Risk, Redistribution and Recognition

Risk, Redistribution and Recognition
Risk, Redistribution and

Recognition
Universal Basic Income as a Just Transcendence of
the Welfare System in Contemporary Risk Society
© Beverly Shipko, “Chocolate Cake”
University College Maastricht
2009/2010
5600 words
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Abstract
In the following article Universal Basic Income (UBI) is analysed with respect
to justice. It is proposed that an UBI increases justice in society. For this
endeavour justice is defined as redistribution and recognition in accordance to
Fraser and Honneth (2003). They consider justice as the equal opportunity to
promote self- respect and to be recognized as peers. Further, the concept of
Risk Society is synthesized with the theory of justice. This warrants an UBI as
increasing justice, and data is provided from the welfare system and
hypothetical consequences of an UBI to support the claim. The welfare
system has shortcomings with respect to the labour market, which an UBI
shall improve. Risks are redistributed through a more equal distribution and
minimizing the impact of negative risks. Recognition is promoted through
active economic rights in the labour market. As an UBI redistributes risks and
promotes recognition, it promotes justice.
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Table of Contents
Introduction 3
I. Justice as Recognition and Redistribution 4
1.1 (Re)distribution of Risks and Recognition of Respect 4
1.2 Welcome Risk Society 6
1.3 Risks: Minimize Impact of Risks and Equalize Distribution 7
1.4 The Struggle for Recognition 9
1.5 Promote Recognition Through Economic Rights 10
II. The Insufficiency of the Welfare System 12
2.1 Welfare has Failed Well 12
2.2 Justification and Viability of UBI 14
2.3 Consequences of an UBI as a Solution for Welfare Insufficiency 18
Conclusion 21
Acknowledgements 22
References 22
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Introduction
Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a concept intuitively attracting interest

through its simplicity. It signifies that each member of society receives a
categorical financial support, which enables a decent and respectable living.
In contrast to welfare, UBI is essentially unconditional, that is independent
from individual conditions, as for instance labour contribution or health status.
UBI is therefore regarded by some political zeitgeist as a revolutionary means
ahead of the welfare state.
UBI especially attracts both scholars and politicians in the liberal egalitarian
tradition. Van Parijs (1995) and Ackerman & Alstott (1999) present
justifications for an UBI and promote its implementation. Both the liberal ideal
of freedom as economic autonomy and the egalitarian approach of fraternal
treatment magnetize genuine interest in the viability of an UBI. Meuris (2008)
shows that an UBI is indeed viable in the scope of the European Union.
The utopian vision of a more just society has to be both critically and
sceptically reflected upon. The monetary means of an UBI are collected, so
the argument goes, by tax revenues. How can an UBI be coherently justified,
as it is essentially a (re)distributive means? One approach of justifying an UBI
is to point at it as being just, according to a theoretical framework of justice.
Conventionally the opus magnum of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice,

provides the common point of departure to warrant an UBI as just. Maximizing
the primary goods of the worst-off individual is a principle of justice, whose
implementation Rawls (1971) necessarily postulates. Van Parijs (1995) claims
this being fulfilled by an UBI. Since the publication of Rawls theory in 1971,
western societies, however, developed into what Beck (1992) and Giddens
(1994) dubbed as Risk Society. Parallel to that, some scholars of distributive
justice shifted focus from primary goods to recognition and redistribution.
The theory of justice, as defined by Fraser & Honneth (2003), synthesized

with contemporary Risk Society, warrant an UBI, which minimizes risk in
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society and promotes recognition. The structure of individual economic
relations in the capitalistic labour market provides supportive data for this
endeavor. The aim of this paper is to propose a fruitful argument for an UBI,
so far neglected, by evaluating UBI in accordance to justice as redistribution
and recognition. This paper claims that an UBI increases justice in society.
The following approach is chosen to support this claim. The first section
provides a theoretical foundation of justice and society. The second section
provides data by showing problems of the welfare system with respect to the
labour market and presents how UBI transcends these shortcomings.
Therefore, the essay is structured in the following way.
The first section introduces justice as redistribution and recognition to warrant

an UBI as just. Firstly, the concept of risk society is introduced and the
distributive importance of minimizing risks analyzed. Secondly, the concept of
maximization of recognition through economic rights is presented. In the
second section, the insufficiency of the welfare system is examined and UBI
as an improvement proposed. Firstly, the problems of the labour market as
part of the welfare system are outlined. Secondly, UBI is specified and the
consequences of an UBI as a solution for welfare problems proposed. Lastly,
a conclusion and further research suggestions follow.
I. Justice as Recognition and Redistribution
1.1 (Re)distribution of Risks and Recognition of Respect
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) argue that justice today requires both
redistribution and recognition. This two-dimensional conception of justice
proposes the equal right to pursue social esteem under conditions of equal
opportunity. The contemporary paradigm of political philosophy is divorced, so
Fraser (2001) argues, into justice in terms of redistribution and justice in terms
of recognition. The argument is that economic distribution and cultural
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recognition are regarded as separate entities, independent of each other.
Fraser, however, tries to unify the false antithesis of separation and
independence into a single paradigm. The conclusion is that justice, and with
that equality of opportunity, cannot be achieved disconnectedly. The two
pillars of this conception of justice are outlined in turn and consolidated.
Honneth (2001), among others, argues that humanity as subjectivity requires

recognition of other people. Recognition for him is the capability of
participatory parity as the main pillar for the possibility to pursue social
esteem. Honneth supports this by shifting focus from distribution with regard
to economic equality to reciprocal recognition. The meaning of distribution and
the moral significance has shifted from relations of production to consideration
of the consequences of these relations. Rawls (1971) takes recognition into
account by referring to ‘self-respect’ as the most important primary good
distributed in society. The distribution of means of production or primary
goods, for instance, is a determinant of self-esteem and respect. Building up
on this classification distribution and recognition are consolidated. Honneth
extending Fraser’s dualistic notion, even regards recognition monistic as the
fundamental concept of justice. This paper, however, limits to the conception
of justice as dualism of redistribution and recognition, as proposed by Fraser.
Redistribution taken together with recognition regards justice as a two-

dimensional conception. Justice is a parity of participation, a possibility for
citizens to interact and to be recognized as peers. As outlined above, the link
between the two notions is explained by Fraser (2001)1. Justice is irreducible
to either of the two categories and only accurately described as an interlinked
concept. The question of the accuracy and legitimacy of this proposition is not
further elaborated on here2. The coherence of the conception is assumed.
How the two notions, which arguably can undermine each other are combined
1
as well as Honneth (2001) and Fraser & Honneth (2003).
2
For criticism of this conception, please see for instance Bernstein (2005) or Kompridis
(2007).
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coherently is presented elsewhere1. What is of importance in this paper is the
relation of these two notions, recognition and redistribution, towards each
other. The particular relation of the conception is used as a tool to relate to the
notion of Risk Society.
1.2 Welcome Risk Society
The nature of contemporary society is inherently risky. The impact of

contingencies, with regard to distribution of resources, goods or capabilities
has a substantial influence on life. In this particular context risk is defined in
the following way, by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1994). Risk is a form of
contingent discrimination of goods, capabilities and resources. Further, risk is
defined as ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Giddens, 1994, p4.). This means that
through cultural creation and social institutionalisation decisions and
responsibilities are faced by individuals, of which outcomes are unknown and
the probabilities of outcomes uncertain. Stated differently, in the context of this
essay risk basically means the following. Firstly, risk is the consequence of an
event which has no causal or associative relation to an individual action.
Secondly, risk is a consequence of a decision which consequences are
incalculable and outcomes, as well as probabilities of those, unknown. The
awareness of this risk influences people’s decisions by separating people
accordingly to their decision-making behaviour. The degree of risk taking and
risk avoidance is a factor that mostly influences behaviour under risk. The
existence of risk and the decisions influenced by it have two particular
consequences.
Firstly, risks are not distributed equally in society. This means that some
people have to deal more often with risky decisions, while others can make
decisions under conditions of certainty. Also people are influenced by
consequences of risks, whose negative impact they have to bear. The impact
1
Please refer to Fraser (1997), Fraser (2001), Fraser & Honneth (2003) or Fraser & Honneth
(2003a).
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of this is that people habitually do not necessarily see this as a contingent
occurrence and can perceive the unwanted outcome, not as bad luck but as
something they deserve. With this moral calculus incorporated in mind, people
are taking responsibilities for outcomes, which they cannot control. The
distribution of risks is, when taking into consideration by individuals as some
form of desert, into their image of self-respect and recognition.
Secondly, the notion of risk implies individualism. With the increased amount
of possibilities of how to spend one’s life, people have the opportunity of
choice. That means that people’s lives are to a lesser extending influenced by
determinants, such as booth and religion, as arguably existent in pre-modern
times. The increased amount of choice is not an increased amount of equality
of opportunity. People do not choose to have the choice and people do not
have equal talent of rational decision making. Experience of humanity, so
Luhmann (2000) argues, has increased in one dimension, because risk
indicates that unexpected consequences are due to individual decisions,
compared to pre-modern times. One of the major problems of the risk people
have to face is that it is to some extend socially created and institutionalized.
Unemployment is one of the most prominent examples, an illustration of the
normative problem follows at a later stage (2.1). The manufactured and
systematic risks in society due to social institutions are controllable and
should be distributed in a more just way.
1.3 Risks: Minimize Impact of Risks and Equalize Distribution
Distribution is a problem that arises because of the scarcity of the following

qualities. Goods, Resources and Capabilities are the most influential qualities,
which are unequally distributed and have significant consequences on
people’s lives. These characteristics are largely discussed in research up to
now. The attempt is made here, however, to enlarge the discussion of
distribution with another dimension, namely the distribution of risk. In
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contemporary society, the distribution of risks is one of the most influential
contingency. If these risks, which individuals have to face are socially
manufactured or constructed, as Giddens (1994) identifies, their distribution
can be influenced to some extend. When are inequalities justified? The
proposition is made here, that a imaginative social contract rule shall be
incorporated into the design of social institutions. Social institutions shall be
formed in they way that socially manufactured risks, such as unemployment,
are both equally distributed and the impact of bearing the risk is minimized.
A substantial amount of risks is a consequence of social institutions.1 Socially

created uncertainties have to be anticipated by governments, if possible
(Giddens, 1994). Because of the unequal distribution of risks, there is a
resulting unequal distribution of consequences concerning the decisions made
under the influence of risks. Lister (2001) identified a positive correlation with
the amount of risk people have to consider in decision making and the actual
occurrence of negative consequences of an undesired outcome. More
interestingly is another outcome of this study. The heaviest impact of risk is
faced by people who are least able to assess and mitigate its contingencies.
This effectively translates into the result that people in the lowest social
positions are bearing the heaviest burden of risk society. As Taylor-Gooby
(2001) similarly identified in his analysis of the British society, risks are
perceived particularly threatening to people with both the lowest material
circumstances and the highest dependency at the labour market.2 How can
risk be distributed more equally and its negative impact minimized?
Risk can be distributed more equally by social protection and social risk
management. The state has to actively protect citizens of decisions which are
risky and lead to existential problems. The common way of this is the
insurance which welfare states provide. But the role of the welfare state is not
merely limited to protection. Encouragement to take risks is vital to a society
1
Holzmann & Jorgensen (1999) argue building up on Giddens (1994) and (1999) that
industrialization and mechanization brought the concept of risk into society.
2
Different studies provide similar findings for other (EU-)countries, for instance Holzmann &
Jorgensen (1999).
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incorporating social mobility and equality of opportunity (Lister, 2001). This
second category of dealing with risk, what Lister labelled risk management
involves providing a better standpoint while decision making as well as a more
rational decision making process with the help of education.
Rational decision making under risk is what a society with active risk
management should work on. This means that socially manufactured risks,
such as unemployment, are both more equally distributed and the impact of
bearing the risk minimized. Focusing on labour market related risks
confidence is important for people to take risky decisions, and deal with
negative burdens of risk, as Luhmann (2000) points out. Without confidence
or self-respect, people irrationally deal with risks. As Giddens (1994)
identified, giving up welfare benefits, is for some people associated with a
risk-infused attitude. Because the risk of ‘failure’ is present, people have to be
confident enough to a ‘risk-taker’ attitude.
The above mentioned points are analysed in 2.1 with respect to the welfare
system and in 2.3 it is shown in how far UBI provides an improvement of the
status quo. Important to mention is that conflicts over distribution, as Honneth
(2001) remarks, are “locked into a struggle for recognition” (p. 54). With a
more equal distribution of risks, adjusted and optimized by social institutions,
a ‘redistribution of respect` and recognition can take place.
1.4 The Struggle for Recognition
The attempt to define recognition as the teleos of human existence is a very

courageous project1. Rather, it seems that recognition is one of many
meanings or purposes of a fulfilled life. Two main aspects for which
recognition is a means are identity and justice. Recognition is a necessary
condition for an integrity of identity, achieved by the means of self-respect and
self-esteem.
1
As Plato, Hegel, Marx, Fukuyama and many others in many of their writings propose.
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Self-respect, which Rawls addresses as a distributive issue is also a means of
recognition. Rawls defines self-respect as “confidence in one’s abilities” and
power to ”fulfill one’s intentions” (1971, p. 440).
Based upon self-respect and self-esteem, recognition is a means for identity.

Building up on Hegel (1977 [1807]) and the ‘master’ and ‘slave’ dialectics,
Honneth (1996) argues that the basis for human interaction is intersubjective
recognition. Honneth actualizes the notion of recognition of Hegel by
materializing his account. One of materialized categories in which recognition
is achieved for Honneth is through rights. In the political sphere, rights serve
to pursue respect and in the social sphere rights are a means for self-esteem.
Because of the normative importance of rights, society should be organized in
a way that reciprocal recognition is promoted. To be is for Honneth in his
pragmatic approach to be in the context of society. Harm is the greatest form
of injustice for Honneth, this implies also that the reason for social conflicts is
related to recognition, in the sense of misrecognition or non-recognition. By
being a base for conflict, misrecognition also takes place in the category of
justice.
Recognition, or thymos as Plato put it, is also a means for justice. Compared
to Honneth, Fraser considers recognition a necessary but not sufficient
condition for identity. Recognition is first and foremost a means to achieve
justice. In the following it is shown how recognition is promoted through
economic rights, with a concentration on the labour market. Also it is shown
how recognition is necessary for positive freedom to be an autonomous and
rational independent agent, free from economic domination.
1.5 Promote Recognition Through Economic Rights
As Fraser (2001) remarks, misrecognition takes place through social

institutions and in terms of group identity. Citizens acting as economic agents
lack the recognition because of the structure of the economic institutionalized
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system. Equality of opportunity has to be promoted as an economic right, in
order to promote recognition. As Lister (2001) indicates, social exclusion, as a
consequence of misrecognition has to be mitigated.
Recognition can be achieved by tackling the following problems concerning

the labour market. In the current state of the European economic system,
value as a determinant for recognition is largely dependent on the economic
exchange value an activity has at the labour market. Because of the need of
economically viable work and the reduction to economic value people have
problems of self-respect in contemporary society. Because people are valued
by their economic productivity as “employed“ and stigmatized as
“unemployed“, a hurdle of economically unproductive work is enforced. The
problem is that people who are treated as economic agents of the labour
market by not having self-ownership are subject to the institution of the labour
market and subject to demand forces. This is problematic as people who
consider the labour market as just have problems of identity, in terms of self-
esteem. People value themselves lower because of a low exchange value at
the labour market. Recognition inside the economic system, independent of
exchange values shall be promoted.
Recognition with respect to the labour market is only possible with economic
rights. The market as a means of allocating resources is effective. However,
entrance to the labour market should be effectively free and independent of
material basic needs. Until now, people seem to be forced normatively by the
state to enter the labour market (Elster, 1988). The undesirability of
unemployment exists, because of the possible loss of self-respect and the
institutionalized consequences of living on welfare. The labour market is
installed as a means of allocation, but is a dominating tool of demand of
labour. The norm of people to work creates an asymmetrical position
concerning power and flexibility in the labour market.
The labour market as an integral part of the capitalistic system discriminates

people as being effectively depended on the demand for labour. As a
consequence of the unequal distribution of capital (as a means of production)
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people are effectively depended upon executing their actions in an
economically productive way, by entering and offering their work at the labour
market. The system does not deal with the problem of recognition that people
desire to achieve. The hurdle of recognition that people face in the economic
system has large cultural influences. However, cultural problems or injustices
are not elaborated on here1, the paper limits to a discussion of economically
related problems. The relation of cultural and economic problems is not
exclusive, but the scope of analysis is in the capitalist labour market and the
welfare system. The above-mentioned points are analysed in 2.1 with respect
to the welfare system and in 2.3 it is shown in how far UBI provides an
improvement of economic rights.
II. The Insufficiency of the Welfare System
This section demonstrates the insufficiency of the welfare system2 with

respect to the labour market (2.1) and after providing justifications for an UBI
(2.2), illustrates how an UBI transcends these (2.3).
2.1 Welfare has Failed Well
The welfare system is mostly concerned with full employment. This full-
employment aim is not a necessity for both, a functioning economy and state.
States shall give up acting for the end of maximizing employment for
employments sake. The conditions for a policy of a full employment economy
are not fulfilled anymore (Elster, 1988) Up to now, policy as unemployment
schemes can be characterised as reactive policies activated in the case of
1
Cultural injustices that for instance Fraser (1997) mentions include domination,
nonrecognition and disrespect.
2
here ‘welfare system’ refers to the political economy of the European Union.
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misfortune. There has to be a way to reduce or eliminate risks in the labour
market. The most significant risk for an individual is ‘unemployment’, even
though the demand for labour is quantitatively decreasing, because of
mechanization (Elster, 1988).
Western European economy is characterised by an increasing automation

implicitly including a decreasing amount of manual work needed. Work ethic
has to be thought outside the identification through the market, which the state
provides. Work defined by the labour market as economic productivity
reduces actions of humans to their economic value and impact. Because work
is a main activity people pursue in their life, this influences self-esteem and
identity. The welfare system up to now recognizes some economically
independent activities as valuable, for instance the upbringing of children, and
grants this by financial transfers to parents. Yet, it is prescribing in a
paternalistic way justifications for an economically unproductive phase. The
underlying assumption of this policy, the aim of full-employment is not needed
for a productive economy anymore.
‘Post-productivists’1 claim that economy can be sustained below full-

employment (Elster, 1988). This does mean that there is no economic
necessity in ‘full-employment’ and that this aim is irrational. Growth for
growth’s sake as well as full employment is becoming redundant. One main
argument for economic growth is to keep employment and reduce
unemployment. Perhaps, a possibility of tackling the problem of
unemployment present in European states is to change the semantics of the
term employment. For that a change in the economic rights of the individual in
the labour market has to take place.
There is a high correlation of identity gained through work and the recognition
received from the execution of that work in western society. In the capitalist
economy the value of an activity is determined by its value in the labour
market as well as its instrumental value or its degree of productivity and
1
a group of heterodox economists thinking ‘ahead of bigger is better’ , see Gobin (2001).
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scarcity. Value is linked to individual recognition on the labour market. The
problem is that people who do not have an employment relation have to face
negative recognition. This negative recognition can be received, because of
risk, which is not influenced by the individual. Unemployment is a highly
unfavourable position in terms of recognition in society. Unemployment is a
form of social exclusion and entails a social stigma if people are paid by
welfare, because of the recognition of being ‘unproductive’ and ‘worthless’
(McKinnon, 2003). This is not in accordance of an equal opportunity of
promoting self-respect. Being “unemployed” recognizes those citizens that do
not act accordingly to the labour market values. Anxiety is a phenomenon that
arises because of the fear of unemployment.
Fraser (2001) argues that the main injustices of the economic system are
exploitation and marginalization. How to tackle these problems? One
possibility, as already outlined before (1.5), is to increase individual economic
rights. Farrelly (1999) provides data that a market society does not need to be
as exploitative as today. Marginalization, as the other main problem can be
tackled by providing a basis for recognition outside the paradigm of
employment sketched above and in 1.5. Perhaps, another argument for both
decreasing exploitation and marginalization is the introduction of an UBI. Is
UBI a possibility to overcome some of the problems the welfare state has to
face? The main arguments for and against an UBI are outlined in the
following.
2.2 Justification and Viability of UBI
There are four arguments here used to justify the introduction of an UBI in the
scope of the EU.1Followed by the justification, two problems concerning UBI
are outlined before evaluating consequences of an UBI (2.3).
1
For more information about the viability please see Meuris (2008).
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An UBI1 promotes the value of fraternity. The egalitarian argument concerning
UBI is its fraternal payment, which does neither discriminate nor differentiate.
Van Parijjs (1995) argues that society owes a right to its members of a (fair)
stake of primary goods to pursue a conception of the good. This can be seen
as a condition of equal opportunity to pursue esteem, what Fraser (2001) is
concerned with as justice. In this respect, Van Parijjs builds up his notion of
an UBI upon Rawls identification of primary goods as the main constituents of
a fulfilled life. The increased freedom from the labour market, for instance, is
another prominent argument.
UBI increases liberty in society. Members of society gain freedom as

economic autonomy from an UBI. Rawlsians argue that people would choose
an UBI in the original position and therefore consider it just. This hypothetical
argument is grounded as follows. Rawls assumes that the threat or risk of
poverty is so substantially influencing decision making that focus in the
original position lies on this particular component. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that the notion of risk and the importance of redistribution is
a part of the Rawlsian theory. Rawls fundament is the belief that people fear
the position of the worst-off the most. Therefore, it seems rational to make this
position as attractive as possible, by providing an UBI as insurance against
risk.
UBI serves as an insurance against risk. UBI minimizes risk and equalizes the
distribution. In this respect, Rawls concludes that people indeed act in the
original position in the way that the worst-off’s position is maximized, as stated
in part (a) of the difference principle (1971, pp. 17-19). Rawls's framework is
used by van der Veen (2004) and van Parijs (1995) to argue for a BI. Still, by
using Rawls as a theory one problem arises, as there is no difference made
between choices people made freely and those by natural and social
disadvantage. Rawls tries to mitigate unjust effects but also provides a
legitimate framework for people in society with a preference for leisure
compared to productive work for society. This means that reciprocal
1
UBI here is an abbreviation for Van Parijs’s (1995) proposal of a basic income and does not
refer to capital proposals, as for instance promoted by Ackerman & Alstott (1999)
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does not take place, as people perceive unequal contribution to the common
good. Therefore, Rawls reacted to criticism made by Musgrave (1974) and
Harsanyi (1975) by including leisure as a primary good.1
An interesting approach of showing if an UBI is justified is the test in an

empirical study. Empirically spoken people both prefer an UBI and consider it
just in a Rawlsian social contract setup, the original position. It is not that
people choose Maximin distributions, as postulated by Rawls (1971) as fair
and just. In fact, the experiments show that people tend to a solution where
the average distribution is maximized. However, there is a condition that has
to be fulfilled for this choice. If and only if there is a certain floor above zero,
which is not undermined by any value of the distribution, people choose the
maximizing average income solution. Empirically spoken Oppenheimer,
Frohlich and Eavey (1987) show that people do not choose the Maximin
distribution. Subsequent studies showed comparable results.2 The empirical
outcome legitimates the instalment of an UBI, if considered as a data for the
argument that an UBI is just. It also indicates that people consider a
distribution where existential financial risk is minimized. The preferred
distribution has no existential risk that people have to bear, as even the worst
off is in a position that makes a basic but decent life feasible, exactly what is
proposed by the installation of an UBI.
UBI promotes justice as redistribution and recognition as defined by Fraser

(2001). Justice as equality of opportunity to pursue self-esteem is satisfied by
an UBI. This is attained by redistribution of primary goods and risks. Natural
primary goods are beyond human control, but social primary goods are
controllable and should be distributed in a just way (Rawls, 1971, p.181). The
redistribution with UBI leads to a risk-free economic floor. With this floor
people have both to a ‘starting gate equality’ after exiting the educational
1
For an elaborate application of the ‘leisure trade-off’ to UBI please see Van Parijs (1991).
2
For instance Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1993).
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sector and an increased possibility to pursue recognition (Wright, 2002). UBI
is actively enforcing recognition as self-respect in the Rawlsian definition (cf.
p9). Self respect with an UBI is derived from both recognition and a resource
base (Cohen, 1989). UBI is promoting an equality of recognition of citizens
and equality of resources leading to more self-respect. However, the
introduction of an UBI still has some problems to face.
Two problems are discussed here in terms of a viability of an UBI. The most
challenging problem of the installation of an UBI is financing. In the scope of
this paper it is assumed building up on Meuris (2008) that European welfare
states indeed can afford an UBI. The factual viability does not mean that the
redistribution is legitimized. In fact, through tax schemes like income tax and
heritage tax, people with high financial wealth redistribute their means. This is
often justified by the deontological argument of value of fraternity. Also, the
utilitarian approach of arguing that marginal freedom as autonomy and
equality of opportunity is higher for a person with less material means that for
the one financing it, is a frequent rebuttal. Yet, all justifications have
shortcomings and are controversially discussed. Also, an UBI has to provided
in the way that the assumptions of increasing justice can be fulfilled.
UBI has to be provided in a way that truly minimizes risks for individuals. The
capital ‘lump-sum’ solution proposed by Ackerman and Alstott (1999) is not
suitable with decreasing impact of risk. Some people can spend their capital
in a long-run irrational and unfavourable way and would have a grave
economical disadvantage and recognition bias to face. To however, not limit
the autonomy of citizens, under certain conditions, e.g. college financing or
starting a business, government shall provide the opportunity to adjust the
income to an accumulated capital sum. The most attractive argument for an
UBI is presented in the next paragraph. Increasing justice with an installation
of UBI is a very good ground to promote an UBI. In the following it is shown in
how far an UBI can achieve this in accordance to justice as defined in the first
section.
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2.3 Consequences of an UBI as a Solution for Welfare Insufficiency
Talking about consequences of an UBI, there is the problem of some

methodological and epistemological tumbling stones lying ahead. The remark
is made that the predictions of people acting in the economic system are
made ceteris paribus. This assumption, however, faces the problem that the
system as a whole changes, so one can assume that the behaviour of the
people in the system changes as well. The predictions made now are made
with the assumption that people tomorrow, ex post an UBI introduction,
behave as people today, ex ante an UBI introduction.
Lister (2001) makes the proposition of an active welfare state, including risk
protection, redistribution and recognition. Combined with Holzmann &
Jorgensen’s (1999) approach of risk protection and risk management, it is
shown in the following in how far an UBI fulfils these criteria and transcends
the shortcomings identified in 2.1, leading to a more just society.
Concerning risk distribution and minimizing impact of risks, UBI is an

improvement compared to welfare. Welfare is mostly concerned with
insurance as risk-protection, whereas UBI increases the scope to more
recognition and risk management. As Standing (2002) points out, protection
can be executed as a means of liberation. In welfare there is a focus, nearly
exclusively on risk compensation based on labour contribution. This shall
change into a liberated protection as a citizen. UBI seems a means that can
provide a transition towards this. Also an UBI shall be installed in the way that
recognition is promoted as most as possible.
UBI promotes recognition, if citizens accept it as an economic egalitarian

right. Under this assumption, there is a parity of participation and a possibility
for citizens to interact and be recognized as peers (Fraser, 2001). This is
achieved as both the harm1 of unemployment and risk is minimized (cf 1.3).
So, after an introduction of UBI people can concentrate on recognition and are
less influenced by existential anxiety. What Fraser postulates as justice is
18 
 
achieved, because there is a parity of participation and a possibility for
citizens to interact and be recognized as peers under equal opportunity
(Fraser, 2001). UBI is installed as an economic right transcending the notion
of insurance and protection into a state of economic recognition and
opportunity. The important difference to welfare is that UBI is paid as a right,
without being influenced by past or current contribution to society. The
recognition, which can be achieved with the transformation into a UBI has
major consequences on the welfare system and the labour market, of which
three are outlined in turn.
UBI leads to major consequences concerning the labour market as a whole.

The introduction of an UBI may change the paradigm of the labour market as
asymmetrical institution of exchange internally into a market beyond mere
economic forces. As the fundamental idea of the UBI is that people do not
have to work, the economic incentive to work would shift to satisfying wants
and desires. The amount of people choosing unattractive jobs characterized
by low payments and bad working conditions would dramatically decrease.
UBI is a coherent way of reducing unemployment without the necessity of
economic growth (van Parijs, 1995). Also, the most substantial risk of the
labour market, unemployment, changes some of its consequences. The
labour market is entered in a way reflecting the value of self respect. UBI is a
gate to justice in the sense that the boundaries of economic productivity are
broken, so that recognition and accomplishment beyond the umbrella of
productivity is possible. This leads to changed terms of exchange at the
labour market.
With an UBI, the power of the supply of labour at the market is increased. The
labour market is entered with a basic set of economic rights. People are
equipped with some financial resources, which strengthens their position.
With this they are not solely trading their fruits of labour, but with some basic
capital, there is a more equal balance in the market achieved. Some
dependencies of suppliers of labour are broken down. Most importantly there
1
as proposed as the greatest injustice by Fraser (2001), cf.1.5.
19 
 
is an increased bargaining power of the supply side (Wright, 2002). Also,
there is an increased power of people to reject offers of the demand side,
because the risk of unemployment weakened and the long-term search for
appropriate jobs practically possible. An UBI gives people the effective
freedom to quit and change jobs without opposing values grounding one’s
self-respect (McKinnon, 2003). There is no loss in self-respect because of the
economic necessity of taking a job, which provides misrecognition. The UBI
can be used for many different purposes, an UBI is an ‘all-purpose means’
(Rawls, 1971, pp. 187-190). The UBI can be used in a three-dimensional way
of stake of resources, means to execute capabilities and increasing power of
suppliers of labour, while entering the market. This goes beyond the concept
of working to fulfil the most basic needs.
The term employment is defined differently. Paid work changes the meaning,
as it not necessary anymore to work in order to fulfil decent basic needs. UBI
provides access to basic needs independently of sale of labour. Non-material
rewards of labour are strengthened, as for instance respect and esteem,
leading to a higher degree of self-respect. Recognition is received from work
that people choose with more autonomy and independency with respect to
economic concerns. It is possible to take a break in-between paid jobs, as the
independence from job offers increases. The meaning of work and the
definition of valuable work changes. The meaning of work is extended and
broadened (Fraser, 2001). People are free to contribute to non-commoditized
forms of activities, beyond the necessity to be economically productive and
with that broadening the value of a job. Activities can be socially-productive,
or not directly productively at all. For instance, non-commoditized forms of
engagement become possible in the arts, politics and other fields (Wright,
2002). Additionally Wright remarks that for engagement or action to be
individually viable, an employment relation has not necessarily to be entered.
20 
 
Conclusion
UBI is both a legitimate and viable possibility of a political reform. There is a

grounded philosophical justification providing argumentative warrants for a
practical implementation of an UBI. In contemporary Risk Society justice as
redistribution and recognition can be promoted by minimizing risks and
promoting recognition through economic rights. UBI distributes risks more
equally and minimizes negative impacts of risks of the labour market. It offers
the possibility to both promote recognition by an egalitarian financial basis and
freedom as autonomy. UBI is increasing justice by giving means to a parity of
participation, a possibility for citizens to interact and to be recognized as
peers. It promotes recognition by equal right to pursue social esteem and
respect. Besides increasing justice as redistribution and recognition, an UBI
has favourable consequences, which transcend shortcomings of the welfare
system.
As far as predictable, the consequences of an UBI for the labour market are
both socially and economically constructive. The labour market system as a
whole as well as internal dynamics change. The positively changing terms of
exchange for people offering their work and the nature of employment are the
most significant consequences. As an UBI is both favoured by citizens and
considered just in accordance to Fraser & Honneth (2003), EU institutions
shall introduce it in the agenda of policymaking, as practically proposed by
Meuris (2008), among others. Further research should focus on the practical
proceedings of an implementation in the EU. Also the discourse about what
kind of UBI shall be focused on for practical suggestions.
21 
 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Fabian and Hilary for their helpful reviews and Nils for the
inspiration to delve in. This paper is dedicated to Sophie. In the end I would
also like to thank Goethe for his helpful remarks. “Science arose from poetry...
when times change the two can meet again on a higher level as friends’’ (J.W.
von Goethe).
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24 

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Risk, Redistribution and Recognition

Risk, Redistribution and

© Beverly Shipko, “Chocolate Cake”

University College Maastricht

I. Justice as Recognition and Redistribution 4

1.1 (Re)distribution of Risks and Recognition of Respect 4

1.2 Welcome Risk Society 6

1.3 Risks: Minimize Impact of Risks and Equalize Distribution 7

1.4 The Struggle for Recognition 9

1.5 Promote Recognition Through Economic Rights 10

II. The Insufficiency of the Welfare System 12

2.1 Welfare has Failed Well 12

2.2 Justification and Viability of UBI 14

2.3 Consequences of an UBI as a Solution for Welfare Insufficiency 18

Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a concept intuitively attracting interest

Conventionally the opus magnum of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice,

The theory of justice, as defined by Fraser & Honneth (2003), synthesized

The first section introduces justice as redistribution and recognition to warrant

I. Justice as Recognition and Redistribution

1.1 (Re)distribution of Risks and Recognition of Respect

Honneth (2001), among others, argues that humanity as subjectivity requires

Redistribution taken together with recognition regards justice as a two-

1.2 Welcome Risk Society

The nature of contemporary society is inherently risky. The impact of

1.3 Risks: Minimize Impact of Risks and Equalize Distribution

Distribution is a problem that arises because of the scarcity of the following

A substantial amount of risks is a consequence of social institutions.1 Socially

1.4 The Struggle for Recognition

The attempt to define recognition as the teleos of human existence is a very

Based upon self-respect and self-esteem, recognition is a means for identity.

1.5 Promote Recognition Through Economic Rights

As Fraser (2001) remarks, misrecognition takes place through social

Recognition can be achieved by tackling the following problems concerning

The labour market as an integral part of the capitalistic system discriminates

II. The Insufficiency of the Welfare System

This section demonstrates the insufficiency of the welfare system2 with

2.1 Welfare has Failed Well

Western European economy is characterised by an increasing automation

‘Post-productivists’1 claim that economy can be sustained below full-

2.2 Justification and Viability of UBI

UBI increases liberty in society. Members of society gain freedom as

An interesting approach of showing if an UBI is justified is the test in an

UBI promotes justice as redistribution and recognition as defined by Fraser

Talking about consequences of an UBI, there is the problem of some

Concerning risk distribution and minimizing impact of risks, UBI is an

UBI promotes recognition, if citizens accept it as an economic egalitarian

UBI leads to major consequences concerning the labour market as a whole.

UBI is both a legitimate and viable possibility of a political reform. There is a

Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society. London: Sage.

Bernstein, J. (2005) Suffering Injustice:Misrecognition as Moral Injury in

Cohen, J. (1989). Democratic equality. Ethics. 99, 727–51.

Farrelly, C. (1999). Justice and a Citizens’ Basic Income. Journal of Applied

Fraser, N. (1997).Justice Interruptus: Rethinking Key Concepts of a

Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. (2003). Umverteilung oder Anerkennung. Eine

Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. (2003a). Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-

Frohlich, N. & Oppenheimer, J. N. (1993). Choosing Justice: An Experimental

Giddens, A. (1994). Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity Press

Holzmann, R., & Jorgensen, S. (1999). Social Protection as Social Risk

Honneth, A. (2001). Recognition or Redistribution?: Changing Perspectives on

Kompridis, N. (2007). Struggling over the Meaning of Recognition. European

Lister, R. (2001). Towards a Citizens’ Welfare State: The 3 + 2 ‘R’s of Welfare

Luhmann, N. (2000). Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and

Meuris, M.A. (2008). Proposal for a European Basic Income. A European

McKinnon, C. (2003). Basic Income, Self-Respect and Reciprocity. Journal of