GR 139405 March 13, 2001People of the Philippines vs Arturo F.

Pacificador
FACTS:On October 27, 1988, Arturo Pacificador, the Chairman of the Board of the
NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation, was charged before the Sandiganbayan
with thecrime of violation of RA 3019 aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
During theperiod of December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, together with Jose
Marcelo, thePresident of Philippine Smelters Corporation, he caused the sale,
transfer andconveyance of the rights, titles and interests over parcels of land owned
by NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation to Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
where JosePanganiban Plant is located. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation is a
government-owned corporation and received only P85,144.50 as consideration for
the sale. Thiscaused injury to the Government because real fair market value of the
lands wereP862,150.00. The Deed of Sale for was executed on December 29, 1975.
Pacificador stated that the prosecution of the crime has already prescribed since
counting from theregistration of the Deed of Sale (or execution of such), the filing of
action against himshould have prescribed. He further contends that during
December 29, 1975, there wasa constructive notice to the world of such registration
and this should be tantamount toconcealing his crime during that day and not on
May 13, 1988 when the complaint wasfiled by the Solicitor General with the
PCGG.ISSUE: Whether or not the prescription of the offense committed by
Pacificador shall runfrom the date the Deed of Sale was executed.RULING: YES. The
date of prescription shall run from the day the crime was committedand if that date
is unknown, the date of discovery should be used as the reckoningpoint. In this
case, since the land was transferred and presumably registered onDecember 29,
1975 when the perpetrators are already aware of their own crimes, thereckoning
point should be that day. The Deed of Sale when registered constitutes anotice to
the whole world, including the petitioner, of its contents, as well as all interests,legal
and equitable. All persons are charged with the constructive knowledge of whatit
contains despite no actual knowledge on their part
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS V. COURT OF APPEALS
254 SCRA 220
FACTS:
The subject lot of this case was formerly classified as timberland until the
time it was reclassified by the government as public land. Petitioners were then
authorized to survey land, for purposes of subdivision into residential lots.
Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceedings including the subject lot.
Petitioner intervened and said that instead of being paid through money, it
preferred acquisition of any housing area of NHA. Upon learning of the annulment
of the title over the same land, the NHA sought the suspension of the expropriation
proceedings. Thereafter, the SC finally resolved by annulling the title and
declaring the subject lot to be public land. The Bureau was furnished of the
decision and according to an investigation, members of the petitioner was found
settling in the land. A Presidential proclamation was then issued reserving the
entire subject land for a slum improvement project of the NHA. This led to the
rejection of the survey submitted by petitioner and the demolition of the
settlement constructed by members of the petitioner. This prompted petitioner to
file a case for forcible entry on which the trial court decided in its favor.
During the pendency of the civil case, a special patent was issued for the entire

subject land. The petitioner sought the execution of decision, which was countered
by a case for quieting of title by the NHA.
HELD:
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain
the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. As
such, injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent
remedy to be used cautiously, as it affects the respective rights of the
parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme
necessity.
NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for
forcible entry; the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel
of land.
Republic v. Umali
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could even be more numerous and complex than they are now
and possibly more abrasive if not even violent.
Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago
on 12:24 PM in Case Digests, Civil Law 0
G.R. No. 151440, June 17, 2003
- free patents issued over private lands are not valid
- difference between direct attack and collateral attack on title
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Santiago and Magdalena Sanchez are the original owners of the
parcel of land in dispute (Lot No. 2344). Simplicio Santiago purchased the land from
his father, Pablo (one of Spouses Santiago's sons) and brother, Guillermo. After
acquiring the same, he then applied for a free patent over it on May 6, 1983, which
free patent was granted, thus, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in his name.
On the other hand, Mariano Santiago contended that Lot No. 2344 was subdivided
into three portions: Lot 2344-A, Lot 2344-B, and Lot 2344-C. Simplicio and his heirs
owned only Lot 2344-B, and Lots 2344-A and 2344-C were fraudelently included in
the free patent and certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago. Mariano testified
that he and his sister bought Lot 2344-A from Simplicio Santiago for the price of Php

5,000.00, as evidenced by a deed of sale dated Sept. 15, 1972. Immediately after
sale, they constructed a house on the lot.
The trial court ruled in favor of Simplicio's heirs and held that Mariano's claim over
the controverted lot lacks basis and that his defense consitutes a collateral attack
on the validity of a Torrens title.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago are
valid
(2) W/N respondents' claim over Lots 2344-C and 2344-A is supported by the
evidence
(3) Indefeasibility of Torrens Title
HELD:
First Issue: Validity of Free Patent
A free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal
effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land - as when there is a prima facie proof
of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous
occupants - is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land law applies only to lands of the public domain.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes
of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered
by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
It was established that Lot 2344 is a private property of the Santiago clan since time
immemorial, and that they have declared the same for taxation.
Also, considering the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. Hence, the free patent
covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto, are void.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence of Claim of Ownership
Respondents' claim of ownership over Lot 2344-C and Lot 2344-A is fully
substantiated. Their open, contnuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of Lot
2344-C in the concept of owners for more than seventy years supports their
contention that the lot was inherited by Mariano from his grandmother Marta. This
was corroborated by respondents' witnesses. It is worthy to note that although Lot

2344-C was within the property declared for taxation purposes by the late Simplicio
Santiago, he did not disturb the possession of Marta and Mariano.
Lot 2344-C was sold by Simplicio Santiago to Mariano Santiago and Belen Sanchez.
The document of sale evidencing the transaction is duly notarized and, as such, is
considered a public document and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its
authenticity and due execution. This legal presumption was not overcome by
petitioners.
Third Issue: Indefeasibility of Torrens Title
A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of
title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under theh Land Registration
Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after
the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. The date of
the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree.
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the
action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible.
Inasmuch as respondents are in possession of the disputed portions of Lot 2344,
their action to annul the Original Certificate of Title, being in the nature of an action
to quiet title, is therefore not barred by prescription.
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or
canceled except in a direct proceeding. The attack is direct when the object of an
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.
In the case at bar, the original action filed was accion publiciana or recovery of
possession, but the Court may rule on the validity of the free patent and the OCT
because of the counterclaim filed by respondents. A counterclaim can be considered
a direct attack on the title, not a collateral attack.
FELICIANO vs. ZALDIVAR
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
FELICIANO vs. ZALDIVAR
G.R. No. 162593
September 26, 2006

FACTS: Feliciano filed against the spouses Aurelio and Luz Zaldivar a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title and reconveyance of the subject
property in Cagayan de Oro City. The said title is registered in the name of Aurelio
Zaldivar.
In her complaint,Feliciano alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by a TCT. Sometime in 1974, Aurelio, allegedly through fraud, was able
to obtain a TCT covering the portion of Felicianos lot as described in her TCT.
According to Feliciano, the subject lot was originally leased from her by Pio Dalman,
Aurelios father-in-law. She further alleged that she was going to mortgage the
subject lot to Ignacio Gil which however, did not push through because Gil took back
the money without returning the receipt she had signed as evidence of the
supposed mortgage contract. Thereafter, in 1974, Aurelio filed with the then CFI of
Misamis Oriental a petition for partial cancellation of theTCT in Felicianos name. It
was allegedly made to appear therein that Aurelio and his spouse Luz acquired the
subject lot from Dalman who, in turn, purchased it from Gil. The petition was
granted and a TCT was issued in Aurelios name.
Remegia denied that she sold the subject lot either to Gil or Dalman. She likewise
impugned as falsified the joint affidavit of confirmation of sale that she and her
uncle, Narciso Labuntog, purportedly executed before a notary public, where
Remegia appears to have confirmed the sale of the subject property to Gil. She
alleged that she never parted with the certificate of title and that it was never lost.
As proof that the sale of the subject lot never transpired, Remegia pointed out that
the transaction was not annotated on her TCT.
In their answer, the spouses Zaldivar denied the material allegations in the
complaint and raised the affirmative defense that Aurelio is the absolute owner and
possessor of the subject lot as evidenced by his TCT and Tax Declaration covering
the same. Aurelio claimed that he acquired the subject lot by purchase from Dalman
who, in turn, bought the same from Gil on April 4, 1951. Gil allegedly purchased the
subject lot from Remegia and this sale was allegedly conformed and ratified by the
latter and her uncle, Narciso Labuntog, before a notary public on December 3, 1965.
After Aurelio obtained a loan from the GSIS, the spouses Zaldivar constructed their
house on the subject lot. They alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been occupying the said property openly, publicly, adversely and continuously
for over 41 years already. Aurelio filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of because when he asked Remegia about it, the latter claimed that
it had been lost.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Remegia. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the spouses Zaldivar. When their MR was
denied by the CA, the heirs of Feliciano (the petitioners) sought recourse to the
Court in their petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred:

1. in ruling that the court who ordered the issuance of new certificate of title despite
existence of owners duplicate copy that was never lost has jurisdiction over the
case.
2. in concluding that the respondents (defendants-appellants) are the absolute
owners of the subject lot based on the TCT issued to them.
3. in concluding that petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot was barred
by estoppel or laches.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision RTC of Cagayan de Oro City is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioners are likewise ordered to exercise the option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
1. YES. As the trial court correctly held, the CFI which granted respondent Aurelios
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy did not acquire jurisdiction
to issue such order. It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of
loss of the original certificate. In such a case, the decision authorizing the issuance
of a new owners duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time
2. YES. The court a quo correctly nullified the TCT in Aurelios name, emanating as it
did from the new owners duplicate, which Aurelio procured through fraud.
The appellate courts reliance on the joint affidavit of confirmation of sale
purportedly executed by Remegia and her uncle, Narciso Labuntog, is not proper. In
the first place, respondent Aurelio cannot rely on the joint affidavit of confirmation
of sale to prove that they had validly acquired the subject lot because, by itself, an
affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Moreover, the affidavit is written
entirely in English, the hearing revealing that Feliciano does not understand English.
On this point, Article 1332 of the Civil Code is relevant:
ART.1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained
to the former.
If the person enforcing the contract fails to discharge this burden, the presumption
of mistake, if not, fraud, stands unrebutted and controlling. The bare statement of
Atty. Velez (testified for the Zaldivar spouses) that he read and interpreted the
document to the affiants and that he asked them as to the correctness of its
contents does not necessarily establish that Remegia actually comprehended or
understood the import of the joint affidavit of confirmation of sale

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. A claim of acquisitive
prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land.
Moreover, respondent Aurelio cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of [his] title
because the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud
attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for
fraud. As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled.
3. As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right
to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches
Nonetheless, the Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondents had built their
house on the subject lot and, despite knowledge thereof, Remegia did not lift a
finger to prevent it. Article 453 of the Civil Code is applicable to their case:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built,
planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such
land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in
good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the
act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
Under the circumstances, respondents and Remegia are in mutual bad faith and, as
such, would entitle the former to the application of Article 448 of the Civil Code
governing builders in good faith:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 54629 and 548,30
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after the proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof.
Following the above provision, the owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of
the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure
luxury or mere pleasure.

Consequently, the petitioners are obliged to exercise either of the following options:
(1) to appropriate the improvements, including the house, built by the respondents
on the subject lot by paying the indemnity required by law, or
(2) sell the subject lot to the respondents.
Petitioners cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel respondents to
remove their house from the land. In case petitioners choose to exercise the second
option, respondents are not obliged to purchase the subject lot if its value is
considerably more than the improvements thereon and in which case, respondents
must pay rent to petitioners. If they are unable to agree on the terms of the lease,
the court shall fix the terms thereof