G.R. No.

104482
January 22, 1996
BELINDA TAREDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters,
and TEOFILA CORPUZ TANEDO, representing her minor daughter VERNA
TANEDO, petitioners
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAREDO AND TERESITA
BARERA TAREDO, respondents
FACTS:
1. October 20, 1962: Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale
in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita
Barera (private respondents) whereby he conveyed for P1,500 one hectare of
his future inheritance from his parents.
2. February 28, 1980: Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro made another
affidavit to reaffirm the 1962 sale.
3. January 13, 1981: Lazaro acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as
consideration for the sale.
4. February 1981: Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children (petitioners) through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980
5. On June 7, 1982, Ricardo recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the
Registry of Deeds
Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazaro in favor of Ricardo. They contend that Lolo Matias desired that
whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his
(Lazaros) children.
Ricardo (private respondents) however presented in evidence a Deed of Revocation
of a Deed of Sale wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of his children for the
reason that it was simulated or fictitious - without any consideration whatsoever.
LAZAROS VERSION: He executed a sworn statement in favor of his children. BUT he
also testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who
induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five
pesos (P5.00) to buy a drink. LABO
Trial court ruled in favor of Lazaros children. Ca affirmed TCs decision.
ISSUES:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? NO
2. Was Ricardos registration of the deed of valid? YES
HELD: SC rules in favor of Ricardo.

Pursuant to Art 1347, the contract made in 1962 (sale of future inheritance) is not
valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
between the parties. (No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.)
However, Article 1544 governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales. The property in question is land, an immovable, and ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property.
Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of Ricardo was later than the one in favor of
Lazaros children, ownership would vest with Ricardo because of the undisputed fact
of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them
at all.
Lazaros children contend that they were in possession of the property and that
Ricardo never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170405 February 2, 2010

RAYMUNDO S. DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
BENITA T. ONG. Respondent.

Facts:
On March 10, 1993, Raymundo S. De Leon (petitioner) sold 3 parcels of land to
Benita T. Ong(respondent). The said properties were mortgaged to a financial
institution; Real Savings & Loan Association Inc. (RSLAI). The parties then executed
a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. As indicated in the
deed of mortgage, the parties stipulated that the petitioner (de Leon) shall execute
a deed of assumption of mortgage in favor of Ong (respondent)after full payment of
the P415,000. They also agreed that the respondent (Ong) shall assume the

mortgage. The respondent then subsequently gave petitioner P415,000 as partial

payment. On the other hand, de Leon handed the keys to Ong and de Leon wrote a
letter to inform RSLAI that the mortgage will be assumed by Ong. Thereafter, the
respondent took repairs and made improvements in the properties. Subsequently,
respondent learned that the same properties were sold to a certain Viloria after
March 10, 1993 and changed the locks, rendering the keys given to her useless.
Respondent proceeded to RSLAI but she was informed that the mortgage has been
fully paid and that the titles have been given to the said person. Respondent then
filed a complaint for specific performance and declaration of nullity of the second
sale and damages. The petitioner contended that respondent does not have a cause
of action against him because the sale was subject to a condition which requires the
approval of RSLAI of the mortgage. Petitioner reiterated that they only entered into
a contract to sell. The RTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA upheld the sale to
respondent and nullified the sale to Viloria. Petitioner moved for reconsideration to
the SC.

Issue:
Whether the parties entered into a contract of sale or a contract to sell?

Held:
In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon
the perfection of the contract. The non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer
does not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price.In
the present case, the deed executed by the parties did not show that the owner
intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The terms and conditions affected
only the manner of payment and not the immediate transfer of ownership. It was
clear that the owner intended a sale because he unqualifiedly delivered and
transferred ownership of the properties to the respondent

AGRICULTURAL & HOME EXTENSION DEVELOPMENT GROUP (AHDG) vs CA

In 1972, Diaz and Mia sold a parcel of land to Gundran. The owners duplicate copy was given to Gundran
but the sale was unregistered because of existing notices of lis pendens on the title.
Gundran and AHDG entered into a joint venture agreement for the improvement & subdivision of the land.
This agreement was also not annotated.
In 1976, Diaz & Mia again sold the same property to Cabautan. By virtue of a court order, a new owners
copy of the title was issued (they supposedly lost their copy).

The notice of lis pendens was canceled and the deed of sale was recorded. A new TCT was issued in favor
of Cabautan.
In 1977, Gundran issued an action for reconveyance.

Who has a better right to the property? Was Cabautan a purchaser in good faith?

Since the 2nd sale was registered, the 2nd buyer has a better right to the property. Cabautan was not a
purchaser in bad faith merely because of the notice of lis pendens.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property without notice that another person has an interest
in the property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of the purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
The TCT shows no annotation of any sale, lien, encumbrance or adverse claim on the property. When the
property is registered under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as 3rrd persons are concerned. A person dealing with registered land is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the register or certificate of title.
Even the annotation of lis pendens on the title to the property by 3 rd parties does not place the buyer
thereof in bad faith since these did not have the effect of establishing a lien or encumbrance on the
property affected.
Their only purpose was to give notice to 3rrd persons and to the whole world that any interest they might
acquire in the property pending litigation would be subject to the result of the suit.

NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO AND ANNABELLE LUMO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128573. January 13, 2003]
Under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing
with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate
of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine
the legal status of the property.
FACTS:
1. On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to private
respondent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring
located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City.
2. Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents made inquiries at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City where the property is
located and the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendors title. They
found out that the property was mortgaged for P8,000 to a certain Mrs.
Galupo and that the owners copy of the Certificate of Title to said
property was in her possession.
3. Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to redeem the property from
Galupo at their expense, giving the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that
purpose.
4. On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo was annotated
on TCT No. T-41499 which covered the subject property.

5. In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release of Galupos adverse
claim, private respondents and Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of
absolute sale. The subject property was allegedly sold for P125,000 but the
deed of sale reflected the amount of only P30,000 which was the amount private
respondents were ready to pay at the time of the execution of said deed, the
balance payable by installment.
6. On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered and inscribed on TCT
No. T-41499 and, on even date, TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private
respondents
7. After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested the issuance of a new
tax declaration certificate in their names. However, they were surprised to
learn from the City Assessors Office that the property was also
declared for tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan Community
Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City Assessors Office revealed that, for the lot
covered by TCT No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumos T/D # 83324 bore the note: This
lot is also declared in the name of Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D
# 71210.
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a P15,000
loan from petitioner Bank using the subject property as security. At
the time said contract of mortgage was entered into, the subject property
was then an unregistered parcel of residential land, tax-declared in the name
of a certain Sergio A. Balibay while the residential one-storey house was taxdeclared in the name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing Comayas to borrow
money and use the subject lot as security. But the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage and the Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the
registration book of the Province of Misamis Oriental, not in the
registration book of Cagayan de Oro City.
It appears that, when the registration was made, there was only one Register
of Deeds for the entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de
Oro City. It was only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for
Cagayan de Oro City was established separately from the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and
the subject property sold at a public auction to the mortgagee Naawan
Community Rural Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of P16,031.35.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for redemption of the
foreclosed subject property lapsed and the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan
de Oro City issued and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance. This time, the deed was registered under Act 3344 and
recorded in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax declaration for the
subject house and lot.

8. Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for ejectment against Comayas

before the MTCC which decided in its favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated April 13, 1988.
9. On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an order for the issuance of
a writ of execution of its judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin,
promptly issued said writ.
10.However, when the writ was served, the property was no longer occupied
by Comayas but herein private respondents, the spouses Lumowho had,
as earlier mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988
11.Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their home, private respondents
filed an action for quieting of title. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered
a decision declaring private respondents as purchasers for value and in good
faith, and consequently declaring them as the absolute owners and possessors
of the subject house and lot.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT REGISTRATION OF SHERIFFS DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE
IN THE PROPER REGISTRY OF DEEDS IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN THE TORRENS
TITLE? NO.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COULD BE CONSIDERED AS
BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH? YES.
HELD:
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance in the day book under Act 3344 should prevail over the later
registration of private respondents deed of absolute sale under Act 496, as
amended by the Property Registration Decree, PD 1529.
1. This contention has no leg to stand on.
2. It has been held that, where a person claims to have superior proprietary rights
over another on the ground that he derived his title from a sheriffs sale
registered in the Registry of Property, Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil
Code will apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered
under Act 496.
3. Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was
acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a final deed of conveyance. On
the other hand, when private respondents purchased the same
property, it was already covered by the Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs. Fulewhere the Court ruled that the
registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds
creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with
the same property.

4. However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at the time of the
execution and delivery of the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on
September 5, 1986, the disputed property was already covered by the
Land Registration Act and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant
to Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in the registration book of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
5. Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was already under the operation
of the Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon
the land.
6. Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving the land
of all claims except those noted thereon.
7. Accordingly, private respondents, in dealing with the subject registered
land, were not required by law to go beyond the register to determine
the legal condition of the property. They were only charged with notice
of such burdens on the property as were noted on the register or the
certificate of title. To have required them to do more would have been
to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the
Torrens Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.
8. Mere registration of title in case of double sale is not enough; good faith must
concur with the registration.
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance on December 2, 1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the subject property on May
17, 1988, they were deemed to have purchased the said property with the
knowledge that it was already registered in the name of petitioner bank.
1. The priority in time principle being invoked by petitioner bank is
misplaced because its registration referred to land not within the
Torrens System but under Act 3344.
2. On the other hand, when private respondents bought the subject property, the
same was already registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in
this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to
rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need
to inquire further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.
3. Private respondents exercise the required diligence in ascertaining the legal
condition of the title to the subject property so as to be considered as innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith
Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo
Comayas, inquiries were made with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of
Lands regarding the status of the vendors title. No liens or encumbrances
were found to have been annotated on the certificate of title. Neither were

private respondents aware of any adverse claim or lien on the property other
than the adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom Guillermo
Comayas had mortgaged the subject property. But, as already mentioned,
the claim of Galupo was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the necessary inquiries,
private respondents did not have to go beyond the certificate of
title. Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of
Title would be rendered futile and nugatory.
Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence required by
law in ascertaining the legal status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over
the subject property and found no flaws therein, they should be considered as
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court upholding private
respondents Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo as the true and rightful owners of the
disputed property is affirmed.
Radiowealth Finance Company v Palileo

The Castros (Enrique and Herminia) sold to Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land situated in Surigao del
Norte. The sale was evidenced by a deed, but was not registered in the Registry of Property. Since the execution
of the deed, Palileo, through his mother (as administratrix or overseer), exercised acts of ownership over the land.
He also paid the necessary taxes from 1971 onwards. In 1976, Enrique Castro lost a case to Radiowealth and to
satisfy the judgment, the same piece of land was levied upon and sold at a public auction. A certificate of sale was
executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of Radiowealth (the only bidder). A deed of final sale was also issued
after the lapse of the period of redemption. Palileo filed an action for quieting of title. The trial court ruled for him.
The CA affirmed.

Who has a better right to the land? Radiowealth or Palileo?

Palileo. It must be stressed that what is being dealt with here is a parcel of unregistered land. Under Act No.
3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right, meaning that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else, even if the first
sale was unrecorded. In the previous case of Carumba v CA, it was held that the purchaser of an unregistered land
at an execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in
the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. Applying this, Radiowealth merely acquired Castros
interest in the land which, since he had already sold the same to Palileo previously, was no interest at all.
Therefore, Palileo has the better right to the land.

SALE BY NON-OWNER

PAULMITAN vs. CA (1992)

Agatona Paulmitan had two children: Pascual (he died and left 7 kids who are respondents in
this case) and Donato (1 child, Juliana Fanesa).
Agatona died and left two parcels of land (Lot 757 and Lot 1091). Her estate was unsettled.
But then Donato extrajudicially adjudicated onto himself Lot 757, and a TCT was issued in his
name. Then donato executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter Juliana
Fanesa.
o Lot 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes. Juliana
Fanesa redeemed the property.
The respondents (kids of Pascual) filed a case to partition the properties plus damages.
RTC: The respondents, as descendants of Agatona, are entitled to of Lot 1091 pro indiviso.
The deed of sale to Juliana Fanesa is valid as to the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091,
while the remaining half belongs to the respondents. CA: Affirmed.

Issue: Does Juliana own the entirety of Lot 1091?

Held: NO. Only pro-indiviso share.
-

When Agatona died, she left two kids, Pascual and Donato. Art 777 says: The rights to the
succession are transmitted form the moment of the death of the decedent, so the right of
ownership of Pascual and Donato was vested in them when Agatona died.
But when Donato sold Lot 1091 to his daughter, he could only sell that portion which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership, because he co-owned
the lot with his brother Pascual who died and left 7 kids, so the kids/respondents
are the co-owners along with Donato. Donatos sale to his daughter did not vest
ownership in the entire land with his daughter, but transferred only the sellers pro
indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
land until it is partitioned.
Juliana Fanesa claims that the owns the land by virtue of her redeeming it from the
government. But the redemption did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the
entire land subject of the co-ownership.
o But she can be reimbursed for half the redemption price she paid on behalf of her coowners.

MINDANAO vs. YAP (1965)

-

Rosenda de Nuqui (widow of deceased Sotero Dionisio) and her son Sotero sold three parcels
of land in favor of Yap. Included the sale were also buildings on the land as well as lab
equipment, books, furniture and other fixtures used by two schools established on the
properties (the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis Academy). The price was P100,700.
But Rosenda actually co-owned the land with many of her other children. And the lab
equipment, buildings, books, etc were owned by the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis
Academy.
Yap took possession of the properties and even changed the names of the schools to
Harvardian Colleges.
The children who did not take part in the deed of sale filed two cases: one was for annulment
of the sale and the other for rescission.

Issue: What is the status of the sale?

Held: NULL AND VOID.

The contract purported to sell properties of which the sellers were not the only owners. Plus
the prestation involved in the sale was indivisible and therefore incapable of partial annulment,
inasmuch as the buyer Yap, by his own admission, would not have entered into the transaction
except to acquire all of the properties purchased by him. So there is no necessity to rule on
the question of rescission since the contract itself is null and void.
The buyer and seller were both in bad faith. The return of the properties by the buyer is a
necessary consequence of the decree of annulment. No part of the purchase price having been
paid, as far as the record shows, there is no need for restitution (just return of the properties).

Note: See Villanuevas explanation in the book (his opinion is that the sale is NOT null and void
because a seller may validly enter into a valid and binding contract of sale on properties which he
entirely does not own; there is a diff between the perfect stage and the consummation stage).

LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her

husband CIRIACO PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24419

July 15, 1968

FACTS:
Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, was originally owned by the late
spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely,
Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October
28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802
consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque. On October
29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia
P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot
No. 802 to Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita
Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and
Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802
with an area of 958 square meters.
Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of
Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square
meters as evidenced by a deed of sale,which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina
Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3
portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the plaintiff
bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence
there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid
portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of.
Estoques stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the
deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any
definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided share,

since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition
takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this
premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area,
should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at
the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said
vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common
property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant argues, when Crispina sold the
rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former was selling an undivided 2/3
that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the
defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal
redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.

ISSUE:
WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?
HELD:
NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802
on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And
when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds
of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since
their respective portions were distinct and separate.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold
as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840
square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could
not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two
brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to
appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the
deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have validly sold her one-third
undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. .

(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed,
the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day (October 29,
1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners
(Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey
(Llacer vs. Muoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly
prescribes that .
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law
to the buyer or grantee."
CA decision affirmed