The Cuban Missile Crisis - 1962

WS531/POE412/POE116/POLS367
Lecture Notes

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is widely considered to be the event that brought the
United States and the Soviet Union closest to nuclear war during the Cold War. This has been
one of the most studied international crises in history and one of the most documented. Indeed,
we have transcripts of the discussions that took place within the White House. (See additional
material below)
By the time John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency in January 1961 both the United
States and the USSR had deployed thousands of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy each other
and large parts of the world, although in terms of sheer numbers and delivery capabilities the US
held a numerical and qualitative advantage. In order to contain the spread of Soviet-backed
communism and deter the Soviets from attacking the U.S. and its allies, the United States had
extended its nuclear deterrent umbrella over a number of other states in Europe and Asia near the
USSR. To reinforce the credibility of this deterrent posture, the US, at the request of some of its
allies, had deployed nuclear-armed bombers and missiles to members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) including Turkey. In the meantime, Cuba had been become a
communist country allied with the Soviet Union. After a failed attempt by the United States to
overthrow the Cuban government by force (the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961), the Cuban
government asked the USSR to deploy missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from the U.S. President
Kennedy, responding to domestic pressure, had declared that he would never allow Soviet
missiles in Cuba. When America surveillance flights discovered preparations to make those
missiles operational, Kennedy went public with the information and demanded that the Soviets
remove the missiles, and order a naval “quarantine” (essentially a blockade) of Cuba to stop
further shipments of Soviet missiles. In the meantime, the U.S. military prepared to launch an
invasion of Cuba if American demands were not met. Tension between the two superpowers
mounted dramatically as the Soviets initially refused to remove the missiles and then said they
would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States removed its missiles from Turkey-a
condition Washington at first rejected. As both sides stood, “eyeball to eyeball” It was feared
that any open hostilities, whether at sea or as a result of US military action against Cuba, would
quickly escalate into a global nuclear war. After many tense days during which multiple
channels of communication between Moscow and Washington were employed and both
Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev realized the looming danger of a nuclear
holocaust a diplomatic solution was arrived at. The Soviets eventually agreed to remove the
missiles from Cuba in exchange for a US pledge not to try to invade Cuba in the future. Secretly,
Washington had indicated that it would eventually remove its missiles from Turkey. While the
crisis was resolved, it did bring to light the intensity and global character of the Cold War rivalry
and the “hair-trigger” nature of mutual nuclear deterrence that was supposed to sustain the
nuclear peace. The crisis demonstrated how perceptions and misperceptions as to each side’s
intentions could threaten that peace. It also showed that rational decision-making could prevail
when faced with the unthinkable, yet real, risk of nuclear war.
Questions:
1. If the USSR could already strike the United States with nuclear weapons, why was
Kennedy administration so adamant that the Soviet missiles in Cuba be removed?
2. Political leaders such as Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara saw the placement of
the Soviet missiles in Cuba as a “political” problem, whereas the senior US military saw
it as an act that had profound military consequences in terms of the strategic nuclear
balance of power. Who was right? How did this difference influence American decision-
making during the crisis?
3. Why was Washington reluctant to simply openly trade the US missiles in Turkey for the
Soviet missiles in Cuba?
4. Had the US itself created this crisis by its hostility toward the communist regime in Cuba,
a regime it had tried to overthrow by force?
5. Was it American overall nuclear superiority, US naval superiority near Cuba and firm
determination which accounted for the favourable outcome of the crisis or was it
Kennedy’s willingness, in view of the risk of nuclear war, to give Khrushchev (who was
also under domestic pressure not to give in) some leeway? As the Soviet leader wrote to
the American President during the Crisis:

Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which
you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that
knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight
that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be
necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to
you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our
countries dispose.

Department of State Telegram Transmitting Letter From Chairman

Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962
Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.
http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct26/doc4.html

6. Did the crisis show the actual military disutility of nuclear weapons for anything other
than deterrence?

Additional Material

David A. Welch and James G. Blight, “The Eleventh Hour of David A. Welch the Cuban Missile
James G. Blight Crisis: An Introduction to the ExCom Transcripts,” International Security Vol.
12, No. 3 (Winter, 1987-1988), pp. 5-29.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538800