History in Points

Thirty years ago, on 6 October 1973 at 2:00 p.m.
(Cairo
time), Egyptian and Syrian forces launched coordinated
Read the Press attacks on Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights.
Release Known variously as the October War or the Yom Kippur
War, this conflict lasted until late October when Washington
Electronic Briefing and Moscow, working through the United Nations, forced a
Books Main Index cease-fire on the warring parties. The October war had a
fundamental impact on international relations not only by
testing the durability of U.S.-Soviet détente but also by
compelling the United States to put the Arab-Israeli conflict
on the top of its foreign policy agenda. The threat of regional
instability, energy crises, and superpower confrontation,
made a U.S. hands-on role in the region inescapable. Since
the fall of 1973, Washington has played a central role in the
protracted, if checkered, effort to address the conflicting
security and territorial objectives of Arabs and Israelis.
Recently declassified U.S. archival material, unearthed by the
National Security Archive, provides critically important
information on American policies, perceptions, and decisions
during the conflict.
Significant scholarship on the October War, by such analysts

as Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, William P.
Quandt, and Kenneth W. Stein, among others, has explored
key issues and developments, such as Egyptian and Syrian
objectives, superpower relations with the belligerents, U.S.
and Israeli intelligence failures, the role of Moscow and
Washington in escalating and dampening the fighting, and the
impact of such key personalities as Kissinger and Sadat.
(Note 1) New archival records, routinely declassified under
Executive Order 12958, from the State Department's central
files and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the
National Archives (College Park), illuminate these and
related issues. Organized chronologically (with a few
exceptions) more or less corresponding to the stages of the
fighting, this briefing book provides some of the highlights of
the declassified archival record. Published here for the first
time are documents reflecting:
• the failure of U.S.

intelligence to perceive the
imminent threat of war;
according to the State
Department's intelligence chief,
Ray Cline: "Our difficulty was
partly that we were
brainwashed by the Israelis,
who brainwashed themselves."
(document 63)
• the advance warnings of

a possible Egyptian-Syrian
attack received by the Israelis
and Kissinger's advice to Prime
Minister Gold Meir to avoid
preemptive action (documents
7, 9, 10, and 18)
• the initial state of

confusion in the U.S.
intelligence community about
the possibility of war
(document 13)
• Kissinger's early
decisions to provide military
aid to Israel (documents 18 and
21) and stay in touch with Arab
leaders, to maximize U.S.
diplomatic influence
(documents 20, 44, and 63)
• Kissinger's initial
downplaying of Arab threats of
an oil embargo and production
cuts (document 36A)
• Kissinger's "shock" at,

and refusal to follow, Nixon's
instruction to establish a U.S.-
Soviet condominium to enforce
a peace settlement (documents
47 and 48)
• the complete record of

Kissinger's 20-22 October talks
with the Soviets and the Israelis
on a United Nations Security
Council cease-fire resolution
(documents 46, 49-50, 53-56)
• Kissinger's virtual green

light for Israeli violations of the
UN cease-fire (documents 51
and 54)
• Brezhnev's use of the

U.S.-Soviet hotline to protest
Israeli cease-fire violations and
the entrapment of Egypt's Third
Army (documents 61A and B)
• Brezhnev's 24 October
letter that prompted the U.S.
Defcon III nuclear alert
(document 71)
• Kissinger's rage at West

European governments, whom
he saw as acting like "jackals"
and "hostile powers," for not
supporting U.S. policy
(documents 63 and 75)
• tense meetings of
NATO's North Atlantic Council
where U.S. Ambassador
Donald Rumsfeld heard
complaints about the lack of
advance notice of the U.S. alert
(documents 79A and B)
• Kissinger's conviction
that war had put the United
States in a "central position" in
the Middle East while the
Soviets had been "defeated"
(document 63)
• U.S.-Palestinian
Liberation Organization
contacts during the war
(document 78)
• the record of emotional

conversations between
Kissinger and Meir over cease-
fire arrangements (documents
91A and B, 93A and B)
As significant as the new material is, highly important U.S.

documentation on the October War remains classified,
especially among the National Security Files in the Nixon
Presidential Materials Project. The withheld material includes
intelligence reports, back channel messages sent through CIA
offices, and a variety of other documents. Perhaps most
important, almost all of the transcripts of meetings of the
Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)--a special NSC
sub-committee responsible for handling crisis situations--
remain classified even though thirty years have passed. In
addition, declassification work at the Nixon Presidential
Materials Project is short-staffed and mandatory review
requests take considerable time to process. Thus, it may be
some years before new archival information on the October
War becomes available. (Note 2)
The transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations

("telcons") are an especially important classified primary
source on the October War. For years under Kissinger's
personal control, all of the telcons are now under review at
the National Archives and the Department of State. A new
book by Kissinger, Crisis, consists of transcripts of his
telephone calls during October 1973. (Note 3) This is a
significant collection which elucidates key developments
during the war. Unfortunately, the documents themselves are
not available, only Kissinger's edited rendition of them.
Crisis is by no means a stand-alone account of U.S. policy
during the October War in part because it overlooks events,
such as Kissinger's meetings with the Israelis on 22 October
that had critically important consequences for the course of
the fighting.
As useful as Kissinger's compilation is, the documents have

been edited by him as well as excised by the National
Security Council. A fuller picture of the October War may
not be available until the universe of Kissinger telcons is open
for research. Moreover, Kissinger's own record may be
incomplete. Other U.S. senior officials who participated in
these events kept their own records of telephone
conversations which may be as illuminating as Kissinger's.
Walter Isaacson's 1992 biography of Kissinger cites some of
this material. For example, on 6 October, Kissinger urged
Nixon assistant, General Alexander Haig to keep Nixon in
Florida in order to avoid "any hysterical moves" and to "keep
any Walter Mitty tendencies under control." This language
does not appear in Crisis. On 12 October, when the airlift
decisions were being made, Kissinger told Schlesinger that
the situation in Israel was "near disaster" and that it was due
to "massive sabotage" by the Pentagon. "Massive sabotage"
does not appear in Crisis either. (Note 4)
The story of the October War and its background is a

complex one that is necessarily simplified in the commentary
on the documents selected for this briefing book. Unlike
today's Mideast crisis, which focuses on Palestinian
grievances against Israeli occupation, the issue that sparked
war in 1973 was the outcome of the last Arab-Israeli conflict,
the "Six Day War" of June 1967. During the months before
the 1967 war, neighboring states, who denied Israel
diplomatic recognition, threatened Israel's very existence.
Worried that an Arab attack was imminent, the Israelis
launched a preemptive strike against Egyptian and Syrian
forces on 5 June 1967. Within a few days, the Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) had seized the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal
from Egypt, Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, and
the Golan Heights--or the Jawlan--from Syria. The conflict
and its outcome came before the United Nations Security
Council, which after protracted discussion passed Resolution
242 calling for a full settlement. The resolution, however, was
ambiguous enough to fit U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's
basic objective: the United States would support Israeli
territorial acquisitions until the Arab states were willing to
declare peace with Tel Aviv. (Note 5)
The extraordinary Israeli victory laid the basis for greater

instability, on the one hand, creating what one analyst calls an
"impertinent sense of invulnerability" in Tel Aviv, and, on the
other hand, kindling irredentist sentiments in Egypt and Syria.
(Note 6) While creating buffer zones eased short-term
security concerns for Israel, a new threat loomed as Arab
military defeats encouraged Palestinians to take the route of
armed struggle. During the next six years, the Egyptians
would engage in low-level conflict in the Sinai ("War of
Attrition") while members of Black September would kill
Israeli Olympians in Munich and U.S. diplomats in the
Sudan, among other incidents. In September 1970, aircraft
highjackings triggered a rebellion against King Hussein by
Palestinian militants. With Syrian tanks entering Jordan, the
possibility of wider conflict loomed but tensions lessened
after Syrian forces withdrew under attack and the PLO was
expelled from Jordan. Linking Damascus with Moscow, the
Nixon administration defined the crisis in Cold War terms
and treated Israel, which had been ready to strike Syrian
forces, as a Cold War ally that had to be armed. The Nixon
administration provided Israel with over a billion dollars in
military credits to support sales of F-4 Phantom jets and other
equipment.
Peace efforts on the Middle East made little progress prior to

1973. During the early 1970s, UN envoy Gunnar Jarring and
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers floated plans to settle
disputed issues, but their initiatives failed. The Israelis, who
were internally divided over the basis for a settlement, were
unresponsive to Egyptian overtures and the Nixon White
House, preoccupied with Vietnam and seeing no immediate
threat to the peace, had low motivation to pull its weight.
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was interested in developing
closer ties with Washington and displayed Egyptian
independence by expelling thousands of Soviet advisers in
mid-1972, but Washington responded slowly to this initiative.
While Cairo-Moscow ties were fraying, the Soviets sought a
role in the region. Egypt remained dependent on Soviet
military aid and Moscow continued to supply Syria.
With diplomacy stalemated, during 1972 and 1973, Sadat

believed that the military option was necessary to secure U.S.
political intervention and to facilitate negotiations. To bring
U.S. influence on Egypt's side, he was willing to make a
separate arrangement with Israel over the Sinai, although he
would keep his flexibility secret from leaders of other Arab
states. To make the military option workable, that is to
disperse Israeli forces during war, Sadat realized that he
needed partners. A non-military ally was King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia, who promised to use the oil weapon against the
United States. For military action, Sadat turned to Syrian
President Hafez el-Assad although the basis for cooperation
was narrow because of differences in objectives. Determined
to recover the Golan Heights, Assad had little interest in a
relationship with Washington and rejected the possibility of
negotiations. He saw Israel's very existence as abhorrent.
Moreover, while Sadat secretly envisioned a limited war with
Israel, Assad incorrectly assumed the possibility of a greater
conflict that would force Israel to surrender the West Bank.
Differences over strategy would undermine the Assad-Sadat
partnership soon after the fighting began. (Note 7)
Once begun, the October War would yield military triumphs

and reverses for all sides. Egyptian and Syrian surprise
attacks would stun the Israelis as Arab forces poured over the
Suez Canal and into the Golan Heights. While the Israelis
expected quickly to reverse the situation, they suffered
significant
losses during
the first few
days. The
Egyptians
successfully
kept forces on
the Canal's
east bank, but
success turned
into near
disaster as Israeli troops, led by General Ariel Sharon, among
others, launched counter-offensives, seized positions on the
Canal's west bank and trapped Egypt's Third Army. U.S.
diplomatic intervention saved Egyptian forces from
destruction. Syria fared worse, with Israeli forces winning
back control of the Golan Heights and moving troops within
striking range of Damascus. Yet, as IDF generals would
ruefully acknowledge, Egyptian and Syrian forces fought
valiantly. The human toll was substantial. By the end of the
war, 2,200 Israelis soldiers had been killed, which in
percentage terms was equivalent to 200,000 Americans. This
was four times as many as in the Six Day War. Another 5,600
were wounded. 8,500 Arabs were killed--many of them
Syrian--but far fewer than the 61,000 lost during the Six Day
War. (Note 8)
Soon after the fighting started, the war developed into an

international crisis, not least because Washington and
Moscow had significant interests in the region. For both
superpowers, credibility was a central consideration. And as
Nixon put it, several weeks into the war, "No one is more
keenly aware of the stakes: Oil and our strategic position."
(Note 9) Both states had already armed their respective Arab
and Israeli clients and both launched massive airlifts to
sustain the battlefield strength of their allies. Although the
Egyptians and Syrians suffered battlefield reverses, their
resolve and a determined Israeli counter-attack kept the
fighting going. Angered by the U.S. airlift, the Arab
petroleum exporting states embargoed oil deliveries to the
United States, thus producing a significant energy crisis.
While both Moscow and Washington recognized the danger
of confrontation and intermittently supported cease-fires,
their political commitments made that support equivocal with
destabilizing consequences. Superpower tensions over Israeli
violations of the 22 October cease-fire escalated to the point
where the Nixon administration staged a Defcon III nuclear
alert, yet with all of the strains, détente prevented a serious
clash.
The need to avoid U.S.-Soviet confrontation made it all the

more essential for Kissinger to press Israel to let non-military
supplies reach the beleaguered Third Army. The U.S.
intervention on behalf of Sadat and his troops foreshadowed
Washington's new diplomatic role, the development for
which Sadat had waged war. In late October, Israeli and
Egyptian senior officers began meeting to work out the
details of the cease-fire which culminated, after Kissinger
became involved, in the "Sinai I" disengagement agreement
of January 1974. Consistent with Sadat's nationalist
orientation, Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory was his
principal objective and it was largely attained before his
assassination in 1981. Nevertheless, other issues from the
1967 war--Israeli control of the Golan Heights and the West
Bank--remain contested and a source of dangerous tension to
this day.
The ongoing Watergate crisis and the financial scandal that

brought down Vice President Spiro Agnew intersected with
the October War. Agnew's resignation and the need to
appoint a new vice president distracted Nixon. So did the
constitutional battle with Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox,
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus, whose firings--"the Saturday
Night Massacre"--coincided with Kissinger's trip to Moscow.
While Nixon's political prestige was collapsing, Kissinger's
was growing even more. With Nixon embattled, Henry
Kissinger emerged as the key U.S. decisionmaker during the
October War. (Note 10)
Documents
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Table of Contents
I. The Looming Conflict
II. On the Brink of War
III. Coordinated Offensives
IV. Airlifts, Battlefield Stalemates, and Oil Threats
V. Turn of the Tide?
VI. "The Smell of Victory" and Search for a Cease-

Fire
VII. Collapse of the Cease-Fire
VIII. Crisis
IX. Crisis Resolved
I. The Looming Conflict

Document 1: Memorandum from National Security Council
[NSC] Staff, "Indications of Arab Intentions to Initiate
Hostilities," n.d. [early May 1973]
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials

Project (hereinafter NPMP), Henry Kissinger Office Files
(hereinafter HAKOF), box 135, Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz)
1973 Jan-July (2 of 3)
In the early spring of 1973, Sadat told Newsweek journalist

Arnaud de Borchgrave that the "time has come for a shock"
but no one at the time believe he had a plan for war. That in
October 1972 he had already made a basic decision for war, if
not its exact timing, was a well-kept secret. (Note 11)
Certainly, the spring of 1973 augured the possibility of great
instability in the Middle East: a looming energy crisis, Saudi
intimations that the kingdom might use the oil weapon in the
absence of a Middle East settlement, and Israeli raids on PLO
offices in Beirut. Moreover, Egypt and other Arab states were
making quiet military moves that portended possible action.
The NSC analysts who may have prepared this report
believed that various moves that U.S. intelligence had picked
up--movement of surface-to-air missiles and bombers, higher
alert for air forces, reports on war planning, and the like--
indicated that those states were "preparing for war."
Nevertheless, they could not be sure whether these
developments indicated intentions to attack or a ploy to put
"psychological pressures" on Tel Aviv and Washington. A
safe conclusion was that "whatever the Egyptian and Arab
leaders intend at this state, the pattern of their action thus far
does not provide the Arabs with a rational basis for an attack
at an early date." Sadat would not take military action "within
the next six weeks," probably not before the "next UN
debate." At the close of May, however, a few weeks after the
preparation of this report, Roger Merick, an analyst at State
Department's Intelligence and Research prepared a report
forecasting a "better than 50 percent chance of major"
Egyptian-Israel hostilities within six months. (Note 12) The
INR estimate, which has not yet been found and declassified,
generated greater interest in the State Department in steps to
facilitate Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Document 2A: Memorandum of Conversation [Memcon]

between Muhammad Hafez Ismail and Henry A. Kissinger,
20 May 1973, 10:15 a.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, Cat C

Arab-Israeli War
Document 2B: Memorandum from Kissinger to the
President, "Meeting with Hafiz Ismail on May 20," 2 June
1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol VII May

20-September 23, 1972
During the late winter and spring of 1973, Henry Kissinger

held several secret meetings on Middle East issues in New
York and France with Muhammad Hafez Ismail, Sadat's
national security adviser. When they first met in February,
Hafez and Kissinger had a wide ranging, although
inconclusive, discussion of Egyptian-Israeli relations and the
relationship of an Egypt-Israel settlement to the Palestinian
problem, among other issues.
This meeting did not start off well because press leaks had
disclosed U.S. plans to provide Israel with F-4 Phantom Jets,
a development that naturally discomfited the Egyptians.
Kissinger tried to persuade Hafez that the administration's
step-by-step approach balancing security and sovereignty
concerns was more likely to win Israeli cooperation than the
Egyptian approach emphasizing a comprehensive settlement
of the 1967 borders. But Hafez was skeptical, worrying, for
example, that once a step had been taken, e.g. a preliminary
agreement over the Sinai, that Washington would lose
interest. Kissinger and Ismail had further communications but
they did not meet again before war broke out. Whatever the
actual diplomatic possibilities were, Sadat had already
decided that military action was essential to break the
diplomatic stalemate and get Washington's attention.
According to one of Ismail's staffers, Ahmad Maher El-
Sayed, who was present at the meetings, "What we heard
from Kissinger was `don't expect to win on the negotiating
table what you lost on the battlefield.'" In other words,
Washington could do little to help as long as Egypt was the
defeated power. Thus, Egypt had to "do something." If
Kissinger said anything to that effect privately, the present
document does not include it. Instead, it shows Ismail treating
"war" as the alternative to accepting the "status quo," with
Kissinger plainly seeing war as a bad choice: "military action
will make [the] situation worse." In any event, nothing that
Kissinger said would encourage Sadat to reverse the decision
for war. Interestingly, however, Ismail himself may have
opposed the final decision to launch hostilities [see Document
8]. (Note 13)
Document 3: Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the

President's Files, "President's Meeting with General Secretary
Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23, 1973 at 10:30 p.m. at
the Western White House, San Clemente, California
Source: HAKO, box 75, Brezhnev Visit June 18-25 1973

Memcons
During 1973, the U.S.-Soviet Union détente process

continued to unfold with Nixon and Brezhnev holding a
summit meeting at Camp David and the "Western White
House" in June. With the second phase of the Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks going slowly, the summit made no progress
in that area, although it did unveil the controversial
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. During the
meetings in California, Brezhnev kept Nixon and Kissinger
up late on the night of 23 June so that he could put across his
concerns about the Middle East and China. While the Soviets
knew nothing of Sadat's decisions until October, Brezhnev
presciently emphasized the danger of the Middle East
situation. Sharing his apprehension that war might break out
unless the superpowers encouraged negotiations he said: "we
must put this warlike situation to an end." Brezhnev further
argued for the importance of agreement on "principles," such
as guarantees for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories but
Nixon, while agreeing that the Middle East was a "matter of
highest urgency," was not interested in making any decisions
that evening. Brezhnev's principles, however, were
inconsistent with the step-by-step approach that Kissinger had
been pushing. Apparently Kissinger (and probably Nixon as
well) was resentful that Brezhnev had raised this subject with
no notice, as Kissinger privately noted: "Typical of Soviets to
spring on us at last moment without any preparation."
Document 4: Theodore Eliot, Jr., Executive Secretary State

Department, Memorandum for the Record, "Next Steps on
the Middle East," 29 June 1973, enclosing, Secretary of State
Rogers to Nixon, "Next Steps on the Middle East," 28 June
1973
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of

State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Subject-Numeric Files
1970-1973 (hereinafter cited as SN 70-73, with file citation),
Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr
During the summer of 1973 Secretary of State William

Rogers supported a major diplomatic initiative on the Middle
East. After Nixon's re-election in November 1972, Henry
Kissinger expected to become secretary of state but Rogers
refused to leave his post for at least six months because he did
not want to hand Kissinger a "victory." The previous four
years had marked one of the lowest points in State
Department history because Nixon and Kissinger had
marginalized Rogers and the State Department in such key
policy areas such as China, Vietnam, and U.S.-Soviet
relations. Nevertheless, Nixon had given Rogers considerable
scope in Middle East policy and Rogers had a continuous
interest in finding ways to ameliorate the Arab-Israeli conflict
(although Kissinger had thwarted many of his initiatives).
After the Brezhnev-Nixon summit, Rogers made his last stab
on Middle East policy by suggesting secret Egyptian-Israeli
peace talks. Concerned about the risk of Middle East war,
superpower confrontation, and oil embargoes if the problems
continued to fester, Rogers believed that it was essential to
get the Egyptians and Israelis to stop talking past each other
on their respective interpretations of UN Security Council
Resolution 242, passed in the wake of the Six Day War.
Rogers' effort was stillborn; as the Eliot memo shows, Nixon
"did not want the Secretary to proceed," ostensibly because
the White House was waiting to hear from Brezhnev. Plainly,
however, Kissinger was beginning to usurp Roger's role on
the Middle East issue and, no doubt, neither Nixon nor
Kissinger wanted him to get the credit for any progress in that
area. Rogers finally resigned in August 1973. It is interesting
to speculate whether a determined effort along the lines that
he proposed could have derailed the war. (Note 14)
Document 5: Memcon between Kissinger and Israeli

Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, 10 September 1973, 6:03 p.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, Box 135, Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive

Memcons
Kissinger and the Nixon White House were under growing

pressure to move on Middle East diplomacy but while they
would make appropriate public signals, they saw no need to
move quickly. On 5 September 1973, during a press
conference, Nixon declared that the administration had
important plans for Middle East negotiations: "we have put at
the highest priority ... making some progress toward the
settlement of that dispute." (Note 15) During a conversation a
few days later with the late Ambassador Simcha Dinitz (Note
16), with whom he established a close relationship, Kissinger
explained that "the trend here to do something is getting
overwhelming. It can be delayed but it can't be arrested."
While Kissinger believed that it was important to get
negotiations going and was looking for ideas on initial steps--
perhaps a proposal on Jerusalem or a settlement with Jordan--
he had no problem with delay: he felt "no immediate
pressure." But to reduce whatever pressure there was and to
maximize U.S. leverage, Kissinger told Dinitz that he wanted
to find ways to "split" the Arabs, to keep the Saudis out of the
dispute, and to otherwise "exhaust the Arabs." Kissinger may
have used such language to ease Israeli concerns about
negotiations, but that rhetoric could also have encouraged
inflexibility. (Note 17)
Document 6: Harold Saunders, NSC Staff, to Kissinger,

"Memorandum on Your Talk with Zahedi," 19 September
1973, enclosing memorandum of Kissinger-Zahedi
conversation, 15 September 1973, and untitled paper handed
to Zahedi on 13 August 1974
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt-Ismail Vol. VI May

20-Sept 30, 1973
Kissinger's backchannel communications with the Egyptians

on a Middle East settlement continued into the weeks before
the war. This time, the intermediary was Iranian Ambassador
Ardeshir Zahedi (the son of the U.S.-backed general who had
ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh twenty years
earlier), who had met with Ashraf Ghorbal, Ismail's deputy in
Switzerland. There Zahedi how shown him a memorandum,
prepared at the White House, which outlined the U.S.
approach to negotiating a settlement, "a step at a time" so that
"propositions" could be presented to Israel that "cannot be
easily rejected." Perhaps suspecting that Kissinger was trying
to entrap Egypt in a negotiating process with no clear end in
sight, Ghorbal was not excited by the White House paper: "it
contained some good words but not action." What he wanted
was "a tangible and concrete suggestion."
II. On the Brink of War
Document 7: Deputy Assistant to the President for National

Security Brent Scowcroft to Kissinger, 5 October 1973,
enclosing message from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir
(passed through Israeli chargé Shalev)
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 136, Dinitz June 4, 1974 [sic]-

Oct. 31, 1973
Neither Israeli nor U.S. intelligence recognized the

imminence of war in early October 1973. AMAN, the Israeli
military intelligence organization, and the leadership
generally assumed that national military power would deter
war and downplayed the possibility of conflict until 1975
when Egypt and Syria had better air capabilities. Moreover,
Israeli military and political leaders had a condescending
view of Arab fighting abilities. Rumors of war had begun to
crop up beginning in the spring of 1973 and during
September 1973 AMAN began collecting specific warnings
of Egyptian-Syrian intentions to wage war in the near future.
Moreover, in late September Jordan's King Hussein warned
Prime Minister Meir that Syrian forces were taking an "attack
position." These developments concerned the Israelis but
AMAN ruled out major war. On 4 October, however, the
Israelis picked up a number of signals suggesting the
imminence of war: the Soviets were starting to evacuate the
families of advisers in Egypt and Syria; a high-level
clandestine source warned Mossad of the possibility of a
coordinated attack; and aerial reconnaissance detected an
increase in gun deployments along the Suez Canal. The next
day, 5 October, with AMAN now seeing a "low probability"
of war, Meir shared Israeli concerns with Washington. (Note
18) With Kissinger in New York at the annual meeting of the
United Nations General Assembly, his deputy Brent
Scowcroft received this urgent message from Meir late in the
day. Egyptian and Syrian war preparations were becoming
more and more noticeable making Meir and her colleagues
wonder whether 1) those countries anticipated an Israeli
attack, or 2) intended to "initiate an offensive military
operation." She asked Kissinger to convey to the Arabs and
the Soviets that Tel Aviv had no belligerent intentions, but
that if Egypt or Syria began an offensive, "Israel will react
militarily, with firmness and great strength."
Document 8: U.S. Interests Section Egypt, Cable 3243 to

State Department, "Soviet View on Causes and Timing of
Egyptian Decision to Resume Hostilities," 26 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 War (Middle East) 26

October 1973-File No. 21
During the weeks before the war, the Soviets believed that the
situation was growing more dangerous, but like the
Americans and the Israelis they did not see the "resumption
of fighting [as] at all likely." Yet, they had begun to evacuate
dependents because they had learned of the decision for war,
but not its exact timing, a few days ahead of the event. As the
war unfolded, U.S. diplomats in Cairo picked up interesting
gossip about Soviet foreknowledge and Egyptian debate over
war from a suspected Russian Intelligence Services (RIS, or
KGB) official, Leo Yerdrashnikov (whose official cover was
deputy director of the local Tass office). His account is
fascinating although some details are unconfirmable, at least
with sources known to this writer. Interestingly, in the
discussion of Sadat and his advisers, Yerdrashnikov claims
that Hafez Ismail was among those who argued against war
because a "policy of rapprochement … was working in
Egypt's favor." The Soviet also claimed that Sadat had told
Saudi Arabia's King Faisal of his decision in August and that
the King had "encouraged" Sadat. Yerdrashnikov also sheds
light on when the Soviets learned of Sadat's decision. On 3
October, Sadat told Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov
that war was imminent. Moscow did not, however, learn
when the war would start until the morning of 6 October.
(Note 19)
Document 9: U.S. Embassy Israel, Cable 7766 to

Department of State, 6 October 9988, "GOI Concern About
Possible Syrian and Egyptian Attack Today"
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files (hereinafter

NSCF), box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct. 1973 File
No. 1 [1 of 2]
Apparently, Kissinger did not receive Meir's message

[Document 7] until the next morning, when he passed a copy
to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to corroborate Israeli
concern. (Note 20) In any event, Kenneth Keating, the U.S.
Ambassador to Israel, provided more specific news in a
message that arrived sometime before 6 a.m.: the Israelis
believed that Egypt and Syria would launch a coordinated
attack within six hours. The Israeli's "Top Source," an
Egyptian (who may have been a double agent) had provided
warning that war would begin that day. Shocked and
surprised by the possibility of war, Golda Meir put it this
way: "we may be in trouble." Some of Meir's advisers urged a
preemptive strike, but the prime minister assured Keating that
Israel would not launch a pre-emptive attack; she wanted to
"avoid bloodshed" and, no doubt, the opprobrium associated
with striking first. Instead, the Israelis ordered the
mobilization of 100,000 troops, a disorganized process that
took several days. At 2:00 p.m., the Egyptians and Syrians,
aided by a successful deception plan, launched their attack.
As Egyptian Major General Talaat Ahmed Mosallam later put
it, the surprise was so complete "because of both the Arab
plan and the failure of the Israelis to understand or even
believe what they saw with their own eyes." (Note 21)
Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New

York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to
President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos &
Misc October 1-October 17, 1973
At 6:00 a.m., Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco woke

his boss with Keating's message. As this document shows,
Kissinger immediately took the reins of power and began
making phone calls and sending messages urging restraint by
all concerned parties. That morning, Kissinger got in touch
with Nixon (who was in Florida) only after he had made a
series of calls, first to Dobrynin, asking that the Soviets hold
back Cairo and Damascus. He also called Israeli chargé
Shalev, advising him to inform his government "that there
must be no preemptive strike." Later, having received Israeli
assurances about preemption, he told Dobrynin and Egyptian
Foreign Minister Zayyat that there would be no such strikes.
Interestingly, Kissinger has never acknowledged that he
recommended against preemption, although his recent
collection provides more confirming information on this
point. (Note 22)
Document 11: U.S. Mission to United Nations cable 4208 to

U.S. Embassy Israel, 6 October 1973

Oct. 1973 File No. 1 [1 of 2]
Hoping that he could avert war, Kissinger wired Ambassador

Keating, informing him of his other efforts to secure Arab
and Israeli restraint and of his "appreciation" for Meir's
assurance that there would be no preemptive moves.
Document 12: U.S. Department of State cable 199583 to

U.S. Embassies Jordan and Saudi Arabia, "Message from
Secretary to King Faisal and King Hussein," 6 October 1973
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files (hereinafter

NSCF), box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct. 1973 File
No. 1 [1 of 2]
During the course of the October War, Kissinger tried to

demonstrate impartiality by communicating with the leaders
of Arab governments he considered "moderate," such as
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, among others. In this message,
prepared for Kings Faisal and Hussein, Kissinger related his
efforts to avert war and vainly asked their help in securing
"restraint" on Assad's and Sadat's part. Within a few days,
Kissinger would soon begin back channel communications
with Ismail and Sadat.
Document 13: Memorandum from William B. Quandt to

Brent Scowcroft, "Arab-Israeli Tensions," 6 October 1973

Oct. 1973 File No. 1 [1 of 2]
Saturday morning, before the U.S. learned that war had

broken out, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)
met in the White House Situation room in Kissinger's
absence. (Unfortunately, all but one of the WSAG meeting
minutes remain classified). According to one account, during
the meeting, Director of Central Intelligence Colby opined
that neither side was initiating war but that the conflict was
the result of an "action-reaction cycle." (Note 23) This
document, prepared by NSC staffer William Quandt, reflects
the uncertainty of that morning. In light of Meir's warning,
Quandt tried to interpret the various signs of impending
conflict: evacuation of Soviet advisers, Egyptian forces on a
high state of alert, and the positioning of Syrian forces at the
Golan Heights. One possibility was that the evacuation of
Soviet advisers meant that Moscow "had gotten wind" that
war was imminent. Another possibility was a "major crisis in
Arab-Soviet relations." Indeed, "downplay[ing] the likelihood
of an Arab attack on Israel," U.S. intelligence saw an Arab-
Soviet crisis as a more plausible explanation. This was
consistent with the received wisdom in the intelligence
establishment that the Arabs would not initiate war as long as
the military balance favored Israel. In other words, Tel Aviv's
preponderant military power deterred war. This was the
prevailing view of Israeli intelligence and U.S. intelligence
bought into it. A few weeks later, Assistant Secretary of State
Intelligence and Research Ray Cline observed, "Our
difficulty was partly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis,
who brainwashed themselves." (Note 24) Brainwashed or not,
Quandt suggested a number of actions "if hostilities are
imminent."
III. Coordinated Offensives
Document 14: Message from Soviet Government to Nixon

and Kissinger, 6 October 1973, called in at 2:10 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27-Arab-Isr
This message conveys Brezhnev's and the Politburo's concern

about the Middle East "conflagration." Although far from
straightforward about when they first learned of Sadat's war
plans, the Soviets were no less shocked than the Americans
by the Egyptian and Syrian decisions for war. For Brezhnev
and his colleagues, war was a "gross miscalculation," a
"major political error," because they believed that the Arabs
were sure to lose. Recognizing the danger of the situation for
superpower relations, during the first days of the war the
Soviets pressed their Egyptian and Syrian clients for a cease-
fire. At the same time, however, Brezhnev wanted to maintain
Soviet influence in the region, thus, Soviet policy had to
avoid a military and political disaster for Egypt and Syria.
The tension between détente and credibility concerns would
shape Soviet policy throughout the conflict. (Note 25)
Document 15: Memorandum from William Quandt and

Donald Stukel, NSC Staff, "WSAG Meeting -- Middle East,
Saturday, October 6, 1973, 3:00 p.m."
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Institutional Files,

box H-94, WSAG Meeting, Middle East 10/6/73 7:30 pm.,
folder 1
As Israelis were observing Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and

Syrians launched their attacks. Just after 2:00 p.m. (Cairo
time) 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks engulfed
Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal while 35,000
Syrian troops and 800 tanks broke through Israeli positions
on the Golan Heights. (Note 26) Providing Kissinger with
some background information for another WSAG meeting,
held early that evening, NSC staffers believed that senior
officials had to start considering a number of issues, such as
steps to minimize threats to U.S. interests, e.g., an Arab oil
embargo, possible Soviet moves, and the "consequences of a
major Arab defeat." With respect to the Soviet position,
Kissinger's advisers believed that the key question was how
Washington could "best take advantage of this crisis to reduce
Soviet influence in the Middle East." But if Moscow's
influence was to be reduced, it could not be the result of a
"major Arab defeat" because that could endanger U.S.
interests in the region, destroy the possibility of a settlement,
and weaken "moderate" Arab regimes. The advantages of
finding ways to "minimize" Arab "loss of face" required
serious consideration.
Document 16: Memorandum to Kissinger, initialed "LSE"

[Lawrence S. Eagleburger], 6 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr
At the outset, the Israelis did not want UN Security Council

action on a cease-fire because it could prevent them from
reversing initial Arab gains. During a conversation with
Foreign Minister Abba Eban at 9:07 a.m, Kissinger indirectly
assured him that Washington would not immediately go to
the Security Council; this satisfied Eban because it would let
the Israelis decide whether to "[do] it quickly." While
Kissinger would soon consider Security Council action to
stop the fighting, the Israeli position on a cease-fire
influenced his thinking. Sometime during the day, Eban
spoke with Kissinger's executive assistant, Lawrence
Eagleburger, (Kissinger must have been temporally occupied)
and registered his appreciation that Kissinger would defer UN
action so that Israel had "time to recoup its position." In other
words, the Israelis sought a cease-fire based on the status quo
ante. To give the Israelis time to do that, Eban asked for a
delay on any Security Council action until Monday. By the
time Eban spoke with Kissinger later in the day, the latter had
seen Eagleburger's memo and Eban had nothing to worry
about. Having decided that Washington had to "lean" toward
Tel Aviv in order to restrain the Arabs and the Soviets but
also to get more leverage over the Israelis during the
negotiating phase, Kissinger tacitly assured the foreign
minister that Washington would not be "precipitate" in
seeking Security Council Action. In any event, the Soviets
were interested in a cease-fire and so was Assad--if the
fighting stopped he would have control of the Golan Heights.
Sadat, however, was not ready to halt until he had a stronger
position on the Sinai. (Note 27)
Document 17: Memcon between Kissinger and Ambassador

Huang Zhen, PRC Liaison Office, 6 October 1973, 9:10- 9:30
p.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff,

Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977. Box 328. China
Exchanges July 10-October 31, 1973
Back in Washington, at the close of the day Kissinger had one

of his confidential talks with Huang Zhen, Beijing's
representative in Washington. Rather frankly, Kissinger
disclosed elements of his grand strategy; he assured the
Chinese that "our strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets
from getting a dominant position in the Middle East."
Believing that the Israelis would achieve a quick victory over
the Arabs in a few days, Kissinger wanted to demonstrate to
the Arab states that "whoever gets help from the Soviet Union
cannot achieve his objective." Moreover, to the extent that the
Arabs believed that they could win some territory before
agreeing to halt the fighting, Kissinger wanted to slap down
that belief by supporting a cease-fire based on a "return to the
status quo ante." The Chinese were sympathetic to the Arab
cause so Kissinger had to be able to assure progress on Arab
grievances. Once negotiations begin, "we will have to
separate ourselves from the Israeli point of view to some
extent." That would be possible, however, if Washington
could offer security guarantees for "new borders after the
settlement."
Document 18: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 7

October 1973, 8:20 a.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977. Box

25. Cat C 1974 Arab-Israeli War
The first page of this document is mostly illegible--except for

a few scraps on U.S. supply of Sidewinder (air-to-air)
missiles and bomb racks--but it provides interesting detail on
the early moments of the war, such as Israeli cabinet debates
on the question of whether to preempt or not. Apparently
advice that Kissinger had given in the past--"whatever
happens, don't be the one that strikes first"--played no small
part in Meir's thinking. With war underway, Kissinger
assumed that Israeli forces would soon reverse Egyptian
advances; therefore, he wanted to delay action at the UN
Security Council to enable the IDF to "move as fast as
possible." The Israelis were seeking military aid---Sidewinder
missiles, planes, ordnance, ammunition, and aircraft parts--
but aircraft was the priority of the moment. Kissinger,
however, was not so sure that aircraft could be provided
"while the fighting is going on," although he thought it
possible to make Sidewinders and bomb racks available. As
for the Soviets, Kissinger did not show much concern: "in all
their communications with us, they were very mild."
Document 19: Department of State, Operations Center,

Middle East Task Force, Situation Report # 8, "Situation in
the Middle East, as of 2300 Hours (EDT, Oct. 7, 1973"

Oct. 1973 File No. 2
During the first day of the fighting, Arab forces made

significant gains--the Syrians had penetrated the Golan
Heights while the Egyptians had moved into the Sinai past the
east bank of the Suez Canal. Given the great strategic value of
the Golan Heights, so close to Israeli population centers, the
Israelis started to throw in forces there first. (Note 28) To
keep officials abreast of developments, the State
Department's Middle East Task Force, lodged at the
Department's basement Operations Center, regularly issued
"sitreps" on military and political developments. This one,
produced at the end of the second day of the fighting, showed
a grim situation: "major losses on both sides," a "miserably
tough day" for the Israelis.
Document 20: Kissinger to Egyptian Foreign Minister Al-

Zayyat, 8 October 1973, enclosing "Message for Mr. Hafiz
Ismail from Dr. Kissinger," 8 October 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol. VII

October 1-21, 1973
Within a day after the war broke out, Sadat's security adviser,
Haifez Ismail, sent Kissinger a secret message, through the
Cairo CIA station, outlining his government's war aims. The
message remains classified and Kissinger found its basic
terms---restoration of 1967 borders--unacceptable, but he saw
it as extraordinarily significant: it treated Washington as the
key player in the peace process but also showed Sadat's
moderation; he did not seek to "widen the confrontation."
(Note 29) Kissinger quickly responded, asking Sadat and
Ismail to clarify points about territorial withdrawal. He also
asked about the substance of a backchannel message from
Sadat to the Shah of Iran that the Iranians showed to U.S.
Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms. Given Kissinger's
expectation that the Israelis would soon be overtaking the
Egyptians, he may have anticipated that Ismail and Sadat
would be interested in his offer to "bring the fighting to a
halt" and "personally participate in assisting the parties to
reach a just resolution" of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Document 21A: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9

October 1973, 8:20-8:40 a.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, CAT C

Arab-Israeli War
Document 21B: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9

October 1973, 6:10-6:35 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol Isr-US
Early in the morning of 9 October, Kissinger received a call

from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more "difficult"
position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had
failed with major losses. At 8:20, the two met for a more
detailed conversation, with a chagrined Dinitz acknowledging
that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians and
100 to the Syrians. Egyptian armor and surface-to-air missiles
were taking their toll in the air and ground battle and the
Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to "get all equipment
and planes by air that we can." Kissinger, who had assumed
that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without major
infusions of aid, was perplexed by the bad news--"Explain to
me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?"--and the
diplomatic implications of substantial U.S. wartime military
aid was troublesome. As indicated on the record of the 8:20
a.m. meeting, Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without a
notetaker, to discuss Golda Meir's request for a secret
meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that
Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen
Moscow's influence in the Arab world. To underline the
urgency of the situation, Dinitz may have introduced an
element of nuclear blackmail into the private discussion.
While Golda Meir had rejected military advice for nuclear
weapons use, she had ordered the arming and alerting of
Jericho missiles--their principal nuclear delivery system--at
least to influence Washington. (Note 30) Kissinger has never
gone on record on this issue and no U.S. documentation on
the U.S. Israeli nuclear posture during the war has been
declassified. Whatever Dinitz said, Kissinger was responsive
to the pleas for more assistance. Later, when the WSAG
considered the Israeli position, it recommended the supply of
arms as long as Washington kept a low profile. Meeting
Dinitz later in the day, Kissinger told him that Nixon had
approved the entire list of "consumable" items sought by the
Israelis (except for laser bombs) would be shipped. Moreover,
aircraft and tanks would be replaced if the need became
"acute." To ensure that the U.S. role had low visibility, Israeli
cargo plans would have the El Al markings painted out.
Moreover, discussion of arrangements to charter U.S.
commercial aircraft for shipping war material began on the
U.S. side. During that meeting, Dinitz had better news to
report: progress on the Golan Heights and the massive
destruction of Syrian tanks.
Document 22: William Quandt to Kissinger, "Middle Eastern

Issues," 9 October 1973
Misc. Oct. 6-Oct 17, 1973
Pointing to risky developments--Israel's losses and request for

supplies, the probability that fighting would "drag on" for
more days, threats to U.S. citizens in Lebanon, calls from
Kuwait for use of the oil weapon, and reports of Soviet
casualties from Israeli bombing in Syria--Quandt advised
Kissinger that he would have to consider decisions on a
number of problems. Meeting Israel's arms requests "too
visibly" could endanger U.S. citizens but holding back would
undermine Tel Aviv's confidence in U.S. policy. For Quandt,
the "key problem" was a cease-fire. The earlier position
favoring a cease-fire based on the status quo ante had become
less and less tenable because of the "prospects for
increasingly serious threats to US interests if the fighting is
prolonged." Pushing for a "ceasefire in place," however, was
likely to "irritate" the Israelis, who were trying to recover lost
territory. Tel Aviv might charge a high price, such as "strong"
diplomatic and military support after the war, but Quandt
thought it might be "worth the cost." Whatever impact this
suggestion may have had on Kissinger's thinking, he brought
up the possibility of a cease-fire in place during a phone
conversation with Dinitz later in the day. (Note 31)
IV. Airlifts, Battlefield Stalemates, and

Oil Threats

Middle East Task Force, Situation Report #18, "Situation in
the Middle East, as of 1800 EDT, Oct. 10, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War - 10

October 1973 File No. 5
While Arab and Israeli ground forces were "sparring and

regrouping," Syrian and Israeli air forces were engaged in
battle and the Israeli Air Force bombed the international
airport at Damascus. Meanwhile, Greek, Israeli, and U.S.
intelligence picked up signs that the Soviets were airlifting
supplies to their Arab clients. "The Israelis speculate the main
cargo is missiles." As for the U.S. effort to supply Israel, the
U.S. press had already observed an Israeli Boeing 707
picking up missiles and bombs in Norfolk, VA. Moreover,
comments by Sheik Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Minister of
Petroleum, suggested that the U.S. military supply of Israel
would have a cost--cutbacks in oil production. The Soviets
had made their airlift decision early in the war, believing that
extensive support could enhance Moscow's prestige in the
Arab world. This decision had significant implications for the
course of the war; not only did the airlift encourage the
Egyptians and Syrians to continue fighting it came to be seen
in Washington as a "challenge" to American power. (Note 32)
Document 24: U.S. Interests Section in Egypt, cable 3942 to

State Department, "Current Egyptian Military Position," 10
October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 638, Arab Republic of Egypt IX
(Jan-Oct 73)
A secret source within the Egyptian government provided the

U.S. Interests Section with current information on battlefield
and political developments. Some of this intelligence reached
the Associated Press, which reported conflicting information
on Egyptian war aims: either to take "all of Sinai" or to hold
ground deep enough into the peninsula to force a cease-fire in
place. While the plan that Sadat has shown Assad aimed at
forty kilometer incursions into the Sinai, the actual Egyptian
war plan posited a far more limited attack, enough to get
Washington's attention and force Tel Aviv to negotiate. The
information provided by the source suggested a more
restricted incursion than Sadat had originally anticipated (20
kilometers instead of 60), but the intimation of limited
purposes was correct. Given that had concealed from Assad
his limited goals, a press leak of this sort was undoubtedly
highly disturbing to the Egyptian leadership. Apparently, the
AP report upset the informant so much that the Interests
Section observed that "If this continues, source cannot
continue to produce."
Document 25: Yuli Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet

Embassy, to Scowcroft, 10 October 1973, enclosing untitled
paper, delivered 11:15 a.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 19 (July 13,

1973-Oct 11, 1973)
Skeptical that the Arabs would make lasting military gains

and worried about the war's impact on U.S.-Soviet détente,
Moscow was interested in a cease-fire throughout the
conflict. But Sadat wanted to keep fighting in order to get
political concessions from Israel while the latter rejected a
cease-fire that left Arab territorial gains in place. By 10
October, Soviet interest in a cease-fire was more serious; the
fighting was stalemated and the Politburo estimated that the
Arabs would not make further military gains. That morning,
Dobrynin called Kissinger informing him that Moscow was
interested in a Security Council resolution for a cease-fire in
place as long as a third party introduced it and Moscow
would not have to vote for it. As the memo suggests, it had
been difficult for the Soviets to persuade the Egyptians to
accept a resolution (by contrast, Assad wanted a cease-fire to
stop Israeli advances). To give their clients some cover, the
Soviets would have to maintain some distance from any
resolution. Kissinger stalled on the Soviet proposal ostensibly
because of Vice President Agnew's resignation (owing to a
financial scandal). Kissinger, however, wanted to give Tel
Aviv time for military advances. In between conversations
with Dobrynin, he advised Dinitz to the effect that
"Everything depended on the Israelis pushing back to the
prewar lines as quickly as possible … We could not stall a
cease-fire proposal forever." By the time the Israelis were
supporting a cease-fire resolution, they had begun making
military gains, but those gains turned Sadat against the
proposal. That, the Soviets regarded as a "gross political and
strategic blunder." While Kissinger's dilatory tactics irritated
Moscow, the Soviets continued their airlift. As Soviet Middle
East expert Victor Israelian later suggested, "the motivations
of the two superpowers were the same," with both were trying
to "assist their clients in their deteriorating military situation.
(Note 33)
Document 26: Memcon between Deputy Secretary of State

Kenneth Rush and Petroleum Company Executives, "The
Middle East Conflict and U.S. Oil Interests," 10 October
1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27Arab-Isr
While Kissinger was trying to put off the Soviet cease-fire

proposal, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush heard out
top executives from Exxon and Gulf Oil on the possible use
of the oil weapon during the war. The executives had asked
for the meeting because they had learned that Kuwaiti Oil and
Finance Minister Abdel Rahman Atiqi, who had already
called for an emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers to
discuss the role of petroleum in the war, was warning
Washington to avoid action that could lead to precipitate
moves against "U.S. oil interests." Believing that the Arabs
had the companies "at their mercies," the oil executives
worried that if Washington started to replace Israeli aircraft
losses, radicals like Qadhafi would get the upper hand and the
companies would be nationalized. Also in prospect were price
increases of 100 percent and the curtailment of oil production.
Rush was also concerned about the impact of prolonged
fighting but he could not promise the executives what they
wanted: a U.S. statement against arms shipments to the
Middle East. As State Department official Roger Davies
noted, the Soviet airlift, then just beginning, would increase
pressure to "resupply Israel."

Middle East Task Force, Situation Report #22, "Situation
Report in the Middle East, as of 0600 EDT, 10/12/73"
October 1973 File No. 7
On 11 October the IDF continued their offensive against

Syrian forces, the next day breaching the "main Syrian
defensive line" and recapturing the Golan Heights. The
situation on the Suez front remained "static," with an artillery
battle under way. The Soviet airlift unfolded causing
apprehension among the Israelis about the restoration of
Syrian SAM capabilities. Meanwhile, Nixon, Kissinger, and
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger were beginning to
make major decisions on the U.S. supply operation. While
Kissinger and Schlesinger had sought to contract private U.S.
aircraft to move supplies, this proved impractical because
U.S. companies wanted to stay away from the conflict.
Moreover, on 12 and 13 October, Kissinger was getting
reports that the Israelis were running low on ammunition.
Although he was not sure if Dinitz was telling him the truth
about ammunition supplies----"How the hell would I know,"
he told Schlesinger--he did not want to risk any Israeli failure
in "going as a fierce force." When it became evident that
civilian charter aircraft could not be mobilized, on 13 October
Nixon ordered a major U.S. military airlift to supply Israel.
To his staff, Kissinger justified this move as part of his
diplomatic strategy: having failed to win Egyptian support for
a cease-fire resolution at the United Nations, it was necessary
to prolong the fighting to create a "situation in which [the
Arabs] would have to ask for a cease-fire rather than we."
[See Document 63]. (Note 34)
Document 28: Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs

Joseph Sisco to Kissinger, "Proposed Presidential Message to
King Faisal," 12 October 1973, with State Department cable
routing message attached
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 15-1 US/Nixon
Given the Nixon administration's continued concern over the

position taken by "moderate" Arab regimes, policymakers
were pleased to receive what they saw as a restrained
communication from King Faisal. In the continued effort to
woo Faisal, the State Department prepared a reply for Nixon's
signature. Stressing Washington's balanced, "pro-peace"
stance, the message delicately encouraged Faisal to keep out
of the conflict and avoid taking actions that could hurt Israel
or Washington: it was important to conduct "ourselves in
such a way that it will not be impossible for the US to play a
helpful role once the fighting is over."
Document 29A: State Department Cable 203672 to U.S.
Embassy, Saudi Arabia, "Message to the King from the
Secretary, 14 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174. 1973 Middle East War 15 -

15 October 1973 File No. 9
Document 29B: U.S. Embassy Saudi Arabia, Cable 45491 to

State Department, "US Arms to Israeli: Saudis Sorrowful:
King May Send Another Message," 16 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174. 1973 Middle East War 15 -

16 October 1973 - File No. 11
A U.S. military airlift to Israel could not occur in secret and

Kissinger's State Department initiated a coordinated
diplomatic campaign to minimize the adverse political impact
on the Arab countries. Before the State Department started
briefing other governments in the region about the airlift,
Kissinger wanted to explain his decision through a private
message to Faisal. Recognizing that the only way he could
make the airlift palatable to the Saudis was on anti-
Communist grounds (the kingdom had never established
diplomatic relations with Moscow), Kissinger played up the
anti-Soviet angle, suggesting that what had made the U.S.
decision "inevitable" was insufficient Soviet cooperation in
the latest cease-fire talks and the Soviet "massive airlift."
Moreover, the administration had to make this decision "if we
are to remain in a position to use our influence to work for a
just and lasting peace." In other words, by helping Israel
Washington would be in a position to press Tel Aviv for
concessions during peace talks. That Kissinger hardly
mollified Faisal is indicated in the marginal notation: "Faisal
angry at this." Although Faisal's response to Nixon remains
classified, apparently he wrote that the U.S. decision had
"pained" him. Yet, the Saudis were careful to conceal any
antagonism; as the cable from Ambassador James Akins
suggests, the embassy in Riyadh discerned "no visible anger
… but rather genuine expression of sorrow." (Note 35)

Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, Oct. 15, 1973"

October 1973 File No. 10 (2 of 2)
After what amounted to a week-long, "operational pause," on

4 October the Egyptians began a major tank offensive on the
Sinai, the "largest armored battle since World War II." Asad
had been pressing Sadat for action to relieve pressure on the
Syrian front, but the Israelis quickly reversed the offensive.
(Note 36) The Egyptians suffered significant losses--76 tanks
according to Egyptian sources, 280 according to the Israelis--
a defeat that opened the way to IDF advances across the Suez
Canal. The Israeli air force was heavily engaged in combat
operations, attacking airfields, fuel depots, tanks, and missile
batteries in Egypt and Syria. On the oil front, oil company
and embassy officials believed that King Faisal would take
"'some' retaliatory" action if the United States announced that
it was airlifting military supplies to Israel.
Document 31: Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-

Military Affairs, Department of State, to Kissinger, "Armed
Shipments to Israel," 15 October 1973
Source: RG 59, Top Secret Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-

1973, box 23, DEF G
The Pentagon organized the airlift to Israel out of the Joint

Staff's Logistics Readiness Center (LRC). Given the high
stakes involved, State Department officials believed it
essential to monitor the airlift's progress, not least so that they
could resolve any political problems that emerged. At the
outset this proved difficult; an Air Force Colonel Wieland,
who was working for the State Department at the LRC, found
himself "prematurely invited out" by the Defense
Department. While Wieland's supervisor, Seymour Weiss,
would have to turn the bureaucratic wheels to reinsert the
State Department into the LRC, he was nevertheless able to
provide an initial report on the airlift's status. Seventeen
flights a day were already scheduled with 25,000 tons of
supplies approved for shipment. Among the items that had
already been delivered were F-4s (Phantom jets), Sidewinder
air-to-air missiles, anti-tank weapons, and artillery projectiles,
among other items. Weiss mentioned a diplomatic problem:
Egypt had lodged a protest with the West German
government against the movement of military supplies from
U.S. bases to Israel. Despite that protest, the United States
continued to supply the Israelis from U.S. bases in Germany
for the time being. Weiss's reference to the "over-taxed"
airbase at Lajes (the Azores) signaled another diplomatic
problem: none of the other bases mentioned--Torrejon in
Spain or Mildenhall in the United Kingdom--would be
available for refueling empty aircraft returning from Israel.
While it took severe diplomatic pressure--a "harsh note" from
Nixon (Note 37)--to secure Portuguese cooperation, Kissinger
would be highly pleased with the Portuguese during the airlift
while his anger with other Europeans steady grew.
Document 32A: U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 4936 to

Department of State, "NATO Implications of the Middle East
Conflict: NAC Meeting of October 16, 1973," 16 October
1973
Document 32B: U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 4937 to

Department of State, "NATO Implications of the Middle East
Conflict: NAC Meeting of October 16, 1973," 16 October
1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War, 16

Oct. 1973-File No. 11 [1 of 2
During the first week or so of the crisis, Kissinger learned

that NATO Secretary General Josesph Luns had said
something to the effect that Washington "had been taken in
by the Soviets on détente and we are now paying the price for
détente" (see Document 75). Taking advantage of a restricted
North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting on the war, Donald
Rumsfeld, the U.S. permanent representative (with
Ambassadorial rank) to the North Atlantic Council, reviewed
U.S. policy with his Canadian and European counterparts and
expressed displeasure at such criticisms. Describing U.S.
policy early in the war, the decisions for an airlift to resupply
Israel, and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting,
Rumsfeld saw the "present crisis [as] a test of the evolving
spirit of détente." He tartly observed that "we do not take
kindly to suggestions that the U.S. was foolishly drawn into
détente relationships with the USSR." In light of the danger
that the Soviets might tip the military balance, Rumsfeld
asked alliance partners to cooperate in finding ways to "make
clear to the Soviets that détente is a two-way street." Later in
the discussion, he suggested a number of measures that the
Allies could take to "damage" Soviet interests "if the choose
to damage ours," including slowdown Western participation
in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation or
"economic measures," presumably denial of credits or
exports. As Rumsfeld noted, the Council emphasized
"Alliance solidarity" but his summary overlooked some tough
questions raised during the discussion. For example, the
Belgian representative, André De Staercke, implicitly
criticized Washington for not consulting with NATO before
the meeting: "consultation was an essential part of solidarity."
While Rumsfeld contended that the present meeting was a
form of consultation, de Staercke was more interested that
Washington consult with its allies on basic decisions during
the crisis.
V. Turn of the Tide?

Report in the Middle East as of 1800 Hours EDT Oct. 16,
1973"

Oct. 1973 File No. 11 [2of 2]
This sitrep pointed out the first signs of what would turn out
to be a major reversal of fortunes for Egypt: a small Israeli
armored force led by General Ariel Sharon had arrived on the
west bank of the Suez Canal to begin striking Egyptian
artillery and air defense units. Another item pointed to the
possibility of a petroleum crisis. Angered by the U.S. airlift
and then by the U.S. announcement of large-scale financial
aid to Israel, the Arab oil producers were making plans to
wield the oil weapon. This document shows the Saudis
pressing the European Community (EC) to "use their
influence to change America's policy in the Middle East." Oil
would be used as a weapon against the U.S. airlift but the
production "decrease … will hurt the EC countries first."
(Note 38)
Document 34A: William B. Quandt to Kissinger,

"Memoranda of Conversations with Arab Foreign Ministers,"
17 October 1973, with memcon attached
Source: SN 70-73, POL 27Arab-Isr
Document 34B: Memcon between Nixon and Arab Foreign

Ministers, Wednesday, October 17, 1973, 11:10 a.m., in the
President's Oval Office
Misc. Oct. 6-Oct 17, 1973
Earlier in the conflict diplomats of key Arab states with close

political and/or economic ties with the United States had
sought a meeting with Kissinger and Nixon to register their
concerns about the U.S. position on a cease-fire based on the
status quo ante and the possibility of U.S. resupply for Israel.
By the time the meeting occurred, the cease-fire issue had
shifted and the U.S. airlift was in progress. Kissinger wanted
to persuade the diplomats that the U.S. position was balanced,
neither pro-Israeli nor pro-Arab, and that any action on the
part of the Arab oil producers to use the oil weapon would
"only hamper our efforts to play an effective peacemaking
role." During the discussions, Foreign Ministers Saqqaf
(Saudi Arabia), Benhima (Morocco), Bouteflika (Algeria),
and Al-Sabah (Kuwait) argued that the fighting could not end
until territory occupied in 1967 had been returned and the
Palestinian problem solved. Nixon and Kissinger, however,
refused to "make commitments we can't deliver on" and
emphasized that the broader issues of a settlement had to be
separated from a cease-fire, because if the fighting was
prolonged it could lead to a "great power confrontation." The
U.S. hoped to "improve the situation" but the fighting had to
stop first. In the meantime, the airlift would continue to "keep
the balance" in the region. Kissinger's line of reasoning did
not wholly convince his audience; as Benhima observed, "It
is difficult for [the ministers] to convey assurances on the US
position to their chiefs of state at a time when the US is
aiding Israel."
Document 35: Thomas R. Pickering, Executive Secretary

State Department, to George Springsteen, Acting Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs, 17 October 1973, enclosing
memorandum by Lawrence Eagleburger, 17 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL Fr-US
As suggested earlier, U.S.-European tensions increased

during the October War. Henry Kissinger's "Year of Europe"
initiative had already produced trans-Atlantic disagreements
over the newly-enlarged EC's decisionmaking processes, and
Western Europe's close dependence on Middle Eastern oil
supplies provided the basis for disagreements during the
crisis. One of Kissinger's chief European critics, French
Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, had been suspicious of the
"Year of Europe" and dubious of Kissinger's détente strategy,
which he believed was producing a superpower condominium
at Europe's expense. On 17 October, during a speech at the
National Assembly, Jobert assailed Israel for checking the
peace process and the superpowers for fanning the flames of
war with military supplies: "We see Mr. Brezhnev, the
apostle of détente, and Dr. Kissinger, now a Nobel Peace
Prize winner, shaking hands while sending thousands of tons
of arms by air." (Note 39) The statement infuriated Kissinger
who ordered a demarché to the French ambassador. Not only
did the State Department find the references to Kissinger
"offensive and unnecessary," it rejected any equivalence
between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and found Jobert's
statement "inconsistent with good relations between the two
countries." Things would get worse.
Document 36A: Minutes, "Washington Special Action

Group Meeting," 17 October 1973, 3:05 p.m. - 4:04 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, box H-117, WSAG

Minutes (originals) 10-2-73 to 7-23-74 (2 of 3)
Document 36B: Memcon, "WSAG Principles: Middle East

War," 17 October 1973, 4:00 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, box H--92, WSAG

Meeting Middle East 10/17/73, folder 6
Except for this transcript, all the minutes for WSAG meetings
during the October War remain classified. At this meeting,
the participants discussed key issues: planning for an energy
crisis, the Arab-Israeli military situation and problems related
to the airlift. During the review of plans for energy
conservation in the event of an oil crisis, Kissinger showed
some optimism that, during the present war, his diplomatic
strategy would avoid Arab oil embargo, as he patronizingly
observed: "Did you see the Saudi Foreign Minister come out
like a good little boy and say they had very fruitful talks with
us?" An hour into the meeting, Nixon called in the WSAG
principles for a "pep talk." Mentioning what he saw at
stake--"oil and our strategic position"--Nixon focused on the
airlift and sealift of supplies to Israel, which he believed were
essential for preserving U.S. "credibility everywhere" as well
as for bringing Tel Aviv to a settlement. In a self-
congratulatory statement, Kissinger declared this was the
"best-run crisis" of the Nixon administration, noting that
despite the "massive airlift" TASS had issued only mild
complaints while Arab foreign ministers were making
"compliments in the Rose Garden." The congratulatory mood
was premature because the Arab oil producers had not
announced the oil boycott and production cuts that were a
direct response to the airlift.
Document 37: U.S. Interests Section in Egypt Cable 3167 to

State Department, "Egyptian Military Situation," 18 October
1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War 18

U.S. diplomats in Egypt reported on a battle "of major

proportions" on the banks of the Suez Canal, a confrontation
that may be showing that the "offensive has begun to move
into Israeli hands if only temporarily." Signs that "things did
not go well for the Egyptians" were the lack of military
announcements and delays on the request of a NBC News
correspondent who wanted to go to the Suez front. Those who
prepared this report did not know that the IDF was launching
a plan to encircle Egypt's Third Army, a development that
would quickly spark a major crisis. (Note 40) An NSC staffer
who read this cable perceptively wrote "turn of tide?" on the
document.
Document 38: U.S. Embassy Kuwait cable 3801 Cable to

State Department, "Atiqi Comment on OAPEC Meeting," 18
October 1973

Arab oil producers had met in Kuwait to discuss wartime oil

supply policy where they decided, as this cable reported, to
begin a "complete embargo on oil to the United States." The
oil producers had decided, contrary to Kissinger, that action
on energy policy would be conducive to negotiations, not an
obstacle to them. They sought to warn the "United States and
other consumers" that the producers were "as serious as front
line fighters that Israel must give up occupied lands."
Nevertheless, apparently the Saudis insisted that the OAPEC
announcement not specifically mention the United States but
countries that were "unfriendly" to the Arab cause.
Document 39: U.S. Embassy United Kingdom Cable 12113

to State Department, "European Attitudes in Middle East
Conflict," 18 October 1973

For the Nixon administration, one of the most disturbing

elements in the October War was the attitude of West
European governments. As former U.S. Ambassador to West
Germany Martin Hillenbrand explained, Washington
"complained vociferously about what it regarded as European
lack of support." While key allies such as the United
Kingdom discouraged the use of their bases for U.S. aircraft
supplying Israel, the Nixon administration conducted
virtually no "prior consultation" with NATO Europe about its
decisions during the war. (Note 41) This cable, signed by the
media magnate Walter Annenberg, the U.S. Ambassador to
the United Kingdom, sheds some light on the divergences.
While Annenberg was clearly displeased that the Europeans
were "staying on the sidelines" and that European attitudes
had the "effect of isolating" the United States from NATO,
Conservative Member of Parliament and confidant of Prime
Minister Edward Heath James Prior believed that cooperation
was difficult because interests were divergent. He explained
that the "Middle East war posed very difficult and serious
problems for Britain" because of the importance of Arab oil
and the UK's "economic and commercial interests in Arab
states." Taking this stand plainly posed some risks for the
Heath government because a "large majority of British public
were sympathetic to Israel."
VI. "The Smell of Victory" and Search

for a Cease-Fire

Middle East Task Force, Situation Report # 43, "Situation
Report in the Middle East as of 0600 Hours EDT, Oct. 19,
1973"

Oct. 1973-File No. 14
While the tank battle on the Sinai raged inconclusively,

Israeli forces enlarged "their bridgehead" on the Canal's west
bank with the presence of over 200 tanks. This, the Israelis
believed, gave them the option of heading toward Cairo, thus
increasing their ability to destroy the Egyptian army. "The
Israelis feel they now have turned the corner in the war and
that the initiative on both fronts is now in Israel's hands."
That the "smell of victory" might make Tel Aviv unwilling to
accept a cease-fire pointed to a dangerous problem: the
impact on U.S.-Soviet relations if the Israelis devastated the
army of one of Moscow's major clients.
Document 41: Brezhnev to Nixon, 19 October 1973, handed

to Kissinger 11:45 a.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20

(October 12-November 27, 1973)
With the reversals on the Sinai, Sadat wanted a cease-fire and

the Soviets treated this as an urgent matter. On the evening of
18 October, Dobrynin read to Kissinger the text of a proposed
cease-fire resolution for the UN Security Council; the next
morning, Brezhnev wrote Nixon about the crisis. (Note 42)
The Soviets saw a "more and more dangerous situation" and a
responsibility by "our two powers" to "keep the events from
going beyond the limits." Anxious to avoid a humiliating
defeat for Moscow's Arab clients, worried about damage to
relations with Washington, and determined to play a role in
any post-war settlement, Brezhnev urged Nixon to send
Kissinger to Moscow for talks on expediting the "prompt and
effective political decisions" needed to stop the fighting.
(Note 43)
Document 42: Memcon between Kissinger, Schlesinger,

Colby, and Moorer, 19 October 1873, 7:17 - 7:28 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1027, Memoranda of

Conversations - Apr-Nov 1973, HAK and President (2 of 5)
Hours before flying to Moscow, Kissinger gave a briefing on

Brezhnev's request and his planned trip to top defense and
intelligence officials. As Kissinger explained, going to
Moscow would delay a cease-fire resolution for a "few days,"
save face for the Soviets, and avoid a worse situation: Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko "coming here with tough
instructions." Kissinger emphasized what he saw as the
centrality of the U.S. role: "Everyone knows in the Middle
east that if they want peace they have to come through us."
Yet while he saw the Soviets failing politically in the region,
""we can't humiliate [them] too much." A-4s refer to
Skyhawk attack aircraft.
Document 43: Nixon to Brezhnev, 20 October 1973

No less than Brezhnev, Nixon saw much at risk if the fighting

continued; he quickly instructed Kissinger to travel to
Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire resolution. Given his
assumption that a trip to Moscow was a way to buy time for
further Israeli military advances, he was dismayed by Nixon's
decision to grant him "full authority" to negotiate: "the
commitments that [Kissinger] may make in the course of your
discussions have my complete support." For Kissinger, too
much freedom of action was not helpful; if he needed to
delay, for example, to help the Israelis improve their position,
he would not be able to use consultations with the President
as an excuse. (Note 44)
Document 44: Excerpts from Backchannel U.S.-Egyptian

messages, 20-26 October 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 130, Saunders-Memorandum-

Sensitive
Ismail also weighed in on behalf of a cease-fire in this

message to Kissinger late in the evening of 20 October.
Aware of Kissinger's plans to meet with Brezhnev in
Moscow, he hoped that the discussions would reach
agreement on a resolution to end the fighting at "present
lines." In keeping with a speech that Sadat had given on 16
October, Ismail called for agreement on a peace conference
that would reach a "fundamental settlement."
Document 45A: State Department Cable 208776 to all

Diplomatic and Consular Posts, "Middle East Situation," 21
October 1973, and

Document 45B: Embassy in Saudi Arabia Cable 4663 to

State Department, "Saudi Ban on Oil Shipments to U.S.," 23
October 1973

While Kissinger was beginning talks with Brezhnev, on 20

October, the IDF continued to advance across the Suez Canal
with the fighting heaviest on the southern front. The Syrian
front "was relatively quiet" and the Syrians were pressing
King Hussein to supply more Jordanian forces. While
Kissinger had seen the Saudi Foreign Minister as a "good
little boy," the State Department had learned that Saudi
Arabia had joined the Arab oil boycott and made the decision
to cut production significantly. According to a cable from the
U.S. Embassy in Jidda a few days later, the U.S.
announcement of a $2.2 billion aid package for Israel had
infuriated King Faisal, who took "umbrage" at the
discrepancy between the "reassuring tone" of U.S.
government communications and the announcement of the
"incredible" volume of U.S. aid for Israel. Apparently, the
King also called for a "jihad." More practically, the Saudis
realized that if they did not join the other Arab oil producers,
they would be in a politically vulnerable position.
Nevertheless, the embassy reported that the Saudis "tend to
confirm our assessment that [they wish to] minimize damage
that present crisis could cause to US-Saudi relations."
Decisions by the Arab oil producers to cut production would
have a significant impact on oil prices in the weeks ahead.
(Note 45)
Document 46: Memcon between Brezhnev and Kissinger, 20

October 1973, 9:15 - 11:30 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 7 US/Kissinger
Kissinger's and Brezhnev's first discussion showed no

disagreements over the basic issue, the imperative of bringing
about an end to the fighting. Nor did the Soviets dissent from
Kissinger's basic proposition that there were "two
problems"--ending the fighting and a political settlement--that
had to be dealt with separately. Kissinger, however, was
determined that Nixon's unwelcome grant of negotiating
authority not force him into quick decisions that could
undercut his goal of buying time for Israeli military advances.
Therefore, he observed to Brezhnev: "If we come to some
understandings, I will still want to check them with the
President." He readily agreed with Brezhnev's statement
about the importance of ending all "slanderous allegations"
that Moscow and Washington sought to "dictate their will to
others" in the Middle East. Kissinger also expressed general
agreement with the Soviet suggestion for a cease-fire
resolution although he observed that the Israelis would reject
any references to Resolution 242. (Note 47)
Document 47: Situation Room Message from Peter Rodman

to Kissinger, TOHAK 20, 20 October 1973, transmitting
memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 39, HAK Trip - Moscow, Tel

Aviv, London - October 20-23, 1973 TOHAK 1-60
After meeting with Brezhnev, Kissinger was shocked to

receive a message from Scowcroft based on Nixon's dictation.
Believing a "permanent Middle East settlement" to be a
critically important goal, Nixon wanted a U.S.-Soviet
agreement reached on "general terms" which would make it
easier for both superpowers "to get out clients in line."
Probably suspecting that Kissinger was too partial to Israeli
interests, Nixon wanted his adviser to take a tough approach
to both sides. As neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would
approach "this subject … in a rational manner," Nixon
believed that Moscow and Washington had to impose a
settlement: to "bring the necessary pressures on our
respective friends." Facing continued attack in the Watergate
scandal and no doubt seeing great political advantage in a
diplomatic success, Nixon wanted Brezhnev to know that if
they could reach a settlement "it would be without question
one of the brightest stars in which we hope will be a galaxy of
peace stemming from the Nixon-Brezhnev relationship."
(Note 48)
Document 48: Message from Kissinger to Scowcroft,

HAKTO 06 [20 October 1973]

Aviv, London - October 20-23, 1973 HAKTO, SECTO,
TOSEC, Misc.
Kissinger ignored Nixon's instructions. Already unhappy

about Nixon's letter to Brezhnev on his negotiating authority
and recognizing that Nixon was in no position to impose his
will, Kissinger conveyed to Scowcroft his "shock." He argued
that if he carried out the instructions it would "totally wreck
what little bargaining leverage I still have." Nixon's vision of
the superpowers imposing their will on wayward clients was
wholly inconsistent with Kissinger's determination to
extricate the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace
process. (Note 49)
Document 49: Memcon between Brezhnev and Kissinger, 21

October 1973, 12:00 noon - 4:00 p.m.
The next Brezhnev-Kissinger meeting was scheduled for

11:00 a.m. on 22 October, but Brezhnev postponed it so the
Politburo could discuss recent communications between the
Egyptians and the Soviet ambassador in Cairo. Believing that
his forces were in desperate condition, Sadat was "begging"
for a cease-fire. By contrast, Assad no longer sought a cease-
fire because he wanted to try to recapture the Golan Heights.
Assad's concerns did not, however, influence the Soviet
leadership which agreed that it was essential to reach a rapid
agreement on a cease-fire in place, although they were careful
not to divulge any secrets about the Egyptian position in the
talks with Kissinger. The U.S.-Soviet meeting that followed
drafted a cease-fire resolution with great dispatch. Despite
Nixon's preferences for superpower co-operation to impose a
settlement, Kissinger carefully steered the Soviets away from
any language that could give them a central role in
negotiating a post-war diplomatic settlement. Using language
requested by Meir and the Egyptians, Kissinger argued that a
cease-fire resolution had to include language about
negotiations "between the parties under appropriate auspices."
For the Soviets, as Brezhnev explained later in the discussion,
"auspices" meant that Moscow and Washington would be
"active participants in the negotiations." Observing that "the
Israelis will violently object to Soviet participation,"
Kissinger argued for a more qualified understanding. He
stated that auspices would mean that the superpowers would
not participate "in every detail, but in the opening phase and
at critical points throughout." Determined to buy time for the
Israelis, Kissinger reminded the Soviets several times that he
had to check with Washington, prepare a memorandum, and
consult with the President so that he understood and approved
the agreement. Moreover, while Kissinger had agreed with
Brezhnev that the resolution should be passed by midnight
that evening, he sent UN ambassador John Scali a cable
advising him to "proceed at a deliberate pace in the Security
Council." "We do not have the same interest [as the Soviets]
in such speed." (Note 50)
Document 50: Memcon between Kissinger and Western

Ambassadors, 21 October 1973, 6:30 - 6:45 p.m.
Once the cease-fire resolution had been negotiated, it was

essential to inform allies and others in order to secure UN
agreement. As indicated in Document 44, Kissinger informed
Ismail about the developments, couching the results in
language--"fundamental settlement"--that would appeal to the
Egyptians. Haig also called Dinitz telling him that the
resolution was "etched in stone and could not be changed."
(Note 51) Kissinger also met with key ambassadors of
governments that were members of the Security Council--
France, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Lawrence
McIntyre, the Council's President, was an Australian). The
meeting was brief, just enough time for a background briefing
and discussion of diplomatic strategy. Kissinger emphasized
that "anyone who is interested in a quick end to the fighting
would presumably desist from trying to make amendments."
Document 51: U.S. Embassy Soviet Union Cable 13148 to

Department of State, 21 October 1973

Aviv, London - October 20-23, 1973 HAKTO, SECTO,
TOSEC, Misc.
Before he left Moscow, Kissinger oversaw the preparation of

a number of urgent backchannel messages to foreign officials.
Owing to a breakdown of the communication system,
Kissinger had to use Moscow embassy channels, but under
the special "Cherokee" control used to limit the dissemination
of communications from the Secretary of State. This delayed
by several hours the messages to the Israeli government about
the cease-fire. One of them, a top secret cable to Ambassador
Dinitz, elucidates the crisis over Israeli encirclement of
Egypt's Third Army that unfolded during 23-24 October. In
light of the communications delay, but concerned that the
Israelis accept the cease-fire plan, Kissinger wanted Dinitz to
know that "we would understand if Israelis felt they required
some additional time for military dispositions." Moreover,
even though there would be a formal twelve-hour interval
between a Security Council decision and the actual beginning
of the cease-fire, Kissinger could "accept Israel's taking [a]
slightly longer" time. How the Israelis interpreted "slightly
longer" was out of Kissinger's hands but this was not the only
time that he would give Tel Aviv leeway in interpreting the
cease-fire. Later, when the dangers of this advice became
clear, and the Israelis had launched a major offensive against
Egypt's Third Army, Kissinger wrote that "[he] had a sinking
feeling that [he] might have emboldened them." Whether
Kissinger or Scowcroft shared this message with Nixon
remains to be seen. (Note 52)
Document 52: Department of State Operations Center,

Middle East Task Force Situation Report # 52, "Situation
Report in the Middle East as of 1830 EDT, 10/21/73"

While Kissinger and the Soviets were working out the details
of the cease-fire resolution, analysts at the State Department
pondered discrepant reports about the fighting on 21 October,
with the Israelis claiming major gains on the Suez Canal's
west bank and the Egyptians reporting a beleaguered Israeli
force. If the Israeli reporting was accurate and the IDF would
be in a position to cut off the Egyptian army from Cairo and
the Suez, the Defense Intelligence Agency believed that
Egyptian units on the east bank would "have only three to
five days supplies remaining." Meanwhile, with the Saudis
joining other Arab oil producers in the boycott, the loss of oil
supplies to the United States could reach two million barrels
per day.
Document 53: Memcon between Gromyko and Kissinger, 22

October 1973, 8:45 - 9:45 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL US-USSR
The next morning, as news of the Security Council action on

what would be Resolution 338 was coming in (Note 53),
Gromyko and Kissinger met for a relatively jovial breakfast
discussion once they had taken two understandings: language
on "auspices" and on the need for "maximum" effort to
ensure the exchange of prisoners-of-war within 72 hours of
the cease-fire. Kissinger's next destination--Tel Aviv--posed a
delicate problem for the Soviets; as Gromyko observed,
"Psychologically … it would be preferable if you not tell your
destination from Moscow [laughing]." For his part, Kissinger
saw no problem in getting the Israelis to accept the resolution;
his visit to Israel was conditioned on Meir's support for the
resolution.
Document 54: Memcon between Meir and Kissinger, 22

October 1973, 1:35 - 2:15 p.m.
Although Ambassador Keating had no notice about

Kissinger's plans, the secretary of state arrived in Tel Aviv for
consultations with Meir and her advisers. The jovial mood in
Moscow was forgotten; as Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron
later remarked, "We were suffering. Henry noticed this right
away." "It did not take him long to sense that the country did
not want to go through this experience again." (Note 54)
Nevertheless, there was a feeling of resentment about the
U.S.-Soviet "dictate" and Kissinger found himself justifying
Resolution 338's references to 242, which plainly displeased
Meir. He argued that, given previous U.S. efforts on behalf of
242 in negotiations with the Soviets, it had to be mentioned
but that it did no harm to the Israeli position because the
language about "just and lasting peace" and "secure and
recognized borders" "mean nothing" until they are negotiated.
Essentially the talks were hand-holding sessions; Kissinger
tried to assuage Meir's concerns about U.S. strategy,
prisoners-of-war, the Egyptians, the continued U.S. airlift,
and Syrian Jews. In his recent book, Crisis, Kissinger claims
that he used the meetings with Meir to "establish the cease-
fire" but the conversations show a far more ambiguous
situation. Again, Kissinger gave the Israelis leeway in
interpreting the cease-fire so they could gear-up military
operations before it went into effect. He advised Meir that if
Israeli forces moved "during the night while I'm flying" there
would be "no violent protests from Washington." Once the
Israelis violated the cease-fire, however, Kissinger would
regret emboldening them, while Brezhnev became deeply
suspicious that there had been a secret deal in Tel Aviv. (Note
55) On the airlift, Kissinger assured Meir that "I have given
orders that it is to continue" and promised more Phantom jets
and a military aid request totaling $2.2 billion. He also filled
her in on some of the side conversations with the Soviets,
who had been "very nasty about the Arabs." On the
fundamental issues, Kissinger used brutal language that he
might have thought would satisfy his hosts: U.S. strategy was
to "keep the Arabs down and the Russians down." Those
goals had been achieved: "you have won, and I believe we
have won." Whatever the Arabs thought of Israel and the
United States, Kissinger claimed, "objective reality" forced
them "to talk to us." Only Washington could help them reach
a settlement.
Document 55: Memcon of Luncheon for Kissinger's Party,

22 October, 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.
While at lunch, Kissinger and the Israelis discussed

substantive issues including timing of the cease-fire
announcement, arrangements for POWs, the mechanism for
implementing the cease-fire, Egyptian and Syrian fighting
abilities, and prospects for a settlement. On the cease-fire
mechanism, Sisco suggested that the Israelis "take the
initiative to contact the Egyptian commanders directly," a
suggestion that foreshadowed the Kilometer 101 talks that
began on 28 October. The discussion of this important issue
was inconclusive, however. On the fighting skills of their
adversaries, General Dayan reported that they "fought better
than in 1967"; in particular, the Syrians were "determined,
fanatic. It was a sort of jihad." On the possibilities of
negotiations, Kissinger was pessimistic: "the beginning of the
process will be an historic event, even if it totally stalemates
-- which I expect, frankly."
Document 56: Memcon, "Military Briefing," 22 October

1973, 4:15 - 4:47 p.m.
Taking place only hours before the cease-fire was to go into

effect, Kissinger's last meeting in Tel Aviv consisted of
briefings by the Army and Air Force Chief's of Staff and the
director of military intelligence, with more assessments of
Arab fighting skills. Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General
David Elaza discussed the state of play in Syria and on the
Sinai and, in a statement that anticipated the next phase of the
crisis, wistfully noted that "we didn't manage to finish the
[Egyptian] Third Army. We think it is possible to do it in two,
maybe three days." The Israelis had been keeping the exact
location of their forces a secret for days so Kissinger kept
listening, asking questions only about details. He may have
later regretted that he had not made any cautionary remarks
about the dangers of trying to "finish" the Third Army (Note
56); instead, he heard out assessments of Israeli strengths and
weaknesses in dealing with Soviet-supplied arms, and
Egyptian and Syrian losses.

Middle East Task Force Situation Report #55, "Situation

This report shows that the Egypt-Israel cease-fire "went into

effect" on 22 October at 13:12 Eastern Daylight Time (7:12
p.m. Cairo time), even though it was supposed to take hold 20
minutes earlier. While reports from the field were
contradictory, the information from the Israelis suggested that
the cease-fire left Egypt in a dangerously exposed position,
with Israeli forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal
straddling strategically important roads from Cairo to Ismailia
and Cairo to Suez. The Third Army on the Suez Canal's east
bank was in danger of being entirely cut off. On the Syrian
front, the cease-fire was not yet in effect, however, because
Damascus had not yet agreed to the resolution. Moreover, the
Palestinean Liberation Organization had expressed its
determination to continue fighting against Israel. In any
event, within hours the Israelis claimed that the trapped
Egyptian Third Army was violating the agreement. With the
Egyptians arguing that no political talks with Israel would be
possible until the Israelis had withdrawn forces from the Suez
Canal's west bank, the prospects for the cease-fire were dire.
Indeed, with the IDF surrounding the Third Army, the Israelis
faced no obstacle between their forces and Cairo; they could
easily have moved to the capital and unseated Sadat. (Note
57)
Document 58: U.S. Embassy Israel cable 8513 to State

Department, "Conversation with Prime Minister Meir," 23
October 1973

The day after Kissinger left Tel Aviv, Ambassador Keating

met with Meir to discuss the latest developments, including
the exchange of POWs, the political opposition's rejection of
a cease-fire, British queries about U.S.-Israeli differences
over the UN resolution (prompting a comment about
"perfidious Albion" from Meir), and the possibility of
military-to-military contacts to enforce a cease-fire. A
discussion of alleged Egyptian violations of the cease-fire,
reported by Israeli Defense Forces, led Keating to raise a
"delicate" question about the likelihood that "some might
view with some skepticism info from GOI sources and …
would wonder whether or not the Israelis might not be taking
initiatives in violation of the cease-fire in order to achieve
certain military objectives." Meir acknowledged that her
government was taking the cease-fire less than seriously: it
had ordered "its troops to continue fighting until and unless
the Egyptians stop." Keating reported his concern that the
IDF would "shoot back" at the Egyptians and "launch an
attack designed to wipe out the Egyptian Third Army." "If
things reach this point [I'm] not sure what kind of a ceasefire
will be left to build on."
VII. Collapse of the Cease-Fire


Whether the Egyptians or the Israelis made the first move

remains unclear but IDF violations of the cease-fire on the
night of 22 October were truly massive as it "pushed
enormous quantities of equipment across the Canal" in order
to encircle Egypt's Third Army. The Israeli claim that they
had not initiated any military actions would anger Kissinger
who understood, that it was the IDF, not the Egyptians, who
were on the offensive. Meanwhile heavy fighting continued
on the Syrian front and Syrian-Israeli forces engaged in an air
battle with the Israelis losing 10 or 11 aircraft. (Note 58)
Document 60: Message from Brezhnev to Kissinger as read

by Minister Vorontsov to the Secretary on the telephone on
October 23, 1973 at 10:40 a.m.

At 4:00 a.m. on 23 October Kissinger received a call that the

fighting had broken out again. In a first-time Brezhnev-to-
Kissinger message, the Soviets protested the "flagrant deceit
on the part of the Israelis" to violate the cease-fire. From the
accounts of Kremlin insiders, an angry Brezhnev had begun
to suspect that Kissinger had "fooled us and made a deal
when he was in Tel Aviv." Certainly if Brezhnev had learned
of Kissinger's statement about moving military forces "during
the night while I'm flying" he would have been infuriated.
Nevertheless, as this document shows, Brezhnev was
confident that U.S. leaders would "use all the possibilities
they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order." To
help enforce the cease-fire he took up a suggestion from
Sadat to make use of UN observers to separate Egyptian and
Israeli forces. He also proposed a UN Security Council
meeting to draft a resolution reconfirming 338, and
demanding withdrawal of forces "to the position where they
were at the moment of adoption" of the cease-fire decision.
Kissinger was not impressed by the "ploy" to move the
Israelis even further back but soon realized that action at the
United Nations was essential. (Note 59)
Documents 61A and 61B: Hotline Messages from Brezhnev

to Nixon, 23 October 1973

During the afternoon, two messages from Brezhnev to Nixon

were sent through the hotline, the first use of that
instrumentality since the last Middle East War. Brezhnev
demanded that "the most decisive measures be taken without
delay" by Moscow and Washington to stop the "flagrant"
Israeli violations. Again, Brezhnev urged new action at the
Security Council. Brezhnev's language--"why this treachery
was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you"--clearly
suggested that he suspected that Washington was behind
Israel's military moves. Through the CIA back-channel the
Egyptians also got in touch with the White House expressing
their worries, with Sadat for the first time directly asking
Nixon to "intervene effectively even if that necessitates the
use of force." Sadat spoke of U.S.-Soviet "guarantees" of the
cease-fire which was more likely based on Soviet
interpretations than on Kissinger's understanding of the
Moscow talks. Replying the same day, Nixon told Sadat that
Washington had only "guaranteed" efforts to reach a
settlement, but that he had directed Kissinger to "make urgent
representations" to Israel to comply with the cease-fire. (see
Document 44). Apparently, worried that the IDF might
advance further, seize Cairo, and put Sadat in perilous straits,
Kissinger called Dinitz from the Situation Room and
demanded that the Israelis halt military action. According to
the recollection of NSC staffer Robert McFarlane Kissinger
"began exhorting [Dinitz]. `Jesus Christ, don't you
understand?' Suddenly Henry stopped shouting and said, 'Oh.'
I was later told that the Israeli calmly explained to Henry that
his government might be more persuaded if he invoked a
different prophet." (Note 60)
Document 62: Nixon to Brezhnev, 23 October 1973, sent via

hotline

In a reply--probably prepared by Kissinger--to Brezhnev's

hotline message sent early in the afternoon, Nixon coolly
responded that the Egyptians might be at fault but noted that
the White House had "insisted with Israel that they take
immediate steps to cease hostilities". Nixon would not let the
"historic" cease-fire agreement "be destroyed."
Document 63: Transcript, "Secretary's Staff Meeting," 23

October 1973, 4:35 P.M.
Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

Staff Meetings, 1973-1977. Box 1
While Kissinger was trying to sort out the cease-fire, he met

with his State Department senior staff to give them his
assessment of the situation since the war broke out. This gave
him a chance to vent some steam about issues that troubled
him, such as the question of his advice on preemption and the
attitude of West European allies who, he argued, were
behaving like "jackals" because they "did everything to egg
on the Arabs." Kissinger reviewed the immediate pre-war
intelligence estimating on the Arab-Israeli conflict ("no
possibility of an attack"), the "new elements" in Arab
strategy, overall U.S. strategy, interpretations of Soviet
conduct, the decision for a major U.S. airlift, U. S. early
efforts toward a cease-fire, and Resolution 338. On the basic
U.S.-Israeli relationship during the war, Kissinger explained
his balancing act: "we could not tolerate an Israeli defeat" but,
at the same time, "we could not make our policy hostage to
the Israelis." Thus, "we went to extreme lengths to stay in
close touch with all the key Arab participants." The progress
of the war, so far had been a "major success" in part because
it validated the importance of détente: "without the close
relationship with the Soviet Union, this thing could have
easily escalated." Washington, however, not Moscow, was in
the catbird seat; the Israelis had won, Soviet clients had lost,
and a peace settlement depended on Washington. The United
States was in a "position where if we behave wisely and with
discipline, we are really in a central position." As for the
current cease-fire problem, Kissinger put on a nonchalant
face: it was a "little flap." He did not mention Brezhnev's
hotline messages.
Document 64: Kissinger to Brezhnev, 23 October 1973,

Dispatched from White House at 5:15 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger soon agreed that Washington had to co-

sponsor with Moscow a new resolution at the Security
Council to "make the cease-fire effective." That afternoon,
the Security Council passed a new cease-fire resolution (339),
which called on the parties to return to positions they had
occupied when 338 went into effect and also provided for UN
observers to supervise the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire. (Note
61) With this message to Brezhnev, curtly addressed as "Mr.
Secretary General," Kissinger explained that the
administration wanted to "maintain unity" on the issue, but
nevertheless had reservations with the resolutions' language
calling upon the parties "to withdraw to the positions they
occupied at the moment they accepted the cease-fire." Given
that the actual positions were in doubt, Kissinger observed
that Vorontsov and he had agreed that the Soviets "will show
moderation when differences ensue between the parties, as to
the positions in dispute." Kissinger also emphasized the
importance of Moscow playing a helpful role in getting the
Syrians to accept the cease-fire (they did later in the day) and
pressing for the release of POWs.
Document 65: Dobyrnin to Kissinger, enclosing letter from

Brehznev to Nixon, 24 October 1973

By 8:30 that evening Kissinger had received a "solemn"

pledge from the Israelis that they would stop shooting if the
Egyptians did the same; he passed that on to Dobrynin asking
him to "get the Egyptians to give another order to stop firing."
(Note 62) Shooting continued, however. The morning of 24
October, Dobrynin read to Kissinger an angry letter from
Brezhnev arguing that the Israelis were again defying the
Security Council by "fiercely attacking … the Egyptian port
of Adabei" and fighting Egyptian forces on the Suez Canal's
east bank. Expressing confidence in Nixon's power to
"influence Israel" and put an end to "provocative behavior,"
Brezhnev asked for information on U.S. steps to secure Tel
Aviv's "strict and immediate compliance" with the UN.
Adding to the pressure was a private message from Sadat,
followed by a public statement, calling for U.S. and Soviet
troops or observers to help implement the cease-fire. (Note
63)
Document 66: Scowcroft letter to Dobrynin, enclosing

message from Nixon to Brezhnev, 24 October 1973, delivered
to Soviet Embassy, 1:00 p.m.

Nixon quickly replied to Brezhnev with information on steps

that the United States had taken to stop the fighting including
tough messages to the Israelis on the possibility of a "severe
deterioration" of relations if "further offensive operations"
took place. The Israelis, he wrote, had given "assurances" that
they had made no advances since 7:00 a.m., that they had
asked the UN observers to "move into place" so they could
"ascertain no troop movements," and that they had "no
intention of moving their forces" to the east bank of the Suez
Canal. Nixon informed Brezhnev that the Israelis had a copy
of a message from the Egyptian minister of war calling on the
"forces to continue fighting" and promising "air support."
Using Moscow's own language, Nixon concluded by asking
Brezhnev for a Soviet "guarantee" that Cairo was
"scrupulously observing" the cease-fire agreement.
Document 67: Ray Cline, Assistant Secretary of State for

Intelligence and Research, to Kissinger, "Cease-Fire
Problems," 24 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 POL 27-14 Arab-Isr
Whatever the truth of Israeli claims, INR chief Ray Cline saw
Tel Aviv at fault. Analyzing the "precarious" nature of the
cease-fire, he saw the Israelis violating the agreement so they
could "definitively isolate the Egyptians' southern salient,"
the Third Army. Egyptian forces were "reportedly running
short of supplies" and "will be under acute pressure to reopen
their two main supply lines." Not only were there insufficient
UN observers, the Israelis had "no real interest" in halting
their action. Although the Syrians had not been "so eager" for
a truce, the Egyptians had needed one so their forces could
"catch their breath" and reorganize. With Egyptian forces
stuck, "the Arab world will soon realize that there will be no
automatic Israeli withdrawal, and that glorious assertions of
… Arab dignity [have] suddenly turned into another crushing
defeat." Sadat might either have to resume the battle, step
down, or claim that "irresistible" superpower pressure had
imposed a bad situation.
Document 68: Telcon [Record of Telephone Conversation]

between Dinitz and Kissinger, 24 October 1973, 3:40 p.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 136, Dinitz June 4, 1974 [sic]-

Oct. 31, 1973
One of the few Kissinger telephone call transcripts from

October 1973 that have shown up in the National Security
Council Files has Kissinger telling Dinitz that the Soviets
continue to report Israeli violations of the cease-fire. (Note
64) Contradicting Moscow, Dinitz replied that he had heard
that "all is quiet" (which did not mean that Egyptian forces
were not hemmed in). Whatever the facts, Kissinger informed
Dinitz that the U.S. was supporting the "strongest call for an
observance of the cease-fire" and measures to strengthen UN
observers. On the question of a "return to the original line,"
Kissinger had instructed Scali "to delay and confuse it." On
Egyptian requests for U.S. and Soviet forces to enforce the
cease-fire, "we will totally oppose." He would soon tell
Dobrynin the same thing: "I will tell them not to propose it
because we will oppose it." He asked for Dinitz's assurances
that "you are not taking any military action." (Note 65)
Document 69: Backchannel message from Nixon through

Ismail to Sadat, 24 October 1973, dispatched 8:55 P.M.,
initialed by Lawrence Eagleburger
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27-14 Arab-Isr
Early in the evening, Kissinger learned from Dobrynin that

the Soviets intended to support a resolution proposed by the
neutrals calling for the introduction of U.S. and Soviet troops
to support the cease-fire. After Kissinger urged the
ambassador not to support such a resolution, he declared "if
you want confrontation, we will have to have one. It would be
a pity." To head off the movement for a resolution on U.S.-
Soviet troops, the White House sent this backchannel
message to Sadat explaining why the United States would
veto it. Outside forces would not "represent an effective
counterweight" to local forces while the presence of U.S. and
Soviet forces "would introduce an extremely dangerous
potential for direct great power rivalry in the area." The
"rapid introduction" of UN observers would be a much better
alternative to an "unnecessary confrontation." Most likely
Kissinger and his staff prepared this message; Nixon may not
have even seen it because he had other preoccupations that
day. The House Judiciary Committee had initiated
impeachment proceedings and the Senate Republican
leadership was asking him to name a special prosecutor to
replace Archibald Cox.
Document 70: State Department Cable 210444 to all

Diplomatic and Consular Posts, "Middle East Situation," 25
October 1973

Based on information collected throughout 24 October, this

cable reported on the military situation, Syria's announcement
of a cease-fire, the movement of UN observers, and the oil
embargo, among other developments. According to the IDF,
units of the Egyptian Third Army had violated the cease-fire
by trying to "break out" of their trapped position. The Israelis
also reported "massive Egyptian air activities." By the end of
the day, however, the situation on the Suez front and on the
Golan front was reported to be "quiet."
VIII. Crisis
Document 71: Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October

1973, received at State Department, 10:00 p.m.

Just before 10:00 p.m., Dobrynin called Kissinger and

dictated the text of this letter from Brezhnev to Nixon that the
Soviet embassy had just received from Moscow. Nixon,
overwhelmed by Watergate matters, did not see the letter
until the next day and played no part in policy discussions
that evening. (Note 66) Published in its entirety for the first
time (Note 67), the letter began with Brezhnev emulating
Kissinger's recent communication and addressing Nixon
simply as "Mr. President." He indicted the Israelis for
"brazenly" violating the cease-fire and continuing "to seize
new and new territory from Egypt." To resolve the crisis,
Brezhnev made a "concrete proposal": "Let us together …
urgently dispatch to Egypt the Soviet and American military
contingents, to insure the implementation of the decision of
the Security Council." Brezhnev would brook no delay. "I
will say it to you straight that if you find it impossible to act
jointly with us … we should be faced with the necessity
urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps
unilaterally." This strong letter, former Soviet insider Victor
Israelyan later observed, was a Soviet "overreaction" based
on Sadat's urgent pleas for help with the Israelis and a
pessimistic assessment of the Egyptian military situation.
Moreover, communications difficulties on the Soviet side
preventing the flow of timely information may have
accounted for disparities in U.S. and Soviet perceptions on
military development in the Middle East. Where the
Americans saw "quiet," Brezhnev saw onslaught. Hoping that
he could pressure the Americans to cooperate and restrain
Israel, Brezhnev personally added the sentence on unilateral
action. No one in the Politburo intended any military moves
in the Middle East or expected a U.S. military reaction to
what amounted to a Soviet bluff. As Israelyan later remarked,
"How wrong was our forecast…!" (Note 68)
Document 72: Memcon between Kissinger and Huang Zhen,

25 October 1973, 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff,

Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977. Box 374. China -
Sensitive July 1973 - February 1974
The Soviet "overreaction" sparked an American

"overreaction." (Note 69) Believing, fearing that the Soviets
might actually intervene and misinterpreting a stand down of
Moscow's airlift to Egypt as a portent of armed intervention,
Kissinger decided it was necessary to "go to the mat." At a
meeting of the WSAG that lasted into the early morning,
Kissinger and his colleagues discussed Brezhnev's letter, its
implications, and the U.S. response. Whatever the Soviets
actually intended, the participants treated Brezhnev's letter as
a significant challenge that required a stern response. NSC
staffer William Quandt, who saw Brezhnev's letter as a bluff,
later said that "we wanted to teach him a lesson." At 11:41
p.m., Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Thomas Moorer ordered
U.S. military commands to raise their alert levels to
DEFCON (Defense Condition) III which meant putting
nuclear-armed units on the "highest state of peacetime alert"
(DEFCON II would mean that nuclear forces were ready for
imminent use). In addition, as the WSAG became aware of
other Soviet military moves---the alerting of some East
German units and the preparation of transport planes to fly to
Egypt from Budapest--it reinforced the DEFCON III by
alerting the 82nd Airborne Division and ordering movements
of aircraft carriers toward the Eastern Mediterranean. In this
account of a meeting the next afternoon with PRC liaison
office chief Huang Zhen, Kissinger provided a general
account of the communications with the Soviets on 24
October and the actions taken by the WSAG during the night
of 24/25 October. Interestingly, Kissinger treated Brezhnev's
threat as a "bluff" although years later he stated that "I did not
see it as a bluff, but it made no difference. We could not run
the risk that [it was not] … We had no choice except to call
the bluff." Besides trying to signal the Soviets, Kissinger may
have also meant the DEFCON as a message to the Israelis:
the United States could not tolerate violations of the cease-
fire because of the danger to world peace. (Note 70)
Document 73: Nixon to Brezhnev, 25 October 1973,

delivered to Soviet Embassy, 5:40 a.m.

Besides discussing alert measures at their 24/25 October

meeting, the WSAG prepared a response to Brezhnev's letter
that would go out under the president's name, but which
Nixon did not see at the time. Delivered to the Soviet
embassy very early in the morning and addressed "Mr.
General Secretary," the letter rejected the proposal for U.S.
and Soviet military contingents as "not appropriate," denied
that the "cease fire is now being violated on any significant
scale," stated "Nixon's" readiness to "take every effective step
to guarantee the implementation of the ceasefire," and
observed that the "suggestion of unilateral action" would be a
"matter of the gravest concern involving incalculable
consequences." Unilateral action, "Nixon" argued, would
violate the "Basic Principles" of U.S.-Soviet relations that
Brezhnev and Nixon signed in Moscow in May 1972, as well
as Article II of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War. (Note 71) Significantly, the letter did not cite the
language in the "Basic Principles" that "efforts to obtain
unilateral advantage at the expense of the other" were
inconsistent with détente; neither government, however, was
abiding by that principle. (Note 72) As an alternative to
sending military contingents, the letter suggested that it
would be more useful if both governments exerted
"maximum influence" on Cairo and Tel-Aviv "to ensure
compliance" with the cease-fire. As an "extraordinary and
temporary step," "Nixon" suggested the deployment of U.S.
and Soviet non-combat personnel to augment the UN "truce
supervisory force." Shortly after receiving the letter,
Dobrynin made what he later called an "angry" phone call to
Kissinger demanding an explanation. "I did not see why the
U.S. government was trying to create the impression of a
dangerous crisis." Kissinger downplayed the U.S. military
actions, made the misleading claim that "domestic
considerations" had been key determinants, and assured
Dobrynin that the DEFCON would be cancelled the next day.
This conversation does not appear in Crisis. (Note 73)
Document 74: Department of State Cable 210450 to U.S.

Mission, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 25 October
1973

After the WSAG had made its decisions on the DEFCON III
and the letter to Brezhnev had been delivered, Kissinger
provided Ambassador Rumsfeld with a brief outline of what
had transpired, although not specifically mentioning the
DEFCON change. Asking Rumsfeld to brief Luns and the
Permanent Representatives ("PermReps") about the alert
measures, he asked that NATO keep the information "totally
confidential." The purpose of confidentially was to avoid a
"public confrontation" with Moscow. When Kissinger wrote
this, he believed that the DEFCON III alert could be kept
secret. As the news of the alert spread quickly to the media,
however, Kissinger learned that such alerts are very public
events. (Note 74)
Document 75: State Department Cable 211737 to U.S.

Embassy France, "Koskiusko-Morizet Call on Secretary," 26
October 1973, with marginal comments by NSC staffer

On 25 October, during another WSAG meeting Kissinger

shared his worries that the Soviets might exploit the situation,
although Secretary of Defense Schlesinger observed that the
Soviets might have genuine concerns about the Third Army's
position and even "suspect American duplicity in egging the
Israelis on." A few hours later, Kissinger gave a press
conference where he explained the developments that led up
to the alert, expressed public opposition to Soviet unilateral
moves in the region, analyzed the complexity of U.S.-Soviet
relations, noted the "quite promising" outlook for peace
negotiations, and emphasized the necessity for all sides to
make "substantial concessions." Early in the afternoon, the
UN Security Council passed Resolution 340 which called for
an immediate and complete cease-fire and created a United
Nations Security Force for the Middle East to secure its
implementation. (Note 75) Apparently sometime before the
UN action Kissinger found time to meet with French
Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet to discuss the war
and U.S.-French relations. The conversation proved to be a
testy one, with Kosciusko-Morizet criticizing the "lack of
consultation during the crisis" either on the alert or the latest
U.S. resolution at the Security Council. Kissinger tried to
justify the rapid pace of U.S. decisions on the grounds that
the Brezhnev letter was a "totally shocking thing." Kissinger
acknowledged that "perhaps we should have told you but …
our experience in this crisis with the Europeans is that they
have behaved not as friends but as hostile powers. Not once
did we get their support." As one reader of this document
marginally noted 30 years ago, the statement about "hostile
powers" was "pretty strong." For Kissinger, however, the key
issue in the crisis was Soviet conduct, not the "Arab-Israeli
problem." But as the NSC staffer noted, it was "hard" for the
Europeans to separate those issues. They found it difficult to
rally automatically to Washington when taking a hard line
against the Soviets in the crisis had the connotation of leaning
toward Tel-Aviv. Kissinger, however, would be getting more
upset with the Europeans by the day.
Document 76: Dobrynin to Kissinger, enclosing letter from

Brezhnev to Nixon, 25 October 1973, received 15:40 hours

Brezhnev's response came soon. Disregarding the controversy

over unilateral action, Brezhnev denied the U.S. assertion that
Israel had stopped making military moves. He argued that
when he had received the U.S. letter, "Israeli aviation was
bombing the city of Ismalia and the fighting was continuing
in the city of Suez." In response to Sadat's request, Brehznev
reported that he had sent 70 Soviet representatives to
supervise the cease-fire. Assuming that Washington would do
likewise, Moscow had requested its representatives to contact
U.S. observers when they arrived in Egypt. Moreover,
Moscow was "ready to cooperate" with Washington on "other
measures … to ensure immediate and strict implementation"
of the UN Security Council resolutions on the cease-fire.
Kissinger treated Brezhnev's reply as "conciliatory" although
he agreed with Dinitz that "the less of them [Soviet
observers] that come the better." (Note 76)
Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT," 26 October 1973

Despite Resolution 340, the fighting had not yet stopped. The
Third Army remained hemmed in; during the morning of 26
October, it "attempted to break through surrounding Israeli
forces." Rather than let the Third Army escape, Israeli air and
ground forces "repulsed" the Egyptian attack. That morning,
Sadat sent an insistent message to Nixon charging the Israelis
with trying to force the Third Army to surrender and
preventing U.N. personnel from reaching the area.
Threatening unilateral action to open up supply lines, Sadat
declared that the continued deadlock would jeopardize the
possibility of "constructive" negotiations. Sadat's message
forced Kissinger to focus on the problem of the embattled
Third Army; he worried that if the Israelis did not relax their
grip, it would run out of supplies, thus exacerbating the
Middle East crisis. He made a series of increasingly tense
phone calls to Ambassador Dinitz importuning him to
convince Tel Aviv to make a proposal to resolve the crisis.
But the first series of phone calls produced no concessions.
Meanwhile, senior Defense Department officials made
serious proposals for a U.S. resupply of the Third Army.
(Note 77)
Document 78: "Talking Points for Meeting with General

Walters," initialed by PWR [Peter W. Rodman], 26 October
1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 139, Palestinians
Some months before the outbreak of war, the Palestinean

Liberation Organization had initiated contact with
Washington through U.S. Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms.
Most of the documents on the contacts are still classified in
the Nixon papers because they were conducted through CIA
channels. According to Kissinger's account, Yasser Araft sent
a message on 10 October expressing interest in talks. Arafat
predicted defeat for Egypt and Syria but opined that they had
achieved enough "face" to enter into negotiations with Israel.
On 23 October, Arafat sent another message suggesting a
meeting on 26 October. Kissinger turned this down but,
wanting some "maneuvering room" during the crisis,
arranged for an early November meeting between Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence Vernon Walters and an Arafat
representative. In the meantime, Peter Rodman on Kissinger's
staff prepared a position paper that suggested a narrow basis
for communication. While making some noises about the
importance of the Palestinian issue in regional negotiations
and expressing gratitude that the PLO had taken a
"responsible position" during the war, the U.S. would take no
position on Palestinian political claims: Washington had "no
proposals" on the "future political role of the Palestinians."
And there was a warning: the United States "does not betray
its friends." Hostile moves against King Hussein's Jordan
were out of the question. And by implication, no threats to
Israel, another U.S. friend, would be tolerated. For Kissinger,
until the Palestinians were ready for a modus vivendi with
Israel, substantive discussions were impossible. Although
Kissinger would later comply with an Israeli demand that
Washington not recognize or negotiate with the PLO, he
would not close the door to informal contacts. (Note 78)
Document 79A: U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5179 to State

Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East", 26
October 1973

Oct. 1973-Files No. 21
Document 79B: U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5184 to State

Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East," 26
October 1973

While Kissinger tried to resolve the Third Army crisis, the

North Atlantic Council held some strained discussions of the
DEFCON III alert on 26 October. The point that André de
Staercke had made, some ten days earlier, about the lack of
consultation received wide expression during what Rumsfeld
described as two "somewhat tense" sessions. While French
Ambassador Francois de Rose was the most vocally critical,
Paris was not alone in criticizing U.S. decisionmaking
processes. Interestingly, Rumsfeld was responsive to
European concerns; he reported sympathetically that "most of
the allies felt embarrassed by not being even generally aware
of what has been happening in the U.S.-Soviet discussions."
They were "further surprised and made to feel irrelevant by
the calling of the alert without prior notification until more
than seven hours later." Rumsfeld personally recommended
"actions soon to counteract this problem."
Document 80: Scowcroft to Dobrynin, 26 October 1973,
enclosing message from Nixon to Brezhnev, 26 October
1973, delivered at 1:00 p.m.

As the Security Council finished up work on a resolution,

Nixon responded to Brezhnev's last letter. Noting the Security
Council's "constructive action" to establish a UN security
force to supervise the cease-fire, Nixon assured Brezhnev of
Washington's intent to live up to the spirit and substance of
the understandings that had been reached in Moscow. In
response to Brezhnev's suggestion about observers, Nixon
informed him that events had overtaken the earlier U.S.
suggestion for a separate U.S.-Soviet supervisory force. The
composition of the UN observer force should be left to the
discretion of the UN secretary general. The letter, however,
made no reference to the growing crisis over the status of the
Third Army which was causing so much concern in the
Pentagon that some officials proposed an emergency airlift of
supplies to beleaguered Egyptian forces. (Note 79)
Document 81: Department of State Cable 212618 to U.S.

Embassy West Germany, "Secretary's Meeting with FRG
Ambassador Von Staden, October 26," 27 October 1973
Kissinger's grievances against the West Europeans mounted

and in a few days he was quoted as saying: "I don't care what
happens to NATO I'm so disgusted." One incident that fed his
anger concerned a West German protest on 26 October over
the supply of munitions to Israel from West Germany. Bonn
had resisted Arab pressures against the U.S. use of bases in
Germany to conduct the airlift, but they changed their tack
once the cease-fire had been arranged. The West Germans
became especially apprehensive when they learned that
Israeli ships docked at Bremerhaven were receiving U.S.
munitions. While the West Germans could say they could not
determine the destination of U.S. supply planes, it was a
different matter when the Israelis received military supplies
on West German territory. Washington had not bothered to
inform the Germans of this and Bonn lodged a mild private
protest; a West German diplomat inadvertently escalated the
matter by releasing to the press an internal document which
was stronger in tone. Given the West German policy that
"weapons delivered using West German territory or
installations from American depots in West Germany to one
of the warring parties cannot be allowed," if a reported third
Israeli ship arrived in Bremerhaven, "we assume it will not be
loaded." Late in the afternoon of 26 October, after telling
Dinitz that he was going to "raise hell" with the Germans,
Kissinger met Ambassador Von Staden. Declaring that he
was "astounded" by Bonn's position, Kissinger argued that
the West Europeans had "deliberately isolated" Washington.
The Ambassador ably explained the West German position
noting that the "FRG showed as much solidarity as it could"
but that its "credibility in the Arab world was at stake." While
Kissinger argued that the "total pattern of European behavior"
had "disastrous potential consequences for the alliance," Von
Staden, referring to the consultations issue, mentioned "the
serious problem of communication which had developed in
the last 14 days." When Von Staden observed that "if
information were provided more promptly the policy adopted
by the European allies was less likely to be divergent,"
Kissinger acknowledged "this was perhaps so, unless our
underlying philosophies were divergent." (Note 80)
Document 82: Memcon, "Meeting with Oil Company

Executives," 5:30 p.m., 26 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, PET 6
Shortly after meeting with German Ambassador Von Staden,

Kissinger met with a group of oil company chieftains (some
of whom had attended the meeting with Kenneth Rush on 10
October). Privately disparaging of the political acumen of the
oil executives and seeing them as pushing unduly for
compromise with the Arab states, Kissinger nevertheless felt
that their powerful position made it necessary to conciliate
them. In the course of a presentation on the war and the
expansion of U.S. influence in the region, Kissinger briefly
discussed the crisis over the Third Army: "The problem will
be to get the Israelis to give up some of their present military
advantage. They cannot force an army to surrender under
conditions of a UN supervised ceasefire." The main purpose
of the meeting, of course, was to discuss the Arab oil
embargo and the interrelationships between diplomacy and
petroleum policy. Comments made during the meeting
suggested the high level of anxiety the embargo had created:
it could produce a "true disaster," a "possible breakdown of
the economy." For Kissinger and the executives, the key
problem on the "supply side" was King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia. Recognizing that Faisal was under pressure from
"radical elements in his own country," Kissinger believed that
resolving the oil crisis depended largely on efforts to "build
bridges" to the monarch. Diplomatic successes in the Arab-
Israeli dispute were critically important in this respect. As
Kissinger explained, with hope and uncertainty, "We will
make every effort we can to try to avoid giving the oil
producers reasons for further action." Getting a cease-fire in
place was an important first step and as Kissinger made more
efforts, "we will know more in three weeks whether what we
are going to do diplomatically is enough to persuade the
Saudis." What Kissinger wanted the executives to do was to
"tell your Arab friends that we are serious about trying to
achieve a peace settlement but that they have to make an
effort to move from there to here." As it would take months to
persuade the Arab oil producers to reverse the embargo and
production cuts, Kissinger had his work cut out for him.
Document 83: Hotline Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 26

October 1973, complete translation received 29 October 1973

Just as Kissinger could not countenance a defeat for Israel, an

Egyptian defeat had become just as intolerable, not least for
the dangers of superpower intervention. Close to 9:00 p.m.,
Kissinger began to turn the screws. Telling Dinitz that he was
speaking to him, not as secretary of state but "as a friend,"
Kissinger warned that if Israel did not resolve the crisis, "you
will lose everything." Before he issued a virtual ultimatum,
however, Brezhnev sent an urgent message to Nixon over the
hotline. Citing Sadat's appeal to Nixon earlier in the day and
alleging that Sadat had also requested that the Israelis allow
Egyptian helicopters to deliver food, blood, and medical
supplies to the Third Army, Brezhnev asked Nixon to exert
"effective and immediate influence" on Israel to ensure
compliance with those requests. He made no threats but
observed that if Washington failed to influence the Israelis,
"we will have the most serious doubts regarding the
intentions of the American side" to carry out U.S.-Soviet
understandings on the cease-fire. In his first reference to the
U.S. alert, Brezhnev mentioned that it surprised him but
argued that the U.S. move, which he saw as a "means of
pressure on the Soviet Union," would fail to "intimidate us."
To emphasize the urgency of Israeli cooperation, Kissinger
sent Dinitz a copy of the Soviet message and then had a
private "showdown" with him over the telephone. About
11:00 p.m., Kissinger advised Dinitz that if the Israelis had
not made a decision by 8:00 a.m. to permit non-military
supplies such as provisions to reach the Third Army,
Washington would join with others on the UN Security
Council to make the issue "an international matter." While
Kissinger had not pressed the Israelis to withdraw forces, he
warned Dinitz that "You will not be permitted to destroy the
army" and it was "inconceivable that the Soviets" would
allow that to happen. Shortly after the phone call, Kissinger
sent a cable to Ismail, urging direct Egyptian-Israeli talks on
supplies for the Third Army. (Note 81)
IX. Crisis Resolved
Document 84: Nixon Hotline Message to Brezhnev, 27

October 1973, sent 2:18 a.m.

In a quick but "polite and vague" reply to Brezhnev's

message, (Note 82) Nixon assured the Soviets that
Washington was treating "on an urgent basis" the matter of
securing Israeli cooperation on the delivery of non-military
supplies to the Third Army. He also agreed with Brezhnev on
the importance of rapid positioning of UN Truce Supervisory
Organization (UNTSO) staffers. In light of Brezhnev's desire
to involve Soviet observers, Nixon offered some U.S.
personnel to work in UNTSO, stipulating that no country's
observers should operate outside the UN framework (as it
turned out, Sadat rejected the presence of any U.S. or Soviet
observers to monitor the cease-fire). As for Brezhnev's
objections to the U.S. alert, Nixon declared that Washington
had "taken seriously" the language in the 24 October letter
about "taking appropriate steps unilaterally." In contrast to
unilateral action, the establishment of a UN force was "a
sensible course in our mutual interest."
Document 85: State Department Cable 212588 to all

Diplomatic Posts, "Egyptian-Israeli Cease Fire Situation," 27
October 1973

Despite U.S. pressure, Prime Minister Meir refused to make a

proposal on non-military supplies for the Third Army, thus
forcing Kissinger to impose a solution. In the meantime,
Kissinger had been in contact with Sadat, via Hafez Ismail,
who had accepted the U.S. proposal for direct Egyptian-
Israeli talks to implement the cease-fire. The only condition
that Sadat stipulated was that the Israelis permit a UN/Red
Cross-supervised convoy to deliver non-military supplies to
the Third Army. Kissinger sent Ismail's message to the
Israelis who accepted it at 6:20 a.m. (EDT). Minutes later,
Kissinger informed Ismail that Israel had accepted Egypt's
proposal and that the Israelis would be in touch with UN
Major General Ensio Siilasvuo, the commander of the UN
Emergency Force operating in the Sinai. Later on 27 October,
in the cable reproduced here, Kissinger informed U.S.
embassies about the developments, although not the gory
details. (Note 83)
Document 86: Scowcroft to Dinitz, 28 October 1973,

enclosing message from Ismail to Kissinger
Source: SN 70-73, POL 27-14 Arab-Isr
After considerable confusion, Egyptian General Mohamad el-

Gamasy and Israeli General Aharon Yariv met for the famous
Kilometer 101 talks, held at the 101st kilometer on the Cairo-
Suez road. Kissinger got a few initial details from Ismail who
reported that the "meeting was dignified" despite
disagreements on cease-fire implementation and exchanges of
prisoners. (Note 84)
Document 87: Memorandum for the Record by Brent

Scowcroft, 29 October 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 136, Dinitz June 4 1974-October

31, 1973
Israeli embassy officer Shalev gave Scowcroft a report of the

second meeting at Kilometer 101. According to the Israeli
account, the talks proceeded normally, with the two sides
discussing supply convoys for Egyptian forces, lists of
POWs, exchange of the wounded soldiers, International Red
Cross visits to the wounded and POWs, and a time table for
exchanges of POWs. "The atmosphere of the meeting was
fairly good."
Document 88A: Memcon between Kissinger and Acting

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, 29 October, first
draft
Document 88B: Memcon between Kissinger and Fahmi, 30
October, 3:08 pm.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27 Arab-Isr
While the Egyptians and Israelis negotiated at Kilometer 101,

Kissinger and Ismail Fahmi had a series of cordial and earnest
discussions leading up to Kissinger's meeting with Sadat on 7
November. While much of the talk involved the rendition of
rather partial accounts of wartime developments and
decisions, for Fahmi the key issue was cease-fire
implementation, especially the problem of non-military
supplies for the Third Army. He was not familiar with the
U.S.-Soviet understanding on the exchange of POWs and
showed surprise that the issue had been part of the dialogue in
Moscow. As Kissinger made clear, for the Israelis the POW
issue was central to their agreement to a cease-fire in the first
place. By the next day, Kissinger and Fahmi were close to an
understanding: that if Egyptian and Israeli forces returned to
the 22 October lines under UN supervision and non-military
supplies were provided to the Third Army in the meantime,
the Egyptians would agree to exchange POWs and lift the
blockade of the Red Sea. Fahmi saw much at stake in these
discussions: "We are about to begin a new chapter," he
declared. Later, he promised that if an understanding was
reached, Cairo and Washington would resume diplomatic
relations.
Document 89: Kissinger memorandum for the President's

File, "Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, at 6:00 p.m., at Camp David
Source: NPMP, HAK, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20

A few hours after meeting with Fahmi, Kissinger flew to

Camp David for a meeting between Nixon and Dobrynin.
Alluding to the risk of the U.S. alert, Dobrynin observed that
"it took a very difficult decision on the part of Brezhnev to
preserve our good relations with each other." After Nixon
suspiciously asked about a leak to John Scali and Dobrynin
plaintively asked, "What kind of a relationship is this … if
one letter produces an alert?" the conversation settled into a
discussion of the Middle East situation. Significantly, Nixon
continued to hold the view that Moscow and Washington
could both play an "indispensable role … in getting a
settlement in the Middle East." No doubt this statement
pained Kissinger who was trying to steer U.S. policy in a
different direction. Indeed, he would complain the next day to
the British ambassador that Dobrynin's proposal for joint
supervision of the cease-fire was a form of harassment.
According to Dobrynin's later account, in early November
Kissinger conveyed "regrets for the alert", observing that the
White House "had made a rash move damaging American-
Soviet relations." It was important to avoid "further mutual
recriminations and offenses, just because we have admitted
what could have been a gross miscalculation on our part."
Bent on pursuing a policy on marginalizing the Soviet
diplomatic role in the region, Kissinger would, however,
provide more occasions for "recriminations and offenses."
(Note 85)
Document 90: Memcon between Kissinger and the Earl of

Cromer, British Ambassador, 31 October 1973, 9:05 - 9:40
a.m.
Source: SN 70-73, POL UK-US
While the British ambassador wanted to find about the talks

with Fahmi were going, Kissinger wanted to make some
complaints, especially that Nixon was "pained" by Prime
Minister Heath's "refusal to endorse the alert." Kissinger
quickly turned to his dismay over NATO Europe's conduct
during the war, which he thought put "our alliance in
jeopardy." Arguing that Western Europe saw the conflict not
as an "East-West blow-up" but an "Arab-Israeli thing,"
Cromer suggested that U.S. policy went wrong by treating the
crisis in East-West terms. This did not satisfy Kissinger who
later observed that "the painful fact is that not one of the
European allies said anything in support." Their inconclusive
discussion turned to the Fahmi talks with Kissinger
suggesting that he saw potential for a deal meeting Egyptian
concerns about non-military supplies for the Third Army and
Israeli concerns about POWs and the blockade of the Red
Sea. During a discussion of Soviet naval activity during the
war, Kissinger stated that "we have information that a Soviet
ship carrying nuclear weapons passed through the Bosporus,
and then came back without them." He told Cromer that he
talked to the Russians about this development. Significantly,
leaked reports about the Soviet ship and other nuclear
weapons allegedly deployed to Egypt surfaced in the
Washington Post during November. Some analysts later
speculated that the purpose of the leaks was to "provide more
muscle" for pressure on Israel to cooperate with the peace
process. None of the intelligence reporting has been
declassified, but the reports were ambiguous enough that
when Kissinger was questioned about them on 21 November,
he said there is no "confirmed evidence" about nuclear
weapons arriving in Egypt. A few days later, after meeting
with Nixon, Senator J. William Fulbright declared that there
was "no confirmation" of the reports. (Note 86)
Document 91A: Memcon between Kissinger, Meir, Dinitz,

and General Yariv. 1 November 1973, 8:10 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.
Document 91B: Memcon between Meir, Nixon, and
Kissinger, 1 November 1973, 12:10 p.m.

2. NODIS Action Memos, 1973-1976
A visit to Washington gave Golda Meir an opportunity to

thank Nixon directly for U.S. military aid during the war.
That she did, but her talks with Henry Kissinger on the cease-
fire were strikingly acrimonious, in part reflecting the
resentment over Washington's determination to ensure the
Third Army's survival. (Note 87) Kissinger accused the
Israelis of blindsiding him on their military plans: "You gave
me good military reports but you didn't tell me what you
intended. I had no reason to think twelve more hours, twenty-
four more hours, were decisive. … Then you took on the
Third Army after the ceasefire … Had I known about it, I
would have done different things in Moscow." A few minutes
later Meir complained: "Why believe the Egyptians? …
Whatever Sadat says is the Bible?" What especially
concerned Meir, however, was the return of Israeli POWs
which, with Egyptian lifting of the Red Sea blockade, she tied
to agreement over the ongoing supply of non-military goods
to the Third Army. The more difficult point was the Israeli
stance on the October cease-fire lines. Knowing how much
importance the Egyptians placed upon the return of Israeli
forces to the cease-fire line, Kissinger believed that the
Israelis could not "avoid accepting in principle the October 22
lines." Nixon agreed but Meir urged him not to "press" it. For
her the line was indeterminate and "separat[ing] the forces"
made more sense. For Meir, that meant the withdrawal of
Egyptian forces to the Canal's west bank, which Sadat would
have rejected. During the Oval Office discussion, Nixon
emphasized U.S. interest in getting "peace talks moving
along" and asked Meir and the Israelis to "have some
confidence" that Nixon and Kissinger will "do our best not
only on the hardware [arms], but on the software side when it
comes to negotiations." During the conversation,
disagreements surfaced between Nixon and Kissinger on
Moscow's role in the peace process. After Kissinger declared,
"your policy, Mr. President, is to move the Soviets into a
secondary position," Nixon observed "We have to take Soviet
sensitivities into the act [account?] because we have other
fish to fry with them." To that, Kissinger stated, "But de facto
we are trying to reduce their influence." Kissinger's goal of
reducing Soviet influence would, in fact, be the thrust of U.S.
policy during the months that followed, as Brezhnev would
learn to his dismay.
Document 92A: Memcon between Fahmi and Kissinger, 1

November 1973. 5:30 p.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 24, Cat "C"
Material November-Dec. 1973 HAK-Golda Meir
Document 92B: Memcon between Fahmi and Kissinger, 2

November 1973, 8:19 p.m.,
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 1, Misc
Docs, Tabs, 1973-77
In between the sessions with Golda Meir, Kissinger had more

talks with Fahmi. Fahmi wanted Kissinger to be sure that he
would be treated well in Cairo but the discussion got stuck on
the cease-fire lines. From Fahmi's perspective, an agreement
to stabilize the cease-fire had to include language about Israel
"going back to the October 22 positions." Kissinger assured
Fahmi that he was trying to "get you the principle of the
return to the October 22 positions" but all that he had gotten
so far from Meir was an understanding on exchange of
prisoners and non-military supplies for the Third Army.
Recognizing that "we will have a massive brawl with the
Israelis on the question of the return to the October 22
positions," Kissinger suggested there were two possibilities:
to have a brawl or to "tackle the bigger problem" of Israeli
disengagement from the Sinai. On the latter, "only we can
deliver." That seemed to please Fahmi who declared "That
the United States will deliver the goods is what we want."
Nonetheless, he still wanted Kissinger to get the Israelis to
return to the October 22 positions.
Document 93A: Memcon between Kissinger, Meir, and

Party, 2 November 1973, 10:00 p.m. - 12:45 a.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL Isr-US
Document 93B: Memcon between Kissinger, Meir, and

Party, 3 November 1973, 10:45 p.m. - 1:10 a.m.
3
Kissinger told Fahmi that he would not see Meir until the
next evening but he met with her only minutes later at Blair
House; they would hold more discussions the next evening. A
telling comment by Kissinger during the Friday night meeting
(2 November) suggested his awareness that Brezhnev
believed that Kissinger had worked behind his back during
the cease-fire negotiations: "Our only concern about the Third
Army is that from Brezhnev's point of view the agreement on
the cease-fire with a fixed deadline, plus my trip to Tel Aviv,
plus your moving afterward -- makes him look like a fool.
That's our dilemma. They assume collusion." The tense and
emotionally charged discussions continued to focus on cease-
fire arrangements. It wasn't exactly a "brawl" but Kissinger,
apparently believing that it was necessary to try, vainly
continued his effort to extract a concession from Meir about
"agreement in principle" on the 22 October cease-fire lines.
While Kissinger may have thought he had convinced the
Israelis on the evening of 2 November, the meeting held the
next evening showed otherwise. For Kissinger, language
about "in principle" would be necessary as a "face-saving
formula" to appease the Egyptians, but Meir denied that
necessity. When Kissinger suggested the "need for a wise
decision," Meir angrily replied: "You're saying we have no
choice." Despite interesting comments about Egypian
flexibility by General Yariv, temporarily called away from
the Kilometer 101 talks, Kissinger may not have understood
that the Israelis were far more fully briefed than he on the
state of the military-to-military talks. Meir and her colleagues
probably found the concession sought by Kissinger
unnecessary. Indeed, she presented elements of what would
become known as the "six-point agreement" that Kissinger
and Sadat would later discuss, including language on a return
to the 22 October cease-fire lines in the context of
disengagement and separation of forces. Kissinger was
skeptical that Sadat would accept the points--"my judgment is
there is next to no chance"--while General Yariv declared that
Sadat "has an interest to pay quite a lot." "We'll have to see,"
Kissinger replied. (Note 88)
Document 94: Scowcroft to President, "Meeting with Sadat,"

7 November 1973, with Nixon's annotated "congratulations"
Source: NPMP, HAKO, boxc 132, Egypt - Vol. VIII

November 1-December 31, 1973
Four days after his talks with Meir, Kissinger was in Cairo
meeting with Sadat. They met without notetakers and no
detailed record of their discussion has surfaced apart from
Kissinger's account in Years of Upheaval. Like Fahmi, Sadat
believed that Kissinger would "deliver the goods" and after
some discussion he signed off on the proposal that Meir had
discussed during the meeting of 3 November, and which
reflected the Kilometer 101 talks. Thus, there was no
controversy over the matter of agreement "in principle" on the
22 October positions: the issue of the cease-fire lines was
folded into a "framework on the disengagement and
separation of forces." While Kissinger had doubted that Sadat
would go along with general language about the cease-fire
lines, Sadat had no basic objection to the meaning of the
agreement: that the Third Army would stay in place, but
supplied, pending the outcome of negotiations to disengage
forces from the former theater of battle. The more sensitive
problem was the Egyptian blockade of the Red Sea;
consistent with the Fahmi-Kissinger talks an understanding
was reached that Egypt would "ease" the blockade. To ensure
that the six point agreement had Israeli assent, Kissinger sent
Joseph Sisco and Harold Saunders to brief Meir. Although
there were some snags in Tel Aviv and Cairo, on 11
November, el-Gamasy and Yarif signed the agreement. In the
meantime, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic
relations. During the coming months, Kissinger would serve
as the go-between for "Sinai I," the January 1974 Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement agreement on thinning out forces east
of the Suez Canal, a UN buffer zone, and the reopening of the
Suez Canal (closed since 1967). Fundamental issues would
remain, especially the Golan Heights and the Palestinian
question, but Sadat was determined first of all to reach a
negotiated solution to Egypt's security problems.
Notes
1. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost

the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
William P. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and
the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.-
Berkeley, CA: Brookings Institution-University of California
Press, 1993); Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat,
Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli
Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999). For the proceedings of
a major conference on the October War involving scholars
and major players from all sides, see Richard Parker, ed., The
October War: A Retrospective (Gainesville, FL: University
Press of Florida, 2001). For a recent history, oriented toward
a more general readership, see Walter J. Boyne, The Two
O'clock War: the 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift
That Saved Israel (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002).
2. On the Israeli side, much of the the IDF's secret history of

the war may not be available for decades. See "Ya'alon: Full
Yom Kippur War report only in 20 years," by Amos Harel,
Haaretz, 30 September 2003, at
<http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/345513.html>
3. Readers of Crisis should be aware that Kissinger turned

over his telcon collection to the State Department and the
National Archives only after lawyers from those agencies had
asked him to do so. Although Kissinger, at p. 1, uses
language about his desire for the "general availability" of
these documents, that had not been a consideration for nearly
30 years until the National Security Archive prodded the
National Archives and the State Department into taking
action. For background on these developments, see
<http://www.nsarchive.org/news/20010809/> and
<http://www.nsarchive.org/news/20020211/>.
4. Walter Issacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 004 and 521.
5. The discussion in the following paragraphs draws on

accounts of the 1967 war and ensuing developments provided
by Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 25-148, and Stein, Heroic
Diplomacy, pp. 49-68. For a map of territorial boundaries
after the Six Day War, see
<http://www.mideastweb.org/israelafter1967.htm>.
6. For "impertinent," see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 50.
7. For discussion of Sadat and Assad's goals and

interrelations, see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, pp. 4-17, Mose
Ma'Oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 128-129, and Patrick Seale, Asad
of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), pp. 194-200. For the
Saudis and the oil weapon, see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p.
67.
8. For casualty figures, see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 91.
9. See document 36B.
10. For Kissinger's "commanding position," see Quandt,

Peace Process, at pp. 180-181.
11. Uri Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973 Intelligence Failure," in

R.M. Kumaraswamy, ed., Revisiting the Yom Kippur War
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 10-11
12. Parker, The October War, pp. 113-116; Stein, Heroic

Diplomacy (quoting Sadat), p.68
13. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 137-139; Parker, October

War, pp. 3, 77, and 79-81; Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973
Intelligence Failure," in R.M. Kumaraswamy, ed., Revisiting
the Yom Kippur War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 11.
Harold Saunders, Kissinger's senior Middle East expert, later
observed that a "lot more … could have been offered in those
meetings in the way of a U.S. framework for dealing with the
issues." See Parker, October War, at p. 54.
14. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Simon &

Schuster, 1992), pp. 210, 286, 475-476, 503, and 511.
15. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States

Richard Nixon containing the Public Messages, Speeches,
and Statements of the President 1973 (Washington, D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 735.
16. For the career of Simcha Dinitz, see obituary in

Jerusalem Post, 24 September 2003. A career Foreign
Service Officer, Dinitz had just completed work as Meir's
political secretary, making him the Prime Minister's personal
envoy to Washington.
17. According to Stein, Kissinger had put the Arab-Israeli

issue on the "back burner." Heroic Diplomacy, p. 72.
18. For significant accounts of Israeli intelligence activities

and estimates prior to the war, see Ephraim Kahana, "Early
Warning Versus Concept," Intelligence and National Security
17 (Summer 2002): 81-104, and Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973
Intelligence Failure," in R.M. Kumaraswamy, ed., Revisiting
the Yom Kippur War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 10-35.
See also Parker, October War, pp. 86-88. Bar Joseph's
forthcoming book on the intelligence failure, The Watchman
Slept, will be a significant contribution. (Updated 16 October
2003)
19. Galia Golan's,"The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur

War," in Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, p.
129. Golan's account is helpful for understanding Soviet
policy during the war as is Victor Israelyan's revealing
account, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995). For an overview of Soviet policy, see Anatoly
Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to
American's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New
York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 287-301.
20. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 542, note 10 citing Kissinger,

Years of Upheaval, pp. 465-466. For the copy provided to
Dobrynin, see HAKO, box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 19
July 13, 1973-Oct., 11, 1973.
21. Kahana, "Early Warning Versus Concept," pp. 95-96;

Parker, October War, p. 99; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 71.
22. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 453, for his guarded

treatment of the preemption issue. For the record of the phone
call with Shalev, Dobrynin, Nixon, and others, see Crisis, p.
15 ff.
23. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 152.
24. For Cline quotation, see document 63. For U.S.

intelligence analysis prior to 6 October, see Quandt, Peace
Process, pp. 150-151, and Parker, October War, p. 127,
where former INR official Philip Stoddard recounts the then-
prevailing "general belief in the superiority of Israeli
intelligence."
25. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 72; Golan, "The Soviet

Union and the Yom Kippur War," in Kumaraswamy,
Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, pp. 129-130.
26. Patrick Seale, Asad, p. 202. For maps--prepared by the

Mid-East Web Group--giving an overview of the fighting, see
<http://www.mideastweb.org/octoberwarmapegypt.htm>
and <http://www.mideastweb.org/octoberwarmapsyria.htm>.
See also a map prepared for a history course at the University
of California, Santa Cruz, at
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~davidyag/octoberwarmap.jpg>
27. Kissinger has published the transcript of this

conversation, but the reference to "precipitate" would be
obscure without reference to Eagleburger's memorandum.
Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 32, 62. For "lean," see conversation
with Haig at page 43. For the Soviets and a cease-fire, see
Golan, "The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War," in
Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, p. 130.
28. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, pp. 75-77.
29. Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 110-111.
30. Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy:

Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars," in Peter
R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning
the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 117-119. For the latest
revelations, see Avner Cohen, "The Last Nuclear Moment,"
New York Times, 6 October 2003. For earlier accounts, see
Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random
House, 1991), pp. 225-230, and Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 517-
522. (updated 16 October 2003)
32. Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, pp. 56-58; Stein and

Lebow, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 185-187.
33. Stein and Lebow, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 201-205;
Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, p. 83; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy,
p. 80. For "blunder," see Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 291.
34. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 77; Kissinger, Crisis, pp.

217-221; Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 517-522; Lebow and Stein,
We All Lost the Cold War, p. 189; Parker, October War, p.
121. For Schlesinger's account of the airlift decisionmaking
process, see Parker, The October War, pp. 153-160.
35. For "pained," see Quandt, Peace Process, p. 167.
36. For the Egyptian offensive and Asad's pressure, see Seale,
Asad, pp. 211-212.
38. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 81.
39. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 709-710.
41. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs

of a Diplomat (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press,
1998), pp. 327-328.
42. Kissinger, Crisis, p. 286.
45. See also Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 167 and 178.
46. For Kissinger's account of the Moscow talks with

Brezhnev, see Years of Upheaval, pp. 548-559
48. For Kissinger's account of the Nixon message and his

reply, see Years of Upheaval, pp. 550-551
49. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 416.
50. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, p. 212;
Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, pp. 84, 87-90.
51. Ibid., p. 89.
52. Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, pp. 526-528; Garthoff,

Détente and Confrontation, p. 418, citing Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval, at page 569. Kissinger does not mention the
message to Dinitz in his memoirs, although he does
acknowledge that the communications difficulties "reduced
the time Israel had available for gearing its last-minute
military operations to the imminent cease-fire." See Years of
Upheaval, pp. 556-557.
53. For the resolution, see

<http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm>.
54. For Kissinger's account of his meetings with the Israelis,

see Years of Upheaval, pp. 559-586. For the Ephrom quote,
see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 91.
55. Kissinger, Crisis, p. 306; Garthoff, Détente and

Confrontation, p. 419. According to Stein, Heroic Diplomacy,
at p. 90, the Israelis were "incensed" by the U.S.-Soviet
imposition of a cease-fire.
56. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, at p. 217,
note Kissinger's failure to warn.
58. Ibid. p. 92; Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 528. See also Garthoff,

Détente and Confrontation, p. 420.
59. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 243-244;
Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 92; Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 306-
307.
60. Michael K. Bohn, Nerve Center: Inside the White House

Situation Room (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2003), p.
74.
62. Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 322, 324.
63. Ibid., pp. 330-331; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation,

p. 423.
64. For the published version, see Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 331-
332.
66. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 425, including

footnote 78. Apparently, Nixon had been drinking heavily
that evening.
67. Kissinger reproduces the main body of the text, without

the language on Israel, in Years of Upheaval, p. 583.
68. For "overreaction," see statement by Victor Israelyan in

Parker, The October War, pp. 224-225. See also Golan, "The
Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War," in Kumaraswamy,
Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, pp. 147-148; Garthoff,
Détente and Confrontation, p. 428; Lebow and Stein, We All
Lost the Cold War, pp. 237-238, 245-246, and Stein, Heroic
Diplomacy, p. 94. Also helpful on the Politburo discussions is
Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 205.
69. For a provocative critique of the Defcon III alert, see

Stein and Lebow, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 246-258.
70. Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 343, 349-352; Stein, Heroic

Diplomacy, p. 95; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp.
432-433.
71. For the texts of these agreements, see, respectively

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/20706.htm>,
document 116, and
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/prevent/text/prevent1.htm>
.
72. For thoughtful analysis of the implications of the "Basic

Principles" and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War for superpower conduct during the October War, see
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 434-441.
73. For Dobrynin's account, see In Confidence, p. 297.
74. Parker, The October War, pp. 175-176

75. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 175-176. For resolution 340,
see <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm>.
76. Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 362, 369.
77. See Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 370-381.
78. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 626-629; Parker, The

October War, p. 282.
80. For background on this flap and the quote from Kissinger,
see Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp. 328-329. For
"raise hell," see Kissinger, Crisis, p. 380.
81. Ibid., pp. 387, 393-97; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.

609.
82. For "polite and vague," see ibid., p. 609.
83. Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 398-401. For background on

General Siilasvuo, see
<http://www.sinibarettiliitto.fi/lehti/1_03/summary.htm>.
84. For a detailed account of the talks, see Stein, Heroic

Diplomacy, pp. 97-116.
85. For Kissinger's "regrets," see Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.

300. For later "recriminations," see Kissinger's account of his
March 1974 conversations with Brezhnev on the Middle East,
in Years of Upheaval, at p. 1022.
86. For further discussion, see Garthoff, Détente and

Confrontation, pp. 424-425; Seymour Hersh, The Samson
Option, pp. 234-235. For the suggestion about "muscle" and
information on the press reports, as well as the Kissinger and
Fulbright quotes, see Yona Bandmann and Yishai Cordova,
"The Soviet Nuclear Threat Toward the Close of the Yom
Kippur War," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 5
(1980): 94-110.
87. Kissinger's account of the talks with Meir downplays the

tension; see Years of Upheaval, pp. 619-624.
88. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, pp. 105-106.

1973 October War (Yom Kippur War) - Egyptian Front
In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched another war against Israel, after the Israeli
government headed by Golda Meir rebuffed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's offers
to negotiate a settlement. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal on the afternoon of
October 6, Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish religious calendar. The Israeli
government had ignored repeated intelligence warnings. They were convinced that
Israeli arms were a sufficient deterrent to any aggressor. Sadat had twice announced
his intention to go to war, but nothing had happened. When the intelligence reports
were finally believed, on the morning of the attack, PM Meir and Defense Minister
Dayan decided not to mobilize reserves.
The Israelis were caught by surprise in more ways than one. Egyptians poured huge
numbers of troops across the canal unopposed and began setting up beachhead. The
Israel Army had neglected basic maintenance tasks and drill. As troops mustered, it
became apparent that equipment was missing and tanks were out of commission. The
line of outposts built as watch posts along the Suez canal - the Bar Lev line, was used
instead as a line of fortifications intended to hold off the Egyptians as long as possible.
A tiny number of soldiers faced the Egyptian onslaught and were wiped out after
stubborn resistance. The Soviets had sold the Egyptians new technology - better
surface to air missiles (SAM) and hand held Sager anti-tank weapons. Israel had
counted on air power to tip the balance on the battlefield, and had neglected artillery.
But the air-force was initially neutralized because of the effectiveness of SAM missiles,
until Israel could destroy the radar stations controlling them. Futile counterattacks
continued in Sinai for several days as Israeli divisions coped with traffic jams that
prevented concentration of forces, and with effective Egyptian resistance.
Egyptians crossed the Suez canal and retook a strip of the Sinai peninsula. Initial
Israeli attempts to oppose the Egyptians without artillery support were fruitless. SAMs
took a heavy toll of Israeli air power. After sustaining heavy losses, Israeli forces rallied
and, with artillery support in place and the radar controlling the SAMs neutralized,
Israeli troops crossed the canal. General Ariel Sharon, disobeying the orders of
cautious superiors, ran ahead of logistics and support to develop the bridgehead on
the Egyptian side of the Suez canal, and to cut off the entire Egyptian third army.
Encouraged by this success, Israeli troops tried to advance and conquer Suez city, an
adventure which proved to be disastrous.
The map shows the Egyptian attacks and counter attacks.
Map adapted from Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, 2000.

"The past isn't dead; it isn't even past." William Faulkner.
"No two historians ever agree on what happened, and the damn thing is they
both think they're telling the truth." Harry S. Truman.
Introductory Note
History, and different perceptions of history, are perhaps the most important factors in
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accounts of history, interpreting history in different ways, are
used to justify claims and to negate claims, to vilify the enemy and to glorify "our own"
side. Dozens of accounts have been written. Most of the accounts on the Web are
intended to convince rather than to inform.
This very brief account is intended as a balanced overview and introduction to

Palestinian and Israeli history, and the history of the conflict. It is unlikely that anyone
has written or will write an "objective" and definitive summary that would be accepted
by everyone, but it is hoped that this document will provide a fair introduction.
It would be wrong to try to use this history to determine "who is right," though many
"histories" have certainly been written by partisans of either side, with precisely that
purpose in mind. Those who are interested in advocacy, in collecting "points" for their
side, cannot find the truth except by accident. If they find it, and it is inconvenient, they
will bury it again. This account intends to inform, and nothing more. Two separate
documents explain how I think we should gather facts and learn about the conflict, and the
importance of words in making Middle East history, as well as in understanding it. A timeline
provides details of many events not discussed in this history, and source documents
provide additional background. Serious students will also refer to the bibliography for
more information and different viewpoints, and will always seek out primary source
documents to verify whatever claims are made about those documents or about quotes
from those documents.
Click here for a brief overview of issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Click here for a perspective on the changing nature of the Israeli - Palestinian/Zionist - Arab/
Jewish-Muslim conflict.
Geography and Early History of Israel and Palestine

The land variously called Israel and Palestine is a small, (10,000 square miles at
present) land at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. During its long history, its
area, population and ownership varied greatly. The present state of Israel occupies all
the land from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean ocean, bounded by Egypt in the
south, Lebanon in the north, and Jordan in the East. The recognized borders of Israel
constitute about 78% of the land. The remainder is divided between land occupied by
Israel since the 1967 6-day war and the autonomous regions under the control of the
Palestinian autonomy. The Gaza strip occupies an additional 141 square miles south
of Israel, and is under the control of the Palestinian authority.
Palestine has been settled continuously for tens of thousands of years. Fossil remains
have been found of Homo Erectus, Neanderthal and transitional types between
Neanderthal and modern man. Archeologists have found hybrid Emer wheat at Jericho
dating from before 8,000 B.C., making it one of the oldest sites of agricultural activity in
the world. Amorites, Canaanites, and other Semitic peoples related to the Phoenicians
of Tyre entered the area about 2000 B.C. The area became known as the Land of
Canaan. (Click here for historical maps and some details of early history)
(Click here for books about Israel & Palestine before 1918 )
The Jewish Kingdoms of Ancient Judah and Israel
The archeological record indicates that the Jewish people evolved out of native
Cana'anite peoples and invading tribes. Some time between about 1800 and 1500
B.C., it is thought that a Semitic people called Hebrews (hapiru) left Mesopotamia and
settled in Canaan. Canaan was settled by different tribes including Semitic peoples,
Hittites, and later Philistines, peoples of the sea who are thought to have arrived from
Mycenae, or to be part of the ancient Greek peoples that also settled Mycenae.
According to the Bible, Moses led the Israelites, or a portion of them, out of Egypt.
Under Joshua, they conquered the tribes and city states of Canaan. Based on biblical
traditions, it is estimated that king David conquered Jerusalem about 1000 B.C. and
established an Israelite kingdom over much of Canaan including parts of Transjordan.
The kingdom was divided into Judea in the south and Israel in the north following the
death of David's son, Solomon. Jerusalem remained the center of Jewish sovereignty
and of Jewish worship whenever the Jews exercised sovereignty over the country in
the subsequent period, up to the Jewish revolt in 133 AD.
The Assyrians conquered Israel in 722 or 721 B.C. The Babylonians conquered
Judah around 586 B.C. They destroyed Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem, and exiled a
large number of Jews. About 50 years later, the Persian king Cyrus conquered
Babylonia. Cyrus allowed a group of Jews from Babylonia to rebuild Jerusalem and
settle in it. However, a large number of Jews remained in Babylonia, forming the first
Jewish Diaspora. After the reestablishment of a Jewish state or protectorate, the
Babylonian exiles maintained contact with authorities there. The Persians ruled the
land from about 530 to 331 B.C. Alexander the Great then conquered the Persian
Empire. After Alexander's death in 323 B.C., his generals divided the empire. One of
these generals, Seleucus, founded a dynasty that gained control of much of Palestine
about 200 B.C. At first, the new rulers, called Seleucids, allowed the practice of
Judaism. But later, one of the kings, Antiochus IV, tried to prohibit it. In 167 B.C., the
Jews revolted under the leadership of the Maccabeans and either drove the Seleucids
out of Palestine or at least established a large degree of autonomy, forming a kingdom
with its capital in Jerusalem. The kingdom received Roman "protection" when Judah
Maccabee was made a "friend of the Roman senate and people" in 164 B.C. according
to the records of Roman historians.
Palestine From Roman to Ottoman Rule

About 61 B.C., Roman troops under Pompei invaded Judea and sacked Jerusalem in
support of King Herod. Judea had become a client state of Rome. Initially it was ruled
by the client Herodian dynasty. The land was divided into districts of Judea, Galilee,
Peraea and a small trans-Jordanian section, each of which eventually came under
direct Roman control. The Romans called the large central area of the land, which
included Jerusalem, Judea. Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem, Judea, in the early
years of Roman rule. Roman rulers put down Jewish revolts in about A.D. 70 and A.D.
132. In A.D. 135, the Romans drove the Jews out of Jerusalem. The Romans named
the area Palaestina, at about this time. The name Palaestina, which became Palestine
in English, is derived from Herodotus, who used the term Palaistine Syria to refer to the
entire southern part of Syria, meaning "Philistine Syria." Most of the Jews who
continued to practice their religion fled or were forcibly exiled from Palestine, eventually
forming a second Jewish Diaspora. However, Jewish communities continued to exist in
Galilee, the northernmost part of Palestine. Palestine was governed by the Roman
Empire until the fourth century A.D. (300's) and then by the Byzantine Empire. In time,
Christianity spread to most of Palestine. The population consisted of Jewish converts
to Christianity and paganism, peoples imported by the Romans, and others who had
probably inhabited Palestine continuously.
During the seventh century (A.D. 600's), Muslim Arab armies moved north from Arabia
to conquer most of the Middle East, including Palestine. Jerusalem was conquered about
638 by the Caliph Umar (Omar) who gave his protection to its inhabitants. Muslim powers
controlled the region until the early 1900's. The rulers allowed Christians and Jews to
keep their religions. However, most of the local population gradually accepted Islam
and the Arab-Islamic culture of their rulers. Jerusalem became holy to Muslims as the
site where, according to tradition, Muhammed ascended to heaven after a miraculous
overnight ride on his horse Al-Buraq. The al-Aqsa mosque was built on the site
generally regarded as the area of the Jewish temples.
The Seljuk Turks conquered Jerusalem in 1071, but their rule in Palestine lasted less
than 30 years. Initially they were replaced by the Fatimid rulers of Egypt. The Fatimids
took advantage of the Seljuk struggles with the Christian crusaders. They made an
alliance with the crusaders in 1098 and captured Jerusalem, Jaffa and other parts of
Palestine.
The Crusaders, however, broke the alliance and invaded Palestine about a year later.
They captured Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1099, slaughtered many Jewish and Muslim
defenders and forbade Jews to live in Jerusalem. They held the city until 1187. In that
year, the Muslim ruler Saladin conquered Jerusalem. The Crusaders then held a
smaller and smaller area along the coast of Palestine, under treaty with Saladin.
However, they broke the treaty with Saladin and later treaties. Crusade after crusade
tried unsuccessfully to recapture Jerusalem.
The crusaders left Palestine for good when the Muslims captured Acre in 1291. During
the post-crusade period, crusaders often raided the coast of Palestine. To deny the
crusaders gains from these raids, the Muslims pulled their people back from the coasts
and destroyed coastal towns and farms. This depopulated and impoverished the coast
of Palestine for hundreds of years.
In the mid-1200's, Mamelukes, originally soldier-slaves of the Arabs based in Egypt,

established an empire that in time included the area of Palestine. Arab-speaking
Muslims made up most of Palestine's population. Beginning in the late 1300's, Jews
from Spain and other Mediterranean lands settled in Jerusalem and other parts of the
land. The Ottoman Empire defeated the Mamelukes in 1517, and Palestine became
part of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Sultan invited Jews fleeing the Spanish
Catholic inquisition to settle in the Turkish empire, including several cities in Palestine.
In 1798, Napoleon entered the land. The war with Napoleon and subsequent
misadministration by Egyptian and Ottoman rulers, reduced the population of
Palestine. Arabs and Jews fled to safer and more prosperous lands. Revolts by
Palestinian Arabs against Egyptian and Ottoman rule at this time may have helped to catalyze
Palestinian national feeling. Subsequent reorganization and opening of the Turkish
Empire to foreigners restored some order. They also allowed the beginnings of Jewish
settlement under various Zionist and proto-Zionist movements. Both Arab and Jewish
population increased. By 1880, about 24,000 Jews were living in Palestine, out of a
population of about 400,000. At about that time, the Ottoman government imposed
severe restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchase. These were evaded in
various ways by Jews seeking to colonize Palestine.
The Rise of Zionism - Jews had never stopped coming to "the Holy land" or Palestine
in small numbers throughout the exile. Palestine also remained the center of Jewish
worship and a part of Jewish culture. However, the Jewish connection with the land
was mostly abstract and connected with dreams of messianic redemption.
In the nineteenth century new social currents animated Jewish life. The emancipation
of European Jews, signaled by the French revolution, brought Jews out of the Ghetto
and into the modern world, exposing them to modern ideas. The liberal concepts
introduced by emancipation and modern nationalist ideas were blended with traditional
Jewish ideas about Israel and Zion. The marriage of "love of Zion" with modern
nationalism took place first among the Sephardic (Spanish and Eastern) Jewish
community of Europe. There, the tradition of living in the land of the Jews and return to
Zion had remained practical goals rather than messianic aspirations, and Hebrew was
a living language. Rabbi Yehuda Alcalay, who lived in what is now Yugoslavia,
published the first Zionist writings in the 1840s. Though practically forgotten, these
ideas took root among a few European Jews. Emancipation of Jews triggered a new
type of virulent anti-Jewish political and social movement in Europe, particularly in
Germany and Eastern Europe. Beginning in the late 1800's, oppression of Jews in
Eastern Europe stimulated emigration of Jews to Palestine.
The Zionist movement became a formal organization in 1897 with the first Zionist
congress in Basle, organized by Theodor Herzl. Herzl's grandfather was acquainted with
the writings of Alcalay, and it is very probable that Herzl was influenced by them. The
Zionists wished to establish a "Jewish Homeland" in Palestine under Turkish or
German rule. They were not concerned about the Arab population, which they ignored,
or thought would agree to voluntary transfer to other Arab countries. In any case, they
envisioned the population of Palestine by millions of European Jews who would soon
form a decisive majority in the land. The Zionists established farm communities in
Palestine at Petah Tikva, Zichron Jacob, Rishon Letzion and elsewhere. Later they
established the new city of Tel Aviv, north of Jaffa. At the same time, Palestine's Arab
population grew rapidly. By 1914, the total population of Palestine stood at about
700,000. About 615,000 were Arabs, and 85,000 to 100,000 were Jews. (See
population figures). Additional information about Zionism and British Zionism Click
here for books about Zionism. Photo history of Zionism Zionism and the Creation of
Israel
World War I - During World War I (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire joined Germany
and Austria-Hungary against the Allies. An Ottoman military government ruled
Palestine. The war was hard on both Jewish and Arab populations, owing to outbreaks
of cholera and typhus; however, it was more difficult for the Jews. For a time, the
Turkish military governor ordered internment and deportation of all foreign nationals. A
large number of Jews were Russian nationals. They had been able to enter Palestine
as Russian nationals because of the concessions Turkey had granted to Russian
citizens, and they had used this method to overcome restrictions on immigration. They
had also maintained Russian citizenship to avoid being drafted into the Turkish army.
Therefore, a large number of Jews were forced to flee Palestine during the war. A
small group founded the NILI underground that fed intelligence information to the
British, in order to free the land of Turkish rule. The Turks eventually caught members
of the NILI group, but the information they provided is said to have helped the British
invasion effort.
Britain and France planned to divide the Ottoman holdings in the Middle East among
themselves after the war. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 called for part of Palestine
to be under British rule, part to be placed under a joint Allied government, and for Syria
and Lebanon to be given to the France. However, Britain also offered to back Arab
demands for postwar independence from the Ottomans in return for Arab support for
the Allies and seems to have promised the same territories to the Arabs. In 1916, Arabs led
by T.E. Lawrence and backed by Sharif Husayn revolted against the Ottomans in the
belief that Britain would help establish Arab independence in the Middle East.
Lawrence's exploits and their importance in the war against Turkey were somewhat
exaggerated by himself and by the enterprising publicist Lowell Thomas. The United
States and other countries pressed for Arab self-determination. The Arabs, and many
in the British government including Lawrence, believed that the Arabs had been short-
changed by the British promise to give Syria to the French, and likewise by the promise
of Palestine as a Jewish homeland. The Arabs claimed that Palestine was included in
the area promised to them, but the British denied this.
The British Mandate for Palestine

The Balfour Declaration - In November 1917, before Britain had conquered
Jerusalem and the area to be known as Palestine, Britain issued the Balfour
Declaration. The declaration was a letter addressed to Lord Rothschild, based on a
request of the Zionist organization in Great Britain. The declaration stated Britain's
support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, without violating the
civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities. The declaration was
the result of lobbying by the small British Zionist movement, especially by Dr. Haim
Weizmann, who had emigrated from Russia to Britain, but it was motivated by British
strategic considerations. Paradoxically, perhaps, a major motivation for the declaration
may have been the belief, inspired by anti-Semitism, that international Jewry would
come to the aid of the British if they declared themselves in favor of a Jewish
homeland, and the fear that the Germans were about to issue such a declaration.
After the war, the League of Nations divided much of the Ottoman Empire into
mandated territories. The British and French saw the Mandates as instruments of
imperial ambitions. US President Wilson insisted that the mandates must foster
eventual independence. The British were anxious to keep Palestine away from the
French, and decided to ask for a mandate that would implement the Jewish national
home of the Balfour declaration, a project that would be supported by the Americans.
The Arabs opposed the idea of a Jewish national home, considering that the areas
now called Palestine were their land. The Arabs felt they were in danger of
dispossession by the Zionists, and did not relish living under Jewish rule.
Arabs lobbied the American King-Crane commission, in favor of annexation of the

Palestine mandate area to Syria, and later formed a national movement to combat the
terms of the Mandate. At the instigation of US President Wilson, the King Crane
commission had been sent to hear the views of the inhabitants. At the commission
hearings, Aref Pasha Dajani expressed this opinion about the Jews, "Their history and
their past proves that it is impossible to live with them. In all the countries where they
are at present, they are not wanted...because they always arrive to suck the blood of
everybody..."
By this time, Zionists had recognized the inevitability of conflict with the Palestinian
Arabs. David Ben Gurion, who would lead the Yishuv (the Jewish community in
Palestine) and go on to be the first Prime Minister of Israel, told a meeting of the
governing body of the Jewish Yishuv in 1919 "But not everybody sees that there is no
solution to this question...We as a nation, want this country to be ours, the Arabs as a
nation, want this country to be theirs."
Click here for books about: The British Mandate Zionism < Palestine & Palestinians
The Zionists and others presented their case to the

Paris Peace conference. Ultimately, the British
plan was adopted. The main issues taken into
account were division of rights between Britain
and France, rather than the views of the
inhabitants.
In 1920, Britain received a provisional mandate

over Palestine, which would extend west and east
of the River Jordan. The area of the mandate (see
map at right) given to Britain at the San Remo
conference was much larger than historic
Palestine as envisaged by the Zionists, who had
sought an eastern border to the West of Amman.
The mandate, based on the Balfour declaration,
was formalized in 1922. The British were to help
the Jews build a national home and promote the
creation of self-governing institutions. The
mandate provided for an agency, later called "The
Jewish Agency for Palestine," that would
represent Jewish interests in Palestine to the
British and to promote Jewish immigration. A
Jewish agency was created only in 1929, delayed
by the desire to create a body that represented
both Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. The Jewish
agency in Palestine became in many respects the
de-facto government of the Jewish Yishuv
(community).
The area granted to the mandate was much
larger than the area sought by the Zionists. It is
possible, that as Churchill suggested in 1922, the
British never intended that all of this area would
become a Jewish national home. On the other
hand, some believe that Britain had no special
plans for Transjordan initially. In his memoirs, Sir
Alec Kirkbride, the British representative in
Amman, wrote that "There was no intention at
that stage [1920] of forming the territory east of
the river Jordan into an independent Arab state."
(Kirkbride, Alexander, A crackle of thorns,
London, 1956 p 19)
However, Abdullah, the son of King Husayn of the

Hijaz, marched toward Transjordan with 2,000
soldiers. He announced his intention to march to
Damascus, remove the French and reinstate the
Hashemite monarchy. Sir Alec Kirkbride, had 50
policemen. He asked for guidance from the British
High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, and
Samuel eventually replied that it was unlikely
Abdullah would enter British controlled areas.
Two days later, Abdullah marched north and by
March 1921, he occupied the entire country.
Abdullah made no attempt to march on
Damascus, and perhaps never intended to do so
In 1922, the British declared that the boundary of

Palestine would be limited to the area west of the
river. The area east of the river, called
Transjordan (now Jordan), was made a separate
British mandate and eventually given
independence (See map at right) . A part of the
Zionist movement felt betrayed at losing a large
area of what they termed "historic Palestine" to
Transjordan, and split off to form the "Revisionist"
movement, headed by Benjamin Vladimir (Ze'ev)
Jabotinsky.
The British hoped to establish self-governing institutions in Palestine, as required by

the mandate. The Jews were alarmed by the prospect of such institutions, which would
have an Arab majority. However, the Arabs would not accept proposals for such
institutions if they included any Jews at all, and so no institutions were created. The
Arabs wanted as little as possible to do with the Jews and the mandate, and would not
participate in municipal councils, nor even in the Arab Agency that the British wanted to
set up. Ormsby-Gore, undersecretary of state for the colonies concluded, "Palestine is
largely inhabited by unreasonable people."
Arab Riots and Jewish immigration - In the spring of 1920, spring of 1921 and
summer of 1929, Arab nationalists opposed to the Balfour declaration, the mandate
and the Jewish National Home, instigated riots and pogroms against Jews in
Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa and Haifa. The violence led to the formation of the Haganah
Jewish self-defense organization in 1920. The riots of 1920 and 1921 reflected
opposition to the Balfour declaration and fears that the Arabs of Palestine would be
dispossessed, and were probably attempts to show the British that Palestine as a
Jewish National home would be ungovernable. The major instigators were Hajj Amin
El Husseini, later Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and Arif -El Arif, a prominent Palestinian
journalist. The riots of 1929 occurred against the background of Jewish-Arab
nationalist antagonism. The Arabs claimed that Jewish immigration and land
purchases were displacing and dispossessing the Arabs of Palestine. However,
economic, population and other indicators suggest that objectively, the Arabs of
Palestine benefited from the Mandate and Zionist investment. Arab standard of living
increased faster in Palestine than other areas, and population grew prodigiously
throughout the Mandate years. (see Zionism and its Impact). The riots were also fueled
by false rumors that the Jews intended to build a synagogue at the wailing wall, or
otherwise encroach upon the Muslim rule over the Temple Mount compound, including
the Al-Aqsa mosque. The pogroms led to evacuation of most of the Jewish community
of Hebron. . The British responded with the Passfield White Paper. The white paper
attempted to stop immigration to Palestine based on the recommendations of the Hope
Simpson report. That report stated that in the best case, following extensive economic
development, the land could support immigration of another 20,000 families in total.
Otherwise further Jewish immigration would infringe on the position of the existing Arab
population. However, British MPs and the Zionist movement sharply criticized the new
policy and PM Ramsay McDonald issued a "clarification" stating that Jewish immigration
would not be stopped.
Jewish immigration swelled in the 1930s, driven by persecution in Eastern Europe,

even before the rise of Nazism. Large numbers of Jews began to come from Poland
owing to discriminatory laws and harsh economic conditions. The rise of Hitler in
Germany added to this tide of immigration. The Jewish Agency made a deal, the
Hesder, that allowed Jews to escape Germany to Palestine in return for hard currency
that the Reich needed. The Hesder saved tens of thousands of lives.
Arab Revolt and the White Paper - In 1936 widespread rioting, later known as the
Arab Revolt or Great Uprising, broke out. The revolt was kindled when British forces
killed Izz al din El Qassam in a gun battle. Izz al Din El Qassam was a Syrian preacher
who had emigrated to Palestine and was agitating against the British and the Jews.
The revolt was coopted by Husseini family and by Fawzi El Kaukji, a former Turkish
officer, and it was possibl financed in part by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
Thousands of Arabs and hundreds of Jews were killed in the revolt, which spread
rapidly owing to initial unpreparedness of the British authorities. About half the 5,000
residents of the Jewish quarter of the old city of Jerusalem were forced to flee, and the
remnant of the Hebron Jewish community was evacuated as well.
The Husseini family killed both Jews and members of Palestinian Arab families
opposed to their hegemony. The Yishuv (Jewish community) responded with both
defensive measures, and with random terror and bombings of Arab civilian targets,
perpetrated by the Irgun (Irgun Tsvai Leumi or "Etsel,"). Etsel was the military
underground of the right-wing dissident "revisionist group" headed first by Vladimir
(Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, who seceded from the Zionist movement, and later by Menachem
Begin. The Peel commission of 1937 recommended partitioning Palestine into a small
Jewish state and a large Arab one. The commission's recommendations also included
voluntary transfer of Arabs and Jews to separate the populations. The Jewish
leadership considered the plan but the Palestinian and Arab leadership, including King
Saud of Saudi Arabia , rejected partition and demanded that the British curtail Jewish
immigration. Saud said that if the British failed to follow Arab wishes in Palestine, the
Arabs would turn against them and side with their enemies. He said that Arabs did not
understand the "strange attitude of your British Government, and the still more strange
hypnotic influence which the Jews, a race accursed by God according to His Holy
Book, and destined to final destruction and eternal damnation hereafter, appear to
wield over them and the English people generally."
In response to the riots, the British began limiting immigration and the 1939 White Paper
decreed that 15,000 Jews would be allowed to enter Palestine each year for five years.
Thereafter, immigration would be subject to Arab approval. At the same time, the
British took drastic and often cruel steps to curtail the riots. Husseini fled to Iraq, where he
was involved in an Axis-supported coup against the British and then to Nazi Germany,
where he subsequently broadcast for the Axis powers, was active in curtailing Jewish
immigration from neutral countries and organized SS death squads in Yugoslavia.
(More about he Arab Revolt or Great Uprising).
The Holocaust - During World War II (1939-1945), many Palestinian Arabs and Jews
joined the Allied forces. though some Palestinian and Arab leaders were sympathetic
to the Nazi cause. Jews had a special motivation for fighting the Nazis because of Nazi
persecution of Jews and growing suspicions that the Nazis were systematically
exterminating the Jews of Europe. These suspicions were later confirmed, and the
extermination of European Jews came to be known as the Holocaust. The threat of
extermination also created great pressure for immigration to Palestine, but the gates of
Palestine were closed by the British White Paper. In 1941 the British freed Jewish
Haganah underground leaders in a general amnesty, and they joined the British in
fighting the Germans.
Illegal Immigration - The Jews of Palestine responded to the White Paper and the
Holocaust by organizing illegal immigration to Palestine from occupied Europe, through
the "Institution for Illegal Immigration" (Hamossad L'aliya Beth). Illegal immigration
(Aliya Bet) was organized by the Jewish Agency between 1939 and 1942, when a
tightened British blockade and stricter controls in occupied Europe made it impractical,
and again between 1945 and 1948. Rickety boats full of refugees tried to reach
Palestine. Additionally, there were private initiatives, an initiative by the Nazis to deport
Jews and an initiative by the US to save European Jews. Many of the ships sank or
were caught by the British or the Nazis and turned back, or shipped to Mauritius or
other destinations for internment. The Patria (also called "Patra") contained immigrants
offloaded from three other ships, for transshipment to the island of Mauritius. To
prevent transshipment, the Haganah placed a small explosive charge on the ship on
November 25, 1940. They thought the charge would damage the engines. Instead,
the ship sank, and over 250 lives were lost. A few weeks later, the SS Bulgaria
docked in Haifa with 350 Jewish refugees and was ordered to return to Bulgaria. The
Bulgaria capsized in the Turkish straits, killing 280. The Struma, a vessel that had left
Constanta in Rumania with about 769 refugees, got to Istanbul on December 16, 1941.
There, it was forced to undergo repairs of its engine and leaking hull. The Turks would
not grant the refugees sanctuary. The British would not approve transshipment to
Mauritius or entry to Palestine. On February 24, 1942, the Turks ordered the Struma
out of the harbor. It sank with the loss of 428 men, 269 women and 70 children. It had
been torpedoed by a Soviet submarine, either because it was mistaken for a Nazi ship,
or more likely, because the Soviets had agreed to collaborate with the British in barring
Jewish immigration. Illegal immigration continued until late in the war, apparently
without the participation of the Mossad 'aliya Bet. Despite the many setbacks, tens of
thousands of Jews were saved by the illegal immigration.
The Biltmore Declaration - Reports of Nazi atrocities became increasingly frequent

and vivid. Despite the desperate need to find a haven for refugees, the doors of
Palestine remained shut to Jewish immigration. The Zionist leadership met in the
Biltmore Hotel in New York City in 1942 and declared that it supported the establishment
of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. This was not simply a return to the Balfour
declaration repudiated by the British White Paper, but rather a restatement of Zionist
aims that went beyond the Balfour declaration, and a determination that the British
were in principle, an enemy to be fought, rather than an ally.
Assassination of Lord Moyne - On November 6, members of the Jewish Lehi

underground Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet Zuri assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo.
Moyne, a known anti-Zionist, was Minister of State for the Middle East and in charge of
carrying out the terms of the 1939 White Paper - preventing Jewish immigration to
Palestine by force. The assassination did not change British policy, but it turned
Winston Churchill against the Zionists. Hakim and Bet Zuri were caught and were
hanged by the British in 1945.
The Season ("Sezon") - The Jewish Agency and Zionist Executive believed that
British and world reaction to the assassination of Lord Moyne could jeopardize
cooperation after the war, that had been hinted at by the British, and might endanger
the Jewish Yishuv if they came to be perceived as enemies of Britain and the allies.
Therefore they embarked on a campaign against the Lehi and Irgun, known in Hebrew
as the "Sezon" ("Season"). Members of the underground were to be ostracized.
Leaders were caught by the Haganah, interrogated and sometimes tortured, and
about a thousand persons were turned over to the British.
Displaced Persons - After the war, it was discovered that the Germans had murdered about
six million Jews in Europe, in the Holocaust. These people had been trapped in Europe,
because virtually no country would give them shelter. The Zionists felt that British
restriction of immigration to Palestine had cost hundreds of thousands of lives. The
Jews were now desperate to bring the remaining Jews of Europe, about 250,000
people being held in displaced persons camps, to Palestine.
United Resistance - In the summer of 1945, the Labor party came to power in Great
Britain. They had promised that they would reverse the British White Paper and would
support a Jewish state in Palestine. However, they presently reneged on their promise,
and continued and redoubled efforts to stop Jewish immigration. The Haganah
attempted to bring immigrants into Palestine illegally. The rival Zionist underground
groups now united, and all of them, in particular the Irgun and Lehi ("Stern gang")
dissident terrorist groups, used force to try to drive the British out of Palestine. This
included bombing of trains, train stations, an officers club and British headquarters in
the King David Hotel, as well as kidnapping and murder of British personnel. In Britain,
newspapers and politicians began to demand that the government settle the conflict
and stop endangering the lives of British troops.
The US and other countries brought pressure to bear on the British to allow
immigration. An Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended allowing 100,000
Jews to immigrate immediately to Palestine. The Arabs brought pressure on the
British to block such immigration. The British found Palestine to be ungovernable and
returned the mandate to the United Nations, successor to the League of Nations. The
report of the Anglo-American Committee provided a detailed summary of the British
mandate period and the security situation in Palestine, as well as a report on the effects of
the Holocaust and the condition of European Jewry.
Partition - The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine
(UNSCOP) recommended that Palestine be divided into an
Arab state and a Jewish state. The commission called for
Jerusalem to be put under international administration The
UN General Assembly adopted this plan on Nov. 29, 1947 as
UN Resolution (GA 181), owing to support of both the US and
the Soviet Union, and in particular, the personal support of
US President Harry S. Truman. Many factors contributed to
Truman's decision to support partition, including domestic
politics and intense Zionist lobbying, no doubt. Truman wrote
in his diary, however, "I think the proper thing to do, and the
thing I have been doing, is to do what I think is right and let them
all go to hell."
The Jews accepted the UN decision, but the Arabs rejected

it. The resolution divided the land into two approximately
equal portions in a complicated scheme with zig-zag borders
(see map at right and see Partition Map and detailed partition
map). The intention was an economic union between the two
states with open borders. At the time of partition, slightly less
than half the land in all of Palestine was owned by Arabs,
slightly less than half was "crown lands" belonging to the
state, and about 8% was owned by Jews or the Jewish
Agency. There were about 600,000 Jews in Palestine,
almost all living in the areas allotted to the Jewish state or in
the internationalized zone of Jerusalem, and about 1.2
million Arabs. The allocation of land by Resolution 181 was
intended to produce two areas with Jewish and Arab
majorities respectively. Jerusalem and environs were to be
internationalized. The relatively large Jewish population of
Jerusalem and the surroundings, about 100,000, were
geographically cut off from the rest of the Jewish state,
separated by a relatively large area, the "corridor," allotted to
the Palestinian state. The corridor included the populous
Arab towns of Lod and Ramla and the smaller towns of
Qoloniyeh, Emaus, Qastel and others that guarded the road
to Jerusalem. (Click for Large Detailed Map)
It soon became evident that the scheme could not work. Mutual antagonism would
make it impossible for either community to tolerate the other. The UN was unwilling
and unable to force implementation of the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Arab
League, at the instigation of Haj Amin Al-Husseini, declared a war to rid Palestine of the
Jews. In fact however, the Arab countries each had separate agendas. Abdullah, king
of Jordan, had an informal and secret agreement with Israel, negotiated with Golda
Meir, to annex the portions of Palestine allocated to the Palestinian state in the West
Bank, and prevent formation of a Palestinian state. Syria wanted to annex the northern
part of Palestine, including Jewish and Arab areas.
Modern History
Click here for books about Modern Israel
The War of Independence - 1948 War (the 'Nakba') - The War of Independence or
1948 War is divided into the pre-independence period, and the post-independence
period. Clashes between Israeli underground groups and Arab irregulars began almost
as soon as the UN passed the partition resolution. During this time, Arab countries did
not invade, though the Jordan legion did assist the in the attack against Gush Etzion, a
small block of settlements in the territory allocated to the Palestinian state, south of
Jerusalem.
Pre-Independence - During the period before Israeli independence was declared, two
armies of Arab irregular volunteers, let by Haj Amin El Husseini in the Jerusalem area,
and by Fawzi El Kaukji in the Galilee, placed their fighters in Arab towns and
conducted various aggressive operations against the Jewish towns and village under
the eyes of the British. Kaukji and his irregulars were allowed into Palestine from Syria
by the British, with the agreement that he would not engage in military actions, but he
soon broke the agreement and attacked across the Galilee. The Arab irregulars were
met by the Zionist underground army, the Haganah, and by the underground groups of
the "dissident" factions, Irgun and Lehi.
In Jerusalem, Arab riots broke out on November 30 and December 1 1947. Palestinian
irregulars cut off the supply of food, water and fuel to Jerusalem during a long siege
that began in late 1947. Fighting and violence broke out immediately throughout the
country, including ambushes of transportation, the Jerusalem blockade, riots such as
the Haifa refinery riots, and massacres that took place at Gush Etzion (by Palestinians)
and in Deir Yassin (by Jews). Arab Palestinians began leaving their towns and villages
to escape the fighting. Notably, most of the Arab population of Haifa left in March and
April of 1948, despite pleas by both Jewish and British officials to stay.
The British did little to stop the fighting, but the scale of hostilities was limited by lack of
arms and trained soldiers on both sides. Initially, the Palestinians had a clear
advantage, and a Haganah intelligence report of March, 1948 indicated that the situation
was critical, especially in the Jerusalem area. It is generally agreed that April 1948
marked a turning point in the fighting before the invasion by Arab armies, in favor of
the initially outnumbered and outgunned Jewish forces. To break the siege of
Jerusalem, the Haganah prematurely activated "Plan Dalet" - a plan prepared for
general defense that was supposed to have been implemented when the British had
left. It required use of regular armed forces and army tactics, fighting in the open,
rather than as an underground. It also envisioned the "temporary" evacuation of Arab
civilians from towns in certain strategic areas, such as the Jerusalem corridor. This
provision has been cited as evidence that the Zionists planned for the exodus and
expulsion of Arab civilians in advance.
The Haganah mounted its first full scale operation, Operation Nahshon, using 1,500
troops. It attacked the Arab villages of Qoloniyah and Qastel, occupied by Arab
irregular forces after the villagers had fled, on the road to Jerusalem and temporarily
broke the siege, allowing convoys of supplies to reach the city. Qastel fell on April 8,
and the key Palestinian military commander, Abdel Khader Al-Husseini was killed
there. Qoloniyeh fell on April 11. In the north, Fawzi El-Kaukji's "Salvation Army" was
beaten back at the battle of Mishmar Haemeq on April 12, 1948. These successes
helped convince US President Truman that the Jews would not be overrun by Arab forces,
and he abandoned the trusteeship proposal that the US had put before the UN earlier.
Following attacks by Arab irregulars, the Irgun attacked the Arab town of Jaffa, just
south of Tel Aviv. Palestinians fled en masse despite the pleas of the British to remain.
The Arab Invasion - The governments of neighboring Arab states were more reluctant
than is generally assumed to enter the war against Israel, despite bellicose
declarations. However, fear of popular pressure combined with fear that other Arab
states would gain an advantage over them by fighting in Palestine, helped sway Syria,
Jordan and Egypt to go to war. While officially they were fighting according to one plan,
in fact there was little coordination between them.
On May 14, 1948, the Jews proclaimed the independent State of Israel, and the British
withdrew from Palestine. In the following days and weeks, neighboring Arab nations
invaded Palestine and Israel (click here for map). The fighting was conducted in several
brief periods, punctuated by cease fire agreements ( truces were declared June 11 to
July 8, 1948 and July 19- October 15, 1948).
In the initial stage, notable successes were scored by the Egyptian and Syrian armies.
In particular, the Egyptians, backed by tanks, artillery, armor and aircraft, which Israel
did not have, were able to cut off the entire Negev and to occupy parts of the land that
had been allocated to the Jewish state. In his book, "In the Fields of Phillistia," Israeli
peace activist Uri Avnery recounts how the Egyptian army attempted a massed
armored strike against Tel Aviv. Palestinian attempts to set up a real state were
blocked by Egypt and Jordan. Jordan kept to its agreement not to invade areas
allocated to the Jewish state, but Syria and Egypt did not. The strike was turned back
by a few recently arrived Messerchmidt aircraft, bought from Czechoslovakia. The
Syrians made some advances into the territory that had been allotted to the Palestinian
state.
While Jordan did not invade Jewish territory, the Arab Legion blocked convoys to
besieged Jewish Jerusalem from its fortified positions in Latroun. Jerusalem was to
have been internationalized according to UN General Assembly Resolution 181 and UN
General Assembly Resolution 303.The Jordanian positions at Latroun (or Latrun) could not
be overcome despite several bloody attacks. To get around it, the Israelis ultimately
built a "Burma Road' that was completed in June of 1948 and broke the siege of
Jerusalem.
The first cease fire and the Altalena - A cease fire in June gave all sides time to
regroup and reorganize. This marked a critical stage in the fighting. The Arab side
made a crucial error in accepting the truce. The Israelis took advantage of the cease
fire to reorganize and recruit and train soldiers. They were now able to bring in large
shiploads of arms, despite the treaty terms, and to train and organize a real fighting
force of 60,000 troops, giving them a real advantage in troops and armament for the
first time. The truce probably saved Jerusalem, which had been on the brink of
starvation. During the long truce, the underground armies of the Haganah, Palmah,
Irgun and Lehi were amalgamated into a single national fighting force, the Israel
Defense Force (IDF). The revisionist Irgun movement attempted to bring a shipload of
arms into Israel on a ship called the Altalena, in order to maintain a separate fighting
force. Israeli PM Ben Gurion ordered the IDF to sink the Altalena when Irgun leader
Menahem Begin refused to give up its cargo of arms. The Palestinians and Arabs did
not use the time well. A large shipment of arms intended for the Palestinians was
blocked by the IDF/Haganah and never reached Syria. Arab states were reluctant to
commit more men to the struggle or to spend more money.
Resumption of the war - The war with the Egyptians

had been static, as they were isolated in the "Falluja"
pocket in central Israel. After the cease fire expired,
Israel took the war with the Egyptians to their territory
and entered the Sinai peninsula. The IDF was forced to
withdraw after encounters with British aircraft.
In the center, the IDF cut a swath of land to open the

"corridor" between Jerusalem and the rest of Israel.
During the "ten days" period of fighting between the two
truces, they invaded the Arab towns of Lod and Ramla
that had been blocking the road to Jerusalem and
expelled most of the Palestinians living there, after
killing a large number. They destroyed numerous small
Palestinian villages surrounding Tel-Aviv, so that
virtually no Palestinians were left in central Israel. (Click
here for a map of Palestine before 1948)
The Arab defeat and the birth of the refugee

problem - Despite initial setbacks, better organization
and intelligence successes, as well as timely
clandestine arms shipments, enabled the Jews to gain Map of the Israel "Green
a decisive victory. The Arabs and Palestinians lost their Line" Borders
initial advantage when they failed to organize and unite.
When the fighting ended in 1949, Israel held territories
beyond the boundaries set by the UN plan - a total of
78% of the area west of the Jordan river. The UN made
no serious attempt to enforce the internationalization of
Jerusalem, which was now divided between Jordan
and Israel, and separated by barbed wire fences and
no man's land areas. Click here to view a map of the UN
plan for Jerusalem and Jerusalem as divided under the
armistice agreements. The rest of the area assigned to
the Arab state was occupied by Egypt and Jordan.
Egypt held the Gaza Strip and Jordan held the West
Bank. About 726,000 Arabs fled or were driven out of
Israel and became refugees in neighboring Arab countries.
The conflict created about as many Jewish refugees
from Arab countries, many of whom were stripped of
their property, rights and nationality, but Israel has not
pursued claims on behalf of these refugees (see Jewish
refugees of the Arab-Israel conflict).
The Arab countries refused to sign a permanent peace

treaty with Israel. Consequently, the borders of Israel
established by the armistice commission never
received de jure (legal) international recognition. Arabs
call the defeat and exile of the Palestinian Arabs in
1948 the Nakba (disaster).
The UN arranged a series of cease-fires between the

Arabs and the Jews in 1948 and 1949. UN GA
Resolution 194 called for cessation of hostilities and
return of refugees who wish to live in peace. Security
Council Resolution 62 called for implementation of
armistice agreements that would lead to a permanent
peace. The borders of Israel were established along
the "green line" of the armistice agreements of 1949.
(Click here for a map of the armistice lines (so called "green
line") . These borders were not recognized by Arab
states, which continued to refuse to recognize Israel.
Though hostilities ceased, the refugee problem was not
solved. Negotiations broke down because Israel refused
to readmit more than a small number of refugees. The
USSR, initially in favor of the Zionist state, now aligned
itself with the Arab countries. Despite continued US
support for the existence of Israel, US aid to Israel was
minimal and did not include military aid during the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) were equipped with surplus arms
purchased third hand and with French aircraft and light
armor. The Arab countries, especially Syria and Egypt,
began receiving large quantities of Soviet military aid.
The Arab League instituted an economic boycott
against Israel that was partly honored by most
industrial nations and continued in force until the
1990s.
The Sinai Campaign - Following the overthrow
of King Farouk of Egypt by the free officers
headed by Naguib and Nasser, Egypt made
some moves toward peace with Israel. However,
in 1954, an Israeli spy ring was caught trying to blow
up the US Information agency and other foreign
institutions in Egypt. The goal was to create
tension between the US and Egypt and prevent
rapprochement. In Israel, both Defense Minister
Pinhas Lavon and Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion disclaimed responsibility for the action,
and blamed each other. This incident came to be
known variously as "the Lavon affair" and "the
shameful business." (click here for details). Egypt
became suspicious of Israeli intentions, and
began negotiating to purchase large quantities of
arms. When they were turned down by the West,
the Egyptians turned to the Eastern bloc
countries and concluded a deal with
Czechoslovakia. Egyptian President Gamal
Nasser also closed the straits of Tiran and Suez
Canal to Israeli shipping. Israeli strategists
believed that Egypt would go to war or force a
diplomatic showdown as soon the weapons had
been integrated, and began looking for a source
of arms as well. Israel concluded an arms deal
with France. A series of border incursions by
Palestinians and by Egyptians from Gaza evoked
increasingly severe Israeli reprisals, triggering
larger raids. The assessment of Israeli "activists"
like Moshe Dayan was that Israel should wage
preventive war before Egypt had fully integrated
the new weapons.
In the summer of 1956, Israel, France and Britain

colluded in a plan to reverse the nationalization
of the Suez canal. Israel would invade the Sinai
and land paratroopers near the Mitla pass.
Britain and France would issue an ultimatum, Sinai Campaign - Map
and then land troops ostensibly to separate the
sides. The plan was carried out beginning
October 29, 1956. Israel swiftly conquered Sinai.
The US was furious at Israel, Britain and France.
UN General Assembly Resolution 997 called for
immediate withdrawal. Israeli troops remained in
Sinai for many months. Israel subsequently
withdrew under pressure from the UN and in
particular the United States. Israel obtained
guarantees that international waterways would
remain open to Israeli shipping from the US, and
a UN force was stationed in Sinai.
The beginning of the Fatah - Yasser Arafat, an Egyptian Palestinian who grew up in
the Gaza strip and had been a member of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers) and the
Futuwwah or Futtuwah (officially called "Nazi Scouts" according to Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims, 1999, page 124, Palestinian armed faction of Grand Mufti Hajj Amin
El Husseini) was recruited by Egyptian intelligence while studying in Cairo in 1955, and
founded the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS). In 1957 he moved to
Kuwait and together with Khalil Al Wazir (Abu Jihad) Farouq Qadumi, Khalid al Hassan
and others founded the Palestine Liberation Committee, later renamed the Fatah
(reverse acronym for Harakat Tahrir Filistin - the Palestine Liberation Movement)
modeled on the Algerian FLN.
The 1967 6-Day War - Tension began developing between Israel and Arab countries
in the 1960s. Israel began to implement its National Water Carrier plan, which pumps
water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate south and central Israel. The project was in
accordance with a plan proposed by US envoy Eric Johnston in 1955, and agreed to
by Arab engineers. Arab governments refused to participate however, because of the
implied recognition of Israel. In secret meetings, Israel and Jordan agreed to abide by
the water quotas set by the plan.
The newly formed Palestinian Fatah movement seized on the Israeli diversion as an
"imperialist event" that would catalyze their revolution, and Yasser Arafat began calling
for war to eliminate Israel. In the Fatah newspaper, Filistinunah, ("our Palestine")
Arafat ridiculed Egyptian President Nasser and other Arab leaders for their impotence,
and called for effective action against Israel. Nasser decided to found the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) as a "tame" alternative to the Fatah, and placed Ahmed
Shukhairy, an ineffective and bombastic diplomat at its head.
The Syrians, who had broken with Nasser's pan-Arabism, countered by supporting
Fatah and attempted to take over the Fatah group. Syrian army intelligence recruited
terrorists for actions against Israel, giving credit for the operations to Fatah. The first of
these actions was announced on December 31, 1964, an attack on the Israel water
carrier at Beit Netopha, but in fact no attack had taken place. A second attempt was
made on January 2, 1965, but the explosives charge was disarmed. However,
successful attacks soon followed on January 14 and February 28. These minor terrorist
activities received great publicity in the Arab world, and were contrasted with the lack
of action and bombastic talk of Gamal Nasser, challenging Nasser's leadership. This
ferment is considered the catalyst of the events that brought about the 6-day war. It is
a moot point whether it is to be attributed to Syrian rivalry with Nasser, or as Yasser
Arafat and the Palestinians claim, to the Fatah movement. Faced with the "heroic"
deeds of the Palestinians under Syrian tutelage, Nasser was pushed to an increasingly
bellicose stance.
In several summit conferences beginning in 1964, Arab leaders ratified the establishment
of the PLO, declared their resolve to destroy Israel, and decided to divert the sources
of the Jordan river that feed the Sea of Galilee, to prevent Israel from implementing the
water carrier plan. The Syrians and Lebanese began to implement the diversions.
Israel responded by firing on the tractors and equipment doing the work in Syria, using
increasingly accurate and longer range guns as the Syrians moved the equipment from
the border. This was followed by Israeli attempts to cultivate the demilitarized zones
(DMZ) as provided in the armistice agreements. Israel was within its rights according to
the armistice agreements, but Moshe Dayan claimed many years later that 80% of the
incidents were deliberately provoked. The Syrians responded by firing in the DMZs
(Click here for a map of the demilitarized zones). When Israelis responded in force, Syria
began shelling Israeli towns in the north, and the conflict escalated into air strikes. The
USSR was intent on protecting the new Ba'athist pro-Soviet government of Syria, and
represented to the Syrians and Egyptians that Israel was preparing to attack Syria. As
tension rose, Syria appealed to Egypt, believing the claim of the USSR that Israel was
massing troops on the Syrian border. The claim was false and was denied by the UN.
Against this background, in Mid-May, 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Nasser began
making bellicose statements. On May 16, 1967, a Radio Cairo broadcast stated: "The
existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We
welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The battle has
come in which we shall destroy Israel." On the same day, Egypt asked for the
withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. UN
Secretary General U Thant agreed to remove the troops on May 18. Formally, the
troops could only be stationed in Egypt with Egyptian agreement. However, for a long
time it was believed that Nasser had really hoped U Thant would not remove the
troops, and that he could use the presence of the UN troops as an excuse to do
nothing.
On May 23, Nasser closed the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The United States
failed to live up to its guarantees of freedom of the waterways to Israel. A torrent of
rhetoric issued from Arab capitals and in the UN. At the UN, PLO Chairman Ahmed
Shukhairy announced that "if it will be our privilege to strike the first blow" the PLO
would expel from Palestine all Zionists who had arrived after 1917 and eliminate the
state of Israel. In a speech to Arab Trade Unionists on May 26, 1967, Nasser justified the
dismissal of the UNEF, and made it clear that Egypt was prepared to fight Israel for Palestinian
rights. He also attacked the Jordanians as tools of the imperialists, stepping up the
constant pressure on Jordan's King Hussein.
Despite the bellicose rhetoric, analysts such as Avi Shlaim (The Iron Wall) and others
believe that each country was dragged into the conflict by inter-Arab rivalry and did not
contemplate a war. Nasser never intended to attack Israel according to Shlaim. He had
been dragged into the conflict by Soviet maneuvers and Syrian fears and his need to
claim leadership of the Arab world according to them. Be that as it may, according to
Michael Oren, recently declassified documents reveal that the Egyptians in fact
planned to attack Israel on May 28, 1967. The plan, codenamed operation Dawn, was
discovered by Israel. The Israelis told the Americans. US President Johnson told
Soviet Premier Kosygin, and Kosygin wrote to Nasser. Nasser understood that he had
lost the element of surprise and called off the attack. Nonetheless, on May 29, 1967,
Nasser was still speaking of confrontation with Israel. He told members of the Egyptian
National Assembly, "God will surely help and urge us to restore the situation to what it
was in 1948."
IDF officers began pressuring the civilian establishment to declare war, because it was
considered that an Arab attack might be imminent, and because Israel's ability to
maintain its army fully mobilized is limited, but Prime Minister Eshkol was reluctant to
take action, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban opposed unilateral action, which he
believed would be against the wishes of the United States. Ariel Sharon now admits
that he and others, including Yitzhak Rabin, had discussed the possibility of a sort of
coup, in which government officials were to be locked in a room, while the army started
the war, but the idea never got passed the stage of thinking out loud.
On May 30, Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt, readying itself for war. King
Hussein stated: "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the
borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of
Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world.
Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has
arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations."
On June 4, Iraq likewise joined a military alliance with Egypt and committed itself to
war. On May 31, the Iraqi President Rahman Aref announced, "This is our opportunity
to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear--to wipe
Israel off the map."
US and Israeli assessments were that Israel would win any war handily, despite the
huge superiority in armor, aircraft, and troops favoring the combined forces of the Arab
countries. Prior to 1967, Israel had gotten almost no military aid from the United States.
Egypt and Syria were equipped with large quantities of the latest Soviet military
equipment. Israel's main arms supplier was France. On paper, Israel had almost as
many aircraft as the Egyptians, but the Israeli aircraft were mostly old, and even the
Super-Mirages were no match for the Mig-21 fighters acquired by Egypt from the
USSR. On paper, the IDF had a large number of "tanks" matching or almost matching
the arms of the Arab countries. However, while Syrians and Egyptians were equipped
with late model Soviet heavy tanks, many of the Israeli "tanks" were in fact tiny French
AMX anti-tank vehicles, and the heavy tanks were refurbished WWII Sherman tanks
fitted with diesel engines. Israel had also been allowed to purchase about 250 M-48
Patton tanks from Germany in 1965. Most of these tanks were being refitted with
Diesel engines in 1967, and the US refused an Israeli request for 100 Pattons to
replace the ones that were out of service. The Israeli and Jewish public, and some in
the government, believed that there was a mortal threat to Israel. Ten thousand graves
were dug in Tel Aviv public parks in anticipation of the heavy casualties.
The Israeli government probably did not want war, and some at least were fearful of
war. Ben Gurion berated Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin for making aggressive statements
that had, according to him, escalated the conflict and gotten Israel into trouble. Israeli
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol appeared hesitant, and stuttered in a dramatic radio speech
to the nation. Under great public pressure from opposition parties, a unity government
was formed. Foreign Minister Abba Eban tried in vain to obtain from the US a
guarantee that they would reopen the straights of Tiran. At first, President Johnson
promised an international flotilla, and warned Israel not to attack on its own. However,
the US was unable to initiate any international action, and reversed its position, hinting
broadly that Israel would have to handle the problem itself.
Israel could not maintain total mobilization indefinitely. When it became apparent that
Egypt would not stand down, Israel attacked the Egyptians beginning on June 5, 1967.
In the first hours of the war, Israel destroyed over 400 enemy aircraft to achieve total
air superiority. Israeli troops quickly conquered the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza.
Jordanian artillery began firing at Jerusalem on the first day of the war, despite a
warning by Israeli PM Levi Eshkol to stay out of the war, and then the Jordan Legion
advanced and took over the headquarters of the UN (Governor's house - Armon
Hanatziv ) in Jerusalem. After warning King Hussein repeatedly to cease fire and
withdraw, Israel conquered the West Bank and Jerusalem. During the first days of the
war, Syrian artillery based in the Golan Heights pounded civilian targets in northern
Israel. After dealing with Egypt, Israel decided to conquer the Golan heights, despite
opposition and doubts of some in the government, including Moshe Dayan, who had
been appointed defense minister. (see map of territories occupied in 1967) and despite the
fact that the UN had already called for a cease fire. Israel agreed to a cease fire on
June 10, 1967 after conquering the Golan Heights. UN Resolution 242 called for
negotiations of a permanent peace between the parties, and for Israeli withdrawal from
lands occupied in 1967. More details here: Six day war 1967 Six Day War Timeline
(chronology)
The aftermath of the war - The 1967 6-Day war
changed the perceived balance of power in the Middle
East and created a new reality. Israel had acquired
extensive territories - the Sinai desert, the Golan heights
and the West Bank, that were several times larger than
the 1948 borders. (Click here to view a map of Israeli
borders after the 6 day war). Nasser had been able to
attribute the Egyptian defeat in 1956 to British and
French support of the Israelis. Though he tried to blame
the 1967 defeat on support supposedly given by the US
Sixth fleet, this was clearly untrue.
According to analysts such as Fouad Ajami, the

disastrous defeat of the Arabs spelled the end of the
Pan-Arab approach advocated by Gamal Abdul Nasser
and contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. It
should be remembered however, that Nasser and the
pan-Arabists always viewed themselves as heads of the
Islamic world as well as the Arab world.
While Israel had acquired territories and a military

victory, it also marked a new day for Palestinian
aspirations. The defeat brought about a million
Palestinian Arabs under Israeli rule. After the war, the
fate of the Palestinians came to play a large role in the Map of Israel-Arab Cease Fire
Arab-Israeli struggle. The Fatah organization (The Lines 1967
Movement for Liberation of Palestine) was founded
about 1957 (though it was formalized much later), and
the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was
founded in 1964. Both had the declared aim of
destroying Israel. After the 6-day war, Ahmad Shukairy,
who had headed the PLO, was replaced as chairman by
Yasser Arafat who headed the Fatah. Fatah and the PLO
now had freedom of action, without the restraints of the
discredited Arab regimes. Since all parts of Palestine
were now under Israeli control, Fatah actions did not
directly threaten Arab governments. In time, the
Palestine Liberation Organization became recognized
by all the Arab states and eventually by the UN as the
representative of the Palestinian people. PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat addressed a session of the UN General
Assembly in 1974. Israel strongly opposed the PLO
because of its terrorist acts against Jews and because
of its charter aims of destroying the state of Israel and
expelling Jews who had arrived after 1917.
The Israeli government was undecided concerning its plans for the territories. The
United States pressured Israel to make a statement calling for withdrawal from the
conquered territories in return for peace. On June 19, 1967, the government decided to
offer Egypt and Syria return of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights for a peace
settlement to be negotiated directly. The offer apparently did not include the Gaza strip,
and called for demilitarization of Sinai. In the Golan, Israel offered to withdraw to the
international border rather than the 1949 armistice lines, not including the territory
conquered by Syria in 1948. J ordan and the West Bank were not mentioned. The
offer was transmitted in secret through the United States, but was turned down. Egypt
and Syria refused to negotiate with Israel.
At the request of Jordan's King Hussein, Ya'akov Herzog met with him in the offices of
his physician in London, on the evening of July 2, 1967. According to Herzog's notes of
the meeting, Hussein discussed the reasons why he had been forced to go to war at
length. He said that if there were to be peace, there would have to be peace with
honor, however he did not ask for peace. He did not reply when Herzog asked him if
he was offering peace, but said he would reply in time. Israel did not have a concrete
peace proposal for Jordan. Herzog offered his private view, that there should be an
economic confederation. (This meeting is documented in Segev, Tom, Israel in 1967
(1967: Veharetz shinta et paneiha - in Hebrew only), 2005, pp 530-536).
Religious and nationalist groups began agitating for annexation and settlement of
areas in the West Bank and Golan heights. Some government ministers including
Pinchas Sapir, Zalman Aran of the Labor party and the NRP's Yaakov Shimshon
Shapira feared the demographic problems that would arise from conquering all those
Arabs. Shapira also pointed out that annexing the West Bank would lend credence to
claims that Israel was a colonialist enterprise. Menachem Begin and Yigal Alon favored
annexation. Moshe Dayan proposed that the Arabs of the West Bank should be given
autonomy, but Menachem Begin, who was later to favor the plan, objected. He
believed large numbers of Jews could now be brought to Israel to settle the territories,
and the Arabs would be given a choice between becoming citizens or leaving.
The Mossad had proposed a Palestinian state under Israeli protection in a report dated
June 14, 1967 (Segev, 1967, pp 537-538), but this was not accepted. According to
some sources, in the summer of 1967, Moshe Dayan received a delegation of notables
who proposed self-rule for the West Bank, but he rejected the offer.
By July 1967, Yigal Alon had submitted his "Alon Plan" which called for Israeli retention of
large parts of the West Bank in any peace settlement for strategic reasons. An
increasing number of settlements were established as it became evident that Arab
states would not negotiate with Israel. A decisive turning point was the Khartoum Arab
summit, in August and September of 1967, which seemed to shut the door on the
possibility of negotiations with Israel or recognition of Israel in any form. The Khartoum
resolutions may not have been an insurmountable barrier to peace. In 1970, King
Hussein of Jordan supposedly offered to make peace in return for Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank and return of the holy places, but the offer was politely turned
down.
A second landmark was the "Zionism is Racism" resolution passed by the United
Nations in 1975, which gave credibility in Israel to claims of Israeli extremists that
opposition to settlements was opposition to Israel, and that Israel was essentially alone
in a hostile world and could expect no justice. The resolution was repealed in 1991, but
similar sentiments surfaced at a UN conference in Durban in 2001. Likewise in
November 1975, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold H Saunders, told a US House
Committee that the US now recognized the importance of the Palestinian national issue
in the conflict, and hinted broadly that the US would be willing to facilitate a solution
that took account of Palestinian rights, if the PLO would recognize the relevant UN
resolutions, including Israel's right to exist, and would be amenable to a reasonable
compromise. This policy was to bear fruit eventually in the Oslo Peace Process, after
PLO Chairman Arafat announced PLO acceptance of UN Resolution 242 in 1988.
Meanwhile however, settlement expansion became official Israeli policy after the
opposition revisionist Likud party came to power in 1977, and continued during the
Oslo accords. As of 2003, about 220,000 Israelis had settled in areas of the West
Bank and Gaza, and an additional 200,000 were settled in areas of Jerusalem and
environs conquered in 1967. About 15,000 Jews were settled in the Golan heights
taken from Syria. (Click for Map of Israeli West Bank Settlements-2002)
The War of Attrition - After the 6-Day war, Egyptian president Nasser launched the
war of attrition on the Suez canal, breaking the cease fire. In Israel, Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol had died and was replaced by the hawkish Golda Meir. The sides fought to a
standstill in increasingly bloody exchanges that included participation by Soviet pilots
on the Egyptian side. Under US pressure, a second cease fire was signed in August
1970, with both sides declaring officially their acceptance of UN Resolution 242.
Nasser died shortly thereafter, and was replaced by Anwar Sadat. Sadat tried
repeatedly to interest Israel in partial peace deals in return for partial Israeli withdrawal,
and the US and UN tried to mediate peace through the offices of Gunnar Jarring.
Nothing came of these peace efforts, partly owing to the stubborn attitude of Israeli PM
Golda Meir, who insisted that Israeli troops would not budge until there was a peace
agreement in place. Sadat continued to alternate peace plans with threats of war, but
he was not taken seriously in Israel. Israeli army intelligence as well as the government
were convinced that Israel had absolute military superiority and that Egypt would not
dare to attack until it had rebuilt its army. Therefore, the best course seemed to be to
wait until the Arab countries met Israel's terms.
The October War (Yom Kippur War) - In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched
another war against Israel, after the Israeli government headed by Golda Meir rebuffed
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's offers to negotiate a settlement. The Egyptians
crossed the Suez Canal on the afternoon of October 6, Yom Kippur, the holiest day in
the Jewish religious calendar. The Israeli government had ignored repeated
intelligence warnings. They were convinced that Israeli arms were a sufficient deterrent
to any aggressor. Sadat had twice announced his intention to go to war, but nothing
had happened. When the intelligence reports were finally believed, on the morning of
the attack, PM Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan decided not to mobilize
reserves.
The Israelis were caught by surprise in more ways than one. Egyptians poured huge
numbers of troops across the canal unopposed and began setting up a beachhead.
The Israel Army had neglected basic maintenance tasks and drill. As troops mustered,
it became apparent that equipment was missing and tanks were out of commission.
The line of outposts built as watch posts along the Suez canal - the Bar Lev line, was
used instead as a line of fortifications intended to hold off the Egyptians as long as
possible. A tiny number of soldiers faced the Egyptian onslaught and were wiped out
after stubborn resistance. The Soviets had sold the Egyptians new technology - better
surface to air missiles (SAM) and hand held Sager anti-tank weapons. Israel had
counted on air power to tip the balance on the battlefield, and had neglected artillery.
But the air-force was initially neutralized because of the effectiveness of SAM missiles,
until Israel could destroy the radar stations controlling them. Futile counterattacks
continued in Sinai for several days as Israeli divisions coped with traffic jams that
prevented concentration of forces, and with effective Egyptian resistance.
Meanwhile, less than 200 Israeli tanks were left guarding the Golan heights against far
superior numbers. Syrians made serious and at first unopposed inroads in the Golan
as Egyptians crossed the Suez canal and retook a strip of the Sinai peninsula. After
suffering heavily losses, Israel reconquered the Golan. Click for map of Syrian Front
In Sinai, Israel troops crossed the canal. General Ariel Sharon, disobeying the orders of
cautious superiors, tried to run ahead of logistics and support to develop the
bridgehead on the Egyptian side of the Suez canal. This small force was reinforced
after bridges were put across the canal, and the Israelis cut off the entire Egyptian third
army. (Click for map of Egyptian front ) Cease-fires ended most of the fighting within a
month. About 2,700 Israeli soldiers and 8,500 Arab soldiers died in the war As a result
of the war, the Golda Meir was forced to resign as Prime Minister of Israel, making way
for Yitzhak Rabin, who had been Israeli ambassador to the US and previously Chief of
staff of the IDF. Click for details of the Yom Kippur War
Oil Embargo - In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, Arab states led by Saudi
Arabia declared an oil embargo, targeting the United States and the Netherlands in
particular for their support for Israel. Oil production was reduced by 340 million barrels
from October to December of 1973. Prices soared from $3 to over $11 a barrel, due to
panic stockpiling as well as actual shortages. Oil sold to European countries eventually
made its way to the United States and the Netherlands in any case, but there were
nonetheless long lines for gasoline and overnight price increases. The embargo
continued until March of 1974. The embargo heightened the perception that Arab
countries could exercise political leverage by controlling the oil supply. It probably
helped motivate European diplomatic moves that were conciliatory to the Arabs, and
played a part in the invitation of Yasser Arafat to address the UN General Assembly,
granting of a permanent observer status at the UN to the PLO and passage of the
Zionism is Racism resolution in 1975.
Peace With Egypt - Subsequent shuttle diplomacy by US Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger resulted in partial Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai peninsula, under much
less favorable terms than could have been obtained before the war. Right-wing
opposition leader Menahem Begin was adamant in his opposition to any withdrawals.
However, in 1978, Egypt led by Anwar Sadat, and Israel, now led by Menahem Begin,
signed the Camp David framework agreements, leading to a Peace treaty in 1979. Israel
withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982.
The PLO in Lebanon and the Lebanese Civil War - Lebanon became increasingly
unstable as Maronite Christians found their once--dominant position threatened by
demographic changes which gave Muslims an increasingly large majority. Tensions
between different religious groups were exacerbated by clan rivalry. Lebanon also has
a relatively large population of Palestinian refugees, who incurred the animosity of
native Lebanese, especially the Christians. A revolt by the PLO against the Jordanian
government led to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970. PLO fighters
streamed into Lebanon, incited tension between Muslims and Christians and turned
Lebanon into a base for attacks on Israel. In 1975, an attack by Christian Phalangist
militias on a bus carrying Palestinians ignited the civil war. the Christian Phalangists
and Muslim militias massacred at least 600 Muslims and Christians at checkpoints,
beginning the 1975-1976 civil war. Full-scale civil war broke out, with the Palestinians
joining the Muslim forces, controlling an increasingly lawless West Beirut. Lebanese
political and social life descended into chaos, characterized by a grim routine of car
bombs, assassinations and harassment and killing of civilians at roadblocks set up by
warring militias.
On January 20, 1976, PLO fighters, possibly reinforced by a Syrian PLO contingent
that had entered Lebanon in 1975, destroyed the Christian towns of Jiyeh and Damour,
massacring about 500 people. In March, Major Saad Haddad formed the Southern
Lebanese Army (SLA), a militia intended to protect Christian residents of southern
Lebanon, which was allied with Israel In June, 1976, with the Maronites on the verge
of defeat, President Elias Sarkis called for Syrian intervention. With the agreement of
the Americans and the Israelis, the Syrians entered Lebanon ostensibly to protect the
Christians and the fragile Lebanese multi-ethnic multi-religious constitution, but also to
further long-standing Baathist ambitions to make Lebanon as part of Greater Syria. On
August 13, 1976, under the protection and with the probable active participation of the
Syrian army, the Christian Phalangist militia attacked the Tel al-Za'atar refugee camp
and killed as many as 3,000 civilians.
After an attack on a bus on the Haifa-Tel-Aviv road, in which about thirty people were
killed, Israel invaded Lebanon in March 1978. It occupied most of the area south of the
Litani River in Operation Litani. In response, UN Security Council resolution 425 called
for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and the creation of an UN Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace.
Israeli forces turned over positions inside Lebanon along the border to the SLA. The
SLA and Israel set up a 12-mile wide security zone to protect Israeli territory from
attacks across the border, and to protect local residents from the PLO, which had been
occupying their villages and using them as bases for shelling Israel. This southern
area became an "open border" area separated by the "good fence," allowing
Lebanese residents to find work in Israel. Attacks and counter attacks along the
northern border of Israel continued. In July of 1981 a cease-fire between Israel and the
PLO was brokered by the US. It was generally honored by both sides. Nonetheless,
the PLO continued to gather strength and dig in in southern Lebanon.
The 1982 War in Lebanon (Peace for the Galilee) - On June 3 1982, terrorists of the
Abu Nidal faction, not controlled by the PLO, shot Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in
the head in London. In response, Israel invaded Lebanon in force. Most analysts
believe that the shooting of Argov served only as an excuse for an operation planned
by defense Minister Ariel Sharon with the tacit approval of the US administration. The
Iranian Islamist regime sent its Pasdaran revolutionary guards, who had previously
organized the takeover of the US embassy in Teheran, into Lebanon, and began
organizing a resistance movement, The Hizb Allah (party of Allah) or Hizbolla.
The Israel invasion resulted in expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis in August.
The war aroused furor in Israel as the army exceeded the official war aims. On
September 14, 1982, the Lebanese President-elect, Bashir Gemayel, an Israeli ally,
was killed by a large bomb that was apparently planted by Syrian intelligence.
Ostensibly to maintain order, the Israeli government decided to move into West Beirut.
They allowed or sent their Lebanese Phalangist Christian allies into the Sabra and
Shatilla Palestinian refugee camps. The Phalangists committed a massacre in Sabra
and Shatilla, killing about 700 people and exciting the wrath of the international
community as well as the Israeli public. An Israeli commission of inquiry led by judge
Kahan indirectly implicated Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and several others in
the massacres, noting that they could have foreseen the possibility of the violence and
acted to prevent it. The Kahan report resulted in the resignation of Sharon as defense
minister. Israel subsequently extricated itself slowly from Lebanon. As Israel withdrew,
Lebanon became increasingly lawless. Beirut life came to be characterized by gunfire,
kidnappings and bombings. Attempts by the US to restore order failed owing to large
scale suicide bombings of a marine barracks and the US embassy. The US withdrew
and Lebanon, especially Beirut, deteriorated into chaos. Order was restored only after
Lebanon became essentially a satellite of Syria. Israel continued to maintain a
presence in south Lebanon until 2000, when the last Israeli troops were withdrawn by
PM Ehud Barak.
The Pollard Affair - In November 1985, Jonathan Pollard, a Jewish-American

employee of the US Naval Anti-Terrorist Alert Center was arrested for spying for Israel.
He pleaded guilty in a plea bargain deal, but the US government apparently reneged
on the deal and Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987, an exceptional
sentence relative to similar cases. The affair was a severe embarrassment to US-
Israeli relations and raised the specter of "double loyalty" accusations for American
Jews. At the same time, Pollard became a cause celebre of the Zionist right, who
pointed out that he had been used and abandoned by the Israeli government, which
did little to secure his freedom.
The First Intifada - While the fortunes of the PLO waned, Palestinians in the occupied
territories took their fate into their own hands. Beginning in 1987, a revolt called the
Intifadeh began in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The revolt was initiated by local
residents and involved mostly low-level violence such as rock throwing, winning
sympathy for the struggle of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupiers. By 1991
however, the Intifadeh had all but ended.
The Oslo Peace Process
Following the Gulf war, US pressure, the ongoing break up of the USSR and favorable
international opinion made it possible to convene negotiations toward settlement of the
Palestinian problem. In 1993 and 1995, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Declaration
of Principles and The Oslo Interim Agreement. which created the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA), a supposedly temporary entity that would have the power to negotiate
with Israel and to govern areas of the West Bank and Gaza evacuated by Israel. Israel
and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994. The peace process with the Palestinians led to
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and most cities and towns of the
West Bank by early 1996. In January 1996, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the
Palestinian-controlled parts of the West Bank elected a legislature controlled by the
Fatah faction, with Yasser Arafat as Chairman (titled "Rais" - "President" by the
Palestinians) to administer these areas. As the Israelis withdrew, Palestinians took
control of these areas. About 97% of the Palestinians in these areas were nominally
under Palestinian rule, but the area controlled by the Palestine National Authority
amounted to about 8% of the land. Israel embarked on an accelerated settlement
program, building thousands of housing units in the West Bank, and doubling the
number of settlers there by 2004.
Though the PLO had agreed to end forego violence in the Oslo declaration of
principles, attacks on settlers continued. Ominously, even before the Oslo declaration
of Principles, on April 16, 1993, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded a car bomb at
Mehola in the West Bank, killing himself and one Israeli. On February 25, 1994, a
disgruntled right-wing settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire on worshippers in the
Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 30 people before being killed himself. In
retaliation, the Hamas carried out several suicide attacks in Israel beginning in April of
1994. The peace process became increasingly unpopular in Israel. On November 4,
1995, Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a young right-wing fanatic, Yigal
Amir, at a peace rally. He was replaced by Shimon Peres, who oversaw the signing of
the Oslo Interim agreement. A rash of Hamas suicide bombings in the spring of 1996
and inept campaign strategy caused Peres to lose the election held in May of 1996 to
Likud party head Benjamin Netanyahu, who was an opponent of the Oslo process.
Nethanyahu decided to complete a controversial underground tourist attraction in
Jerusalem by opening a gate between two tunnels. Arab sources spread the false
rumor that the gate endangered the foundations of the Al-Aqsa mosque. This caused
several days of rioting and numerous casualties.
Despite Nethanyahu's opposition to the Oslo process, in January of 1997 Israel and
the PNA signed an interim agreement on Hebron. The IDF withdrew from most of
Hebron, leaving an enclave of about 500 settlers living in the middle of an Arab city,
protected by the IDF. Negotiations at the Wye River Plantation in October of 1998
produced agreements on further withdrawal of Israeli troops and renewed Palestinian
commitments to prevent terror and incitement. However, most of the provisions of the
agreement were not carried out by the Palestinians, and the Israelis did not withdraw
as stipulated in the Wye agreements while Netanyahu was in office. In May of 1999
Benjamin Netanyahu was voted out of office, and Labor party head Ehud Barak
became Prime Minister. Barak continued settlement expansion programs, but he
vowed to pursue peace negotiations actively. Barak first tried to renew negotiations
with Syria, but Syrian President Hafez Assad rejected an offer related through US
President Clinton, which would have given Syria most of the Golan heights except for
access to the sea of Galilee.
Barak turned his attention to the Palestinians. Israel made the troop withdrawals
mandated by the Wye agreements, and negotiators began working toward a final
settlement. Barak offered to turn over Abu Dis, a suburb of Jerusalem, to be used as
the Palestinian capital. However, this offer was withdrawn in the wake of violence that
broke out in mid-May of 2000.
Recent Events
The Second Intifada

Negotiations for a final settlement at Camp David in the
USA, in July, 2000 ended in deadlock. Palestinians
insisted that refugees should have the right to return to
Israel, which would produce an Arab majority in Israel.
Israel insisted on annexing key portions of the
Palestinian areas and on leaving most settlements
intact, and offered only a limited form of Palestinian
statehood. Palestinians claim that the only offers made
at Camp David included cantons or "Bantustans" that
would make up the Palestinian State. This apparently
characterizes initial Israeli proposals. However, in his
book, The Missing Peace, 2004, Dennis Ross presents
a map, shown at right, that supposedly reflects the US
compromise proposal at Camp David, to include about
91% of the territory of the West Bank. Both sides
agreed on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
Palestinian violence erupted on September 28, 2000,

triggered by a visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple mount
in Jerusalem. This location, called the Haram as Sharif
in Arabic, is also the site of the Al-Aqsa mosque, holy to
Muslims. False rumors spread that Sharon had entered
the mosque, helping to fan the unrest. The US called a
summit conference in Sharm-El Sheikh in October, in
order to bring about an end to the violence. Both sides
vowed to put an end to the bloodshed and return to
negotiations. At the conference, it was also agreed to
set up a US led investigative committee that would
report on the causes of the violence and make
recommendations to the UN. This eventually resulted in
the Mitchell Report. Shortly thereafter, however, Arab
leaders and Yasser Arafat met in an extraordinary Arab
League Summit in Cairo, and issued a belligerent
communique praising the Intifada and calling for an
international investigative commission rather than the
one agreed upon in Sharm El Sheikh. About two weeks
later a suicide bombing in Jerusalem put an end to the
truce.
Time was running out for negotiations, as Israeli PM

Ehud Barak faced elections and US President Clinton
had completed his term of office. Negotiations in
Washington in December of 2000 failed to produce an
agreement. President Clinton provided Bridging
proposals and requested that the sides agree to the
them by December 27. The outcome has been
deliberately obscured by many, but Dennis Ross, chief
US negotiator, was unequivocal in his memoir (Dennis
Ross, The Missing Peace, 2004, pp 753-755).
According to Ross's summary, (and as published in the Click for larger map
Bridging proposals) Clinton's proposal gave the Palestinians
about 97% of the territory of the West Bank and
sovereignty over their airspace. Refugees could not return
to Israel without Israeli consent. An international force
would remain in the Jordan valley for six years, replacing
the IDF. Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem and the Haram
as Sharif (temple mount) would be incorporated into
Palestine. Saudi Arabian ambassador Prince Bandar Ibn
Sultan said, "If Arafat does not accept what is available
now, it won't be a tragedy, it will be a crime." (Ross, The
Missing Peace, 2004, p.748).
The Israeli government met on December 27 and accepted

the proposals with reservations, which according to Ross,
were "within the parameters." The Palestinians
equivocated. The deadline passed, and no definitive
Palestinian reply was forthcoming. According to Ross, on
December 29, he told Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei):
Mark my words, they [the US] will disengage from the

issue and they will do so at a time when you won't have
Barak, or Amnon or Shlomo, but at time when you will
have Sharon as Prime Minister. He will be elected for
sure if there is no deal, and you 97% will become 40-45
percent; your capital in East Jerusalem will be gone; the
IDF out of the Jordan Valley will be gone; unlimited right
of return for refugees to your own state will be gone.
Abu Ala replied:
"I am afraid it may take another fifty years to settle this

issue."
(Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, 2004, p. 755)
The map at right was presented by Ross in The Missing

Peace. It illustrates the approximate boundaries of the
Palestine state under the Clinton bridging proposals,
omitting land to be ceded by Israel to Palestine.
At a memorial dinner held in November 2005 in memory of Yitzhak Rabin, President

Clinton said that Chairman Yasser Arafat had made a "colossal historical blunder" in
refusing the terms, causing the breakdown of the peace process. (Haaretz, Nov. 14,
2005).
Palestinian negotiators present a different version. On November 13, 2005, the Palestinian
Authority International Press Center related these remarks of Palestinian Minister of
Information, Nabil Sha'at, on the anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat:
He also set out that Israel has never endeavored to reach a final solution during the
second Camp David negotiations, putting to rest the rumor which tells that Israel
proposed for the Palestinians a state with 97% of the West Bank and 10% of the
Jordan Valley.
He went ahead as saying, "all what was circulated that Israel proffered to the
Palestinian side great concessions is incorrect," asserting that Israel rejected to
give back Jerusalem to the Palestinian, and above all it kept adamant to annex the
settlements blocs to the city of Jerusalem.
Minister Sha'at made clear that this point led the negotiations of Camp David II to a
gridlock.
What was suggested by Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister, was only to
give Arafat a presidential headquarters in the Old City of Jerusalem, but the late
president rebuffed this suggestion roundly, he added.
However, Palestinians have never disputed the published version of President
Clinton's bridging proposals in which it is quite clear that the Palestinians would have
sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem, including the Haram as Sharif (temple mount).
In last minute negotiations at Taba on January 21-27 2001, under European and Egyptian
patronage, the sides failed to reach a settlement despite further Israeli concessions.
Though both sides agreed to a joint communiqué saying they had never been so close
to agreement, substantive disagreements remained about the refugee issues and final
settlement maps. Israeli PM Barak broke off negotiations on January 28, 2001,
suspending them until after the elections. Barak had hoped to reach a deal he could
present to the Israeli public, and was angry and disappointed. Negotiations were
terminated because Barak, who had furthered the peace process, was voted out of
office at the beginning of February and replaced by a right wing government headed by
Ariel Sharon.
No official maps were actually presented by or to the sides during the negotiations.
Following the failure of the negotiations, the Palestinians continued to claim that Israel
had offered only "Bantustans" in the West Bank. The Israeli government did not publish
any maps. Dennis Ross, who headed the US negotiating team, summarized the
proposals presented by the USA in the maps presented above. The Gush Shalom
group and the Foundation for Middle East Peace also published a map of an offer
made by the Barak government at Taba (Click here for details of the different maps). One
of the major outstanding questions was the refugee problem. U.S. President Clinton
had believed there were only differences of wording between the Israeli and
Palestinian approaches. Clinton's Bridging proposals called for allowing refugees to
return from abroad to the Palestinian state. They could return to Israel only with the
agreement of Israel. However, at Taba, the Palestinian proposal called for eventual
return of all the refugees to Israel. This proposal was unacceptable to Israel as it would
create an Arab majority in Israel and put an end to Jewish exercise of the right to self-
determination.
Violence continued into 2001 and 2002, despite attempts by the Mitchell commission
and others to restore calm. The terror attack on the World Trade Center in the US on
September 11, 2001, had direct repercussions for the Israel-Palestine conflict. On the
one hand, Arab and Islamic countries tried to leverage on the need for their
cooperation in the war against terror to win concessions for the Palestinians. On the
other, many Americans began to view terrorist actions in a new light, as organizations
such as Hamas and Hizbulla came to be linked with the Al-Qaeda group of Osama Bin-
Laden. Particularly damaging for the Palestinians were the demonstrations held in favor
of Bin Laden, and evidence linking a boatload of illegal arms intercepted by Israel, the
Karine A, with Iranian support for the PNA. The boat was intercepted on January 3,
2002, on the day that US envoy Anthony Zinni arrived to attempt to arrive at a
settlement. Against this background, the US and EU seemed to give Israel wider
latitude for action against the Palestinians. Israel made increasing incursions into
Palestinian areas, and confined PNA Chairman Arafat to his compound in Ramalah.
but the Palestinians stepped up attacks on soldiers as well as suicide bombings.
The Saudi Peace Proposal and the Palestinian State Resolution - Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah made a dramatic proposal to end the long Arab war against Israel in return for
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories, withdrawal in the Golan and appropriate
arrangements regarding Jerusalem and the refugees. This proposal, modified to be
more specific about refugee issues, was adopted by a meeting of the Arab League,
and eventually became incorporated in the quartet roadmap plan. On March, 12, 2002
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1397, calling on the sides to stop the
violence once again, mentioning the peace plan of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, and
for the first time since 1947 calling for creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
Operation Defensive Wall

Meanwhile however, terror and suicide attacks and Israeli reprisals continued. Yasser
Arafat declared a cessation of violence several times, but this did not seem to affect
the frequency or severity of suicide bombings and ambushes. The Israelis, for their
part, continued with their policy of assassinating wanted men in the Palestinian areas.
During the last week in March, as General Zinni was again coming to the Middle East,
the Palestinians launched a successful suicide attack almost every day, in addition to
many unsuccessful ones. A blast at the Park Hotel in Nethanya killed 27 people as
they were celebrating Passover. Israel launched a massive raid, operation Defensive
Wall, intended to root out terror infrastructure, including reoccupation of Ramallah,
Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm and other towns. Israel claimed that only about 50 were killed
in the Jenin refugee camp, mostly members of the Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs suicide
brigades. Palestinians charged that the Israelis had committed a massacre in the Jenin
refugee camp, killing over 500 people. These charges were repeated by most news
sources in Europe, though they were later retracted. Human rights groups who
entered the Jenin refugee camp after the Israeli invasion reported that there was a
great deal of damage and that the IDF had probably committed war crimes by
preventing medical aid, but that only about 50 people had been killed, more than half of
whom were terrorists, confirming the Israeli version of events.
Suicide attacks abated, but did not stop. During the course of the fighting, Israel
captured numerous documents providing evidence that Yasser Arafat had personally
approved the organization of terror cells, and that the PNA treasury had approved
payments for suicide-bomber explosive belts. The Israelis captured or killed numerous
persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. The IDF also destroyed
records, building, roads and other innocent civilian infrastructure of banks, NGOs and
other organizations clearly not involved in terror. Later in the fighting, the IDF managed
to locate Marwan Barghouti, head of the Fatah Tanzeem, and to capture him. Israel
claimed it has evidence of complicity by Barghouti in numerous terrorist acts, and it
eventually put him on trial, condemning him to five life sentences for complicity in
murder. Critics argued that it would be impossible to put an end to terror by military
activity in the absence of progress toward a peaceful solution. However, following
Defensive Wall, the number and frequency of successful terror attacks began to
decline, as the Israeli security forces made better and better use of intelligence
gathered during the operation to detect and stop attacks. The number of attempted
attacks did not decrease noticeably however.
During the aftermath of operation Defensive Wall, US Secretary of State Colin Powell,
who needed quiet in Israel and Palestine to leave the US free hand to organize an
alliance against Iraq, arrived to try to end the violence. Powell's mission did not
accomplish anything. He was unable to get the Israelis to withdraw completely from the
areas they had reoccupied, nor could he get the Palestinians to agree to a cease fire.
Demonstrations and public outrage in Arab countries, fueled by charges of a
massacre, prompted UN action. UN resolution 1402 directed that Israel withdraw from
the territories immediately. By the time Powell had left, Israel had withdrawn from
some towns, but Yasser Arafat was still imprisoned in Ramallah, and the Israelis were
besieging the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, where armed Palestinians had
sought refuge from the IDF. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1403,
expressing dismay that resolution 1402 had not been implemented. On April 19, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1405, calling for an an impartial investigative team
to be send to determine the truth of Palestinian allegations. Israel objected to the
composition of the team. Israel at first agreed to the investigation, but later backtracked
and blocked it, claiming that the composition and procedures of the investigation would
be unfair to Israel, and that the UN had reneged on initial agreements about the
investigation. Opposition to the investigation was fueled by Israeli memories of the
recent Durban conference as well as by the infamous Zionism is Racism resolution of
the UN, which was recalled repeatedly in public debate.
Israeli PM Ariel Sharon visited the US in May of 2002, under pressure from the US
administration to advance a peace program that could be acceptable to Palestinians
and the Arab states. The two discussed plans for a regional summit to be held later in
2002, and the Israelis presented documents that they claim prove the involvement of
Yasser Arafat and the PNA in terrorist activities. News of a suicide bombing committed
by the Hamas came while Bush and Sharon were meeting, causing the Israeli PM to
cut the visit short and return to Israel.
The sieges of Muqata and Church of Nativity were also resolved in May 2002.
Militants in the Church of Nativity were exiled to Cyprus and Europe. Some of the
wanted men in the Muqata compound in Ramallah were jailed in Jericho, but others
apparently remained in the Muqata. The head of the PFLP allegedly coordinated a
suicide attack from his cell in Jericho. At the end of May, under pressure for democratic
reform, Yasser Arafat signed into law the Basic Law or constitution of the Palestinian
transitional state. The law states that Palestinian law will be based on the principles of
Islamic law (Sha'ariyeh).
In June, following another wave of Palestinian suicide attacks, Israeli forces essentially
reoccupied all of the West Bank. The Israeli government was quick to claim that the re-
occupation would not continue indefinitely, but later indicated otherwise. President Bush
made a long awaited speech on Middle East policy calling for a Palestinian state, but
insisting on democratic reform of the Palestine National Authority.
In August and September 2002, several attempts at Palestinian cease fire initiatives
were foiled by refusal of extremist groups to participate and by Israeli acts such as the
killing of Salah Shehadeh, head of the military wing of the Hamas in a missile attack on
Gaza that cost the lives of 13 civilians. Shehadeh was replaced by Mohamed Deif.
August and September witnessed a six week respite from major suicide and terror
attacks, facilitating an Israeli-Palestinian plan to return full Palestinian authority in Gaza
and Bethlehem first. However, this fizzled after several violent attacks in Gaza. At the
beginning of September, Israeli security forces foiled several suicide attack attempts
and detected a truck laden with 1300 pounds of explosives and gas tanks, that was to
be used by Palestinians in a suicide attack.
The PLC convened in September to approve the new cabinet chosen in line with
reform efforts. PLC cabinet members refused to ratify the cabinet until Yasser Arafat
would allow a Prime Minister to share power. Instead, Arafat agreed to elections in
January, 2003, despite Israeli occupation. Arafat's popularity was at a nadir. The
elections never took place.
The period of relative calm came to an end with suicide bombings in Umm El Fahm
and in a Tel-Aviv bus. The Israeli government proceeded with an attack on Gaza
including entry into Gaza city and besieged Yasser Arafat and an estimated 200
others in the Muqata compound in Ramala. Israel demanded that Palestinians give up
wanted persons who had taken refuge in the Muqata including Palestinian preventive
security boss Tawfiq Tirawi. Arafat remained defiant. Israel destroyed all buildings in
the compound except the main one, promising not to harm Arafat. After a rumor was
spread that Israel was about to blow up the Muqata, widespread demonstrations took
place in the West Bank and Gaza, resulting in four deaths. The USA exerted pressure
on Israel to stop destroying buildings in the Muqata and to withdraw. Despite a UN
resolution, Israel continued the siege. Arafat's popularity with Palestinians soared.
Eventually, the siege was lifted, but Arafat remained confined to Ramalla and isolated.
A second siege was reinstituted in the fall. (Click here for commentary on the Muqata
Siege)
In April of 2002, the US government initiated a series of consultations with a group of

diplomats that became known as the "Quartet." The quartet evolved a roadmap for a
settlement, including Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and establishment of a
Palestinian state.
In October of 2002, the Labor party withdrew from the Israel unity government. PM
Ariel Sharon initiated immediate elections, to be held January 28. Ariel Sharon's Likud
Party won a sweeping mandate to continue hard line policies against the Palestinians.
The Israel Labor party refused to form a unity government. Israel continued to occupy
most of the West Bank.
During this period, the US continued to mass forces for an invasion of Iraq, and the US
and quartet partners continued to advance the quartet road map for middle east peace.
The quartet partners and especially the US pressured the Palestinians to commit to a
thoroughgoing reform of their government that would eliminate corruption and support
for terror. It was proposed that Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) would assume the post of
Prime Minister, overshadowing and displacing the still-popular Yasser Arafat.
The Iraq War, the Roadmap and Palestinian Reform
On March 20, 2003, US, British and Australian forces invaded Iraq. The Palestinians
had supported Saddam Hussein and his regime had provided payments for families of
suicide bombers, as well as sheltering Palestinian militants. US forces entered
Baghdad on April 9, and President Bush declared the war over on May 1. The war
produced an upheaval in the Middle East and especially affected the Palestinians.
Arabs were astounded by the swiftness of Iraq's collapse. Arab governments including
the Palestinians hurried to make conciliatory gestures and talk of democracy, at the
same time criticizing the US occupation of Iraq, which generated a great deal of
resentment. Mahmud Abbas was elected Palestinian PM on April 29, however the violence
did not abate. Israelis made bloody raids in Gaza and elsewhere on the day of his
election. A few hours later, Fateh and Hamas perpetrated a suicide attack at a Tel Aviv
night club, and the next day Israel began extensive raids in the territories. In violation
of the roadmap, Yasser Arafat put himself in charge of organizing a new unified
security force. As it had promised the Palestinians, the US released an updated road
map on April 30 immediately after the election of Abu Mazen. (Click here for
commentary on the roadmap).
At a festive summit held on June 4 in Aqaba, Israeli PM Sharon and Palestinian PM

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) pledged to fulfill the conditions of the road map and shook
hands in the presence of US President George Bush. Abu Mazen called for an end to
violence. Click here for more commentary on the roadmap.
Islamist extremist Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders vowed to continue violence. Soon
after the summit, four Israeli soldiers in Gaza were killed in a joint operation that
included not only the Islamist extremists but also the Fatah movement of Abu Mazen.
Israel began dismantling about ten of the 100 illegal outposts, but dismantled only
uninhabited ones. On June 10, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Ahmed
Rantissi, kindling fury among Palestinians and eliciting criticism from the US. On June
11, a Hamas suicide bombing killed 16 Israelis in a bus on the main street of
Jerusalem. On August 20, a suicide bombing killed 21 people on a bus in Jerusalem.
The following day, Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab, possibly in
retaliation. Israel also announced that the lives of all Hamas leaders were forfeit, and
made several assassination attempts, some unsuccessful against Hamas leaders,
including the aged and crippled "spiritual leader" of the Hamas. As the Hudna (truce)
unraveled, there were threats and rumors of attempts on the life of PNA PM Mahmud
Abbas by Palestinian extremists. In the following days, Israel moved into the West
bank for a security clean up intended to last several days. Abbas and his Gaza
Security Chief Mohamed Dahlan began to move against Palestinian terrorists as
required by the roadmap, whereupon Yasser Arafat moved to replace Dahlan with
Gibril Rajoub and to put security and the interior ministry in the hands of his
supporters. Abbas announced that he would not act against terrorists on September 4,
but this did not save his political career. Abbas resigned on September 6, and Ahmed
Qureia ("Abu Ala"), an Arafat supporter, was appointed PM in his stead. Qureia vowed
a tough line against Israel. On September 8, EU leaders moved to ban the political
wing of the Hamas and prevent monetary contributions to it.
On the evening of September 10, 2003, twin suicide bombings in Jerusalem and
outside the Tzrifin Army base near Rishon Le Zion claimed a total of 15 lives. A period
of quiet was broken by a suicide bombing in a Haifa restaurant on October 4, attributed
to Islamic Jihad. Palestinian PM designate Ahmed Qurei and the PA condemned the
bombing, but refused to commit to taking action against terror groups. In retaliation,
Israel invaded Gaza as well as Jenin, and on October 5 they struck at a base in Syria
that Israel claimed was training Palestinian terror groups. This was the first Israeli
attack on Syrian territory since the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) war in 1973. A long period
of relative abatement in Palestinian attacks ensued, but Israel continued attacks on
Palestinian targets with considerable loss of civilian life. Suicide attacks continued from
time to time, done by either the Hamas and Islamic Jihad Islamist factions or by the
Fatah Al Aqsa brigades, a faction of Yasser Arafat's Fatah group over which the PNA
has apparently lost control. Suicide bombings were carried out December 25 2003,
January 14, 2004, January 29, 2004, and February 22, by the "moderate" Fatah Al
Aqsa brigades as well as by the Hamas and by the Popular Front for the liberation of
Palestine.
Geneva Accord - Israeli opposition political leaders and Palestinian leaders

announced an agreement in principle on conditions for a final settlement. The
agreement, which has come to be known as the Geneva Accord, proposed historic
concessions by both sides. Israel would give up sovereignty in Arab portions of
Jerusalem, while the Palestinians would explicitly renounce the right of Palestinian
refugees to return to Israel. Though it has no formal standing at present, the
agreement has gotten widespread publicity, including support from US Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and warm words from PNA Chairman Yasser Arafat. The Israeli
government has denounced the agreement and the people involved in it, and tried to
block advertisements for the agreement in the public media. Likewise, Palestinian
extremists and their allies have denounced the agreement.
The Security Barrier (also called "Security Fence" "Apartheid Wall") - A major
issue of the 2003 Israel election campaign had been the erection of a security barrier
(fence, wall) advocated by dovish Israel Labor party. The barrier was to be erected
along the Green line and would help to prevent suicide attacks in Israel. A similar
barrier in Gaza had reduced infiltration to zero. The right, including Ariel Sharon's Likud
party, opposed the barrier, because it would create a de-facto border as they thought,
dividing Jerusalem, and putting most of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank
outside the protection of the security arrangements. Sharon and the Likud won the
election by a landslide majority, sending the Labor party and the leftist Meretz party
into total disarray.
During 2003, PM Ariel Sharon adopted and adapted the barrier concept, changing the
route to include major Israeli settlements and including a projected eastern portion that
would envelope the Palestinians in two enclaves. As the barrier went up, it became
evident that it would trap many Palestinians who would be cut off from their fields and
places of work, some on the Israeli side of the 1948 armistice Green Line, and some
on the Palestinian side. In populated areas where it is most visible, the barrier is in fact
a forbidding cement wall, though it is a fence over most of its extent. Palestinian
groups and Israeli peace groups began an intense protest campaign. On December 8,
2003, the UN General Assembly met in Emergency session and adopted resolution
ES-10/14, which asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague for an
advisory opinion on the legality of the barrier. The ICJ began its hearings on February
24. Israel boycotted the hearings, but submitted a brief saying that the court should not
rule on the matter. About 30 other countries including the United States and several
EU countries, submitted briefs saying that the court should not rule on the matter
because it was a political question rather than a legal one, and likewise did not attend
the hearings. Most of these countries also criticized the barrier as illegal or a hindrance
to peace negotiations. Zionist and Israeli groups organized demonstrations at the
Hague, and Palestinians organized counter demonstrations. The Israelis brought a
bombed out bus and stressed that the wall prevents suicide attacks. The Palestinians
used the hearings as a platform for de-legitimizing the occupation. ( Click here for maps
and details about the security barrier/fence/wall)
On July 9, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the Israeli
security barrier. The court ruled that the barrier violates human rights and that Israel
must dismantle it. Israel announced that it would not abide by the court decision, but it
did plan changes in the route of the barrier to satisfy requirements of the Israeli High
Court.
Israeli Corruption Scandal - Ever since Ariel Sharon's election in 2003, a pall of
suspicion had fallen over him and other Likud party members owing to allegations of
bribery and underworld influence. In January 2003, David Appel, a close associate of
Israeli PM Ariel Sharon, was indicted for bribery charges. The charge sheet alleged
that he had bribed Sharon, Sharon's son and Deputy PM Ehud Ohlmert. The obvious
question was whether or not Sharon would be indicted (see commentary for details).
Controversial Prisoner Exchange - After many months of negotiations through a

German intermediary, Israel and the Lebanese Hizbollah movement agreed to an
exchange of prisoners on very one-sided terms on January 29, 2004. Israel freed over
four hundred live Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners and returned a large number of
bodies in return for the bodies of three Israeli soldiers kidnapped by the Hizbullah and
killed, and one civilian, reserve army officer Elhanan Tannenbaum, a shady
"businessman" who lied about the way in which he was kidnapped, and gave the
Hizbullah a free commercial on El-Manara Television. (see commentary for details).
Assassination of Sheikh Yassin - Israel had been targeting Hamas leader Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin for assassination for many months. Following a suicide attack in the
port of Ashdod, the IDF stepped up operations against Islamists in Gaza, and
announced again that all Hamas leaders were targets for assassination. On March 22,
Israeli intelligence ascertained that Ahmed Yassin, founder and leader of the Hamas
Islamist movement, had gone to prayers without his wife and children, and the green
light was given to assassinate him. The assassination of the crippled old man, who
was nonetheless responsible for instigating the deaths of hundreds of people, and for
sabotaging the peace process, drew protests from most of the world, and vows of
revenge from Hamas. The assassination probably had little strategic value, and was
carried out to bolster the failing popularity of Israeli PM Ariel Sharon. (see commentary
and sources for details).
Disengagement Plan and Letter of Assurance from George Bush
A proposal of the Israel Labor Party, led by Amram Mitzna, during the 2003 election
campaign, was that if negotiations with the Palestinians fail, Israel should withdraw
unilaterally from the Gaza strip and perhaps from parts of the West Bank, and try to
live its life behind the security barrier. Ariel Sharon and the Likud damned this proposal
as defeatism, but toward the end of 2003, Sharon himself announced that he was drawing
up a unilateral withdrawal plan, to be carried out "in 6 months" (a date later postponed). The
plan for withdrawing from all of Gaza met with intense opposition from fellow Likud party
members and from settlers. Reports in late February indicated that Israel was still
confiscating land to build security barriers for Gaza settlements, even though Sharon
had supposedly earmarked the settlements for evacuation. In April, 2004, Israeli PM
Ariel Sharon traveled to the US and on April 14 he met with US President George
Bush, to get American backing and assurances for Sharon's unilateral disengagement
plan. Bush provided a letter stating that the the US accepts the disengagement plan
and that the roadmap remains the only peace plan backed by the United States. In
addition, to help Sharon gain popularity for the plan in Israel, Bush stated that the US
believes Palestinian refugees should be settled in the new Palestinian state, rather
than Israel, that in his view, Israel should not have to withdraw to the borders of the
1949 armistice, and that the US acquiesces in the Israeli security fence. Sharon
reiterated Israeli commitment to the roadmap and pledged that the security barrier was
a temporary expedient and not a final border. Bush's letter carried little weight in future
negotiations, and reiterated stands taken by former President Clinton on refugees and
borders. Nonetheless, it created an uproar throughout the Muslim world. The
disengagement plan was defeated in a Likud party referendum on May 2, 2004,
whereupon Sharon proposed a modified version of the plan. Also in May, Israel
conducted extensive military operations in Gaza in Operation Rainbow, killing over 40
persons, leaving thousands homeless, and arousing international ire. In late October,
the Israeli parliament (Knesset) passed the first reading of the disengagement law,
ultimately causing the right-wing National Religious Party to leave the government, and
reducing the government to a minority of 55 seats.
Assassination of Abdel Azis Rantisi - On April 17, 2004, the IAF killed newly elected
Hamas leader Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi. Dr. Mahmoud Zahar was apparently elected in his
place, but no official announcement was made for fear of Israeli retaliation. Zahar is
reportedly the last of the seven founders of the Hamas still alive. The others were all
assassinated by Israel.
Government of Ahmed Qurei - On November 12, 2003, after a long period of

negotiations, Palestinian PM Ahmed Qurei formed a permanent government and
moves began to institute a cease fire and renew negotiations with the Israelis.
However, very little came of these moves. On November 19, the UN Security Council
passed resolution 1515, endorsing the quartet road map for peace and calling upon the
sides to fulfill their obligations to the road map plan. However, the Israeli incursions
continued, and for their part, the Palestinians seemed unwilling or unable to control
terrorist groups. Prospective meetings between Ahmed Qurei and Israeli PM Ariel
Sharon were announced, rumored, vaunted and then evaporated. For a time, Qurei
announced that he would not meet with Sharon until Israel stopped building its security
barrier (see below). However, when Sharon announced his unilateral disengagement
plan and it appeared to be in earnest, Qurei became concerned that the withdrawal
without any negotiations would be a victory for the Hamas and Islamic Jihad, political
rivals of the PLO who run the PNA, and who are grooming themselves to inherit
leadership of the Palestinians. Qurei then announced that he would be ready to meet
with Sharon, and that a meeting would definitely take place by the end of February.
However, negotiations to set the agenda of this meeting were postponed for various
reasons, including suicide bombings and Israeli assassinations.
Chaos in Gaza -Meanwhile, it became evident that Qurei was not really able to
govern, despite some successes in improving financial transparency as demanded by
the EU and USA. By the beginning of 2004 there were several reports of chaos, disunity
and lawlessness in the Palestinian territories. At the end of February, ex-security-chief
Mohamed Dahlan indicated that the Palestinian Authority could not rein-in the dissident
Fatah Al-Aqsa brigades that had been responsible for several suicide bombings.
Attempts to unify the security forces, blocked by Arafat, ended in dissension and bitter
recriminations. On February 26, Chairman Arafat promised to hold long-postponed
elections, but many Palestinians did not believe he would keep his promise. In Nablus,
lawlessness reigned and the Mayor resigned.
On the weekend of July 18, 2004 violence broke out in Gaza between factions of the
Fatah. One group kidnapped police chief Ghazzi Jibbali and several French nationals,
and later released them, on condition that Jibbali will stand trial. Yasser Arafat
reorganized security, appointing his nephew, Musa Arafat, to be in charge of
Palestinian security forces. Opposition forces reacted by storming Musa Arafat's
headquarters. Subsequently, PM Ahmed Qurei announced his resignation, which was
not accepted by Arafat, but Qurei insisted he would resign anyway. Arafat announced
that he is withdrawing the appointment of Musa Arafat, but then announced that Musa
will remain in charge of security in Gaza. Subsequent agitation for reform elicited more
declarations from Arafat, but when these were not implemented, Palestinian legislators
announced that they would adjourn in protest.
Security situation in 2004 - During the spring and summer of 2004 there were no
successful major terror attacks within Israel, despite numerous attempts. Israelis and
Palestinians attributed the relative quiet to the partially constructed separation barrier
and better Israeli intelligence. Israel continued to arrest and kill Palestinians belonging
to terrorist organizations, and to occupy Palestinian cities in the West Bank. On August
31, 2004, Hamas perpetrated a double suicide attack in Beersheba, in revenge for the
killings of their leaders. The attackers came from the area south of Hebron in the West
Bank, where no fence had been built. The attack accelerated construction of the
barrier, and Israel took bloody revenge by bombing a Hamas training camp in Gaza. In
October of 2004 Israel conducted operation Days of Repentance to overcome
Palestinian rocket fire on Israeli towns. The operation killed many civilians and left
many others homeless.
Syrian Israeli Peace Talks

Syrian-Israeli Peace
Talks - Following the
Madrid peace
conference, Syria and
Israel initiated peace
talks, and by May of
1995 they had
supposedly completed
a fairly detailed peace
agreement that would
involve Israeli
withdrawal from the
Golan Heights, which
Israel had occupied in
1967 and later
annexed. The Syrians
in return would
recognize Israel, allow
normal trade and allow
an Israeli early
warning station on
Syrian territory. The
Israeli promise to
retreat from the entire
Golan was given
indirectly by PM
Yitzhak Rabin to US
Secretary of State
Warren Christopher,
as a "deposit" to be
presented to the
Syrians if they agreed
to all other Israeli
terms. This deposit
was also termed the
"pocket," since
allegedly, Rabin told
Christopher to "keep
this in your pocket"
until all other
conditions are met.
During the
negotiations,
Christopher violated
the understanding with
Rabin and told Assad
about "the pocket."
During the period
when negotiations
were continuing, Rabin
often repeated the
slogan. "The depth of
of the withdrawal will This map shows the actual Israeli offer conveyed to President
be equivalent to the Assad in March of 2000 by President Clinton and refused out of
depth of the peace," hand. The offer was based on the borders of June 4, 1967 with
indicating that in return very minor deviations. From Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace,
for real peace, Israel Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004, Map 10.
would be willing to
withdraw to the
armistice lines.
However, negotiations
with the Rabin
administration were
not pursued, and
Rabin was
assassinated on
November 5, 1995.
Negotiations were
renewed by PM Ehud
Barak in January of
2000. These
negotiations broke
down finally on March
27, 2000. Syria
insisted on beginning
negotiations from the
point at which they had
left off, including the
"deposit" of PM Rabin.
Rabin had in fact
promised the June 4
lines in the "deposit,"
but Barak was
unwilling to meet those
demands.
Nonetheless, under
US pressure, Barak
agreed to honor the
pledge to retreat to the
line of June 4, 1967
with minor
modifications. US
President Clinton
presented Assad with
an Israeli proposal to
withdraw to June 4
lines based on
mutually agreed
borders, according to
the map at right. The
proposal was in accord
with previous
agreements made with
the Syrians.
Nonetheless, Assad
refused. On June 10,
2000, Hafez Assad
died, and was
replaced by his son
Bashar. The Syrian-
Israeli peace track
faded into the
background.
Syria, which had

opposed Iraq in 1991
and cooperated with
the US, cooperated
with Saddam Hussein
in the 2003 Iraq war.
After the war, Syria
hosted Iraqi exiles and
apparently sheltered
insurgent groups. The
US became
increasingly unhappy
with Syria's real or
alleged role in the Iraq
insurgency, and
administration officials
began pressuring
Syria to stop
insurgents from
crossing from Syria
into Iraq, and to stop
supporting terrorist
groups including the
Hizbollah in Lebanon
and the Hamas, which
has offices in
Damascus On
December 12, 2003,
President Bush signed
into law the Syria
Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act of
2003. These called for
Renewed Peace feelers from Syria - Following the passage of the Syria
Accountability Act in the United States, Syria announced that it was ready to renew
negotiations with Israel over a peace treaty, without preconditions, but stated that the
negotiations should continue where they had been interrupted. Syria renewed the call
at various times through November of 2004. In some versions, the proposal was for
negotiations "without conditions" while in other cases the Syrians called for
negotiations "without conditions based on the deposit" (the promise of Yitzhak Rabin to
withdraw to the cease fire lines of 1949). Israel's response to these overtures has been
cool, since no pressure emanated from the US regarding renewal of negotiations, and
President Assad's government continued to shelter the Hizbullah and Palestinian
"resistance" groups. (See commentary Here and Here). Though President Katzav called
for pursuing the Syrian peace initiative, PM Ariel Sharon and the foreign ministry
insisted that before talks begin, Syria must stop support for terrorist organizations.
Israel assassinated Hamas leader Izz El-Deen Al-Sheikh Khalil in Syria on September
26, 2004, and apparently attempted to assassinate another Hamas leader in
Damascus in December.
Death of Yasser Arafat
Palestinian Authority Chairman and long-time leader Yasser Arafat died November 11,
2004 leaving an uncertain future. Some signs indicated that the death of Arafat had
opened up new possibilities for peace, as well as for reform and democracy in the
Palestinian authority.
Preparations for Palestinian elections began in an orderly way, with Mahmoud Abbas
the leading candidate. Fatah el-Aqsa brigades leader Marwan Barghouthi, jailed by
Israel for his involvement in multiple terror attacks, announced his candidacy as an
independent, but later withdrew under pressure from the Fatah in mid-December.
During his campaign, Abbas promised repeatedly to continue to fight for a Palestinian
state with its capital in Jerusalem, and for right of return of Palestinian refugees.
However, he also told the London newspaper As Sharq al Awsat that the violent
Intifada was a mistake, and that Palestinians must pursue their goals by diplomatic
means. Incitement against Israel in Palestinian media was toned down on the directive
of Abbas. There were no successful violent attacks against civilians within Israel during
this period, but mortars were fired on Israeli settlements in Gaza and terrorists blew up
an Israeli army border post at the Gaza-Egypt border. Israel continued to arrest and
assassinate Palestinian terrorist leaders, to occupy Palestinian West Bank cities, to
raid targets in Gaza in reaction to Palestinian actions, to destroy homes and olive
groves and to harass Palestinians at checkpoints. Several Palestinian children were
killed during these raids. The Israeli army was criticized in Israel and abroad for
carelessness with civilian lives and possible war crimes.
Relations with Egypt - Following the death of Arafat, Israeli-Egyptian relations

improved, and Egyptian President Mubarak had warm words for Israeli PM Ariel
Sharon. In the beginning of December, Egypt released an Israeli, Azzam Azzam, who
had been in jail for eight years on espionage charges that he denied. At the same time,
Israel released six Egyptian students who were accused of plotting to kill Israeli
soldiers, and later Israel freed a number of Palestinian prisoners as a "gesture to
Egypt," though Israeli and Egyptian actions were supposedly unrelated. In mid-
December, Egypt, Israel and the US signed a Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) treaty
that would give Egypt trade advantages in the USA for cooperative ventures with
Israeli participation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Egyptian
intelligence chief Omar Suleiman visited Jerusalem. Despite the improved relations,
the Egyptians did not return their ambassador, who had been recalled following the
outbreak of violence in 2000.
Abbas Succeeds Arafat

On January 9 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Palestine National
Authority, receiving about 61 percent of the vote. Mustafa Barghouthi, his closest rival,
received about 20% of the vote. Over 60% of eligible voters participated, despite
difficulties owing to the Israeli occupation and a boycott of the elections by the Islamist
groups (See commentary here). US President George Bush invited Abbas to Washington,
after several years during which Palestinian leaders had not been welcome in the
White House, and Israeli PM Ariel Sharon announced that he would call Abbas and
plan a meeting.
Unity government in Israel - Owing to disaffection of the Israeli right with the
disengagement plan of PM Ariel Sharon, the National Religious Party left the
government, and dissenting members of Sharon's Likud party tried to block formation
of a unity government with the Labor party. The center Shinui party was forced out of
the government, and instead a coalition was formed with the Israel Labor party and the
small United Torah Judaism party. This government was approved by a narrow margin
(58 to 56) with several Likud members abstaining.
Sharm El Sheikh Conference - Following his election, Palestinian President

Mahmoud Abbas called on Palestinian factions to end the violence and negotiated a
truce agreement. Palestinian police were deployed throughout Gaza with explicit
orders to prevent terror attacks. The sides agreed to meet at a summit conference
hosted by Egypt in Sharm El Sheikh on February 8, 2005. At the conference, attended
by Jordan's King Abdullah and Egyptian President Mubarak as well as the Israeli and
Palestinian leaders, both sides announced an end to the violence. Israel would be
releasing over 900 Palestinian prisoners and gradually withdrawing from Palestinian
cities according to newspaper reports. Egypt and Jordan announced that they were
returning their ambassadors to Israel. The Intifadah was deemed to be officially over.
(see commentary.) However, following the pattern of previous conferences of this type,
the peace was soon shattered by a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on February 25,
apparently perpetrated by an Islamic Jihad group controlled from Damascus. Israel
announced it was freezing the planned handover of Palestinian towns to PNA security.
Mahmud Abbas condemned the bombing and the PNA made some arrests. (see
commentary)
Disengagement Decision - Shortly after the Sharm El Sheikh conference, the Israeli
Knesset, followed by the Israeli cabinet on February 20, approved the disengagement
plan , which calls for unilateral evacuation of 21 settlements in Gaza and 4 in the West
Bank by the summer of 2005. The disengagement was to be coordinated with the
Palestinian Authority. Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Prime Minister, promised to help
ensure quiet during the evacuation. Click for Map
London Conference - on March 1, 2005, a conference hosted by Great Britain was

held in London. The purpose of the conference was to organize financial support for
the Palestinian government and to assist in organization of Palestinian security. Israel
did not attend the conference, and bilateral issues were not touched upon directly.
However, Palestinian President Abbas said that ending the occupation and achieving
peace was a priority goal for the Palestinians.
Cairo Conference and Tahidiyeh - In mid March, Palestinian militant groups met in
Cairo and agreed to a tahidiyeh (lull in the fighting) - less than a full truce or hudna.
The Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups began moving to rejoin the PLO and the Hamas
announced its intention to participate in the May elections of the Palestine Legislative
Council. Israel withdrew from Jericho, and a week later, from Tulqarm. Israel held up
withdrawal from a third Palestinian city later in the month, because it claimed the
Palestinian Authority was not disarming terrorists as it should have been under the
roadmap. Israel continued to catch militants planning attacks or smuggling arms during
this period, but Palestinian Authority forces also spotted and stopped terrorist activities.
At the end of March, rebellious militants of the Al-Aqsa brigades, discontent with
changes in the Palestinian Authority, fired on Abbas's headquarters in Ramallah.
Though at first authorities announced a hard line against the extremists, Abbas later
reconsidered and decided to try and smooth over the differences. Tawfik Tirawi, head
of Palestinian Intelligence in the West Bank, resigned because, he wrote, little was
being done to implement the rule of law.
Arab Summit and Peace Proposal - An Arab summit in Algiers ignored most of the
pressing issues in the Arab world, and turned down a fresh peace initiative by King
Abdullah of Jordan. Instead, it reiterated its support for the version of the Saudi Peace
Plan passed in 2002 in Beirut that had been rejected by Israel. Israel indicated that the
proposals are now outdated due to changes in the reality of the Middle East.
Illegal Outposts - In March 2005, the Israeli government accepted a report on Illegal
outposts prepared at the request of the government by Talia Sasson. The report investigated
the status of a large number of illegal outposts, built without proper permits and
government authorization in the West Bank since March of 2001. It described
systematic lawlessness and diversion of funds used to finance the outposts. There are
about 20 or 30 such outposts that were supposed to have been evacuated under the
roadmap peace plan . Repeated government decisions and attempts to evacuate these
outposts have not availed. The government appointed a committee to study the report,
but no action was taken.
Settlement Controversy - Palestinians were upset by the advancing Israeli security

barrier, which isolates Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and by announced
Israeli plans to build several thousand new housing units in the E1 area, near the
settlement of Ma'aleh Edumim, east of Jerusalem. Under the Geneva Accord, Ma'aleh
Edumim would be included in Israel, but the roadmap peace plan forbids construction in
settlements. In his letter to Ariel Sharon in reply to Sharon's formal statement of the
disengagement plan, President Bush had stated that the borders of the final settlement
would take into account changes due to large Israeli population concentration in the
occupied territories. The Israeli announcement may have been designed to test this
statement, and to bolster Sharon's flagging popularity among right-wing supporters.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ambassador Dan Kurtzer first
condemned the Israeli announcement. This reaction elicited a hail of ridicule from right-
wing critics of Sharon and from former PM Ehud Barak, who claimed it was proof that
the U.S. promise was worthless. Rice and Kurtzer then reversed themselves and
denied that there were any differences of opinion with Israel over the settlement plans.
Motion in no direction - During April and May, both Ariel Sharon and Mahmud Abbas
visited with the President of the United States. Symbolically, this visit was very important,
because it signaled that the US was ending the isolation of the Palestinian Authority
that it had begun when Arafat failed to take action against terrorists. President Bush
promised the Palestinians $50 million in direct aid in addition to larger sums already
allocated for aid through NGOs, and stated that the borders of the 1949 armistice were
the basis for any agreement. This last statement caused some controversy in Israel for
some reason, but turned out to consistent with the wording of the letter Bush had given
Ariel Sharon in April, 2004. Despite the fanfare, neither the meeting with Sharon nor the
meeting with Abbas produced any visible change in Israeli unwillingness to make
concessions to the Palestinians or in Palestinian unwillingness to take decisive steps to
end terror by outlawing terrorist groups, disarming the terrorists, actively combating
attacks, arresting wanted men and collecting illegal arms. The Israelis released about
400 prisoners as a good will gesture to Abbas. This number included, for the first time,
prisoners "with blood on their hands," who had been involved in attacks that resulted in
bloodshed. However, the Palestinians belittled this gesture as meaningless, since most
of the prisoners were near the end of their sentence, and a large number of prisoners
remain in Israeli jails. The Palestinians pointed out that none of the prisoners held from
before 1994 had been released, so the prisoner release did not fulfill the conditions
agreed upon in Sharm El Sheikh.
Attempted and successful Palestinian attacks, and particularly mortar and missile
attacks on Gaza settlements and Negev towns continued. Palestinian President Abbas
traveled to Gaza and secured a half-hearted commitment from extremist factions to
honor the "Tahidiyeh" as long as Israel did, but repeated Palestinian attacks and Israeli
reprisals and arrests of wanted men continued. Israeli forces caught a 15 year old boy
suicide bomber at a checkpoint in the West Bank and later caught a young woman en
route to carry out a suicide bombing attack on an Israeli hospital, sent by the Fatah El-
Aqsa brigades. According to Palestinian statistics, Israel killed about 40 Palestinians in
the period, wounded 411 and arrested nearly a thousand civilians, many for illegally
staying in Israel. Most of the dead were wanted men or were in the course of carrying
out an attack. In late June, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived, met with the
sides and announced that the sides had agreed to destroy the houses of Gaza settlers
after Israeli withdrawal.
On June 21, 2005, Sharon and Abbas met in a long-awaited summit, but nothing at all
appeared to result from the meeting, other than an announcement by Ariel Sharon that
he had attained Palestinian consent to coordination of the Gaza pullout. Israel would
make no concessions on security unless the Palestinians acted against terrorists, and
the Palestinians would not act decisively against terrorists. No communique was
issued and the Palestinian leadership announced its profound disappointment.
Palestinians announced that a large number of wanted terrorists had agreed to join
the Palestinian police, while the Israelis announced they had convinced US AID to
donate $500 million in medical equipment to Palestinian hospitals. For its part, the US
ended its ban on diplomatic visits to Gaza that had begun 18 months previously, when
AID officials were killed in a terrorist attack, resuming visits of US diplomatic personnel.
As violence flared following the summit, Israel launched air attacks against rocket
launchers in Gaza, killed several Islamic Jihad terrorists and also announced it was
resuming its policy of targeted killings of Islamic Jihad terrorists.
In Palestine, demonstrations and even armed attacks continued against the leadership.
The popularity of the Hamas, now a contender in legislative elections, continued to
rise, perhaps abetted by rumored and actual meetings between EU officials and Hamas
representatives and repeated calls in the US for recognition of the Hamas. Both the
British and PM President Abbas called on Hamas to end violence and join the political
process, but Hamas initially refused, while accepting a short term truce. President
Abbas announced that legislative elections would be delayed for several months in
order to implement changes in the election law. At the beginning of July Abbas invited
the Hamas and Islamic Jihad to join a unity government.
The impasse during this period is attributable to several factors. Neither side is
politically strong enough to offer concessions on final status. Such negotiations are
pointless as long as Ariel Sharon insists that Jerusalem cannot be divided and Abbas
insists that Jerusalem must be the Palestinian capital and that there will be no
"compromise" on the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. Abbas must produce a
Fatah win in the legislative elections and cannot do anything that will antagonize
extremist sympathizers. On the other hand, Sharon has staked everything on the
disengagement process, leaving him with little support for any other concessions. If
any concessions are followed by Palestinian violence, that may be used as a reason to
stop the disengagement. As Palestinian attacks against Israeli settlements continued,
and as right-wing agitation against the disengagement escalated, Israel support for the
withdrawal move dwindled from over 65% to about 50%.However, the new IDF chief of
staff, Dan Halutz, indicated that no military exigency would stop the disengagement. It
could only be stopped by a political decision. Israel also warned that if necessary it
would take drastic steps to ensure that settlements and soldiers were not attacked
during the evacuation.
Disengagement Protests - Settlers protesting the disengagement carried out

increasingly aggressive protests, which including blocking roads in Israel, violence
against Palestinians, police and IDF soldiers, and calls for soldiers to refuse to
participate in evacuating settlers. At the end of June, settler-supporters who took up
residence in Maoz Yam, an abandoned Gaza hotel, attempted to take over Palestinian
houses and attacked an 18 year old Palestinian youth. Israeli police raided the hotel
and removed the settlers by force. On July 13, the Israeli government closed the Gaza
strip to Israeli citizens who were not residents of the settlements, to foil a planned
march organized by the Yesha (settlers') council.
The truce is broken - On July 13 a terrorist of the Islamic Jihad originating in Tul Karm
carried out a suicide bombing in Netanya, resulting in the deaths of five people. The
IDF reoccupied to Tul Karm, arrested several Islamic Jihad members and killed a
Palestinian policeman who opened fire on them. The Hamas in Gaza retaliated with a
rain of rocket fire on Gaza settlements and Israeli towns, killing one. The IDF in return
launched rocket attacks in Gaza and a manhunt for Hamas military leaders in the
Hebron area, resulting in the deaths of 8 or more Hamas members, some of them
killed while on their way to launch fresh rocket attacks. On July 15, a violent battle
broke out between Palestine National Authority forces trying to restore order and
Hamas members in Gaza. Two Palestinian civilian bystanders were killed in the attack.
Implementation of Disengagement - Israeli evacuation of Gaza settlements and four

West Bank settlements began on August 15 and was completed August 24. Despite
threats of civil war and demonstrations by right-wing Zionist groups, the evacuation
was completed without major violence. One woman set herself on fire in protest and
died of her wounds. Some protestors threw unidentified substances that may have
included paint, turpentine and caustic soda at police. After completing the evacuation,
IDF killed 5 wanted Islamic Jihad men in Tul Karm. The disengagement was completed
ahead of schedule. As Israel withdrew there were increasing omens of impending
chaos. Former PNA official Moussa Arafat, a relative of Yasser Arafat, was murdered
by Palestinians angry about corruption. On September 11, the last Israeli soldiers left
Gaza. On September 12, the settlements were officially handed over to the
Palestinians.
Subsequently a passage was opened between Gaza and Rafah in Egypt to ensure that
Palestinians are not cut off from the world. Egyptians, Palestinians and EU
representatives monitor the passage to prevent smuggling of arms, but Israelis claim
that Palestinians are smuggling in substantial qualities of arms. Under pressure from
the United States, Israel agreed to implement safe passage between Gaza and the
West Bank using busses, but did not implement it. Qassam rockets continued to be fired
on Sderot and were now also fired on Ashqelon just north of Gaza. Israel responded
with air strikes to create a buffer zone
On January 4, 2006, Ariel Sharon suffered a massive stroke, leaving the leadership of
Israel and the new Kadima party in the hands of Ehud Olmert Olmert appeared to take
some vigorous action against settler lawlessness, denouncing the destruction of olive
trees, calling for evacuation of illegal outposts, and at the end of January, IDF and
police forces staged a confrontation with settlers who had infiltrated part of the Arab
Suq in Hebron and destroyed property there. The settlers evicted the Arabs, claiming
that the land was owned by a Jewish Yeshiva and that they were the lawful inheritors.
However, the IDF had not given them permission to occupy the properties. After a
dramatic confrontation however, the government appeared to back down,
compromising on peaceable removal of the settlers in return for a promise that they
could soon return to the properties "lawfully."
Hamas Victory - In elections held January, 26, 2006, the radical Hamas movement
won an upset victory over the Fateh. Hamas won about 74 of the 133 seats in the
Palestine Legislative Assembly. The movements that had led the Palestinians for about
40 years, the Fateh and the PLO seemed to be on their way to the opposition. Under
the Palestinian constitution, Mahmoud Abbas remains President with broad powers.
European and American leaders pledged not to negotiate with Hamas and not to
provide aid to the Palestinians until Hamas agreed to disarm and recognize Israel.
Hamas spokesmen sent mixed signals, but vowed never to recognize Israel and never to give
up their claim to all of Palestine, though a majority of Palestinians apparently want
them to follow the path of peace. The Hamas-led government was sworn in on March
29, 2006. The Fatah refused to join the coalition because Hamas would not recognize
the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people, and would not agree to
honor past agreements of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, including the Oslo
agreements that recognize the existence of Israel and which form the basis of
legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority.
Israeli Elections - In elections held March 28, 2006, the Kadima party led by Ehud
Olmert gained 29 seats, more than any other party, while the right-wing Likud, formerly
the governing party, got only 12 seats, signaling the end of the domination of Israeli
politics by settler ideology
Hamas in power - The international community suspended aid to the Hamas-led PNA
government, causing an acute financial crisis. Iran and Russia freed funds for use of
the Hamas, and Hamas politicians smuggled cash into Gaza under the eyes of
European monitors in Rafah, in order to pay salaries of Palestinian security forces and
workers. International donors eventually agreed on a mechanism for disbursing funds
through Palestinian NGOs and for paying salaries directly to employees, and on June
24, EU donors announced a 105 million Euro aid package that would be distributed by
this method. By the end of June however, Palestinians had apparently received only
some partial salary payments from the cash smuggled by the Hamas.
Hamas formed a new security militia headed by Jamil Abu Samhadana, leader of the
Palestinian Popular Resistance Committees. This security force was declared illegal by
President Mahmoud Abbas, who organized yet another Fatah-based militia. Fighting
between Hamas and Fatah broke out, including killings and kidnappings of officials on
both sides. Life in Gaza became increasingly chaotic, as Palestinian rights
organizations documented a steady stream of internecine political violence, criminal
violence and random killings. Samhadana was killed in an Israeli air-raid in early June,
apparently as he was reviewing a rehearsal for a terrorist attack.
Palestinians continued an almost daily rain of Qassam rockets on Israeli towns within
the green line, in particular, the little town of Sderot. At the same time, Israel continued
arrests and targeted killings of terrorist leaders whom it claimed were planning attacks,
and in return the Islamic Jihad and Hamas vowed revenge.
About 1000 Qassam rockets fell up to June 2006. The Qassam rockets grew in size and
range, and the attacks had killed at least 9 to 11 people in all, including 5 residents of
Sderot. Israel responded with artillery fire into empty fields and other psychological
warfare, and then took to attacking the launching sites. At approximately the time of
one such attack, several members of a Palestinian family were killed on a beach in
Gaza, though Israel denied that their attack was responsible. Subsequent Israeli
attacks missed their targets and killed civilians. On June 25th, just as PNA announced
the conclusion of an agreement on a truce with Israel, Hamas attacked an Israeli army
border outpost at Kerem Shalom, killing two soldiers and capturing a third. Hamas
offered to trade the soldier for Palestinian prisoners. Israel refused to negotiate and
began a siege of Gaza and later invaded in operation "Summer Rains" in an attempt to
force Palestinians to return the soldier alive and stop the rain of Qassam rockets.
(updated to July 8)
Palestinian Prisoners' Document- Palestinians of various factions approved a document

May 11 calling for national unity. The document called for right of return of the refugees
and continued violent resistance against Israel, the latter in violation of provisions of
the Roadmap for Middle East Peace. It also called for establishment of a Palestinian
state in the boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to the 1967 war, and for
negotiations with Israel to be conducted by PNA President and PLO chairman
Mahmoud Abbas. Many believed that the document implied recognition of Israel. A
crisis was precipitated when Abbas demanded that Hamas accede to the document or
accede to results of a referendum to approve the document. Hamas and Fatah
gunmen carried out various acts of violence. A revised version of the Palestinian
Prisoners Document was approved Hamas made it clear that it would not recognize
Israel. The revised document also limited the historic PLO acceptance of UN Resolution
242 (guaranteeing the right of all states to exist in peace) by excluding any provisions
that might violate Palestinian "rights."
Hezbollah attack and Israeli response - Operation Just Reward - On the morning
of July 12, Hezbollah terrorists crossed the blue line border from Lebanon to Israel and
attacked an Israeli army patrol, killing 3 and capturing 2 soldiers. An additional soldier
died the following day and several were killed when a tank hit a mine, while pursuing
the captors. At the same time, Hezbollah began a series of rocket and mortar attacks
on northern Israel. This incident may have been timed to coincide with the meeting of
the G-8, which was to examine the issue of the Iranian nuclear development program.
It also occurred against the background of the earlier fighting in Gaza.
Subsequently, Israel carried out massive but selective bombing and artillery shelling of
Lebanon, hitting rocket stores, Hezbollah headquarters in the Dahya quarter of Beirut
(see Beirut Map) and al-Manara television in Beirut, and killing an estimated 900
persons in total, many of them civilians. Hezbollah responded by launching thousands
of rockets on Haifa, Tiberias, Safed and other towns deep in northern Israel, killing
about 40 civilians (See Map of Hezbollah Rocket Attacks ). About 120 soldiers were
killed in the fighting. A Hezbollah Iranian supplied C-802 missile hit an Israeli missile
cruiser off the coast of Beirut, killing 4. Hezbollah rockets also sank a Cambodian ship
and damaged an Egyptian one. The G-8 democratic industrial powers, meeting in St
Petersburg, issued a statement calling for an end to violence, return of the soldiers and
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 UN Security Council Resolution 1680,
which call for disarming militias. (See statement of the G-8 on the Lebanon-Israel Crisis ).
After Israeli air-attacks proved ineffective at stopping Hezbollah rocket attacks or

producing a satisfactory cease-fire resolution, Israel launched a limited ground invasion
of Lebanon, making halting and indecisive moved coupled with aggressive rhetoric by
Israeli public figures. Efforts continued to broker a cease fire that would be satisfactory
to both sides. Key Israeli demands were implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1559 and 1680 - that is, disarming the Hezbollah, and moving the Lebanese
army up to border, to take control of south Lebanon from the Hezbollah, as well as
return of the kidnapped soldiers. Israel and the US also wanted a strong international
force that would oversee disarmament of the Hezbollah. Key Lebanese demands were
embodied in a seven point plan that included deployment of the Lebanese army in
southern Lebanon, but did not include disarmament of Hezbollah. Lebanese also
insisted on return of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, and immediate Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Lebanon also demanded the Sheba farms territory
from Israel. In 2000, the UN had ruled that Sheba farms, in the Golan Heights, is part
of Syria. Syria, for its part, had refused to demarcate its border with Lebanon formally
but said it supported the Lebanese demand.
The desultory Israeli offensive was stepped up on August 11 when efforts to broker a
cease-fire appeared to be at an impasse, and Israeli troops began advancing in force
toward the Litani river, 30 KM north of the Israel-Lebanon border. At the same time
however, the UN Security Council met and approved Resolution 1701, calling for
cessation of hostilities, and deployment of the Lebanese army in Southern Lebanon,
but with ambiguous wording about the various issues. Both sides stopped the fighting
on August 14, 2006. The poor conduct of the war raised a storm of criticism in Israel,
and the Israeli attack roused widespread resentment in the Arab world.
International human rights groups and the UN condemned Israel for the alleged war
crime of using cluster bombs in Southern Lebanon. Cluster bombs have not been
outlawed by international conventions and have been used in previous conflicts. They
also alleged that Israel had deliberately targeted civilians. However, an Israeli NGO
report issued in December found that Hezbollah had hidden among civilian population
and that nearly 700 of the casualties were Hezbollah fighters. Some human rights
groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, also later
condemned the Hezbollah for indiscriminate rocket fire. However, the UN Human
Rights Council, which issued a total of eight condemnations of Israel in 2006, failed to
condemn the Hezbollah or Hamas for egregious violations.
The two Israeli soldiers captured by the Hezbollah. remained in captivity and in
December it was revealed that they had been wounded when captured and that their
medical condition was uncertain. The border remained quiet, though Hezbollah was
being rearmed by Syria at a heavy pace. On November 21, assassins gunned down
anti-Syrian politician Pierre Gemayel. On the first of December, after the Seniora
government approved a motion calling for an international tribunal to try the murderers
of Rafiq Hariri, Hezbollah ministers walked out of the Lebanese government, and large
crowds of Hezbollah supporters were organized to besiege the Prime Minister's office
and bring down the Lebanese government. The demonstrators were said variously to
demand one third representation for pro-Hezbollah ministers, or reform of the
constitution in order to provide equitable representation for Shi'ites or a unity
government.
Gaza Violence - During and after the Israeli offensive in Lebanon, IDF operations
continued unabated in Gaza as Palestinians continued to rain down Qassam rockets
on the Western Negev and the Hamas insisted solemnly that it was keeping a truce.
The Hamas government continued to be supplied with money from Iran and Arab
states, brought into Gaza under the not too watchful eyes of European monitors in
Rafaj (Rafiah), while some 30 tons of arms were estimated to have been smuggled into
Gaza through tunnels built from the Egyptian side of the border. Egypt did little to stop
these activities.
During October and November, Palestinians shot a relentless rain of Qassam missiles
on the Western Negev and in particular the town of Sderot, killing three Israelis. IDF
operations in Rafah uncovered extensive tunnels used for smuggling, but IDF
operations in the north of Gaza, intended to stop the firing of Qassam missiles, were
terminated under increasing international pressure, as Israelis had killed over 50
Palestinians, including several civilians. The operations in the north were intended to
stop the firing of Qassam missiles, but had no effect. During one raid, terrorists had
hidden in a mosque, and escaped with the help of women who volunteered to be used
as human shields. IDF killed several of these women. On November 8, following the
Israeli withdrawal, an especially heavy barrage of Qassam fire prompted an Israeli
shelling response. The shells missed their target, hitting a residential neighborhood
and killing about 20 Palestinian civilians. Negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians for the return of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit remained stalled as
Palestinians demanded the release of over a thousand prisoners.
Truce - On November 26, the Palestinians and Israelis announced a surprise truce
that was to apply only to the Gaza strip. Despite continuation of Qassam fire by the
Palestinians for several days thereafter, Israel held to the truce. On the day following
the truce announcement, November 27, Israeli PM Ehud Olmert announced a new
Israeli diplomatic initiative offering peace to the Palestinians and other other neighbors
along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative. This was the first time that an Israeli leader
had referred to the initiative in a positive way. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas
welcomed the speech, while Hamas leaders and Israeli extremists condemned it. From
the United States, the Iraq Study Group report, which recommended active US
involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, also gave rise to talk of peace
negotiations.
The truce was violated repeatedly in Gaza by barrages of Qassam rockets fired at
Israeli towns. The dissident Islamic Jihad claimed that it would not adhere to the truce
unless it was extended to the West Bank. However, it was revealed that the Hezbolla
were paying thousands of dollars for each Qassam rocket fired.
The Syrian government, attempting to recover the Golan and to break out of the
isolation imposed on it because of its role in violence in Lebanon, Iraq and the
Palestinian conflict, offered to negotiate peace with Israel "without conditions."
However, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, citing continuing Syrian support for terror
groups, rejected the offer.
Abbas - Olmert Summit - On December 23, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert finally
met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and announced some concessions to
make life easier for the Palestinians including release of tax funds frozen by Israel and
removal of a number of checkpoints. A plan to release prisoners for the Eid al Adha
holiday was abandoned however. Following the meeting, Israel agreed to a large
transfer of weapons to the Fatah group loyal to President Abbas from Egypt. Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzippi Livni hinted at a new peace initiative in press interviews. These
moves were seen as attempts to support President Abbas in his rivalry with the
Hamas-led government of Ismail Hanniyeh.
Palestinian Unity Government and Anarchy - Following the release of the Palestinian
Prisoners letter, negotiations continued to form a Palestinian unity government that
could, it was hoped, recognize the existence of Israel, cease violent activity, get
recognition from the West and allow Western governments to resume funding of the
Palestinian authority. President Mahmoud Abbas repeatedly set two week "deadlines"
that were postponed and forgotten, but the negotiations failed. On December 16,
Mahmoud Abbas announced that he was dissolving the government and calling for
new elections, unless Hamas agreed to a unity government. but he did not set a date
for the elections. This proposal led to renewed violence between Palestinian factions,
with Hamas charging that Fatah had tried to assassinate Palestinian PM Hanniyeh. An
attempted truce failed, and Gaza schools were closed in the rising anarchy. However,
on February 8, 2007, under the aegis of the Saudi monarchy, the sides concluded an
agreement to form a unity government. The agreement did not explicitly declare
Palestinian recognition of Israel or meet demands of the quartet to disarm militant
groups. A trilateral summit between President Mahmud Abbas, Israeli P.M. Ehud
Olmert and US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on February 19 failed to produce
any change in Abbas's stance or any concessions to the Palestinians.
Temple Mount/Al Aqsa Construction sparks riots - Israel began rebuilding a fallen
rampway to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem along a new route. The ramp had
collapsed in 2004. The new route would run about 80 meters from the mosque.
Though the Muslim Waqf agreed to the construction originally, Sheikh Raed Salah of
the Israeli Islamist movement claimed that the construction was damaging the mosque
and threatened to begin another Intifadah. Israel denied that the construction was
harming the mosques. Following protests from the Arab and Muslim world, Israel
suspended work on the bridge, but continued archeological salvage operations. It
installed Web cams to show the operations and invited the Turkish government to
inspect the site.
(Updated February 19, 2007)

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Thirty years ago, on 6 October 1973 at 2:00 p.m.

Significant scholarship on the October War, by such analysts

• the failure of U.S.

• the advance warnings of

• the initial state of

• Kissinger's "shock" at,

• the complete record of

• Kissinger's virtual green

• Brezhnev's use of the

• Kissinger's rage at West

• the record of emotional

As significant as the new material is, highly important U.S.

The transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations

As useful as Kissinger's compilation is, the documents have

The story of the October War and its background is a

The extraordinary Israeli victory laid the basis for greater

Peace efforts on the Middle East made little progress prior to

With diplomacy stalemated, during 1972 and 1973, Sadat

Once begun, the October War would yield military triumphs

Soon after the fighting started, the war developed into an

The need to avoid U.S.-Soviet confrontation made it all the

The ongoing Watergate crisis and the financial scandal that

II. On the Brink of War

III. Coordinated Offensives

IV. Airlifts, Battlefield Stalemates, and Oil Threats

V. Turn of the Tide?

VI. "The Smell of Victory" and Search for a Cease-

VII. Collapse of the Cease-Fire

IX. Crisis Resolved

I. The Looming Conflict

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials

In the early spring of 1973, Sadat told Newsweek journalist

Document 2A: Memorandum of Conversation [Memcon]

Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, Cat C

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol VII May

During the late winter and spring of 1973, Henry Kissinger

Document 3: Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the

Source: HAKO, box 75, Brezhnev Visit June 18-25 1973

During 1973, the U.S.-Soviet Union détente process

Document 4: Theodore Eliot, Jr., Executive Secretary State

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of

During the summer of 1973 Secretary of State William

Document 5: Memcon between Kissinger and Israeli

Source: NPMP, HAKO, Box 135, Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive

Kissinger and the Nixon White House were under growing

Document 6: Harold Saunders, NSC Staff, to Kissinger,

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt-Ismail Vol. VI May

Kissinger's backchannel communications with the Egyptians

II. On the Brink of War

Document 7: Deputy Assistant to the President for National

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 136, Dinitz June 4, 1974 [sic]-

Neither Israeli nor U.S. intelligence recognized the

Document 8: U.S. Interests Section Egypt, Cable 3243 to

Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 War (Middle East) 26

Document 9: U.S. Embassy Israel, Cable 7766 to

Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files (hereinafter

Apparently, Kissinger did not receive Meir's message

Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New

At 6:00 a.m., Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco woke

Document 11: U.S. Mission to United Nations cable 4208 to

Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6

Hoping that he could avert war, Kissinger wired Ambassador

Document 12: U.S. Department of State cable 199583 to