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THE OXFORD
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
HI
STANLEY N. KATZ
EDITOR IN CHIEF
VOLUME 5
Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht-Torture
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
2009
Orro
ScHERNER
public law and civillaw, internationallaw as an "intellectual community," laws as the "organ of popular law,"
customary law as "natural law," scientific law rather
than communis opinion (common opinion), subjective
law as the rule of volition, legal capacity, capacity to
act, legal facts, nominal value theory, "seat of the legal
relationship" in international private law, real contract,
principie of abstraction, conditions as a general principie, and res judicata of decisions.
Calling on his exceptional historie knowledge and systematic talent, Savigny's ability to reduce myriad details
to a "principie," that is, general rules with strictly limited
exceptions, continues to remain impressive. Moreover, he
always established these basic concepts thoroughly systematically, starting out from dichotomies. This system is
neither deductive nor theoretical, but rather derived from
positive law, of course from a permanent civillaw held to
be nonpolitical by nature. This is a rich general jurisprudence which reflected, for the first time, postfeudal, modem, and generally liberal conditions. Roman civillaw was
necessarily its main constituent, as it had been widely
adopted on the Continent. Savigny contributed decisively
to its decline by examining its current validity in each case
and often denying it.
His writings also deal with political matters, some of
them directly (Vermischte Schriften) (Miscellaneous works,
Vol. V). In principie, his considerations of positive civil
law were liberal, less so in public law. He welcomed and
pursued codification in penallaw (as minister). Savigny's
position seems "reformed-conservative" (Epstein), not
simply liberal or conservative, but he was strongly against
revolution.
For many generations of jurists, Savigny was the most
celebrated teacher. In order to claim his authority, there
were continuous arguments about the correct interpretation of his works. Did he follow Kant or not? Was he
unphilosophical? Was he a romaniticist, a classicist, or a
humanist? Or eclectic? Formalistic? Legalistic and positivistic? Or, in truth, unhistoric? Reactionary or not?
Debates continue about dogmatic positions such as the
doctrine of error, representation, action for restitution,
and so on. For more than twenty years, his voluminous
scientific estate in Marburg has produced new sources
and arguments, and the Savigny edition (see Rckert,
Savignyana) and research continue to flourish. Much
could and can be analyzed from a differentiated point of
view. Savigny's philosophy and structure of basic concepts is especially subject to differing positions. On the
one hand, there are convincing arguments that both
follow the assumptions of post-Kantian and thus a general objective-idealistic metaphysics, as was shared by
many, including Schelling and Hegel, after 1800. Sollen
und Sein ("is and ought") should be considered as one
from an ontological and epistomological point of view,
J OACHIM
RCKERT