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Rehab Farooq (BS - International Relations)

NDU, Islamabad.
Instagram: _rehabfarooq

Thirteen Days, A Memoire of The Cuban Missile Crisis

Book Review

‘Thirteen Days, A Memoire of The Cuban Missile Crisis’ is written by Robert Francis Kennedy, former
Attorney General of the United States, and brother of 35 th President of the United States John F. Kennedy.
This book is the author’s personal account of the October 1962’s Cuban Missile Crisis that lasted exactly
13 days—the name he later picked for his book. It was published by The New American Library in 1969,
a year after his assassination.
The book starts with brief introduction by Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, and Harold
MacMillan, former Prime Minister of the UK. Instead of chapters, the first-person account is divided into
titled sections and moves chronologically through the meetings, discussions, events, and decisions that
determined the American approach to the crisis. What makes this book special is the fact that he penned
down his firsthand experience of the crisis as a person involved in it and making decision on the behalf of
his state. The main theme of this book revolves around the ‘threat of a nuclear war’ and the
‘destruction it [a nuclear war] would bring to mankind’.
The book opens with a quotation from John Keats’ poem ‘The Fall of Hyperion’, one of the author’s
favorites. It reads,
“Who feel the giant agony of the world.
And more, like slaves to poor humanity,
Labor for mortal good…”
It wouldn’t be an understatement to say that this quote in a way captures the essence of the crisis, both
governments pulled into a dilemma—whether to carry on with the aggression to thwart the enemy or to
end the problem on a safer note by means of diplomacy. Nevertheless, it would be a favor for the
mankind to save them the pain of going through another nuclear holocaust.
The introduction by Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense of the United States, gives us an
insight into how Robert Kennedy, as the top advisor to the President of the United States, handled the
crisis. He wrote that Robert Kennedy was a strong advocate for a blockade and knew too well the
destruction a military conflict could bring. Moreover, the author was aware of the danger posed by the
escalation of such a conflict that could result in them losing their strategic position to the hands of the
Soviets—Berlin in this case. No matter the situation, the Attorney General remained calm and collected
and made some very wise decisions over the course of 13 days. In fact, it was his idea to reply to
Khrushchev’s ‘favorable message’ which he sent a night before the second ‘unfavorable’ message, which
categorically called for war. He ends his introduction with these words: “He demonstrated then, as I
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have seen him do on so many other occasions before and since, a most extraordinary combination
of energy and courage, compassion and wisdom.”
Unlike McNamara, Harold MacMillan focused more on the joint effort of the Kennedy brothers to get
around the crisis. He gives credit to the author for accurately writing down ‘what the president thought
and did during these fateful hours.’ He indicates that the President maintained his composure and was
always receptive to recommendations from his advisers and the cabinet. Nevertheless, he had a shrewd
side to his unperturbable self. He did show this while expertly opting for a blockade that gave more time
for Americans to prepare and for the Russians to recede. He then went on to say that this book doesn’t
explain much about the Russian side of this crisis and the risks they had to take while keeping up with
their advancements.
The first chapter marks the start of the chronicle. On Tuesday, October 16, when Robert Kennedy
discovered for the first time that Russia had been placing nuclear weapons in Cuba. He was shocked, to
say the least, and that was virtually the same sentiment throughout the cabinet when the word spread
among them. The author recalled the meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, in which he categorically
clarified the US position of not accepting any kind of offensive weapons to be installed in Cuba. The
Soviet Ambassador assured him that Premier Khrushchev had no intention of disappointing the US
president. But the author didn’t really take his word for it, for he knew that the Soviets were deploying
some weapons despite their repeated assurances, although the type of weapons was unknown. Upon
asking, the Soviet Ambassador replied by saying that the weapons meant no harm to the US and were
clearly ‘defensive’ in nature. It was one gigantic web of lies, and the Americans had been clearly fooled.
It is important to note here that the Americans' intelligence lacked in their actions too, the reports
generated from the military buildup were either false or not accurate, and they didn’t care enough to
investigate their authenticity. Furthermore, elections were around the corner and the Republic took this as
their chance to one up on the opposition, adding to the concerns of the President. In the morning,
President Kennedy called a conference of his senior advisers, cabinet members, and other government
representatives to discuss the problem and assign them the task of formulating a plan of action.
Throughout the crisis, this group would meet almost constantly. The committee members all contributed
equally to the hard debate and occasionally heated disagreements as they considered various solutions to
the issue. The Cuban missiles would soon be prepared for launch, leaving little time for action.
Secretiveness was crucial to their mission. Before the public became aware of the situation or the
Russians learned that the U.S. administration was aware of the missiles, they needed to come up with a
plan as soon as possible.
The second chapter deals with the course of action the president had to take. The group assigned to come
up with the plan battled to reach a unanimous decision while the Soviets were still building the missile
sites, adding to their frustration. An important thing to note here is that the President decided not to attend
all these meetings because he did not want to arouse attention while elections were approaching. He had
to keep his cool and not let anyone tarnish his reputation. The author thought of it in a way that the
presence of the president usually leaves an intimidating impression, which tends to mess up with the
members’ rationality, thus affecting their thinking process. He said they would feed the president words
they thought he wished to hear. Anyway, discussions went on, and some members of the cabinet
advocated for a military strike, the idea of imposing a blockade around Cuba was also put forth. Robert
McNamara and certain other members were in favor of the blockade, reasoning that it was limited
pressure that could be increased if the situation worsened. Those who advocated for a military strike
reasoned that a blockade would not do any good because it was almost like ‘closing the door after the
horse has left the barn’ so it meant little to them. They argued that the missile sites needed to be destroyed
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if it meant peace. Robert McNamara presented his counterargument, saying the airstrike could only mean
invasion. The only strong argument was that the blockade around Cuba would encourage the Russians to
do the same with Berlin. In the end, no agreement or consensus was reached. Each option has drawbacks
and constraints. Robert Kennedy backed the blockade, primarily for moral reasons because even a small
air strike would result in the deaths of several defenseless civilians. A serious risk was the potential for a
military battle to turn into a nuclear conflict.
The third chapter reads the events of Thursday night. The committee's majority decided in support of a
blockade. But the accord broke down when the President raised doubts about their advice. The author
dives into the psyches of the members, revealing that frustration and anxiety were clouding their
judgment. They divided into two sections, each of which created a thorough plan for starting a blockade
of Cuba and taking military action. Later, the groups would meet and exchange papers, finding the
opposite lacking, and try to come up with a better plan—the definitive plan. This plan gave an outline for
those in favor of a blockade as to the legal basis of their action. It would forward their agenda to the OAS
and the United Nations. If the situation demanded it, military action was also considered. On the other
hand, the plan gave the supporters of a military strike an outline for the areas to be targeted, a set of
suggestions to gain support from the Latin American countries, and a letter to Premier Khrushchev
criticizing his methods as unwise.
The fourth chapter unfolds the events of Friday night. The final plan was eventually presented to the
president, who decided in favor of blockade. When the Commander in Chief for the tactical air command
revealed that even an airstrike wouldn’t erase the threat, that removed the lingering doubt that remained.
The strongest argument, according to the author, was “that a surprise attack would erode, if not
destroy, the moral position of the United States throughout the world.” Adlai Stevenson, former
governor of Illinois, presented his suggestion of asking the Soviets to pull out their missiles from Cuba
and the US would do same for Jupiter Missiles in Turkey and Italy and relinquishing the Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba. This was criticized by the cabinet. The author taught of him as very bold and courageous to
even have come up with such an argument. Hours went by and the president called for immediate military
preparation in case the blockade failed or sparked a Soviet response. It was time to start the diplomatic
process of informing and gathering support from the American allies to join their cause. President
Kennedy addressed the nation through television on Monday night to alert them of the situation in Cuba
and the crisis at hand, the reasons for the blockade were also mentioned. The entire world began to look
on at that time.
In the fifth chapter, the author recalls the time when President Kennedy gave the go-ahead for the
blockade to start the following morning after the Organization of American States, France, Germany, and
Canada decided to back the United States, giving the move legal validity. The blockade was carefully
planned to account for every possible contingency. On Monday, before his speech, the president came up
with a proper name for the cabinet. It was then called the “Executive Committee of the National Security
Council." The most difficult meeting for the President was that with the Congressional leaders who
thought that a blockade was too weak a response for such a critical issue, but he took the criticism
positively and assured the Congress that he would take every necessary step to ensure the security of the
US. He reminded them that once an attack began, our adversaries could respond with a missile barrage, in
which many millions of Americans would be killed. He would not take that risk until he had finally and
firmly ruled out all other options.
The following chapters reveal a series of developments in the crisis. The committee came up with detailed
protocols to handle the complex situation of Russian ships nearing the blockade while simultaneously
attempting to prevent the start of a military conflict. The U.S. would have to stop the blockade or
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intercept Russian ships that were headed towards Cuba. The Russian ships stopped short of the blockade
line, and some of them turned around, giving the situation a slight break. However, the other ships soon
resumed their journey towards Cuba. It was hotly contested which ships should be stopped and which
should be allowed to pass.
Surveillance footage showed that work on the missile sites was still being done, implying that diplomatic
efforts to end the issue were futile. Plans for an invasion of Cuba have been devised. The President was
anxious that the Soviet Union and the United States were headed toward a war that neither side wanted,
and he was resolute to thwart it.
Chairman Khrushchev wrote a letter to the White House on Friday night to offer to cooperate with
President Kennedy in reducing tensions and averting war. Khrushchev proposed that Russia would
remove the missiles in exchange for an end to the blockade and a promise from the United States not to
invade Cuba. This was the first concrete sign that the issue would be handled amicably. The following
day, Khrushchev sent the President a different formal correspondence with a less-viable suggestion. Once
more, there was no agreement inside the group as to how America ought to react. News that an Air Force
pilot had been killed when his surveillance plane was shot down over Cuba arrived as they discussed
possible options. The committee's initial recommendation was for military action. Kennedy recommended
prudence and a careful analysis of all potential outcomes, though. It was Robert Kennedy’s suggestion to
respond to the earlier offer made by Khrushchev rather than the more recent one, which had slightly
harsher terms.
The meeting between Robert Kennedy and the Soviet Ambassador left neither party feeling encouraged.
The President mobilized the Air Force Reserve in case of a military strike. The president had done
everything in his power to avert a confrontation; Khrushchev now had to react. By Saturday night, it
looked like war with the Soviet Union was about to break out. Robert Kennedy was informed that the
Soviets had consented to take down the Cuban missiles around 10 a.m. on Sunday. The crisis was over.
Robert Kennedy considers the lessons from the missile crisis in the book's final two sections. He
emphasizes the value of giving the committee enough time to deliberate in private. He believed that the
president ought to be exposed to a variety of perspectives and areas of knowledge. Achieving a peaceful
conclusion to the issue required President Kennedy's efforts to comprehend the situation from the Soviet
perspective and to provide a check on the military. He also stresses how crucial it is to have the backing
of allies and other states.
Other significant works on the Cuban Missile Crisis include “High Noon in the Cold War” by Max
Frankel, in which he examines the errors of judgment made by the U.S. and Soviet administrations,
including President Kennedy's assumption that the Soviet Union wouldn't send offensive missiles to Cuba
and Nikita Khrushchev's assumption that a weak leader would eventually give in. The discussions
between Kennedy and Khrushchev and their top military and civilian advisors are described in Mr.
Frankel's book. We find that Gen. Curtis LeMay of the US Air Force supported an offensive against
Cuba, an argument supported by Robert Kennedy in his book.
One interesting account of the crisis, which uncovers many hidden secrets, is presented in the book “The
Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory” by Sheldon M. Stern. He has attempted to correct many
misconceptions and falsehoods regarding the crisis. Sheldon Stern was the first historian to hear and
assess the tapes created in the White House during the missile crisis after they were declassified in the
middle of the 1990s. His book, which was released 50 years after the events of October 1962, mostly
draws on the conversations of President Kennedy and the ExCom. Robert Kennedy's hawkish self-portrait
in "Thirteen Days" is challenged by Mr. Stern as he debunks myths about the events. According to him,
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Robert Kennedy was a hardliner who preferred more aggressive airstrikes over a naval blockade by the
United States. The former Attorney General urged for an invasion, saying ‘that it was their last chance to
kill Castro’ even after the president and his military experts had decided on a blockade.
This book, in my opinion, is nothing less than a phenomenal non-fiction work that takes the reader on an
emotional rollercoaster ride, anticipating what will happen next. I seemed to have the sensation that the
author has sent me back in time, and I am now seeing and assessing everything through his eyes.
Moreover, this book's simple language makes the author's incredible talent for storytelling abundantly
obvious.
All appreciations aside, the book appeared to be too into glorifying the United States' stand on blockade
just moral reasons and that a nuclear war could bring an end to mankind. However, it was apparent that a
year before the crisis the US President was so adamant to invade Cuba just to topple the Communist
regime. The failed invasion through the Bay of Pigs, which he tried to keep a secret, was also a source of
embarrassment for him. As a result, Cuba started leaning on the Soviet bloc just to protect itself from the
United States. It relates to the Russia-Ukraine crisis of today, where Russia attacked Ukraine because the
US has NATO forces on its shared border with the latter. Consequently, Ukraine is now looking forward
to siding with the US.
The book reveals how expertly the US president, and the war cabinet handled the crisis. As the crisis
worsened, Jack Kennedy's position as a candidate for the next election was also weakened. The
congressional leaders started finding fault with his methods and called for an equally offensive response.
Despite this tight situation, he was pulled in, but he maintained his composure and effectively tackled the
crisis. One of my favorite lines from the book is when the President was in a meeting with the author,
Kenny O'Donnell, and Ted Sorenson, and he said, “The great danger and risk in all of this is a
miscalculation—a mistake in judgment.” This happened when a US submarine shot down a Soviet
vessel carrying missiles under the command of three Soviet chiefs. Two of these chiefs’ immediate
response was to launch a nuclear missile but Vasili Arkhipov refused to do so saying that this could be a
miscalculation. This decision saved the world from a nuclear holocaust.
In another instance, President Kennedy's prudence was clearly shown with how he avoided the use of the
word ‘blockade’ and instead opted for ‘quarantine’ because the former was also seen as an act of war.
However, Khrushchev still took it as an ‘act of aggression and didn’t stop with their advancements. They
wanted the United States to have a taste of their own medicines. For them, it was simply a ‘Strategic
Defense Tactic’ to counter the threat posed by the presence of US missiles around the Soviet eastern
borders. He demanded the missiles be removed from Turkey and Italy if the US wanted peace. A shrewd
sense of diplomacy is shown by both governments when Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin finally
came to a compromise, with the former accepting latter’s terms for the removal of missiles. However, this
was only to happen during a secret mission without public knowledge. In a way, there would be no public
declarations made for this acceptance of Khrushchev’s demand, but the weapons would be removed,
nonetheless. This was a major hit to Nikita Khrushchev’s public image who was deliberately made to
appear as if he lost to the American’s demands. All in all, the crisis was finally over. It was a win for both
states and humanity.