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INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON

CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
COMMITTED BY

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION


OF THE UNITED STATES

VERDICT
and Findings of Fact

September 13, 2006

Bush Crimes Commission


305 West Broadway, #199
New York, NY 10013

www.bushcommission.org
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Preface
With this international commission we are looking at the crimes against humanity, which we
have been experiencing for some years, ever since the Bush administration came into office, but
whose antecedents really go back far into American history. It is a history of a very aggressive
foreign policy, a history which starts with the extermination of the Indians driving them out of
this continent, killing them, which proceeds with the invasion of Mexico, and goes on to send
troops into the Caribbean and then into the Philippines. And we’ve seen in this post-World War
II America, what was called by Henry Luce, the “American Century,” the military dominance of
the United States in the world.

The problem is that it is has not been moral dominance. The military dominance has gone along
with an immorality, which in these last years especially, has now reached the point of crime,
crimes against humanity, a phrase which came into general understanding after World War II
when the Nuremberg trials talked about the Nazis and their crimes against humanity. And it’s a
shame that we are at this point in American history where the charge that was made against the
Nazis is now a charge that people all over the world, and now more and more people in the
United States, are beginning to level against this administration.

Here is an administration that has taken this country into two wars in five years, ruthlessly send-
ing troops, first into Afghanistan and then into Iraq, under the guise of a war on terrorism, but in
fact waging war, carrying out acts of terrorism, against the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Bush Administration has been reserving to itself the right to unilaterally act whenever it felt
obliged to act, presumably in the interests of democracy and liberty, but actually in the interests
of business, big business, the oil business in this instance.

I remember during the Vietnam War, there was an artist who did a poster, which was distributed
by the thousands. The poster had simple words on it. It said, “War is good for business. Invest
your son.” That’s the situation we’re in now. Our sons, daughters are being invested for business
purposes. People all over the world know this, and now the American people recognize the im-
morality of what we are doing.

The destruction of life abroad is accompanied by the destruction of our liberties at home. When-
ever the government was engaged in war, in near war, or in a foreign policy crisis, then it has
used this as an excuse to say to the nation: “The First Amendment doesn’t count anymore. We
are in danger.” Precisely at that time is when people most need their freedom of speech, when
constitutional rights are most required, yet exactly at that point are they crippled and destroyed,
as is happening now with this administration with its Patriot Act, with its surveillance, with its
barging into libraries to demand the names of people who take out books, with its detention of
people without any due process and without trial.

The Bush Administration has been following a course, which can only now be described as a se-
ries of crimes against humanity. The Constitution provides for impeachment for what it calls
“high crimes and misdemeanors.” It has never been made exactly clear what this means. Gener-
ally, the presidents that have been impeached or threatened with impeachment have had that

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happen, not as a result of high crimes, but as a result of relatively small actions which irritated
the opposite political party. But in this case, this is a clear case for the removal of a president for
committing “high crimes.” What could be a higher crime than sending the young people of the
country into a war against a small country on the other side of the world, which is no danger to
the United States, and in fact a war which is condemned by people all over the world and a war
which results in, not only the loss of American lives and the crippling of young Americans, but
results in the loss of huge numbers of people in Iraq? These are high crimes.

Along with it, of course, comes the incapacity of the government to use its resources, because the
resources are being used for war. We are in the midst right now of international catastrophes, of
hurricanes, of earthquakes, which are taking the lives of tens of thousands of people. It is a crime
that we have military equipment and soldiers fighting a war, when they could be used in other
parts of the world to save peoples’ lives. These are crimes, which I think the American people
now are more and more recognizing. If Congress doesn’t act, and Congress has been so reluctant
to act, with the Democratic Party so feeble and really cowardly in its subservience to the Ad-
ministration and its policies, in such a situation, where the political mechanisms of the govern-
ment are inadequate to address these crimes, then it is the responsibility of the people to speak up
and to demand that these crimes be recognized and that the people responsible for these crimes
be removed from office and brought to justice.

The Declaration of Independence, which is our founding philosophical document for democratic
ideas, says that “governments are established by the people” and that the purpose of government
is to ensure that people have an equal right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” And
when governments become destructive of these ends, when governments become destructive of
these ends, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish the government.” That is the situation
we are in today. This government is destructive of the rights of people, of their right to life, their
right to liberty. It is also destructive of the right to life of people abroad, which is why the rest of
the world has opposed this war in Iraq. The government is destructive of the health of people,
because, while people are dying of disease in Africa and Asia, and the Middle East, and even in
this country, this government with enormous wealth at its disposal is using that wealth to wage.

We’re facing a situation which really is intolerable from a moral point of view, a situation which,
not being redressed by Congress or by the Supreme Court, a situation in which democracy must
arise. Democracy must come alive, as historically in the past, where the government has failed to
act on behalf of human rights, where the government has failed to act for racial equality. Black
people in the South had to take it upon themselves to create the kind of commotion in the country
that would bring about a change. When working people were facing 12-hour days and couldn’t
survive and the government was not doing anything about this, the working people themselves
had to go out on strike and stop the machinery of the economic system. Those are situations
when democracy came alive. And we face that kind of situation today. My hope is that this tri-
bunal will be an important step in advancing a movement which will demand that the crimes tak-
ing place now stop, that the people responsible for it be removed from office, and that democracy
be restored in the United States.

Howard Zinn

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Table of Contents
Preface by Howard Zinn ........................................................................................................ 3

Table of Contents................................................................................................................... 5

Introduction by C. Clark Kissinger........................................................................................ 7

Summary ................................................................................................................................11

Verdict and Findings..............................................................................................................13

Appendices

A. Commission Charter ..................................................................................................35

B. Standards for Judgment..............................................................................................39

C. Witness List ...............................................................................................................41

D. Panel of Jurists and Prosecutors.................................................................................43

E. Opening Remarks to Hearings from Harry Belafonte and Michael Ratner...............45

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Introduction
The extraordinary Commission of Inquiry convened to consider charges that the President
George W. Bush and his administration have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity
has now reached a verdict: Guilty.

On wars of aggression, illegal detention and torture, suppression of science and catastrophic
policies on global warming, potentially genocidal abstinence-only policies imposed on
HIV/AIDS prevention programs in the Third World, and the abandonment of New Orleans be-
fore, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, President George W. Bush and his administration have
been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This verdict comes at crucial moment. As Michael Ratner, President of the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, emphasized at the Commission hearings: “We want this trial to be a step in the
building of mass resistance to war, to torture, to the destruction of earth and its people. It’s a se-
rious moment. . . . We still have a chance, an opportunity to stop this slide into chaos. But it is
up to us. We must not sit with our arms folded, and we must be as radical as the reality we are
facing.”

Acts of the Bush Administration have continued to reinforce this assessment. The crimes cited in
the indictments have continued. We have witnessed a continuing onslaught of horrors in Iraq
from the massacres in Haditha and Mahmudiya to the exposure of rapes and murders by U.S.
forces. Torture continues at secret overseas sites. New Orleans still lies in ruins, much of its
Black population “resettled.” New evidence concerning the deadly impact of U.S. AIDS policy
in Africa has come to light. New crimes have been committed such as the destruction of Lebanon
with U.S. weapons and backing. And now even more serious crimes loom with open threats to
launch a new war of aggression on Iran.

This administration has flouted and defied the Geneva Conventions. It has arrogated to itself the
right to suspend habeas corpus, engage in mass warrantless searches, and defines the powers of
the “commander-in-chief” to be above the law. Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, has
sought to legitimize torture and exempt those who employ torture from prosecution.

At the 1967 Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, Bertrand Russell gave a profound mandate: “We
meet at an alarming time. Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent.
We investigate in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse consciousness in
order to create mass resistance.” Establishing the truth of the Bush Administration’s acts and
their implications for humanity is our moral and political responsibility in this time.

Background of the Commission

Bush’s new doctrine of “preventive war,” massive civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
opening of a concentration camp at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and the appearance of government
documents seeking to legitimize torture, the potentially catastrophic and genocidal policies on

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global warming and HIV/AIDS prevention all made clear that a serious investigation and adjudi-
cation was demanded.

Recognizing the need for this inquiry to establish the truth about charges of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, the Not In Our Name statement of conscience convened the Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administra-
tion. The Commission was initiated with a Charter (see Appendices) that was itself signed by
many noted voices of conscience.

The Charter begins, “When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against human-
ity exists, people of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope
of these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.”

The Charter also forthrightly states the Commission’s intent that “[t]he holding of this tribunal
will frame and fuel a discussion that is urgently needed in the United States: Is the administration
of George W. Bush guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity?”

The Commission took oral testimony and accepted documentary evidence from 44 witnesses at
public hearings held at the Manhattan Center, the historic Riverside Church, and the Columbia
School of Law during October 2005 and January 2006. These witnesses were an amazing array
of former government officials, noted experts, journalists, and victims.

Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector testified to the complete lies and fabrications of
the Bush administration in making the case for war in Iraq, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski,
the former commander of all prisons in Iraq established the chain of command from the torture
chambers of Abu Ghraib to the highest offices of the land, and Craig Murray, the former British
ambassador to Uzbekistan testified to the use of torture by U.S. allies in the War on Terror.
Murray exemplified the moral clarity needed by society when he stated, “I would personally
rather die than have anyone tortured to save my life”

Standards for the Commission

The Commission’s legitimacy derives from its integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evidence,
and the stature of its participants.

Precisely because of the singular nature of some of this administration’s actions and the lack of
relevant precedent in existent law, it was necessary to proceed from a “first principles” definition
of crimes against humanity. As a basis for its verdicts and findings of fact, these principles were
codified in its Standards of Judgment document (see Appendices), which sets forth the definition
of “crimes against humanity” to be used by the Commission:

“[C]rimes against humanity as popularly understood and conceived [are] acts that, by their scale
or nature, shock the conscience of humankind.

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“Crimes against humanity are brutal crimes that are not isolated incidents but that involve large
and systematic actions often cloaked with official authority. These include mass murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts perpetrated against a population,
conducted in wartime or not. Apartheid and persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds
have also been considered inhumane acts causing great suffering, and therefore crimes against
humanity.”

While the Commission has referenced existing international law where applicable, it neither at-
tempted to develop new law nor to force-fit its findings into existing legal frameworks. Rather,
through the rigorous presentation of expert and witness testimony, documents, and other evi-
dence, the Commission has sought to establish the truth about major acts and policies of the
Bush administration, acts that could by their nature or scope, rise to the level of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.

That is, first and foremost, it is the task of the Commission to establish the truth.

Finally, the Standards gives a charge to its panel of judges (referred to in the Charter as a “jury of
conscience”): “The historic and political responsibility before this tribunal lies in delivering find-
ings of fact and a verdict on the central question before the commission: ‘whether George W.
Bush and his administration have committed crimes against humanity.’ As the Charter mandates,
‘The Commission’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.’
The jury of conscience will carefully assess the evidence and base its conclusions on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.”

***

It was a great strength that the hearings were held in the United States itself and were not limited
to one issue. By taking the charges together, a whole emerges that is greater than the sum of its
parts: the conscious, systematic malevolence at the core of the Bush agenda.

Realizing and confronting the reality that war crimes and crimes against humanity are being
committed by your government, in your name, brings to the fore the moral and political respon-
sibility to bring these crimes to halt -- and make sure that they are never repeated.

C. Clark Kissinger
New York, NY

C. Clark Kissinger was an initiator of the Not In Our Name statement of conscience as is the
Convener of the Bush Crimes Commission.

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FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED BY THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Commission’s panel of jurists has reached a unanimous decision that George W.

Bush and his administration have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

We find the Bush Administration guilty of all five indictments presented for which we

have received evidence: wars of aggression, torture and indefinite detention, global warming

policies and actions, attacks on public health HIV/AIDS programs and reproductive rights, and

preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Each of these constitutes a shocking crime in itself, and taken together the full horrors are

all the more unconscionable. It is also clear that this is an administration that demonstrates an

utter disregard for truth and flagrantly lies about the reasons for its actions.

In arriving at this decision the jurists were particularly alarmed by the degree to which

the Bush Administration’s actions in all five indictments were informed by the extreme right. It

was the politics and perspective of the extreme, often religious, right that appeared in most cases

to provide the ideological framework for the Bush Administration within which the lives of the

poor, people of color and frequently non-Christians, were devalued to the extent that their human

rights were flagrantly violated. Thus, although the specific conduct differs among the indict-

ments, the result is the same: human life was debased and devalued by gratuitous acts of vio-

lence, torture, narrow self interest, indifference, and disregard.

The findings outlined below were reached after careful assessment of the evidence pre-

sented to the Commission in October 2005 and January 2006 as well as documents submitted by

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the prosecutors after the hearings at the request of the jurists during the hearings.1 The findings

are based on our application of the Standards of Judgment for the International Commission of

Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the United States.

As required by this standard, the Commission relied on fundamental principles of morality and

justice, and, where appropriate, customary international law and international law principles in-

cluding the United Nations Charter, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Principles

of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention, the Torture Vic-

tims’ Protection Act, the War Crimes Act, and the international law of War Crimes and Crimes

Against Humanity.

Finally, the Commission has fulfilled its responsibility outlined in the Charter of the In-

ternational Commission of Inquiry: “When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes

against humanity exists, people of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the

nature and scope of these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes

and crimes against humanity.” We find that the acts of the Bush Administration in the five in-

dictment areas do “rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

Members of the panel:

Adjoa Aiyetoro
Dennis Brutus
Abdeen Jabara
Ajamu Sankofa
Ann Wright

1
The final decision and judgment differs from the preliminary findings released on February 2, 2006, in several re-
spects: (1) the Commission has reached a conclusion on the Global Health indictment after reviewing the documents
requested at the January hearing and received after the February 2 preliminary findings; (2) the findings made for
each indictment are more detailed; (3) in one instance, the Commission found a violation although it also found that
the charge made by the prosecution was not supported by the evidence.

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FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (hereinafter The Commission)

FINDINGS:
WARS OF AGGRESSION INDICTMENT

Count 1: The Bush Administration authorized a war of aggression against Iraq.

As to count 1, we find that the Bush Commission authorized, under the doctrine of “preemptive
war” and a policy of “regime change”, a war of aggression against Iraq.

The doctrine of “preventive war” is not recognized as a justification for war under international
law. The goal of “regime change” is also not recognized as a legitimate purpose for waging war
under international law. Notwithstanding these facts, the Bush Administration launched a full
scale war against Iraq, a sovereign state; it did so not in self-defense or under the authorization of
the United Nations Security Council. The Bush Administration knew prior to the 2003 invasion
that Iraq had no connection to Al Qaeda, was disarmed, had no weapons of mass destruction, and
was incapable of mounting a credible defense much less an attack on the United States. Accord-
ingly, the Iraq war is an aggressive war in violation of international law.2

The Bush Administration steadfastly asserted only one justification for its invasion of Iraq: it
claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction3. The Bush Administration fixed and manipu-
lated intelligence on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in order to mislead de-
liberately and persuade the United States population and their elected representatives to support
the war of aggression. Accordingly, what the Bush Administration called intelligence to justify
the invasion of Iraq was politically motivated propaganda deliberately concocted to prosecute a
war of aggression.4

Count 2: The Bush Administration authorized conduct of the war that involved the com-
mission of “war crimes.”

As to Count 2, we find that the Bush Administration authorized conduct of the war that involved
the commission of war crimes.

As discussed above, the war is a war of aggression against the Iraq people. A war of aggression
is termed the supreme international war crime in international law because it is the world’s most
egregious war crime. This is so because it contains within it the combined atrocities of all war
crimes. In addition to committing the supreme international war crime, the Bush Administration,
2
Testimony of Amy Bartholomew, The Commission; Testimony of Phil Shiner, World Tribunal on Iraq, (WTI).
3
Testimony of Scott Ritter, The Commission
4
Testimony of Scott Ritter, David Swanson, Larry Everest, and Ray McGovern, The Commission; Declaration of
the Jury of Conscience, World Tribunal on Iraq, and Legal appendix by Richard Falk;

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pursuant to its war of aggression in Iraq, has committed additional enumerated war crimes that
include but are not limited to the following:

1. The use of force beginning with the campaign of “Shock and Awe” was not a necessary
means or necessary measure to attain a lawful objective and it was a severe example of
overwhelming, indiscriminate, and disproportionate use of military force against a nation
state.5
2. The indiscriminate use of weapons such cluster munitions, incendiary bombs, depleted
uranium, and chemical weapons for which it is reasonably foreseeable would have caused
and indeed caused significant civilian injuries.6

Count 3: The Bush Administration authorized the occupation of Iraq involving, and con-
tinuing to involve, the commission of “war crimes.”

As to Count 3, we find that the Bush Administration authorized the occupation of Iraq involving
and continuing to involve, the commission of war crimes.

In the spring of 2003, the Bush Administration announced a military victory in Iraq signaled by
its destruction of the Iraqi Ba’athist government at which point the United States proceeded to
occupy Iraq.

For the duration of the United States occupation of Iraq, the United States is failing to safeguard
the lives of Iraqi civilians that have resulted from the devastation created by its intentionally
bombing of civilian infrastructure, termed “Shock and Awe” and created by its ongoing criminal
acts that include but are not limited to the following:

1. Because the invasion of Iraq was the supreme war crime, the resultant occupation of Iraq
itself is a war crime.7 The occupation consisted of additional war crimes such as: collec-
tive punishment upon the Iraqi people in the form of post invasion intentional and tar-
geted attacks upon civilian populations, hospitals, medical centers, residential neighbor-
hoods, electrical power stations and water purification facilities8 the wide spread use of
torture against the Iraqi people,9 mass arrests and detention of civilians and civilian home
demolitions10 and the destruction and desecration of the cultural and archeological heri-
tage of the Iraqi people11
2. Killing and injuring individual civilians through random fire during military operations
or in response to attacks by resistance forces, e.g. killing of over 40 people in a wedding
near Al Qaim, and over 600 people in Fallujah, half of them women and children. The
Bush Administration declared the City of Fallujah, a population of 350,000 people, a free
fire zone. As a result, the Bush Administration bombed 70 % of the city in 2004. The

5
Testimony of Phil Shiner, WTI
6
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, Dr. Fasy, and Stephen Bronner, The Commission
7
Center for Economic and Social Rights CESR Report, June 10, 2004;
8
Testimony of Camilo Mejia, Dennis Halliday, and Dahr Jamal, The Commission; Testimony of Ramsey Clark,
WTI;
9
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;
10
CESR Report, June 10. 2004;
11
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;

14
Bush Administration also extensively and indiscriminately bombed Ramadi, Samara,
Haditha, Alkaim, Abuhisma, Sania, Najaf, Kut, Baghdad, Musul and other Iraqi cities
causing substantial civilian deaths and severe injuries.12
3. The failure of civil reconstruction, the impeding of medical care during the occupation,
and the facilitation of the corporate looting of Iraq through the rewriting of Iraq’s laws.13;
4. Deliberately bombing civilian and neutral broadcasting outlets and otherwise restricting
press and media coverage of actual events.14; and
5. Extrajudicial killings at checkpoint.15

TORTURE, RENDITION, ILLEGAL DETENTION and MURDER INDICTMENT

Torture:

Count 1: The Bush Administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in violation of
international humanitarian and human rights law, customary international law, and do-
mestic constitutional and statutory law.

As to Count 1, we find that the Bush Administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in
violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, customary international law, and
domestic constitutional and statutory law.

In December 2001, the Bush Administration implemented the Special Access Program that au-
thorized the secret seizure, detention, and interrogation of persons and subjected them to torture.
The torture included but was not limited to: water boarding, beatings, the administration of elec-
tric shocks, extreme temperatures, denial of pain medication for injuries, severe burning, depri-
vation of food and water, and threats of death and sexual assault of family members.16.

In January 2002, the Bush Administration declared that Geneva Conventions protections will not
be honored for the “war on terror” prisoners held at the Guantánamo detention center in Cuba. In
August 2002, the Administration attempted to redefine “torture” to escape liability and/or insure
immunity for those who authorized or committed torture. Under the Bush Administration’s new
torture definition, torture only exists when a person is put at risk of complete organ failure or
death. The Bush Administration also examined the ways that it could avoid liability under cir-
cumstances where its actions exemplified its new definition of torture, including raising the de-
fenses of necessity and self-defense.17

The United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, admitted that Guantánamo prisoner,
Al-Qahtani was tortured at Guantánamo. Other Guantánamo detainees were subjected to ex-

12
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, The Commission; CESR Report, June 10, 2004; New York times article on Haditha,
May, 2006 ;
13
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, The Commission; CESR; Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI; Testimony of
Ramsey Clark, WTI;
14
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI; Testimony of Jeremy Scahill, The Commission
15
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;
16
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
17
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission

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tremes of temperature, deprived of food and water, shackled for days to the floor in extreme po-
sitions calculated to cause pain, and denied medical care. As a direct result of this torture, detain-
ees suffered permanent injuries including the loss of limbs and broken bones. Other detainees
suffered severe personality decompensation and are now suffering from a range of mental ill-
nesses. The techniques of torture used at Guantánamo were transferred by General Geoffrey
Miller to and used on the detainees imprisoned at Abu Ghraib in Iraq.18

Persons held under United States custody in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo as well as those
held under the custody of the United States during rendition were subjected to torture, and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment as a matter of policy and systemic practice.19

Secret detention itself is a form of torture for the person detained and for the families who were
faced with a situation that amounted to that of enforced disappearance of an individual20.

Rendition:

Count 2: The Bush Administration authorized the transfer (“rendition”) of persons held in
U.S. custody to foreign countries where torture is known to be practiced.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the seizure, trans-
fer, and detention (“rendition”) of persons to foreign countries where torture is known to be prac-
ticed.21

In late 2001, at the request of CIA Director, George Tenet, the President authorized the creation
of CIA-run secret detention centers in countries outside the United States where post 9/11 de-
tainees would be sent (“rendered”) and subjected to practices that would be unlawful in the
United States.22

The original rendition program was conceived by the CIA and authorized in the 1990’s by the
Clinton Administration. The strategic target of the CIA rendition program has always been, and
remains the global network known as Al-Qaeda. Post 9/11, under the Bush Administration, the
CIA has taken a much larger role in the rendition program to include its participation in interro-
gation of detainees rather than just placing them behind bars. Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice referred to this program as “extraordinary rendition.23

18
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
19
Testimony of Jumah al-Dossari and Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Report: Alleged Secret Detentions and
Unlawful Inter-state Transfer involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty, Switzer-
land, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly.
20
Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions in Coun-
cil of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty p. 2, see comments by United Nations
High Commissioner on Human Rights, Ms. Louise Arbour.
21
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission
22
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky The Commission; Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Federal Regis-
ter: November 16, 2001 Vol. 66, No.222, Presidential Documents pp. 57831-36.
23
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur: Mr.
Dick Marty p. 3

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The result has been that captured suspects are placed outside of the reach of any judicial system
and are subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques that are in themselves forms of torture.24

The Bush Administration undertook an untold number of these “extraordinary renditions” where
the abductees, while under US custody or control, were tortured by CIA agents or foreign opera-
tives. Typical of these renditions is the case of Egyptian citizen, Hassam Mustafa Nasr, known as
Abu Omar. He was abducted by the CIA in Milan Italy on June 17th 2003 and transferred to
Egypt where he was detained. Abu Omar was tortured after his abduction and prior to his being
sent to Egypt during which time the CIA participated in the torture investigation. CIA operatives
acknowledged that rendered suspects were being tortured in Egypt. Maher Arar, a Canadian citi-
zen, born in Syria was detained in the United States and rendered to Syria against his wishes
where he was tortured and held for ten and a half months. Mamdouh Habib was picked up in
Pakistan and sent to Egypt where he was tortured for four months before being transferred to
Guantánamo by the United States.25

Illegal Detention:

Count 3: The Bush Administration authorized the indefinite detention of persons seized in
foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone and denied them the
protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and the protec-
tions of the US Constitution.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the indefinite de-
tention of person seized in foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone
and denied them the protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war
and the protections of the US Constitution.

On November 13th 2001, the Bush Administration created a “trial system” for trying non-citizen
detainees where the United States does not provide these detainees due process protections that
are well established in domestic and international law. The “trial system” is to be held in
Guantánamo where detainees are deprived due process rights under the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
eighth amendments of the United States Constitution.

Persons have been or are currently detained in these detention centers without charge and are be-
ing held indefinitely. These US controlled detention centers are in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as
well as in several sites in Eastern Europe and North Africa. The Bush Administration declared

24
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Report, Section C, 2.1 Para. 35 and 26 of Alleged Secret Deten-
tions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfer Involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty,
Switzerland, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly; Also see:
Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper October 2004, The United States Disappeared: The CIA’s Long-Term Ghost
Detainees; Amnesty International Report, April 5, 2006: Below the Radar: Secret Flights To Torture and Disappear-
ance
25
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions in Council of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur:
Mr. Dick Marty p. 8 and 13

17
that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these detainees who were defined as “enemy com-
batants”, a term not valid under international law.26

Round ups

Count 4: The Bush Administration authorized the round-up and detention in the United
States of tens of thousands of immigrants on pretextual grounds and held them without
charge or trial in violation of international law and domestic constitutional and civil rights
law.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the round-up and
detention in the United States of thousands (the exact number is unknown) of immigrants on pre-
textual grounds and held many of them illegally long past the resolution of their immigration
status.

The FBI and INS, under the rubric of very large immigration sweeps, rounded up and detained
immigrants, mostly Arabs, Muslims or South Asian men. The sweeps were a flagrant example
of racial profiling. The detainees could not call their family, nor call their consulate. Very few
were permitted out on bond. They were in a legal black hole. Many were brutalized by guards
and held in virtual solitary confinement. These actions were in violation of international law and
domestic constitutional law.

In September 2001, the Bush Administration authorized the seizures and detention of US immi-
grants in US detention centers. The seizures and detentions in the United States were called “ma-
terial witness “seizures by the US Justice Department. The Commission finds that the Bush Ad-
ministration held possibly hundreds of people under the material witness statute without charge
or trial in violation of international and domestic constitutional and civil rights law. In many
cases, people who merely looked Arab or South Asian were picked up first based on uncorrobo-
rated tips and then held if they had a minor immigration violation or were designated as a mate-
rial witness. No one knows exactly how many are still being held in the United States pending
deportation or as material witnesses; evidence strongly suggests that it may be hundreds. They
are held without charge and denied basic principles of due process and judicial review. These
practices contravene the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.

Another category of detainees are people who entered the United States for purposes other than
becoming a permanent resident, for example, on a visitor or student visa (non-immigrants).
Thousands of such individuals were subjected to the National Registration Act, a post 9/11 law.
This act was intended to register and monitor non-immigrants from countries designated by the
Secretary of State entering or already in the United States but in fact was used as a means of ar-

26
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Report, Section C, 2.1 Para. 35 and 26: Alleged Secret De-
tentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfer Involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick
Marty, Switzerland, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly;
Also see: Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper October 2004, The United States Disappeared: The CIA’s Long-
Term Ghost Detainees; Amnesty International Report, April 5, 2006: Below the Radar: Secret Flights To Torture
and Disappearance

18
resting and deporting these individuals. In addition, the Act was enforced in an discriminatory
manner only against Muslims and Arab visitors, and in an arbitrary manner in that some people
were deported to countries from which they had previously been granted political asylum. The
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of the Act contravene the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights.27

Indefinite Detentions

Count 5: The Bush Administration used military force to seize and detain indefinitely
without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their detention in U.S,
courts.

As to Count 5, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration used military force to seize
and detain indefinitely without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their
detention in U.S. courts.

The Bush Administration seized and detained within the United States persons who are United
States citizens. The Bush Administration has classified these seized persons as “enemy combat-
ants.” For example, Yaser Hamdi, A US citizen, was detained in Afghanistan and placed in
United States custody. There is also Jose Padilla, a US citizen, who was arrested in O’Hare air-
port by law enforcement agent and later transferred to military custody at the request of the
President. These detainees were taken into US military custody after they had been declared
“enemy combatants” by the Bush Administration. All such “enemy combatant” detainees were
denied a judicial hearing on the facts or on the legality of their detention. In each case and in
violation of the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions, the United States took the position
that the president has the authority to hold “enemy combatants” and decide their status unilater-
ally.

The US Supreme Court subsequently gave meaning to the Bush Administration’s made up term
“enemy combatant.” The Court limited the meaning to persons who, while in Afghanistan, had
taken up arms against the United States in alliance with the Taliban or other terrorists and as long
as hostilities existed. The Bush Administration proceeded to violate the Supreme Court’s defi-
nition as exemplified by the fact that Mr. Padilla was not arrested in Afghanistan or anywhere
near a battlefield, and was not shown to have ever taken up arms against the United States in Af-
ghanistan or elsewhere.28

Murder

Count 6: The Bush Administration committed murder by authorizing the CIA to kill those
that the president designates either US citizens or non-citizens, anywhere in the world.

27
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
28
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; (Also see: Supreme Court, US decision on Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, No. 05-184, 2006)

19
As to Count 6, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration committed murder by author-
izing the CIA to kill those that the president designates, either US citizens or non-citizens, any-
where in the world and where this authorization was acted upon causing death.

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, issued a secret directive to Special Operations forces
allowing them to “capture terrorists for interrogation or, if necessary, to kill them” anywhere in
the world.29. The Bush Administration had already issued a presidential finding authorizing the
killing of terrorist leaders, but the secret Rumsfeld directive increased such efforts.30 The Bush
Administration, claiming that terrorists are military combatants, never rescinded a preexisting
presidential executive order signed by US President Ford in 1976 that banned all assassinations.

In February 2002, a Predator drone missile was launched by the CIA; it targeted for assassination
someone intelligence agents thought was bin Laden. The drone hit its target, but killed three in-
nocent Afghan farmers instead.31 The first successful assassination takes place in November
2003 when the CIA launched a Hellfire drone missile that killed US citizen Kamal Derwish and
five others in Yemen. The United States considered the dead men to be enemy combatants in its
global war on terror.32

GLOBAL WARMING INDICTMENT

Denial and Distortion of Scientific Consensus and Findings

Count 1: The Bush Administration has consistently denied the scientific consensus around
global warming and its causes. Administration officials have misrepresented, distorted, and
suppressed scientific information on the subject, especially as it would impact public opin-
ion.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has consistently denied the
scientific consensus around global warming and its causes. Administration officials have misrep-
resented, distorted, and suppressed scientific information on the subject, especially as it would
impact public opinion.

The Bush Administration, early in its existence, requested the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to review the findings of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). The IPCC is composed of 2,000 scientists; they had been studying global warming since
1989. The Bush Administration also wanted the NAS to provide it a further assessment of what
climate science says about the reality of global warming/climate change. The NAS subsequently

29
Manhunt by Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, December 16, 2002
30
Bush Has Widened Authority of CIA to Kill Terrorists by James Risen and David Johnson, New York Times,
12/15/2002
31
Manhunt by Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, December 16, 2002
32
US Citizen Killed by CIA Linked to NY Terror Case by Michael Powell and Donna Priest, p. A01, Washington
Post, November 9, 2002

20
strongly confirmed the findings of the IPCC that had affirmed the existence of global warming
and climate change. In addition, the American Geophysical Union (AGU), the world’s largest
organization of earth scientists had also released a strong report describing the human causes of
disruption of the Earth’s climate.

Despite the scientific consensus evidenced in the IPCC, NAS, and the AGU reports on the exis-
tence of global warming and the human behavior that is causing it, the Bush Administration con-
tended in full contradiction and misrepresentation of the scientific consensus presented to it, that
uncertainties in climate projections existed and that fossil fuel emissions are too great to warrant
mandatory action to slow emissions.

The Bush Administration successfully lobbied to have the chief of the IPCC, Dr. Robert Watson,
removed from the IPCC.33

An example of the Bush Administration actively suppressing information showing the existence
of global warming is illustrated by its pressuring the Environmental Protection Agency to re-
move any reference discussing the existence to global warming and extreme climate change and
its causes from its 2002 annual air pollution report.34

An example of the Bush Administration actively distorting the science on global warming and
extreme climate change was evident when a whistleblower, Rick Piltz, a senior associate from a
federal climate change program publicly disclosed proof of the Bush Administration editing fed-
eral documents to distort the science. The New York Times printed excerpts of the documents in
June 2005. The documents showed that a Mr. Philip A. Cooney, chief of the White House Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, also a former manager for the American Petroleum Institute who
had led the oil industry’s drive to prevent restrictions on greenhouse emissions, and who had no
scientific training; redrafted the federal climate change official report to deny the validity of the
scientific consensus on global warming and extreme climate change. Cooney and his staff had
made 100 to 450 pertinent editorial changes per report.35

Among the topics that the Bush Administration is attempting to keep from the public are the na-
tional and regional deleterious outcomes to the earth and its human population from global
warming and extreme climate change: for example, increased heat waves and corresponding
public health threats, droughts and conflicts from water shortages, flooding that will destroy cos-
tal infrastructure and wetlands as occurred due to Katrina and other hurricanes, irreversible de-
struction of coral reefs indispensable to sea life, massive economic dislocation with the elimina-
tion of major coastal industries and government and corporate action that could be taken to pre-
vent, mitigate, and adapt to the coming disasters.

33
Testimony of Ted Glick, The Commission; 2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking
34
2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking

35
2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking

21
As a result of the Bush Administrations behavior to misrepresent, distort, and suppress informa-
tion on global warming and extreme climate change, the actual problem solving of global warm-
ing has been set back ten years.36

Obstructionism on International Efforts

Count 2: The Bush Administration has refused to take any measures to curb the emissions
of greenhouse gases, guided by narrow corporate interests. It has withdrawn from any in-
ternational efforts that would impose binding restrictions, however minimal. It has done
this with full knowledge of the catastrophic effects of global warming and the dispropor-
tionate U. S. share of world greenhouse emissions, the leading cause of global warming.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has refused to take any meas-
ures to curb the emissions of greenhouse gases, guided by narrow corporate interests. It has
withdrawn from any international efforts that would impose binding restrictions, however mini-
mal. It has done this with full knowledge of the catastrophic effects of global warming and the
disproportionate U. S. share of world greenhouse emissions, the leading cause of global warm-
ing.

The United States, under the Bush Administration, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol which is
an international effort to reduce greenhouse emissions and end global warming. It did so despite
the fact that the United States has only 5% of the world’s population and is responsible for nearly
25% of greenhouse emissions.37

Despite a pledge by George Bush during the 2000 Presidential campaign to mandate mandatory
emission reductions of carbon dioxide on the US based coal fired power plants, President Bush
reversed this pledge two months after his inauguration in 2001.38 In March 2001, under the lead-
ership of Vice President, Dick Cheney, the Bush Administration presented its energy plan. This
plan, the Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, called for the construction
of 1,300 to 1,900 new power plants, most of them coal fired.39

The motives of the Bush Administration are clear. The Bush Administration is deliberately tar-
geting the information that expert policy-makers have on climate change in an effort to protect
the most powerful industries on the planet: the oil, gas and coal industries, in full disregard of the
harm to the environment and to the most vulnerable people globally. According to a World
Health Organization study, 160,000 people are dying every year as a result of extreme climate
change related to floods, hurricanes, droughts, disease, and food shortages.40

36
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission
37
Testimony of Ted Glick, The Commission
38
Groups Blast Bush for reversing position on Emissions, Inside Politics, CNN, March 15, 2001
39
See www.whitehouse.gov/energy
40
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission

22
For the peoples of Africa, the threat is worse, because the temperature increases over many areas
of the continent will be double the global average. This suggests that 182 million people in sub-
Sahara Africa could die of diseases directly attributable to climate change by the end of the cen-
tury.41

Indigenous people of the Pacific Islands, The United States Great Lakes, Southwest, and Great
Plains regions are experiencing the severe difficulties reported by the UN. Indigenous people of
the Artic region, specifically the Inuit and the Yupik, are experiencing enormous difficulties as
well. They are experiencing life threatening accidents due to falling through thinning ice, com-
munity displacements, previously unknown health problems such as sunburn, skin cancer, cata-
racts, immune system disorders and heat related health problems.42

Despite the scientific consensus on the present known toll in human death and suffering attrib-
uted to global warming and extreme climate change and the prospects for far more catastrophic
and irreversible injury to the Earth and its human population, the Bush Administration has used
its enormous power through deliberate deception, to diffuse and confuse the focused attention of
the world on the multilateral framework of the Kyoto protocol and the climate convention. The
Bush Administration used its power to exacerbate the problems associated with extreme climate
change by promulgating policies and practices that actually increased global warming and ex-
treme climate change and that simultaneously limited the capacity of the world’s people to re-
spond before irreversible injuries result.43

SUMMARY

The Commission considers the deliberate acts and failures to act by the Bush Administration re-
garding global warming to be systemic. We also consider the global consequences of this behav-
ior to be both grave and foreseeable. The Administration’s behavior also constitutes breaches of
UN treaties that the US has signed and ratified related to protecting the global environment: they
are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that commits the US to developing poli-
cies aimed at returning its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. We also find, as it pertains to
the fundamental rights of sovereign indigenous people of the Americas that the Bush Admini-
stration is violating indigenous people’s fundamental human rights as protected by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

We find that the disproportionate role that the United State plays in polluting the earth is directly
causing global warming and extreme climate change. We also find that the systemic nature of the
Bush Administration’s deliberate refusal to act reasonably to curb global warming combined

41
Climate Change Will be Catastrophe for Africa, by Paul Vallely, The Independent (UK), May 16, 2006
42
Testimony by Tom “Mato Awanyankapi” Goldtooth, The Commission; Inuit Petition Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United States of America, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Peti-
tioner, December 7, 2005; Also see: Tiohtia Declaration, International Indigenous Peoples Forum on climate Change
Statement to the State Parties of the COP 11/MOP 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on climate
Change UNFCCC, November 28-December 9, 2005
43
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission

23
with its deliberate acts that directly increase global warming and extreme climate change place
the world’s people at imminent risk of unspeakable and irreversible destruction in the near fu-
ture. Accordingly, we find that the Bush Administration is committing a crime against humanity.

GLOBAL HEALTH INDICTMENT

Imposition of Abstinence-Only HIV prevention Programs

Count 1: The Bush Administration is using its political influence, aid, and funding in the
sphere of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment to advance policies and programs that
worsen the AIDS pandemic. Guided by a Christian fundamentalist ideological agenda, the
administration is promoting and forcing deadly abstinence-only HIV prevention and sex
education programs instead of proven comprehensive programs that comprise consistent
and correct use of condoms.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration is using its political influence,
aid, and funding in the sphere of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment to advance policies and
programs that worsen the AIDS pandemic. We also find that the Administration, guided by a
Christian fundamentalist ideological agenda, is promoting and forcing deadly abstinence-only
HIV prevention and sex education programs instead of proven comprehensive programs that
comprise consistent and correct use of condoms.

The Bush Administration’s abstinence-only policy influences global HIV prevention efforts. It is
called the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It is a moralistic, Christian fundamental-
ist, and non public health oriented approach, promulgated in February 2004; it focuses on 15
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia that are severely stricken by the AIDS
pandemic.

PEPFAR requires that grantees devote at least 33% of prevention spending to abstinence-until
marriage programs. These policies are inherently coercive in that they withhold needed informa-
tion and they also promote inaccurate opinions and harmful outcomes. The PEPFAR law in-
cludes no comparable minimum for condom distribution; hence prevention funds are steered to
abstinence only programs.44

The Bush Administration developed PEPFAR through a closed-door process that did not include
participation of key stakeholders in the global AIDS policy debate. The Bush Administration
continues to be the primary donor for HIV/AIDS programs in Uganda and in the world.45

44
Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The Interna-
tional Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working Papers, No. 1 June 2004, p.10; Journal of
Adolescent Health 38 2006 72-81, Review article: Abstinence and abstinence-only education: A review of U.S.
policies and programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H. et al, p.77-79
45
Condom Crisis in Uganda: Shortages Spread to Other Countries, US Policies Undermine HIV Prevention Pro-
grams, August 2005, by Jodi L. Jacobson, Center for Health and Gender Equity Center for Health and Gender Eq-

24
The PEPFAR policies are reversing the well-recognized successes that Uganda had achieved in
preventing the spread of HIV between 1991 and 2001.46

Global inequality drives health disparity. AIDS funds represent a substantial sum of money to
Uganda, and other desperately impoverished that are already critically financially dependent on
western international financial institutions dominated by the United States. Substantial economic
dependence on the West, coupled by the Bush Administration’s manipulation of AIDS funding
to promulgate a religious doctrine at the expense of sound public health policy and science, has
shattered coercively and dramatically Uganda’s preexisting successful AIDS domestic priorities.
As a practical matter, many third-world countries, such as Uganda, have little or no choice be-
cause of a lack of public health funds and infrastructure but to comply with PEPFAR.47

In 2005, the Ugandan Minister of Health, the Hon. Maj. Gen. Jim K. Muhwezi reported that de-
spite the historical record of Uganda’s success in reducing HIV, the Uganda government, in an
effort to prevent a drying up of AIDS resources, since 2003, started downplaying its own proven
successful track record and re-wrote its own history in an obvious attempt to please the United
States that had started pouring millions of dollars into ideologically driven PEPFAR HIV-
prevention programs that provided misleading information about the effectiveness of condoms
and that failed to equip people, particularly women with the essential skills needed to negotiate
safer sex.

Ambassador Stephen Lewis, the United Nations secretary general’s special envoy for HIV/AIDS
in Africa since 2001, and the former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, stated the
PEPFAR policies in the Uganda will cause significant numbers of HIV and other STD infections
in Uganda which should never have occurred.48

Imposition of “Gag Rule”

uity Report, Debunking the Myths in the U.S. Global AIDS Strategy: An Evidence-Based Analysis, p.10 March
2004
46
Human Rights Watch, Distortions of Uganda’s HIV Prevention Efforts
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm]; New York Times editorial on Uganda and condoms entitled The
Missing Condoms, September 4, 2005; Human Rights Watch, Distortions of Uganda’s HIV Prevention Efforts
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm; Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on
Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The International Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working
Papers, No. 1 June 2004; Human Rights Watch, Uganda and the U.S. Global AIDS Initiative-
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm; Condom Crisis in Uganda: Shortages Spread to Other Countries, US
Policies Undermine HIV Prevention Programs, August 2005, by Jodi L. Jacobson, Center for Health and Gender
Equity

47
Testimony of Dr. Alan Berkman and Naina Dhingra, The Commission
48
Press release from Hon. Maj. Gen. Jim Muhwezi, September 2005; source Human Rights Watch, Ugandans Resist
Anti-Condom Agenda; New York Times article, US Blamed for Condom Shortage in Fighting AIDS in Uganda, by
Lawrence K. Altman, August 30, 2005.

25
Count 2: The Bush Administration has re-instated the “gag-rule” restricts foreign organi-
zations that receive US funds from using their own, non-US. Funds to provide legal abor-
tion services or even provide accurate medical counseling of reproductive health clinics de-
pendent on international funding in very poor parts of the world. In man areas, these clin-
ics have also been the only source of HIV/AIDS prevention and care, including the supply
of much-needed and life saving condoms.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that The Bush Administration has re-instated the “gag-
rule” that restricts foreign organizations that receive US funds from using their own, non-US
funds to provide legal abortion services or even provide accurate medical counseling of repro-
ductive health in clinics dependent on international funding in very poor parts of the world. In
many areas, these clinics have also been the only source of HIV/AIDS prevention and care, in-
cluding the supply of much-needed and life saving condoms.

The Bush Administration put the gag-rule in place on the first business day of its administration
in 2001. The gag rule denies foreign organizations receiving U.S. family planning assistance the
right to use their own non-U.S. funds to provide legal abortion, counsel or referral for abortion,
or lobby for the legalization of abortion in their own country. NGO’s must withhold information
from women about the option of legal abortion and where to obtain safe abortion services using
their own, non US government funds to do so. Also, these NGOs are banned from disseminating
any information regarding the health hazards of unsafe abortion, or provide legal abortion ser-
vices with non-U.S. funding.

The gag rule is a public health disaster in the developing world and places people at grievous risk
of injury, disease and death: about 70,000 women die each year from unsafe abortions, many of
them leaving young children behind. By preventing high-risk pregnancies, family planning could
save at least 25% of these women’s lives.

The gag rule has exacerbated and intensified a condom shortage across the developing world and
decreased the effectiveness of HIV prevention programs. Although the global gag rule does not
apply to HIV/AIDS assistance, most family planning organizations have been denied HIV/AIDS
resources because implementing partners have been chilled by the gag rule and abstinence only
policies; the partners are frightened of retribution, and scrutiny from the right wing ideologically
driven Bush Administration. This is a disastrous outcome given the fact that family planning
providers are crucial to HIV/AIDS prevention programs.49

In 2005, 5 million people were infected with HIV globally. The Commission finds that the Bush
Administration’s reproductive health global policy is complicit in putting millions of people
around the world at risk for HIV by intentionally obstructing the dissemination of crucial medi-
cal information about condoms as a well proven effective means of HIV prevention, to vulner-

49
Testimony of Naina Dhingra, The Commission

26
able, powerless and poor people, in the midst of an HIV pandemic. This behavior is unethical,
morally reprehensible, and shocks the conscience.50

Distortion of Science

Count 3: The Bush Administration and its political operatives have distorted sound science
and attempted to suppress medical research studies in HIV prevention when it conflicts
with the ideology of the Christian Right.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration and its political operatives
have distorted sound science and attempted to suppress medical research studies in HIV preven-
tion when it conflicts with the ideology of the Christian Right.

As early as 1997, the Joint United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS found evidence that sexual
health education for children and young people that included the promotion of condom use and
safer sexual practices, which is one the main scientifically proven forms of HIV/AIDS preven-
tion, did not increase participant’s sexual activity. Indifferent to this data, the Bush Administra-
tion pursued its AIDS global agenda when it clearly knew or should have known that its absti-
nence-only HIV/AIDS prevention strategies had not demonstrated that they did or could prevent
the spread of HIV.

The Institute of Medicine, a body of experts that acts under a United States Congressional charter
as an advisor to the U.S. federal government, noted in 2001, that there was no evidence support-
ing abstinence-only program, and that investing “millions of dollars of federal…funds…in absti-
nence-only programs with no evidence constitutes poor fiscal and health policy.” The Institute
simultaneously concluded that scientific studies have shown that comprehensive sex and
HIV/AIDS programs and condom availability programs can be effective in reducing high-risk
sexual behaviors.

In contravention of federal government experts’ recommendations, the Bush Administration re-


quired that the abstinence-only programs in Uganda be administered according to the precise
guidelines evaluated and criticized by the Institute of Medicine. These policies continue notwith-
standing an ever-growing scientific consensus of the ineffectiveness and potential harms of these
programs.

In 2001, under pressure from anti-condom activists within the Bush Administration, the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) removed a 1999 fact sheet on condom use that encouraged sexually
active youth to use condoms to prevent HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. In 2002, the
CDC replaced the fact sheet with biased information regarding condom use that dissuades use.

50
Testimony of Naina Dhingra and Dr. Tom Fasy, The Commission; Journal of Adolescent Health 38 (2006) 72-81,
Abstinence and Abstinence-only Education: A review of U.S. policies and programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H.
et al, p. 78

27
This action demonstrates a willingness to censor vital, life saving information in the face of the
HIV pandemic.51

Absent any scientific support and notwithstanding peer review scientific research to the contrary,
The Bush Administration, in December 2002, at the United Nations Fifth Asia-Pacific Popula-
tion conference in Bangkok claimed that the promotion of abstinence-only is preferred as the
healthiest choice for sexually active unmarried adolescents. In addition, the Bush Administration
has erroneously linked condom failure with the relatively high prevalence of human papillomavi-
rus (HPV) as a means to dissuade people from the use of condoms. This deliberate misinforma-
tion is spread despite the solid science that HPV is spread by exposure to areas not covered or
protected by condoms.

The Commission is persuaded that the Bush Administration’s ideologically driven policy has
caused countless deaths in the five years since the Bush Administration has been in power.
Uganda’s AIDS Commissioner, Kihumuro Apuuli announced that HIV infections have almost
doubled in Uganda over the past two years, from 70,000 in 2003 at the approximate time that
PEPFAR was initiated in Uganda to 130,000 in 2005.52

Restriction of Generics

Count 4: The Bush Administration has used its political and economic power to coerce
other countries into agreements that severely restrict and manufacture and supply of ge-
neric drugs, the only affordable option for most HIV positive people in the Third World.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has used its influence in ways
that frustrate the supply of generic HIV/AIDS drugs, the only affordable option for most HIV
positive people in the Third World.

Until 2003, the prior Clinton and current Bush Administrations had consistently obstructed a
World Trade organization pact on the export of inexpensive generic drugs. Since September
2003, the United States requires that the requests for importation of generics be made in “good
faith” and “for no commercial gain” and that the generic drugs so exported be packaged and la-
beled differently to prevent re-exportation. These conditions create bureaucratic obstacles to ge-
neric HIV/AIDS drug importation.53

51
Advocates for Youth, CDC’s Condom Fact Sheets: A Comparison

52
A disaster for Abstinence Ideology, by Esther Kaplan, May 2006; Testimony of Dr. Alan Berkman, The Commis-
sion; Human Rights Watch, studies discrediting abstinence-only approaches in the U.S;
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm ; Center for Health and Gender Equity Report, Debunking the Myths
in the U.S. Global AIDS Strategy: An Evidence-Based Analysis, p.10 March 2004;Also see Journal of Adolescent
Health 38 (2006 72-81, Review article: Abstinence and abstinence-only education: A review of U.S. policies and
programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H. et al, p.79; Abstinence Promotion: Censorship, Moralizing, Politics, & the
Risk to Young People; Testimony by Vanessa Brocato, The Commission;
53
Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The Interna-
tional Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working Papers, No. 1 June 2004, p. 13

28
The body of evidence as a whole demonstrates that Bush Administration’s Global Health
Agenda violates International law:

SUMMARY

Access to accurate HIV/AIDS prevention information is a human right that the Bush
Administration is intentionally violating. Its coercive abstinence-only and gag-rule policies are
imposed on impoverished and politically and economically dependent countries of the world
with catastrophic and foreseeable injury to children in violation, the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The policies also obstruct the purpose of Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The Commission finds that grave injuries and the risk of grave injuries confront the worlds’ peo-
ple who are subjected to the Bush Administration’s HIV/AIDS and family planning global health
policies. The injuries are preventable, racially discriminatory in their disproportionate impact on
people of color, religiously intolerant, and systemic. As a result, the Commission finds that the
Bush Administration’s HIV/AIDS and family planning policies constitute a crime against hu-
manity.

HURRICANE KATRINA INDICTMENT

The Levees

Count 1: Knowing failure of the Bush Administration to adequately maintain and upgrade
the levees directly contributed to the foreseeable loss of life and suffering of many people
when Hurricane Katrina struck.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that knowing failure of the Bush Administration to ade-
quately maintain and upgrade the levees directly contributed to the foreseeable loss of life and
suffering of many people when Hurricane Katrina struck.

The Federal Government is responsible for monitoring the design and construction of the levees
in the United States at every step. Since the late 1960’s, the federal government has been very
well aware of New Orleans vulnerability to flooding due to levee breaches. “[The New Orleans]
levees were never intended to protect against category four hurricanes such as Katrina according
to Corps of Engineer’s official, Lt. General Strock.

In addition, the 17th Street Canal Levee was built at 93% to 98% of the strength needed to meet a
category 3 hurricane and far below the 130% standard requirement for a category 3 hurricane. As
early as 2003, civil engineers were well aware that the levees could not handle a lingering cate-
gory 3 storm.

29
Since 2003, under the Bush Administration, the flow of federal dollars to deal with flood relief
issues in New Orleans fell to trickle due to the pressures on federal funding caused by the war in
Iraq.54

Foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina

Count 2: Despite foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina striking land as a greater than cate-
gory 3 storm and the devastation that this would cause, the Bush Administration failed to
implement an emergency evacuation plan for people in the path of the storm and unable to
evacuate on their own.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that despite foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina striking
land as a greater than category 3 storm and the devastation that this would cause, the Bush Ad-
ministration failed to implement an emergency evacuation plan for people in the path of the
storm and unable to evacuate on their own.

President George Bush falsely claimed that no one could have predicted the Katrina disaster.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, FEMA ranked the potential of hurricane
caused damage to New Orleans as among the likeliest, most catastrophic disasters facing the
United States. Since 2002, Dr. Ivor van Heerdon, the director of Louisiana State University’s
Center for Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes led a multidisciplinary team looking at precisely
what would happen if a major storm hit New Orleans. Their research included how the city
would flood and how many people would ignore evacuation warnings. There predictions, analy-
ses, and summary of expected devastation were almost 100% accurate.

In 2003, Louisiana State oceanographer, Joseph Suhayda modeled the grave disaster that would
be caused by a lingering category 3 or a category 4 or 5 hurricane. He shared his findings with
emergency preparedness officials throughout Louisiana.

In 2004, FEMA conducted a hurricane simulation for New Orleans. In that simulation, a cate-
gory 3 hurricane named Pam slammed into New Orleans with sustained winds of 120 mph. Wa-
ter from Lake Ponchartrain poured over the levees and the entire city was quickly under water.
FEMA drafted a comprehensive disaster response plan in response to the simulation. The plan
stated that there could be thousands of fatalities, floating coffins, and large quantities of hazard-
ous waste that would result in airborne and waterborne contamination. In addition, in 2004, New

54
Testimony of Prof. John Clark, The Commission; Looking Forward After Katrina: Environmental Health Prob-
lems and Recommendations for Officials, U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), Education Fund, September
21, 2005; Exhibit 6, Louisiana’s Levee Inquiry Faults Army Corps, by John Schwartz and Christopher Drew; Ex-
hibit 3, CRS Report for Congress, New Orleans Levees and the Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, by
Nicole T. Carter; Exhibit A, Why the levee Broke, by Will Bunch, Attytood, September 1, 2005,
http://www.alternet.org/story/24871; Ex. 4: Katrina Compounded by Matthew Rothschild, September 1, 2005,
http://progressive.org/?q=node/2377 ; Ex. 7: News, Hurricane Katrina, Scientists’ Fears Come True as Hurricane
Floods New Orleans, 9 September 2005, vol. 309 Science; Testimony of Beverly Wright, The Commission

30
Orleans residents advocated to both the federal and local governments for the creation and im-
plementation of a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan. Yet no such plan was ever imple-
mented.

The record of the Bush Administration’s failure to act is well established:

On August 25, 2005, category 1 Katrina hit Florida, killing 9 people. That same day the National
Hurricane Center indicated that Katrina is likely to become a dangerous storm in 3 days. Presi-
dent Bush is in Crawford, Texas.

On August 26, Katrina became a category 2 hurricane and was forecasted to become a category 3
by August 26. On August 26, the Bush Administration announced a state of emergency for parts
of Louisiana not threatened by Katrina. On August 27, Katrina became a category 3 hurricane
and was predicted to become a category 4 within 24 hours. However, on August 27, Pres. Bush
was still in Crawford, Texas. The Gov. of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, contacted Pres. Bush and
requested federal assistance on August 27th. Pres. Bush’s, August 26 declaration of a state of
emergency omitted the Louisiana Parishes at risk that were identified by Gov. Blanco.

On August 28, the National Hurricane Center Director, Max Mayfield briefed Pres. Bush on hur-
ricane Katrina. Gov. On August 28, Blanco sends a second request to Pres. Bush for federal re-
lief, listing again the parishes at risk. On August 28, weather experts predicted that Katrina will
soon hit landfall as a category 5 hurricane. Katrina hit the Gulf as a high category 4 hurricane on
August 28. President remained in Crawford hailing the draft Iraqi constitution as an inspiring
success. There is no record of Bush ever declaring a state of emergency for areas that were put a
risk by Hurricane Katrina or that were identified by Gov. Blanco.

Despite several days of warnings of a monstrous hurricane heading for the Gulf that would dev-
astate New Orleans and the Gulf region causing large losses of life and human suffering and de-
spite the availability of a comprehensive federal disaster response draft plan in case of such a
predicted disaster scenario that would mitigate the loss of life and human suffering, the Bush
Administration did not initiate its disaster response plan prior to or during the duration of Katrina
and admitted as much.55

Failure to launch rescue operations


55
Ex. 10:Exclusive: Were the Warnings signs of Katrina Ignored?, Disaster Response Plan Predicted Hurricane
Katrina’s Catastrophic Results, by Pierre Thomas, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/print?id=1117497 ; Ex. 4: Katrina
Compounded by Matthew Rothschild, September 1, 2005, http://progressive.org/?q=node/2377 ; Ex. 11: FEMA’s
“Pam” Simulation Foretold Katrina Disaster, From Robert Longley, Your Guide to U.U. Gov. Info/Resources, Pre-
paredness action plans not implemented in time,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/femapam_p.htm , News Release FEMA, Hurricane Pam Exer-
cise Concludes U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 23, 2004, Contact: David Passey, Number 940-368-
0210, R6-04-93; Ex. 7: News, Hurricane Katrina, Scientists’ Fears Come True as Hurricane Floods New Orleans, 9
September 2005, vol. 309 Science; Ex. 15. White House Press Release dated August 27th 2005; Ex. 17: Bobhar-
ris.com, Basic Human Decency Shouldn’t Have To Be An Act of Rebellion,
http://www.bobharris.com/content/view/637/1/ ; Hurricane Katrina Timeline,
http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline; Testimony of Malik Rahim, The Commission

31
Count 3: The Bush Administration neither launched an immediate rescue operation nor
provided the emergency shelter, food and water needed to save peoples lives and prevent
needless suffering.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration neither launched an immedi-
ate rescue operation nor provided the emergency shelter, food and water needed to save peoples
lives and prevent needless suffering.

On August 28, 2005, the National Weather Service sent an urgent weather message nationwide,
warning of devastating damage that it described comprehensively. Katrina hit New Orleans on
August 29. Electrical power in the Superdome where the city’s poor, disabled, and homeless
were crammed failed at 5am. Entire New Orleans neighborhoods were submerged in water. In
late afternoon, on August 29, a levee broke near St. Bernard-Orleans parish. President Bush was
playing golf. Five hours after Katrina hits FEMA dispatched 1000 employees to region, giving
them two days to arrive.

On September 12, 2005, the Congressional Research Service, in response to an inquiry from
Congressmen John Conyers (D. Mich.), determined that the Bush Administration had not taken
the steps needed to trigger Stafford Act emergency assistance and disaster assistance.56

Federal Authorities Block Emergency Relief

Count 4: Federal authorities block provision of emergency services, including rescue and
provision of food and water on the part of other levels of government and private sources
despite the obvious need for this kind of relief.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that federal authorities block provision of emergency ser-
vices, including rescue and provision of food and water on the part of other levels of government
and private sources despite the obvious need for this kind of relief.

On August 29, the 17th Street Canal levee broke. However, FEMA instructs outside fire and res-
cue departments not to enter disaster area and refuses to allow firefighters into New Orleans. On
August 31, the Department of Homeland Security blocked assistance from foreign countries.

The first 100 persons rescued from the flooding in New Orleans and delivered to the Houston
Astrodome were rescued by an 18 year old, not FEMA, who had commandeered an abandon bus.
Four days after Katrina it landfall, the Bush Administration requested assistance from the airline
industry to evacuate Katrina victims. As of September 1, the Bush Administration had not di-
rected the U.S military to immediately assist people without food or water in the city center.

56
Hurricane Katrina Timeline, http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline ; Environmental
Health Perspectives Vo. 114, Number 1, January 2006

32
The military prevented a caravan of nearly 100 buses from Houston, Texas carrying food and
water for people trapped in New Orleans to get the supplies to the Convention Center. The mili-
tary stopped caravan in sight of the Convention Center. The supplies never got to the Convention
Center. On September 3, FEMA blocked life saving aid to Jefferson Parish. On September 13, a
frustrated FEMA employee appeared on Nightline, speaking for himself, said, “right now as we
talk, unfortunately, Homeland Security is actually impeding…the rescue effort.”57

Federal Authorities Enforce Repressive Conditions

Count 5: Federal authorities enforced repressive conditions and eventually carried out an
evacuation that separated families, including small children from their parents, and left
many people not knowing where their loved ones were located and even if they had sur-
vived the storms.

As to Count 5, the Commission finds that the federal authorities enforced repressive conditions
and eventually carried out an evacuation that separated families, including small children from
their parents, and left many people not knowing where their loved ones were located and even if
they had survived the storms.

A direct consequence of the federal government’s belated involvement in evacuations, were the
avoidable instances of family separation and missing persons.

The primary focus of early federal intervention in New Orleans was the protection of property at
the expense of rescuing people from the rapidly unfolding natural disaster caused by Katrina.
The federal government contracted with private security agencies that acted, with impunity, as
legitimate local law enforcement in ways that violated residents’ civil rights and that terrified
disaster victims and systematically thwarted their attempts to survive at risk of being shot. The
Bush Administration promulgated a “Zero Tolerance” order on September 1 that told local law
officials to move against anyone engaged in, looting and other crimes. Consequently, the police
went after desperately hunger people attempting to get food and water to survive.58

SUMMARY

The Bush Administration’s response to the Katrina natural disaster violated and obstructed the
purpose of international law. The persons most injured by the Bush Administration’s response to
the Katrina natural disaster were the poor, people of color, and especially people of African de-
57
Hurricane Katrina Timeline, http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline ; Testimony of
Beverly Wright, The Commission; Taped testimony of Anthony Zumbado, The Commission; testimony of Abigail
B., The Commission; Testimony of Emma Lofton Woods-hotel space, cruise ships, and unused trailers were used
for FEMA and Red Cross personnel only, The Commission
58
Testimony of Jeremy Scahill, Malik Rahim, and Devon Turner, The Commission

33
scent who were already living under circumstances of institutional racism that the Bush Admini-
stration’s failed response profoundly exacerbated.

The foreseeable consequences of the Bush Administration’s Katrina response violated the legal
principles embodied in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination. In addition the failures of the Bush Administration obstructed the efforts of the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights because of its deliberate indiffer-
ence to provide medical services, food, and shelter to the residents of the Gulf in a manner that
was within its capacity to provide and that would have saved lives and prevented enormous suf-
fering.

Further this record is clear. The Bush Administration demonstrated a gross and wanton indiffer-
ence to human life that caused thousands of Gulf coast residents to die and suffer needlessly. The
suffering continues, systemically causing continuous grievous injuries due to displacement and
related issues. Accordingly, the Bush Administration has committed crimes against humanity.

34
The International Commission of Inquiry on
Crimes Against Humanity
Committed by the Bush Administration of the United
States

W hen the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against humanity exists, people
of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope of these
acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. That is the mission of the International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity.
The final session will be held January 20-22 in New York City. This tribunal will, with care and
rigor, present evidence and assess whether George W. Bush and his administration have commit-
ted crimes against humanity. Well-established international law will be referenced where appli-
cable, but the tribunal will not be limited by the scope of existing international law.

T he tribunal will deliberate on four categories of indictable crimes: 1) Wars of Aggression,


with particular reference to the invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. 2) Tor-
ture and Indefinite Detention, with particular reference to the abandonment of international stan-
dards concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and the use of torture. 3) Destruction of the
Global Environment, with particular reference to systematic policies contributing to the catastro-
phic effects of global warming. 4) Attacks on Global Public Health and Reproductive Rights,
with particular reference to the genocidal effects of forcing international agencies to promote
“abstinence only” in the midst of a global AIDS epidemic.

T he Commission’s jury of conscience will be composed of internationally respected jurists


and legal scholars, prominent voices of conscience, and experts and monitors in relevant
fields. The tribunal’s legitimacy is derived from its integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evi-
dence, and the stature of its participants. Representatives of the Bush administration will be in-
vited to present a defense.

P rior to the meeting of the Commission, teams with sufficient expertise will prepare prelimi-
nary indictments in each of the four areas, setting forth the scope of the Bush administra-
tion’s actions and how they contravene legal and moral norms for international behavior. At the
meeting of the Commission, there will be four prosecution teams that organize the presentation
of the evidence. This evidence will be documents as well as eyewitness testimony by victims and
observers of the crimes alleged. The formal proceedings will be held in a public venue and all
attempts will be made to publicize and broadcast its deliberations internationally. The Commis-
sion’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.

T he holding of this tribunal will frame and fuel a discussion that is urgently needed in the
United States: Is the administration of George W. Bush guilty of war crimes and crimes
against humanity? The Commission will conduct its work with a deep sense of responsibility to
the people of the world.

35
The Commission is sponsored by the Not In Our Name statement of conscience, joined by the
following individuals and organizations:
James Abourezk, former United States Senator
As'ad AbuKhalil, professor of politics & public administration, California State University-Stanislaus
Dirk Adriaensens, BRussells Tribunal executive committee and coordinator SOS Iraq
After Downing Street
Dr. Nadje Al-Ali, social anthropologist at the Univ. of Exeter, founding member of Act Together: Women's Action
on Iraq & and member Women in Black UK
Anthony Alessandrini, organizer with the World Tribunal on Iraq and New York University Students for Justice in
Palestine
Edward Asner
Michael Avery, president of the National Lawyers Guild and professor, Suffolk Law School
Russell Banks, novelist
The Rev. Luis Barrios, Ph.D., associate professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice & Anglican Priest
Amy Bartholomew, professor of law at Carleton University
Greg Bates, Common Courage Press
Tony Benn, former chairman of the British Labour Party
Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies
Michael S. Berg, grieving father of Nick Berg killed in Iraq May 7, 2004, and one man for Peace
Ayse Berktay, from the organizing team of the World Tribunal on Iraq
William Blum, author of Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II and Rogue State: A
Guide to the World’s Only Superpower
Francis Boyle, author of Destroying World Order and professor at the University of Illinois College of Law
Jean Bricmont, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Center for Constitutional Rights
Marjorie Cohn, professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and executive vice president of the National Lawyers
Guild
Lieven De Cauter, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Patrick Deboosere, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Eve Ensler, playwright
Peter Erlinder, William Mitchell College of Law and lead defense counsel, United Nations Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania
Larry Everest, author of Oil, Power & Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda and Behind the Poison Cloud: Un-
ion Carbide’s Bhopal Massacre
Richard Falk, professor emeritus of International Law, Princeton, and Visiting Professor in Global and International
Studies, UC-Santa Barbara
Thomas M. Fasy, MD, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York City
Lawrence Ferlinghetti, member, American Academy of Arts & Letters and founder & editor in chief, City Lights
Books, San Francisco
The Rev. Dr. James E. Fitzgerald, minister for mission and social justice, The Riverside Church
Ted Glick, former coordinator, Independent Progressive Politics Network
Dr. Elaine C. Hagopian, former president of Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) and pri-
mary founder of the Trans-Arab Research Institute (TARI)
Sam Hamill. director, Poets Against War
International Movement for a Just World (JUST), Malaysia
Abdeen Jabara, past president, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
Dahr Jamail, U.S. independent journalist who has reported extensively from Iraq since the invasion
C. Clark Kissinger, contributing writer for Revolution and initiator of the Not In Our Name statement of conscience
The Reverend Doctor Earl Kooperkamp, Rector, St. Mary's Episcopal Church, West Harlem, New York
Joel Kovel, editor-in-chief, Capitalism Nature Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Ecology, and author of
The Enemy of Nature
Jesse Lemisch, professor of history emeritus, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Rabbi Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun magazine and author of The Left Hand of God: Taking Back America from
the Religious Right

36
Rev. Davidson Loehr, Ph.D., First Unitarian Universalist Church of Austin, Texas National Lawyers Guild
National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter
Rev. Davidson Loehr, Ph.D., First Unitarian Universalist Church of Austin, Texas
Robert Meeropol, Executive Director, Rosenberg Fund for Children
New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee
New Jersey Workers Democracy Network
National Lawyers Guild
National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter
Not In Our Name Project
Barbara Olshansky, deputy legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and author of Secret Trials and
Executions
James Petras, professor emeritus of sociology at Binghamton University, New York
Jeremy Pikser, screenwriter
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights and author with Ellen Ray of Guantanamo: What
the World Should Know
Stephen F. Rohde, civil liberties lawyer and co-founder of Interfaith Communities United for Justice and Peace
Marc Sapir, MD, MPH, co-convener of the UC Berkeley Teach In on Torture and executive director of Retro Poll
Sister Annette M. Sinagra, OP
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University
State of Nature on-line magazine
U.S. Tour of Duty
Inge Van de Merlen, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Gore Vidal
Anne Weills, civil rights attorney in Oakland, National Lawyers Guild
Leonard Weinglass, criminal defense attorney
Naomi Weisstein, professor emeritus of Neuroscience, State University of NY at Buffalo
Howard Zinn, historian
[institutions for identification only]
Web site: www.bushcommission.org E-mail: commission@nion.us

37
38
Standards of Judgment for the International Commission of
Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the
Bush Administration of the United States
When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against humanity exists, peo-
ple of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope of
these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. That is the mission of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Crimes Against Humanity. This tribunal will, with care and rigor, present evidence and
assess whether George W. Bush and his administration have committed crimes against
humanity.
-- From the Charter of The International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes
Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the United States

The need for this tribunal, as an instrumentality of world humanity, arises from the historical,
moral and political responsibility of people of conscience to sit in judgment of this administra-
tion: to inquire and assess whether this administration has committed crimes that do in fact rise
to the levels of crimes against humanity as popularly understood and conceived, that is, acts that,
by their scale or nature, shock the conscience of humankind.

Crimes against humanity are brutal crimes that are not isolated incidents but that involve large
and systematic actions often cloaked with official authority. These include mass murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts perpetrated against a population,
conducted in wartime or not. Apartheid and persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds
have also been considered inhumane acts causing great suffering, and therefore crimes against
humanity.

We see the need to proceed from this first-principles definition of crimes against humanity pre-
cisely because of the singular nature of some of this administration’s actions and the lack of rele-
vant precedent in existent law. This is especially true for judging categories of crimes other than
wars of aggression and torture, where precedent and conventional standards do exist within in-
ternational law.

We are not pre-determining a minimum quantitative level required to constitute a “mass scale” --
or “large and systematic action” -- within our definition of crimes against humanity. Rather, we
are focusing on the overall nature and scope of the impact of these actions and policies. Nor are
we making a criterion of explicit intentionality. The jury of conscience will inquire into and as-
sess whether the Bush administration policies involve foreseen or foreseeable risk of catastrophic
or genocidal proportions. The question is not whether the Bush administration is intentionally
setting out to make millions suffer with its global warming and global health policies, for exam-
ple. Rather, the question is, whether such suffering is clearly the predictable consequences of
policies guided by ideological and political goals?

39
Such culpability must also distinguish actions specific to the Bush administration from general
systemic causes and the actions of previous administrations (even where such actions themselves
may rise to the level of crimes against humanity).

Proceeding from the tribunal’s Charter and its mission, the character of this commission is sui
generis -- a unique response by people of conscience to the unprecedented historical responsibil-
ity before us. The Commission’s Charter states, “The tribunal’s legitimacy is derived from its
integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evidence, and the stature of its participants.” Its political
and moral authority is based on high standards which are not arbitrary and capricious but prede-
fined and consistent. These standards are critical to safeguarding findings of this commission
from arbitrariness, a priori political motivations, or other forms of subjectivity.

Though it is not a court of law with power to impose sanctions, the “judicial” character of the
Commission’s conduct, proceedings, and verdict is foundational to its integrity and its historic
mission. As the Charter states, “Well-established international law will be referenced where ap-
plicable, but the tribunal will not be limited by the scope of customary international law.” This
commission is neither attempting to develop new international law per se, nor tortuously apply-
ing current law to force-fit its proceedings and findings into existing legal frameworks. Rather,
through the rigorous presentation of expert and witness testimony, documents, and other evi-
dence, the Commission aims to establish the truth about major acts and policies of the Bush ad-
ministration in the areas specified in the Charter. In addition, “representatives of the administra-
tion will be invited to present a defense.”

The historic and political responsibility before this tribunal lies in delivering findings of fact and
a verdict on the central question before the commission: “whether George W. Bush and his ad-
ministration have committed crimes against humanity.” As the Charter mandates, “The Commis-
sion’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.” The jury of
conscience will carefully assess the evidence and base its conclusions on the sufficiency of the
evidence. In assessing sufficiency, we are aware that some acts constitute crimes against human-
ity in and of themselves, while other particular acts may be instances of more general patterns of
conduct that constitute such crimes.

We must continuously return to the fact that the need for this Commission flows precisely from
the real and horrendous crimes being committed and our historical, moral and political responsi-
bility as people of conscience. We reaffirm that “The Commission will conduct its work with a
deep sense of responsibility to the people of the world.”

40
Witnesses
Annette A., New Orleans survivor of Hurricane Katrina
Saleh Ajaj, Victim of arbitrary detention in the US after 9/11
Anthony Alesandrini, World Tribunal on Iraq
Jay Arena, Housing rights advocate from New Orleans
Abigail B., School bus driver from Houston blocked by authorities from rescuing people from
New Orleans
Amy Bartholomew, Professor of law, Carleton University
Dr. Alan Berkman, Professor of epidemiology, Columbia University School of Public Health
Vanessa Brocato, International Policy Associate, Sexuality Information and Education Council
of the United States (SIECUS), author of SIECUS PEPFAR
Stephen Bronner, Professor of political science, Rutgers University
Dr. Robert Bullard, Director, Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta Univer-
sity, Author, “Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights & the Politics of Pollu-
tion”
Eric Carter, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
John Clark, Professor of Environmental Studies, Loyola University, New Orleans
Naina Dhingra, Advocates for Youth
King Downing, National Coordinator of the ACLU's Campaign Against Racial Profiling
Larry Everest, Author, “Oil, Power & Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda”
Dr. Thomas Fasy, Professor of pathology, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Campaign Against
Depleted Uranium
Chris Fox, Chairman, Department of Environmental Science & Technology, Community Col-
lege of Baltimore County
Lindsey German, Convenor, UK Stop the War Coalition
Ted Glick, Climate Crisis Coalition
Tom Goldtooth, Indigenous Environmental Network
Arron Guyton, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
Denis Halliday, ex-UN Assistant Secretary-General, former head of UN Humanitarian Mission
In Iraq
Dahr Jamail, Independent journalist, reported extensively from Iraq
Tanya Jones, Filmmaker from New Orleans
Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, former commander Abu Ghraib prison, author of "One Woman’s
Army : The Commanding General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story"
Mark Krasnoff & Monique Verdin, Cajun community activists and filmmakers
Eric Lerner, New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee
Larry McBride, who was left to drown in a New Orleans prison when Katrina struck
Ray McGovern, former CIA analyst

41
Camilo E. Mejia, Iraq Veterans Against the War
Dr. Stephen Miles, Professor, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota Medical School,
author “Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity and the War on Terror”
Craig Murray, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, author “Murder in Samarkand”
Barbara Olshansky, Center for Constitutional Rights and co-ordinator of Guantanamo detainee
defense
Malik Rahim, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
Scott Ritter, former UN weapons inspector, author, “Iraq Confidential”
Jeremy Scahill, correspondent for Democracy Now! and The Nation, eyewitness to the Iraq oc-
cupation and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
Sarah Sohn, Legal fellow with Immigration Equality
Dr. Ida Susser, Professor, Columbia University School of Public Health
David Swanson, Co-founder of AfterDowningStreet.org, on the Downing Street memo
Josh Tulkin, Organizing Director for the Chesapeake Climate Action Network, on the relation-
ship between Hurricane Katrina and global warming
Devon Turner, Hurricane Katrina survivor from the Louisiana wetlands
Emma Lofton Woods, Volunteer aid worker in New Orleans
Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University
Daphne Wysham, Institute for Policy Studies, Sustainable Energy & Economy Network
Tony Zimbado, MSNBC videographer and producer, provided video testimony of aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans

42
Panel of Jurists
Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. She has
servied as Executive Director, National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL), the Director of
Administration for the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc., a consultant to the Law-
yers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Chief Legal Consultant for the National
Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA).

Dennis Brutus, professor emeritus, Department of Africana Studies, University of Pittsburgh.


Currently visiting scholar. Centre for Civil Society University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South
Africa. Holds several honorary doctorates, former political prisoner on Robben Island in South
Africa. Published several books including Poetry and Protest; a Dennis Brutus reader, Haymarket
Press Chicago. University of Kwazulu Press, Durban.

Abdeen Jabara, former President, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. In the mid-


1980s, he played a major role in exposing the Nixon administration’s Operation Boulder pro-
gram, a program begun in the 1960s that included surveillance, deportations and other incidents
involving the Arab and Arab-American community in the United States.

Ajamu Sankofa, lives in Brooklyn, NY. He is a human rights public policy specialist and com-
munity organizer. He is the former executive director of the NYC chapter of Physicians for So-
cial Responsibility. He is a consultant for the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in
America, Legal Defense, Research and Education Fund and he chairs the NYC local organiz-
ing committee of Health Care-Now.

Ann Wright, is a retired United States Army Colonel, retired official of the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and now full-time anti-war activist. She currently sits on the Board of Directors for organi-
zations Operation Truth/Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, and Veterans for Common
Sense. Wright is most noted for being one of three U.S. State Department officials to publicly
resign in direct protest of the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.

Prosecutors
Wars of Aggression: Stephen Bronner, Larry Everest, Ray McGovern

Torture and Detention: Marjorie Cohn, Eric Lerner, Barbara Olshansky

Global Environment: Ted Glick

Health and Reproductive Rights: Ida Susser, Jonathan Garcia

Destruction of New Orleans: Carl Dix, King Downing, Dionne Franklin, Chokwe Lumumba

43
44
WE GO IN THE FINAL HOUR,
TO THE MOST IMPORTANT LINE OF BATTLE:
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
by Harry Belafonte

Thank you very much. I would to first express my great sense of privilege, and opportunity to be
part of this evening's tribunal and what we will be seeing and hearing. I would like to also ex-
tend my respects to the panel and to the tasks you have before you, and what we will be hearing.

It is most gratuitous that this should be taking place at the end of a week of celebration of the
memory of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. This nation has never, ever produced a greater citizen,
who stood and still stands for the principles for why we are all gathered here: the pursuit of jus-
tice, the pursuit of human rights, the pursuit of human dignity.

Theodore Roosevelt once said that when the powers of state, that having been mandated to reach
out and to protect the interest of the people, begin to usurp the Constitution and undermine our
laws, that it is the responsibility of the citizens to rise up and to speak against this process. And,
to in fact, insist upon the changing of the guard, the changing of regime. And those, (applause),
those citizens who fail to hear that call, in fact should be charged with patriotic treason (Ap-
plause). I think none gathered here this evening can be so charged.

It is important when all the instruments of government collapse, we go in the final hour, to the
most important line of battle: the people themselves. The people of this nation, I think, and I
know it, are awake, and are being more awakened every day. They are hearing and sensing the
danger that sits on the horizon. Looking at the international oppressions that we are a part of,
looking at how we have violated international humanity and law, one day this tribunal I hope,
will reach out, and in its investigation look at the oppression and illegal experiences people in
this nation are experiencing themselves.

On 9/11, we were all stunned by the tragic events that took place when the Twin Towers col-
lapsed, and this terrorism was put upon our people. Two thousand lost their lives. Two thousand
who were innocent, two thousand who did not cause war. And we said they were terrorists and
we should hunt them down and bring them to justice. Tell me, where for you does the line blur?

When a nation as powerful as this, the most powerful in the history of human existence, and
those who have dubiously come to power and who are reigning over the will of this nation, when
they lie and mislead the citizens of this country, when they put before us fear and then govern by
terrorism -- where does the line blur for you? When our sons and daughters are sent to die in
foreign battlefields, each day we claim the lives of tens and thousands of innocent men, women,
and children, in other places -- where for you does terrorism end and where does it begin, and
who are the terrorists?

45
Those who would choose to detract the real meaning of this tribunal, the real meaning of this
people's moment, would suggest to you that we are somehow perhaps irrelevant. Well, I guess
Paul Revere was considered at one point irrelevant, when he called for the alarm against the red
coats.

I know very well that at the beginning, Dr. Martin Luther King was considered irrelevant. I know
that there are so many that have called for the awakening of our citizens to look at what is hap-
pening to us and to seize our rights to put us back into democratic governance. Always in the be-
ginning, we are minimalized, marginalized and relegated to the dustbins of history. We have
prevailed before and we will prevail again. I am honored to be a part of this process, and any-
thing I can do to help broaden its base, to help broaden it's inquiry, and to help save the soul of
our nation, I welcome the opportunity and I will so serve. Thank you.

46
TOMORROW IS TODAY:
THE FIERCE URGENCY OF INDICTING
– AND DRIVING OUT –
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
By Michael Ratner

When Clark Kissinger called me yesterday and said, I’ll be sharing a platform with Harry Bela-
fonte, I said, “well, maybe you want to put me on for tomorrow.” But here I am, and of course
I’m proud to be even in any kind of association with Harry Belafonte. And I’m sure you’re all
familiar with Harry Belafonte’s comments that he made to President Chavez in Venezuela a few
days ago. And if you don’t remember them, I’ll repeat them. “No matter what the greatest tyrant
in the world, the greatest terrorist in the world, George W. Bush, says, we’re here to tell you that
not hundreds, not thousands, but millions of the American people support your revolution.” Now
what’s remarkable about that, and of course Harry Belafonte was heavily attacked for that. But,
as he has never been willing to do, he did not retreat from the statement. And if you go on the net
you come to what he said, at the Children’s Defense Fund, a few days later, and what he says
was, “so I made my remarks, they may stir up controversy, but then it’s time to talk about new
definitions, new points of view.” And that’s what Harry Belafonte was doing, and that is what
we are doing here today, and over the next two days, at these Commissions.

The other important point about being here, at Riverside of course, is that in April 1967, this is
the place, this church, where Martin Luther King openly, and notoriously I should say, opposed
the war in Vietnam. The speech was called “Beyond Vietnam: A time to break the silence.” It’s a
historic place for that reason, and he began that speech with these words: “A time comes when
silence is betrayal. That time has come for us, in relation to Vietnam.” And then in that speech,
he lays out a 5-point program. But the ultimate point of that program was: remove all foreign
troops from Vietnam. Incredibly, even though it was Martin Luther King saying that, in 1967, it
took 9 more years, millions of Vietnamese deaths, and thousands of American deaths, to do so.
We today model our conduct on that of Dr. Martin Luther King. As he said then, we say today, a
time comes when silence is betrayal. That time has come for us, in relationship to the war in Iraq.
It is time for us to bring the troops home now.

A people’s trial, a people’s commission, is not without important precedents. Almost 40 years
ago, in 1968, there was another people’s trial. It was held in Sweden and Denmark. Originally it
was to be held in France. But the French wouldn’t allow it; they prohibited it, because it was
about Vietnam, and of course the French had been very deeply involved in the subjugation of
Vietnam. The witnesses at that people’s trial were well-known progressives, including Jean-Paul
Sartre. They gathered in Stockholm and Copenhagen, and they were there to judge another hu-
man outrage in our history, the brutal and inhuman Vietnam War. Bertrand Russell, the famous
English philosopher, was one of the key participants in that trial. In fact, it was called the Russell
War Crimes Tribunal. Russell opened that trial, and here is what he said: “We meet at an alarm-
ing time. Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent. We investigate
in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse consciousness in order to create

47
mass resistance.” And so, as Russell said then, we say today: we are putting the Bush administra-
tion on trial. We investigate in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse con-
sciousness in order to create mass resistance. We want this trial to be a step in the building of
mass resistance to war, to torture, to the destruction of earth and its people. It’s a serious mo-
ment. Our country and our world are at a tipping point. Tipping toward permanent war, the end
of human rights, and the impoverishment and death of millions. We still have a chance, an op-
portunity to stop this slide into chaos. But it is up to us. We must not sit with our arms folded,
and we must be as radical as the reality we are facing.

The witnesses you will hear over the next few days are the truth-tellers: the witnesses to the car-
nage this country and this administration has wrought. This truth challenges us — challenges us
all to act. We, particularly the American people, have not heard or seen the truth. And if some
do, in their comfort and complacency, they often turn away. The truth is hidden. It is hidden
through cover-up language, euphemisms, legalisms, obfuscations, false investigations, the blam-
ing of low-level individuals: all meant to hide the reality of the criminal involvement of high of-
ficials of this administration. The criminal involvement in war, torture, global and human de-
struction.

Let’s take a look at a few of these examples, and there are many. The failure in this country, and
the media, my pundits everywhere we look, to look at the reality- a reality this commission will
examine. I’m sure most of you are familiar with the first example: the war in Iraq. Supposedly,
the war was to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Now it is said: that was a mistake.
It was bad intelligence. The administration says it, and much of Congress says, the Press says it,
“Had we only known — but we thought they had weapons of mass destruction. So we must in
the future get better intelligence.” As if that explains or excuses why we went to war. But of
course, that explanation — the failure of intelligence — and still the current explanation of to-
day, by the elites, hides the real reasons for war. It blames some negligent officials, individuals,
at the CIA, for leading us into war. All we need to do according to them is correct that, and we
won’t be in mistaken wars any longer. Mistaken wars will come to an end. If you believe that,
you believe in the tooth fairy. We all know that is not the truth. In fact, in 1967, Martin Luther
King predicted it. He said we will be marching and protesting wars for the rest of our lives as
long as we are on the wrong side of history. And we are on the wrong side of history.

Sometimes I ask myself: why did we progressives know the weapons of mass destruction story
was a cover for war? But Congress and the media claimed they could not? Because they — all of
them, Democrats, Republicans, the media — they were all reading from the same page. And that
page is U.S. world exploitation and domination. And of course what does the truth tell us about
the war in Iraq? It tells us that it’s an aggressive war, a crime against peace, and according to the
judgment at Nuremberg, that kind of war is the most heinous of all war crimes. I can give you
other examples: Clark had referred to one. For example, the fact that they say that we do not tor-
ture. All of a sudden in this country, torture is not torture. Or at worst it is abuse. And even that
abuse, it is no worse than a fraternity prank. Or if it was abuse, it was because abusive techniques
were only for use in Guantánamo. What sense does that make? Used in Guantánamo — and
somehow they migrated to Iraq? But what does “migrated to Iraq” mean? Are they birds, like a
bird migrates? Without any human agent, torture techniques move from one place to another? Or
we are told that it is a few bad apples, but no responsibilities for the higher-ups. And yet the me-
dia has gone along with this, with these lies and these cover-ups. Even worse, serious media dis-

48
cussion and respectability is given to the legal justifiers. For example, John Yoo, a lawyer for the
administration, who wrote that you could torture in the name of national security — much like
the Pinochet defense, torture in the name of national security. I was utterly shocked the other day
when I picked up the New York Times and there on the back page they had asked half a dozen
people what questions would you ask the potential new Supreme Court Judge Alito? And there
they asked John Yoo, ‘what question would he ask him’. They are giving credibility to a man
who should not be on the back of the New York Times but should be in the docks but who
should be in the docks facing justice.

Let there be no doubt this administration is engaged in massive violations of the law. Torture is
an international crime. It is a grave breech of the Geneva conventions. And almost no one is tell-
ing you that. And in this country it is anathema to do so.

A third and last example of the hiding of reality, of the blaming of individuals, instead of the na-
ture of this country and it’s leaders is the example of what happened in New Orleans and
Katrina. It is the preparation for and aftermath of Katrina. What do we hear and read? It was an
unpredictable act of god. It was the failure of FEMA. FEMA had a bad manger. All sorts of ex-
cuses similar to what we heard about the so-called intelligence failures in the Iraq war. But to
blame FEMA, to blame the individuals, obscures what we know occurred in New Orleans. What
we saw in New Orleans and the Superdome was something very different — it was the legacy of
slavery, the legacy of Jim Crow, the legacy of separate but equal, and it was the legacy and the
current practice and policy of our country today that human beings are seen as disposable par-
ticularly if they are poor and black. That is the reality of New Orleans, and that is the reality
faced everyday in this country. And again, that is the reality this Commission will bring you.

The war, torture, and the effects of Katrina are not looked at as failures or as products of the sys-
tem. The truths are hidden and by hiding it we are disempowered; so we are here this weekend to
hear truth tellers to empower people. It is not just a few bad apples, it is not mistakes or bad
choices, it is not just bad managers and getting better ones; but something much more fundamen-
tal. It’s that awful alchemy as Dr. Martin Luther King described it in this very church — the gi-
ant triplets of racism extreme materialism and militarism.

I want to say a few words about one aspect of the current period that is extremely frightening.
Probably the most frightening although it does have roots in prior administrations. The short
hand for the expression of this period and the scare and fear that I feel is, “The king can do no
wrong” or the word might be tyranny, police state or dictatorship. I recall that after 9/11, within a
few months afterwards, I wrote an article. It was entitled, “Moving toward a police state — or
have we arrived?” And I remember being nervous about it because this was pretty aggressive to
be saying a few months after 9/11. Was I gonna get trashed for it? Did it really reflect reality? I
wasn’t sure. I had some evidence in front of me. I had the Patriot Act. I had internal detentions. I
had the President’s military order that allows him to pick up people anywhere in the world and
detain them in Guantánamo or elsewhere. But I still was willing to say ‘moving toward a police
state’, not have ‘we arrived’. And a police state to me is one were authority is not under law,
where the legislature is overridden, and where our courts are ignored. Where one can be jailed
without a court proceeding or trial and where the president, king or what have you, can do as he
pleases — wire tap, torture, and disappear people. Unfortunately, and dangerously that is the
situation we are in today.

49
You are familiar with much of the evidence, some of which I have laid out, some of which the
next two days will address. There is however one piece of important evidence I want to bring to
your attention. In which the president, their president, not our president, is open and notorious
about his aims, public if you will; and if you miss it you have to be an ostrich with your head in
the ground. What he has done is basically lay the plan for what has to be called a coup-de-tat in
America. And it’s a small (Applause) it is a small paragraph and it’s contained in what we call a
‘signing statement.’ It was signed on December 30th and it’s the signing statement to what we
call the McCain amendment. You probably all remember the McCain amendment. That’s the
amendment that prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, or supposedly prohibits it.
The president as you recall, resisted the McCain amendment. But in the end he had to sign it be-
cause it was part of a broader military authorization to pay for what we’re doing in Iraq. And
when the president signs legislation, he sometimes and more recently with President Bush, he
issues a signing statement as to what his understanding of the law is. The president’s statement
on McCain is only one short paragraph. But it is historic. It is unprecedented. And if you’re look-
ing for the grab for power that allows you, permits you, compels you to call this a tyranny it is
that paragraph.

It makes three points and I’ll paraphrase. First, speaking as the president, ‘My authority as com-
mander in chief allows me to do whatever I think is necessary in the war on terror including use
torture. Second, the Commander in Chief cannot be checked by Congress. Third, the Com-
mander in Chief cannot be checked by the courts.’ There it is. There you have it. That boring
stuff I learned as a junior high school student about checks and balances or about limited law or
about authority under law - out the window. Gone. In other words, the republic and democracy is
over. In Germany what did they call that? They called that the Führer’s law. Why? Because the
Führer was the law. That’s what George Bush is saying here. George Bush is the law.

This assertion of power is so blatant so open, and so notorious, that it is finally shocking some
people like former Vice President Gore to speak up. And I’m sure many of you are familiar with
what he said in his recent speech on Martin Luther King’s birthday. Quote: “The President of the
United State has been breaking the law repeatedly and persistently.” He was referring to the NSA
spying scandal. And then he went on to say, “A president who breaks the law is a threat to the
very structure of our government.” And then he said, “An executive who acts free of the will of
Congress as this president says he can, or the check of the judiciary, as this president says he can,
becomes the central threat that the founders sought to nullify in the Constitution.” And then he
quotes James Madison. “To the effect that what President Bush has done is the very definition of
tyranny.” So there you have it. It’s not just us, its not just progressives, but even someone like
former Vice President Gore is saying the very definition of tyranny.

I believe that the president and this grab for power will be repudiated. But it will not just happen.
The pendulum does not swing back automatically. It will take an aroused public and an aroused
people. And so the question is really - where do we go from here? One place I can tell you not to
go is: don’t go to the Democrats in Washington. I have to tell you (Applause) I’ve have never in
my life been kicked in the teeth so badly as I was on the Guantánamo cases when we took that to
the Democrats in Washington. Now I’m just gonna say it here, there is a million reasons I can
tell you don’t go there, but this one is called the Graham-Levin Bill. And after we win the right
to go court for the detainees at Guantánamo, and we win that in the Supreme Court, Republican

50
Senator Graham and Democrat Senator Levin get together - and what do they decide to do a few
weeks ago? But strip the courts of any jurisdiction to hear the Guantánamo cases. That’s what
they do - Democrats and Republicans together. And then they say you can use evidence from
torture to keep those people in jail. Kicking us right in the teeth! Kicking the courts in the teeth.
And so if you think that we’re going to get far by going there, you’ve got it wrong. Lessons of
history teach us that we don’t move our leaders without the passion and the protest of the people.

I want to close with a sense of hope. It’s been a rough four years, it’s been a rough twenty years,
it’s been a rough forty years since Dr. King spoke. But I want to close with a sense of hope. This
administration is unraveling. There is a split in the elites. Gore is one of the best examples. Eve-
rywhere we see former administration officials speaking out. They realize the administration has
gone too far. They want to save some remnant of democracy. We see indictments from Scooter
Libby to Delay coming fast and furious. We see General Miller, responsible for torture in
Guantánamo and Iraq, taking the 5th amendment essentially so he won’t have to testify. We see
General Sanchez, who was head of troops in Iraq, retiring without that 4th star. It’s a real opening
for us but it is not simply to go back to the normal. It’s not simply to save a remnant of democ-
racy. The malady is much deeper than that. We need a radical transformation of our society. My
hopes for today and for the future is that the truth will arouse resistance and with resistance there
will be some change. I mean resistance of every sort, mobilizing, protesting, disobeying and dis-
obedience. And then again, when I was reading Dr. King’s speech, the thought that he closed
with, and that I want to close with, is that sometimes we can wait too long to take action. Or as
Dr. King said, “you can be too late.” And we, unless we act, may be too late. So let me end with
Dr. King’s directive to us all: “We are now faced with the fact, my friends, that tomorrow is to-
day. We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now. There is such a thing as being too late.
We still have a choice today. Now let us begin. Now let us rededicate ourselves to the long and
bitter, but beautiful struggle for our new world.” Thank you. We’ll do this together.

***********

Michael Ratner is President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, and was co-counsel in Rasul
vs. Bush, the historic case of Guantánamo detainees, in which the Supreme Court ruled that U.S.
courts do indeed have jurisdiction over Guantánamo. Ratner is an expert in international human
rights law, and is a past President of the National Lawyers’ Guild.

51
INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON

CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
COMMITTED BY

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION


OF THE UNITED STATES

VERDICT
and Findings of Fact

September 13, 2006

Bush Crimes Commission


305 West Broadway, #199
New York, NY 10013

www.bushcommission.org
2
Preface
With this international commission we are looking at the crimes against humanity, which we
have been experiencing for some years, ever since the Bush administration came into office, but
whose antecedents really go back far into American history. It is a history of a very aggressive
foreign policy, a history which starts with the extermination of the Indians driving them out of
this continent, killing them, which proceeds with the invasion of Mexico, and goes on to send
troops into the Caribbean and then into the Philippines. And we’ve seen in this post-World War
II America, what was called by Henry Luce, the “American Century,” the military dominance of
the United States in the world.

The problem is that it is has not been moral dominance. The military dominance has gone along
with an immorality, which in these last years especially, has now reached the point of crime,
crimes against humanity, a phrase which came into general understanding after World War II
when the Nuremberg trials talked about the Nazis and their crimes against humanity. And it’s a
shame that we are at this point in American history where the charge that was made against the
Nazis is now a charge that people all over the world, and now more and more people in the
United States, are beginning to level against this administration.

Here is an administration that has taken this country into two wars in five years, ruthlessly send-
ing troops, first into Afghanistan and then into Iraq, under the guise of a war on terrorism, but in
fact waging war, carrying out acts of terrorism, against the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Bush Administration has been reserving to itself the right to unilaterally act whenever it felt
obliged to act, presumably in the interests of democracy and liberty, but actually in the interests
of business, big business, the oil business in this instance.

I remember during the Vietnam War, there was an artist who did a poster, which was distributed
by the thousands. The poster had simple words on it. It said, “War is good for business. Invest
your son.” That’s the situation we’re in now. Our sons, daughters are being invested for business
purposes. People all over the world know this, and now the American people recognize the im-
morality of what we are doing.

The destruction of life abroad is accompanied by the destruction of our liberties at home. When-
ever the government was engaged in war, in near war, or in a foreign policy crisis, then it has
used this as an excuse to say to the nation: “The First Amendment doesn’t count anymore. We
are in danger.” Precisely at that time is when people most need their freedom of speech, when
constitutional rights are most required, yet exactly at that point are they crippled and destroyed,
as is happening now with this administration with its Patriot Act, with its surveillance, with its
barging into libraries to demand the names of people who take out books, with its detention of
people without any due process and without trial.

The Bush Administration has been following a course, which can only now be described as a se-
ries of crimes against humanity. The Constitution provides for impeachment for what it calls
“high crimes and misdemeanors.” It has never been made exactly clear what this means. Gener-
ally, the presidents that have been impeached or threatened with impeachment have had that

3
happen, not as a result of high crimes, but as a result of relatively small actions which irritated
the opposite political party. But in this case, this is a clear case for the removal of a president for
committing “high crimes.” What could be a higher crime than sending the young people of the
country into a war against a small country on the other side of the world, which is no danger to
the United States, and in fact a war which is condemned by people all over the world and a war
which results in, not only the loss of American lives and the crippling of young Americans, but
results in the loss of huge numbers of people in Iraq? These are high crimes.

Along with it, of course, comes the incapacity of the government to use its resources, because the
resources are being used for war. We are in the midst right now of international catastrophes, of
hurricanes, of earthquakes, which are taking the lives of tens of thousands of people. It is a crime
that we have military equipment and soldiers fighting a war, when they could be used in other
parts of the world to save peoples’ lives. These are crimes, which I think the American people
now are more and more recognizing. If Congress doesn’t act, and Congress has been so reluctant
to act, with the Democratic Party so feeble and really cowardly in its subservience to the Ad-
ministration and its policies, in such a situation, where the political mechanisms of the govern-
ment are inadequate to address these crimes, then it is the responsibility of the people to speak up
and to demand that these crimes be recognized and that the people responsible for these crimes
be removed from office and brought to justice.

The Declaration of Independence, which is our founding philosophical document for democratic
ideas, says that “governments are established by the people” and that the purpose of government
is to ensure that people have an equal right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” And
when governments become destructive of these ends, when governments become destructive of
these ends, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish the government.” That is the situation
we are in today. This government is destructive of the rights of people, of their right to life, their
right to liberty. It is also destructive of the right to life of people abroad, which is why the rest of
the world has opposed this war in Iraq. The government is destructive of the health of people,
because, while people are dying of disease in Africa and Asia, and the Middle East, and even in
this country, this government with enormous wealth at its disposal is using that wealth to wage.

We’re facing a situation which really is intolerable from a moral point of view, a situation which,
not being redressed by Congress or by the Supreme Court, a situation in which democracy must
arise. Democracy must come alive, as historically in the past, where the government has failed to
act on behalf of human rights, where the government has failed to act for racial equality. Black
people in the South had to take it upon themselves to create the kind of commotion in the country
that would bring about a change. When working people were facing 12-hour days and couldn’t
survive and the government was not doing anything about this, the working people themselves
had to go out on strike and stop the machinery of the economic system. Those are situations
when democracy came alive. And we face that kind of situation today. My hope is that this tri-
bunal will be an important step in advancing a movement which will demand that the crimes tak-
ing place now stop, that the people responsible for it be removed from office, and that democracy
be restored in the United States.

Howard Zinn

4
Table of Contents
Preface by Howard Zinn ........................................................................................................ 3

Table of Contents................................................................................................................... 5

Introduction by C. Clark Kissinger........................................................................................ 7

Summary ................................................................................................................................11

Verdict and Findings..............................................................................................................13

Appendices

A. Commission Charter ..................................................................................................35

B. Standards for Judgment..............................................................................................39

C. Witness List ...............................................................................................................41

D. Panel of Jurists and Prosecutors.................................................................................43

E. Opening Remarks to Hearings from Harry Belafonte and Michael Ratner...............45

5
6
Introduction
The extraordinary Commission of Inquiry convened to consider charges that the President
George W. Bush and his administration have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity
has now reached a verdict: Guilty.

On wars of aggression, illegal detention and torture, suppression of science and catastrophic
policies on global warming, potentially genocidal abstinence-only policies imposed on
HIV/AIDS prevention programs in the Third World, and the abandonment of New Orleans be-
fore, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, President George W. Bush and his administration have
been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This verdict comes at crucial moment. As Michael Ratner, President of the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, emphasized at the Commission hearings: “We want this trial to be a step in the
building of mass resistance to war, to torture, to the destruction of earth and its people. It’s a se-
rious moment. . . . We still have a chance, an opportunity to stop this slide into chaos. But it is
up to us. We must not sit with our arms folded, and we must be as radical as the reality we are
facing.”

Acts of the Bush Administration have continued to reinforce this assessment. The crimes cited in
the indictments have continued. We have witnessed a continuing onslaught of horrors in Iraq
from the massacres in Haditha and Mahmudiya to the exposure of rapes and murders by U.S.
forces. Torture continues at secret overseas sites. New Orleans still lies in ruins, much of its
Black population “resettled.” New evidence concerning the deadly impact of U.S. AIDS policy
in Africa has come to light. New crimes have been committed such as the destruction of Lebanon
with U.S. weapons and backing. And now even more serious crimes loom with open threats to
launch a new war of aggression on Iran.

This administration has flouted and defied the Geneva Conventions. It has arrogated to itself the
right to suspend habeas corpus, engage in mass warrantless searches, and defines the powers of
the “commander-in-chief” to be above the law. Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, has
sought to legitimize torture and exempt those who employ torture from prosecution.

At the 1967 Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, Bertrand Russell gave a profound mandate: “We
meet at an alarming time. Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent.
We investigate in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse consciousness in
order to create mass resistance.” Establishing the truth of the Bush Administration’s acts and
their implications for humanity is our moral and political responsibility in this time.

Background of the Commission

Bush’s new doctrine of “preventive war,” massive civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
opening of a concentration camp at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and the appearance of government
documents seeking to legitimize torture, the potentially catastrophic and genocidal policies on

7
global warming and HIV/AIDS prevention all made clear that a serious investigation and adjudi-
cation was demanded.

Recognizing the need for this inquiry to establish the truth about charges of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, the Not In Our Name statement of conscience convened the Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administra-
tion. The Commission was initiated with a Charter (see Appendices) that was itself signed by
many noted voices of conscience.

The Charter begins, “When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against human-
ity exists, people of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope
of these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.”

The Charter also forthrightly states the Commission’s intent that “[t]he holding of this tribunal
will frame and fuel a discussion that is urgently needed in the United States: Is the administration
of George W. Bush guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity?”

The Commission took oral testimony and accepted documentary evidence from 44 witnesses at
public hearings held at the Manhattan Center, the historic Riverside Church, and the Columbia
School of Law during October 2005 and January 2006. These witnesses were an amazing array
of former government officials, noted experts, journalists, and victims.

Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector testified to the complete lies and fabrications of
the Bush administration in making the case for war in Iraq, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski,
the former commander of all prisons in Iraq established the chain of command from the torture
chambers of Abu Ghraib to the highest offices of the land, and Craig Murray, the former British
ambassador to Uzbekistan testified to the use of torture by U.S. allies in the War on Terror.
Murray exemplified the moral clarity needed by society when he stated, “I would personally
rather die than have anyone tortured to save my life”

Standards for the Commission

The Commission’s legitimacy derives from its integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evidence,
and the stature of its participants.

Precisely because of the singular nature of some of this administration’s actions and the lack of
relevant precedent in existent law, it was necessary to proceed from a “first principles” definition
of crimes against humanity. As a basis for its verdicts and findings of fact, these principles were
codified in its Standards of Judgment document (see Appendices), which sets forth the definition
of “crimes against humanity” to be used by the Commission:

“[C]rimes against humanity as popularly understood and conceived [are] acts that, by their scale
or nature, shock the conscience of humankind.

8
“Crimes against humanity are brutal crimes that are not isolated incidents but that involve large
and systematic actions often cloaked with official authority. These include mass murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts perpetrated against a population,
conducted in wartime or not. Apartheid and persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds
have also been considered inhumane acts causing great suffering, and therefore crimes against
humanity.”

While the Commission has referenced existing international law where applicable, it neither at-
tempted to develop new law nor to force-fit its findings into existing legal frameworks. Rather,
through the rigorous presentation of expert and witness testimony, documents, and other evi-
dence, the Commission has sought to establish the truth about major acts and policies of the
Bush administration, acts that could by their nature or scope, rise to the level of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.

That is, first and foremost, it is the task of the Commission to establish the truth.

Finally, the Standards gives a charge to its panel of judges (referred to in the Charter as a “jury of
conscience”): “The historic and political responsibility before this tribunal lies in delivering find-
ings of fact and a verdict on the central question before the commission: ‘whether George W.
Bush and his administration have committed crimes against humanity.’ As the Charter mandates,
‘The Commission’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.’
The jury of conscience will carefully assess the evidence and base its conclusions on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.”

***

It was a great strength that the hearings were held in the United States itself and were not limited
to one issue. By taking the charges together, a whole emerges that is greater than the sum of its
parts: the conscious, systematic malevolence at the core of the Bush agenda.

Realizing and confronting the reality that war crimes and crimes against humanity are being
committed by your government, in your name, brings to the fore the moral and political respon-
sibility to bring these crimes to halt -- and make sure that they are never repeated.

C. Clark Kissinger
New York, NY

C. Clark Kissinger was an initiator of the Not In Our Name statement of conscience as is the
Convener of the Bush Crimes Commission.

9
10
FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED BY THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Commission’s panel of jurists has reached a unanimous decision that George W.

Bush and his administration have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

We find the Bush Administration guilty of all five indictments presented for which we

have received evidence: wars of aggression, torture and indefinite detention, global warming

policies and actions, attacks on public health HIV/AIDS programs and reproductive rights, and

preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Each of these constitutes a shocking crime in itself, and taken together the full horrors are

all the more unconscionable. It is also clear that this is an administration that demonstrates an

utter disregard for truth and flagrantly lies about the reasons for its actions.

In arriving at this decision the jurists were particularly alarmed by the degree to which

the Bush Administration’s actions in all five indictments were informed by the extreme right. It

was the politics and perspective of the extreme, often religious, right that appeared in most cases

to provide the ideological framework for the Bush Administration within which the lives of the

poor, people of color and frequently non-Christians, were devalued to the extent that their human

rights were flagrantly violated. Thus, although the specific conduct differs among the indict-

ments, the result is the same: human life was debased and devalued by gratuitous acts of vio-

lence, torture, narrow self interest, indifference, and disregard.

The findings outlined below were reached after careful assessment of the evidence pre-

sented to the Commission in October 2005 and January 2006 as well as documents submitted by

11
the prosecutors after the hearings at the request of the jurists during the hearings.1 The findings

are based on our application of the Standards of Judgment for the International Commission of

Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the United States.

As required by this standard, the Commission relied on fundamental principles of morality and

justice, and, where appropriate, customary international law and international law principles in-

cluding the United Nations Charter, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Principles

of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention, the Torture Vic-

tims’ Protection Act, the War Crimes Act, and the international law of War Crimes and Crimes

Against Humanity.

Finally, the Commission has fulfilled its responsibility outlined in the Charter of the In-

ternational Commission of Inquiry: “When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes

against humanity exists, people of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the

nature and scope of these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes

and crimes against humanity.” We find that the acts of the Bush Administration in the five in-

dictment areas do “rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

Members of the panel:

Adjoa Aiyetoro
Dennis Brutus
Abdeen Jabara
Ajamu Sankofa
Ann Wright

1
The final decision and judgment differs from the preliminary findings released on February 2, 2006, in several re-
spects: (1) the Commission has reached a conclusion on the Global Health indictment after reviewing the documents
requested at the January hearing and received after the February 2 preliminary findings; (2) the findings made for
each indictment are more detailed; (3) in one instance, the Commission found a violation although it also found that
the charge made by the prosecution was not supported by the evidence.

12
FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (hereinafter The Commission)

FINDINGS:
WARS OF AGGRESSION INDICTMENT

Count 1: The Bush Administration authorized a war of aggression against Iraq.

As to count 1, we find that the Bush Commission authorized, under the doctrine of “preemptive
war” and a policy of “regime change”, a war of aggression against Iraq.

The doctrine of “preventive war” is not recognized as a justification for war under international
law. The goal of “regime change” is also not recognized as a legitimate purpose for waging war
under international law. Notwithstanding these facts, the Bush Administration launched a full
scale war against Iraq, a sovereign state; it did so not in self-defense or under the authorization of
the United Nations Security Council. The Bush Administration knew prior to the 2003 invasion
that Iraq had no connection to Al Qaeda, was disarmed, had no weapons of mass destruction, and
was incapable of mounting a credible defense much less an attack on the United States. Accord-
ingly, the Iraq war is an aggressive war in violation of international law.2

The Bush Administration steadfastly asserted only one justification for its invasion of Iraq: it
claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction3. The Bush Administration fixed and manipu-
lated intelligence on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in order to mislead de-
liberately and persuade the United States population and their elected representatives to support
the war of aggression. Accordingly, what the Bush Administration called intelligence to justify
the invasion of Iraq was politically motivated propaganda deliberately concocted to prosecute a
war of aggression.4

Count 2: The Bush Administration authorized conduct of the war that involved the com-
mission of “war crimes.”

As to Count 2, we find that the Bush Administration authorized conduct of the war that involved
the commission of war crimes.

As discussed above, the war is a war of aggression against the Iraq people. A war of aggression
is termed the supreme international war crime in international law because it is the world’s most
egregious war crime. This is so because it contains within it the combined atrocities of all war
crimes. In addition to committing the supreme international war crime, the Bush Administration,
2
Testimony of Amy Bartholomew, The Commission; Testimony of Phil Shiner, World Tribunal on Iraq, (WTI).
3
Testimony of Scott Ritter, The Commission
4
Testimony of Scott Ritter, David Swanson, Larry Everest, and Ray McGovern, The Commission; Declaration of
the Jury of Conscience, World Tribunal on Iraq, and Legal appendix by Richard Falk;

13
pursuant to its war of aggression in Iraq, has committed additional enumerated war crimes that
include but are not limited to the following:

1. The use of force beginning with the campaign of “Shock and Awe” was not a necessary
means or necessary measure to attain a lawful objective and it was a severe example of
overwhelming, indiscriminate, and disproportionate use of military force against a nation
state.5
2. The indiscriminate use of weapons such cluster munitions, incendiary bombs, depleted
uranium, and chemical weapons for which it is reasonably foreseeable would have caused
and indeed caused significant civilian injuries.6

Count 3: The Bush Administration authorized the occupation of Iraq involving, and con-
tinuing to involve, the commission of “war crimes.”

As to Count 3, we find that the Bush Administration authorized the occupation of Iraq involving
and continuing to involve, the commission of war crimes.

In the spring of 2003, the Bush Administration announced a military victory in Iraq signaled by
its destruction of the Iraqi Ba’athist government at which point the United States proceeded to
occupy Iraq.

For the duration of the United States occupation of Iraq, the United States is failing to safeguard
the lives of Iraqi civilians that have resulted from the devastation created by its intentionally
bombing of civilian infrastructure, termed “Shock and Awe” and created by its ongoing criminal
acts that include but are not limited to the following:

1. Because the invasion of Iraq was the supreme war crime, the resultant occupation of Iraq
itself is a war crime.7 The occupation consisted of additional war crimes such as: collec-
tive punishment upon the Iraqi people in the form of post invasion intentional and tar-
geted attacks upon civilian populations, hospitals, medical centers, residential neighbor-
hoods, electrical power stations and water purification facilities8 the wide spread use of
torture against the Iraqi people,9 mass arrests and detention of civilians and civilian home
demolitions10 and the destruction and desecration of the cultural and archeological heri-
tage of the Iraqi people11
2. Killing and injuring individual civilians through random fire during military operations
or in response to attacks by resistance forces, e.g. killing of over 40 people in a wedding
near Al Qaim, and over 600 people in Fallujah, half of them women and children. The
Bush Administration declared the City of Fallujah, a population of 350,000 people, a free
fire zone. As a result, the Bush Administration bombed 70 % of the city in 2004. The

5
Testimony of Phil Shiner, WTI
6
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, Dr. Fasy, and Stephen Bronner, The Commission
7
Center for Economic and Social Rights CESR Report, June 10, 2004;
8
Testimony of Camilo Mejia, Dennis Halliday, and Dahr Jamal, The Commission; Testimony of Ramsey Clark,
WTI;
9
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;
10
CESR Report, June 10. 2004;
11
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;

14
Bush Administration also extensively and indiscriminately bombed Ramadi, Samara,
Haditha, Alkaim, Abuhisma, Sania, Najaf, Kut, Baghdad, Musul and other Iraqi cities
causing substantial civilian deaths and severe injuries.12
3. The failure of civil reconstruction, the impeding of medical care during the occupation,
and the facilitation of the corporate looting of Iraq through the rewriting of Iraq’s laws.13;
4. Deliberately bombing civilian and neutral broadcasting outlets and otherwise restricting
press and media coverage of actual events.14; and
5. Extrajudicial killings at checkpoint.15

TORTURE, RENDITION, ILLEGAL DETENTION and MURDER INDICTMENT

Torture:

Count 1: The Bush Administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in violation of
international humanitarian and human rights law, customary international law, and do-
mestic constitutional and statutory law.

As to Count 1, we find that the Bush Administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in
violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, customary international law, and
domestic constitutional and statutory law.

In December 2001, the Bush Administration implemented the Special Access Program that au-
thorized the secret seizure, detention, and interrogation of persons and subjected them to torture.
The torture included but was not limited to: water boarding, beatings, the administration of elec-
tric shocks, extreme temperatures, denial of pain medication for injuries, severe burning, depri-
vation of food and water, and threats of death and sexual assault of family members.16.

In January 2002, the Bush Administration declared that Geneva Conventions protections will not
be honored for the “war on terror” prisoners held at the Guantánamo detention center in Cuba. In
August 2002, the Administration attempted to redefine “torture” to escape liability and/or insure
immunity for those who authorized or committed torture. Under the Bush Administration’s new
torture definition, torture only exists when a person is put at risk of complete organ failure or
death. The Bush Administration also examined the ways that it could avoid liability under cir-
cumstances where its actions exemplified its new definition of torture, including raising the de-
fenses of necessity and self-defense.17

The United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, admitted that Guantánamo prisoner,
Al-Qahtani was tortured at Guantánamo. Other Guantánamo detainees were subjected to ex-

12
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, The Commission; CESR Report, June 10, 2004; New York times article on Haditha,
May, 2006 ;
13
Testimony of Dahr Jamail, The Commission; CESR; Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI; Testimony of
Ramsey Clark, WTI;
14
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI; Testimony of Jeremy Scahill, The Commission
15
Declaration of the Jury of Conscience, WTI;
16
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
17
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission

15
tremes of temperature, deprived of food and water, shackled for days to the floor in extreme po-
sitions calculated to cause pain, and denied medical care. As a direct result of this torture, detain-
ees suffered permanent injuries including the loss of limbs and broken bones. Other detainees
suffered severe personality decompensation and are now suffering from a range of mental ill-
nesses. The techniques of torture used at Guantánamo were transferred by General Geoffrey
Miller to and used on the detainees imprisoned at Abu Ghraib in Iraq.18

Persons held under United States custody in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo as well as those
held under the custody of the United States during rendition were subjected to torture, and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment as a matter of policy and systemic practice.19

Secret detention itself is a form of torture for the person detained and for the families who were
faced with a situation that amounted to that of enforced disappearance of an individual20.

Rendition:

Count 2: The Bush Administration authorized the transfer (“rendition”) of persons held in
U.S. custody to foreign countries where torture is known to be practiced.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the seizure, trans-
fer, and detention (“rendition”) of persons to foreign countries where torture is known to be prac-
ticed.21

In late 2001, at the request of CIA Director, George Tenet, the President authorized the creation
of CIA-run secret detention centers in countries outside the United States where post 9/11 de-
tainees would be sent (“rendered”) and subjected to practices that would be unlawful in the
United States.22

The original rendition program was conceived by the CIA and authorized in the 1990’s by the
Clinton Administration. The strategic target of the CIA rendition program has always been, and
remains the global network known as Al-Qaeda. Post 9/11, under the Bush Administration, the
CIA has taken a much larger role in the rendition program to include its participation in interro-
gation of detainees rather than just placing them behind bars. Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice referred to this program as “extraordinary rendition.23

18
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
19
Testimony of Jumah al-Dossari and Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Report: Alleged Secret Detentions and
Unlawful Inter-state Transfer involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty, Switzer-
land, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly.
20
Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions in Coun-
cil of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty p. 2, see comments by United Nations
High Commissioner on Human Rights, Ms. Louise Arbour.
21
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission
22
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky The Commission; Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Federal Regis-
ter: November 16, 2001 Vol. 66, No.222, Presidential Documents pp. 57831-36.
23
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur: Mr.
Dick Marty p. 3

16
The result has been that captured suspects are placed outside of the reach of any judicial system
and are subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques that are in themselves forms of torture.24

The Bush Administration undertook an untold number of these “extraordinary renditions” where
the abductees, while under US custody or control, were tortured by CIA agents or foreign opera-
tives. Typical of these renditions is the case of Egyptian citizen, Hassam Mustafa Nasr, known as
Abu Omar. He was abducted by the CIA in Milan Italy on June 17th 2003 and transferred to
Egypt where he was detained. Abu Omar was tortured after his abduction and prior to his being
sent to Egypt during which time the CIA participated in the torture investigation. CIA operatives
acknowledged that rendered suspects were being tortured in Egypt. Maher Arar, a Canadian citi-
zen, born in Syria was detained in the United States and rendered to Syria against his wishes
where he was tortured and held for ten and a half months. Mamdouh Habib was picked up in
Pakistan and sent to Egypt where he was tortured for four months before being transferred to
Guantánamo by the United States.25

Illegal Detention:

Count 3: The Bush Administration authorized the indefinite detention of persons seized in
foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone and denied them the
protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and the protec-
tions of the US Constitution.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the indefinite de-
tention of person seized in foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone
and denied them the protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war
and the protections of the US Constitution.

On November 13th 2001, the Bush Administration created a “trial system” for trying non-citizen
detainees where the United States does not provide these detainees due process protections that
are well established in domestic and international law. The “trial system” is to be held in
Guantánamo where detainees are deprived due process rights under the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
eighth amendments of the United States Constitution.

Persons have been or are currently detained in these detention centers without charge and are be-
ing held indefinitely. These US controlled detention centers are in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as
well as in several sites in Eastern Europe and North Africa. The Bush Administration declared

24
Testimony of Craig Murray, The Commission; Report, Section C, 2.1 Para. 35 and 26 of Alleged Secret Deten-
tions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfer Involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty,
Switzerland, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly; Also see:
Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper October 2004, The United States Disappeared: The CIA’s Long-Term Ghost
Detainees; Amnesty International Report, April 5, 2006: Below the Radar: Secret Flights To Torture and Disappear-
ance
25
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions in Council of Europe Member States, January 22, 2006, Rapporteur:
Mr. Dick Marty p. 8 and 13

17
that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these detainees who were defined as “enemy com-
batants”, a term not valid under international law.26

Round ups

Count 4: The Bush Administration authorized the round-up and detention in the United
States of tens of thousands of immigrants on pretextual grounds and held them without
charge or trial in violation of international law and domestic constitutional and civil rights
law.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration authorized the round-up and
detention in the United States of thousands (the exact number is unknown) of immigrants on pre-
textual grounds and held many of them illegally long past the resolution of their immigration
status.

The FBI and INS, under the rubric of very large immigration sweeps, rounded up and detained
immigrants, mostly Arabs, Muslims or South Asian men. The sweeps were a flagrant example
of racial profiling. The detainees could not call their family, nor call their consulate. Very few
were permitted out on bond. They were in a legal black hole. Many were brutalized by guards
and held in virtual solitary confinement. These actions were in violation of international law and
domestic constitutional law.

In September 2001, the Bush Administration authorized the seizures and detention of US immi-
grants in US detention centers. The seizures and detentions in the United States were called “ma-
terial witness “seizures by the US Justice Department. The Commission finds that the Bush Ad-
ministration held possibly hundreds of people under the material witness statute without charge
or trial in violation of international and domestic constitutional and civil rights law. In many
cases, people who merely looked Arab or South Asian were picked up first based on uncorrobo-
rated tips and then held if they had a minor immigration violation or were designated as a mate-
rial witness. No one knows exactly how many are still being held in the United States pending
deportation or as material witnesses; evidence strongly suggests that it may be hundreds. They
are held without charge and denied basic principles of due process and judicial review. These
practices contravene the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.

Another category of detainees are people who entered the United States for purposes other than
becoming a permanent resident, for example, on a visitor or student visa (non-immigrants).
Thousands of such individuals were subjected to the National Registration Act, a post 9/11 law.
This act was intended to register and monitor non-immigrants from countries designated by the
Secretary of State entering or already in the United States but in fact was used as a means of ar-

26
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; Report, Section C, 2.1 Para. 35 and 26: Alleged Secret De-
tentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfer Involving Council of Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick
Marty, Switzerland, ALDE June 2006, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly;
Also see: Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper October 2004, The United States Disappeared: The CIA’s Long-
Term Ghost Detainees; Amnesty International Report, April 5, 2006: Below the Radar: Secret Flights To Torture
and Disappearance

18
resting and deporting these individuals. In addition, the Act was enforced in an discriminatory
manner only against Muslims and Arab visitors, and in an arbitrary manner in that some people
were deported to countries from which they had previously been granted political asylum. The
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of the Act contravene the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights.27

Indefinite Detentions

Count 5: The Bush Administration used military force to seize and detain indefinitely
without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their detention in U.S,
courts.

As to Count 5, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration used military force to seize
and detain indefinitely without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their
detention in U.S. courts.

The Bush Administration seized and detained within the United States persons who are United
States citizens. The Bush Administration has classified these seized persons as “enemy combat-
ants.” For example, Yaser Hamdi, A US citizen, was detained in Afghanistan and placed in
United States custody. There is also Jose Padilla, a US citizen, who was arrested in O’Hare air-
port by law enforcement agent and later transferred to military custody at the request of the
President. These detainees were taken into US military custody after they had been declared
“enemy combatants” by the Bush Administration. All such “enemy combatant” detainees were
denied a judicial hearing on the facts or on the legality of their detention. In each case and in
violation of the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions, the United States took the position
that the president has the authority to hold “enemy combatants” and decide their status unilater-
ally.

The US Supreme Court subsequently gave meaning to the Bush Administration’s made up term
“enemy combatant.” The Court limited the meaning to persons who, while in Afghanistan, had
taken up arms against the United States in alliance with the Taliban or other terrorists and as long
as hostilities existed. The Bush Administration proceeded to violate the Supreme Court’s defi-
nition as exemplified by the fact that Mr. Padilla was not arrested in Afghanistan or anywhere
near a battlefield, and was not shown to have ever taken up arms against the United States in Af-
ghanistan or elsewhere.28

Murder

Count 6: The Bush Administration committed murder by authorizing the CIA to kill those
that the president designates either US citizens or non-citizens, anywhere in the world.

27
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission
28
Testimony of Barbara Olshansky, The Commission; (Also see: Supreme Court, US decision on Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, No. 05-184, 2006)

19
As to Count 6, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration committed murder by author-
izing the CIA to kill those that the president designates, either US citizens or non-citizens, any-
where in the world and where this authorization was acted upon causing death.

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, issued a secret directive to Special Operations forces
allowing them to “capture terrorists for interrogation or, if necessary, to kill them” anywhere in
the world.29. The Bush Administration had already issued a presidential finding authorizing the
killing of terrorist leaders, but the secret Rumsfeld directive increased such efforts.30 The Bush
Administration, claiming that terrorists are military combatants, never rescinded a preexisting
presidential executive order signed by US President Ford in 1976 that banned all assassinations.

In February 2002, a Predator drone missile was launched by the CIA; it targeted for assassination
someone intelligence agents thought was bin Laden. The drone hit its target, but killed three in-
nocent Afghan farmers instead.31 The first successful assassination takes place in November
2003 when the CIA launched a Hellfire drone missile that killed US citizen Kamal Derwish and
five others in Yemen. The United States considered the dead men to be enemy combatants in its
global war on terror.32

GLOBAL WARMING INDICTMENT

Denial and Distortion of Scientific Consensus and Findings

Count 1: The Bush Administration has consistently denied the scientific consensus around
global warming and its causes. Administration officials have misrepresented, distorted, and
suppressed scientific information on the subject, especially as it would impact public opin-
ion.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has consistently denied the
scientific consensus around global warming and its causes. Administration officials have misrep-
resented, distorted, and suppressed scientific information on the subject, especially as it would
impact public opinion.

The Bush Administration, early in its existence, requested the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to review the findings of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). The IPCC is composed of 2,000 scientists; they had been studying global warming since
1989. The Bush Administration also wanted the NAS to provide it a further assessment of what
climate science says about the reality of global warming/climate change. The NAS subsequently

29
Manhunt by Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, December 16, 2002
30
Bush Has Widened Authority of CIA to Kill Terrorists by James Risen and David Johnson, New York Times,
12/15/2002
31
Manhunt by Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, December 16, 2002
32
US Citizen Killed by CIA Linked to NY Terror Case by Michael Powell and Donna Priest, p. A01, Washington
Post, November 9, 2002

20
strongly confirmed the findings of the IPCC that had affirmed the existence of global warming
and climate change. In addition, the American Geophysical Union (AGU), the world’s largest
organization of earth scientists had also released a strong report describing the human causes of
disruption of the Earth’s climate.

Despite the scientific consensus evidenced in the IPCC, NAS, and the AGU reports on the exis-
tence of global warming and the human behavior that is causing it, the Bush Administration con-
tended in full contradiction and misrepresentation of the scientific consensus presented to it, that
uncertainties in climate projections existed and that fossil fuel emissions are too great to warrant
mandatory action to slow emissions.

The Bush Administration successfully lobbied to have the chief of the IPCC, Dr. Robert Watson,
removed from the IPCC.33

An example of the Bush Administration actively suppressing information showing the existence
of global warming is illustrated by its pressuring the Environmental Protection Agency to re-
move any reference discussing the existence to global warming and extreme climate change and
its causes from its 2002 annual air pollution report.34

An example of the Bush Administration actively distorting the science on global warming and
extreme climate change was evident when a whistleblower, Rick Piltz, a senior associate from a
federal climate change program publicly disclosed proof of the Bush Administration editing fed-
eral documents to distort the science. The New York Times printed excerpts of the documents in
June 2005. The documents showed that a Mr. Philip A. Cooney, chief of the White House Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, also a former manager for the American Petroleum Institute who
had led the oil industry’s drive to prevent restrictions on greenhouse emissions, and who had no
scientific training; redrafted the federal climate change official report to deny the validity of the
scientific consensus on global warming and extreme climate change. Cooney and his staff had
made 100 to 450 pertinent editorial changes per report.35

Among the topics that the Bush Administration is attempting to keep from the public are the na-
tional and regional deleterious outcomes to the earth and its human population from global
warming and extreme climate change: for example, increased heat waves and corresponding
public health threats, droughts and conflicts from water shortages, flooding that will destroy cos-
tal infrastructure and wetlands as occurred due to Katrina and other hurricanes, irreversible de-
struction of coral reefs indispensable to sea life, massive economic dislocation with the elimina-
tion of major coastal industries and government and corporate action that could be taken to pre-
vent, mitigate, and adapt to the coming disasters.

33
Testimony of Ted Glick, The Commission; 2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking
34
2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking

35
2004 UCS Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking

21
As a result of the Bush Administrations behavior to misrepresent, distort, and suppress informa-
tion on global warming and extreme climate change, the actual problem solving of global warm-
ing has been set back ten years.36

Obstructionism on International Efforts

Count 2: The Bush Administration has refused to take any measures to curb the emissions
of greenhouse gases, guided by narrow corporate interests. It has withdrawn from any in-
ternational efforts that would impose binding restrictions, however minimal. It has done
this with full knowledge of the catastrophic effects of global warming and the dispropor-
tionate U. S. share of world greenhouse emissions, the leading cause of global warming.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has refused to take any meas-
ures to curb the emissions of greenhouse gases, guided by narrow corporate interests. It has
withdrawn from any international efforts that would impose binding restrictions, however mini-
mal. It has done this with full knowledge of the catastrophic effects of global warming and the
disproportionate U. S. share of world greenhouse emissions, the leading cause of global warm-
ing.

The United States, under the Bush Administration, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol which is
an international effort to reduce greenhouse emissions and end global warming. It did so despite
the fact that the United States has only 5% of the world’s population and is responsible for nearly
25% of greenhouse emissions.37

Despite a pledge by George Bush during the 2000 Presidential campaign to mandate mandatory
emission reductions of carbon dioxide on the US based coal fired power plants, President Bush
reversed this pledge two months after his inauguration in 2001.38 In March 2001, under the lead-
ership of Vice President, Dick Cheney, the Bush Administration presented its energy plan. This
plan, the Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, called for the construction
of 1,300 to 1,900 new power plants, most of them coal fired.39

The motives of the Bush Administration are clear. The Bush Administration is deliberately tar-
geting the information that expert policy-makers have on climate change in an effort to protect
the most powerful industries on the planet: the oil, gas and coal industries, in full disregard of the
harm to the environment and to the most vulnerable people globally. According to a World
Health Organization study, 160,000 people are dying every year as a result of extreme climate
change related to floods, hurricanes, droughts, disease, and food shortages.40

36
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission
37
Testimony of Ted Glick, The Commission
38
Groups Blast Bush for reversing position on Emissions, Inside Politics, CNN, March 15, 2001
39
See www.whitehouse.gov/energy
40
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission

22
For the peoples of Africa, the threat is worse, because the temperature increases over many areas
of the continent will be double the global average. This suggests that 182 million people in sub-
Sahara Africa could die of diseases directly attributable to climate change by the end of the cen-
tury.41

Indigenous people of the Pacific Islands, The United States Great Lakes, Southwest, and Great
Plains regions are experiencing the severe difficulties reported by the UN. Indigenous people of
the Artic region, specifically the Inuit and the Yupik, are experiencing enormous difficulties as
well. They are experiencing life threatening accidents due to falling through thinning ice, com-
munity displacements, previously unknown health problems such as sunburn, skin cancer, cata-
racts, immune system disorders and heat related health problems.42

Despite the scientific consensus on the present known toll in human death and suffering attrib-
uted to global warming and extreme climate change and the prospects for far more catastrophic
and irreversible injury to the Earth and its human population, the Bush Administration has used
its enormous power through deliberate deception, to diffuse and confuse the focused attention of
the world on the multilateral framework of the Kyoto protocol and the climate convention. The
Bush Administration used its power to exacerbate the problems associated with extreme climate
change by promulgating policies and practices that actually increased global warming and ex-
treme climate change and that simultaneously limited the capacity of the world’s people to re-
spond before irreversible injuries result.43

SUMMARY

The Commission considers the deliberate acts and failures to act by the Bush Administration re-
garding global warming to be systemic. We also consider the global consequences of this behav-
ior to be both grave and foreseeable. The Administration’s behavior also constitutes breaches of
UN treaties that the US has signed and ratified related to protecting the global environment: they
are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that commits the US to developing poli-
cies aimed at returning its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. We also find, as it pertains to
the fundamental rights of sovereign indigenous people of the Americas that the Bush Admini-
stration is violating indigenous people’s fundamental human rights as protected by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

We find that the disproportionate role that the United State plays in polluting the earth is directly
causing global warming and extreme climate change. We also find that the systemic nature of the
Bush Administration’s deliberate refusal to act reasonably to curb global warming combined

41
Climate Change Will be Catastrophe for Africa, by Paul Vallely, The Independent (UK), May 16, 2006
42
Testimony by Tom “Mato Awanyankapi” Goldtooth, The Commission; Inuit Petition Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United States of America, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Peti-
tioner, December 7, 2005; Also see: Tiohtia Declaration, International Indigenous Peoples Forum on climate Change
Statement to the State Parties of the COP 11/MOP 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on climate
Change UNFCCC, November 28-December 9, 2005
43
Testimony of Daphne Wysham, The Commission

23
with its deliberate acts that directly increase global warming and extreme climate change place
the world’s people at imminent risk of unspeakable and irreversible destruction in the near fu-
ture. Accordingly, we find that the Bush Administration is committing a crime against humanity.

GLOBAL HEALTH INDICTMENT

Imposition of Abstinence-Only HIV prevention Programs

Count 1: The Bush Administration is using its political influence, aid, and funding in the
sphere of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment to advance policies and programs that
worsen the AIDS pandemic. Guided by a Christian fundamentalist ideological agenda, the
administration is promoting and forcing deadly abstinence-only HIV prevention and sex
education programs instead of proven comprehensive programs that comprise consistent
and correct use of condoms.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration is using its political influence,
aid, and funding in the sphere of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment to advance policies and
programs that worsen the AIDS pandemic. We also find that the Administration, guided by a
Christian fundamentalist ideological agenda, is promoting and forcing deadly abstinence-only
HIV prevention and sex education programs instead of proven comprehensive programs that
comprise consistent and correct use of condoms.

The Bush Administration’s abstinence-only policy influences global HIV prevention efforts. It is
called the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It is a moralistic, Christian fundamental-
ist, and non public health oriented approach, promulgated in February 2004; it focuses on 15
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia that are severely stricken by the AIDS
pandemic.

PEPFAR requires that grantees devote at least 33% of prevention spending to abstinence-until
marriage programs. These policies are inherently coercive in that they withhold needed informa-
tion and they also promote inaccurate opinions and harmful outcomes. The PEPFAR law in-
cludes no comparable minimum for condom distribution; hence prevention funds are steered to
abstinence only programs.44

The Bush Administration developed PEPFAR through a closed-door process that did not include
participation of key stakeholders in the global AIDS policy debate. The Bush Administration
continues to be the primary donor for HIV/AIDS programs in Uganda and in the world.45

44
Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The Interna-
tional Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working Papers, No. 1 June 2004, p.10; Journal of
Adolescent Health 38 2006 72-81, Review article: Abstinence and abstinence-only education: A review of U.S.
policies and programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H. et al, p.77-79
45
Condom Crisis in Uganda: Shortages Spread to Other Countries, US Policies Undermine HIV Prevention Pro-
grams, August 2005, by Jodi L. Jacobson, Center for Health and Gender Equity Center for Health and Gender Eq-

24
The PEPFAR policies are reversing the well-recognized successes that Uganda had achieved in
preventing the spread of HIV between 1991 and 2001.46

Global inequality drives health disparity. AIDS funds represent a substantial sum of money to
Uganda, and other desperately impoverished that are already critically financially dependent on
western international financial institutions dominated by the United States. Substantial economic
dependence on the West, coupled by the Bush Administration’s manipulation of AIDS funding
to promulgate a religious doctrine at the expense of sound public health policy and science, has
shattered coercively and dramatically Uganda’s preexisting successful AIDS domestic priorities.
As a practical matter, many third-world countries, such as Uganda, have little or no choice be-
cause of a lack of public health funds and infrastructure but to comply with PEPFAR.47

In 2005, the Ugandan Minister of Health, the Hon. Maj. Gen. Jim K. Muhwezi reported that de-
spite the historical record of Uganda’s success in reducing HIV, the Uganda government, in an
effort to prevent a drying up of AIDS resources, since 2003, started downplaying its own proven
successful track record and re-wrote its own history in an obvious attempt to please the United
States that had started pouring millions of dollars into ideologically driven PEPFAR HIV-
prevention programs that provided misleading information about the effectiveness of condoms
and that failed to equip people, particularly women with the essential skills needed to negotiate
safer sex.

Ambassador Stephen Lewis, the United Nations secretary general’s special envoy for HIV/AIDS
in Africa since 2001, and the former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, stated the
PEPFAR policies in the Uganda will cause significant numbers of HIV and other STD infections
in Uganda which should never have occurred.48

Imposition of “Gag Rule”

uity Report, Debunking the Myths in the U.S. Global AIDS Strategy: An Evidence-Based Analysis, p.10 March
2004
46
Human Rights Watch, Distortions of Uganda’s HIV Prevention Efforts
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm]; New York Times editorial on Uganda and condoms entitled The
Missing Condoms, September 4, 2005; Human Rights Watch, Distortions of Uganda’s HIV Prevention Efforts
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm; Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on
Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The International Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working
Papers, No. 1 June 2004; Human Rights Watch, Uganda and the U.S. Global AIDS Initiative-
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm; Condom Crisis in Uganda: Shortages Spread to Other Countries, US
Policies Undermine HIV Prevention Programs, August 2005, by Jodi L. Jacobson, Center for Health and Gender
Equity

47
Testimony of Dr. Alan Berkman and Naina Dhingra, The Commission
48
Press release from Hon. Maj. Gen. Jim Muhwezi, September 2005; source Human Rights Watch, Ugandans Resist
Anti-Condom Agenda; New York Times article, US Blamed for Condom Shortage in Fighting AIDS in Uganda, by
Lawrence K. Altman, August 30, 2005.

25
Count 2: The Bush Administration has re-instated the “gag-rule” restricts foreign organi-
zations that receive US funds from using their own, non-US. Funds to provide legal abor-
tion services or even provide accurate medical counseling of reproductive health clinics de-
pendent on international funding in very poor parts of the world. In man areas, these clin-
ics have also been the only source of HIV/AIDS prevention and care, including the supply
of much-needed and life saving condoms.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that The Bush Administration has re-instated the “gag-
rule” that restricts foreign organizations that receive US funds from using their own, non-US
funds to provide legal abortion services or even provide accurate medical counseling of repro-
ductive health in clinics dependent on international funding in very poor parts of the world. In
many areas, these clinics have also been the only source of HIV/AIDS prevention and care, in-
cluding the supply of much-needed and life saving condoms.

The Bush Administration put the gag-rule in place on the first business day of its administration
in 2001. The gag rule denies foreign organizations receiving U.S. family planning assistance the
right to use their own non-U.S. funds to provide legal abortion, counsel or referral for abortion,
or lobby for the legalization of abortion in their own country. NGO’s must withhold information
from women about the option of legal abortion and where to obtain safe abortion services using
their own, non US government funds to do so. Also, these NGOs are banned from disseminating
any information regarding the health hazards of unsafe abortion, or provide legal abortion ser-
vices with non-U.S. funding.

The gag rule is a public health disaster in the developing world and places people at grievous risk
of injury, disease and death: about 70,000 women die each year from unsafe abortions, many of
them leaving young children behind. By preventing high-risk pregnancies, family planning could
save at least 25% of these women’s lives.

The gag rule has exacerbated and intensified a condom shortage across the developing world and
decreased the effectiveness of HIV prevention programs. Although the global gag rule does not
apply to HIV/AIDS assistance, most family planning organizations have been denied HIV/AIDS
resources because implementing partners have been chilled by the gag rule and abstinence only
policies; the partners are frightened of retribution, and scrutiny from the right wing ideologically
driven Bush Administration. This is a disastrous outcome given the fact that family planning
providers are crucial to HIV/AIDS prevention programs.49

In 2005, 5 million people were infected with HIV globally. The Commission finds that the Bush
Administration’s reproductive health global policy is complicit in putting millions of people
around the world at risk for HIV by intentionally obstructing the dissemination of crucial medi-
cal information about condoms as a well proven effective means of HIV prevention, to vulner-

49
Testimony of Naina Dhingra, The Commission

26
able, powerless and poor people, in the midst of an HIV pandemic. This behavior is unethical,
morally reprehensible, and shocks the conscience.50

Distortion of Science

Count 3: The Bush Administration and its political operatives have distorted sound science
and attempted to suppress medical research studies in HIV prevention when it conflicts
with the ideology of the Christian Right.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration and its political operatives
have distorted sound science and attempted to suppress medical research studies in HIV preven-
tion when it conflicts with the ideology of the Christian Right.

As early as 1997, the Joint United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS found evidence that sexual
health education for children and young people that included the promotion of condom use and
safer sexual practices, which is one the main scientifically proven forms of HIV/AIDS preven-
tion, did not increase participant’s sexual activity. Indifferent to this data, the Bush Administra-
tion pursued its AIDS global agenda when it clearly knew or should have known that its absti-
nence-only HIV/AIDS prevention strategies had not demonstrated that they did or could prevent
the spread of HIV.

The Institute of Medicine, a body of experts that acts under a United States Congressional charter
as an advisor to the U.S. federal government, noted in 2001, that there was no evidence support-
ing abstinence-only program, and that investing “millions of dollars of federal…funds…in absti-
nence-only programs with no evidence constitutes poor fiscal and health policy.” The Institute
simultaneously concluded that scientific studies have shown that comprehensive sex and
HIV/AIDS programs and condom availability programs can be effective in reducing high-risk
sexual behaviors.

In contravention of federal government experts’ recommendations, the Bush Administration re-


quired that the abstinence-only programs in Uganda be administered according to the precise
guidelines evaluated and criticized by the Institute of Medicine. These policies continue notwith-
standing an ever-growing scientific consensus of the ineffectiveness and potential harms of these
programs.

In 2001, under pressure from anti-condom activists within the Bush Administration, the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) removed a 1999 fact sheet on condom use that encouraged sexually
active youth to use condoms to prevent HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. In 2002, the
CDC replaced the fact sheet with biased information regarding condom use that dissuades use.

50
Testimony of Naina Dhingra and Dr. Tom Fasy, The Commission; Journal of Adolescent Health 38 (2006) 72-81,
Abstinence and Abstinence-only Education: A review of U.S. policies and programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H.
et al, p. 78

27
This action demonstrates a willingness to censor vital, life saving information in the face of the
HIV pandemic.51

Absent any scientific support and notwithstanding peer review scientific research to the contrary,
The Bush Administration, in December 2002, at the United Nations Fifth Asia-Pacific Popula-
tion conference in Bangkok claimed that the promotion of abstinence-only is preferred as the
healthiest choice for sexually active unmarried adolescents. In addition, the Bush Administration
has erroneously linked condom failure with the relatively high prevalence of human papillomavi-
rus (HPV) as a means to dissuade people from the use of condoms. This deliberate misinforma-
tion is spread despite the solid science that HPV is spread by exposure to areas not covered or
protected by condoms.

The Commission is persuaded that the Bush Administration’s ideologically driven policy has
caused countless deaths in the five years since the Bush Administration has been in power.
Uganda’s AIDS Commissioner, Kihumuro Apuuli announced that HIV infections have almost
doubled in Uganda over the past two years, from 70,000 in 2003 at the approximate time that
PEPFAR was initiated in Uganda to 130,000 in 2005.52

Restriction of Generics

Count 4: The Bush Administration has used its political and economic power to coerce
other countries into agreements that severely restrict and manufacture and supply of ge-
neric drugs, the only affordable option for most HIV positive people in the Third World.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration has used its influence in ways
that frustrate the supply of generic HIV/AIDS drugs, the only affordable option for most HIV
positive people in the Third World.

Until 2003, the prior Clinton and current Bush Administrations had consistently obstructed a
World Trade organization pact on the export of inexpensive generic drugs. Since September
2003, the United States requires that the requests for importation of generics be made in “good
faith” and “for no commercial gain” and that the generic drugs so exported be packaged and la-
beled differently to prevent re-exportation. These conditions create bureaucratic obstacles to ge-
neric HIV/AIDS drug importation.53

51
Advocates for Youth, CDC’s Condom Fact Sheets: A Comparison

52
A disaster for Abstinence Ideology, by Esther Kaplan, May 2006; Testimony of Dr. Alan Berkman, The Commis-
sion; Human Rights Watch, studies discrediting abstinence-only approaches in the U.S;
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/8.htm ; Center for Health and Gender Equity Report, Debunking the Myths
in the U.S. Global AIDS Strategy: An Evidence-Based Analysis, p.10 March 2004;Also see Journal of Adolescent
Health 38 (2006 72-81, Review article: Abstinence and abstinence-only education: A review of U.S. policies and
programs by John Santelli, M.D., M.P. H. et al, p.79; Abstinence Promotion: Censorship, Moralizing, Politics, & the
Risk to Young People; Testimony by Vanessa Brocato, The Commission;
53
Global Implications of U.S. Domestic and International Policies on Sexuality by Francoise Girard, The Interna-
tional Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy IWGSSP Working Papers, No. 1 June 2004, p. 13

28
The body of evidence as a whole demonstrates that Bush Administration’s Global Health
Agenda violates International law:

SUMMARY

Access to accurate HIV/AIDS prevention information is a human right that the Bush
Administration is intentionally violating. Its coercive abstinence-only and gag-rule policies are
imposed on impoverished and politically and economically dependent countries of the world
with catastrophic and foreseeable injury to children in violation, the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The policies also obstruct the purpose of Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The Commission finds that grave injuries and the risk of grave injuries confront the worlds’ peo-
ple who are subjected to the Bush Administration’s HIV/AIDS and family planning global health
policies. The injuries are preventable, racially discriminatory in their disproportionate impact on
people of color, religiously intolerant, and systemic. As a result, the Commission finds that the
Bush Administration’s HIV/AIDS and family planning policies constitute a crime against hu-
manity.

HURRICANE KATRINA INDICTMENT

The Levees

Count 1: Knowing failure of the Bush Administration to adequately maintain and upgrade
the levees directly contributed to the foreseeable loss of life and suffering of many people
when Hurricane Katrina struck.

As to Count 1, the Commission finds that knowing failure of the Bush Administration to ade-
quately maintain and upgrade the levees directly contributed to the foreseeable loss of life and
suffering of many people when Hurricane Katrina struck.

The Federal Government is responsible for monitoring the design and construction of the levees
in the United States at every step. Since the late 1960’s, the federal government has been very
well aware of New Orleans vulnerability to flooding due to levee breaches. “[The New Orleans]
levees were never intended to protect against category four hurricanes such as Katrina according
to Corps of Engineer’s official, Lt. General Strock.

In addition, the 17th Street Canal Levee was built at 93% to 98% of the strength needed to meet a
category 3 hurricane and far below the 130% standard requirement for a category 3 hurricane. As
early as 2003, civil engineers were well aware that the levees could not handle a lingering cate-
gory 3 storm.

29
Since 2003, under the Bush Administration, the flow of federal dollars to deal with flood relief
issues in New Orleans fell to trickle due to the pressures on federal funding caused by the war in
Iraq.54

Foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina

Count 2: Despite foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina striking land as a greater than cate-
gory 3 storm and the devastation that this would cause, the Bush Administration failed to
implement an emergency evacuation plan for people in the path of the storm and unable to
evacuate on their own.

As to Count 2, the Commission finds that despite foreknowledge of Hurricane Katrina striking
land as a greater than category 3 storm and the devastation that this would cause, the Bush Ad-
ministration failed to implement an emergency evacuation plan for people in the path of the
storm and unable to evacuate on their own.

President George Bush falsely claimed that no one could have predicted the Katrina disaster.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, FEMA ranked the potential of hurricane
caused damage to New Orleans as among the likeliest, most catastrophic disasters facing the
United States. Since 2002, Dr. Ivor van Heerdon, the director of Louisiana State University’s
Center for Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes led a multidisciplinary team looking at precisely
what would happen if a major storm hit New Orleans. Their research included how the city
would flood and how many people would ignore evacuation warnings. There predictions, analy-
ses, and summary of expected devastation were almost 100% accurate.

In 2003, Louisiana State oceanographer, Joseph Suhayda modeled the grave disaster that would
be caused by a lingering category 3 or a category 4 or 5 hurricane. He shared his findings with
emergency preparedness officials throughout Louisiana.

In 2004, FEMA conducted a hurricane simulation for New Orleans. In that simulation, a cate-
gory 3 hurricane named Pam slammed into New Orleans with sustained winds of 120 mph. Wa-
ter from Lake Ponchartrain poured over the levees and the entire city was quickly under water.
FEMA drafted a comprehensive disaster response plan in response to the simulation. The plan
stated that there could be thousands of fatalities, floating coffins, and large quantities of hazard-
ous waste that would result in airborne and waterborne contamination. In addition, in 2004, New

54
Testimony of Prof. John Clark, The Commission; Looking Forward After Katrina: Environmental Health Prob-
lems and Recommendations for Officials, U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), Education Fund, September
21, 2005; Exhibit 6, Louisiana’s Levee Inquiry Faults Army Corps, by John Schwartz and Christopher Drew; Ex-
hibit 3, CRS Report for Congress, New Orleans Levees and the Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, by
Nicole T. Carter; Exhibit A, Why the levee Broke, by Will Bunch, Attytood, September 1, 2005,
http://www.alternet.org/story/24871; Ex. 4: Katrina Compounded by Matthew Rothschild, September 1, 2005,
http://progressive.org/?q=node/2377 ; Ex. 7: News, Hurricane Katrina, Scientists’ Fears Come True as Hurricane
Floods New Orleans, 9 September 2005, vol. 309 Science; Testimony of Beverly Wright, The Commission

30
Orleans residents advocated to both the federal and local governments for the creation and im-
plementation of a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan. Yet no such plan was ever imple-
mented.

The record of the Bush Administration’s failure to act is well established:

On August 25, 2005, category 1 Katrina hit Florida, killing 9 people. That same day the National
Hurricane Center indicated that Katrina is likely to become a dangerous storm in 3 days. Presi-
dent Bush is in Crawford, Texas.

On August 26, Katrina became a category 2 hurricane and was forecasted to become a category 3
by August 26. On August 26, the Bush Administration announced a state of emergency for parts
of Louisiana not threatened by Katrina. On August 27, Katrina became a category 3 hurricane
and was predicted to become a category 4 within 24 hours. However, on August 27, Pres. Bush
was still in Crawford, Texas. The Gov. of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, contacted Pres. Bush and
requested federal assistance on August 27th. Pres. Bush’s, August 26 declaration of a state of
emergency omitted the Louisiana Parishes at risk that were identified by Gov. Blanco.

On August 28, the National Hurricane Center Director, Max Mayfield briefed Pres. Bush on hur-
ricane Katrina. Gov. On August 28, Blanco sends a second request to Pres. Bush for federal re-
lief, listing again the parishes at risk. On August 28, weather experts predicted that Katrina will
soon hit landfall as a category 5 hurricane. Katrina hit the Gulf as a high category 4 hurricane on
August 28. President remained in Crawford hailing the draft Iraqi constitution as an inspiring
success. There is no record of Bush ever declaring a state of emergency for areas that were put a
risk by Hurricane Katrina or that were identified by Gov. Blanco.

Despite several days of warnings of a monstrous hurricane heading for the Gulf that would dev-
astate New Orleans and the Gulf region causing large losses of life and human suffering and de-
spite the availability of a comprehensive federal disaster response draft plan in case of such a
predicted disaster scenario that would mitigate the loss of life and human suffering, the Bush
Administration did not initiate its disaster response plan prior to or during the duration of Katrina
and admitted as much.55

Failure to launch rescue operations


55
Ex. 10:Exclusive: Were the Warnings signs of Katrina Ignored?, Disaster Response Plan Predicted Hurricane
Katrina’s Catastrophic Results, by Pierre Thomas, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/print?id=1117497 ; Ex. 4: Katrina
Compounded by Matthew Rothschild, September 1, 2005, http://progressive.org/?q=node/2377 ; Ex. 11: FEMA’s
“Pam” Simulation Foretold Katrina Disaster, From Robert Longley, Your Guide to U.U. Gov. Info/Resources, Pre-
paredness action plans not implemented in time,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/femapam_p.htm , News Release FEMA, Hurricane Pam Exer-
cise Concludes U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 23, 2004, Contact: David Passey, Number 940-368-
0210, R6-04-93; Ex. 7: News, Hurricane Katrina, Scientists’ Fears Come True as Hurricane Floods New Orleans, 9
September 2005, vol. 309 Science; Ex. 15. White House Press Release dated August 27th 2005; Ex. 17: Bobhar-
ris.com, Basic Human Decency Shouldn’t Have To Be An Act of Rebellion,
http://www.bobharris.com/content/view/637/1/ ; Hurricane Katrina Timeline,
http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline; Testimony of Malik Rahim, The Commission

31
Count 3: The Bush Administration neither launched an immediate rescue operation nor
provided the emergency shelter, food and water needed to save peoples lives and prevent
needless suffering.

As to Count 3, the Commission finds that the Bush Administration neither launched an immedi-
ate rescue operation nor provided the emergency shelter, food and water needed to save peoples
lives and prevent needless suffering.

On August 28, 2005, the National Weather Service sent an urgent weather message nationwide,
warning of devastating damage that it described comprehensively. Katrina hit New Orleans on
August 29. Electrical power in the Superdome where the city’s poor, disabled, and homeless
were crammed failed at 5am. Entire New Orleans neighborhoods were submerged in water. In
late afternoon, on August 29, a levee broke near St. Bernard-Orleans parish. President Bush was
playing golf. Five hours after Katrina hits FEMA dispatched 1000 employees to region, giving
them two days to arrive.

On September 12, 2005, the Congressional Research Service, in response to an inquiry from
Congressmen John Conyers (D. Mich.), determined that the Bush Administration had not taken
the steps needed to trigger Stafford Act emergency assistance and disaster assistance.56

Federal Authorities Block Emergency Relief

Count 4: Federal authorities block provision of emergency services, including rescue and
provision of food and water on the part of other levels of government and private sources
despite the obvious need for this kind of relief.

As to Count 4, the Commission finds that federal authorities block provision of emergency ser-
vices, including rescue and provision of food and water on the part of other levels of government
and private sources despite the obvious need for this kind of relief.

On August 29, the 17th Street Canal levee broke. However, FEMA instructs outside fire and res-
cue departments not to enter disaster area and refuses to allow firefighters into New Orleans. On
August 31, the Department of Homeland Security blocked assistance from foreign countries.

The first 100 persons rescued from the flooding in New Orleans and delivered to the Houston
Astrodome were rescued by an 18 year old, not FEMA, who had commandeered an abandon bus.
Four days after Katrina it landfall, the Bush Administration requested assistance from the airline
industry to evacuate Katrina victims. As of September 1, the Bush Administration had not di-
rected the U.S military to immediately assist people without food or water in the city center.

56
Hurricane Katrina Timeline, http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline ; Environmental
Health Perspectives Vo. 114, Number 1, January 2006

32
The military prevented a caravan of nearly 100 buses from Houston, Texas carrying food and
water for people trapped in New Orleans to get the supplies to the Convention Center. The mili-
tary stopped caravan in sight of the Convention Center. The supplies never got to the Convention
Center. On September 3, FEMA blocked life saving aid to Jefferson Parish. On September 13, a
frustrated FEMA employee appeared on Nightline, speaking for himself, said, “right now as we
talk, unfortunately, Homeland Security is actually impeding…the rescue effort.”57

Federal Authorities Enforce Repressive Conditions

Count 5: Federal authorities enforced repressive conditions and eventually carried out an
evacuation that separated families, including small children from their parents, and left
many people not knowing where their loved ones were located and even if they had sur-
vived the storms.

As to Count 5, the Commission finds that the federal authorities enforced repressive conditions
and eventually carried out an evacuation that separated families, including small children from
their parents, and left many people not knowing where their loved ones were located and even if
they had survived the storms.

A direct consequence of the federal government’s belated involvement in evacuations, were the
avoidable instances of family separation and missing persons.

The primary focus of early federal intervention in New Orleans was the protection of property at
the expense of rescuing people from the rapidly unfolding natural disaster caused by Katrina.
The federal government contracted with private security agencies that acted, with impunity, as
legitimate local law enforcement in ways that violated residents’ civil rights and that terrified
disaster victims and systematically thwarted their attempts to survive at risk of being shot. The
Bush Administration promulgated a “Zero Tolerance” order on September 1 that told local law
officials to move against anyone engaged in, looting and other crimes. Consequently, the police
went after desperately hunger people attempting to get food and water to survive.58

SUMMARY

The Bush Administration’s response to the Katrina natural disaster violated and obstructed the
purpose of international law. The persons most injured by the Bush Administration’s response to
the Katrina natural disaster were the poor, people of color, and especially people of African de-
57
Hurricane Katrina Timeline, http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Huricane Katrina timeline ; Testimony of
Beverly Wright, The Commission; Taped testimony of Anthony Zumbado, The Commission; testimony of Abigail
B., The Commission; Testimony of Emma Lofton Woods-hotel space, cruise ships, and unused trailers were used
for FEMA and Red Cross personnel only, The Commission
58
Testimony of Jeremy Scahill, Malik Rahim, and Devon Turner, The Commission

33
scent who were already living under circumstances of institutional racism that the Bush Admini-
stration’s failed response profoundly exacerbated.

The foreseeable consequences of the Bush Administration’s Katrina response violated the legal
principles embodied in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination. In addition the failures of the Bush Administration obstructed the efforts of the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights because of its deliberate indiffer-
ence to provide medical services, food, and shelter to the residents of the Gulf in a manner that
was within its capacity to provide and that would have saved lives and prevented enormous suf-
fering.

Further this record is clear. The Bush Administration demonstrated a gross and wanton indiffer-
ence to human life that caused thousands of Gulf coast residents to die and suffer needlessly. The
suffering continues, systemically causing continuous grievous injuries due to displacement and
related issues. Accordingly, the Bush Administration has committed crimes against humanity.

34
The International Commission of Inquiry on
Crimes Against Humanity
Committed by the Bush Administration of the United
States

W hen the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against humanity exists, people
of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope of these
acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. That is the mission of the International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity.
The final session will be held January 20-22 in New York City. This tribunal will, with care and
rigor, present evidence and assess whether George W. Bush and his administration have commit-
ted crimes against humanity. Well-established international law will be referenced where appli-
cable, but the tribunal will not be limited by the scope of existing international law.

T he tribunal will deliberate on four categories of indictable crimes: 1) Wars of Aggression,


with particular reference to the invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. 2) Tor-
ture and Indefinite Detention, with particular reference to the abandonment of international stan-
dards concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and the use of torture. 3) Destruction of the
Global Environment, with particular reference to systematic policies contributing to the catastro-
phic effects of global warming. 4) Attacks on Global Public Health and Reproductive Rights,
with particular reference to the genocidal effects of forcing international agencies to promote
“abstinence only” in the midst of a global AIDS epidemic.

T he Commission’s jury of conscience will be composed of internationally respected jurists


and legal scholars, prominent voices of conscience, and experts and monitors in relevant
fields. The tribunal’s legitimacy is derived from its integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evi-
dence, and the stature of its participants. Representatives of the Bush administration will be in-
vited to present a defense.

P rior to the meeting of the Commission, teams with sufficient expertise will prepare prelimi-
nary indictments in each of the four areas, setting forth the scope of the Bush administra-
tion’s actions and how they contravene legal and moral norms for international behavior. At the
meeting of the Commission, there will be four prosecution teams that organize the presentation
of the evidence. This evidence will be documents as well as eyewitness testimony by victims and
observers of the crimes alleged. The formal proceedings will be held in a public venue and all
attempts will be made to publicize and broadcast its deliberations internationally. The Commis-
sion’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.

T he holding of this tribunal will frame and fuel a discussion that is urgently needed in the
United States: Is the administration of George W. Bush guilty of war crimes and crimes
against humanity? The Commission will conduct its work with a deep sense of responsibility to
the people of the world.

35
The Commission is sponsored by the Not In Our Name statement of conscience, joined by the
following individuals and organizations:
James Abourezk, former United States Senator
As'ad AbuKhalil, professor of politics & public administration, California State University-Stanislaus
Dirk Adriaensens, BRussells Tribunal executive committee and coordinator SOS Iraq
After Downing Street
Dr. Nadje Al-Ali, social anthropologist at the Univ. of Exeter, founding member of Act Together: Women's Action
on Iraq & and member Women in Black UK
Anthony Alessandrini, organizer with the World Tribunal on Iraq and New York University Students for Justice in
Palestine
Edward Asner
Michael Avery, president of the National Lawyers Guild and professor, Suffolk Law School
Russell Banks, novelist
The Rev. Luis Barrios, Ph.D., associate professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice & Anglican Priest
Amy Bartholomew, professor of law at Carleton University
Greg Bates, Common Courage Press
Tony Benn, former chairman of the British Labour Party
Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies
Michael S. Berg, grieving father of Nick Berg killed in Iraq May 7, 2004, and one man for Peace
Ayse Berktay, from the organizing team of the World Tribunal on Iraq
William Blum, author of Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II and Rogue State: A
Guide to the World’s Only Superpower
Francis Boyle, author of Destroying World Order and professor at the University of Illinois College of Law
Jean Bricmont, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Center for Constitutional Rights
Marjorie Cohn, professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and executive vice president of the National Lawyers
Guild
Lieven De Cauter, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Patrick Deboosere, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Eve Ensler, playwright
Peter Erlinder, William Mitchell College of Law and lead defense counsel, United Nations Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania
Larry Everest, author of Oil, Power & Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda and Behind the Poison Cloud: Un-
ion Carbide’s Bhopal Massacre
Richard Falk, professor emeritus of International Law, Princeton, and Visiting Professor in Global and International
Studies, UC-Santa Barbara
Thomas M. Fasy, MD, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York City
Lawrence Ferlinghetti, member, American Academy of Arts & Letters and founder & editor in chief, City Lights
Books, San Francisco
The Rev. Dr. James E. Fitzgerald, minister for mission and social justice, The Riverside Church
Ted Glick, former coordinator, Independent Progressive Politics Network
Dr. Elaine C. Hagopian, former president of Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) and pri-
mary founder of the Trans-Arab Research Institute (TARI)
Sam Hamill. director, Poets Against War
International Movement for a Just World (JUST), Malaysia
Abdeen Jabara, past president, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
Dahr Jamail, U.S. independent journalist who has reported extensively from Iraq since the invasion
C. Clark Kissinger, contributing writer for Revolution and initiator of the Not In Our Name statement of conscience
The Reverend Doctor Earl Kooperkamp, Rector, St. Mary's Episcopal Church, West Harlem, New York
Joel Kovel, editor-in-chief, Capitalism Nature Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Ecology, and author of
The Enemy of Nature
Jesse Lemisch, professor of history emeritus, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Rabbi Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun magazine and author of The Left Hand of God: Taking Back America from
the Religious Right

36
Rev. Davidson Loehr, Ph.D., First Unitarian Universalist Church of Austin, Texas National Lawyers Guild
National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter
Rev. Davidson Loehr, Ph.D., First Unitarian Universalist Church of Austin, Texas
Robert Meeropol, Executive Director, Rosenberg Fund for Children
New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee
New Jersey Workers Democracy Network
National Lawyers Guild
National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter
Not In Our Name Project
Barbara Olshansky, deputy legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and author of Secret Trials and
Executions
James Petras, professor emeritus of sociology at Binghamton University, New York
Jeremy Pikser, screenwriter
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights and author with Ellen Ray of Guantanamo: What
the World Should Know
Stephen F. Rohde, civil liberties lawyer and co-founder of Interfaith Communities United for Justice and Peace
Marc Sapir, MD, MPH, co-convener of the UC Berkeley Teach In on Torture and executive director of Retro Poll
Sister Annette M. Sinagra, OP
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University
State of Nature on-line magazine
U.S. Tour of Duty
Inge Van de Merlen, BRussells Tribunal executive committee
Gore Vidal
Anne Weills, civil rights attorney in Oakland, National Lawyers Guild
Leonard Weinglass, criminal defense attorney
Naomi Weisstein, professor emeritus of Neuroscience, State University of NY at Buffalo
Howard Zinn, historian
[institutions for identification only]
Web site: www.bushcommission.org E-mail: commission@nion.us

37
38
Standards of Judgment for the International Commission of
Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the
Bush Administration of the United States
When the possibility of far-reaching war crimes and crimes against humanity exists, peo-
ple of conscience have a solemn responsibility to inquire into the nature and scope of
these acts and to determine if they do in fact rise to the level of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. That is the mission of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Crimes Against Humanity. This tribunal will, with care and rigor, present evidence and
assess whether George W. Bush and his administration have committed crimes against
humanity.
-- From the Charter of The International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes
Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the United States

The need for this tribunal, as an instrumentality of world humanity, arises from the historical,
moral and political responsibility of people of conscience to sit in judgment of this administra-
tion: to inquire and assess whether this administration has committed crimes that do in fact rise
to the levels of crimes against humanity as popularly understood and conceived, that is, acts that,
by their scale or nature, shock the conscience of humankind.

Crimes against humanity are brutal crimes that are not isolated incidents but that involve large
and systematic actions often cloaked with official authority. These include mass murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts perpetrated against a population,
conducted in wartime or not. Apartheid and persecution on political, ethnic, and gender grounds
have also been considered inhumane acts causing great suffering, and therefore crimes against
humanity.

We see the need to proceed from this first-principles definition of crimes against humanity pre-
cisely because of the singular nature of some of this administration’s actions and the lack of rele-
vant precedent in existent law. This is especially true for judging categories of crimes other than
wars of aggression and torture, where precedent and conventional standards do exist within in-
ternational law.

We are not pre-determining a minimum quantitative level required to constitute a “mass scale” --
or “large and systematic action” -- within our definition of crimes against humanity. Rather, we
are focusing on the overall nature and scope of the impact of these actions and policies. Nor are
we making a criterion of explicit intentionality. The jury of conscience will inquire into and as-
sess whether the Bush administration policies involve foreseen or foreseeable risk of catastrophic
or genocidal proportions. The question is not whether the Bush administration is intentionally
setting out to make millions suffer with its global warming and global health policies, for exam-
ple. Rather, the question is, whether such suffering is clearly the predictable consequences of
policies guided by ideological and political goals?

39
Such culpability must also distinguish actions specific to the Bush administration from general
systemic causes and the actions of previous administrations (even where such actions themselves
may rise to the level of crimes against humanity).

Proceeding from the tribunal’s Charter and its mission, the character of this commission is sui
generis -- a unique response by people of conscience to the unprecedented historical responsibil-
ity before us. The Commission’s Charter states, “The tribunal’s legitimacy is derived from its
integrity, its rigor in the presentation of evidence, and the stature of its participants.” Its political
and moral authority is based on high standards which are not arbitrary and capricious but prede-
fined and consistent. These standards are critical to safeguarding findings of this commission
from arbitrariness, a priori political motivations, or other forms of subjectivity.

Though it is not a court of law with power to impose sanctions, the “judicial” character of the
Commission’s conduct, proceedings, and verdict is foundational to its integrity and its historic
mission. As the Charter states, “Well-established international law will be referenced where ap-
plicable, but the tribunal will not be limited by the scope of customary international law.” This
commission is neither attempting to develop new international law per se, nor tortuously apply-
ing current law to force-fit its proceedings and findings into existing legal frameworks. Rather,
through the rigorous presentation of expert and witness testimony, documents, and other evi-
dence, the Commission aims to establish the truth about major acts and policies of the Bush ad-
ministration in the areas specified in the Charter. In addition, “representatives of the administra-
tion will be invited to present a defense.”

The historic and political responsibility before this tribunal lies in delivering findings of fact and
a verdict on the central question before the commission: “whether George W. Bush and his ad-
ministration have committed crimes against humanity.” As the Charter mandates, “The Commis-
sion’s jury of conscience will come to verdicts and its findings will be published.” The jury of
conscience will carefully assess the evidence and base its conclusions on the sufficiency of the
evidence. In assessing sufficiency, we are aware that some acts constitute crimes against human-
ity in and of themselves, while other particular acts may be instances of more general patterns of
conduct that constitute such crimes.

We must continuously return to the fact that the need for this Commission flows precisely from
the real and horrendous crimes being committed and our historical, moral and political responsi-
bility as people of conscience. We reaffirm that “The Commission will conduct its work with a
deep sense of responsibility to the people of the world.”

40
Witnesses
Annette A., New Orleans survivor of Hurricane Katrina
Saleh Ajaj, Victim of arbitrary detention in the US after 9/11
Anthony Alesandrini, World Tribunal on Iraq
Jay Arena, Housing rights advocate from New Orleans
Abigail B., School bus driver from Houston blocked by authorities from rescuing people from
New Orleans
Amy Bartholomew, Professor of law, Carleton University
Dr. Alan Berkman, Professor of epidemiology, Columbia University School of Public Health
Vanessa Brocato, International Policy Associate, Sexuality Information and Education Council
of the United States (SIECUS), author of SIECUS PEPFAR
Stephen Bronner, Professor of political science, Rutgers University
Dr. Robert Bullard, Director, Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta Univer-
sity, Author, “Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights & the Politics of Pollu-
tion”
Eric Carter, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
John Clark, Professor of Environmental Studies, Loyola University, New Orleans
Naina Dhingra, Advocates for Youth
King Downing, National Coordinator of the ACLU's Campaign Against Racial Profiling
Larry Everest, Author, “Oil, Power & Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda”
Dr. Thomas Fasy, Professor of pathology, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Campaign Against
Depleted Uranium
Chris Fox, Chairman, Department of Environmental Science & Technology, Community Col-
lege of Baltimore County
Lindsey German, Convenor, UK Stop the War Coalition
Ted Glick, Climate Crisis Coalition
Tom Goldtooth, Indigenous Environmental Network
Arron Guyton, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
Denis Halliday, ex-UN Assistant Secretary-General, former head of UN Humanitarian Mission
In Iraq
Dahr Jamail, Independent journalist, reported extensively from Iraq
Tanya Jones, Filmmaker from New Orleans
Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, former commander Abu Ghraib prison, author of "One Woman’s
Army : The Commanding General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story"
Mark Krasnoff & Monique Verdin, Cajun community activists and filmmakers
Eric Lerner, New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee
Larry McBride, who was left to drown in a New Orleans prison when Katrina struck
Ray McGovern, former CIA analyst

41
Camilo E. Mejia, Iraq Veterans Against the War
Dr. Stephen Miles, Professor, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota Medical School,
author “Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity and the War on Terror”
Craig Murray, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, author “Murder in Samarkand”
Barbara Olshansky, Center for Constitutional Rights and co-ordinator of Guantanamo detainee
defense
Malik Rahim, Common Ground Collective, New Orleans
Scott Ritter, former UN weapons inspector, author, “Iraq Confidential”
Jeremy Scahill, correspondent for Democracy Now! and The Nation, eyewitness to the Iraq oc-
cupation and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
Sarah Sohn, Legal fellow with Immigration Equality
Dr. Ida Susser, Professor, Columbia University School of Public Health
David Swanson, Co-founder of AfterDowningStreet.org, on the Downing Street memo
Josh Tulkin, Organizing Director for the Chesapeake Climate Action Network, on the relation-
ship between Hurricane Katrina and global warming
Devon Turner, Hurricane Katrina survivor from the Louisiana wetlands
Emma Lofton Woods, Volunteer aid worker in New Orleans
Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University
Daphne Wysham, Institute for Policy Studies, Sustainable Energy & Economy Network
Tony Zimbado, MSNBC videographer and producer, provided video testimony of aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans

42
Panel of Jurists
Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. She has
servied as Executive Director, National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL), the Director of
Administration for the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc., a consultant to the Law-
yers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Chief Legal Consultant for the National
Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA).

Dennis Brutus, professor emeritus, Department of Africana Studies, University of Pittsburgh.


Currently visiting scholar. Centre for Civil Society University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South
Africa. Holds several honorary doctorates, former political prisoner on Robben Island in South
Africa. Published several books including Poetry and Protest; a Dennis Brutus reader, Haymarket
Press Chicago. University of Kwazulu Press, Durban.

Abdeen Jabara, former President, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. In the mid-


1980s, he played a major role in exposing the Nixon administration’s Operation Boulder pro-
gram, a program begun in the 1960s that included surveillance, deportations and other incidents
involving the Arab and Arab-American community in the United States.

Ajamu Sankofa, lives in Brooklyn, NY. He is a human rights public policy specialist and com-
munity organizer. He is the former executive director of the NYC chapter of Physicians for So-
cial Responsibility. He is a consultant for the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in
America, Legal Defense, Research and Education Fund and he chairs the NYC local organiz-
ing committee of Health Care-Now.

Ann Wright, is a retired United States Army Colonel, retired official of the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and now full-time anti-war activist. She currently sits on the Board of Directors for organi-
zations Operation Truth/Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, and Veterans for Common
Sense. Wright is most noted for being one of three U.S. State Department officials to publicly
resign in direct protest of the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.

Prosecutors
Wars of Aggression: Stephen Bronner, Larry Everest, Ray McGovern

Torture and Detention: Marjorie Cohn, Eric Lerner, Barbara Olshansky

Global Environment: Ted Glick

Health and Reproductive Rights: Ida Susser, Jonathan Garcia

Destruction of New Orleans: Carl Dix, King Downing, Dionne Franklin, Chokwe Lumumba

43
44
WE GO IN THE FINAL HOUR,
TO THE MOST IMPORTANT LINE OF BATTLE:
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
by Harry Belafonte

Thank you very much. I would to first express my great sense of privilege, and opportunity to be
part of this evening's tribunal and what we will be seeing and hearing. I would like to also ex-
tend my respects to the panel and to the tasks you have before you, and what we will be hearing.

It is most gratuitous that this should be taking place at the end of a week of celebration of the
memory of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. This nation has never, ever produced a greater citizen,
who stood and still stands for the principles for why we are all gathered here: the pursuit of jus-
tice, the pursuit of human rights, the pursuit of human dignity.

Theodore Roosevelt once said that when the powers of state, that having been mandated to reach
out and to protect the interest of the people, begin to usurp the Constitution and undermine our
laws, that it is the responsibility of the citizens to rise up and to speak against this process. And,
to in fact, insist upon the changing of the guard, the changing of regime. And those, (applause),
those citizens who fail to hear that call, in fact should be charged with patriotic treason (Ap-
plause). I think none gathered here this evening can be so charged.

It is important when all the instruments of government collapse, we go in the final hour, to the
most important line of battle: the people themselves. The people of this nation, I think, and I
know it, are awake, and are being more awakened every day. They are hearing and sensing the
danger that sits on the horizon. Looking at the international oppressions that we are a part of,
looking at how we have violated international humanity and law, one day this tribunal I hope,
will reach out, and in its investigation look at the oppression and illegal experiences people in
this nation are experiencing themselves.

On 9/11, we were all stunned by the tragic events that took place when the Twin Towers col-
lapsed, and this terrorism was put upon our people. Two thousand lost their lives. Two thousand
who were innocent, two thousand who did not cause war. And we said they were terrorists and
we should hunt them down and bring them to justice. Tell me, where for you does the line blur?

When a nation as powerful as this, the most powerful in the history of human existence, and
those who have dubiously come to power and who are reigning over the will of this nation, when
they lie and mislead the citizens of this country, when they put before us fear and then govern by
terrorism -- where does the line blur for you? When our sons and daughters are sent to die in
foreign battlefields, each day we claim the lives of tens and thousands of innocent men, women,
and children, in other places -- where for you does terrorism end and where does it begin, and
who are the terrorists?

45
Those who would choose to detract the real meaning of this tribunal, the real meaning of this
people's moment, would suggest to you that we are somehow perhaps irrelevant. Well, I guess
Paul Revere was considered at one point irrelevant, when he called for the alarm against the red
coats.

I know very well that at the beginning, Dr. Martin Luther King was considered irrelevant. I know
that there are so many that have called for the awakening of our citizens to look at what is hap-
pening to us and to seize our rights to put us back into democratic governance. Always in the be-
ginning, we are minimalized, marginalized and relegated to the dustbins of history. We have
prevailed before and we will prevail again. I am honored to be a part of this process, and any-
thing I can do to help broaden its base, to help broaden it's inquiry, and to help save the soul of
our nation, I welcome the opportunity and I will so serve. Thank you.

46
TOMORROW IS TODAY:
THE FIERCE URGENCY OF INDICTING
– AND DRIVING OUT –
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
By Michael Ratner

When Clark Kissinger called me yesterday and said, I’ll be sharing a platform with Harry Bela-
fonte, I said, “well, maybe you want to put me on for tomorrow.” But here I am, and of course
I’m proud to be even in any kind of association with Harry Belafonte. And I’m sure you’re all
familiar with Harry Belafonte’s comments that he made to President Chavez in Venezuela a few
days ago. And if you don’t remember them, I’ll repeat them. “No matter what the greatest tyrant
in the world, the greatest terrorist in the world, George W. Bush, says, we’re here to tell you that
not hundreds, not thousands, but millions of the American people support your revolution.” Now
what’s remarkable about that, and of course Harry Belafonte was heavily attacked for that. But,
as he has never been willing to do, he did not retreat from the statement. And if you go on the net
you come to what he said, at the Children’s Defense Fund, a few days later, and what he says
was, “so I made my remarks, they may stir up controversy, but then it’s time to talk about new
definitions, new points of view.” And that’s what Harry Belafonte was doing, and that is what
we are doing here today, and over the next two days, at these Commissions.

The other important point about being here, at Riverside of course, is that in April 1967, this is
the place, this church, where Martin Luther King openly, and notoriously I should say, opposed
the war in Vietnam. The speech was called “Beyond Vietnam: A time to break the silence.” It’s a
historic place for that reason, and he began that speech with these words: “A time comes when
silence is betrayal. That time has come for us, in relation to Vietnam.” And then in that speech,
he lays out a 5-point program. But the ultimate point of that program was: remove all foreign
troops from Vietnam. Incredibly, even though it was Martin Luther King saying that, in 1967, it
took 9 more years, millions of Vietnamese deaths, and thousands of American deaths, to do so.
We today model our conduct on that of Dr. Martin Luther King. As he said then, we say today, a
time comes when silence is betrayal. That time has come for us, in relationship to the war in Iraq.
It is time for us to bring the troops home now.

A people’s trial, a people’s commission, is not without important precedents. Almost 40 years
ago, in 1968, there was another people’s trial. It was held in Sweden and Denmark. Originally it
was to be held in France. But the French wouldn’t allow it; they prohibited it, because it was
about Vietnam, and of course the French had been very deeply involved in the subjugation of
Vietnam. The witnesses at that people’s trial were well-known progressives, including Jean-Paul
Sartre. They gathered in Stockholm and Copenhagen, and they were there to judge another hu-
man outrage in our history, the brutal and inhuman Vietnam War. Bertrand Russell, the famous
English philosopher, was one of the key participants in that trial. In fact, it was called the Russell
War Crimes Tribunal. Russell opened that trial, and here is what he said: “We meet at an alarm-
ing time. Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent. We investigate
in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse consciousness in order to create

47
mass resistance.” And so, as Russell said then, we say today: we are putting the Bush administra-
tion on trial. We investigate in order to expose; we document in order to indict; we arouse con-
sciousness in order to create mass resistance. We want this trial to be a step in the building of
mass resistance to war, to torture, to the destruction of earth and its people. It’s a serious mo-
ment. Our country and our world are at a tipping point. Tipping toward permanent war, the end
of human rights, and the impoverishment and death of millions. We still have a chance, an op-
portunity to stop this slide into chaos. But it is up to us. We must not sit with our arms folded,
and we must be as radical as the reality we are facing.

The witnesses you will hear over the next few days are the truth-tellers: the witnesses to the car-
nage this country and this administration has wrought. This truth challenges us — challenges us
all to act. We, particularly the American people, have not heard or seen the truth. And if some
do, in their comfort and complacency, they often turn away. The truth is hidden. It is hidden
through cover-up language, euphemisms, legalisms, obfuscations, false investigations, the blam-
ing of low-level individuals: all meant to hide the reality of the criminal involvement of high of-
ficials of this administration. The criminal involvement in war, torture, global and human de-
struction.

Let’s take a look at a few of these examples, and there are many. The failure in this country, and
the media, my pundits everywhere we look, to look at the reality- a reality this commission will
examine. I’m sure most of you are familiar with the first example: the war in Iraq. Supposedly,
the war was to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Now it is said: that was a mistake.
It was bad intelligence. The administration says it, and much of Congress says, the Press says it,
“Had we only known — but we thought they had weapons of mass destruction. So we must in
the future get better intelligence.” As if that explains or excuses why we went to war. But of
course, that explanation — the failure of intelligence — and still the current explanation of to-
day, by the elites, hides the real reasons for war. It blames some negligent officials, individuals,
at the CIA, for leading us into war. All we need to do according to them is correct that, and we
won’t be in mistaken wars any longer. Mistaken wars will come to an end. If you believe that,
you believe in the tooth fairy. We all know that is not the truth. In fact, in 1967, Martin Luther
King predicted it. He said we will be marching and protesting wars for the rest of our lives as
long as we are on the wrong side of history. And we are on the wrong side of history.

Sometimes I ask myself: why did we progressives know the weapons of mass destruction story
was a cover for war? But Congress and the media claimed they could not? Because they — all of
them, Democrats, Republicans, the media — they were all reading from the same page. And that
page is U.S. world exploitation and domination. And of course what does the truth tell us about
the war in Iraq? It tells us that it’s an aggressive war, a crime against peace, and according to the
judgment at Nuremberg, that kind of war is the most heinous of all war crimes. I can give you
other examples: Clark had referred to one. For example, the fact that they say that we do not tor-
ture. All of a sudden in this country, torture is not torture. Or at worst it is abuse. And even that
abuse, it is no worse than a fraternity prank. Or if it was abuse, it was because abusive techniques
were only for use in Guantánamo. What sense does that make? Used in Guantánamo — and
somehow they migrated to Iraq? But what does “migrated to Iraq” mean? Are they birds, like a
bird migrates? Without any human agent, torture techniques move from one place to another? Or
we are told that it is a few bad apples, but no responsibilities for the higher-ups. And yet the me-
dia has gone along with this, with these lies and these cover-ups. Even worse, serious media dis-

48
cussion and respectability is given to the legal justifiers. For example, John Yoo, a lawyer for the
administration, who wrote that you could torture in the name of national security — much like
the Pinochet defense, torture in the name of national security. I was utterly shocked the other day
when I picked up the New York Times and there on the back page they had asked half a dozen
people what questions would you ask the potential new Supreme Court Judge Alito? And there
they asked John Yoo, ‘what question would he ask him’. They are giving credibility to a man
who should not be on the back of the New York Times but should be in the docks but who
should be in the docks facing justice.

Let there be no doubt this administration is engaged in massive violations of the law. Torture is
an international crime. It is a grave breech of the Geneva conventions. And almost no one is tell-
ing you that. And in this country it is anathema to do so.

A third and last example of the hiding of reality, of the blaming of individuals, instead of the na-
ture of this country and it’s leaders is the example of what happened in New Orleans and
Katrina. It is the preparation for and aftermath of Katrina. What do we hear and read? It was an
unpredictable act of god. It was the failure of FEMA. FEMA had a bad manger. All sorts of ex-
cuses similar to what we heard about the so-called intelligence failures in the Iraq war. But to
blame FEMA, to blame the individuals, obscures what we know occurred in New Orleans. What
we saw in New Orleans and the Superdome was something very different — it was the legacy of
slavery, the legacy of Jim Crow, the legacy of separate but equal, and it was the legacy and the
current practice and policy of our country today that human beings are seen as disposable par-
ticularly if they are poor and black. That is the reality of New Orleans, and that is the reality
faced everyday in this country. And again, that is the reality this Commission will bring you.

The war, torture, and the effects of Katrina are not looked at as failures or as products of the sys-
tem. The truths are hidden and by hiding it we are disempowered; so we are here this weekend to
hear truth tellers to empower people. It is not just a few bad apples, it is not mistakes or bad
choices, it is not just bad managers and getting better ones; but something much more fundamen-
tal. It’s that awful alchemy as Dr. Martin Luther King described it in this very church — the gi-
ant triplets of racism extreme materialism and militarism.

I want to say a few words about one aspect of the current period that is extremely frightening.
Probably the most frightening although it does have roots in prior administrations. The short
hand for the expression of this period and the scare and fear that I feel is, “The king can do no
wrong” or the word might be tyranny, police state or dictatorship. I recall that after 9/11, within a
few months afterwards, I wrote an article. It was entitled, “Moving toward a police state — or
have we arrived?” And I remember being nervous about it because this was pretty aggressive to
be saying a few months after 9/11. Was I gonna get trashed for it? Did it really reflect reality? I
wasn’t sure. I had some evidence in front of me. I had the Patriot Act. I had internal detentions. I
had the President’s military order that allows him to pick up people anywhere in the world and
detain them in Guantánamo or elsewhere. But I still was willing to say ‘moving toward a police
state’, not have ‘we arrived’. And a police state to me is one were authority is not under law,
where the legislature is overridden, and where our courts are ignored. Where one can be jailed
without a court proceeding or trial and where the president, king or what have you, can do as he
pleases — wire tap, torture, and disappear people. Unfortunately, and dangerously that is the
situation we are in today.

49
You are familiar with much of the evidence, some of which I have laid out, some of which the
next two days will address. There is however one piece of important evidence I want to bring to
your attention. In which the president, their president, not our president, is open and notorious
about his aims, public if you will; and if you miss it you have to be an ostrich with your head in
the ground. What he has done is basically lay the plan for what has to be called a coup-de-tat in
America. And it’s a small (Applause) it is a small paragraph and it’s contained in what we call a
‘signing statement.’ It was signed on December 30th and it’s the signing statement to what we
call the McCain amendment. You probably all remember the McCain amendment. That’s the
amendment that prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, or supposedly prohibits it.
The president as you recall, resisted the McCain amendment. But in the end he had to sign it be-
cause it was part of a broader military authorization to pay for what we’re doing in Iraq. And
when the president signs legislation, he sometimes and more recently with President Bush, he
issues a signing statement as to what his understanding of the law is. The president’s statement
on McCain is only one short paragraph. But it is historic. It is unprecedented. And if you’re look-
ing for the grab for power that allows you, permits you, compels you to call this a tyranny it is
that paragraph.

It makes three points and I’ll paraphrase. First, speaking as the president, ‘My authority as com-
mander in chief allows me to do whatever I think is necessary in the war on terror including use
torture. Second, the Commander in Chief cannot be checked by Congress. Third, the Com-
mander in Chief cannot be checked by the courts.’ There it is. There you have it. That boring
stuff I learned as a junior high school student about checks and balances or about limited law or
about authority under law - out the window. Gone. In other words, the republic and democracy is
over. In Germany what did they call that? They called that the Führer’s law. Why? Because the
Führer was the law. That’s what George Bush is saying here. George Bush is the law.

This assertion of power is so blatant so open, and so notorious, that it is finally shocking some
people like former Vice President Gore to speak up. And I’m sure many of you are familiar with
what he said in his recent speech on Martin Luther King’s birthday. Quote: “The President of the
United State has been breaking the law repeatedly and persistently.” He was referring to the NSA
spying scandal. And then he went on to say, “A president who breaks the law is a threat to the
very structure of our government.” And then he said, “An executive who acts free of the will of
Congress as this president says he can, or the check of the judiciary, as this president says he can,
becomes the central threat that the founders sought to nullify in the Constitution.” And then he
quotes James Madison. “To the effect that what President Bush has done is the very definition of
tyranny.” So there you have it. It’s not just us, its not just progressives, but even someone like
former Vice President Gore is saying the very definition of tyranny.

I believe that the president and this grab for power will be repudiated. But it will not just happen.
The pendulum does not swing back automatically. It will take an aroused public and an aroused
people. And so the question is really - where do we go from here? One place I can tell you not to
go is: don’t go to the Democrats in Washington. I have to tell you (Applause) I’ve have never in
my life been kicked in the teeth so badly as I was on the Guantánamo cases when we took that to
the Democrats in Washington. Now I’m just gonna say it here, there is a million reasons I can
tell you don’t go there, but this one is called the Graham-Levin Bill. And after we win the right
to go court for the detainees at Guantánamo, and we win that in the Supreme Court, Republican

50
Senator Graham and Democrat Senator Levin get together - and what do they decide to do a few
weeks ago? But strip the courts of any jurisdiction to hear the Guantánamo cases. That’s what
they do - Democrats and Republicans together. And then they say you can use evidence from
torture to keep those people in jail. Kicking us right in the teeth! Kicking the courts in the teeth.
And so if you think that we’re going to get far by going there, you’ve got it wrong. Lessons of
history teach us that we don’t move our leaders without the passion and the protest of the people.

I want to close with a sense of hope. It’s been a rough four years, it’s been a rough twenty years,
it’s been a rough forty years since Dr. King spoke. But I want to close with a sense of hope. This
administration is unraveling. There is a split in the elites. Gore is one of the best examples. Eve-
rywhere we see former administration officials speaking out. They realize the administration has
gone too far. They want to save some remnant of democracy. We see indictments from Scooter
Libby to Delay coming fast and furious. We see General Miller, responsible for torture in
Guantánamo and Iraq, taking the 5th amendment essentially so he won’t have to testify. We see
General Sanchez, who was head of troops in Iraq, retiring without that 4th star. It’s a real opening
for us but it is not simply to go back to the normal. It’s not simply to save a remnant of democ-
racy. The malady is much deeper than that. We need a radical transformation of our society. My
hopes for today and for the future is that the truth will arouse resistance and with resistance there
will be some change. I mean resistance of every sort, mobilizing, protesting, disobeying and dis-
obedience. And then again, when I was reading Dr. King’s speech, the thought that he closed
with, and that I want to close with, is that sometimes we can wait too long to take action. Or as
Dr. King said, “you can be too late.” And we, unless we act, may be too late. So let me end with
Dr. King’s directive to us all: “We are now faced with the fact, my friends, that tomorrow is to-
day. We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now. There is such a thing as being too late.
We still have a choice today. Now let us begin. Now let us rededicate ourselves to the long and
bitter, but beautiful struggle for our new world.” Thank you. We’ll do this together.

***********

Michael Ratner is President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, and was co-counsel in Rasul
vs. Bush, the historic case of Guantánamo detainees, in which the Supreme Court ruled that U.S.
courts do indeed have jurisdiction over Guantánamo. Ratner is an expert in international human
rights law, and is a past President of the National Lawyers’ Guild.

51
THE DOWNING STREET PAPERS, Transcriptions

Text of the Iraq Options paper - March 8, 2002 Memo from Overseas and Defence
Secretariat

IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER SECRET UK EYES ONLY

SUMMARY

Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess
WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur
with Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst opinion, we have supported a policy of
containment which has been partially successful. However:

* Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD,. although our intelligence is poor. Saddam
has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is
no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and
* Saddam’s brutal regime remains in power and destablises the Arab and wider Islamic world.

We have two options. We could toughen the existing containment policy. This would increase
the pressure on Saddanm [sic]. It would not reintegrate Iraq into the international community.

The US administration has lot faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The
end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a representative government.

Tre [sic] three options for achieving regime change are:

* covert support to opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup;


* air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; and
* a full-scale ground campaign.

These are not mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option3
[sic]. the greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the
greater the cost and the longer we woul [sic] need to stay. the only certain means to remove
Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government. But this could involve nation
building over many years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and
build-up its conventional forces, so long a Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional
armouries and there was no acceptable solution to Palestinian grievances.

A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, non currently
exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore consider
a staged approach, establishing international support, building up pressure on Saddam and
developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.

CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF UK POLICY

-1-
1 Within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy
security, our current objectives towards Iraq are:
* the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours,
into the international community. Implicitly this cannot occur with Saddam in power; and
* hence, as the least worst option, we have supported containment of Iraq, by constraining
Saddam’s ability to re-arm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.

2 Subsidiary objectives are:


* Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq;
* improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people;
* protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq;
*sustaining UK/UK co-operation, including, if necessary by moderating US policy; and
* maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security Council.

HAS CONTAINMENT WORKED?

3 Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful;


* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the
Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain
autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.

4 However:
* Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq
has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting
Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit os 150km
continues. Iraq continues with the BW and CW programmed and, if it has not already done so
could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a
decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including is ballistic
missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam
has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.
* Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his people. While in power Saddam is a
rallying point for anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world, and as such a
cause of instability; and
* despite UN controls over Iraq’s oil revenue under Oil for Food, there is considerable oil and
other smuggling.

5 In this context, and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq
into the international community, we examine the two following policy options:
* a toughening of the existing containment policy, facilitate by 11 September; and
* regime change by military means: a new departure which would require the construction of a
coalition and a legal justification.

-2-
TOUGHENING CONTAINMENT

6 This would consist of the following elements:


* full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We
should ensure that the Good Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russian holds to its
promise not to block. The signs are positive but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses
sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related and other arms, while allowing
other business without scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate Iraqi commerce under
Oil for Food.);
* encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the modalities of Resolution 1284 once
Russian agreement to the GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each area for
clarification - the purpose of clarification is not to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but
* P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific demand that Iraq re-admit the UN
inspectors. Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action.
* push for tougher action (especially by the US) against states breaking sanctions. This should not
discriminate between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others (especially Syria). It would put
real pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out;
* maintain our present military posture, including in the NFZs, and be prepared to respond
robustly to any Iraqi adventurism; and
* continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime change) our view that Iraq would be
better off without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him in a ‘Con tract with
the Iraqi People’, although to be at all credible, this would need some detailed work.

7 What could it achieve:


* There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will make sanctions more attractive to at
least some of their detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would reduce the regime’s
illicit revenues; and
* the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater scrutiny of Iraqi programmes and of
Iraqi forces in general. If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or, in face of
an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place, then this could provide legal justification for
large-scale military action (see below).

8 But:
* Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply;
those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change ge tack;
* Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale
US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting
decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and
* although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased it
international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the sanctions
regime could collapse in the long-term.

9 Tougher containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the international community as it
offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes,
destabilising the ARab and Islamic world, and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater

-3-
threat no that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is
an option.

US VIEWS

10 The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed.
The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes,
and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors. Washington believes the legal basis for an
attack on Iraq already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider political factors. The
US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.

REGIME CHANGE

11 In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of
Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity.
Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on
abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities.
The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk
of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni
dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but within a federal
structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such
a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive
it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This wold entail
a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: INTERNAL

12 Saddam has a strong grip on power maintained through fear and patronage. The security and
intelligence apparatus, including the Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the
regime to effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab Sunni minority (2-25 per cent of the
population); many from Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule, which would bring retribution
and the end of their privileges. The regime’s success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from
senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule and preserving their interests by backing
Saddam. In the current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote possibility.

13 Unaided, the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime. The external
opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi
National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad Chalabi, a Shia and convicted
fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), espouses
moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military
capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir
opposition groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.

-4-
14 The internal opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is
no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There are 3-4m in northern Iraq. Most live in Kurdish
Autonomous Zone, established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000 lightly armed militia
but are divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an interest in preserving the status quo
and are more interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying against Saddam. Divide
and rule is easy; in 196 the KDP assisted the Iraqi Army’s expulsion of the PUK and Iraqi
opposition groups from Irbil.

15 The Kurds do not co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the population.
The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), with 3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most Shia would like to have
a greater say in Iraqi government, but not necessarily control: they do no want secession, Islamic
autonomy or Iranian influence.

REGIONAL

16 Iraq’s neighbours have a direct interest in the country’s affairs. Iran and Turkey, in
particular, are wary of US influence and oppose some opposition groups. Turkey, conscious of
its own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent the establishment of a independent
Kurdish state in northern Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish minority, would
also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south (see
FCO paper on P5, European and regional view of possible military action against Iraq, attached.)

17 We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination
of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal):

OPTION 1: COVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS

18 The aim would be to bring down the regime byinternal [sic] revolt, aided by the defection
or at least acquiescence of large sections of the Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from
within the Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the alternative was defeat.
This option could be pursued by providing covert intelligence, large scale financial and Special
Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would be persuaded to unite and attack into
northern Iraq, tying down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat to the regime, the
Shia would rise up in the southern cities, and in Baghdad.

19 This option also has a very low prospect of success on its own. The external opposition is
no strong enough to overthrow Saddam and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement
government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited offensive in the north. Mass uprisings
in the south would be unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising remains vivid. The
Republican Guard would move against any opposition and any wavering regular Army units.
There would also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured. The remaining elements
of opposition could be eliminated, buttressing Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On
the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a concerted, single-minded way before and
should not be dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and 3.

-5-
OPTION 2: AN AIR CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION
GROUPS LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING

20 The aim would be to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and tactical air
support for opposition groups to move against the regime. Such support would disable Saddam’s
military and security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be targeted. Substantial
numbers of aircraft and munitions would need to be built up in threatre over a period of months.
Any campaign would take several weeks at least probably several months. Pressure on the
regime could be increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening a land invasion.

21 This option has no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might persuade other
Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family, but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat
would be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading. Saddam’s military and security
apparatus is considerable more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai figure able
to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab states would only back the plan if they were
sure Saddam would be deposed. At least the co-operation of Kuwait would be needed for the
necessary military build-up. The Arab street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but
visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public opinion.

OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN

22 The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam]s [sic]
military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western regime would be installed which
would destroy Iraq’s WMD capability, make peace with Iraq’s neighbours and give rights to all
Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the Gulf War, this would need to be preceded by a
major air-offensive to soften up defences.

23 US contingency planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground campaign


would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers would be roughly half those of 1991 because
Iraqi forces are now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need to pose a credible
threat to Baghdad in order to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was
better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets
would need three months and ground forces at least four-five months to assemble so on logistical
grounds a ground campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action
are early spring.

24 From a purely military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an invasion from
Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not be enough because of the need for land-based air-
to-air refuelling. T be confident of success, bases either in Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be
required. However, a wider and durable international coalition would be advantageous for both
military and political reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by the
promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to address the MEPP.

25 The risks include US and others military casualties. Any coalition would need much
tending over the difficult months of preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US
encirclement and that it will be invaded next will be prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With

-6-
his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam
could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. it
would try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct
Israeli military involvement in Iraq would great complicate coalition management and risk
spreading conflict more widely.

26 None of the above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural
precursors to Option 3. All options had lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then
a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in advance. The greater investment of
Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we
would need to stay. Option 3 comes closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we need to
wait to see which option or combination of options may be favoured by the US government.

27 But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD
and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and
conventional armouries.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

28 A full opinion should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options are developed
further. But in summary CONTAINMENT generally involves the implementation of existing
UNSCRs and has a firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in
international law. A separate note by FCO Legal Advisors setting out the general legal
background and the obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.

29 In the judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with
international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on action
in self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan. However,
Article 51 would come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.

30 Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified if Iraq is held to be
in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard
to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations. But 687 never terminated the
authority to use force mandated in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the
[sic] authorisation to use force in 678.

31 As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is for the Council to
decide whether a breach of obligations has occurred. There is a precedent, UNSCR 1205 (1998),
passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant
violation of its obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the authority for the use of force
under 678 and underpin ned Operation Dessert Fox. In contrast to general legal opinion, the US
assets the right of individual Member States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687,
regardless of whether the Council has reached this assessment.

32 For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was in breach of
687:

-7-
* they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD,
and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity.
Current intelligence is insufficiently robus [sic] to meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof
China, France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable lobbying to approve or
acquiesce ina new resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in other policy
areas might be needed. However, many Western states, at lest, would not wish to oppose the US
on such a major issue; or
* if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by
the UN Security Council; or
* the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or
were again expelled trying to do so.

CONCLUSION

33 In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overridng force in a ground
campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back
into the international community.

34 To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach:


* winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher containment.
Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime. A refusal to
admit N inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an
appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide the justification for military action.
Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated beofre [sic];
* careful planning: detailed military planning on the various invasion and basing options, and
when appropriate force deployment;
* coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an international coalition to provide the broadest
political and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to focus on China, France and
particularly Russia who have the ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on the
other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid to moderate Arab states and to Iran;
* incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi territorial
integrity. Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the international community
could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its people. These should be published.
* tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious effort to re-energise the
MEPP would greatly assist coalition building; and
*sensitising the public: a media campaign to warm of the dangers that Saddam poses and to
prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.

35 The US should be encouraged to consult widely on its plans.

OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT


CABINET OFFICE
8 MARCH

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

-8-
Text of the Iraq: Legal Background-March 8, 2002 memo from UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (office of Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair advising him on
the legality of the use of force against Iraq.

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ: LEGAL BACKGROUND

(i) Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions


(b) Self-defence
(c) Humanitarian Intervention

(ii) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the sanctions regime

(iv) Security Council Resolutions relating to UNMOVIC

(i) Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Authorisation of the Use of
Force

1. Following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council authorised the use of
force against Iraq in resolution 675 (1990); this resolution authorised coalition forces to use all
necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw, and to restore international peace and security in the
area. This resolution gave a legal basis for Operation Desert Storm, which was brought to an end
by the cease-fire set out by the Council in resolution 687 (1991). The conditions for the cease-
fire in that resolution (and subsequent resolutions) imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the
elimination of WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution 687 (1991) suspended but did
not terminate the authority to use force in resolutions 678 (1990).

2. I the UK’s view a violation of Iraq’s obligations which undermines the basis of the cease-fire
in resolution 687 (1991) can revive the authorisation to use force in resolutions 678 (1990). As
the cease-fire was proclaimed by the Council in resolution 687 (1991), it is for the Council to
assess whether any such breach of those obligations has occurred. The US have a rather different
view: they maintain that the assessment if breach is for individual member States. We are not
aware of any other State which supports this view.

3. The authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678 (1990) has been revived in this way
on certain occasions. For example, when Iraq refused to cooperate with the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) in 1997/8, a series of SCRs condemned the decision as unacceptable.
In resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned Iraq’s decision to end all cooperation with
UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of Iraq’s obligations under resolution 687 (1991), and restated
that the effective operation of UNSCOM was essential for the implementation of that Resolution.
In our view these resolutions had the effect of causing the authorisation to use force in
resolutions 678 (1991) to revive, which provided a legal basis for Operation Desert Fox. In a
letter to the President of the Security Council in 1998 we stated that the objective of that

-9-
operation was to seek compliance by Iraq with the obligations laid down by the Council that
theoperation was undertaken only when it became apparent that there was no other way of
achieving compliance by Iraq, and that the action was limited to what was necessary to secure
this objective.
4. The more difficult issue is whether we are still able to rely on the same legal base for the use
of force more than three years after the adoption of resolution 1205 (1998). Military action in
1998 (and on previous occasions) followed on from specific decisions of the Council; there has
now not been any significant decision by the Council since 1998. Our interpretation of
resolutions 1205 was controversial anyway; many of our partners did not think the legal basis
was sufficient as the authority to use force was no explicit. Reliance on it now would be unlikely
to receive any support.

USE OF FORCE: (B) SELF-DEFENCE


5. The conditions that have to be met for the exercise of the right of self-defence are well known:
i) There must be an armed attach upon a State or such an attack must be imminent;
ii) The use of force must be necessary and other means to reverse/avert the attack must be
unavailable;
iii) The acts in self-defence must be proportionate and strictly confined to the object of stopping
the attack.

The right of self-defence may only be exercise until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to ensure international peace and security and anythign [sic] done in exercise fo [sic]
the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Council.

6. for the exercise of the right of self-defence there must be more than “a threat”. There has to be
an armed attack actual or imminent. The development of possession of nuclear weapons does not
in itself amount to an armed attack; what would be needed would be clear evidence of an
imminent attack. During the Cold War there was certainly a threat in the sense that various States
had nuclear weapons which they might, at short notice unleash upon each other. But that did not
mean the mere possession of nuclear weapons, or indeed their possession in time of high tension
or attempt to obtain them, was sufficient to justify pre-emptive action. And when Israel attacked
an Iraqi nuclear reaction, near Baghdad, on 7 June 1981 it was “strongly condemned” by the
Security Council (acting unanimously) as a “military” attack ....in clear violation of the Charter
of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct”.

USE OF FORCE: (C) HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

7. In the UK view the use of force may be justified if the action is taken to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. The limits to this highly contentious doctrine are not
clearly defined , but we would maintain the the catastrophe must be clear and well documented,
that there must be no other means short of the use of force which could prevent it, and that the
measures taken must be proportionate. this doctrine partly underlies the very limited action taken
by allied aircraft to patrol the No Fly Zones in Iraq (following action by Saddam to repress the
Kurds and the Shia in the early 90s), which involved occasional and limited use of force by those
aircraft in self-defence. The application os this doctrine depends on the circumstances at any
given time, but it is clearly exceptional.

- 10 -
(II) NO FLY ZONES (NFZs)

8. The NFZs over Northern and Southern Iraq are not established by UN Security Council
Resolutions. They were established in 1991 and 1992 on the basis that they were necessary and
proportionate steps taken to prevent a huminitarian [sic] crisis. Prior to the establishment of the
Northern NFZ the Security Council had adopted resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1991 in which
the Council stated that it was gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population
in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which had led to a
massive refugee flow and that it was deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering
involved. The resolution condemned that repression of the Iraqi civilian population and
demanded that Iraq immediately end the repression. In our view the purpose of the NFZs is to
moniter [sic] Iraqi compliance with the provisions of resolution 688. UK and US air-craft
patrolling the NFZs are entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force [sic] is a
necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems.

9. The US have on occasion claimed that the purpose of the NFZs is to enforce Iraqi compliance
with resolutions 687 or 688. This view is not consisent [sic] with resolution 687, which does not
deal with the repression of the Iraqi population, or with resolution 688, which was not adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and does not contain any provision for enforcement. Nor
(as it is sometimes claimed) were the current NFZs provided for in the Safwan agreement, a
provisional agreement between coalition and Iraqi commanders of 3 March 1991,laying down
military conditions for the cease fire which did not contain any reference to the NFZs.

(III) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE SANCTIONS REGIME

10. The sanctions regime against Iraq was established by resolutions 661 (1990) of 8 August
1990, which, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, decides that all states shall prevent the
import into their territories of any commodities originating in Iraq, the sale or supply to Iraq of
any commodities other than medical supplies, and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs,
and that Iraqi funds and financial resources should be frozen. Resolution 661 remains in force.
The major exception to the sanctions regime is the oil for food programme which was
established by resolution 986 (1993) by Iraq on condition that the purchase price is paid into an
escrow account established by the UN Secretary-General, and the funds to that account are used
to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the export of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. The escrow account is
also used to fund the Un [sic] Compensation Commission and to meet the operating costs of the
UN, includign [sic] those of UNMOVIC (see below).

11. The oil for food programme is renewed by the Security Council at (usually) 6 monthly
intervals, most recently by resolution 1382 (211) of 29 November 2001. Under that resolution
the Council also decided that it would adopt, by 13 May 2002, procedures which would improve
the flow of goods to Iraq, other than arms and other potential dual use goods on a Good Review
List. The US are currently reviewing the final details of the list with the Russians.

12. In resolution 687 (1991) the Council decided that the prohibition against the import of goods
from Iraq should have no further force when Iraq has completed all the actions contemplated in

- 11 -
paragraphs 8-13 of that resolution concerning Iraq’s WMD programme. Iraq has still not
complied with this condition. Under paragraph 21 of resolution 687, the Council decided to
review the prohibition against the supply of commodities to Iraq every 60 days in the light of the
policies and practices of the Iraqi government, including the implementation of all the relevant
resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift them. These
regular reviews are currently suspended as a result of Iraqi noncompliance with the Council’s
demands.

13. The intention of the Council to act in accordance with resolution 687 on the termination of
these prohibitions has been regularly reaffirmed, including in resolution 1284 (1999). Paragraph
33 of that resolution also contains a complex formula for the suspension of economic sanctions
against Iraq for renewable periods of 120 days, if UNMOVIC and the IAEA report cooperation
in all respects by Iraq in fulfilling work programmed with those bodies for a period of 120 days
after a reinforced system of monitoring and verification in Iraq becomes fully operational. Iraq
has never complied with these conditions.

(iv) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO UNMOVIC

14. UNMOVIC was established under resolution 687 (1991) (the ceasefire resolution).
UNMOVIC is to undertake the responsibilities of the former Special Commission under
resolution 687 relating to the destruction of Iraqi CBW and ballistic missiles with a range of over
150 kilometres and the on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with these
obligations. Like the Special Commission, UNMOVIC is to be allowed unconditional access to
all Iraqi facilities, equipment and records as well as to Iraqi officials. Under pragraph [sic] 7 of
resolution 1284 UNMOVIC and the IAEA were given the responsibility of drawing up a work
programme which would include the implementation of a reinforced system of ongoing
monitoring and verification (OMV) and key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by
Iraq, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance. There are currently no
UNMOVIC personnel in Iraq, and the reinforced OMV system has not been implemented
because of IRaq’s [sic] refusal to cooperate.

- 12 -
Text of the David Manning Memo - March 14, 2002 memo from David Manning
(UK Foreign Policy Advisor) to Tony Blair recounting Manning’s meetings with his US
counterpart Condoleeza Rice (National Security Advisor), and advising Blair for his upcoming
visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch.

SECRET - STRICTLY PERSONAL

FROM : DAVID MANNING


DATE: 14 MARCH 2002

CC: JONATHAN POWELL

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR TRIP TO THE US

I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with her an NSC team on Wednesday
(to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank
when we were one-on-one at dinner. I attach the records in case you want to glance.

IRAQ

We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has
registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime
change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different
than anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we
pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was
not an option.

Condi’s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some signs, since we last
spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and political risks. (See the attached piece
by Seymour Hersh which Christopher Meyer says gives a pretty accurate picture of the uncertain
state of the debate in Washington.)

From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions:
- how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and
justified;
- what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition;
- how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is
any);
- what happens on the morning after?

Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear whether he can expect coalition
support. I told Condi that we realiised that the Administration could go it alone if it chose. But if
it wanted company, it would have to take account of the concerns of its potential coalition
partners. In particular:

- 13 -
- the Un [sic] dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that
would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international
framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed refused
[sic] by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument’
- the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did, we could find ourselves
bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf.

YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH

No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with Condi convinced me that
Bush wants to hear you [sic] views on Iraq before taking decisions. He also wants your support.
He is still smarting from the comments by other European leaders on his Iraq policy.

This gives you real influence: on the public relations strategy; on the UN and weapons
inspections; and on US planning for any military campaign. This could be critically important. I
think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree
that failure isn’t an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it.

Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by Kurds and Shias? Will Americans
really put in enough ground troops to do the job if the Kurdish/Shi’ite stratagem fails? Even if
they do will they be willing to take the sort of casualties that the Republican Guard may inflict
on them if it turns out to be an urban war, and Iraqi troops don’t conveniently collapse in a heap
as Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to answer there and other tough
questions, in a more convincing way than they have so far before concluding that they can do the
business.

The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the Middle East. The Iraq
factor means that there may never be a better opportunity to get this Administration to give
sustained attention to reviving the MEPP.

- 14 -
Text of the Christopher Meyer Letter - March 18, 2002 memo from
Christopher Meyer (UK ambassador to the US) to David Manning (UK Foreign Policy Advisor)
recounting Meyer’s meeting with Paul Wolfowitz (US Deputy Secretary of Defense).

DAVID MANNING

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

British Embassy Washington

From the Ambassador


Christopher Meyer KCMG

18 March 2002

Sir David Manning KCMG


No 10 Downing Street

1. Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, came to Sunday lunch on 17 March.

2. On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used the Condi Rice last week.
We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would
be a tough sell for us domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go
it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for
building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongnfoot
Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs and the critical importance of the MEPP as an
integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully (sic), we
were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.

3. I said that the UK was giving serious through to publishing a paper that would make the case
against Saddam. If the UK were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would
have to be able to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us. It was
extraordinary how people had forgotten ho bad he was.

4. Wolfowitz said that he fully agreed. He took a slightly different position from others in the
Administration, who were forcussed (sic) on Saddam’s capacity to develop weapons of mass
destruction. The WMD danger was of course crucial to the public ase against Saddam,
particularly the potential linkage to terrorism. But Wolfowitz thought it indispensable to spell out
in detail Saddam’s barbarism. This was well documented from what he had done during the
occupation of Kuwait, the incursion into Kurdish territory, the assault on the Marsh Arabs, and to
hiw (sic) own people. A lot of work had been done on this towards the end of the first Bush
administration. Wolfowitz thought that this would go a long way to destroying any notion of
moral equivalence between Iraq and Israel. I said that I had been forcefully struck, when
addressing university audiences in the US, how ready students were to gloss over Saddam’s
crimes and to blame the US and the UK for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

- 15 -
5. Wolfowitz said that it was absurd to deny the link between terrorism and Saddam. There might
be doubt about the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker on
9/11, and Iraqi intelligence (did we, he asked, know anything more about this meeting?). But
there were other substantiated cases of Saddam giving comfort to terrorists, including someone
involved in the first attack on the World Trade Center (the latest New Yorker apparently has a
story about links between Saddam and Al Qaeda operating in Kurdistan).

6. I asked to Wolfowitz’s take on the struggle inside the Administrations between the pro- and
anti- INC lobbies (well documented in Sy Hersh’s recent New Yorker piece, which I gave you).
He said that he found himself between the two sides (but as the conversation developed, it
became clear that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not). He said that he was strongly
opposed to what some were advocating: a coalition including all outside the factions except the
INC (INA, KDP, PUK, SCRI) . This would not work. Hostility towards the INC was in reality
hostility toward Chalabi. It was true that Chalabi was not the easiest person to work with. Bute
(sic) had a good record in bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq. The CIA stubbornly refused
to recognize this. They unreasonably denigrated the INC because of their fixation with Chalabi.
When I mentioned that the INC was penetraded (sic) by Iraqi intelligence, Wolfowitz
commented that this was probably the case with all the opposition groups: it was something we
would have to live with. As to the Kurds, it was true that they were living well (another point to
be made in any public dossier on Saddam) and that they feared provoking an incursion by
Baghdad. But there were good people among the Kurds, including in particular Salih (?) of the
PUK. Wolfowitz brushed over my reference to the absence of Sunni in the INC: there was a big
difference between Iraqi and Iranian Shia. The former just wanted to be rid of Saddam.

7. Wolfowitz was pretty dismissive of the desirability of a military coup and of the defector
generals in the wings. The latter had blood on their hands. The important thing was to try to have
Saddam replaced by something like a functioning democracy. Though imperfect, the Kurdish
model was not bad. How to achieve this, I asked? Only through a coalition of all the parties was
the answer (we did not get into military planning).

- 16 -
Text of the Peter Ricketts Letter - March 22, 2002 memo from Peter Ricketts
(Political Director, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Jack Straw (UK Foreign
Secretary) providing Ricketts’ advice for the Prime Minister on issues of the threat posed by
Iraq, connections to al Qaida, post-war considerations and working with the UN.

Confidential and Personal PR.121

From: P F Ricketts, Political Director

Date: 22 March 2002

CC: PUS

Secretary of State

IRAQ: Advice for the Prime Minister

1 You invited thoughts for your personal note to the Prime Minister covering the official
advice (we have put up a draft minute separately). Here are mine.

2 By sharing Bush's broad objective" the Prime Minister can help shape how it is defined, and
the approach to achieving it. In the process, he can bring home to Bush home of the realities
which will be less evident from Washington. He can help Bush make good decisions by telling
him things his own machine probably isn't.

3 By broad support for the objective brings two real problems which need discussing.

4 First, the THREAT. The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's
WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. This is not something we need
to be defensive about, but attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase scepticism about our
case. I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of the unclassified document. My
meeting yesterday showed that there is more work to do to ensuer that the figures are accurate
and consistent with those of the US. But even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will
not show much advance in recent years ont he nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the
programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know", been stepped up.

5 US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Aaida is so far frankly unconvincing.
To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations, we have to be convincing that:

- the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops to die for;

- it is qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are closer to
achieving nuclear capability (including Iran).

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

- 17 -
We can make the case on qualitative difference only Iraq has attacked a neighbour' used CW and
fired missiles against Israel). The overall strategy needs to include re-doubled efforts to tackle
other proliferators, including Iran, in other ways (the UK/French ideas on greater IAEA activity
are helpful here). But we are still left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the
imminence of a threat from Iraq. This is something the Prime Minister and President need to
have a frank discussion about.

6 The second problem is the END STATE. Military operations need clear and compelling
military objectives. For Kosovo" it was: Serba out, Kosovars back" peace-keepers in. For
Afghanistan, destroying the Taleban and Al Qaida military capability. For Iraq, "regime change:
does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have
suggested, to make the objective ending the threat to the international community from Iraqi
WMD before Saddam uses it or gives it to the terrorists. This is at once easier to justify in terms
of international law" but also more demanding. Regime change which produced another Sunni
General still in charge of an active Iraqi WMD programmme would be a bad outcome (not least
because it would be almost impossible to maintain UN sanctions on a new leader who came in
promising a fresh start). As with the fight against UBL, Bush would do well to de"personalise
the objective" focus on elimination of WMD, and show that he is serious about UN Inspectors as
the first choice means of achieving that (it is win/win for him: either Saddam against all the odds
allows Inspectors to operate freelyk" in which case we can further hobble his WMD
programmes, or he blocks/hinders, and we are on stronger ground for switching to other
methods),

7 Defining the end state in this way, and working through the UN, will of course also help
maintain a degree of support among the Europeans, and therefore fits with another major
message which the Prime Minister will watn to get across: the importance of positioning Iraq as
a problem for the inernational community as a whole" not just for the US.

PETER RICKETTS

- 18 -
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Text of the Jack Straw Memo - March 25, 2002 memo from Jack Straw (UK
Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair in preparation for Blair’s visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch,
covering Iraq-al Qaida linkage, legality of invasion, weapons inspectors and post-war
considerations.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PM/02/019

CRAWFORD/IRAQ

1 The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few. The risks are high, both for you and for
the Government. I judge that there is at present no majority inside the PLP for any military
action against Iraq, (alongside a greater readiness in the PLP to surface their concerns).
Colleagues know that Saddam and the Iraqi regime are bad. Making that case is easy. But we
have a long way to go to convince them as to:

(a) the scale of the threat from Iraq and why this has got worse recently:

(b) what distinguishes the Iraqi threat from that of eg Iran and North Korea so as to justify
military action;

(c) the justification for any military action in terms of international law: and

(d) whether the consequence of military action really would be a compliant, law abiding
replacement government.

2 The whole exercise is made much more difficult to handle as long as conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians is so acute.

THE SCALE OF THE THREAT

3 The Iraqi regime plainly poses a most serious threat to its neighbours, and therefore to
international security. However, in the documents so far presented it has been hard to glean
whether the threat from Iraq is so significantly differently from that of Iran and North Korea as
to justify military action (see below).

WHAT IS WORSE NOW?

4 If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering
military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with
UBL and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11
September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community

- 19 -
(especially that of the US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what determined
evil people can these days perpetuate.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAQ, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

5 By linking these countries together in this "axis of evil" speech, President Bush implied an
identity betwen them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms of the action necessary to
deal with the threat, but also in terms of the action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of
work will now need to be to delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so
much more justified than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case" that Iraq poses a
unique and present danger - rests on the facts that it:

* invaded a neighbour;
* has used WMD and would use them again;
* is in breach of nine UNSCRS.

THE POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

6 That Iraq is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed on it by the UNSC
provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is based on international law. Indeed' if
the argument is to be won, the whol case against Iraq and in favour (if necessary) of military
action, needs to be narrated with reference to the international rule of law.

7 We also have better to sequence the explanation of what we are doing and why. Specifically,
we need to concentrate in the early stages on:

* making operational the sanctions regime foreshadowed by UNSCR 1382;

* demanding the readmission of weapons inspectors, but this time to operate in a free and
unfettered way (a similar formula to that which Cheney used at your joint press conference, as I
recall).

8 I know there are those who say that an attack on Iraq would be justified whether or not
weapons inspectors were readmitted. But I believe that a demand for the unfettered readmission
of weapons inspectors in essential, in terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal sanction
for any subsequent military action.

9 Legally there are two potential elephant traps:

(i) regime change per se is no justification for military action; it could form part of the method
of any strategy, but not a goal. Of course, we may want credibly to assert that regime change is
an essential part of the strategy by which we have to achieve our ends - that of the elimination of
Iraq's WMD capacity; but the latter has to be the goal;

(ii) on whether any military action would require a fresh UNSC mandate (Desert Fox did not).
The US are likely to oppose any idea of a fresh mandate. On the other side, the weight of legal

- 20 -
advice here is that a fresh mandate may well be required. There is no doubt that a new UNSCR
would transform the climate in the PLP. Whilst that (anew mandate) is very unlikely, given the
US's position, a draft resolution against military action with 13 in favour (or handsitting) and two
vetoes against could play very badly here.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY MILITARY ACTION

10 A legal justification is a necessary but far from sufficient pre"condition for military action.
We have also to answer the big question - what will this action achieve? There seems to be a
larger hole in this than on anything. Most of the assessments from the US have assumed regime
change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how
that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement
regime will be better.

11 Iraq has had NO history of democracy so no-one has this habit or experience.

(JACK STRAW)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office


25 March 2002

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 21 -
Text of the Cabinet Office Briefing Paper, July 21 2005
Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action
Submitted by downing on Sun, 2005-06-12 12:12. Evidence

Published by Sunday Times of London, June 12, 2005

The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page
is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the
source.

PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY

IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note by Officials)

Summary

Ministers are invited to:

(1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for possible action.

(2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within
present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its
neighbours or international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic political strategy,
which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions
necessary to justify government military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return
of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to
President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August.

(4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake
operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD should bring forward proposals for the
procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from
Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002.

(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office
Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US.

Introduction

1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as
yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the
political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it.

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2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that
the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain
conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the
Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through
the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.

3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US Government to place its
military planning within a political framework, partly to forestall the risk that military action is
precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is
particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we
could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit
themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support.

4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK support for military
action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, and other considerations taken into
account. This note sets them out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US
Government. Depending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on
whether and in what form the UK takes part in military action.

The Goal

5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating
with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international
security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could
be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning
unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by
elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in the view of UK officials, that
one would necessarily follow from the other. Even if regime change is a necessary condition for
controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

US Military Planning

6. Although no political decisions have been taken, US military planners have drafted options for
the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a 'Running Start', military action could
begin as early as November of this year, with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support
for opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land
forces deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the collapse
of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up before any military
action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military plans include no specifics on the
strategic context either before or after the campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for
the 'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail.

7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This
means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever option Ministers choose with regard
to UK participation.

- 23 -
The Viability of the Plans

8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. Their initial view is that
there are a number of questions which would have to be answered before they could assess
whether the plans are sound. Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent
to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons
and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight.

UK Military Contribution

9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US military planning and
the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD is examining how the UK might
contribute to US-led action. The options range from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized
contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK
could not generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible
decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in time, provided
adequate basing arrangements could be made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK
military involvement include the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which
there is no financial provision.

The Conditions Necessary for Military Action

10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the following conditions
necessary for military action and UK participation: justification/legal base; an international
coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of
domestic opinion.

Justification

11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community.
Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. But
regime change could result from action that is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of
force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective
self-defence, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by
the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared earlier this year,
is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. Legal
bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in both the first two instances but
would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and
proportionality. Further legal advice would be needed on this point.

12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has
held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons
inspectors. These have made no substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating.
Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade
the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be allowed to continue ad
infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain

- 24 -
backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi
Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this.

13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors
as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not allow them to operate freely.
UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months after entering Iraq to
establish the monitoring and verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess
whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by
January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible that they will
encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely when they are fully
operational.

14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject
(because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not be regarded as
unreasonable by the international community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we
would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003.

An International Coalition

15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform and desirable for
political purposes.

16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and
ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our
bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except
granting military over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in
the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be necessary.

17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing the support of NATO
and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK. France
might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking
to improve their US relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to
their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the region would be
neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in military action. In practice, much
of the international community would find it difficult to stand in the way of the determined
course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater the
prospects of success.

A Quiescent Israel-Palestine

18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian violence for the time
being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking more trouble for the future. The Bush
speech was at best a half step forward. We are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make
progress, including a resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a
ministerial conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is
the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action

- 25 -
against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly
likely. The co-incidence of such an upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq
cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to
bolster popular Arab support for his regime.

Benefits/Risks

19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the
benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of the
military action would match our objective as set out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war
occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already
made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us
to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely
the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in particular what form of
Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be
possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military
action on other UK interests in the region.

Domestic Opinion

20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military
action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial effort to secure the
support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related
to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World
and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed
by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action.

Timescales

21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a
military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only because of the time it will take
to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that for climactic reasons, military action
would need to start by January 2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn.

22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. This means that:

(a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before President Bush is briefed
on 4 August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels;

- 26 -
Downing Street Minutes complete text
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607_1,00.html

The Sunday Times – Britain May 01, 2000

The secret Downing Street ‘memo’


SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett,
Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown
only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough
and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military
action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to
line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam
among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military
action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action,
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for
publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August
and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

- 27 -
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then
a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days
deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by
an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A
hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical
for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main
options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern
Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on
the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear
that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided.
But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to
Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military
action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205
of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam
refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it
was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two
key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to
give the military plan the space to work.

- 28 -
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military
were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did
not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced
that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political
strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly
the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the
threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he
would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going
down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political
context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But
we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should
tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in
preparation for this operation.

c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and
possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors,
and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region
especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

- 29 -
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

- 30 -

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