Review: How Is Necessary Knowledge Possible?

Author(s): Richard F. Kitchener

Review by: Richard F. Kitchener
Source: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 443-449
Published by: University of Illinois Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1422900
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443

BOOK REVIEWS

Learningby Duckworth(1987). Gruberstressesthe importanceof the feeling

of wonder in scientific work and the need to convey this feeling to students.
The feeling of wonder and excitement is conveyed admirablyin Creativity.
Sandra W. Russ
Department
Psychology
Case WesternReserveUniversity
Cleveland,OH 44106
References
Barron, F, & Harrington, D. (1981). Creativity,intelligence, and personality.In M.
(Vol. 32, pp. 439-476).
Rosenzweig& L. Porter (Eds.),Annualreviewof psychology
Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Duckworth, E. (1987). The havingof wonderfulideas and otheressayson teachingand
learning.New York:Teacher's College Press.
Gardner, H. (1993). Creatingminds:An anatomyof creativityseen throughthe lives of
.Freud, Einstein,Picasso,Stravinsky,Eliot, Graham,and Gandhi.New York:Basic
Books.
Isen, A., Daubman,K., & Nowicki,G. (1987). Positiveaffectfacilitatescreativeproblem
52, 1122-1131.
solving.Journal of Personalityand SocialPsychology,
Russ, S. (1993). Affectand creativity:The role of affectand play in the creativeprocess.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shaw, M., & Runco, M. (1994). Creativityand affect.Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

How Is Necessary

Knowledge

Possible?

Necessary Knowledge: Piagetian Perspectives on Constructivism

By Leslie Smith. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1993. 220 pp. Cloth, $49.95.
Although the work ofJean Piaget is widely knownamong the general public,
his theory has often been misunderstoodby both friend and foe. Psychologists acknowledgehim as one of the two or three most seminalpsychologists
of the twentieth century, yet they too have not been very successful in
interpreting his research program. The problem is that Piaget not only had
a theory of cognitive-psychologicaldevelopment, he also had a theory of
knowledge-genetic epistemology-and very often these two have been
conflated. In truth, his genetic epistemology was his primary and lifelong
concern, and it was this that drove his empirical, psychological research
(Kitchener, 1986).
Among philosophers and psychologists,few read, appreciate, or have interest in his genetic epistemology, but for different reasons: Philosophers
typically distrust nonphilosophers when the latter write on epistemology;
psychologists typically distrust other psychologists when they wax philo-

sophical. Piaget's psychology fares not much better: Philosophershave little

interest in it, and many psychologists consider it to be empiricallyin deep
trouble, to constitute, in the phrase of Lakatos (1980), a "degenerating
research programme."
Why then write a book on Piaget's genetic epistemology and psychology?

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The answer is: to sort things out conceptually, to set aside misinterpretations
and misunderstandings, to determine what kinds of empirical facts really
are (or would be) embarrassing to Piaget, all of this with the aim of getting
a better understanding of Piaget's program.
Smith achieves all these goals with consummate skill and scholarship. He
knows full well that Piaget's genetic epistemology is not the same as his
psychology; he has read-really
read-Piaget,
traipsing through the volumes of untranslated French works; he has spent a considerable amount of
his career trying to interpret Piaget correctly (as well as criticizing him when
appropriate). The result of all of this is an excellent work on Piaget's theory.
The central theme of Smith's work is (nominally) a critical account of
Piaget's constructivist theory about necessary knowledge, about how the
individual's conception of necessity develops. But while pursuing this aim,
Smith also provides his own original and interesting account of several
concepts and related issues. Smith plays on a dual keyboard, discussing
necessity both from a psychological and philosophical point of view.
The central problem underlying the book is the following: Assuming the
adult recognizes the necessity of certain relationships, consequences, and
concepts, how is this possible when the individual at birth has no such
conception and has available only non-necessary cognitive instruments? How,
in short, can necessity come from the non-necessary? This is an important
issue in (genetic) epistemology because adult knowledge presupposes a recwhat must be the case, of what is possible, of what
ognition of necessity-of
is contingent, etc. Indeed, such a notion seems central to the very nature
of a concept, and such a notion is central to all logical inferences, because
the concept of validity is typically defined in such modal terms.
Chapter 1 is an informative introduction to a set of background issues
concerning the nature of necessity. In particular, Smith claims there are
three sets of related claims about Piaget's theory: First, there is a philosophical
claim that concepts have defining (necessary, essential) properties as opposed
to nondefining (contingent, empirical) properties associated with it. (This
claim would be questioned by several philosophers and psychologists.) These
defining properties, Smith implies, are normative in nature, whereas the
latter are empirical. (Why they are normative is never made clear.) Second,
there is a psychological(empirical) claim to the effect that children gain their
initial knowledge by use of the nondefining properties of concepts. Finally,
there is the epistemological claim that this constructive process is one of
differentiation, integration, and coordination, resulting in a coherent system.
(It is never made clear what the nature of this epistemological strand is and
how it relates to philosophy and psychology.)
Smith also provides a useful discussion of various theories of necessity,
including Platonism, rationalism, Humean empiricism, and Kant's transcendentalism. Missing, however, are other equally important theories of necessity: Aristotelian essentialism, the linguistic theory, and the pragmatic theory.
Smith misses the important tie between Aristotle and Kripke-a modernday essentialist-and
thereby misses the opportunity to see that one can

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445

have a theory of necessary,essential properties that is also a posteriori. In

addition, a better choice of an empiricist would have been John Stuart Mill
instead of Hume, who (contrary to Smith) was not an empiricist about
necessity.
The next chapter is a summaryof Piaget's empirical epistemology. This
is an excellent chapter, which discusses, among other issues, the complex
relations between philosophy and psychology, the empirical and the normative, the epistemologicaland the psychological.Piaget, we are told, transformednormative (philosophical)questions (e.g, What is knowledge?How is
knowledge possible? What is necessary knowledge?) into their respective
empiricalquestions(How do different typesof knowledgesucceed in growing
with respect both to their intensions and their extensions? How do the
different types of knowledge become possible?How does the actual process
of construction result in atemporal norms?).The problem with this claim,
however, is that the normative dimension is not eliminated (reduced) in the
latter "transformations,"becauseone has to make a normativedecisionabout
what constitutes knowledge. However, if normative claims are still present
in the latter transformations,how is this supposedto be an empiricalsolution
to the initial problem about normativity?If the normative status of such
inquiry is eliminated by using epistemic terms in quotes, why not just do
the same for the former claims?It would have helped Smith's discussionif
were
Piaget's distinctionbetween restrictedand generalizedgeneticepistemology
clarified and stressed. In any case, Smith is clear that Piaget's genetic epistemology is both empiricaland epistemological(normative)and hence that
he cannot avoid the normativedimensionsimplyby doing empiricalresearch.
Indeed, Smith makes the point that Piaget is knee-deep in normativeissues,
because the very process of constructionand its consequent stagelike nature
are normative in nature.
The two questions that arise, therefore, concern the adequacyof Piaget's
normative and empirical accounts. Although Smith devotes some space to
the former (see also Kitchener, 1986), he spends considerablymore time on
the latter.
According to Smith, an adequate analysis of the empirical standing of
Piaget's theory involves several component issues: First, empirical research
into genetic epistemology is necessarily driven by epistemological assumptions (broadly Kantianones about basic epistemic categories and capacities)
and cannot be eliminated. Next, one must design a taskrelevant to assessing
the absence or presence of this epistemic category. In so doing, one must
specify criteria for a correct response along with appropriate procedures.
Finally,one must develop a general method and methodology for all of the
above. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 take up these issues and thus are collectively
concerned with the empirical standing of Piaget's theory.
Chapter 3 contains an excellent discussionof Piaget's empirical methods
and methodology. Both Piaget'scriticalmethodand his earlier methodeclinique
from which it developed are briefly discussedby Smith, but the heart of the
chapter is a discussion of Piaget's methodology, that is, the theoreticaljustification of the use of the critical method.

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Chapter 4 is concerned with what procedures are appropriate in the

empirical evaluation of Piaget's theory-in
particular, with the question of
whether experimental studies are necessary or not. After discussing several
senses of "experimental," Smith concludes that although Piaget does use an
experimental method in the forensic sense, he does not employ it in the
more standard sense. However, Smith has reservations about whether the
latter is necessary for the empirical testing of Piaget's theory.
The focus of chapter 5 ("Tasks") is the question of what performances
are necessary, sufficient, or both, for assessing (inferring) the possession of
knowledge (competence). Smith concludes that (standard) assessment tasks
are not sufficient because of a variety of reasons, including the competenceperformance distinction, the issue of conceptual displacement (decalage), etc.
(Presumably, however, such assessment tasks would be necessary for the
empirical testing of Piaget's theory.) In short, all assessment tasks underdetermine the ascription of epistemic competence to the individual and, as
a result, psychologists have been overly sanguine about the falsifiability of
Piaget's theory.
What, then, is Smith's view about the current empirical status of Piaget's
theory?
The argument in Chapters3-5 has been that although there are psychological
challenges to consider in relation to the acceptabilityof Piaget's account of the
constructionof necessaryknowledge,those challengesdo not require substantial
change to that account. Piaget's main problem has been variouslybypassedor
subjected to inappropriateoperationalisationin much psychological research.
This researchmay have contributedsubstantiallyto the psychologyof childhood
without significantlyaddressinga central issue in empiricalepistemology.(p. 123)
In chapter 6, Smith discusses "alternatives to constructivism," in particular,
social constructivism (e.g., Harre) and Fodor's nativism. There are excellent
discussions and criticisms of both of these alternatives, which are committed
to Platonism and hence incompatible with constructivism. Smith concludes
that Piagetian constructivism has more explanatory potential than either of
these two approaches. This raises the question, however, of the nature of
mechanism of epistemic
Piaget's explanation of developmental change-the
construction, which presumably will involve the concept of equilibration. All
of this is nominally the subject of chapter 7, "Epistemic Construction."
However, there is unfortunately little discussion of this key explanatory
there is a sustained discussion of formal
notion-equilibration-although
models of constructivism.
Finally, chapter 8 provides an overall conclusion. In brief, Smith concludes,
the empirical dimension of Piaget's theory is not that bad after all, because
much of the negative evidence accumulated by psychologists is simply misplaced owing to inherent misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Piaget's theory or based upon incompatible theoretical commitments (e.g., to
nativism). All of this concerns the empirical or psychological strand in Piaget's genetic epistemology. What then of the philosophical and the epistemological strands? Although Smith says relatively little, at least explicitly,

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447

about the epistemologicalstrand mentioned earlier,the philosophicalstrand

in Piaget is addressed throughout the book, if often only tacitly. Indeed,
Smith is concerned with the larger philosophical issues surrounding both
Piaget's psychology and his genetic epistemology because genetic epistemology containsboth normative(philosophical)and empirical(psychological)
issues.

There is, in particular,one philosophicalstrand I wish to draw attention

to because I believe Smith is in error about it and because it nicely illustrates
how substantivephilosophical issues can underlie the methodological issues
debated by psychologists while doing their empirical research.
Piaget's critical method is a dialogical,dialectical,or Socraticmethod of
question-answer-question,where the child must answer a question by providing a response or judgment and then justify this answer by providing a
reason for it. If the child cannot justify the response given, we have insufficient evidence for the child'spossessionof knowledge. Hence, a child knows
a proposition p only if the child can provide a justification for his belief
(judgment) that p. This is the J-J (justificationfor judgment) method.
Smith discusses and criticizes the contrary position, held by many psychologists, that judgment alone is sufficient for ascribing knowledge to the
child (i.e., the child knowsthat p only if the child believesp andp is correct)the J method. Such issues are not merely methodological ones, however;
they presuppose a substantive epistemological issue about the underlying
nature of knowledge. To show that Piaget is correct about the (tacit) substantive epistemological issue, Smith looks to two dominant, contemporary
philosophical accounts concerning the nature of knowledge: foundationalism, and the causal theory of knowledge. Both accounts (in different ways)
support Smith's interpretation of Piaget.
It is at this point, however, that serious questions arise about several of
Smith's claims. It is not just the reservationthat these two accounts are not
the only ones available concerning the nature of knowledge (see Shope,
1983), it is Smith's use of these accounts that seems questionable to me.
First, Smith (correctly) claims that the standard pre-Gettier account of
knowledge is that a person S knows that p iff (if and only if) (a) S believes
p, (b) p is true, and (c) "the person is justified in believing p." This classical
account, which Smith endorses, is committed to foundationalism,and foundationalism requires the J-J account because of condition (c). (Although
Smith does not define it, we may take foundationalismto be the view that
person S is foundationallyjustified in believing p iffS is justified in believing
p, S is noninferentiallyjustified in believing p, and p inferentiallyjustifies S
in believing other propositions q, r, s, etc.)
First,the classicalaccount of knowledgeis not (contraryto Smith)a version
of foundationalism. For example, Lehrer (1974) has defended a modified
versionof the classicaldefinitionof knowledge,in whichknowledgeis (roughly)
undefeated, justified, true belief, but Lehrer completely rejects foundationalism. Second, what Smith should have said is that the classicalaccount of
knowledge requires the J-J account. But this is also mistaken because the

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BOOK REVIEWS

third condition does not specify that "the person must be able to provide
a justification for his belief p." Hence the classical definition of knowledge
does not entail the J-J account. But (for the same reason) neither does
foundationalism require the J-J account. Hence, neither the classical nor
foundational account entails theJ-J account. But even less so does the causal
theory, the other epistemological alternative that Smith discusses, entail the
J-J account. Hence, neither of Smith's philosophical positions supports the
J-J account. In fact, both are compatible with the J account. Hence, Smith
has offered no philosophical (epistemological)justification for theJ-J account
and, a fortiori, for the preferability of the J-J over the J account.
I would suggest that Smith has misidentified the real epistemological issue
underlying methodological disputes concerning the appropriate testing of
children's knowledge. The issue is not foundationalism versus nonfoundationalism but rather internalism versus externalism.
Internalism is the view that if S is justified in believing p, then not only
must there be a justification for S to believe p (say, j) but S himself must be
aware of (have access to, be able to provide)j. Externalism is the view that if S
is justified in believing p, S need not be aware of (have access to, be able to
provide) j, because other agents may be aware of S's justification, no one
may be aware of it, etc. (See, e.g., Luper-Foy, 1988.)
It is clear, I think, that on Smith's interpretation of Piaget, Piaget is
committed to what can be called genetic epistemologicalinternalism: a child S
knows that p only if S judges that p, there is a justification j for p, and S
can provide j. But another possibility would be genetic epistemologicalexternalism: a child S gives judgment p and there is a justification j for p even
though S cannot provide j. Smith is really claiming that the Piagetian J-J
methodology is committed to internalism. This seems to me to be correct.
However, the real question is whether internalism is adequate. I have my
reservations. To be able to give a reason (justification) j for judgment p
requires that S not only have the belief (a representation) but that S be
aware of this belief (a belief about a belief) and be aware of the justification
for this belief. This requires what some would call a metacognitive levela representation of a representation. However, it seems clear that cognition
emerges earlier than metacognition does, (partly) because the latter is at a
higher cognitive, representational level than the former. Indeed, this metacognitive view is one Piaget himself articulated and defended in several later
works (e.g., Piaget, 1974/1976; 1974/1978). If there are, as Piaget suggests,
different epistemic levels (e.g., success vs. understanding) and if the latter
is developmentally and epistemically more complex than the former, then
clearly a child may be at the earlier level but not at the later one. If so,
then the child may possess knowledge (e.g., know-how) but not be able to
justify it (know-that). If so, then this latter account of the growth of knowledge needs to be squared with Piaget's earlier account of his methodology.
All of this raises questions about whether and why Piaget insisted on J-J,
that is, internalism. If he did assume this view in his methodology, he did
not seem to have good substantive epistemological or empirical grounds to

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do so. If he did not assume this view, then are his methodological critics
correct about their claim that children know things much earlier than Piaget
was willing to countenance? Can their views be criticized on methodological
grounds? All of these questions await more sustained discussion.
Although I have raised some objections to Smith's account, this should
in no way overshadow the positive contribution of the book. He has given
a balanced perspective on the empirical dimension of Piaget's genetic epistemology, and he has also defended certain philosophical conceptions relating
to genetic epistemology. Philosophers and psychologists may disagree with
both assessments, but Smith is certainly correct that any assessment of Piaget's program must involve the kind of collaborative discussion of philosophy and psychology that I believe Smith's book so admirably illustrates.
Richard F. Kitchener
Department of Philosophy
Colorado State University
Ft. Collins, CO 80523
Refee ences
and scientific
Kitchener, R. F (1986). Piaget'stheoryof knowledge:Geneticepistemology
reason.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lakatos, I. (1980). Falsifiabilityand the methodology of scientific research programmes. In J. Worrall& G. Currie (Eds.),ImreLakatos:Philosophical
papers(Vol.
1, pp. 8-101). Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Lehrer, K. (1974). Knowledge.Oxford, England:Oxford University Press.
Luper-Foy,S. (Ed.). (1988). Internalism.Synthese,74, 263-414.
(S. Wedgwood,Trans.). Cambridge,MA:
Piaget, J. (1976). Thegrasp of consciousness
Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1974)
Piaget, J. (1978). Successand understanding(A. Pomerans, Trans.). Cambridge,MA:
Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1974)
Shope, R. K. (1983). The analysisof knowledge.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.

The Lure and Limits of Young Children's Utterances

Language Development From Two to Three
By Lois Bloom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. ix + 514 pp.
Paper, $24.95.
To provide a context for Lois Bloom's new book Language DevelopmentFrom
Two to Three, we have to look not at recent child language research but at
work carried out in the 1960s. The theoretical underpinning of that work
was transformational grammar, an approach to language which even in the
1960s was multifaceted but which nevertheless took the idea of universal
base structure as its guiding hypothesis. On the assumption of universal base
structure, human linguistic knowledge involves a common core, which is
built on and transformed in ways that differ from language to language.
Because the core must in some sense precede the variations, the implication

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