POLITICAL LAW

INTRODUCTION
GENERAL CONCEPTS
1. Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
forms of local government. [Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2 (1), Adm. Code of 1997]
2. Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable
as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty one (51) per cent of its capital stock.
[Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2 (13), Adm. Code of 1997]
3. Agency is defined as any government authority other than a court or legislative body which affects
private rights, either through rule-making or adjudication.
4. Agency refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit
thereof. [Sec. 2 (4), Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987]
4. Examples of government agencies:
a. The Land Transportation Office is an agency of the government because it is an office under the
Department of Transportation and Communication.
b. The Department of Public Works and Highways is an agency because it is a department.
7. Government-owned and controlled corporations may fall within the scope and meaning of the
Government of the Philippines if they perform functions that are governmental in character acting as the
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines.
8. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations. [Sec. 2 (10), Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987]
9. Examples of government instrumentalities:
a. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is an instrumentality because it is vested with the special functions of being
the central monetary authority, and enjoys operational autonomy through its charter.
b. Philippine Ports Authority is an instrumentality because it is merely attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communication. It is vested with the special function of regulating ports, and it is
endowed with all corporate powers through its charter.
c. The Land Bank of the Philippines is a government instrumentality because it is vested with the special
function of financing agrarian reform. It is endowed with all corporate powers, and it enjoys autonomy
through a charter.

d. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA is not a government owned or controlled corporation
but an instrumentality of the government that is exempt from taxation.
It is an instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. It exercises
governmental powers of eminent domain, police power authority, and levying of fees and charges.
Finally, the airport lands and buildings are property owned by the government that are devoted to public
use and are properties of the public domain. (Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G. R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006)
10. A presidential government is one in which the state, the sovereign, makes the executive independent
of the legislative, both in tenure and prerogative, and furnishes him with sufficient power to prevent the
legislative from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the State as executive independence and
prerogative. (Garner)
11. The principal identifying feature of a presidential form of government is embodied in the separation of
powers doctrine. Each department of government exercises powers granted to it by the Constitution and
may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done within the constitutional competence of the
others. However, the Constitution also gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely
restrain the others from improvident action, thereby maintaining a system of checks and balances among
them, thus, preserving the will of the sovereign expressed in the Constitution. (UP Law Center)
12. A parliamentary government is one in which the state confers upon the legislature the complete
control of the administration of laws. Under this system, the Cabinet or Ministry is immediately and legally
responsible to the legislature or one branch thereof, usually the more popular chamber, and mediately or
politically responsible to the electorate, while the titular or nominal executive the King or Chief of State
occupies a position of irresponsibility. (Garner)
13. The essential characteristic of a parliamentary form of government is the fusion of the legislative and
executive branches in parliament; the prime minister, who is the head of government, and the members of
the cabinet, who are chosen from among the members of parliament and as such are accountable to the
latter.
Another feature is that the prime minister may be removed from office by a vote of loss of confidence by
the parliament. There may be a head of state who may or may not be elected (UP Law Center) and who
usually merely exercises ceremonial functions.
14. Advantages of a unicameral form of legislature:
a. The Philippines is a simple and unitary state unlike the United States which is federal. There is no
necessity for a bicameral system because there are no dual interests to be represented, i.e. the national
or federal and local or state.
b. It is simple in organization and deals quickly with the problems of legislation.
c. It is more economical and would save a lot of because there is only one chamber.
d. It is free from deadlocks between the Senate and the House, as well as recriminations which usually
plague a two-chambered body.
e. Responsibility is easily pinpointed there being only one deliberative body.
15. A unitary or centralized government is one in which the powers of government are vested in one
supreme organ from which all local governing authorities derive their existence and powers.
The Philippine government is an example of a unitary form of government.
16. The essence of a unitary form of government is the fact that a single organization has been created

by the sovereign people (the people) through their constitution, to which is left the task of providing for the
territorial distribution of governmental powers with which it is invested. (Aruego and Laguio)
17. A federal form of government is one in which the governmental powers are, by the common
sovereign, distributed between a central government and the local governments, each being supreme
within its own sphere. (Aruego and Laguio)
DELEGATION OF POWERS
1. The two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power are
the Completion Test and the Sufficient Standard Test.
2. The Completeness Test which characterizes a valid delegation of legislative power means that the law
being complete in itself must set forth the policy to be carried out by the delegate.
3. The Sufficient Standard Test which is a characteristic of a valid delegation of legislative power means
that the limits to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions are determinate and
determinable.
4. There is no undue delegation of legislative power when the VAT law provides that the President shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise to 12% the VAT rate. What was delegated was not the power to tax but
only of the discretion as to the execution of the law. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita, etc., et al.,
G. R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing various cases]
5. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
In the Abakada Guro case the President of the Philippines becomes merely the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will takes place. The President
cannot set aside the findings of the President, who is now under the conditions acting as the legislatures
alter ego or subordinate. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita, etc., et al., G. R. No. 168056,
September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing various cases]
6. There is improper delegation of legislative authority if the law does not provide for the term of
imprisonment leaving the same to the discretion of the court.
Declared invalid was the proviso in Sec. 32 of R. A. No. 4670 (The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers) to the effect that certain violations shall be penalized by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (emphasis
supplied)
Leaving to the courts discretion the determination of the minimum and maximum term of imprisonment is
granting a wide latitude to fix the imprisonment without any sufficient standard. This power is essentially
legislative and may not be unduly delegated. (People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90)
SEPARATION OF POWERS
1. The Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all government employees, elective or appointive,
except members of Congress and the Judiciary.
2. It is violative of separation of powers for Supreme Court to compel Congress to reinstate a member
suspended for disorderly behavior. (Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil.

863)
3. A member of the judiciary may not be investigated by the Ombudsman because it would violate the
separation of powers by encroaching upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over
all courts and their personnel. (Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 454)
4. The doctrine of separation of powers is violated if the Ombudsman would investigate members of the
Supreme Court for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust decision. (In Re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382)
5. A disadvantage of the separation of powers which is overcome by compromise between the contending
parties. is that the Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate
functioning of government.
It is the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required
by the separation of powers. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
INHERENT POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
1. The three great inherent powers of government that may be exercised even without constitutional grant
are police power, taxation and eminent domain.
Although inherent the exercise must not contravene the constitution and may be exercise only if there is a
law which provides for the details of the exercise.
2. Police power is based on the twin concepts of salus populi est suprema lex and sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas.
3. The two tests, requisites or limitations for valid exercise of police power are lawful subject and lawful
means.
4. Lawful subject as a requisite for valid exercise of police power means that the interest of the public in
general require an interference with private rights through the exercise of police power and not the
interest of a particular subject.
5. Lawful means as a requisite for valid exercise of police power requires that the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The means employed must not be unduly oppressive upon individuals. (City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio,
etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing various cases)
6. Other limitations if the exercise of police power is merely delegated to local government units:
a. The delegation is by express provision of law;
b. It must be exercised within the territorial limits of the delegate;
c. Exercise is not contrary to law.
7. Tests for the validity of an ordinance. It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:

a. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

b. must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. must not be unreasonable. (City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
citing Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G. R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161 and other
cases)
8. Barangay Assembly or Liga ng mga Barangay both not being local government units cannot exercise
legislative powers hence cannot exercise any policed power.
9. An ordinance prohibiting the establishment, within the Ermita-Malate Area of businesses such as sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beer houses, beer houses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels, inns. providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community
and must therefore relocate outside of the Ermita-Malate area is not valid being an invalid exercise of
police power because of the following reasons:
a. It violates the equal protection because it prohibits motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments despite the fact that these establishments are all similarly
situated.
b. it prohibits the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.
There is no valid classification because a noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
c. the standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution
one of the ills the Ordinance aims to banish not a profession exclusive to women. This discrimination
based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government
objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
d. The requisites for the valid exercise of police power are not met because there is no reasonable
relation between the purposes of the ordinance and the means employed for its accomplishment. The
purpose of the ordinance is the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community
but the means used the closing down and transfer of business or their conversion into allowed business
will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community. It will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila. (En banc, Tinga, J. City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April
12, 2005)
10. There is no impairment of the obligations of contract where a zoning ordinance declared an area as
commercial and a purchaser of a subdivision lot constructed a commercial building despite the restrictions
in the deed of sale.
There was a valid exercise of police power because a zoning ordinance was enacted reclassifying certain
areas to protect the health and safety of the residents as a result of the construction of the main highway
that made residential living in the subdivision hazardous and dangerous to the health and safety of
residents.
11. A law prohibiting certain types of advertisement (such for tobacco) is valid if it was adopted in the
interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the people. (Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328)

12. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) in the exercise of police powers granted under its
enabling act may prohibit a municipality from operating a dump site. (Laguna Lake Development Authority
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 231 SCRA 292)
13. The abatement of a nuisance is an exercise of police power, not of eminent domain, hence there is no
need to pay just compensation.
14. Power of eminent domain is the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty to control and
regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and
control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare
may demand. (Aruego and Laguio citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p. 1110)
15. Power of eminent domain distinguished from police power.
a. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain the taking of property is for a public use WHILE in the
exercise of police power, the taking is a mere incident to a valid regulation to promote public interest.
b. In the exercise of eminent domain, property or right of property is taken from the owner and transferred
to a public agency to be enjoyed by it as its own WHILE in the exercise of the police power the taking of
property or a right therein is accomplished not by transfer of ownership but by destroying the property or
impairing its value. (Aruego and Laguio)
16. Constitutional limitations on the exercise of eminent domain.
a. Due process clause and equal protection clause;
b. Private property shall not be taken for public use without adequate compensation. (Lagcao v. Labra, G.
R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004)
17. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain unless specifically granted. By virtue
of Section 19 of the Local Government Code, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate.
While housing is one of the most serious problems of the country, LGU do not possess unbridled authority
to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. Their power is limited by
Rep. Act No. 7279, the law that governs expropriation of lands for purposes of urban land reform. Lagcao
v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004)
18. Rep. Act No. 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban
land reform. The following are its appropriate provisions:
SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program sites, which have not yet been acquired;
e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and
f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall five budgetary priority
to on-site development of government lands.
SEC.10. Modes of Land Acquisition.- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,
donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,

however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted: provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: x x x
19. The acquisition of property for social housing is for public use which is not diminished by the fact that
only a few and not everyone will benefit from the expropriation. (Philippine Columbian Association v.
Panis, 228 SCRA 668)
20. Condemnation of small lots not intendment of power of eminent domain. Condemnation of private
lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no
more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the
Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible
benefit to the public. (Lagcao v. Labra, G. R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004 citing Urban Estates, Inc. v.
Montesa, 88 Phil. 348 [1951])
21. Reconciliation between holding in Philippine Columbian Association and Lagcao. Philippine
Columbian benefits to few does not result to invalidity of expropriation WHILE Lagcao refers to
expropriation of small parcels as invalidating expropriation.
22. Local governments do not have inherent power of eminent domain unless specifically granted. By
virtue of the Local Government Code, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate.
While housing is one of the most serious problems of the country, LGU do not possess unbridled authority
to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (Lagcao v. Labra, G. R.
No. 155746, October 13, 2004)
23. A private commercial complex may not be expropriated so that the profits from its operation by the
government would be used to finance housing projects for government employees. It is a taking for
private purpose. (Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89)
24. A city ordinance which expropriates a parcel of land cannot fix the value of land, even if it is based on
fair market value at the time of enactment ,because there may be supervening events which may change
such value at the time of taking.
25. The legal rate of 6% should be used in computing interest on just compensation. CB Circular No. 416
which increased the legal interest to 12% is applicable only to loans and not to expropriation proceeds.
(National Power Corporation v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542)
25. A judge cannot validly withhold the issuance of a writ of possession in expropriation while awaiting full
payment. The government could immediately take possession of the property upon deposit of the
provisional value with the National or Provincial Treasurer. (National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206
SCRA 520)
26. The Department of Agrarian Reform cannot require a local government unit to secure an authority
from it before converting an expropriated agricultural land to be converted into a housing project for the
poor. To require such, would result to the DAR determining the public use to which the expropriated
property shall be devoted which is the prerogative of the LGU. (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of
Appeals, 222 SCRA 173)
27. Power of taxation can also be used to implement power of eminent domain. Tax measures are but
enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions and clearly imposed for public purpose. In

most recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice,
public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647, April 16, 2005)
28. Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners. It is not intended to take
away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. For this reason a just
compensation for income that is take away from establishments becomes necessary.
It is in the tax credit (now tax deduction under current law) that our legislators find support to realize social
justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647, April 16, 2005)

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Refer to PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, infra for a discussion of the sovereign state immunity of foreign
states.
1. State immunity from suit means that the state may not be sued without its consent. A corollary of such
principle is that properties used by the State in the performance of its governmental functions cannot be
subject to judicial execution.
2. The two kinds of sovereign immunity are absolute immunity and restrictive immunity.
3. Under absolute immunity all acts of state are protected by sovereign immunity.
4. Under restrictive immunity there is a distinction made between jure imperii the sovereign and
government acts which is covered by the immunity compared with jure gestonis in which the States
private, commercial and proprietary acts are not immune from suit. The Philippines adheres to restrictive
sovereign immunity. (United States v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487, 490-491)
5. Consent of a state to be sued may be express or implied.
6. Consent is express when a law is passed providing conditions under which the state may be sued.
(Com. Act No. 327 as amended by P.d. No. 1445)
7. Consent may also be implied from the following acts.
a. A government waives its immunity if it sues thus a counterclaim may be interposed against it. (Froilan v.
Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Pil.905)
b. A government agency created for irrigation may not invoke State immunity from suit because it has a
personality separate from the National Government and has the capacity to sue and be sued.
Furthermore, irrigation is a proprietary function. (Fontanilla v.Maliaman, 179 SCRA 685; 194SCRA 486)
There was an unconditional waiver when the enabling statute was passed creating the agency hence the
waiver may include an action based on a quasi-delict. (Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 456)
c. A landowner whose property was taken by the government without prior expropriation or negotiated
sale may sue the government because it is deemed to have waived its immunity. Otherwise, the guaranty
that private property shall not be taken without compensation would be inutile. (Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu,
40 SCRA 464)

8. Waiver of the State of its immunity does not mean that it is admitting liability. (Philippine Rock
Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 180 SCRA 171) It means that the State in allowing itself to be sued
is merely giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove its case but the State does not waive its lawful
defenses.
Consent to suit does not include consent to attachment of property for foreign sovereign. (Dexter v.
Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43F2d 705)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. The essential parts of a good written constitution.
a. Constitution of liberty
1) Fundamental civil and political rights
2) Limitation on governmental powers
b. Constitution of government
1) Organization of government
2) Enumeration of powers and rules relative to administration
c. Constitution of sovereignty
1) Procedure for amendment
PREAMBLE
Art. I. NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. The national territory comprises of the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
a. consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains.
b. Including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas.
c. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Art. I, 1987 Constitution, arrangement
and numbering supplied)
2. Archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of land and waters by defining an archipelago either as a
group of islands surrounded by waters or a body of waters studded with islands.
For this purpose, the doctrine requires that baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of
the outermost islands to encircle the islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of
the baselines regardless of breadth or dimensions are merely internal waters.
3. Territorial sea is the adjacent belt of sea with a breadth of twelve (12) nautical miles measured from the
baselines of a state and over which the state has sovereignty. (Articles 2 and 3, Convention on the Law of
the Sea)
Ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Article 14,Convention on
the Law of the Sea)
4. Internal waters are the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Article 1,
1987 Constitution)
There is no right of innocent passage for foreign vessels in the case of internal waters.
5. Contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to twelve (12) nautical miles

from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea. (Article 33 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea)
6. Exclusive economic zone. A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a state over
which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and
of the seabed and subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57, Convention on the Law of the Sea)
7. Rights of the coastal state in the exclusive economic zone:
a. Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and
subsoil,
b. Sovereign rights with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone
or EEZ such as production of energy from water, currents and winds;
c. Jurisdictional right with respect to establishment and use of artificial islands;
d. Jurisdictional right as to protection and preservation of the marine environment;
e. Jurisdictional right over marine scientific research; and
f. Other rights and duties provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention. (Article 56, Convention on the
Law of the Sea)
7. Flag state means that a ship has the nationality of the flag it flies, but there must be a genuine link
between the state and the ship. (Article 91, Convention of the Law of the Sea)
8. Flag of convenience. The flag of a country in which a merchant ship is registered solely in order to save
on taxes and avoid the more stringent regulations imposed by other countries regarding such matters as
safety, wages, environmental controls and working conditions. (Webster Randon)
Art. II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
1. The doctrine of incorporation means that generally accepted principles of international law are
incorporated as part of the law of the land without need of legislative enactment.

2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)
3. Armed Forces of the Philippines distinguished from the Philippine National Police.
a. Functions. The function of the AFP is to protect the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory WHILE that of the PNP is to maintain
peace and order, and to protect life and property.
b. Confirmation. Appointment of AFP officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments WHILE such confirmation is required for PNP officers
of the same level.
c. The AFP is basically military in character and its personnel are not members of the civil service WHILE
the PNP is civilian in character and its personnel are members of the civil service.

d. No member of the AFP in the active service shall at any time be appointed or designated to a civilian
position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries WHILE such constitutional prohibition does not find application to PNP members.
4. Constitutional provisions that institutionalize the principle of civilian supremacy.
a. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1st sentence)
b. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. (Art. VII, Sec.
18, 1st sentence)
c. All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the
Constitution. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1)]
d. The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect
for peoples rights in the performance of their duties. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1)]
e. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to
vote. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (3), 2nd par.]
STATE POLICIES
1. The State policy on ecology. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people and their
posterity to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Sec. 16,
Art. II, 1987 Constitution)
2. The State policy on cultural minorities. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. (Sec.22, Art. II, 1987
Constitution)
Art. III BILL OF RIGHTS
1. Civil rights refers to the rights secured by the constitution of any state or country to all its inhabitants
and not connected with the organization or administration of government. It defines the relations of
individuals among themselves.
They are rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et
al., G. R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)
2. Examples of civil rights are the rights against involuntary servitude, religious freedom, guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode, etc.

3. A contract may not impair the basic civil rights of marriage and procreation. These are part of the liberty
protected under the due process clause. Waiver of basic human rights is void. Contractual property rights
could not prevail over basic human rights.
4. Human rights are the basic natural rights which inherent man because of his humanity. The right to life,
dignity and existence may be considered as human rights.
5. Political rights consist in the power to participate directly or indirectly, in the management of the
government. It defines the relations between the individuals and the state.
6. Examples of political rights are the right of suffrage, right of assembly, right to petition the government

for redress of grievances.

7. Distinctions between civil rights and political rights:
a. Civil rights refers to all constitutionally guaranteed and protected not connected with the organization or
administration of government WHILE political rights are those related to the establishment, management
or support of the government;
b. Civil rights defines the relations between individuals WHILE political rights defines the relations
between individuals and the State;
c. Civil rights extend protection to all inhabitants of a State WHILE political rights protect only citizens. (UP
Law Center)
8. Distinctions between human rights on one hand, and civil and political rights on the other.
a. The scope of human rights is broader than civil and political rights. Human rights also include social,
economic, and cultural rights.
b. Human rights are natural rights that are inherent in every person because they exist as humans. Every
human being possess them everywhere, anywhere irrespective of national boundaries as a result of his
being human WHILE some civil and political rights require that a statute should grant them. (UP Law
Center)
DUE PROCESS
1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Sec. 1, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
2. Liberty as to come under constitutional protection is not mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.
(City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Rubi v. Provincial
Board, 39 Phil.660 (1919),as cited in Morfe v. Mutuc,130 Phil. 415,440; 22 SCRA 424, 440 (1968)]
3. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.
It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice, [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc .v. City Mayor of Manila, 20SCRA 849,860
(1967)] and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. [City of Manila, et al., supra
citing In re Lutker, Okl. Cr. 274P. 2d 786, 789,790)
Due process includes the right to decisional privacy, which refers to the ability to make ones own
decisions and act on those decisions free from governmental or other unwanted interference. ]Grisworld
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 415 (1965)]
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
procedural due process and substantive due process. . ( City of Manila, et al., supra)
4. Purpose of guaranty of due process.
a. To prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;
b. to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive justice;
c. to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction

without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and
d. to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. [City of Manila, et
al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing 16 C.J.S.,pp.1150-1151,numbering
supplied)
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. [City of
Manila, et al., supra, citing Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.136, 145 (1919)]
5. Procedural due process are the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing
the government must provide when it takes a particular action. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al.,
G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 2nd
Ed. 523(2002)]
6. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
persons life, liberty, or property.
In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
governments action. [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing
Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed.(2002), at pp. 523-524]
7. Rate increases which public utilities may charge shall be promulgated only by government regulatory
bodies after proper notice and hearing. However, if the increase is merely provisional in character, it may
be issued pending notice and hearing. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180
SCRA 218) If the provisional rate increase is to be made permanent there is mandatory notice and
hearing.
8. Administrative due process does not require the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of
evidence before the same officer who will decide the case. (Adamson & Adamson v. Amores, 152 SCRA
237)
9. There is due process even if the complainant, the prosecutor and the hearing officers are all connected
with one office and all subordinates of the deciding officer because the findings of the subordinates are
not binding upon the head of office who is the deciding officer.
What is important is that the respondent was allowed to present his side and the proof he has adduced
supports the decision. (Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 470)
10. Through its October 22, 1991 Resolution, the Supreme Court prohibited live radio and TV coverage of
court proceedings to protect the due process rights of the parties, prevent distraction of the participants,
and to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
11. An Executive Order of a City Mayor may not prohibit artificial methods of birth control such as the use
of condoms, pills, intrauterine devices, vasectomy and other methods of surgical sterilization, etc. in
public hospitals but not in private clinics because it would violate due process and equal protection. The
womens freedom of choice shall be curtailed and would discriminate against poor women who cannot
afford to pay the fees charged by private clinics.
EQUAL PROTECTION
1. The criteria of equal protection and uniformity, are used interchangeably and is met:

a. when the laws operate uniformly

1) on all persons
2) under similar circumstances
b. all persons are treated in the same manner
1) the conditions not being different
2) both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed
3) favoritism and preference not allowed.
2. The commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under the
color of its authority. (Duncan Association of Detailmen-PTGWO, et al., v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
Inc., G. R. No. 1629934, September 17, 2004)
3. Requisites of valid classification.
a. There must be substantial distinctions which must make for real differences.
b. The classification must be germane to the issue.
c. It must apply not only to existing conditions but future conditions as well.
d. It must be applicable to all members of the same class. (People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56)
4. The equal protection clause does not take away from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police power laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard and avoids
what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. [Re: (a)
Request of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for
the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing Lao Ichong
v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957)]
5. The legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none. [Re: (a) Request
of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for the
Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing De Guzman v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 188]
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, equal protection should extend to
every person under circumstances, which, if not identical, are analogous. (Ibid., citing Basco v. Phil.
Amusements and Gaming Corp., G. R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52)
6. Law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade violates the equal protection clause. The
law discriminates only against Chinese citizens without any valid grounds shown for such classification.
There must be a basis to discriminate other than on the basis of citizenship alone.
7. Tests used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the validity of a classification and compliance with
the equal protection clause.
a. The traditional (or rational basis) test.
b. The strict scrutiny (or compelling interest) test.
c. The intermediate level of scrutiny (or quasi-suspect class) test.
8. The traditional (or rational basis) test. The classification is valid if it is rationally related to a
constitutionally permissible state interest.
The complainant must prove that the classification is invidious, wholly arbitrary, or capricious,
otherwise the classification is presumed to be valid. (Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61;

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420; United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166)
9. The strict scrutiny (or compelling interest) test. Government regulation that intentionally discriminates
against a suspect class such as racial or ethnic minorities, is subject to strict scrutiny and considered to
violate the equal protection clause unless found necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
A classification is necessary when it is narrowly drawn so that no alternative, less burdensome means is
available to accomplish the state interest.
Thus, it was held that denial of free public education to the children of illegal aliens imposes an enormous
and lasting burden based on a status over which the children have no control is violative of equal
protection because there is no showing that such denial furthers a substantial state goal. (Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202)
10. The intermediate level of scrutiny (or quasi-suspect class) test. Classification based on gender or
legitimacy are not suspect, but neither are they judged by the traditional or rational basis test.
Intentional discriminations against members of a quasi-suspect class violate equal protection unless they
are substantially related to important government objectives. (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190)
Thus, a state law granting a property tax exemption to widows, but not widowers, has been held valid for
it furthers the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that
loss usually imposes a heavier burden. (Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351)
11. The standard used in the analysis of equal protection challenges in the Philippines in the main have
followed the rational basis test coupled with a differential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. (Central Bank etc., v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, etc., G. R. No. 148208, December 15,
2004)
12. Tests to determine whether there is justification in taking. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us
that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. [City of Manila,
et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis,523
U.S. 833, 840(1998)]
For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is
met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where
strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet
substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose. . [City of Manila, et al., v. Laguio, etc., et al., supra 5 citing Cherimsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law
Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed.(2002), at p. 524]
13. Two remedial alternatives courts face in sustaining the claim against a constitutionally underinclusive
scheme
a. It may declare the statute a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature
intended to benefit or
b. it may extend to the coverage of the statute to include those aggrieved by the exclusion. [Re: (a)
Request of Assistant Court Administrators, etc., A. M. No. 03-10-05-SC, October 1, 2004; Re: Request for
the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance ,etc., A. M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004 citing Heckler v.
Matthews, 465 US 728, 79 L Ed. 2e 646, 104 S Ct. 1387 (1984)]
14. The VAT law does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses when it reduced the input
credits to only 70% of output VAT because input VAT is not property or a property right within the
constitutional purview of the due process clause being merely a statutory privilege. Persons have no

vested rights in statutory privileges.

The state may change or take away rights, which were created by law of the state, although it may not
take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights. [Abakada Guro Party List (etc.) v. Ermita,
etc., et al., G. R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 and companion cases citing United Paracale Mining Co.
V. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 63786-87, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 108, 115)]
15. There is no such thing as political libel exempt from penalty. Unfounded and malicious statements
made by one against another in the course of an election campaign, or by reason of differences in
political views are not per se constitutionally protected. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory
utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties
(Brillante v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004 citing Orfanel v.
People 141 Phil. 519; 30 SCRA 819 (1969); U.S. v. Bustos, 13 Phil. 690, 701), or against public figures in
relation to matters of public interest involving them [Ibid., Ayer Productions v .Capulong, G.R. Nos. L82830,L-82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861; U.S. v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918)], such defamatory
utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
16. The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather it permits of reasonable classification. If the
classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently
from another. It is sufficient that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both
in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.
118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004 citing various cases)
17. Under the privilege of neutral reportage in libel cases involving matters of public interest in public
figures a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made
against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republishers subjective awareness of the
truth or falsity of the accusation. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational
Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January 17, 2005
citing 50 Am.Jur. 2d Libel and Slander Sec.313)
18. The doctrine of fair comment states that fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
It means that while in general every discreditable imputations publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
to be malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is made against a public person in his
official capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.[Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and
Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January
17, 2005 citing Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1; 301 SCRA 1 (1999)]
19. For imputations against an official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, so long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. [Filipinas
Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine
(AMEC-BCCM), et al., G.R. Mo. 141994, January 17, 2005 citing Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1;
301 SCRA 1 (1999)]
20. Attacks against public figures not necessarily libellous unless there is actual malice which means that
the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless regard of whether it was false

or not. [Borjal v. Court ofAppeals,361 Phil. 1; 301 SCRA 1 (1999)]

21. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal
protection because economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration of the
imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and one who is not able to pay it. (Tate v.
Short, 401 U. S. 395)
CONTRARY STATEMENT: There is no violation of equal protection because punishment should not be
tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel the eradication of every disadvantage
caused by poverty. (U.S. ex rel. Previtera v. Kross,382 U.S. 911)
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Constitutional protection. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of what ever nature whatever and for any purpose
shall be inviolable and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, Sec. 2,
1987 Constitution)
Search and seizure without a judicial warrant becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (People v. Nuevas, et al., G. R. No. 170233,
February 22, 2007)
The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is a restraint upon the
government and not upon private parties. (Waterous Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 280 SCRA 735)
2. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Sec. 4, Rule 126, ROC, arrangement and numbering
supplied)
3. Authority to issue search warrant inherent in all courts. A search warrant is merely a process issued by
the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may
be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. (Savage, etc. v. Taypin, et al., G.R. No. 134217 May 11,
2000)
4. Application for search warrant does not require certification of no forum shopping. The Rules of Court
as amended requires the certification of no forum shopping only for initiatory pleadings, omitting any
mention of applications. The old Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such
certification even from applications. The absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of
an application for search warrant. (Savage, etc. v. Taypin, et al., G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000)
5. Sufficiency of description of place to be searched. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended to be searched. (People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001)

6. Lack of probable cause does not invalidate warrant if item was not seized. The fact that there was no
probable cause to support the application for the seizure of the drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in
fact seized. The warrant is valid for the other items where probable cause exist. (People v. Salanguit, G.R.
Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001)
7. Police officers lawfully searching for firearms inadvertently found cocaine in plain view may lawfully
seize the same. (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770)
8. A lawful search with is not invalidated by the failure of the searching officers to inform the owner of her
right to be silent and to counsel.
These rights may be invoked only if there is custodial investigation where a suspect has been identified
and is under investigation. (People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111)
9. Articles described in the warrant may be lawfully seized even if found in a neighboring place, which is
other than that shown in the warrant, because their possession is illegal. (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770)
10. Instances of valid warrantless searches and seizures. Alternatively, when there could be valid
warrantless search and seizure.
a. Search incident to a lawful arrest.
b. When it involves prohibited articles in "plain view."
c. Search of a moving vehicle,
d. Consented warrantless search.
e. Customs searches. (People v. Escano, et al., G.R. Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000)
f. Searches without warrant of automobiles to prevent violations of smuggling or immigration laws. g. Terry
search; and
h. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. Nuevas, et al., G. R. No. 170233, February 22,
2007)
11. Search in incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant. (Sec. 13, Rule 126, ROC)
12. Warrantless search as an incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception,
the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest.
13. As to subject, the warrantless search as an incident of a lawful arrest is sanctioned only with respect
to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof off the commission of the offense.
14. With respect to time and place of the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.
Stated otherwise, to be valid the search must be conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. (People v. Ting, etc., G.R. Nos. 130568-69, March 21, 2000) The search may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his

immediate control.
15. Terry search. "Stop and frisk" is a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons."
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere suspicion or a hunch will not
invalidate it. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997; People v. Escano, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000)
16. There is a difference between the concepts of "stop and frisk" search and of search incidental to a
lawful arrest where a precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search.
There could be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto nor a "hot pursuit" arrest preceding the
search if there is a lack of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting office or an overt physical act
on the part of the accused, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed, or was
going to be committed. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)
17. The plain view doctrine. Objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence.
18. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
a. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.
b. The object must be open to eye and hand;
b. the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
c. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA `668, 710 - 711 cited in People v.
Elamparo, G.R. No. 121572, March 31, 2000)
19. No need for further search. The plain view justifies the seizure of evidence without need of further
search. (People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 1242, July 20, 2001; People v. Aspiras, G.R. No. 138382-84,
February 12, 2002)
20. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, and the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then
the contents are in plain view and may be seized.
In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126292,
January 15, 2002)
21. Warrantless search of vehicles. The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.
This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can properly transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)

22. Probable cause should exist for warrantless searches of vehicles. The mere mobility of vehicles does
not give the police unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within
the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002)
23. The term probable cause for warrantless search of vehicles eludes exact definition but it
a. signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged; or
b. the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
136292, January 15, 2002)
24. One form of search on vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at military or police
checkpoints which has bee
declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it
may involve an intensive search. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002)
25. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search.
The search which is normally permissible is limited to the following instances:
a. where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;
b. simply looks into a vehicle;
c. flashes a light therein without opening the cars doors;
d. where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
e. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
f. where the routine check is conducted at a fixed area. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
136292, January 15, 2002)
25. The physical intrusion of the body of the police officer into a vehicle would allow him to see and to
smell things he could not see or smell from the outside violates the constitution.
26. Consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches requires
that to constitute a valid waiver, it must first appear that:
a. The right exists;
b. The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
c. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (People v. Figueroa, et al., G.R. No.
124056, July 6, 2000)
d. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

(Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)
26. Characteristics of person giving consent to determine validity of consent. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given:
a. the age of the defendant;
b. whether he was in a public or secluded location;
c. whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
d. the education and intelligence of the defendant;
e. the presence of coercive police procedures;
f. the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
g. the nature of the police questioning;
h. the environment in which the questioning took place; and
i. the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002)
27. There was valid consented search where the accused accompanied police officers to his house in
order to surrender his share of the ransom money. He even brought them to his room upstairs. The
consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removed any badge of illegality, (People v.
Deang, et al, G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000)
28. The act of the accused in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure, especially so when members
of the raiding team were intimidating numerous and heavily armed. (People v. Compacion, G.R. No.
12442, July 20, 2001)
29. A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (People v. Cubcubin, Jr., G.R. No. 136267, July 20,
2001)
30. Scope of search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined to search for weapons under
the Terry search doctrine. This is authorized under the Anti-Hijacking Law.
Thus, a strip search is conducted by airport security inside the ladies room is not a search after a lawful
arrest but in pursuance of law is valid. (People v. Canton, G. R. No. 148825,December 27, 2002)
31. Warrantless customs search. REASONS why there is no necessity for the Bureau of Customs to
secure a judicial search warrant where the place to be searched is not a dwelling place:
a. There should be no unnecessary hindrance on the governments drive to prevent smuggling and other
frauds upon the Customs;
b. To render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables
the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform (Jao, et al., v. Court of Appeals,
et al., and companion case, 249 SCRA 35, 43); and
c. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
32. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or constructive borders like

checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136292,
January 15, 2002)
33. A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting
to commit an offense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, ROC)
34. Kinds of warrantless arrest:
a. Arrest "in flagrante delito" under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113, ROC;
b. Arrest in "hot pursuit" under Sec. 5 (b), and (c), Rule 113, ROC.
35. Requisites for valid in flagrante warrantless arrest.
a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
1) has just committed,
2) is actually committing, or
3) is attempting to commit a crime; and
b. Such overt act is done in the prescience or within the view of the arresting officer. (People v. Molina,
G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)
36. A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers and, if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, deserves judicial
sanction.
A warrant of arrest is not essential because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made
incidental thereto are valid. (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 113255-56, July 19, 2001)
37. Where the police saw the gun tucked in the accuseds waist when he stood up, the gun was plainly
visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Since the accused could not show any license
for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter, he was in effect committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary. (People v. Go, G.R. Nos. 116001 &
123943, March 14, 2001)
38. Personal knowledge of facts in warrantless arrest must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.
Thus, there is no personal knowledge of facts where the police officers merely relied on information
given to them by others such as: a report of the killing, information from a witness who saw the killing, the
physical description given of the last man who saw the victim fitting the person arrested and information
where this man lived. (People v. Cubcubin, Jr. G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)
The personal knowledge of facts or circumstances must convincingly be indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 cited in People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917,
February 19, 2001)

39. Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officer, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. (People v. Doria 301 SCRA
668 cited in People v. Molina, G.R. No 133917, February 19, 2001)
40. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that, reliable information alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. (People v. Molina,
G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)
41. There was no valid in flagrante delito or hot pursuit arrest where there is lack of personal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act on the part of the accused, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. (Malacat v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)
42. For warrantless arrest to be valid there must be compliance with the element of immediacy between
the time of the commission of the offense and the time of the arrest. Warrantless arrests made within
shorter periods like ten (10) days from commission considered as illegal. (People v. Salavaria, G.R. No.
104663, July 24, 1997)
43. Remedy for unlawful arrest.
a. Motion for the quashal of the warrant;
b. Motion for reinvestigation.
44. Failure to challenge the validity of the arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence
obtained thereby, is considered a waiver of the constitutional rights, particularly against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (People v. Cuison, et al., G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996)
45. Any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial
court upon entering a plea and participation during the trial. (People v. Tumaneng, G.R. No. 117624,
December 4, 1997)
Failure to question the legality of the arrest before arraignment is deemed a waiver of such defense.
(People v. Deang, et al., G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000
46. The filing of charges and the subsequent issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of
such defect. (The minor Larranaga, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998)
47. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. (Sec. 26,
Rule 114, ROC)
(1) PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
1. The inviolability of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence is applicable not only
against the government but also acts of private individuals as well. (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253

SCRA 699)
(2); (3) FRUIT OF THE POISONED TREE DOCTRINE
1. Any evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures under Section 2,
Article III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec. 3(2), Article III, 1987
Constitution)
2. Admission of evidence procured without counsel not violative of due process in customs search and
seizure proceedings because the protection does not extend to administrative proceedings but only to
criminal proceedings. (Feeder International Line, PTS, Ltd., 197 SCRA 842)
3. The prohibition against warrantless searches applies to unwarranted intrusion by the government and
does not operate as a restraint upon private individuals. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57)
(4) FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE
1. An association of mass media (print and ratio-TV broadcast) cannot be compelled by an advertiser to
accept an advertisement which it believes to be offensive to women.
The guarantee of the freedom of the press and speech is a limitation on state action and not on the action
of private parties. [Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)]
The mass media are private enterprises, and their refusal to accept any advertisement does not violate
the freedom of the press and speech. ]Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democrat Control Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)]
:2. Government nominees in a private corporation may not vote to block use of the corporate funds for
advertising of a perceived offensive promotion because this is a threat to the freedom of speech of the
advertiser which is constitutive of prior restraint.
The government nominees being part of the State are bound by the freedom of speech protection which
extends to commercial advertisements. [Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)] The mere
fact that an advertisement is offensive cannot justify its suppression. (Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)]
3. People power may be defined as the power of the people to peaceably assemble in great numbers in
order to effect a change in political leadership.
It is an extra-constitutional act of the people to directly exercise the sovereignty that resides in them.
4. Constitutional provisions considered by some authorities as implementing people power: a. No law
shall be passed abridging the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. (Art. III, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution)
b. Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum. (Article VI, Sec. 32, Ibid.)
c. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. (Art. XIII, Sec. 16, Ibid.)
5. B.P. Blg. 880 is valid but the use of calibrated preventive response (CPR) insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance is null and void.
Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the conduct of the
expression in the rally. The law neither recognizes nor allows the use of CPR. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)

6. B.P.Blg.880, The Public Assembly Act, is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places and plazas.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes otherwise they would not be peaceful and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
opinion, protesting, and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based since they can
refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances came from the
wording of the constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No.
169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)
7. Requirement to hold permit to hold rally not prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly. What is
regulated is the time, place, and manner of holding the public assembly. For prior restraint to apply what
must be regulated should be the content of the speech itself. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R.
No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)
8. All public plazas are venues of rallies without need for permits if the local government unit does not
declare, within thirty days from the decision, what public plazas may be used for rallies without need for
permits. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc., et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)
9. The application for a permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights event under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (BAYAN, et al., v. Ermita, etc.,
et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, and companion cases)
10. Remedy to contest denial of application for permit. The denial may be contested in an appropriate
court of law. The court must decide within twenty-four (24) hours from the date of the filing. Said decision
may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. In all
cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court
.
11. Absence of a permit when required results to arrest of leader but not participants. The holding of any
public assembly by any leader or organizer without having first secured a permit where a permit is
required results to arrest. However, those who are not the leaders are not to be punished or held
criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly [B.P. Blg. 880, Sec. 13 (a)
and 14 (a)].
12. Rallyists to be stopped only if there is clear and present danger to public safety. The policy of
maximum tolerance requires that rallyists should first be requested to disperse if they do not have any
permits and only upon refusal may they be dispersed.
5. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
1. To expel the students who are children of a religious sect because they refuse to participate in the flag
ceremony which includes saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,
on account of their religious beliefs is tantamount to violation of their freedom of religion (Ebralinag v. The
Division Superintendent, etc., 251 SCRA 569), and the duty of the state to protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education and make such education accessible to all.
Freedom of religion cannot be impaired except upon clear showing of a clear and present danger of a

substantive evil which the State has a right to prevent. The students refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony does not pose a clear and present danger.
2. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (Art. III, Sec. 5, 1987
Constitution, arrangement supplied).
3. State not to intrude in purely religious matters. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) must not intrude in
purely religious matters by exclusively arrogating to itself the right to classify a product as halal even on
the premise that the government has the power to protect and promote the Muslim Filipinos right to
health.
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Quran and Islamic beliefs. By arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State in effect
forced Muslims to accept the governments interpretation of the Qur-an and Sunnah on halal food.
(Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., et al., v. Office of the Executive Secretary, etc., et al., G.
R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)
4. The preferred status is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. (Islamic DaWah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., et al., v. Office of the Executive Secretary, etc., et al., G. R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)
5. MTRCB may review but not ban the tapes on the ground that they attack other religions prior restraint
on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of
a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the reality already on the ground. (Iglesia ni Cristo v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 259 SCRA 529)
The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the state is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to
the more overriding interest of public morals, or public welfare.
Clearly the use of offensive language may tend to influence the moral development of children who easily
gain access to a medium such as television.
6. A fixed annual license fee on those engaged in the business of general enterprise including the sale of
bibles by a religious sect is not valid and is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion.
As a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, such a license fee, when
applied to a religious sect is actually imposed as a condition for the free exercise of religion.
A license fee restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends
to suppress their exercise.
6. LIBERTY OF ABODE
1. Residents in an area of imminent military operations may be forcibly evacuated without a necessity to
secure a court order because the urgency of the need justifies a valid exercise of police power which
takes precedence over the liberty of abode.
2. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1st sentence, 1987 Constitution)

7. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
8. RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS
9. JUST COMPENSATION
10. IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
1. Scope of the impairment clause. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties,
either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed
or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its term, is law which impairs the
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. (Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702, 717),
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference
to each other and not with respect to non-parties. [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, et al., G.R. No. 143076,
June 10, 2003]
The non-impairment clause does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition
on the impairment of obligations of contracts, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
2. Illustration of non-impairment. Withdrawal of all tax exemption privileges under the Local Government
Code did not impair the obligations imposed under the loan agreements executed by the NEA and the
USAID, because the loan agreements did not provide any tax exemption in their wordings that the
borrower shall pay the lender the principal amount of the loan and interest thereon, in full, without any
deduction of the tax component thereof imposed under applicable Philippine law and any tax imposed
shall be paid by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds. [Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, et al., G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003]
3. The imposition of VAT on grantees of legislative franchises that are subject to a franchise tax which
shall be in lieu of all taxes is not violative of the non-impairment clause because of the following
reasons:
a. Article XII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public
utility is subject to amendment. alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good requires;
b. Not only existing laws but also the reservation of essential attributes of sovereignty is read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order;
c. Contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful
authority of the government and no obligation of contract can extend to defeat that authority;
d. A lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, does not interfere with a contract or
impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the constitution. Even though such taxation may affect
particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may
impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid
unless prohibited by the constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligations of any existing
contract in its true and legal sense. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and its companion cases, 235
SCRA 630, 249 SCRA.628)
4. Constitutional tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as

those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in
which the government, acting in its private capacity sheds its cloak of authority and waives its government
immunity.
Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. A
franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is not beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Indeed the 1987 Constitution like its precursors the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so
requires. (Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna, et al., G.R. No. 131359, May 5, 1999)
11. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
12 (1) RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL
1. Custodial investigation is the stage of police investigation
a. when a person is taken into custody and
b. is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and
c. the police officers begin to ask questions on
1) the suspects participation therein and
2) which tend to elicit an admission. (People v. Pavillare, et al., G.R. No. 129970, April 5, 2000)
2. When mere invitation not considered as part of custodial investigation. Inviting certain individuals
without singling them out as the perpetrators of the crime is not considered custodial investigation. So
also, asking a single question as to whereabouts is not custodial investigation as the query was merely
part of the general exploratory stage. (People v. Legaspi, et al., G.R. No. 117802, April 27, 2000)
However, where the questioning is not a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but already focused on
the individual as a particular suspect, there was already custodial investigation and he must be
accorded his Miranda rights. (People v. Gamer, G.R. No. 115984, February 29, 2000)
3. Police line-up not custodial investigation. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to
stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has
also been held than an uncounselled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility
of an in-court identification. (People v. Pavillare, et al., G.R. No. 129970, April 5, 2000)
4. Taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel is not a violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination because it is purely a mechanical act.
The right proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000)
5. The Miranda rights of a person under custodial investigation. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right
a. to be informed of his right to remain silent and
b. to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
c. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (People v. Naag, et al., G.R. No. 123860,
January 20, 2000)

6. Authoritative interpretations of the Miranda rule as embodied in the above Art. III, Sec. 12 (1) require,
however, that the crucial question is whether the accused has effectively waived the effectuation of these
rights. Accused should be asked whether he was willing to testify even without the assistance of counsel.
If he was willing to testify only with the assistance of counsel, he should be asked if he has one. If he said
he wanted to have counsel but could not afford one, he should be asked if he wanted one appointed for
him. If these questions are not asked there is no effective waiver of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel. (People v. Naag, et al., G.R. No. 123860, January 20, 2000)
7. Rationale behind Miranda warning. An uncounselled statement is presumed to be psychologically
coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. (People v.
Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000)
8. Nature of Miranda warning. The warning contemplates the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not
enough for the interrogator to merely enumerate to the person his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of
the Constitution, the interrogator must also explain the effect of such provision in practical terms, e.g.
what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.
(People v. Ordono, et al., G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
9. The failure to inform of right to counsel during custodial investigation attains significance only if the
person under investigation makes a confession in writing without the aid of counsel which is then sought
to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such a case the tainted confession is inadmissible.
(Eugenio v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008)
10. During custodial investigation the the primacy of the voluntariness of the choice of counsel by the
person being investigated should be respected.
The officers could not replace the counsel of choice as the replacement, no matter how bright and
competent, may not be considered as independent considering the relationship between them and the
lawyer they have chosen. Statements thus, elicited with the assistance of the replacement lawyer is not
admissible. (People v. Sahagun, 274 SCRA 208)
11. The purpose of right to counsel during custodial investigation is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. (People
v. Base, G.R. No. 109773, March 30, 2000)
12. Counsel during custodial investigation must be competent and independent. Ideally, a lawyer engaged
for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latters relatives or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
(People v. Juanario, cited in People v. Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000)
The independent counsel cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney or
counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. To allow a Station Commander
of the WPD, a part of the police force would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during
custodial investigation. (People v. Bedula, 232 SCRA 566 cited in People v. Obrero, G.R. No. 122142,
May 17, 2000)
13. Extent of assistance to be given by the competent and independent counsel. The desired role of

counsel in the progress or custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. (People v.
Deniega cited in People v. Suela, et al., G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002)
The lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation
to his constitutional rights
14. True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from confessing.
But his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his client on the nature and consequences of an
extrajudicial confession. (People v. Labtan cited in People v. Suela, et al., G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January
15, 2002)
15. The lawyer is required to be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. (People v. Labtan cited in People v. Suela, et al., G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002)
16. Period when right to counsel arises. The protection covers the period from the time a person is taken
into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time
he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. (People v.
Base, G.R. No. 109773, March 30, 2000)
17. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot
afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the
final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. (People v. Gallardo, et
al., G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000)
18. Waiver of right must be in writing. The right to counsel during custodial investigation is not waived by
reason of failure to make a timely objection before plea. There can only be a valid waiver of the right if
such waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel as mandated by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution and the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7438. (People v. Buluran, et al., G.R. No.
113940, February 15, 2000)
19. Even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion, or even it had been voluntarily given.
(People v. Camat, et al,. G.R. No. 112262, April 2, 1996) This refers to custodial investigation only.
20. Accused who was a foreign national was effectively denied his right to counsel, as he was provided
with one he could not understand and communicate with concerning his defense. He was likewise denied
his right to compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witness and the production of evidence on
his own behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his
testimony. (People v. Cuison, et al., G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996)
21. A confession to the mayor is not one made under custodial investigation but a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.

The prohibition against self-incrimination are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997)
22. The media confessions were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. There
was no coercive atmosphere in the interview made by the reporters, neither were they acting under the
direction and control of the police.
Finally, the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It lays down limitations on governmental power to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of the government and its agencies. (People v. Ordono, et
al., G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
12 (2) NO TORTURE OR VIOLENCE
12 (4) COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE
13. RIGHT TO BAIL
1. Bail is
a. the security given
b. for the release of a person
c. in custody of the law,
d. furnished by him or a bondsman,
e. to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified.
(1st sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 114, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
2. Forms of bail:
a. Corporate surety;
b. Property bond;
c. Cash deposit; or
d. Recognizance. (2nd sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 114, ROC)
3. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
higher that is reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose. (SPO1 Caneda, et al., v. Hon. Allan, etc., A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1376, January 23, 2002)
To fix an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged of should not be allowed
because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. (Yap, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
141529, June 6, 2001)
4. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.
The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to
bail. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant amount.
As Justice Jackson once said, a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a
munificent bequest in a paupers will. (Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 1411529, June 6,
2001 citing De Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1)
5. Accused to be released only after the corresponding property or cash bond has been properly filed.

(Sec. 3, Rule 114,ROC)

6. No right to bail in extradition as not criminal in character. (Government of the U.S.A. v. Purganan, G. R.
No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
7. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bails shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (1987 Constition, Art. III, Sec. 13)
8. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
a. before conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and
b, before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule 114, ROC words not in bold supplied)
9. There is discretionary bail granted on application upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. (1st two pars., Sec.
5, Rule 114, ROC paraphrasing supplied)
10. After conviction bail is discretionary because after a person has been tried and convicted the
presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in conviction.
From another point of view, it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is more likely to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction (Francisco cited in Yap, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)
11. Instances when the court shall deny bail or cancel if already posted. If the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court, on motion notice to the adverse party. (3rd and 4th pars., Sec. 5, Rule 114, ROC)
12. A person who appealed his conviction of homicide on a murder charge to the Court of Appeals, may
be denied bail by the Court of Appeals because he could be convicted of a capital offense. (Obosa v.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281)
13. No bail shall be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. (1st sentence, Sec. 24, Rule

114, ROC)
14. If after such finality of judgment of conviction, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail.
When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed
after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (Sec. 24, Rule 114, ROC)
15. Bail, as a matter of right, in the amount fixed may be filed with
a. the court where the case is pending, or in the absence of unavailability of the judge thereof, with
b. any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in
the province, city, or municipality.
c. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality, other than where the case is pending,
1) bail may be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or,
2) if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge thereto. (Sec. 17, Rule 114, ROC arrangement, numbering and underlining supplied)
15. Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application can only be filed in
a. the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal. (Sec. 17,
Rule 114, ROC arrangement, numbering and underlining supplied)
16. Any person who is in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
a. any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. (Sec. 17, Rule 114, ROC arrangement,
numbering and underlining supplied)
17. Duties of the trial judge where an application for bail is filed.
a. Give reasonable notice to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (Sec. 18, Rule
114, ROC paraphrasing supplied)
b. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Secs. 7 and 8, supra)
c. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution.
d. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Sec.
19, supra) (Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997)
18. Hearing is mandatory when accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.
The judge shall conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise , not only to take into account the
guidelines set forth under the Rules for the grant of bail, but primarily to determine the existence of strong
evidence of guilt or the lack of it, against the accused, only for purposes of bail.
If the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right. (People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698,
July 19, 2001)
19. Due process to be given to prosecution in application for bail.
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right
of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.
To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process. The prosecution must be given ample

opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. (People v. Hon. Antona, etc., et al., G.R. No.
137681, January 31, 2002)
20. Rationale for giving due process to prosecution in bail applications. By the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it based on evidence presented by the prosecution that judicial discretion is
exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.
Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness. (People v. Hon. Antona, etc., et al., G.R. No. 137681, January 31,
2002)
21. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless
the latter is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (2nd sentence, Sec. 8, Rule
114, ROC)
8. A witness may be required to post bail.
If the witness is a material witness and the court, upon motion of either party, is satisfied upon proof or
oath that he will not testify when required.
14 (1) CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
14 (2) PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
1. It is incumbent upon the prosecution during the trial, to prove that prior to questioning, the confessant
was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of regularity of official acts
does not apply during in-custody investigation. (People v. Camat, et al., G.R. No. 1122262, April 2, 1996)
2. The signatures of the accused on the boxes and on the plastic bags are tantamount to uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights and are, therefore inadmissible as
evidence.
The fact that all of the accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary
rule" because the constitutional guarantee embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extends to all
persons, both aliens and citizens. (People v. Wong Chuen Ming, et al., G.R. Nos. 112801-11, April 12,
1996)
14 (2) RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING TRIAL
14 (2) RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy, impartial and public
trial. [Art. III, Sec. 14 (2), 1987 Constitution]
2. Right to speedy trial guaranteed under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. If the accused is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by Section 1 (g), Rule 116 and Section 1, the information may be
dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial.
The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of
going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The
dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss

under this section. (Sec. 9, Rule 119, ROC)

3. Period for arraignment under Sec. 1 (g), Rule 116, Rules of Court. Unless a shorter period is provided
by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
day the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion
to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying the suspension of the arraignment shall be
excluded in computing the period.
4. Commencement of trial under Section 1, Rule 119. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused
shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the pre-trial order.
5. Time under Sec. 6, Rule 119. The time limit from arraignment to trial is starting September 16, 2000 =
80 days. (Sec. 6, Rule 119, ROC)
6. Time limit for trial: In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the
Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months
imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the
accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. (Sec. 6, R.A. No. 8493)
In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial,
except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (last sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 2, Rule 119, ROC)
7. Mere mathematical reckoning of time involved not sufficient in determining violation of right to speedy
trial.
It is violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case tried (Ty-Dazo, et al., v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143885-86, January 21, 2002) such as political motivation playing a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there was blatant departure from the established
procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of the preliminary investigation; and that the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. (Ibid, citing
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70)
8. The right to speedy trial is a relative one, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from
illness, medical attention, and body operations, as in the present case where it was duly proven that
complainant had to undergo a carotid operation.
Accused persons sometimes forget that those who are aggrieved also have rights. What offends the right
to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. (de
Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Judge Rosete, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1426, May 9, 2002)
9. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged
in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said
previous decision is hearsay.
Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation
of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court,
especially where what is presented is only its decision without the transcript of the testimony of the

witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based. (People v. Ortiz-Miyake, G.R. No.
115338-39, September 16, 1997)
10. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witness face to face. [Art. III,
Sec. 14 (2), 1987 Constitution]
11. Purpose of the right to confront witnesses:
a. To secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and
b. To allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (People v.
Ortiz-Miyake, G.R. No. 115338-39, September 16, 1997)
15. SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Refer to Article VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, infra.
16. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
17.RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
1. The right against self-incrimination. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Art.
III, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution)
This right is recognized under the Rules on Evidence, which provides that, it is the right of a witness not to
give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by
law. [Sec. 3 (4), Rule 132, ROC]
2. The human body could be used as evidence without violating the right. Mechanical acts without the use
of intelligence do not fall within the scope of the protection. Some of the acts which are not covered by the
right of self-incrimination are the following:
a. Fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing, physical examination. (U.S. v. Tang, 23 Phil. 145)
b. Physical examination of a woman accused of adultery to determine if she is pregnant. (U.S. v. On Suy
Hon, 36 Phil. 735; Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62)
c. Undergoing ultra-violet rays examination to determine presence of fluorescent powder on the hands.
(People v. Tranca, 35 SCRA 455)
c. Subpoena directing government officials to produce official documents or public records in their
custody.
d. Fitting the accused foot over a foot print, putting on a pair of trousers, shoes, etc.
3. The right against self-incrimination include protection against being compelled to provide specimens of
the accused handwriting.
Since the provision prohibits compulsory testimonial evidence, it does not matter whether the testimony is
taken by oral or written means as either way it involves the use of intellectual faculties.
The purpose of the privilege is to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of compelling a
person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
(Bermudez v. Castillo, Per Rec. No. 714-A, July 26, 1937; Beltran v. Samson, G. R. No. 32025,
September 23, 1929)
4. An accused is exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself [Sec. 1 (e), Rule 115,
ROC) hence he may refuse to take the witness stand.

5. Ordinary witness who is NOT the accused may be compelled to testify. However, he could claim the
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer only as each question requiring an incriminatory
answer is propounded to him. (Badiong v. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906)
18 (1) NO DETENTION FOR POLITICAL BELIEFS
18 (2) NO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
19 (1) NO EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
19 (2) NO DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
20. NO IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
21. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
1. The concept of double jeopardy. When an accused
a. has been convicted or acquitted, or
b. the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
1) without his consent
2) by a court of competent jurisdiction,
3) upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and
c. after the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge,
d. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution
1) for the offense charged, or
2) for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
3) for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information. (1st par., Sec. 7, Rule 117, ROC numbering and arrangement supplied)

2. Related protection afforded by double jeopardy:

a. Against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
b. Against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
c. Against multiple punishments for the same offense. (People v. dela Torre, G.R. Nos. 137953-58, April
11, 2002)
3. Purposes of protection against double jeopardy.
a. It prevents the State from using its criminal processes a an instrument of harassment to wear out the
accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated cases.
b. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.
c. Finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty. (People v. dela Torre, G.R. Nos. 137953-58, April 11, 2002)
4. Requisites for double jeopardy.
a. The first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second.
b. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated.

c. The second jeopardy must be

1) for the same offense, or
2) the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or
is
3) an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
110315, January 16, 1998)
5. Proof that first jeopardy has attached.
a. Court of competent jurisdiction;
b. Valid complaint or information;
c. Arraignment;
d. Valid plea; and
e. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110315, January 16,
1998)
6. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, in which case certiorari may be resorted to
cure an abusive denial.
In that extraordinary proceeding it must be clearly demonstrated that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (People v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 140633, February , 2002)
7. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of
law, the same is null and void. It is as if there is no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim
for double jeopardy.
In rendering the judgment of dismissal, the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a
judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed,
jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing. (Merciales v. Hon. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002)
8. Appeal by the State seeking increased penalty constitutes double jeopardy. (People v. dela Torre, G.R.
Nos. 137953-58, April 11, 2002)
9. Instances where the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information:
a. the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
b. the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plead was
entered in the former complaint or information or
c. the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except when more than one offense is charged unless a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law, as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116. (last par., Sec. 7, Rule 117, words
not in bold supplied)
21. NO EX POST FACTO LAW
1. Ex post facto law is a law which penalizes a person for having committed an act which was not

punishable at the time of its commission. Such retroactive application violates a persons right to due
process.
2. An ex post facto law has been defined as one:
a. which makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such action; or
b. which aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; or
c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed; or
d. which alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; or
e. which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when exercised was lawful; or
f. which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 145184, March 14,
2008 citing various cases)
3. The constitution proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the restrospectivity of penal laws.
(Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R. No.
145184, March 14, 2008)
4. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. (Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 145184, March
14, 2008 citing Orlando L. Salvador v. Placido L. Mapa, et al., G. R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007, 539
SCRA 34)
A law is also penal if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal penalty (e.g. disqualification from the
practice of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an administrative proceeding. (Pascual v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344)
5. The prohibition against the enactment of an ex post facto law does not apply to
a. an extradition treaty because the same is not a penal law. (Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341)
b. the Presidential Adm. Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans because it merely provides for its composition and functions,
c. the Presidential Memorandum Order No, 61 which provides the frame of reference in determining the
existence of behest loans because not being penal laws, they cannot be characterized as ex post facto
laws. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R.
No. 145184, March 14, 2008)
6. A bill of attainder is a law that inflicts punishment without a trial, substituting the legislative act for a
judicial determination of guilt. It violates the right s of the accused to be presumed innocent and to seek a
proper remedy before a court of law.
Art. IV. CITIZENSHIP
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art. IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
2. Marriage does not result to loss of citizenship. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
(Sec.4, Art. IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
3. Loss of Filipino citizenship results from taking an oath of allegiance to follow the citizenship of an alien
husband. (Sec. 1 [3], C
mmonwealth Act No. 63)
4. Only natural born citizens are qualified to retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship. Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. (Sec.
3, Rep. Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003)
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country, shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Ibid.)
5. Derivative Citizenship under Rep. Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003.
The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
(Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 9225)
6. Civil and political rights under Rep. Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 and other existing laws;
2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. (Sec. 5, Rep. Act
No. 9225)
7. Persons who despite having reacquired or retained their Filipino citizenship could cannot exercise their
right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines:
a. Candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
b. Are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens. (Sec. 5, Rep. Act No. 9225)
Art. V. SUFFRAGE
Refer to discussion below.