migration. And, as the Cuban people feel
greater incentive to take charge of their own future, they are more likely to stay at home and build the informal and formal structures that will
make transition easier. Meanwhile, we remain firmly committed to bilateral migration accords that seek to ensure that migration be through legal
and safe means.

Cuban Democracy would protect the environment

Gershman 12 National Carl Gershman President of the Endowment for Democracy October 12,
2012 Latin America and the Worldwide Movement for Democracy
http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archived-presentations-and-articles/latinamerica-and-the-worldwide-m
The third area is promoting greater economic equality and social inclusion, and here I want to call attention to the Social Agenda for

Democracy in Latin America for the Next 20 Years, the report prepared by former President Alejandro Toledos Global Center for
Development and Democracy (GCDD). Developed in consultation with twenty former Latin American heads of state, it is a comprehensive plan
to address the problems of economic inequality and social exclusion. It contains recommendations for tax reform; for building
human capital through conditional cash transfers and microcredit loans to the poorest sectors of society; for improving education by making
schools more accountable for student learning and by giving parents incentives to ensure that their children attend classes; and for expanding
health services to prevent and treat diseases that are endemic among low-income populations. There are also other recommendations

for

protecting the environment and nonrenewable resources ; for bridging the digital divide by making new
communications technologies more accessible to the poor; and for promoting gender equity and the inclusion of indigenous peoples. President
Toledo is quite explicit in saying that he has a dual purpose in advancing this Social Agenda. The first is to overcome the structural problems of
inequality and social exclusion that block economic growth and undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of formal democratic political
institutions. And the second is to offer a credible alternative to authoritarian populism. Aside from being politically divisive and a threat to human
rights, such populism offers no meaningful solution to the social and economic problems of Latin Americas poorest citizens. As Francis
Fukuyama has said, its failing is that it offers at best short-term solutions that actually worsen the long-term prospects of the poor. And even the
short-term solutions are possible only because theyre subsidized by oil, not by real economic productivity. This, of course, brings us to
Venezuela, which just held a presidential election in which Hugo Chavez secured his third six-year term. While the election showed that Chavez
still has considerable popular support, the opposition mounted its strongest challenge ever, and there is no question that the final numbers would
have been different, and the outcome possibly reversed, if there had been anything close to a level playing field, which there was not. The 10point differential was actually very small given the governments extensive control of the media, its extravagant use of state oil resources to
secure votes, and the fact that millions of Venezuelans went to the polls fearing that a vote against Chavez would affect their jobs and well-being.
To their credit, the opposition leader Henrique Capriles and the broad Democratic Unity alliance he heads are not complaining but rather are
trying to build on the movements strong performance in preparation for the gubernatorial elections that will be held in December. Their coalition
represents a new generation of Venezuelan democrats and also an alternative vision for the country. If Chavez does not begin to seriously address
the countrys catastrophic problems -- from rampant crime and collapsing bridges to the highest rate of inflation in the hemisphere and also the
most polarized society his support will erode and the opposition could gain new momentum, especially if the country goes into recession once
the electoral funding spigot is turned off. And of course there are also the uncertainties surrounding Chavez health. Let me be clear: Venezuelans
will have to solve their own problems. But those in Venezuela who are seeking a peaceful and progressive path to a democratic future deserve our
continued moral support and solidarity. The same holds true for people in Cuba who are also seeking a peaceful

way to democracy -- and under even more difficult conditions. This coming Wednesday, the World Movement for Democracy will
present its Democracy Courage Tribute to the Pro-Democracy Movement of Cuba. This movement has been growing in Cuba and now faces
mounting repression. Just last week 22 Cubans were arrested for trying to attend a meeting in Santa Clara to discuss the Citizens Demand for
Another Cuba, a petition that has been signed by over one thousand democracy advocates and calls for basic democratic rights and a modern,
free and plural Cuba. Also last week, the well-known Cuban journalist Yoani Sanchez and her husband Reinaldo Escobar were detained for
trying to attend the manslaughter trial of Angel Carromero, the Spanish Christian Democrat who was driving the car that crashed into a tree near
the eastern city of Bayamo on July 22, killing Oswaldo Paya, Cubas most famous human rights defender, and his young colleague, Harold
Cepero. Payas widow and daughter have called for an independent investigation of the crash, charging that Carromeros car was forced off the
road by a second vehicle. That is extremely likely since Paya had often received death threats, and he and his wife had been rammed by another
car when they were driving in Havana just weeks before the fatal accident.

Transition to democracy is inevitable- helps Environment

Gershman 12 Carl Gershman, Aug 2, 2012 President, the National Endowment for Democracy
The Sharpening Crisis in Cuba http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archivedpresentations-and-articles/the-sharpening-crisis-in-cuba
Change is coming, and its important that we start preparing now for the post-Castro future. While
the struggle for a democratic breakthrough is still the highest priority, its necessary now to start
thinking about and preparing for the process of democratic transition, which as we know from

other contemporary experiences think of Nicaragua, or Egypt, or Ukraine will not be easy.
This was the advice that Czech President Vaclav Havel gave to Paya on November 17, 2003
the anniversary of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in an exchange of letters that we
published in the Journal of Democracy. Each democrat, Havel wrote, should behave today as
if power were to be handed over tomorrow. It was on the basis of that advice that Paya initiated
a process of independent national dialogue, involving some 14,000 Cubans, that he called the
Cuban Forum. This initiative produced a 170-page All-Cuban Plan containing
recommendations on issues ranging from economic and political reform to education and health,
the environment and public order, privatization of the media, and reuniting with the exile
community. Other activists today are also looking at the coming transition. The significance of
this work goes beyond helping Cuban democrats prepare for the inevitable change. It also helps
the opposition counter the regimes strategy of instilling fear in the population not just fear of
repression, which is largely disappearing, but fear of the consequences of change, which the
regime claims will being rampant capitalism as well as domination by the United States and
Cuban exiles. As Paya said, its necessary to dispel the myth that a transition will mean
catastrophe for Cuba.

Democracy is the only way to save the Cuban environment

Cepero 04 Eudel Eduardo Cepero. Prepared for the Cuba Transition Project (CTP)
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS FOR A CUBA IN TRANSITION
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/ECepero.pdf
The ecological

costs of the Cuban totalitarian model have yet to be assessed; however, future
generations will inevitably have to pay a high price to repair the damage. Among the Cuban archipelagos
most serious environmental problems are, in order of importance, soil degradation, deforestation, water
pollution and contamination, deterioration of urban environments, and loss of biodiversity. The
only way to avoid increasing Cubas heavy ecological burden is to establish basic environmental guidelines at the
outset of a

transition to democracy.

These new guidelines should be based upon the principles of sustainable development and be

part of a new economic design. During the transition to democracy, there will be three overarching stages or phases for dealing with the
countrys primary ecological problems: 1) the environmental emergency phase, 2) the institutionalization phase, and 3) the sustainability stage.
Each stage will include a logical sequence of actions to allow the understanding (that is, social environmental awareness) required for the timely
establishment of a new legal framework, upto-date regulations, and incentives that will lead to a sustainable development model. At the end of
this paper, suggested actions to be taken during each of the three phases are listed. Soil Degradation Domestic food production is

severely limited and compromised because 60 percent of Cubas farmlands are affected by soil
degradation. Soil erosion affects more than 4 million hectares of farmlands and acidity is widespread in over 1.7 million hectares. Elevated
saline and sodium levels exist in more than 1 million hectares. Compaction is present in some 2 million hectares and poor drainage problems
are reported in 2.7 million hectares. Deforestation The irrational use of forests has become common practice under the Castro regime. As no
current data are available on the actual total area of cover forest, the value of Cubas forest resources is unknown. Most of the

remaining natural forests are in poor condition from being overexploited. An average of 200 forest fires occur

each year, affecting some 5,000 hectares of forest. Reforestation has been precarious, due to poor quality seeds, a low survival rate of plantings,
and a narrow range of forest species utilized. Water Pollution and Contamination Contamination and pollution of freshwater and inshore
seawater have increasingly worsened, especially during the past few years. Water quality in most cities has deteriorated for the following
reasons: 1) sewage networks are poorly maintained and insufficient to service the population; 2) many more wastewater treatment plants need to
be built and the ones that exist are in critically poor repair; and 3) potable water service is deplorable, due to chronic insufficiencies in
chlorination and deteriorated facilities for potable water treatment. Deterioration of Urban Environments The collection and disposal of solid
waste in cities is lacking, as are the hygienic-sanitary conditions of landfills. It is common practice to collect and dispose of hospital waste
together with residential garbage. Most facilities that produce hazardous wastes do not have systems in place for treating them. According

to official figures, there are more than 2,200 contamination focal points considered to be highly
toxic in the country. Loss of Biodiversity A substantial, unquantified loss of biodiversity exists, due, among other reasons, to improper
management of certain ecosystems, the application of intensive farming, the marketing of endangered species, as well as conditions making it
easy for important genetic resources to leave the country. Among the most serious biodiversity losses are the

disappearance of substantial numbers of plant and animal species, the reduction of ecosystems, the destruction of
coastal environments, and the collapse of urban sanitation systems. Cubas environmental status has been
compromised, and catastrophes have begun to surface, such as the soil-related disaster involving the iiappearance of
significant desert areas in some regions of the archipelago. The current situation is the result of a chain of unsustainable actions and factors
inflicted on ecosystems, especially during the past 40 years of developmental experiments, characterized by governmental willfulness,
irrationality, and stubbornness. If current negative trends in environmental variables continue, Cubas

national ecological account will fall dangerously close to possible bankruptcy. Tourism and agriculture
economic sectors identified as key to Cubas future market economyare based upon key natural resources. If those resources continue to
deteriorate, projections for socioeconomic recovery in the medium term will be useless.

Only Democracy solves the Cuban environment

Cepero 04 Eudel Eduardo Cepero. Prepared for the Cuba Transition Project (CTP)
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS FOR A CUBA IN TRANSITION
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/ECepero.pdf
Since the early 1960s, Cubas

development model has unsuccessfully attempted to make economic gains by

using a centralized military production design. The model was adjusted to compensate for various internal and external
political circumstances and decisions were made without regard for their long-term social or ecological costs.
Unfortunately, the failed experiment has degenerated into a subsistence economy. Its most dramatic environmental impact1 in the history of the
archipelago has been the creation of desert areas in the provinces of Pinar del Ro and Guantnamo, caused by the accelerated artificial
transformation of the landscape. This degradation occurred because a nonsustainable economic development model was applied.2 A

scourge on a national scale, desertification is the extreme example of Cubas environmental chaos,
as acknowledged by the islands authorities themselves: The truth of the matter is that currently, in 11 of the 14
provinces and in the special municipality of the Isle of Youth, there are vestiges of desertification (Granma, March 13, 2003). Initiating
Cubas environmental recovery will be a complex endeavor, with courses of action to be determined
by the extent of the deterioration, as well as by the economic, political, and social dynamics established during the
transition to democracy period. Given the declining prognosis for the Cuban model, it is possible that no significant improvements
will occur in the medium term. Instead, it is likely that the environmental situation will become worse.

Stability
Adopting democracy is the only way to ensure a prosperous Cuba and is key to economic
recovery.
Cruz 2k
Cruz, Robert D. (Associate professor of Economics and International business at Barry
University) "Sustainable Small Enterprise Development In A Cuban Transition
Economy." Studies In Comparative International Development 34.4 (2000): 100. Academic
Search Premier. Web. 3 July 2013 (jm
Private enterprise in Cuba today is largely confined to a limited number of self-employed workers
or family operated small businesses, notwithstanding the joint ventures between foreign and state
companies. If Cuba's economy is to make significant progress in the 21st Century, then the nation
must dismantle its socialist institutions and build a new social infrastructure based on free markets
and democracy. The eventual path of transition to market capitalism and democracy in Cuba
cannot be predicted, but the development of a vibrant, sustainable small and medium sized
enterprise sector is a desirable, if not necessary, component of a prosperous Cuba. Institutional

reforms and the development of new institutions (like an independent and efficient judicial
system and a private financial system) will be required in the transition process. Small
enterprises will need access to capital, and access to technology and management know-how.
Macroeconomic policies that promote economic growth and international competitiveness must
be implemented, and new business networks developed. These are formidable challenges, but
"best practices" may be gleaned from the transition experiences of Russia and Eastern Europe
and from the development experiences of Asia and Latin America. The speed with which
institution building and reform occur will directly impact the rate of economic recovery in Cuba .
A transition to democracy would promote sustainable small business growth.
Cruz 2k
Cruz, Robert D. (Associate professor of Economics and International business at Barry
University) "Sustainable Small Enterprise Development In A Cuban Transition
Economy." Studies In Comparative International Development 34.4 (2000): 100. Academic
Search Premier. Web. 3 July 2013 (jm)
In any Cuban transition to democracy and capitalism, small enterprise development is highly
desirable, if not essential, for creating a sustainable and growing economy. Small and medium
sized enterprises are seen as important elements of change in the process of transition to a market
economy and supportive elements in the development of democracy and a strong civil society .[ 2]
Developing a sustainable small enterprise sector ("grassroots capitalism") in Cuba faces
numerous obstacles, however. Some obstacles are of a technical and economic nature. These are
formidable and have been analyzed extensively in the vast literature on transitional economies.
[ 3] Some obstacles, however, are grounded in human behaviors that are incompatible with a
globally competitive market economy. These obstacles, which represent important challenges for
human resource managers in Cuba, are also difficult to overcome, but have not been a principal
focus of study

Cuban stability and economics directly affect the United States and other regional powers
American Society and Council of the Americas February 20

American Society and Council of the Americas. February 20, 2013. 7 Steps the U.S. President can Take to Promote Change in
Cuba by Adapting the Embargo (jm)
The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of
timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo

Chvez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy , if it leads to reductions in oil imports
and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the islands disaffected youth. Such
an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To
maintain Cubas social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must
throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The
collapse of Cubas tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring
countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated bya downturn in the
Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area,
including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding
Cuba as follows: Avoid one or more mass migrations; Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale
migration to the hemisphere; Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; Avoid Cuba
becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All of

these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.

The socialist restriction on current attempts at democracy are the problem.

Bolender 10
Bolender, Keith (lecturer on the Cuban Revolution at the University of Trontos school of Continuing studies). "Rethinking
Cuban Socialism In The New Times Of Crisis." NACLA Report On The Americas 43.4 (2010): 46-49.Academic Search Premier.
Web. 2 July 2013. (jm)

Many of the essays discuss the relationship between the government and its citizens in the
present-day confines of Cuban-style democracy, which comes in for a great deal of scrutiny The
authors grapple with how to improve direct public participation in political processes and to
better ensure the accountability of political representatives. Sociologist Mayra Espina Prieto

reminds us that the early revolution was a bottom-up process, while its subsequent
institutionalization in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s came from the top down, as a
key element to develop new ideas in order to confront the crisis. Don't fear change . Espina Prieto
counsels, although her position requires an important balancing actinstituting reform without
sacrificing the revolution's logros sociales (social achievement
Even slight changes toward more open policies have increased Cuban stability.
Sulivan 8
Sulivan, Mark P. (Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division) Cubas Political
Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22742.pdf Feb 28, 2008 acc. July 2, 13 (jm)

What is notable about Cubas political succession from Fidel to Ral is that it has been
characterized by political stability. There has been no apparent evidence of rivalry or schisms within the
ruling elite that have posed a threat to Rals new position. In the aftermath of Fidel initially stepping down in 2006, Ral mobilized thousands
of reservists and military troops to quell a potential U.S. invasion. He also reportedly dispatched undercover security to likely trouble spots in
the capital to deal with any unrest, but the streets remained calm with a sense of normalcy in day-to-day Cuba. As Ral stepped into

his new role as head of government, a number of observers predicted that he would be more open
to economic reform than Fidel, pointing to his past support for opening up farmers markets in
Cuba and the role of the Cuban military in successfully operating economic enterprises. Many have speculated that Cuba under Ral might
follow a Chinese or Vietnamese economic model. To date, however, there have not been any significant economic changes to indicate that Cuba
is moving in the direction of a Chinese model. Nevertheless, with several minor economic policy changes undertaken by Ral, there are some
signs that more substantial economic changes could be coming.

Global experience means no violent transition

Simonyi March 12 (Director of the Center of Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins)Cubas
Future Transition to Democracy Can be a Success http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrassimonyi/ (jm)
There is a treasure trove of experiences out there to be considered. We now know how difficult
transition from dictatorship to democracy was, in Spain, in Eastern Europe or South Africa. There
are valuable lessons learned, Cuba need not repeat the mistakes of others. It is easy to erect
institutions of democracy, create a free press, a free and independent judiciary . It is far more

difficult to guard these institutions. Beware of populism, smart and attractive, but equally
dangerous leaders. It is now also understood, that success of change hinges on economic success.
The wider population will embrace democracy only if it associates more freedom with a better life.

For a country without natural resources the only source they can exploit, it the smartness of its
people. Only full-fledged democracy can ensure the frameworks for that. Only strong institutions
can mitigate the ugliness of a privatization. Dreams must be constructive, not destructive.

Cuban Democracy Bad

Environment
Cuba solves the environment now, without democracy
Rand ll, Marcus Rand member of the Development and International Cooperation Programme
University of Jyvskyl in Finland Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development The
Necessity of Democracy for Sustainable Development: A Comparison between the USA and
Cuba http://www.consiliencejournal.org/index.php/consilience/article/viewFile/148/60
This evidence alone should be enough to indicate that democracy is not the exclusive ideology or
form of government for sustainable development to thrive. Cubas constitution specifically
addresses environmental protection and sustainability, while the U.S. constitution largely deals
with the mechanics of governing a country. In the examination of the democratic and socialist governance structures, it
was revealed that both countries have mechanisms for public participation, at least at the theoretical level. In other words, when promoting
sustainable development, the existing mechanisms for individual expression and participation should be used. More specifically, countries and
international organizations such as the UN should be flexible and work with existing forms of government to

promote sustainable development rather than insisting that only a democratic government can
achieve sustainable development. The case studies above show that it is possible to promote sustainable development through
differing governing systems and political ideologies. In evaluating the environmental aspects of sustainable
development, it appears that environmental protection and green technologies are being developed
in both countries. Cuba and the U.S. want to reduce their dependency and increase their self-sufficiency, which simultaneously increases
sustainable living and sovereignty. Cubas smaller ecological footprint seems to further contradict the
notion that democracy is necessary for sustainable development. Critics may counter that much more of Cubas population is
engaged in subsistence farming and has a significantly lower income. While this is true, indicators within the social context seem to indicate
that income is not necessarily positively correlated to quality of life indicators such as education, life expectancy and health. Both Cuba and
the U.S. have made notable steps in pursuing sustainable development, but Cuba has made more of a symbolic

commitment internationally by signing, ratifying and implementing the Biological Diversity

Convention and the Kyoto protocol. Basic quality of life, according to UNICEF, is very similar between the U.S. and Cuba
except for the significant income difference. Moreover, according to the respective countries constitutions, both have a system of participatory
government where the individuals voice can be heard. Given this evidence, it is clear that multiparty democracy is not necessary for
sustainable development.

Cuba solves environment best absent Democracy

Liberation News 13 May 31, 2013 NEWSPAPER OF THE PARTY FOR SOCIALISM AND
LIBERATION AT LIBERATIONNEWS.ORG Cuba: Environmentally sustainable development
is possible Capitalism talks, socialism achieves
http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/newspaper/vol-7-no-7/cuba-environmentally-sustainabledevelopment-is-possible.html
Several years ago, the

World Wildlife Fund called Cuba the only country in the world to have achieved
sustainable development, which it measures as the improvement of the quality of human life within the carrying capacity of a
countrys ecosystem. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 marked a dramatic break with 400 years of Spanish colonization and half a century
of neocolonial intervention led by the United States. The agrarian structure had severe deformations, including immense holdings of foreign capital (U.S. companies
owned nearly 2.5 million acres of land), extensive sugar cane plantations and cattle fields, and an agricultural economy based on the production and export of one
crop, sugar. All these factors had a negative impact on the environment, leading to deforestation, deterioration of sanitation and environmental conditions, pollution
of land and sea waters, and loss of biodiversity, among other things. The peasantry and agricultural workers were extremely impoverished. Because of these factors,

five months after the triumph of the revolution, the First Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. The state
became owner of 40 percent of the land, state enterprise arose and 120,000 farmer previously tenants, sharecroppers and squatters became owners of land. In
1963, the revolution enacted the Second Agrarian Reform Law. Individual ownership of land was limited to 165 acres.
Peasants and agricultural workers became owners of 70 percent of the land, and the state consolidated its enterprises. These two factors were the major feature of
Cuban agriculture and land ownership at the time. The

reform was the first step of the revolutionary government to create optimal conditions
for the development of a comprehensive sustainable economy, which includes, among other things,
protection of the environment. Cuban environmental policy is based on the principles of sustainable
social and economic development, whose primary objective is to generate healthy food supplies for the entire population while protecting the
environment. Cuba already has eliminated extreme poverty in its cities as well in the countryside. Cubas 1976 Constitution
established national sovereignty over the environment and the natural resources of the country. The
National Commission for the Protection of the Environment was created that same year and
protections for the environment have only grown. The economic crisis of the 1990s, caused by the destruction of the socialist camp
and the tightening of the economic blockade imposed by the United States, led the government to search for new forms of land use and natural resources, the
incorporation of environmentally friendly technology in rural agriculture and urban agricultural gardens, and better organization of agricultural cooperatives and land
tenure. The use of many chemical pesticides was eliminated. All

countries, including the United States, engage in environmental

discourse, but economies based on capitalism cannot achieve sustainable development. Economies
based on socialism can.

Cubas current environmental model is best- democracy doesnt help the environment
Wallis 08, Victor Wallis Writer for monthly review, November 1, 2018 Capitalist and Socialist
Responses to the Ecological Crisis http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?
sid=7fce50da-f36b-4125-aa61-b07b95434e31%40sessionmgr4&vid=2&hid=14
The third and most impressive application of socialist ecology is that of Cuba . The initial effect on
Cuba of the Soviet collapse (1991) offers a foretaste of the difficulties that will hit many other

countries when their resource-base is cut off. Although Cuba would later (after 1999) receive
significant oil shipments from Venezuela, it lacked such a collaborative supplier in the early
1990s. Its immediate predicament then was comparable to that which any oil dependent country
will experience in the post-peak oil era. The countrys response was radical, creative, and, above
all, green.42 Confronted with a fuel shortage, the government imported massive numbers of
bicycles. Unable to run tractors and lacking chemical fertilizer, the state promoted a full-scale
return (but at a scientifically intensive level) to organic farming methods. Its reforestation
program serves as an environmental model, and Cuba now offers the only remaining habitat to
many of Americas tropical species. Finally, encouraged by appropriate land-grants, planning

laws, and seed houses the only nationwide infrastructure for urban agriculture in the
world Cubans planted urban gardens on a large scale (more than 30,000 in the city of Havana
as of 2003).43

Stability
The Cuban government will not cooperate with attempts to move away from the current
governing system.
Suchlicki March 4
Suchlicki, Jamie.(Professor and Director of Cuba and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami) Why Cuba Will Still Be AntiAmerican After Castro. March 13, 2013 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-aftercastro/273680/(jm)

But not so fast. There are other Castros in the wings. In particular, Raul's son, Alejandro Castro
Espin, a colonel in Cuba's intelligence apparatus, could be groomed in the future by becoming a
general and a member of the Communist Party Politburo, Cuba's ruling body. In the meantime,
Raul appointed a younger Communist, Miguel Diaz Canel, as first vice president among five other

vice presidents. A hardline party apparatchik, Diaz Canel, a 52-year-old engineer and former
Minister of Education, grew up under Fidel's and Raul's shadow as an obedient and disciplined
Marxist. A protg of Ramon Machado Ventura, an old communist and (till Sunday) first vice
president, Diaz Canel mirrors the ideological rigidity of his mentor. Raul is unwilling to renounce
the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange
for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in

Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes
that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return
for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for
a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are
politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe . Serious

negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually
carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington
and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as
evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States
and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. "I was
not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba. I was elected to defend, maintain and
continue to perfect socialism and not to destroy it."

Empirics prove trying to force Cuban democracy backfires i.e. the embargo
American Society and Council of the Americas February 20, 2013
American Society and Council of the Americas. February 20, 2013. 7 Steps the U.S. President can Take to Promote Change in
Cuba by Adapting the Embargo (jm)

The embargo, fully in place since 1962, has done $108 billion in damage to the Cuba economy, but
also has violated the constitutional rights of Americans and made a market of 11 million people off
limits to U.S. companies, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told reporters. "The blockade is,

without doubt, the principal cause of the economic problems of our country and the essential
obstacle for (our) development," he said, using Cuba's term for the embargo. "The blockade
provokes suffering, shortages, difficulties that reach each Cuban family, each Cuban child,"
Rodriguez said. He spoke at a press conference that Cuba stages each year ahead of what has
become an annual vote in the United Nations on a resolution condemning the embargo. The vote is
expected to take place next month. Last year, 186 countries voted for the resolution, while only the
United States and Israel supported the embargo, Rodriguez said. Lifting the embargo would

improve the image of the United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end

what he called a "massive, flagrant and systematic violation of human rights." That violation
includes restrictions on U.S. travel to the island that require most Americans to get U.S.
government permission to visit and a ban on most U.S. companies doing business in Cuba, he
said. "The prohibition of travel for Americans is an atrocity from the constitutional point of
view," Rodriguez said. Cuba has its own limits on travel that make it difficult for most of its
citizens to leave the country for any destination. Rodriguez said the elimination of the embargo
would provide a much-needed tonic for the sluggish U.S. economy. "In a moment of economic
crisis, lifting the blockade would contribute to the United States a totally new market of 11
million people. It would generate employment and end the situation in which American
companies cannot compete in Cuba," he said. Obama, who said early in his presidency that he
wanted to recast long-hostile U.S.-Cuba relations, has been a disappointment to the Cuban
government, which expected him to do more to dismantle the embargo. He has lifted some
restrictions on travel and all on the sending of remittances to the island, but Rodriguez said he
has broadened the embargo and its enforcement in other areas. Fines against U.S. and foreign
companies and individuals who have violated the embargo have climbed from $89 million in 2011 to
$622 million so far this year, he said.

Cuban Democracy inevitable transition will be violent

Purcell 1991 Susan Kauffman Purcel, Susan Kaufman Purcell is Vice President for Latin American Affairs at the Americas Society,
America and the World 1991 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47460/susan-kaufman-purcell/collapsing-cuba

It is only a matter of time before Cuban communism collapses . While the date of its demise is
obviously unknown in advance, it can be expected sooner rather than later. Fidel Castro still

seems determined to hold back history but, with the death of the Soviet Union, his last hope for a
conservative leadership in Moscow to rescue Cubas crumbling economy may also have died.
The end of Soviet patronage has left Castro with a dilemma: to avoid challenges to his continued
rule and to revive Cubas flagging economy he must relinquish some control, but his domestic
opponents could try to use the momentum of reform to force him from power. As 1991 drew to a
close Castro still had not found a satisfactory solution to his problem. The islands economic
disintegration was accelerating at a breathtaking pace. Aid from the former Soviet Union, which
was already drastically reduced, should now disappear entirely. Castros attempts to attract
foreign capital to replace Soviet subsidies are likely to be too little, too late. Tinkering with the
design of Cubas outmoded communist system may postpone Castros day of reckoning, but
fundamental economic and political changes seem increasingly unavoidable. The most interesting
question now is whether Cuba will be able to avoid violence and experience a peaceful transition
from a communist dictatorship to representative democracy . II The history of the Cuban

Revolution is in great part the history of Cubas growing dependence on Soviet economic and
military aid. By the beginning of the 1990s almost three quarters of Cuban imports came from
the Soviet Union, principally Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. The most
important import was petroleum. Until 1991 the Soviet Union furnished virtually all, and often
more than, the estimated 10 million tons of oil Cuba used annually. In return Cuba exported to
the Soviets sugar, some citrus, tobacco and nickel...
Under the socialist regime, Cuba has served as a model of stability and anti-imperialism
since the 60s.
Kapacia 12

KAPCIA, ANTONI. "Celebrating 50 Years - But Of What Exactly And Why Is Latin America
Celebrating It?." Bulletin Of Latin American Research 31.(2012): 58-76. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 5 July 2013.
Moreover, we should not forget that another aspect of longevity and continuity regarding Cuba
can be detected in the fact that, just as many on the Left in the 1960s saw in the new Cuba some
sort of model, both to achieve revolution and to create a desirable anti-imperialist and egalitarian
system, and just as, in the 1970s, progressive Latin American and Caribbean governments turned
to Cuba for advice on how to structure their social and land reform programmes, so too now, since
the late 1990s, have an increasing number of politicians and governments in Latin America
turned to Cuba for some sort of template. This, therefore, in turn raises the question as to

whether it is the rest of Latin America that has changed in what it takes from Cuba or whether
the changes in Cubans own denition of their Revolution are less important than any
continuity within the whole process.

Cuba has been one of the worlds most resilient nations under socialism
Kapacia 12
KAPCIA, ANTONI. "Celebrating 50 Years - But Of What Exactly And Why Is Latin America
Celebrating It?." Bulletin Of Latin American Research 31.(2012): 58-76. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 5 July 2013.
Hence, after 1997, Cuba was once again appreciated, rather than admired, as a model of survival
(because Cubas collapse was greater than any recession suffered during the regions lost
decade), and also, emotionally and morally, as an example and inspiration. Indeed, the latter
helps explain the widespread respect for Fidel Castro, despite evident political differences
between the doyen of anti-imperialism and the admiring leaders who trek in pilgrimage to
Havana after taking power. The latter also realise, of course, that their own domestic political

legitimacy gains through public sympathy with Cubas plight, although this in turn conrms the
continuing appeal of Cuba (as an idea) beyond the political class. Yet, there is another
motivation for many of these leaders attraction to the still magnetic pole of Havana: namely,
the reality that their formal sympathy for Cuba is a way of acquiring historical legitimacy from
clearly leftist forces while they themselves are obliged to drop their former radicalism and move
towards variations on neoliberal economics. However, even allowing for such self-serving
motivations, the reality is also that, if there is any lesson to be learned from Cuba by these new
governments or movements, it is that Cubas nation-building project is still based on the unusual
and vital element of participation. In other words, the new admirers seem to have realised that,
while Cubas commitment to nationalisation, a state-run economy and single-party rule, with a
formally Marxist ideology, are no longer as acceptable as in the 1960s to a redened Left,
Cuba does perhaps teach something to a post-military, post-recession, postWashington-Consensus
and post-democratisation regime, in a context where previous nation-building processes (including
populist structures from 1930) have been dismantled by the combination of military rule,
neoliberalism, recession and debt.

The Cuban idea of a socialist democracy is supported by Cubans and has allowed the
nation to survive.
Raby 9

RABY, DIANA. "Why Cuba Still Matters." Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist
Magazine 60.8 (2009): 1-13. Academic Search Premier. Web. 5 July 2013
Cubas success in surviving the extraordinary rigors of the worst years of the Special Period
in the mid-1990s cannot possibly be explained in any other way than by the continued vitality
of the revolution. The scarcity and hardship was such that any other government would have
collapsed in a matter of months. No one who visited Cuba in those years could fail to be impressed
by the stoicism and commitment of the Cuban people when power supplies only functioned for a

few hours a day, food rotted in the fields for lack of transportation to market, workers spent
six hours a day getting to and from workplaces on foot only to find that nothing could be done
for want of fuel, and the shelves of the stores were literally bare. This took place in a country
that was deluged with images of U.S. consumer society and counter-revolutionary propaganda,
and where everyone knew that the Berlin Wall had fallen and that the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe had collapsed like ninepins. Yet in Cuba there was only one serious protest, in
August 1994, and although some took to rafts to cross the Florida Straits in desperation, the

majority remained faithful to the revolution. A crucial factor in Cubas survival was the
commitment and example of the leadership, especially Fidel. But another essential point was
that the socialist orientation of policy was never abandoned: unlike Sandinista Nicaragua,
which under severe pressure in the late eighties adopted IMF recommendations, liberating
prices of basic commodities, and marketizing social services, Cuba maintained free universal
health care and education and subsidized rates for housing and utilities. It also intensified
rather than abandoningdemocratic consultation with the mass of the population regarding the
measures to be taken. Just when former Communist leaders were falling over each other to
embrace capitalism and Western governments were telling their populations there was no
alternative to neoliberalism, the Cuban leaders embarked on an extensive process of
consultation involving some 80,000 workers parliaments throughout the country in order to
discuss the measures needed to resolve the economic crisis. Despite the conventional notion
of Cuba as a dictatorship (albeit, for those on the left, a benevolent one), the Cubans have
always maintained that they have their own form of socialist democracy. After what form of
democracy; rejection of Stalinist authoritarianism should After what happened in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, skepticism about this is understandable. But one of the great errors
of progressive thought in recent decades has been the unquestioning acceptance of liberal
polyarchy as the only valid form of democracy; rejection of Stalinist authoritarianism should
not mean abandoning the Marxist critique of bourgeois liberalism.
Generic democracy arguments d/n apply, Cuba is a unique instance of stable socialism
Raby 9
RABY, DIANA. "Why Cuba Still Matters." Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist
Magazine 60.8 (2009): 1-13. Academic Search Premier. Web. 5 July 2013
Furthermore, the Cubans have been explicit in saying that they do not regard their own socialism
as a blueprint to be copied. What Cuba provided was a living example, a demonstration .that
contrary to the conventional wisdom of the New World Order, the state is not powerless and
that it is possible to build and maintain a noncapitalist alternative. What was not possible was to
reproduce the Cuban strategy of armed revolution, and this was the great contribution of Chvez

and the Venezuelans: to devise a new strategy which was neither purely military nor purely
electoral, but a combination of popular mobilization, elections, and military support.

Cuban socialist models are being considered to stabilize the rest of Latin America
Raby 9
RABY, DIANA. "Why Cuba Still Matters." Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist
Magazine 60.8 (2009): 1-13. Academic Search Premier. Web. 5 July 2013
Finally, the extraordinary generosity and commitment of thousands of Cuban internationalists
providing medical and other services in conditions few others would accept is living testimony to
the reality of the countrys socialist project. The veteran British journalist Hugh

OShaughnessy recently offered a moving account of the Cuban missions in Bolivia. He quoted
Mara de los ngeles, a Cuban doctor working as Director of the Ophthalmological Hospital in
El Alto, Bolivia, at nearly 4,000 metres altitude and in harsh conditions: I think there is always
an element of love involved, she said: Before I left Cuba for Guatemala and Bolivia, I
didnt know what real poverty was like.16 While Cuba continues to practice solidarity like this,
its relevance to the global anticapitalist movement can scarcely be questioned . But also, this
presence in the ALBA countries is further evidence that Cuba cannot be separated from the
inspiring new developments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and elsewhere: Latin America today
demonstrates that another world really is possible, and Cuba is central to the creation of that
world.

Venezuelan Democracy Good

Environment
Venezuelas autocracy is contributing significantly to the damage done to the environment
Guadilla 10, Maria, Professor Garca-Guadilla is a tenured professor in the Urban Planning, Political Sciences, and Environment and
Development Departments of the University Simn Bolvar (USB) in Venezuela; she also created and is currently Director of the Interdisciplinary
Research Laboratory in Environmental, Urban and Sociopolitical Conflicts Resolution (GAUS-USB). Mara Pilar holds an M.A in Social
Sciences and a PhD in Human Ecology and Urban Sociology from the University of Chicago, Venezuela: the myth of "Eco-socialism of the XXI
Century", http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/04/13/18644631.php

The development model based in the exploitation of hydrocarbons that the Venezuelan government
has proposed on a national level, for countries part of the ALBA and the South American and
Caribbean region that participates in the IIRSA, has been strongly questioned by the
environmental, indigenous and human rights movements due to the large scale environmental and
socio-cultural impacts that will generate. In various discussions on the subject made in the World
Social Forum carried out in Caracas in January 2006, indigenous social movements and
environmentalists of Venezuela and the world expressed strong criticism against the negative effects
of oil exploitation, being the largest mobilization of the Forum the march against exploitation and

expansion of coal developments in the Sierra de Perija in support of life, environment, cultural
identity and, in general, rights sanctioned in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999
(Soberania.org.ve, 2006). Currently, there are frequent protests against negative effects of oil and
gas in Ecuador and Venezuela, and questioning via national and international digital
environmental networks such as oilwatch.org, maippa.org, soberana.org and
amigransa.blogia.com; because these spaces are privileged and globalized electronic networks of
resistance against the negative impacts of oil and gas exploitation in tropical countries.
Venezuelas autocracy uses oil exports to fund most of its functions
Hammond, 11, John L., John L. Hammond received his B.A. in History from Harvard College and his Ph.D. in Sociology from the
University of Chicago, He teaches courses on Sociology of Work, American Society, Human Rights, Development and Globalization, and Latin
American Societies, The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela,

http://www.eslpascaipb.net/downloads/61845346.pdf
In this paper I will compare Angola and Venezuela to illustrate alternative ways of using oil
wealth. The two countries illustrate three different scenarios: Angola is a classic example of the
resource curse, while Venezuela has overcome it, at least to some degree. Venezuela successfully
channeled oil revenues into productive investment in the 1980s and 1990s when the national oil
company operated autono- mously from the state, preventing its revenues from being used to
finance social welfare expenditures. Since President Hugo Chvez took office in 1999, Venezuela
has reasserted political control of the company and used its revenues for social programs. So oil is
not inevi- tably a curse. An oil-rich government can make political choices to use its oil wealth to
benefit its people. There is no disagreement, however, that Venezuelan oil is econom- ically,
politically, and strategically important, both domestically and internationally. Oil accounts for
about 80% of Venezuelas exports, half of total government revenues, and one third of GDP (Table
1). It is the ninth largest oil producer in the world, the sixth largest in oil exports, and the fourth
largest source of U. S. oil imports, amounting to 1.41 million bpd in 2006.
Oil production harms many parts of the environment
Dabbs, 12, John, Oil Production And Environmental Damage

http://africaoil.ning.com/profiles/blogs/oil-production-and-environmental-damage

Although much of the world depends on the production or the trade of oil to fuel its economies ,
these activities can cause severe damage to the environment, either knowingly or unintentionally.
Oil production, and/or transportation, can disrupt the human population, and the animal and fish
life of the region. Oil waste dumping, production pollution, and spills wreak havoc on the
surrounding wildlife and habitat. It threatens the extinction of several plants, and has already
harmed many land, air, and sea animal and plant species. The effects of oil on marine life are

cause by either the physical nature of the oil (physical contamination and smothering) or by its
chemical components (toxic effects and accumulation leading to tainting). Marine life may also
be affected by clean-up operations or indirectly through physical damage to the habitats in which
plants and animals live. The animals and plants most at risk are those that could come into
contact with a contaminated sea surface: marine animals and reptiles; birds that feed by diving or
form flocks on the sea; marine life on shorelines; and animals and plants in mariculture facilities.
Runoffs from petroleum processing and petrochemical plants have dumped tons of toxic wastes into
nearby waters. Gas and oil pipelines have stanched many creeks and rivers, swamping prime
pastures and cropland. Furthermore, entire bays and lagoons along coasts have been fouled by oil
spills and runoff of toxic chemicals. The environmental damage that is a result of oil retraction and
production can also directly effect human life in the region. Damage can include pollution of water

resources and contamination of the soil. Humans are effected by environmental devastation
because it is damaging to vegetation, livestock, and to the health of the human body itself. Oil spills
can interfere with the normal working of power stations and desalination plants that require a
continuous supply of clean seawater and with the safe operation of coastal industries and ports.
Environmental damage can also be a result of conflict over oil-producing regions. Environmental
harm associated with oil resources can either be attributed to a side effect of conflict, or, in some
cases, it is associated with military aggression that is intended to damage the natural resources of
the region

Stability
Democracy key to Venezuelan Stability key to American economy
Duddy 2012
Patrick D. Duddy Visiting Senior Lecturer in International Studies at Duke University and Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. "Political
Unrest in Venezuela." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 2012. Web. 02 July 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936>.

the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the

importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela . The United States should
restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the
continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States
should emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuelas political problems, it
should also encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemispheres concern
that democracy be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and
violence be avoided. The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and
verification of results should be stressed. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the
As the election approaches,

Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian Revolution. More specifically,
the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible:

Democracy key to Venezuelan stability

Johnson, 03
Johnson, Stephen. (Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation). "Stability and
Democracy, Not Oil, Are at Risk in Venezuela." The Heritage Foundation. N.p., 12 Feb. 2003.
Web. 02 July 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/02/stability-anddemocracy-not-oil>.

Venezuela is the world's fifth largest oil producer and normally provides 13 percent of U.S.
petroleum imports, but the United States should not be so eager to open the spigot that it acquiesces
to the consolidation of an emerging dictatorship or to prolonged turmoil there. Neither outcome will
enhance stability in volatile South America or assure a steady supply of petroleum at a time when the United
States is likely to engage in military action in Iraq. The only way to rescue Venezuela's viability as an
energy producer and trade partner is to help restore democracy by bringing sustained pressure on
President Hugo Chvez to allow a peaceful, constitutional vote on his mandate and then supervise the resulting
campaign and vote to safeguard political and civil liberties until the Venezuelan government is able to do so itself. So
far, the Bush Administration has pursued this course.

Democracy key to Venezuelan stability

Johnson, 03
Johnson, Stephen. (Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation). "Stability and
Democracy, Not Oil, Are at Risk in Venezuela." The Heritage Foundation. N.p., 12 Feb. 2003.

Web. 02 July 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/02/stability-anddemocracy-not-oil>.

To avoid dependence on unstable regimes for critical resources, the U.S. should facilitate exploration
elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin and in Alaska and welcome market-developed technologies that are less
dependent on finite resources. Meanwhile, by increasing international pressure on Venezuela's president

to agree to a constitutional, democratic decision on the future of his country with outside scrutiny to
safeguard the process, the United States can help restore stability to this important energy producer
and ally. Moreover, it can help the people of Venezuela retake their government, open up their
economy, and work for the kind of prosperity that has so far eluded them.

Democracy key to Venezuelan stability and standing in the world

Chirsty 2013
Christy, Patrick. "Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela." US News.
U.S.News & World Report, 15 Mar. 2013. Web. 02 July 2013.
<http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-mustencourage-democratic-venezuela>.
Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez
will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez
long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power,
undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election
through corruption, fraud and intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that
free and fair elections,properly monitored by respected international election observers, are
essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John
Kerry should work with regional partnersincluding (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexicoto firmly encourage
Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime
enablers in China, Iran and Russia.

Venezuelan Democracy Bad

Stability
Democracy doesnt work in Venezuela- creates instability
Schuyler, 96
George W. Schuyler Latin American Perspectives , Vol. 23, No. 3, Postbonanza Venezuela
(Summer, 1996), pp. 10-29 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Article Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/stable/2634105
Venezuelans have begun to question an electoral democracy that fails to deliver jobs and meet
basic human needs. Corruption, judicial venality, and the repression of protest disfigure the
system. Politicians and parties draw scathing criticism from religious and civic groups. Church leaders have condemned Venezuela's
political establishment for "demagoguery and vile deceit" and argued that Venezuelans "have been betrayed by those who pretend to be public
servants, while they have only been becoming more and more wealthy" (Latinamerica Press, May 16, 1991, 2). What both

Venezuelans and some outside critics seem to agree upon is the need for broader and deeper
popular participation in the political process and more equitable distribution of the benefits of the
development process. Since 1935, when a 27-year dictatorship ended, and especially since 1958, Vene- zuela's political, military, and
business elites have sought to modernize their nation and to avoid the bloody civil strife that characterized the 19th century. Petroleum
revenues contributed to social peace by allowing populist govern- ments to dampen potentially disruptive issues through public spending.
Periodic elections, combined with party-led patronage, agrarian reform, and the expansion of educational and health services, gave the
appearance of a stable, working democracy. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Venezuelan state buckled under the burden of about US$30
billion in debt, low oil prices, and structural adjustment. In its weakened condition, the state is unable to provide adequate basic services or to
meet the demands of organized social groups, in part because of its commitments to international financial agencies and foreign capital. It
cannot control inflation. Between 1988 and 1992, the cost of basic foods and services soared-eggs went up 500 percent, corn flour 557 percent,
coffee 800 percent, electricity 1,000 percent, and telephone rates 500 percent (Latinamerica Press, February 6, 1992, 1). Beginning in the mid1980s, deterioration accelerated in employment and in the quantity and quality of public services that are crucial to the well-being of the poor-
health, education, water, sewage, transportation, roads, and police protection. President Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993) had campaigned on
promises to recapture the petroleum-based prosperity that characterized his first admin- istration (1974-1978). Once elected, however, he
concluded an agreement behind closed doors with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to under- take structural adjustment. The

drastic price hikes and public austerity measures associated with the implementation of this
agreement early in 1989 triggered a social explosion that shattered the illusion of Venezuelan
democracy.

Enviornment
Venezuelas oil company is governed like a private company in a democracy this leaves
Venezuela with a surplus of oil and checks offshore drilling
Hogan and Sturtzenegger 10, William and Federico, Professor Hogan is Research Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy
Group (HEPG), which is exploring the issues involved in the transition to a more competitive electricity market and Federico Sturzenegger is
President of Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Previously, he was Visiting Professor of Public Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, Dean of the Business School of Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Secretary of Economic Policy of the Republic
of Argentina and Chief Economist of YPF, The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment Without Public Commitment,

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=R3qCcL-zNrwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA409&dq=
%22venezuela%22+AND+%22democracy%22+AND+%22oil+infrastructure%22+AND+
%22increase
%22&ots=UAW6atSlPd&sig=YuHqPMKhvcu8_9eDybGVG32b6lc#v=onepage&q=venezuela&
f=false
From a legal perspective, PDVSA and its affiliated companies were corporations subject to private
law, with the Republic of Venezuela as the sole shareholder. They were governed by commercial
regulations, such as the Code of Commerce applicable to the private sector. Their budgets and
financial outcomes were approved at a shareholders meeting, where the Minister of Energy and
Mines represented the sole shareholder. The nationalized oil industry was governed and run as a
commercial company. The affiliated companies retained the corporate structure of their foreign
predecessors and kept following their systems and procedures regarding operations, personnel
management, finance, time of nationalization, in just fifteen years, Venezuela was faced with a
radically different reality: a superabundant stock of reserves that would sustain capacity, at current
levels, for centuries to come .

Offshore oil drilling destroys the marine environment

Rose 09, Mary, Ed.D. in Education, (2002), Indiana University, Instructional Systems Technology, Minor: Educational Psychology, M.S. in
Education, (2001), Indiana University, Instructional Systems Technology, M.A. in Secondary Education, (1983), West Virginia University,
Technology Education, B.S. in Education, (1980), Northeastern State University, Industrial Arts Education, The Environmental Impacts of
Offshore Oil Drilling

http://www2.tec.ilstu.edu/students/tec_304/Rose%20Oil%20Drilling.pdf
There are known detrimental impacts upon the marine environment for all phases of offshore
E&P (Patin, 1999). While natural seepages contribute more hydrocarbons to the marine
environment by volume, the quick influx and concentration of oil during a spill makes them
especially harmful to localized marine organisms and communities. Plants and animals that
become coated in oil perish from mechanical smothering, birds die from hypothermia as their
feathers lose their waterproofing, turtles die after ingesting oil-coated food, and animals become
disoriented and exhibit other behavior changes after breathing volatile organic compounds.
When emitted into the marine environment, oil, produced water, and drilling muds may adversely
impact an entire population by disrupting its food chain and reproductive cycle. Marine estuaries
are especially susceptible, as hydrocarbons and other toxins tend to persist in the sediments
where eggs and young often begin life.

Venezuelan Stability Impacts

Venezuelan Instability destroys US democracy efforts and opens up Iran and Cuban
influence Democracy Key
Duddy 12
Patrick D. Duddy Visiting Senior Lecturer in International Studies at Duke University and
Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. "Political Unrest in Venezuela." Council on Foreign
Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 2012. Web. 02 July 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936>.
Democracy promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the
Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian,
undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and
weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a
suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuelas democracy as a setback for U.S.
policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez
regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close
relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other
assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in
exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.

Venezuelan Instability hurts Americans relations with Latin America

Duddy 12
Patrick D. Duddy Visiting Senior Lecturer in International Studies at Duke University and
Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. "Political Unrest in Venezuela." Council on Foreign
Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 2012. Web. 02 July 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936>.
Regional cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation
particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a
core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America,
the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically
elected 5 governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in
Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the
organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its
relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in
the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly
to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that
characterized the hemispheres efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to
U.S. relations with the region.

Venezuelan Instability hurts Americas private sector and the global oil market
Duddy 12
Patrick D. Duddy Visiting Senior Lecturer in International Studies at Duke University and
Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. "Political Unrest in Venezuela." Council on Foreign
Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 2012. Web. 02 July 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936>.
Economic interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it
remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services. Many of

these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out . Venezuela is consistently
among the five largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is
Venezuelas largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up
to 45 percent of Venezuelas total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of
Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although
a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely
given Venezuelas dependence on the U.S. market. The United States is now less
vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen
and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuelas
economy, on the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although
production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuelas
export earnings, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the governments
budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports
generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react
negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan
relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil.