Part IV

Termination of Relations

A. Modes of termination
End of term
Fernandez v Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, 3-30-63
Facts:
Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City on January 7,
1954, took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia,
in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty
of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty.
Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City with two
offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and
another for oral defamation (Criminal Case No. 438), for which he was suspended from office
by the then Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension be
lifted but it was denied. After the prosecution had rested its cases and without requiring the
accused to submit his defense, the latter was acquitted in the two criminal cases
abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal
administrative charge were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation
conducted of said charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo
wrote Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of
police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place requesting him at the
same time to turn over his office to Ledesma. The nomination of Ledesma having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of
police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted an action for quo
warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as
provided by law was in violation of our Constitution.
Issue:
WON, the removal of Fernandez from office by the President was valid in accordance with
Section 17, RA 288 Charter of the City of Basilan.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has put an end to the
services of appellant as chief of police of Basilan City on April 28, 1959, and this he did
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as
the Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows:
SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and employees Compensation.
The President shall appoint with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
municipal judge and auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurerassessor, the city attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of
the city which may be created from time to time, and the President may remove at
his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal
judge, who may be removed only according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be noted, under the aforesaid section, the President is vested with the authority to
appoint, with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, among others, the chief of
police, and in connection with such power the same section says "the President may remove
at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge,
who may be removed only according to law." Verily, the President interpreted said removal
clause as meaning that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under
the charter at his discretion or pleasure with the exception of the municipal judge who may
be removed only according to law, and in the exercise of such power he terminated the

services of appellant as chief of police.

We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says that the President may
remove at his discretion any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative
intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. If such were not the case, it would not have made a distinction
in point of removal between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. This
distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is there
any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, and for that matter of any
appointive officer, with the exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period.
The fact no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an intention to make it
dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power. And Congress is not
wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly said: "A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign function of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public" (7 Mechem, Public Officers, Section 1; See also 42 Am. Jur., 944-955; Emphasis
supplied). And in Alba v. Alajar, 53 O.G. No. 5, p. 1452, this Court also said: "Congress can
legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure
of the President."
Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he contends that the act of
the President in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position of chief of police of Basilan City
in his place is tantamount to his removal without cause from office in violation of Section 4,
Article XII, of our Constitution, invoking in support thereof our ruling in the cases of De los
Santos v. Mallare, 48 O.G., 1791 and Lacson v. Roque, 49 O.G., 93. But this contention
cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of police does not have a fixed
term. As already said, it was made dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the
President, whereas the cases invoked by appellant relate to positions for which the law fixes
a definite term of office. What is in point here is the case of Alba v. Alajar, supra, wherein
this Court made the following pronouncement:
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the
President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal.
The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of his tenure , which
is one the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. On this score, section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative in the Santos vs. Mallare case,
is different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603. Section 2546 refers to removal at
pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of
the President.
Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether legal cause should
precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure
of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the
President.
The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, inopposite to the instant proceedings.
For all of them relate to removal of officials in violation of laws which prescribe fixity of term.
"'Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act
itself is valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has
been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with
the policy laid down by Congress therein.
Hernandez v Villegas, G.R. No. L-17287, 6-30-65
Facts:
Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of
the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. In 1956,
he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices
under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the

International Cooperation Administration.

Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily
detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was
designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent,
however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security and, when the
salary was increased from P6,600 to P7,017.60, he also received the corresponding salary
adjustment.
On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the
President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his
letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status
from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a
classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of
Director for Security was likewise proposed.
On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary Hernandez that the
President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly,
Villegas and Keefe's appointments, effective January 1, 1958, were prepared and later
signed by Secretary Hernandez. As the Court of Appeals observed in its decision, "In one of
the appointments, defendant Keefe was promoted to the position of Director for Security ...
and in the other plaintiff was demoted to the rank of arrastre superintendent." (Emphasis
supplied)
It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28,
1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security
and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. On
March 3, 1958, therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas
that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also
wrote the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget
Commissioner, and the Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security.
Villegas resorted for quo warranto and the judgment was on his favor.
Issue/s:
1) WON, the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs, is a primarily
confidential position
Held/Ratio:
Not necessarily, SC said that, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is
primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject
to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4) Villanuevas' removal,
is, therefore, concededly without cause. Thus, only recently, this Court reiterated in Corpus
v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965, the view that :
[T]he Constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily
confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit a fitness as
determined from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 49 O.G.
[No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the
operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of
Article XII that
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
and which recognizes no exception.
This view finds confirmation in sections 3 and 5 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act No.
2260).
The statement in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, to the effect that appointment to any of
the three classes of positions is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be
deemed a mere obiter. It has been correctly criticized as misleading. For if these three
special positions do not really belong to the Civil Service, the Constitution would not have

specifically named them as an exception to the general rule that all appointments must be
made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examinations.
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law 411 [11th ed. 1962]) Indeed, in the Corpus case, this
statement was held as not controlling, the ruling in the De los Santos case, where the
statement appears, being that a city engineer who belongs to the unclassified service is
protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution.
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers. (See, e.g., Corpus v. Cuaderno, supra; Alba vs. Evangelista, 53 O.G. 1452;
Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18879, March 30, 1963. Contra Hojilla v. Marino, G.R. No.
L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965.) But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures and
it has been shown that it has been lost in this case the incumbent is entitled to continue
in office.
We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without
cause and is therefore illegal.
Retirement
Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
Facts:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of
Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the
effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the
service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and
void.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as
and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had
occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS
during all times required by law.
In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well
as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to
1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also
indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the
GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor
General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900.
According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner
discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in
1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he
was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of
age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had
been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in
September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and
Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board
and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service
Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was
endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22,
1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of
Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence

to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as
January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to
the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable
recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum
dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his
initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of
petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. As emphasized by
petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has
been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the
2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to
petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the
basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on
October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as
January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due
to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more
specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to
the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of
petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine
National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since
January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last
January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government
service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961."
Issue/s:
WON, the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by
General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all
circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches,
estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it acted within its powers. It is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General
Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must
be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by
the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following
powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of
the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the
functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager,
who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and
social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or
more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an
actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they
may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their
compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall
have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications
to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees:
Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages
the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and
the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to
act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of
authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to
manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the
General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities,
the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General
Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the
System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this
principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of
the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its
administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and
workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the
government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the
saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if
the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its
controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. We hold that any authority
conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said
Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the
actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the
authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality
is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is
not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law
clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief
executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General
Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually
boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this
clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which
another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and
that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral
and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,
upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610,
614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government
officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the
age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the
government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate
perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a
comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting
demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the
public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the

duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the
Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence
before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be
disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.
For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material
government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his
date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to
January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise,
and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was
duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the
Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. It is to be noted
that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent
System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to
take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal
Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the
General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations
are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes
an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the
constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature
and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance
policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his
retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake
in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.
Abolition of office
Busacay v Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 1033
Facts:
The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan.
His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On
October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at
the rate of P720 per annum. On March 21, 1946, he resigned but on April 16 he was
reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was
destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laid off.
Previously, from July 17 to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to
traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not
been paid salaries because they had not rendered any service, but upon the reopening of
the bridge to traffic after the repairs, he and his companions resumed work without new
appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947.
When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November,
1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness
to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint
him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in
February, 1951, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The position
now carries a salary of P1,440 a year. The Bued toll bridge is a portion of a national road and

is a national toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid
from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these
salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll
bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees
thereon, and prescribed corresponding rules and regulations.
Issue/s:
WON, by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided
therefor were abolished.
Held/Ratio:
No. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it
wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought,
avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather the contrary was
taken for granted, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon
and to Baguio.
This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to
suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation
as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is coextensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by
statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the
power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
The fact that the destruction of the bridge in question was total, and not partial as in 1945,
the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new
structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail
and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We
believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments were not
considered forfeited notwithstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines
and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new
appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed
Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before
the destruction of the Bued river bridge.
The claim for back salary and/or damages may not be granted, however. Without deciding
the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not
personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper
authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit.

Manalang v Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954

Facts:
Petitioner Luis Manalang contests, by quo warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and seeks to take possession of said
office as the person allegedly entitled thereto.
The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano, who, at the time of the filing of the petition

(August 4, 1953), held said office, which he assumed on July 1, 1953, by virtue of a
designation made, in his favor, as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service,
by the Office of the President of the Philippines. Subsequently, or on October 22, 1953,
petitioner included, as respondents, Emiliano Morabe, who, on September 11, 1953, was
designated Acting commissioner of National Employment Service, and Zosimo G. Linato, the
Collecting, Disbursing and Property Officer of said National Employment Service
hereinafter referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Service in order to restrain him from
paying, to respondent Morabe, the salary of the Commissioner of said Service. Still later, or
on January 21, 1954, Mohamad de Venancio, who was designated Acting Commissioner of
said Service, and assumed said office, on January 11 and 13, respectively, of the same year,
was included as respondent.
Petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the Placement Bureau, an office created by
Executive Order No. 392, dated December 31, 1950 (46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 5913, 59205921), avowedly pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Republic Act No. 422. On
June 20, 1952, Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organization of a
National Employment Service," was approved and became effective. Section 1 thereof partly
provides:
. . . In order to ensure the best possible organization of the employment market as an
integral part of the national program for the achievement and maintenance of
maximum employment and the development and use of productive resources there
is hereby established a national system of free public employment offices to be
known as the National Employment Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service.
the Service shall be under the executive supervision and control of the Department of
Labor, and shall have a chief who shall be known as the Commissioner of the
National employment Service hereinafter referred to as Commissioner. Said
Commissioner shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments and shall receive compensation at the rate of
nine thousand pesos per annum. A Deputy Commissioner shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and
shall receive compensation at the rate of seven thousand two hundred pesos per
annum.
On June 1, 1953, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras, recommended the appointment
of petitioner Luis Manalang as Commissioner of the Service. On June 29, 1953, respondent
Aurelio Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made a similar recommendation in favor
of Manalang, upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and "loyal to service and
administration." Said Acting Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that he would
probably be appointed to the office in question. However, on July 1, 1953, Quitoriano was
the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting Commissioner of the Service. Such designation
of Quitoriano like the subsequent designation, first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of
Mohamad de Venancio is now assailed by Manalang as "illegal" and equivalent to removal
of the petitioner from office without cause.
Issue/s:
WON, Manalang was illegally removed from office without cause.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was not. Petitioner Manalang has never been Commissioner of the National
Employment Service and, hence, he could not have been, and has not been removed
therefrom. Secondly, to remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration of
his term. As removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Such is not the case of
petitioner herein, for Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau, and,
by implication, the office of director thereof, which, obviously, cannot exist without said
Bureau. By the abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto of its incumbent,
petitioner herein, was necessarily extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil. Const.), is not in point,
for there has been neither a removal nor a suspension of petitioner Manalang, but an

abolition of his former office of Director of the Placement Bureau, which, admittedly, is
within the power of Congress to undertake by legislation.
It is argued, however, in petitioner's memorandum, that
. . . there is no abolition but only fading away of the title Placement Bureau and all its
functions are continued by the National Employment Service because the two titles
cannot co-exist. The seemingly additional duties were only brought about by the
additional facilities like the district offices. Employment Service Advisory Councils,
etc.
The question whether or not Republic Act No. 761 abolished the Placement Bureau is one of
legislative intent, about which there can be no controversy whatsoever, in view of the
explicit declaration in the second paragraph of section 1 of said Act reading:
Upon the organization of the Service, the existing Placement Bureau and the existing
Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare shall be abolished, and all the
files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel and unexpended balances of
appropriations of said Bureau and Commission pertaining to said bureau or office
shall thereupon be transferred to the Service. (Emphasis supplied.)
Incidentally, this transfer connotes that the National Employment Service is different and
distinct from the Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transferred only from one place to
another, not to the same place. Had Congress intended the National Employment Service to
be a mere amplification or enlargement of the Placement Bureau, Republic Act No. 761
would have directed the retention of the "qualified personnel" of the latter, not their transfer
to the former. Indeed, the Service includes, not only the functions pertaining to the former
Placement Bureau, but also, those of the former Employment Office in the Commission of
Social Welfare, apart from other powers, not pertaining to either office, enumerated in
section 4 of Republic Act No. 761.
It is next urged in petitioner's memorandum "that the item of National Employment Service
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the petitioner" and that the petitioner is
entitled to said office "automatically by operation of law," in view of the above quoted
provision of section 1 of Republic Act No. 761, relative to the transfer to the service of the
"qualified personnel" of the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare.
This contention is inconsistent with the very allegations of petitioner's pleadings. Thus, in
paragraph 11 of his petition, it is alleged "that increasing the item and elaborating the title
of a civil servant, although necessitating a new appointment, does not mean the ousting of
the incumbent or declaring the item vacant." In paragraph 12 of the same pleading,
petitioner averred that "on or about June 25, 1953, two days before the departure of
President Quirino to Baltimore, petitioner wrote a confidential memorandum to His
Excellency reminding him of the necessity of appointing anew the petitioner as head of the
National Employment Service."
Having thus admitted and correctly that he needed a new appointment as
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, it follows that petitioner does not hold
or, in his own words, occupy the latter's item, inasmuch as the right thereto may be
acquired only by appointment. What is more, Republic Act No. 761 requires specifically that
said appointment be made by the President of the Philippines 'with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments." How could the President and the Commission on
Appointments perform these acts if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the National Employment Service?
Neither may petitioner profit by the provision of the second paragraph of section 1 of
Republic Act No. 761, concerning the transfer to the Service of the "qualified personnel" of
the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare,
because:
1. Said transfer shall be affected only "upon the organization" of the National Employment
Service, which does not take place until after the appointment of, at least, the commissioner
thereof. If the Director of the Placement Bureau were included in the phrase "qualified
personnel" and, as a consequence, he automatically became Commissioner of the Service,

the latter would have become organized simultaneously with the approval of Republic Act
No. 761, and the same would not have conditioned the aforementioned transfer "upon the
organization of the Service," which connotes that the new office would be established at
some future time. Indeed, in common parlance, the word "personnel" is used generally to
refer to the subordinate officials or clerical employees of an office or enterprise, not to the
managers directors or heads thereof.
2. If "qualified personnel" included the heads of the offices affected by the establishment of
the Service, then it would, also, include the chief of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare, who, following petitioner's line of argument, would, like
petitioner herein, be, also, a Commissioner of the National Employment Service. The result
would be that we would have either two commissioners of said Service or a Commission
thereof consisting of two persons instead of a Commissioner and neither alternative is
countenanced by Republic Act No. 761.
3. Congress can not either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to said office. The appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to
prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.
Facundo v Pablan, G.R. No. L-17746, January 31, 1962
Facts:
On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669)
against respondents Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Layos, Domingo,
Lopez, de los Trinos, Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Perez (municipal treasurer)
alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed
Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held
said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because
he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service
examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260,
known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal
councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved
Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and that four days later, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry
clerk.
As second cause of action, the petition alleged that the other petitioner Facundo, a third
grade civil service eligible was appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Asingan, on October 15, 1958, and has continuously held and performed the
duties of said position and received the emoluments therefor since his appointment; that in
said Resolution No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28, 1960, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector.
The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and the
termination of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions;
that in approving and adopting said resolution and in terminating their services, respondents
were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives; that respondents' acts are oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of the cited Republic Act No. 2260.
Petitioners, therefore, prayed that a preliminary mandatory order 1 be issued directing
respondent mayor Carbonell to reinstate them to their positions; and that judgment be
rendered declaring respondents to have acted illegally in passing said resolution, and in
terminating petitioners' services, declaring void said resolution for being oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260
To this petition, respondents timely filed their answer alleging, among others, that the
positions abolished under the resolution in question "were unnecessary and useless and
carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other employees in the office of the

Municipal Treasurer"; that the appropriation for said positions, "could be applied for more
important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation
and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of
maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past"; and that said
resolution "is valid and lawful, enacted and resolved with a view of bringing about a better
and more efficient administration and in consonance with the promise and avowed policy of
the present administration of maintaining peace and order" for which it received the
confidence of the people of Asingan in the last local elections. Respondents prayed that the
petition be dismiss with costs.
The lower court ruled that the abolition of the position of Ulep was valid, being not civil
service legible while the abolition of the position of Facundo is not valid as he was entitled to
permanency being civil service legible.
To this, Ulep appealed while the respondents appealed out of the reglementary period. The
counsel for Facundo moved for execution of the judgment, to which the Judge Pabalan
denied, alleging that since Ulep appealed, then the SC may declare valid or invalid in parts
or in whole the Resolution 67 which can still affect Facundo. Facundo filed for mandamus
against Judge Pabalan.
Issue/s:
1) WON, mandamus can be granted against Judge Pabalan.
2) WON, the municipal council validly abolished the position of Ulep.
Held/Ratio:
1) Yes, Facundo's petition for certiorari with mandamus is meritorious. The records disclose
that respondents' appeal was filed out of time and was disallowed by the trial court in its
order of November 3, 1960. Consequently, the decision in favor of petitioner Facundo
became final and executory (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court), and he (Facundo) became
entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution. It, therefore, became respondent Judge's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus, to issue the writ of execution sought by
Facundo.
The fact that there is only one decision and only one resolution involved, does not make the
right of one of the petitioners dependent upon the right of the other. The provisions of
Resolution No. 67 are severable, each petitioner occupying a different position and having
different qualifications, Facundo being a civil service eligible and Ulep, not. The decision too,
although only one, contains separate findings for each of the parties and makes distinct and
independent rulings for each of them. The appeal, therefore, of Ulep which has no bearing to
the ordered reinstatement of Facundo cannot be an obstacle to the execution of said
decision insofar as Facundo is concerned.
2) There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it
has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power
to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly
providing otherwise (Castillo v. Pajo, et al., G. R. No. L-11262, prom. April 28, 1958, citing
Brillo v. Enage, 50 O. G. 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in
good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with
substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise
appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will
intervene (Gacho, et al. v. Osmena, et al., G. R. No. L-10989, prom. May 28, 1959, citing 37
Am. Jur. 858).
In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting.
Resolution No. 67 dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of appellant are stated
therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk" in
said office; and if abolished, the remaining positions in said office "will be sufficient to
warrant the sound operation of said office". In respondents' answer, it is also stated that the
appropriation for said position "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings
of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty,
which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order, which

have been unduly neglected in the past." Observe too, that the new positions created (in
Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67) are those of policemen, the duties of which,
are entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to
declare that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and
discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez v. Montinola, G.R. No. L-5689, prom. May
14, 1954).
Appellant contends that his removal from his position was illegal because having taken the
civil service examination required under Section 23 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the
Civil Service Act of 1959, he could not be replaced or removed from office, unless the results
of said examination shows he failed therein. He also argues that his removal was illegal, as it
was not for cause as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution. But, appellant can
not successfully invoke said provisions in his favor, because there has been no removal of
petitioner, but in abolition of his position, which was within the power of the municipal
council of Asingan to do.
Cruz v Primicias, 23 SCRA 998
Facts:
Direct petition for Mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by certain employees of the
Province of Pangasinan, to declare Resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Board and Executive
Order No. 2 of the Provincial Governor null and void; to have the abolition of petitioners'
positions declared illegal, and compel their immediate reinstatement; to restrain
respondents from excluding petitioners from the enjoyment of their rights as civil service
employees, and to recover attorneys' fees and costs.
It is not disputed that upon election and assumption of office in 1967 of the respondents
Provincial Governor and Members of the Provincial Board, the latter adopted on January 1,
1968, Resolution No. 5 providing as follows:
Resolution No. 5
RESOLVED by the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, that for the purpose of promoting
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the operation of the Provincial Government and
for the purpose of providing the necessary expanded services on agricultural
extension, rural health, provincial public works and legal services, etc., the Provincial
Governor is hereby authorized to effect by executive orders from time to time for a
period not exceeding six (6) months from the date of approval of this resolution, such
reforms and changes in the different offices and branches of the Provincial
Government as may be necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish
those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer
functions, appropriations, equipments, properties, records and personnel from one
office or branch to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not
provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do
whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency of the
government service and provide necessary services for the promotion of the general
social welfare.
That any action taken by the Provincial Governor pursuant to this resolution shall be
immediately reported to the Provincial Board and shall be valid and subsisting until
the Provincial Board shall provide otherwise.1vvphi1.nt
Acting pursuant to this Resolution, the Governor issued his Executive Order No. 2 on January
2, 1968, reorganizing the office of the Governor and that of the Provincial Board. The order

expressly abolished the divisions provided for in the Annual Budget for the fiscal year ending
on June 30, 1968
1.
Executive
2.
Socio-Economic
Program
Implementation
3.
Political
Affairs
and
Placement
4.
Public
Information
5. Legal Division

Division
Division
Division
Division

as well as "all the positions listed in the current plantilla of personnel of said offices," with
certain exceptions. At the same time, the Executive Order (pars. d-f) provided:
(d) That there is hereby created, effective January 1, 1968, a private and confidential
staff of the Governor under his immediate control and supervision with such duties
and functions as may be assigned and prescribed by him from time to time in the
interest of the service.
(e) That as authorized by the Decentralization Law, there is hereby created, effective
January 1, 1968, One Provincial Attorney under the Governor with an annual salary of
P8,400.
(f) That there is hereby created a Personnel Division under the Office of the Governor
with such duties and functions as prescribed under Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules
in relation to Section 21 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Petitioners are Provincial Clerk eligibles, except Bancod, who is a general clerk eligible. On or
about January 11 to 15, 1968, they were individually served notices of termination of their
services and coincidentally, the equipment used by said petitioners was taken, transferred
and redistributed to other retained offices.
In their answer filed on February 12, 1968, respondents pleaded that the reorganization of
the offices of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board had been made within the powers
of the Provincial government, in order to effect economy in view of the province's deficit of
P3.714 million pesos; to promote simplicity and efficiency, and to provide for more essential
services and activities; that the Governor's Executive Order No. 2 had been approved and
ratified by the Provincial Board on January 5, 1968, by its Resolution No. 8, while the
supplemental budget to provide for the newly created positions was ratified by the Board's
Resolution No. 50, of January 26, 1968; that the actions thus taken were immediately
effective, without need of the approval of the Secretary of Finance; and that the abolition
and creation of new positions were made in good faith, the selection of retained employees
had been made on the basis of seniority and fitness as required by the Civil Service law,
those retained having been appointed earlier than the petitioners. The answer also urged
that the petitioners should have exhausted their administrative remedies, by appealing to
the Commissioner of Civil Service.
After this case was argued in open court, one of the petitioners, Myrna Sison, formerly
occupying the position of correspondence clerk, manifested in writing that she was no longer
interested in the case and prayed that she be excluded therefrom.
Issue/s:

WON, the abolition of the offices held by petitioners is valid and legal.
Held/Ratio:
No, the abolition was not valid and legal. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903;
Rodriguez vs. Montemayor, 94 Phil. 964; Castillo vs. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515). And, of course, if
the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees, it is null and void.
A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for the abolition of
petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges resorted to for disguising
an illegal removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The claim of economy effectuated through the reorganization is belied by the fact that while
72 positions were abolished, 50 of these were actually vacant. Only 22 stations were
occupied at the time of the reorganization, carrying total emoluments of P25,538.71 per
semester, of which P6,120.00 per semester corresponds to the five remaining petitioners
(Answer, Exh. 3-C). As against these 22 positions suppressed by the reorganization
(Executive Order No. 2), 28 new positions were simultaneously created, with a compensation
of P87,600.00 per annum, P43,800.00 per semester, for confidential personnel in the office
of the Governor (Exh. Order No. 2, par. d). In addition, a Provincial Attorney and his staff (p.
2), and a Personnel Division of five members, importing P13,380.00 per semester were set
up. Thus, against the suppressed items of P25,538.71, new items carrying a total
appropriation of P57,180.00 per semester (or P114,360.00 annually) were created, in
addition to P8,000.00 for casual laborers at the discretion of the Governor. Where the
economy lies is difficult to see. Significantly, this "economy" was the same excuse advanced
by the preceding administration when it attempted to eliminate civil service eligibles upon
its coming into power (Ocampo, et al. vs. Duque, supra).
As to the alleged need for greater efficiency, it is well to observe that no charge of
inefficiency is lodged against petitioners herein. Their efficiency is attested by their
promotional appointments in 1967. What can not be glossed over is that respondent's
reorganization replaced 22 civil service eligibles with 23 confidential employees. No further
elaboration is required to show that in truth and in fact, what respondents sought to achieve
was to supplant civil service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure would be
totally dependent upon respondents' pleasure and discretion. Thus the spirit of the Civil
Service law and of the Constitution are being purposely circumvented.
The motives behind these wholesale replacements are made manifest in paragraph 10 of
respondents' own Answer, where it is averred, in an attempt to justify the new positions
created, that:
... These positions are indispensable to the respondent Governor, he being the

elected Chief Executive of the Province and it could not be denied that his position is
more political in nature and as such, it is humbly submitted, that he is entitled to a
flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants in whom he has complete trust
and confidence not only in their capacity for work but also in their personal fitness
and loyalty. This should be so because his executive position is a political one and as
elected Governor, he is also the Chairman of the Provincial Committee of the
Nacionalista Party to which he belongs. In this situation, it could not be helped that
his Office should deal with his own party men on party matters. Not only that, as the
Chief Executive of the Province, his office has to keep and take up official secrets of
the government which should not be put in danger of being leaked out to third
parties, and it is for this reason, among others, that the respondent Governor should
have a flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants.
Here is proof that the true motivation for reorganizing out the petitioners was "not only (in)
their capacity for work but also (in) their personal fitness and loyalty". Political loyalty or
disloyalty are not statutory nor constitutional preconditions for appointment or grounds for
separation of eligibles in the Civil Service.
As a consequence of this pronouncement, it is likewise held, that respondents have
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the enjoyment of an office to which they are
entitled; and that in failing or refusing to include in the 1968-1969 budget items required to
cover appropriations for salaries of petitioners, respondents have unlawfully failed or
neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.

Reorganization
Dario v Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989

Facts:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING
THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other
things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to
measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
corruption.

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of
the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all
government offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is
abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties
shall be transferred to the office or body to which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially pertain.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the
1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives
reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected
local officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed
functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel,"
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and
the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or

c) informed of their termination.

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz,
Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay
Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto
Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,,
Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279
individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further
states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56
which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so
declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the
position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally
separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that
case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force
and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17,
which was meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, had ceased to have force and
effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39,
the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under question
were "not for cause" and were a result of government reorganize organization decreed by
Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security
of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
Issue/s:
WON, Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason (WON, the
removals conducted by Commissioner Mison in light of the reorganization as he claimed was
valid NO).
Held/Ratio:
No, reorganization must be in good faith. There is no question that the administration may
validly carry out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional
Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive
in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government.

It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit
implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions.
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive"
reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy"
following the people power revolution of 1986;

60
61

2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the
President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under
the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be
entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered
in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision
in so far as it mentions removals not for cause that would arguably support the
challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization
after the ratification of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much
later, on June 10, 1988.
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article
XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all
officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall
vacate their respective office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:

Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of
the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by
the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are
by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there
is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free
from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office
(not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is
obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and
simply because the Constitution allows it.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to
continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in
the sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to
those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation
No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date
(February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of
reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service.
And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February

2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy
and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and
primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for
cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive,
must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution
ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only
mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present
Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not
be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but
is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and
Palma-Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent
officials and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like
the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the
democratic character of the Charter itself.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary
powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from
Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless
propensity that accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would
have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank and file that
reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she
said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is
necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be
made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We

quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have
ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that
would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports,
it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his
"progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief
Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to
separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v.
Arroyo, clarified.
The transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization,
the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been
consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions
themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after
the effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization.
Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as
stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's
subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the
reorganization inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that
Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by
law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify
removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good
faith a test not obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly
prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under
a democratic Charter.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes
place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we

are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course
of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to
"grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack
of it.
Reorganization
of
Lack of Good Faith in.

the

Bureau

of

Customs,

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy except for the change of personnel has occurred, which would have justified
(an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at
the Bureau (which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the
same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted
There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the
Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt
further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is

not.

88

Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.

With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394
removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin
with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order
No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all
Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to
our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In PalmaFernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on
30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any
of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity
was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when
the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions
of the latter on security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a
reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
(De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);

3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a
challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar
as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs
counter to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated
without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" is not contrary to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's
transitory provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that
the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the
possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about
the Act.

Dela Llana v Alba, 112 SCRA 294

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo,
assailed its validity because, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.
Issue/s:
WON, BP 129 is constitutional.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is constitutional.
Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of
cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the
proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in
the proposed Bill." In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which
it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential

Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained
the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments
to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government,
to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and
the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in
the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated
to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to
its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such
a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that
its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence
of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for
the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at
rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." As with the offices in the other branches
of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in
good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa cannot be any clearer. This is a quo
warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled
to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a
Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then
National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude
any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of
tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an
entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and

constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in
these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies
of every sort.
It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and
other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities,
and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of
such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems
that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.
To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article
X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively
inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing

ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the
boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid
the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara
decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins." It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers,
whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down
'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not
only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'"
There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of
a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to
alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole."The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" He warned against
a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."

Further on this point from the same opinion" Another objection based on the absence in the
statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
to be issued by the President." Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished
and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and
clean record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption
in the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the
new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive.
It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral
adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is
to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. The judges may be guaranteed
a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to
be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an
empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to
reorganize inferior courts." That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will
do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing
the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units
in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant
to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend
the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and

justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, a decision promulgated almost half a
century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Biraogo v Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, & 193036 December 7, 2010

Facts:
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Nature of the Truth Commission
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as
an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or

administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created
as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context
of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys
past. They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics:
(1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a
period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commissions
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend
institutional reforms.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on
reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators.
Issue/s:
(a) WON, The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(b) WON, E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
Held/Ratio:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency
or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
a) No, it cannot legitimize the creation of the PTC, however the President has the power to
create ad hoc committees such the PTC. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing

structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the
interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are
fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued.

Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective
anymore
upon
the
promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your

Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

The power of the President to reorganize

the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents
powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches
of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to
the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the

President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the

scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. In a
case,
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no
changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
b) No on the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise
of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
However, PTC cannot be succesfully created for it violated equal protection clause
as it targeted only the past administration.

Abandonment
Summers v Ozaeta, G.R. No. L-1534, October 25, 1948
Facts:
Summers was a cadastral judge who received an adterim appointment for the position of
judge-at-large. He then assumed office as a judge-at-large. However, such appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. He wanted to go back being a cadastral
judge invoking section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution, that he is entitled to continue as
cadastral judge during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and
judge-at-large are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter office
he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue/s:
WON, Summers can validly resumed as a cadastral judge.
Held/Ratio:
No. There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Supreme Court
and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. We believe,
that said right is waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of
abandonment in proper cases.
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-atlarge consequent upon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a
waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and
guaranteed by the Constitution. But it is maintained that an ad interim appointment is
merely temporary and the petitioner cannot be said to have vacated the office of cadastral
judge in view of the rejection of said appointment by the Commission on Appointments. This
point has to be resolved adversely to the petitioner, if we are to be consistent with the
decision in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, wherein it was held that "when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of
a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another
Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to
be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased
in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Moreover, an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an "acting" appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued. Thus, the decision in Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 1,
cannot be invoked by the petitioner because Santiago, while being a member of the

municipal board of Manila, was designated only "Acting Mayor" and this Court held that he
did not thereby vacate his first office. Indeed, the distinction between an acting designation
and a permanent appointment may be gathered from the following passage of the decision:
"Mr. Santiago took the oath of office and qualified for the position of Acting Mayor of the City
of Manila. He indicated to the Municipal Board his intention to fill the new office temporarily
and then return to his position as member of the Municipal Board. Mr. Santiago never took
the oath of office as Mayor of the City of Manila. He never qualified for the office of Mayor.
He never accepted the office of Mayor. He did not at any time disclose an intention to
abandon the office of member of the Municipal Board. There was no resignation, express or
implied, from the latter office.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by
taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an "acting" judge-at-large. He
cannot argue that said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval of the appointment
by the Commission on Appointments, for, as stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the
petitioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to
the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been for him to
await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying for and assuming the
position of judge-at-large. A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the
anxiety to enjoy either the higher honor or better material advantages of a second office,
may lead to seemingly unfair consequences for which the appointing power should not be
blamed. While in the ordinary course of things, an appointee certainly has the right to rely
on his record and expect the approval of his appointment, it is nevertheless the better part
of wisdom for one always to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore, protect him
against any design, intentional or otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which
is fixed by the Constitution.
Under the comparison presented by the petitioner, the situation before us is undoubtedly
not one wherein he may appropriately hold two compatible offices at one time such, for
instance, as the positions of town recorder and county and probate judge, but one wherein
he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of
judge of first instance. At least, the petitioner does not contend that he can simultaneously
occupy the position of cadastral judge and the office of judge-at-large, for this would of
course be clearly against public policy. The law has created a fixed number of cadastral
judges (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P8,400 per annum each), and a
fixed number of judge-at-large (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P9,000
per annum each), and considerations of public interest must have been the basis thereof. If
the petitioner can be a cadastral judge and a judge-at-large at the same time, the judicial
positions as specified and created by law will be diminished by one. Authority in support of
our proposition is not wanting. In State vs. Jones, 150 Wis., 572; 110 N. W., 431, it was held:
"That realtor in a contest by quo warranto for the office of police justice of the city of
Watertown was held to have no right to that office, because at the time he was holding the
office of justice of the peace in the same city. The court said: 'We consider that the two
offices are clearly incompatible with each other, and that one person cannot and should not
hold both of them at the same time. In the plainest terms the charter gives the city four
judicial officers of the grade of justice of the peace while, if the realtor could make good his
right to the office of police justice it would, in fact, have but three.' This is a strong and
authoritative declaration of public policy and it is said elsewhere that the incompatibility
'which shall operate to vacate the first office exists where the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper from consideration of public policy for one person to
retain both.' (Mechem, Pub. Off., section 422 and cases.) Preliminary examinations in
criminal cases may be held before a justice of the peace, country judge or court
commissioner. Chapter 195, St. 1898. The consolidation in one person of the offices of
country judge and justice of the peace diminishes the number of examining magistrates by

one." And is State ex rel. Crawford vs. Anderson, 155 Iowa, 271, 136 N. W., 128, the same
rule was stressed: "It is apparent from these several provisions of the law that the
lawmaking power considered it for the public good and convenience to have three judicial
officers in every township containing within its geographical limits an incorporated city,
town, and that in criminal prosecutions under statute, these officers should have the same
jurisdiction. And if this be true, can this plain purpose be thwarted by permitting one man to
hold two of these offices? We think not, because the two offices are, in our judgment,
incompatible when viewed in the light of the public policy expressed in the statutes creating
them and defining their powers and duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain
instances, there should be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly
without force and effect.
Incompatible office
Resignation
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)

On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The

pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
Office of the Ombudsman v Andutan, G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;

Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation (Steel Asia); Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Lorenzana, President and Chief
Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was
criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively
charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to
submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the
Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
Issue/s:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
Held/Ratio:
I. No, provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was
committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been
settled by jurisprudence. In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court, speaking
through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the
object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in
nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while

the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may

be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year
from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In
fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a
general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative phrase "may not" is
mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in
character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on
statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged
act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one
(1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to
conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the
issue of the Ombudsmans authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.
II. Yes, Andutans resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an
administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against
Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,
we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July
2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation neither warrants
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while
he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot
and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of

the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case
[Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he shall still be answerable.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the
above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative
cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against
him by resigning, since he knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of
the State would eventually reach him] is unfounded. First, Andutans resignation was
neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned
from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to
find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before
the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to
accept the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him,
his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to
the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the
Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while
the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is
not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with
this interpretation, any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long
time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law
which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. Likewise, if the act
committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal
mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsmans
lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from the service is
moot, there is an irresistible justification to determine whether or not there remains
penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of
benefits. Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against
Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the
inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an
administrative case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed,
this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., indeed, we held:

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even if the
most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses
charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. Our position that accessory penalties are still
imposable thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint merely
flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case
against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have
justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Paganos filing of
candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano
confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was
already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already
filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was
considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of
her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest
when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were
being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in
laying the foundation for an administrative case. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case
notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in filing the certificate of
candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is
a question of transcendental [importance] and that preserving the inviolability of public
office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x
x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office. However, the State must
perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier
stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may exercise
administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has
validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an administrative
complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who
committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under
the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the

Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for
Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
CONCLUSION
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this
statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public
institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case for
violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and
dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper
subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsmans
factual findings.

Removal
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.

Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771
Facts:
An indorsement letter from Mr. Gonzalez forwarding to Mr. Fernan a letter-complaint with
enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the SC. Mr. Fernan brought this indorsement to the

attention of the Court en banc because of its important implications of policy raised by said
1st indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from
Mr. Cuenco addressed to Hon. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently
filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in
the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to
comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
intervention.
Issue/s:
Can a disbarment be made against Mr. Fernan, a member of the SC?
Held/Ratio:
No. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle
may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case
No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of
the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint
for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a
majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1]
in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom
are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed
by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes, or graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be

charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited
to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in
accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found
in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the
above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be
proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law.
There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope
of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding
shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance
with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should
the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation
of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the
protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons
might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and
motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Recall
Prescription

Unabia v City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253

Facts:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place
was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the
Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health
Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but his petition was not headed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a
person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670,
Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
The court further held that the notation at the bottom of Petitioners appointment to the
effect that his appointment is temporary pending report from the Government Service
Insurance System as to the appointees physical and medical examination did not make his
appointment merely temporary.
Issue/s:
WON, petitioner could be allowed to claim the remedy as he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was deemed to have abandoned his office for his inaction. There is no reason for
excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging
to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service hence,
the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified
service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject
to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be
a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which
he was removed.
If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce
therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These defenses are
valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with
approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained:
A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to
take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce
to the order of removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case
of unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments. (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which
may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case
decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an
unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the right to recover its
emoluments. However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of

the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to
employees in the civil service:
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer
for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of
justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to
public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples interest requires
that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.
Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to
be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it,
so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the
policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for
quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the
objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not
having been raised in the court below. The above circumstance (belated objection) would
bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider it to be essential to
the Petitioners right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is
essential to Petitioners cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the
action.
We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to
the existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one
year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to
dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a
defense (section 10, Rule 9).

Failure to assume office

Section 11, Omnibus Election Code:
Failure to assume office. - The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take
his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant,
unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

Part IV
Termination of Relations

A. Modes of termination
End of term
Fernandez v Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, 3-30-63
Facts:
Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City on January 7,
1954, took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia,
in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty
of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty.
Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City with two
offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and
another for oral defamation (Criminal Case No. 438), for which he was suspended from office
by the then Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension be
lifted but it was denied. After the prosecution had rested its cases and without requiring the
accused to submit his defense, the latter was acquitted in the two criminal cases
abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal
administrative charge were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation
conducted of said charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo
wrote Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of
police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place requesting him at the
same time to turn over his office to Ledesma. The nomination of Ledesma having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of
police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted an action for quo
warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as
provided by law was in violation of our Constitution.
Issue:
WON, the removal of Fernandez from office by the President was valid in accordance with
Section 17, RA 288 Charter of the City of Basilan.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has put an end to the
services of appellant as chief of police of Basilan City on April 28, 1959, and this he did
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as
the Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows:
SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and employees Compensation.
The President shall appoint with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
municipal judge and auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurerassessor, the city attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of
the city which may be created from time to time, and the President may remove at
his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal
judge, who may be removed only according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be noted, under the aforesaid section, the President is vested with the authority to
appoint, with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, among others, the chief of
police, and in connection with such power the same section says "the President may remove
at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge,
who may be removed only according to law." Verily, the President interpreted said removal
clause as meaning that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under
the charter at his discretion or pleasure with the exception of the municipal judge who may
be removed only according to law, and in the exercise of such power he terminated the

services of appellant as chief of police.

We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says that the President may
remove at his discretion any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative
intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. If such were not the case, it would not have made a distinction
in point of removal between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. This
distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is there
any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, and for that matter of any
appointive officer, with the exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period.
The fact no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an intention to make it
dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power. And Congress is not
wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly said: "A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign function of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public" (7 Mechem, Public Officers, Section 1; See also 42 Am. Jur., 944-955; Emphasis
supplied). And in Alba v. Alajar, 53 O.G. No. 5, p. 1452, this Court also said: "Congress can
legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure
of the President."
Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he contends that the act of
the President in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position of chief of police of Basilan City
in his place is tantamount to his removal without cause from office in violation of Section 4,
Article XII, of our Constitution, invoking in support thereof our ruling in the cases of De los
Santos v. Mallare, 48 O.G., 1791 and Lacson v. Roque, 49 O.G., 93. But this contention
cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of police does not have a fixed
term. As already said, it was made dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the
President, whereas the cases invoked by appellant relate to positions for which the law fixes
a definite term of office. What is in point here is the case of Alba v. Alajar, supra, wherein
this Court made the following pronouncement:
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the
President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal.
The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of his tenure , which
is one the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. On this score, section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative in the Santos vs. Mallare case,
is different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603. Section 2546 refers to removal at
pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of
the President.
Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether legal cause should
precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure
of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the
President.
The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, inopposite to the instant proceedings.
For all of them relate to removal of officials in violation of laws which prescribe fixity of term.
"'Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act
itself is valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has
been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with
the policy laid down by Congress therein.
Hernandez v Villegas, G.R. No. L-17287, 6-30-65
Facts:
Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of
the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. In 1956,
he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices
under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the

International Cooperation Administration.

Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily
detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was
designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent,
however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security and, when the
salary was increased from P6,600 to P7,017.60, he also received the corresponding salary
adjustment.
On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the
President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his
letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status
from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a
classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of
Director for Security was likewise proposed.
On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary Hernandez that the
President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly,
Villegas and Keefe's appointments, effective January 1, 1958, were prepared and later
signed by Secretary Hernandez. As the Court of Appeals observed in its decision, "In one of
the appointments, defendant Keefe was promoted to the position of Director for Security ...
and in the other plaintiff was demoted to the rank of arrastre superintendent." (Emphasis
supplied)
It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28,
1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security
and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. On
March 3, 1958, therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas
that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also
wrote the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget
Commissioner, and the Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security.
Villegas resorted for quo warranto and the judgment was on his favor.
Issue/s:
1) WON, the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs, is a primarily
confidential position
Held/Ratio:
Not necessarily, SC said that, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is
primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject
to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4) Villanuevas' removal,
is, therefore, concededly without cause. Thus, only recently, this Court reiterated in Corpus
v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965, the view that :
[T]he Constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily
confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit a fitness as
determined from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 49 O.G.
[No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the
operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of
Article XII that
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
and which recognizes no exception.
This view finds confirmation in sections 3 and 5 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act No.
2260).
The statement in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, to the effect that appointment to any of
the three classes of positions is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be
deemed a mere obiter. It has been correctly criticized as misleading. For if these three
special positions do not really belong to the Civil Service, the Constitution would not have

specifically named them as an exception to the general rule that all appointments must be
made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examinations.
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law 411 [11th ed. 1962]) Indeed, in the Corpus case, this
statement was held as not controlling, the ruling in the De los Santos case, where the
statement appears, being that a city engineer who belongs to the unclassified service is
protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution.
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers. (See, e.g., Corpus v. Cuaderno, supra; Alba vs. Evangelista, 53 O.G. 1452;
Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18879, March 30, 1963. Contra Hojilla v. Marino, G.R. No.
L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965.) But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures and
it has been shown that it has been lost in this case the incumbent is entitled to continue
in office.
We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without
cause and is therefore illegal.
Retirement
Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
Facts:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of
Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the
effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the
service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and
void.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as
and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had
occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS
during all times required by law.
In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well
as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to
1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also
indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the
GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor
General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900.
According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner
discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in
1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he
was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of
age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had
been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in
September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and
Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board
and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service
Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was
endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22,
1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of
Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence

to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as
January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to
the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable
recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum
dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his
initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of
petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. As emphasized by
petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has
been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the
2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to
petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the
basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on
October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as
January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due
to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more
specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to
the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of
petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine
National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since
January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last
January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government
service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961."
Issue/s:
WON, the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by
General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all
circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches,
estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it acted within its powers. It is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General
Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must
be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by
the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following
powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of
the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the
functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager,
who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and
social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or
more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an
actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they
may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their
compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall
have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications
to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees:
Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages
the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and
the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to
act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of
authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to
manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the
General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities,
the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General
Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the
System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this
principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of
the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its
administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and
workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the
government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the
saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if
the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its
controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. We hold that any authority
conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said
Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the
actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the
authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality
is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is
not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law
clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief
executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General
Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually
boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this
clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which
another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and
that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral
and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,
upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610,
614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government
officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the
age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the
government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate
perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a
comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting
demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the
public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the

duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the
Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence
before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be
disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.
For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material
government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his
date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to
January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise,
and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was
duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the
Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. It is to be noted
that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent
System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to
take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal
Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the
General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations
are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes
an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the
constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature
and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance
policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his
retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake
in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.
Abolition of office
Busacay v Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 1033
Facts:
The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan.
His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On
October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at
the rate of P720 per annum. On March 21, 1946, he resigned but on April 16 he was
reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was
destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laid off.
Previously, from July 17 to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to
traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not
been paid salaries because they had not rendered any service, but upon the reopening of
the bridge to traffic after the repairs, he and his companions resumed work without new
appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947.
When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November,
1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness
to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint
him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in
February, 1951, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The position
now carries a salary of P1,440 a year. The Bued toll bridge is a portion of a national road and

is a national toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid
from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these
salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll
bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees
thereon, and prescribed corresponding rules and regulations.
Issue/s:
WON, by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided
therefor were abolished.
Held/Ratio:
No. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it
wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought,
avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather the contrary was
taken for granted, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon
and to Baguio.
This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to
suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation
as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is coextensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by
statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the
power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
The fact that the destruction of the bridge in question was total, and not partial as in 1945,
the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new
structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail
and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We
believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments were not
considered forfeited notwithstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines
and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new
appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed
Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before
the destruction of the Bued river bridge.
The claim for back salary and/or damages may not be granted, however. Without deciding
the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not
personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper
authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit.

Manalang v Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954

Facts:
Petitioner Luis Manalang contests, by quo warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and seeks to take possession of said
office as the person allegedly entitled thereto.
The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano, who, at the time of the filing of the petition

(August 4, 1953), held said office, which he assumed on July 1, 1953, by virtue of a
designation made, in his favor, as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service,
by the Office of the President of the Philippines. Subsequently, or on October 22, 1953,
petitioner included, as respondents, Emiliano Morabe, who, on September 11, 1953, was
designated Acting commissioner of National Employment Service, and Zosimo G. Linato, the
Collecting, Disbursing and Property Officer of said National Employment Service
hereinafter referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Service in order to restrain him from
paying, to respondent Morabe, the salary of the Commissioner of said Service. Still later, or
on January 21, 1954, Mohamad de Venancio, who was designated Acting Commissioner of
said Service, and assumed said office, on January 11 and 13, respectively, of the same year,
was included as respondent.
Petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the Placement Bureau, an office created by
Executive Order No. 392, dated December 31, 1950 (46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 5913, 59205921), avowedly pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Republic Act No. 422. On
June 20, 1952, Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organization of a
National Employment Service," was approved and became effective. Section 1 thereof partly
provides:
. . . In order to ensure the best possible organization of the employment market as an
integral part of the national program for the achievement and maintenance of
maximum employment and the development and use of productive resources there
is hereby established a national system of free public employment offices to be
known as the National Employment Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service.
the Service shall be under the executive supervision and control of the Department of
Labor, and shall have a chief who shall be known as the Commissioner of the
National employment Service hereinafter referred to as Commissioner. Said
Commissioner shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments and shall receive compensation at the rate of
nine thousand pesos per annum. A Deputy Commissioner shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and
shall receive compensation at the rate of seven thousand two hundred pesos per
annum.
On June 1, 1953, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras, recommended the appointment
of petitioner Luis Manalang as Commissioner of the Service. On June 29, 1953, respondent
Aurelio Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made a similar recommendation in favor
of Manalang, upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and "loyal to service and
administration." Said Acting Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that he would
probably be appointed to the office in question. However, on July 1, 1953, Quitoriano was
the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting Commissioner of the Service. Such designation
of Quitoriano like the subsequent designation, first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of
Mohamad de Venancio is now assailed by Manalang as "illegal" and equivalent to removal
of the petitioner from office without cause.
Issue/s:
WON, Manalang was illegally removed from office without cause.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was not. Petitioner Manalang has never been Commissioner of the National
Employment Service and, hence, he could not have been, and has not been removed
therefrom. Secondly, to remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration of
his term. As removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Such is not the case of
petitioner herein, for Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau, and,
by implication, the office of director thereof, which, obviously, cannot exist without said
Bureau. By the abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto of its incumbent,
petitioner herein, was necessarily extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil. Const.), is not in point,
for there has been neither a removal nor a suspension of petitioner Manalang, but an

abolition of his former office of Director of the Placement Bureau, which, admittedly, is
within the power of Congress to undertake by legislation.
It is argued, however, in petitioner's memorandum, that
. . . there is no abolition but only fading away of the title Placement Bureau and all its
functions are continued by the National Employment Service because the two titles
cannot co-exist. The seemingly additional duties were only brought about by the
additional facilities like the district offices. Employment Service Advisory Councils,
etc.
The question whether or not Republic Act No. 761 abolished the Placement Bureau is one of
legislative intent, about which there can be no controversy whatsoever, in view of the
explicit declaration in the second paragraph of section 1 of said Act reading:
Upon the organization of the Service, the existing Placement Bureau and the existing
Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare shall be abolished, and all the
files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel and unexpended balances of
appropriations of said Bureau and Commission pertaining to said bureau or office
shall thereupon be transferred to the Service. (Emphasis supplied.)
Incidentally, this transfer connotes that the National Employment Service is different and
distinct from the Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transferred only from one place to
another, not to the same place. Had Congress intended the National Employment Service to
be a mere amplification or enlargement of the Placement Bureau, Republic Act No. 761
would have directed the retention of the "qualified personnel" of the latter, not their transfer
to the former. Indeed, the Service includes, not only the functions pertaining to the former
Placement Bureau, but also, those of the former Employment Office in the Commission of
Social Welfare, apart from other powers, not pertaining to either office, enumerated in
section 4 of Republic Act No. 761.
It is next urged in petitioner's memorandum "that the item of National Employment Service
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the petitioner" and that the petitioner is
entitled to said office "automatically by operation of law," in view of the above quoted
provision of section 1 of Republic Act No. 761, relative to the transfer to the service of the
"qualified personnel" of the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare.
This contention is inconsistent with the very allegations of petitioner's pleadings. Thus, in
paragraph 11 of his petition, it is alleged "that increasing the item and elaborating the title
of a civil servant, although necessitating a new appointment, does not mean the ousting of
the incumbent or declaring the item vacant." In paragraph 12 of the same pleading,
petitioner averred that "on or about June 25, 1953, two days before the departure of
President Quirino to Baltimore, petitioner wrote a confidential memorandum to His
Excellency reminding him of the necessity of appointing anew the petitioner as head of the
National Employment Service."
Having thus admitted and correctly that he needed a new appointment as
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, it follows that petitioner does not hold
or, in his own words, occupy the latter's item, inasmuch as the right thereto may be
acquired only by appointment. What is more, Republic Act No. 761 requires specifically that
said appointment be made by the President of the Philippines 'with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments." How could the President and the Commission on
Appointments perform these acts if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the National Employment Service?
Neither may petitioner profit by the provision of the second paragraph of section 1 of
Republic Act No. 761, concerning the transfer to the Service of the "qualified personnel" of
the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare,
because:
1. Said transfer shall be affected only "upon the organization" of the National Employment
Service, which does not take place until after the appointment of, at least, the commissioner
thereof. If the Director of the Placement Bureau were included in the phrase "qualified
personnel" and, as a consequence, he automatically became Commissioner of the Service,

the latter would have become organized simultaneously with the approval of Republic Act
No. 761, and the same would not have conditioned the aforementioned transfer "upon the
organization of the Service," which connotes that the new office would be established at
some future time. Indeed, in common parlance, the word "personnel" is used generally to
refer to the subordinate officials or clerical employees of an office or enterprise, not to the
managers directors or heads thereof.
2. If "qualified personnel" included the heads of the offices affected by the establishment of
the Service, then it would, also, include the chief of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare, who, following petitioner's line of argument, would, like
petitioner herein, be, also, a Commissioner of the National Employment Service. The result
would be that we would have either two commissioners of said Service or a Commission
thereof consisting of two persons instead of a Commissioner and neither alternative is
countenanced by Republic Act No. 761.
3. Congress can not either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to said office. The appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to
prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.
Facundo v Pablan, G.R. No. L-17746, January 31, 1962
Facts:
On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669)
against respondents Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Layos, Domingo,
Lopez, de los Trinos, Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Perez (municipal treasurer)
alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed
Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held
said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because
he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service
examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260,
known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal
councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved
Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and that four days later, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry
clerk.
As second cause of action, the petition alleged that the other petitioner Facundo, a third
grade civil service eligible was appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Asingan, on October 15, 1958, and has continuously held and performed the
duties of said position and received the emoluments therefor since his appointment; that in
said Resolution No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28, 1960, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector.
The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and the
termination of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions;
that in approving and adopting said resolution and in terminating their services, respondents
were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives; that respondents' acts are oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of the cited Republic Act No. 2260.
Petitioners, therefore, prayed that a preliminary mandatory order 1 be issued directing
respondent mayor Carbonell to reinstate them to their positions; and that judgment be
rendered declaring respondents to have acted illegally in passing said resolution, and in
terminating petitioners' services, declaring void said resolution for being oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260
To this petition, respondents timely filed their answer alleging, among others, that the
positions abolished under the resolution in question "were unnecessary and useless and
carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other employees in the office of the

Municipal Treasurer"; that the appropriation for said positions, "could be applied for more
important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation
and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of
maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past"; and that said
resolution "is valid and lawful, enacted and resolved with a view of bringing about a better
and more efficient administration and in consonance with the promise and avowed policy of
the present administration of maintaining peace and order" for which it received the
confidence of the people of Asingan in the last local elections. Respondents prayed that the
petition be dismiss with costs.
The lower court ruled that the abolition of the position of Ulep was valid, being not civil
service legible while the abolition of the position of Facundo is not valid as he was entitled to
permanency being civil service legible.
To this, Ulep appealed while the respondents appealed out of the reglementary period. The
counsel for Facundo moved for execution of the judgment, to which the Judge Pabalan
denied, alleging that since Ulep appealed, then the SC may declare valid or invalid in parts
or in whole the Resolution 67 which can still affect Facundo. Facundo filed for mandamus
against Judge Pabalan.
Issue/s:
1) WON, mandamus can be granted against Judge Pabalan.
2) WON, the municipal council validly abolished the position of Ulep.
Held/Ratio:
1) Yes, Facundo's petition for certiorari with mandamus is meritorious. The records disclose
that respondents' appeal was filed out of time and was disallowed by the trial court in its
order of November 3, 1960. Consequently, the decision in favor of petitioner Facundo
became final and executory (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court), and he (Facundo) became
entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution. It, therefore, became respondent Judge's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus, to issue the writ of execution sought by
Facundo.
The fact that there is only one decision and only one resolution involved, does not make the
right of one of the petitioners dependent upon the right of the other. The provisions of
Resolution No. 67 are severable, each petitioner occupying a different position and having
different qualifications, Facundo being a civil service eligible and Ulep, not. The decision too,
although only one, contains separate findings for each of the parties and makes distinct and
independent rulings for each of them. The appeal, therefore, of Ulep which has no bearing to
the ordered reinstatement of Facundo cannot be an obstacle to the execution of said
decision insofar as Facundo is concerned.
2) There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it
has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power
to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly
providing otherwise (Castillo v. Pajo, et al., G. R. No. L-11262, prom. April 28, 1958, citing
Brillo v. Enage, 50 O. G. 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in
good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with
substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise
appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will
intervene (Gacho, et al. v. Osmena, et al., G. R. No. L-10989, prom. May 28, 1959, citing 37
Am. Jur. 858).
In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting.
Resolution No. 67 dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of appellant are stated
therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk" in
said office; and if abolished, the remaining positions in said office "will be sufficient to
warrant the sound operation of said office". In respondents' answer, it is also stated that the
appropriation for said position "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings
of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty,
which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order, which

have been unduly neglected in the past." Observe too, that the new positions created (in
Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67) are those of policemen, the duties of which,
are entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to
declare that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and
discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez v. Montinola, G.R. No. L-5689, prom. May
14, 1954).
Appellant contends that his removal from his position was illegal because having taken the
civil service examination required under Section 23 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the
Civil Service Act of 1959, he could not be replaced or removed from office, unless the results
of said examination shows he failed therein. He also argues that his removal was illegal, as it
was not for cause as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution. But, appellant can
not successfully invoke said provisions in his favor, because there has been no removal of
petitioner, but in abolition of his position, which was within the power of the municipal
council of Asingan to do.
Cruz v Primicias, 23 SCRA 998
Facts:
Direct petition for Mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by certain employees of the
Province of Pangasinan, to declare Resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Board and Executive
Order No. 2 of the Provincial Governor null and void; to have the abolition of petitioners'
positions declared illegal, and compel their immediate reinstatement; to restrain
respondents from excluding petitioners from the enjoyment of their rights as civil service
employees, and to recover attorneys' fees and costs.
It is not disputed that upon election and assumption of office in 1967 of the respondents
Provincial Governor and Members of the Provincial Board, the latter adopted on January 1,
1968, Resolution No. 5 providing as follows:
Resolution No. 5
RESOLVED by the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, that for the purpose of promoting
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the operation of the Provincial Government and
for the purpose of providing the necessary expanded services on agricultural
extension, rural health, provincial public works and legal services, etc., the Provincial
Governor is hereby authorized to effect by executive orders from time to time for a
period not exceeding six (6) months from the date of approval of this resolution, such
reforms and changes in the different offices and branches of the Provincial
Government as may be necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish
those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer
functions, appropriations, equipments, properties, records and personnel from one
office or branch to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not
provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do
whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency of the
government service and provide necessary services for the promotion of the general
social welfare.
That any action taken by the Provincial Governor pursuant to this resolution shall be
immediately reported to the Provincial Board and shall be valid and subsisting until
the Provincial Board shall provide otherwise.1vvphi1.nt
Acting pursuant to this Resolution, the Governor issued his Executive Order No. 2 on January
2, 1968, reorganizing the office of the Governor and that of the Provincial Board. The order

expressly abolished the divisions provided for in the Annual Budget for the fiscal year ending
on June 30, 1968
1.
Executive
2.
Socio-Economic
Program
Implementation
3.
Political
Affairs
and
Placement
4.
Public
Information
5. Legal Division

Division
Division
Division
Division

as well as "all the positions listed in the current plantilla of personnel of said offices," with
certain exceptions. At the same time, the Executive Order (pars. d-f) provided:
(d) That there is hereby created, effective January 1, 1968, a private and confidential
staff of the Governor under his immediate control and supervision with such duties
and functions as may be assigned and prescribed by him from time to time in the
interest of the service.
(e) That as authorized by the Decentralization Law, there is hereby created, effective
January 1, 1968, One Provincial Attorney under the Governor with an annual salary of
P8,400.
(f) That there is hereby created a Personnel Division under the Office of the Governor
with such duties and functions as prescribed under Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules
in relation to Section 21 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Petitioners are Provincial Clerk eligibles, except Bancod, who is a general clerk eligible. On or
about January 11 to 15, 1968, they were individually served notices of termination of their
services and coincidentally, the equipment used by said petitioners was taken, transferred
and redistributed to other retained offices.
In their answer filed on February 12, 1968, respondents pleaded that the reorganization of
the offices of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board had been made within the powers
of the Provincial government, in order to effect economy in view of the province's deficit of
P3.714 million pesos; to promote simplicity and efficiency, and to provide for more essential
services and activities; that the Governor's Executive Order No. 2 had been approved and
ratified by the Provincial Board on January 5, 1968, by its Resolution No. 8, while the
supplemental budget to provide for the newly created positions was ratified by the Board's
Resolution No. 50, of January 26, 1968; that the actions thus taken were immediately
effective, without need of the approval of the Secretary of Finance; and that the abolition
and creation of new positions were made in good faith, the selection of retained employees
had been made on the basis of seniority and fitness as required by the Civil Service law,
those retained having been appointed earlier than the petitioners. The answer also urged
that the petitioners should have exhausted their administrative remedies, by appealing to
the Commissioner of Civil Service.
After this case was argued in open court, one of the petitioners, Myrna Sison, formerly
occupying the position of correspondence clerk, manifested in writing that she was no longer
interested in the case and prayed that she be excluded therefrom.
Issue/s:

WON, the abolition of the offices held by petitioners is valid and legal.
Held/Ratio:
No, the abolition was not valid and legal. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903;
Rodriguez vs. Montemayor, 94 Phil. 964; Castillo vs. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515). And, of course, if
the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees, it is null and void.
A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for the abolition of
petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges resorted to for disguising
an illegal removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The claim of economy effectuated through the reorganization is belied by the fact that while
72 positions were abolished, 50 of these were actually vacant. Only 22 stations were
occupied at the time of the reorganization, carrying total emoluments of P25,538.71 per
semester, of which P6,120.00 per semester corresponds to the five remaining petitioners
(Answer, Exh. 3-C). As against these 22 positions suppressed by the reorganization
(Executive Order No. 2), 28 new positions were simultaneously created, with a compensation
of P87,600.00 per annum, P43,800.00 per semester, for confidential personnel in the office
of the Governor (Exh. Order No. 2, par. d). In addition, a Provincial Attorney and his staff (p.
2), and a Personnel Division of five members, importing P13,380.00 per semester were set
up. Thus, against the suppressed items of P25,538.71, new items carrying a total
appropriation of P57,180.00 per semester (or P114,360.00 annually) were created, in
addition to P8,000.00 for casual laborers at the discretion of the Governor. Where the
economy lies is difficult to see. Significantly, this "economy" was the same excuse advanced
by the preceding administration when it attempted to eliminate civil service eligibles upon
its coming into power (Ocampo, et al. vs. Duque, supra).
As to the alleged need for greater efficiency, it is well to observe that no charge of
inefficiency is lodged against petitioners herein. Their efficiency is attested by their
promotional appointments in 1967. What can not be glossed over is that respondent's
reorganization replaced 22 civil service eligibles with 23 confidential employees. No further
elaboration is required to show that in truth and in fact, what respondents sought to achieve
was to supplant civil service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure would be
totally dependent upon respondents' pleasure and discretion. Thus the spirit of the Civil
Service law and of the Constitution are being purposely circumvented.
The motives behind these wholesale replacements are made manifest in paragraph 10 of
respondents' own Answer, where it is averred, in an attempt to justify the new positions
created, that:
... These positions are indispensable to the respondent Governor, he being the

elected Chief Executive of the Province and it could not be denied that his position is
more political in nature and as such, it is humbly submitted, that he is entitled to a
flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants in whom he has complete trust
and confidence not only in their capacity for work but also in their personal fitness
and loyalty. This should be so because his executive position is a political one and as
elected Governor, he is also the Chairman of the Provincial Committee of the
Nacionalista Party to which he belongs. In this situation, it could not be helped that
his Office should deal with his own party men on party matters. Not only that, as the
Chief Executive of the Province, his office has to keep and take up official secrets of
the government which should not be put in danger of being leaked out to third
parties, and it is for this reason, among others, that the respondent Governor should
have a flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants.
Here is proof that the true motivation for reorganizing out the petitioners was "not only (in)
their capacity for work but also (in) their personal fitness and loyalty". Political loyalty or
disloyalty are not statutory nor constitutional preconditions for appointment or grounds for
separation of eligibles in the Civil Service.
As a consequence of this pronouncement, it is likewise held, that respondents have
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the enjoyment of an office to which they are
entitled; and that in failing or refusing to include in the 1968-1969 budget items required to
cover appropriations for salaries of petitioners, respondents have unlawfully failed or
neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.

Reorganization
Dario v Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989

Facts:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING
THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other
things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to
measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
corruption.

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of
the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all
government offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is
abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties
shall be transferred to the office or body to which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially pertain.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the
1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives
reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected
local officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed
functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel,"
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and
the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or

c) informed of their termination.

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz,
Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay
Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto
Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,,
Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279
individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further
states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56
which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so
declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the
position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally
separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that
case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force
and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17,
which was meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, had ceased to have force and
effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39,
the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under question
were "not for cause" and were a result of government reorganize organization decreed by
Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security
of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
Issue/s:
WON, Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason (WON, the
removals conducted by Commissioner Mison in light of the reorganization as he claimed was
valid NO).
Held/Ratio:
No, reorganization must be in good faith. There is no question that the administration may
validly carry out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional
Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive
in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government.

It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit
implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions.
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive"
reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy"
following the people power revolution of 1986;

60
61

2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the
President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under
the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be
entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered
in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision
in so far as it mentions removals not for cause that would arguably support the
challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization
after the ratification of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much
later, on June 10, 1988.
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article
XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all
officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall
vacate their respective office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:

Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of
the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by
the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are
by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there
is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free
from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office
(not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is
obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and
simply because the Constitution allows it.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to
continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in
the sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to
those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation
No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date
(February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of
reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service.
And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February

2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy
and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and
primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for
cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive,
must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution
ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only
mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present
Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not
be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but
is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and
Palma-Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent
officials and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like
the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the
democratic character of the Charter itself.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary
powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from
Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless
propensity that accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would
have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank and file that
reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she
said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is
necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be
made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We

quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have
ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that
would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports,
it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his
"progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief
Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to
separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v.
Arroyo, clarified.
The transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization,
the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been
consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions
themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after
the effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization.
Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as
stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's
subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the
reorganization inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that
Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by
law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify
removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good
faith a test not obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly
prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under
a democratic Charter.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes
place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we

are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course
of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to
"grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack
of it.
Reorganization
of
Lack of Good Faith in.

the

Bureau

of

Customs,

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy except for the change of personnel has occurred, which would have justified
(an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at
the Bureau (which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the
same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted
There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the
Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt
further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is

not.

88

Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.

With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394
removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin
with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order
No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all
Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to
our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In PalmaFernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on
30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any
of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity
was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when
the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions
of the latter on security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a
reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
(De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);

3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a
challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar
as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs
counter to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated
without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" is not contrary to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's
transitory provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that
the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the
possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about
the Act.

Dela Llana v Alba, 112 SCRA 294

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo,
assailed its validity because, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.
Issue/s:
WON, BP 129 is constitutional.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is constitutional.
Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of
cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the
proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in
the proposed Bill." In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which
it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential

Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained
the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments
to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government,
to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and
the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in
the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated
to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to
its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such
a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that
its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence
of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for
the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at
rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." As with the offices in the other branches
of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in
good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa cannot be any clearer. This is a quo
warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled
to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a
Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then
National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude
any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of
tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an
entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and

constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in
these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies
of every sort.
It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and
other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities,
and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of
such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems
that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.
To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article
X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively
inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing

ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the
boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid
the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara
decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins." It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers,
whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down
'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not
only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'"
There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of
a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to
alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole."The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" He warned against
a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."

Further on this point from the same opinion" Another objection based on the absence in the
statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
to be issued by the President." Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished
and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and
clean record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption
in the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the
new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive.
It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral
adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is
to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. The judges may be guaranteed
a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to
be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an
empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to
reorganize inferior courts." That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will
do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing
the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units
in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant
to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend
the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and

justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, a decision promulgated almost half a
century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Biraogo v Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, & 193036 December 7, 2010

Facts:
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Nature of the Truth Commission
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as
an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or

administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created
as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context
of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys
past. They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics:
(1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a
period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commissions
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend
institutional reforms.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on
reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators.
Issue/s:
(a) WON, The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(b) WON, E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
Held/Ratio:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency
or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
a) No, it cannot legitimize the creation of the PTC, however the President has the power to
create ad hoc committees such the PTC. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing

structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the
interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are
fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued.

Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective
anymore
upon
the
promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your

Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

The power of the President to reorganize

the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents
powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches
of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to
the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the

President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the

scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. In a
case,
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no
changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
b) No on the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise
of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
However, PTC cannot be succesfully created for it violated equal protection clause
as it targeted only the past administration.

Abandonment
Summers v Ozaeta, G.R. No. L-1534, October 25, 1948
Facts:
Summers was a cadastral judge who received an adterim appointment for the position of
judge-at-large. He then assumed office as a judge-at-large. However, such appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. He wanted to go back being a cadastral
judge invoking section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution, that he is entitled to continue as
cadastral judge during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and
judge-at-large are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter office
he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue/s:
WON, Summers can validly resumed as a cadastral judge.
Held/Ratio:
No. There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Supreme Court
and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. We believe,
that said right is waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of
abandonment in proper cases.
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-atlarge consequent upon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a
waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and
guaranteed by the Constitution. But it is maintained that an ad interim appointment is
merely temporary and the petitioner cannot be said to have vacated the office of cadastral
judge in view of the rejection of said appointment by the Commission on Appointments. This
point has to be resolved adversely to the petitioner, if we are to be consistent with the
decision in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, wherein it was held that "when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of
a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another
Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to
be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased
in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Moreover, an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an "acting" appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued. Thus, the decision in Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 1,
cannot be invoked by the petitioner because Santiago, while being a member of the

municipal board of Manila, was designated only "Acting Mayor" and this Court held that he
did not thereby vacate his first office. Indeed, the distinction between an acting designation
and a permanent appointment may be gathered from the following passage of the decision:
"Mr. Santiago took the oath of office and qualified for the position of Acting Mayor of the City
of Manila. He indicated to the Municipal Board his intention to fill the new office temporarily
and then return to his position as member of the Municipal Board. Mr. Santiago never took
the oath of office as Mayor of the City of Manila. He never qualified for the office of Mayor.
He never accepted the office of Mayor. He did not at any time disclose an intention to
abandon the office of member of the Municipal Board. There was no resignation, express or
implied, from the latter office.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by
taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an "acting" judge-at-large. He
cannot argue that said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval of the appointment
by the Commission on Appointments, for, as stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the
petitioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to
the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been for him to
await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying for and assuming the
position of judge-at-large. A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the
anxiety to enjoy either the higher honor or better material advantages of a second office,
may lead to seemingly unfair consequences for which the appointing power should not be
blamed. While in the ordinary course of things, an appointee certainly has the right to rely
on his record and expect the approval of his appointment, it is nevertheless the better part
of wisdom for one always to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore, protect him
against any design, intentional or otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which
is fixed by the Constitution.
Under the comparison presented by the petitioner, the situation before us is undoubtedly
not one wherein he may appropriately hold two compatible offices at one time such, for
instance, as the positions of town recorder and county and probate judge, but one wherein
he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of
judge of first instance. At least, the petitioner does not contend that he can simultaneously
occupy the position of cadastral judge and the office of judge-at-large, for this would of
course be clearly against public policy. The law has created a fixed number of cadastral
judges (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P8,400 per annum each), and a
fixed number of judge-at-large (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P9,000
per annum each), and considerations of public interest must have been the basis thereof. If
the petitioner can be a cadastral judge and a judge-at-large at the same time, the judicial
positions as specified and created by law will be diminished by one. Authority in support of
our proposition is not wanting. In State vs. Jones, 150 Wis., 572; 110 N. W., 431, it was held:
"That realtor in a contest by quo warranto for the office of police justice of the city of
Watertown was held to have no right to that office, because at the time he was holding the
office of justice of the peace in the same city. The court said: 'We consider that the two
offices are clearly incompatible with each other, and that one person cannot and should not
hold both of them at the same time. In the plainest terms the charter gives the city four
judicial officers of the grade of justice of the peace while, if the realtor could make good his
right to the office of police justice it would, in fact, have but three.' This is a strong and
authoritative declaration of public policy and it is said elsewhere that the incompatibility
'which shall operate to vacate the first office exists where the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper from consideration of public policy for one person to
retain both.' (Mechem, Pub. Off., section 422 and cases.) Preliminary examinations in
criminal cases may be held before a justice of the peace, country judge or court
commissioner. Chapter 195, St. 1898. The consolidation in one person of the offices of
country judge and justice of the peace diminishes the number of examining magistrates by

one." And is State ex rel. Crawford vs. Anderson, 155 Iowa, 271, 136 N. W., 128, the same
rule was stressed: "It is apparent from these several provisions of the law that the
lawmaking power considered it for the public good and convenience to have three judicial
officers in every township containing within its geographical limits an incorporated city,
town, and that in criminal prosecutions under statute, these officers should have the same
jurisdiction. And if this be true, can this plain purpose be thwarted by permitting one man to
hold two of these offices? We think not, because the two offices are, in our judgment,
incompatible when viewed in the light of the public policy expressed in the statutes creating
them and defining their powers and duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain
instances, there should be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly
without force and effect.
Incompatible office
Resignation
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)

On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The

pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
Office of the Ombudsman v Andutan, G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;

Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation (Steel Asia); Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Lorenzana, President and Chief
Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was
criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively
charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to
submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the
Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
Issue/s:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
Held/Ratio:
I. No, provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was
committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been
settled by jurisprudence. In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court, speaking
through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the
object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in
nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while

the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may

be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year
from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In
fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a
general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative phrase "may not" is
mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in
character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on
statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged
act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one
(1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to
conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the
issue of the Ombudsmans authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.
II. Yes, Andutans resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an
administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against
Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,
we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July
2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation neither warrants
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while
he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot
and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of

the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case
[Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he shall still be answerable.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the
above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative
cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against
him by resigning, since he knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of
the State would eventually reach him] is unfounded. First, Andutans resignation was
neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned
from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to
find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before
the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to
accept the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him,
his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to
the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the
Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while
the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is
not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with
this interpretation, any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long
time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law
which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. Likewise, if the act
committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal
mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsmans
lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from the service is
moot, there is an irresistible justification to determine whether or not there remains
penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of
benefits. Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against
Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the
inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an
administrative case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed,
this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., indeed, we held:

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even if the
most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses
charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. Our position that accessory penalties are still
imposable thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint merely
flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case
against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have
justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Paganos filing of
candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano
confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was
already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already
filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was
considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of
her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest
when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were
being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in
laying the foundation for an administrative case. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case
notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in filing the certificate of
candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is
a question of transcendental [importance] and that preserving the inviolability of public
office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x
x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office. However, the State must
perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier
stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may exercise
administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has
validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an administrative
complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who
committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under
the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the

Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for
Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
CONCLUSION
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this
statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public
institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case for
violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and
dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper
subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsmans
factual findings.

Removal
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.

Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771
Facts:
An indorsement letter from Mr. Gonzalez forwarding to Mr. Fernan a letter-complaint with
enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the SC. Mr. Fernan brought this indorsement to the

attention of the Court en banc because of its important implications of policy raised by said
1st indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from
Mr. Cuenco addressed to Hon. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently
filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in
the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to
comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
intervention.
Issue/s:
Can a disbarment be made against Mr. Fernan, a member of the SC?
Held/Ratio:
No. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle
may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case
No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of
the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint
for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a
majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1]
in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom
are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed
by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes, or graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be

charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited
to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in
accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found
in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the
above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be
proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law.
There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope
of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding
shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance
with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should
the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation
of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the
protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons
might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and
motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Recall
Prescription

Unabia v City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253

Facts:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place
was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the
Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health
Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but his petition was not headed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a
person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670,
Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
The court further held that the notation at the bottom of Petitioners appointment to the
effect that his appointment is temporary pending report from the Government Service
Insurance System as to the appointees physical and medical examination did not make his
appointment merely temporary.
Issue/s:
WON, petitioner could be allowed to claim the remedy as he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was deemed to have abandoned his office for his inaction. There is no reason for
excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging
to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service hence,
the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified
service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject
to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be
a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which
he was removed.
If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce
therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These defenses are
valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with
approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained:
A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to
take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce
to the order of removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case
of unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments. (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which
may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case
decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an
unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the right to recover its
emoluments. However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of

the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to
employees in the civil service:
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer
for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of
justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to
public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples interest requires
that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.
Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to
be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it,
so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the
policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for
quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the
objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not
having been raised in the court below. The above circumstance (belated objection) would
bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider it to be essential to
the Petitioners right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is
essential to Petitioners cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the
action.
We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to
the existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one
year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to
dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a
defense (section 10, Rule 9).

Failure to assume office

Section 11, Omnibus Election Code:
Failure to assume office. - The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take
his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant,
unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.