Preston Taylor

Cuban Missile Crisis

Following the Allied Victory in World Word II, the US and USSR transitioned from

war-time allies, united in the fight against Hitler and the Axis Powers, to political opponents,

fighting for ideological supremacy. While capitalist NATO attempted to hold back the spread of

Communism across Eastern Europe and Asia by fiercely opposing any democratic country

electing a communist government, in a policy known as ‘containment’, the Soviets began

developing their own Nuclear weapons, fearing the US had taken one to much power after the

war and was a threat to worldwide peace as the sole nuclear power. The US and USSR began a

decades-long technological-race, known as the cold war, as each side sought to out-develop the

other in Nuclear weapons, space technology, and espionage tactics, while never actually fighting

head to head. Alongside this arms race, each side sought to greatly expand their sphere of

influence, allying with nations to gain tactical advantages and access to land for military

installations across the globe. The Cold War was never closer to the brink of exploding into a

nuclear catastrophe than in the Cuban Missile Crisis when the Soviets installed mid-range

missiles only 90 miles off the shores of the US in Cuba. While a tense two weeks of negotiations

ensued, and a nuclear strike seemed imminent, the Soviets eventually withdrew their missiles in

the closing hours before a US invasion. Thus, even though the Cuban missile crisis was the

closest the cold war got to becoming a nuclear war, it was instrumental in preventing further

conflicts and opening up direct communication between the US and Moscow.

 Fidel Castro rose to power as a political rebel, leading a guerilla force of 800 men to

victory against the 30,000 soldier army of the corrupt military dictator, Fulgencio Batista, who

colluded with American businessmen to sell the most profitable Cuban land to American

investors and was resented by most Cubans for the widening wealth gap in Cuba.1 Castro’s

uprising sought to reinstate civil liberties, restore faith in the government and institute socialist

reform across the country, wishing to bring the control of Cuba back to the Cuban people after

decades of US intervention. After seizing power and establishing himself as the Premier in the

‘Cuban Revolution’, his policies shifted from anti-corruption to pro-communism, taking control

of private industries, seizing privately-held land, and signing new trade agreements with the

Soviets, stripping most American businesses of their assets and trade agreements. In response,

the US froze most Cuban assets in the US and passed a comprehensive trade embargo on Cuba,

crippling their economy.2 The US started exploring options to overthrow Castro in favor of

installing a more pro-American president, arming Cuban exiles in the US, including José Miró

Cardona, who was to be the replacement president if successful. Following Kennedy’s

inauguration in 1961, he authorized a full invasion of Cuba, known as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The plan called for US bombers, painted without US insignia, to bomb Cuban airfields and

establish Air Supremacy before the invasion. This bombing run was unsuccessful, missing many

targets and leaving the Cuban Airforce still operational. Real disaster struck quickly after when

the 1,400 men of the US-backed Cuban exile force landed in the Bay of Pigs, hoping to quickly

march into the capital without much resistance under the cover of dark; they were quickly

overwhelmed by the Cuban army, having been stuck in a bog, low on ammunition and were

picked off by Cuban fighter planes, who sank their support vessels in the harbour. After being

1
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Encyclopedia Britannica,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.
2
“Cuba Sanctions - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, August 20, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/.
captured by the 20,00 strong Cuban army, the US had to negotiate for their safe release,

promising $53 million worth of medical supplies and baby food after a year of captivity.3 This

invasion left Castro deeply suspicious of the US, fearing a later attack of greater magnitude could

quickly capture the nation and he sought out protection from the Soviets. After signing a trade

agreement to supply the Soviet Union with sugar, with another $100 million in aid being offered

to assist in buying Soviet machinery and weaponry, Castro sought to strengthen relations,

economically, politically, and militarily.4 Khrushchev saw Cuba as an opportunity to strengthen

his domestic reputation, pushing back on his reputation of being soft on America and

strengthening the Soviet’s nuclear position, having fallen behind the technology of America and

proximity of American missiles to the USSR (in eastern European countries, particularly

Turkey). If discovered, the missiles could be used as a bargaining chip for the Soviets, with their

removal possibly being traded for the removal of NATO missiles or concession of Nato-held

West Berlin5. Thus, Castro allowed the missile facility to be built, and Khrushchev eagerly sent

Soviet missiles to Cuba, hoping that they (the thermonuclear missiles) would help forge a closer

relationship and deter potential invasions by the US.

When American U-2 spy planes spotted the mid-range missile facility being built in

Castro’s Cuba, the newly elected President Kennedy was forced into the most precarious

situation in how the US should respond. US officials agreed that inaction was not an option and

it was fully unacceptable to have missiles that could be launched less than 100 miles off our

shores, leaving the US air and missile defenses wholly unable to deal with the nuclear threat and
3
JFK Library. (n.d.). The Bay of Pigs. Retrieved May 24, 2022, from
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-bay-of-pigs
4
Robert S. Walters. “Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba: 1959-1964.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944-)42, no. 1 (1966): 74–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/2612437.
5
Keith Eubank, “Air Strike, Invasion or Blockade,” in The Missile Crisis in Cuba (Malabar, FL: Krieger Pub.,
2000), pp. 36-90, 39.
leaving cities across the continental US exposed, especially under the control of a famously

anti-American ruler. Disagreements, however, arose on how to deal with this issue. The safest

option was to call a joint meeting with Cuba and the USSR, in hope of diplomatically solving the

crisis, without any fear of retaliation; but, this plan would have a very low likelihood of actually

working, and would leave the Cubans ample time to build up the facility, increasing their

leverage over the situation. On the other hand, the US could quickly launch a bombing campaign

on Cuba, destroying the facility and Cuban air bases, before the missiles could become

operational. This plan could be supplemented by land and naval invasion, in order to install a

pro-American puppet president such as José Miró Cardona; this option was also unlikely to

succeed, as it was an act of aggression against Soviet interests and could trigger a full-blown

nuclear war, a risk Kennedy didn’t want to take. Ultimately, Kennedy chose to force the decision

back on the USSR, setting up a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent further Soviet arms from

reaching the nation and declaring open surveillance of the situation in order to force the USSR to

negotiate. To effectively cut off Cuba from receiving more strategic weapons, the naval

quarantine had to be set up before Cuba knew of the plan, leading to “the largest mobilization of

American men and equipment since World War 2” 6 and the creation of Task Force 136, a

coalition of an “aircraft carrier, two cruisers, 22 destroyers, and two guided-missile frigates” all

arranged in a semi-circle around Cuba’s eastern coast, with orders to stop any ships containing

Soviet nuclear materials and sink any non-compliant ships.7 On October 22, 7 days after the

missiles were first spotted, Kennedy publicly addressed the nation, revealing the missile threat

and naval quarantine, stressing the US priority was“secur[ing] their withdrawal or elimination

6
Keith Eubank, “Air Strike, Invasion or Blockade.”
7
David Coleman, “Map of the U.S. Naval Quarantine Line during the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Fourteenth Day:
JFK & the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 15, 2012,
https://jfk14thday.com/naval-quarantine-line-cuban-missile-crisis/.
from the Western Hemisphere” and remaining at peace with all nations involved.8

Accompanying his address, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a letter urging the Soviets to back down

and take their missiles from Cuba, or risk sending the whole world into Nuclear disaster; in

addition, he insisted that the Soviets adhere to the US’s naval quarantine, and send back any

ships containing tactical weapons, conceding the US would let through any civilian goods such

as food or medicine as it was not a total blockage (an act of war). In written communications

over the following few days, Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged letters, where each side

accused the other of trying to start a war. To assist in the negotiations, JFK used his brother and

close confidant, Robert Kennedy, to communicate with the Soviets through non-official

channels, often meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the US in private to voice concerns over

Cuba’s possession of nuclear weapons and question if the Soviets really trusted Castro’s

judgment with possession of nuclear weapons. Finally, on October 26, Khrushchev sent the US

embassy a correspondence, which detailed a compromise: if the Americans promised to never

attack Cuba, nor support any Cuban invasion forces, the Soviets would no longer need to provide

defensive weapons (an euphemism for the nuclear warheads) to them, a coded bargain to remove

the missiles. However, soon after this agreement was purposed, Cuban intelligence revealed that

the US had positioned bombers, missiles, and submarines for an imminent attack on Cuba, even

alerting Floridian hospitals to be ready for war casualties, in the event of the strike. With Cuban

officials urging the Soviets to launch the warheads as a defense mechanism, believing a US

strike was coming within hours, the Soviets were under increasing pressure to find a way out. In

further escalation, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot and

leaving the US searching for a response to the killing, an action the Cuban justified as they

8
John F Kennedy, “Address during the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Address During the Cuban Missile Crisis (JFK
Library), accessed May 24, 2022,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-during-the-cuban-missile-crisis.
believed the plane (in Cuban airspace) was taking photos to assist in an invasion of Cuba. 9 Just

as war seemed imminent, the Soviets rushed a message to Washington: the Soviets were

dismantling the missile array in return for the US’s promise not to invade Cuba and would come

to a final agreement for terms. Kennedy cut a backroom deal as well, vowing to remove the US’s

Jupiter missiles in Turkey, after all the Soviet missiles left Cuba, but refusing to put any

agreement on paper as the publication of such a document would surely destroy Kennedy’s

political career. As final terms were negotiated, with the removal of Soviet bombers and the final

lifting of the naval quarantine, crisis was averted, by the slimmest of margins.

Although the Cuban missile crisis almost sparked nuclear war, it was instrumental in

preventing further conflicts from escalating by establishing new procedures for negotiation,

creating a direct line of communication between Washington and Moscow, and creating nuclear

reduction treaties. In reconciling the conflict, all sides could save face, with the U.S. having

prevented Castro from gaining nuclear missiles (and thus sway over America), Castro having

secured an American promise not to invade his homeland, at least on paper, and Khrushchev

having used the whole conflict to reassert the Soviets nuclear position, and have the Jupiter

missiles removed from their border (although this facet could not have been bragged apart

publicly). Although these negotiations were successful, illustrating diplomacy and deterrence

could prevent war between the two superpowers, both the Soviets and Americans agreed that the

conflict had escalated too far, and more measures must be in place if both major nuclear powers

wanted to expand their influence, without risking nuclear war at every confrontation. Midyear in

1963, a direct communication link, colloquially referred to as the ‘hotline’, was established to

9
Keith Eubank, “Air Strike, Invasion or Blockade,” in The Missile Crisis in Cuba (Malabar, FL: Krieger Pub.,
2000), pp. 36-90, 83.
allow private, secure communication between the President of the United States and the Kremlin,

alleviated the confusion and back-room negotiation required during the crisis.10 This connection

alleviated the slowness of conventional Western-Union communications while ensuring the

securing not afforded by radio messages or public phone lines. On top of being a purely practical

connection, historians argue that the personal connection it provides has developed a greater

sense of trust between leaders, even when more modern forms of communication were available

and its use has become a symbolic gesture of mutual cooperation, even to this day.11 Moreover,

the increased cooperation led to the first agreement in limiting nuclear arms development,

banning above-ground nuclear-arms testing (Limited Test Ban Treaty), a treaty which helped

limit the spread of radioactive material in the atmosphere and pave the way to further restrictions

on nuclear arsenals. As more nations became capable of producing nuclear weapons, the

technology widely known through leaks and academic research, the US and USSR sought a way

to limit the number of nations with functional nuclear weapons, fearing smaller, more unstable

nations could acquire nuclear weapons, and use them without the repercussions of mutually

assured destruction. In times such as the Cuban Missile crisis, it was far easier to diplomatically

negotiate with one or two other nations than with twenty and thus, The Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was born; this agreement, barred nuclear states from sending

nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations, spreading the technology to produce these weapons and

restricted non-nuclear nations from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.12 Although the

number of nuclearly-armed nations has expanded since the 1960s, this agreement has limited the

10
Bruce MacDonald, “Looking Back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 50 Years Later,” United States Institute of Peace,
May 19, 2016, https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/10/looking-back-cuban-missile-crisis-50-years-later.
11
Eszter Simon and Agnes Simon, “Trusting through the Moscow-Washington Hotline: A Role Theoretical
Explanation of the Hotline's Contribution to Crisis Stability,” Journal of Global Security Studies 5, no. 4 (July
2020): pp. 658-674, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz062.
12
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA,” United Nations Office of Disarmament
Affairs (United Nations), accessed May 22, 2022, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text.
spread to only 9 nations currently. On top of NPT, over the last 50 years, both countries agreed

to many more treaties, aimed at reducing expenditure on nuclear weapon development,

restricting testing of them, and reducing the stockpiles of warheads ( Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty).13 Thus, the Cuban missile crisis was instrumental in overhauling Nuclear negotiation,

Soviet-American communication, and nuclear treaties.

Nuclear security has become increasingly precarious in the last 5 years. While the US and

Russia have decreased their stockpiles, from a combined total of 70,000 warheads in the 1980s to

under 10,000 today, other countries have continued to grow their arsenals. While the US

continues to decrease our number of warheads, decommissioning or retiring thousands of

warheads, worldwide stockpiles are actually increasing, led by smaller powers such as India,

Pakistan, China, and the United Kingdom rebuilding and modernizing their weapons. Most

notably, after years of development, North Korea is now in possession of an estimated 20

warheads and has tested long-range missiles capable of delivering them to the mainland US.14

This has sparked global outcry, especially as Kim Jon Un has repeated touted the DPRK’s ability

to attack both US assets and the 50 million South Koreans just over the border; many experts

voice concerns that the regime cares not for the lives of its own people, and is less likely to

respect the war limitations provided by mutually assured nuclear destruction. Most recently,

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pressured NATO and Eastern European countries to build up

their army and seek nuclear deterrence, in hopes of preventing Putin from invading. Following

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Ukraine possessed 1,900 Soviet nuclear

13
Office of the Historian (U.S. Department of State), accessed May 22, 2022,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/npt, 1.
14
Fas, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation Of American Scientists, accessed May 23, 2022,
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.
weapons, making it the third-largest nuclear power. Through a series of accords, they agreed to

disarm, sending all the warheads, ICBMs, and other delivery devices back to Russia in exchange

for security guarantees, economic assistance, and political support from both the US and

Russia.15 These accords are now widely criticized in Ukraine, as many believe that had Ukraine

not given up the Nuclear weapons, they would not have been susceptible to Russia’s invasion in

2021 or annexation of Crimea in 2014. With the threat of Russia invading other neighbors, the

Nuclear threat has become increasingly relevant and the US is currently at DEFCON 3, with

nuclear-armed air forces ready to launch in 15 minutes or less.

15
Daryl G Kimball, “Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance,” Arms Control Association,
February 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Ukraine-Nuclear-Weapons.
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