20160214-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council - APPEAL-15-2502-ADDRESS To The COURT-Supplement 1

Page 1 AP 2502 ADDRESS TO THE COURT Suppl 1, Hearing date 22-2-2016 (or alternative date if allocated)
ADDRESS TO THE COURT (Written submissions) Supplement 1

County Court of Victoria
Ballarat venue (and/or alternative venue)
Cc:
Elliott Stafford and Associated

lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
County Court of Victoria crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Reference AP 2502 Buloke Shire Council for State of Victoria (s114 of the constitution) v Schorel-Hlavka
Sir/Madam,
as I maintained all along an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION I submit no hearing
De Novo can eventuate. What however ought to be understood is that any adjournment at this
stage to allow for further submissions regarding the jurisdictional issue would in itself be a denial
of justice as it would cause further protracted litigation which should have been avoided from
onset. After all Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives were aware about the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud
commenced its hearings on 20 August 2015, and as such they had ample of time to prepare and
present a case if they sought to do so to prove jurisdiction. This never eventuated and again it
would be a gross denial of justice if the court were to adjourn matters to give them time where
they had ample of time already. As such their failure to present evidence to prove jurisdiction
can only but result that this court must declare that the Magistrates Court of Victoria at st Arnaud
did not invoke jurisdiction on 20 August 20125 and neither on 17 September 2015 and all and
any orders of 20 August 2015 and 17 September 2015 are set aside as they have no legal validity
in law. By this the County Court of Victoria neither can invoke jurisdiction and cannot hear the
matter De Novo as the summons that was before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud
must be held to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and as such no matter is there for the court
to hear De Novo.
In light of this I submit the court must deem it appropriate to order exemplary damages in
favour of the objector (which I am), by this also considering the conduct of Buloke Shire Council
and its legal representatives to blatantly disregard proper compliance with legal requirements and
by this causing unduly protraction of litigation and in the process harm upon the objector.
1 "When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes
expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." [Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633
F.2d 844, cert. den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326]
2 "A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to
immunity from civil action for his acts." [Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)]
3 "When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction
requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision
made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction." [Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576,
64 So. 2d 697]
4 "No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it
beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence." [Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard
506 (1859)]
5 We (judges) have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution."
[Cohen v. Virginia, (1821), 6 Wheat. 264 and U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200]
The following correspondence shows we are not referring to a mere oversight, but a persistent
conduct to defy the court rules, and even court orders, and to deceive/seeking to deceive the court
as well as myself.
p1
14-2-2016
Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue
Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. 107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria admin@inspector-rikati.com
(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers
QUOTE 14-2-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
Elliott Stafford and Associated
14-2-2016
lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au
Cc:
Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J. judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Mr Wayne Wall & Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
Ref; 20160214-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06- -Re APPEAL-15-2502 Re NO CASE TO ANSWER
Sir/Madam,
Without seeking to imply that my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION will be dismissed, I am
well aware that judges at times may act in a manner not expected and/or not legally justified but that
may be the issue of a judicial review, etc. As such, were the court to proceed with any De Novo hearing
then I pursue the NO CASE TO ANSWER claim
See also eg Glass, McHugh and Douglas, The Liability of Employers, 2nd ed (1979) at 204-217; Glass, "The
Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer" (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 842.
Some of the issues but not in any of priority

OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
Fire Prevention Notice in violation to the provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958
Fire Prevention Notice contains demands exceeding delegated powers.
Fire prevention Notice in valid in law
Infringement Notice invalid in law based on invalid Fire prevention Notice.
Summons invalid in law based on Invalid Infringement Notice.
Summons invalidly issues as Infringement Noticed failed to have been withdrawn.
Summons hearing in the wrong court venue
Failure to serve full brief
No evidence to prove jurisdiction.
No evidence whatsoever to justify 20 August 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
No evidence to legally justify 17 September 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
Failing to file and serve Notice of Appearance regarding appeal
Failing to file and serve for Leave to file and serve out of time Notice of Appearance
Failure to provide 27 October 2015 requested brief
Failing to comply with 30/10/2015 order to serve via Australia Post by 9/11/2015 full brief
Failing to request leave to serve out of time full brief.
Providing misleading Form 11 statement dated 25/11/2015 re 18/3/2013 alleged hearing
Provide different Form 11 for 22/2/2016 hearing without full brief
Failure by State Government to provide relevant FOI material requested 9/12/2015
Not to overlook purported evidence obtained by tress passing! As such no evidence exist to support any
charge!
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.
Awaiting your response,
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL (Our name is our motto!)

END QUOTE 14-2-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2498.html
R v LEVAN URUSHADZE [2008] EWCA Crim 2498
QUOTE
The failure of the prosecution to comply with the rules, even before the start of the adjourned retrial
was, in our view, unacceptable. Whether or not to entertain a late application, and whether to refuse it on
the grounds of lateness or the prejudice asserted, was a matter for the discretion of the learned judge.
END QUOTE
This purported hearing De Novo on 22 February 29016 has the same kind of problems!
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Appeal 15-2502
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1634.html
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
R v Hassett [2008] EWCA Crim 1634
QUOTE
18. The first of the submissions made with the utmost eloquence to this court by Mr Topolski QC (who did not
appear at the trial but who represents Kevin today) is that the Recorder fell into legal error in the passage of
her ruling to which we have referred. He submits that, having found the delay to be "unacceptable", the
Recorder put that on one side. Having described it as "not the test I must apply", she went on to consider
the interests of justice and prejudice separately from the finding of unacceptable delay.
19. At this point it is important to remind ourselves of the basis upon which this court has power to interfere
with the decision of a trial judge on such matters. In the leading case of R v Hanson [2005] 2 Cr App 21
Rose LJ (the then Vice-President of the court) said at paragraph 15:
"If a judge has directed himself or herself correctly, this Court will be very slow to interfere with a ruling
either as to admissibility or as to the consequences of non-compliance with the regulations for the giving of
notice of intention to rely on bad character evidence. It will not interfere unless the judge's judgment as to
capacity of prior events to establish propensity is plainly wrong, or discretion has been exercised
unreasonably in the Wednesbury .... sense."
20. Before leaving the authorities it is instructive also to refer to the case of R(Robinson) v Sutton Coldfield
Magistrates' Court [2006] 2 Cr App R 13, where the Divisional Court was considering the power to extend
time conferred by rule 35.8. A submission had been made that such an extension should only be granted in
exceptional circumstances. The Divisional Court rejected that fetter on the discretion of the court,
preferring the formulation that in the exercise of its discretion the court must take account of all relevant
considerations, including the furtherance of the overriding objective. Owen J, with whom Hallett LJ agreed,
went on to say:
"15. In this case there were two principal material considerations: first the reason for the failure to comply
with the rules. As to that a party seeking an extension must plainly explain the reasons for its failure.
Secondly, there was the question of whether the claimant's position was prejudiced by the failure.
16. .... A party seeking an extension cannot expect the indulgence of the court unless it clearly sets out the
reasons why it is seeking that indulgence. But importantly, I am entirely satisfied that there was no
conceivable prejudice to the claimant ...."
21. Finally, in R v Musone [2007] 2 Cr App R 29, Moses LJ said:
"37. The Act .... gives power to the judge to prevent that which, in the judge's assessment might cause
incurable unfairness either to the prosecution or to a fellow defendant. Plainly, the procedural rules should
not be used to discipline one who has failed to comply with them in circumstances where unfairness to
others may be cured and where the interests of justice would otherwise require the evidence to be admitted.
But, there will be cases in which the judge can properly deploy [the provision], not merely as a matter of
discipline but to prevent substantial unfairness which cannot be cured by an adjournment."
Although that observation was not made specifically in relation to the bad character provisions, it is equally
germane to them.
22. The authorities have made clear on a number of occasions that the important task which falls on the trial
judge must be carried out with a very close scrutiny of all the circumstances to ensure that unfairness is
avoided.
23. Having regard to those legal propositions, which are common ground in this case, we return to Mr
Topolski's criticism, which is adopted by Mr Whitehouse on behalf of Richard, that the Recorder fell into
legal error by leaving the finding that the delay was unacceptable out of her consideration of the interests of
justice. In our judgment, that is not a sustainable submission. It depends on a pedantic interpretation of the
language used by the Recorder. It is plain to us that in the passage to which we have referred, the Recorder
carried out precisely the approach that had been referred to in Robinson when she said that the unacceptable
delay "is not the test". Plainly she meant that it was not the sole test. On the authorities that is abundantly
p3 14-2-2016 Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
clear. It was a factor. No one takes a kindly view of unexplained delay. It seems to us that, far from being
left out of her consideration, thereafter the Recorder took it into account; but when everything was put into
the scales she came to the conclusion that, following a consideration of possible prejudice, the interests of
justice came down in favour of the admission of the evidence. In our judgment that passage in the ruling
does not contain any legal error.
END QUOTE
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2006/152.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="leave%20to%20serve%20"out%20
of%20time"%20"
DPP v Hayden [2006] VSCA 152 (25 July 2006)
QUOTE
11 In OKeefe, the Full Court said:
"An applicant who has been dilatory or has acted in such a way as to indicate that he does not intend to
appeal has small if any claim to the exercise of the discretion of the Court in his favour. On the other hand, if
the applicant has acted promptly, his case will be considered very differently. Where there has been a long
delay the practice of the Court has not been to grant the extension sought unless it is clear that the decision is
attended with such doubt as to make it probable that the appeal will succeed." [18]
12 Winneke ACJ took a similar approach in R v Davis, when he said:
"It is to be emphasised that the courts decisions upon applications of this kind involve discretionary
considerations, and the longer the time which elapses between the closure of the statutory time limit and the
date of the application, the more exceptional will the circumstances have to be. Certainly the applicant must,
in any case, put forward material to demonstrate satisfactory reasons for the failure to comply with the time
and also to show, in the event that the time lapse is considerable (as it is in this case), that there are such
merits in the proposed appeal that it will probably succeed." [19]
13 Even where the time lapse is relatively short, as in the present case, we would still expect the Director to
file material showing that the appeal had sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave. As
appears later, no such material was filed.
END QUOTE
The following quotation while relating to contracts nevertheless likewise can apply to legal
requirements of filing and serving.
As was stated the anticipatory breach as fundamental and where it relates to legal practitioners
who charge ample to their clients because of being well professionals then surely the list of
failures listed above must be held as fundamental anticipatory breached which a competent lawyer
ought to have avoided, at the very least the numerous breaches listed above.
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1989/51.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=anz%20and%20volume%20and%20evi
dence%20and%20consider
Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385 (15 November 1989)
QUOTE
19. It was not necessary for the purchasers to show that the breach of the essential term was also a
fundamental breach in the sense in which that expression was explained by Lord Diplock in Afovos
Shipping Co. v. Pagnan & Flli (1983) 1 WLR 195, at p 203; (1983) 1 All ER 449, at p 455, before they
acquired a right to terminate the contract. However, if it were necessary to consider the question, I
would regard the anticipatory breach as fundamental. The law has traditionally treated completion on
the date fixed for completion, where time is of the essence, as being a matter of vital importance to the
parties.
END QUOTE
While this indicates numerous failures/breaches including a defiance of court orders of His
Honour Mullaly J of 30 October 2015 to serve by no later than 9 November 2015 via Australia
Post posting the full brief none was served upon me, as such, I am could expect that Buloke
Shire Council and its legal representatives for the State Government may seek the court to
nevertheless ignore all this. Hence, I have set out in this supplement 1 additional issues/details
and Authorities, and opposes any leave to be granted to file and/or serve out of time.
Despite my legally based objections I have nevertheless been forced to travel long distance to
attend to matters which clearly could have been avoided had Buloke Shire Council and/or its
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Appeal 15-2502
legal representatives and/or the State Government acted appropriately. I submit the court cannot
disregard the failure by them to act in a reasonable and appropriate manner and as set out below
by quotations are coming to court with dirty hands.
The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action denies any remedy to a litigant
(including a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
If your own action is very unlawful and very unethical, if you come to court with Dirty Hands
best not to question others legality, morality, and ethics!
Liability for Negligent Misrepresentation in the Finance Industry
Pauline Sadler
School of Business Law and Taxation
Curtin University of Technology
QUOTE
The history of the duty concept shows that the courts envisaged that there must be a nearness or closeness
between the parties, a relationship that Lord Atkin defined in his neighbour speech in Donoghue v
Stevenson.19 Lord Atkin said:20
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be person who are so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
END QUOTE
There ought to be no doubt that Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives, Mr Wayne
Wall, the Premier and the Attorney-General all ought to have been aware that their conductor
failing to act would/might inflict harm upon me. The question then is had there been errors that
were reasonable errors people ordinary engage in and were those errors remedied once they were
made aware of them. The amount of writings to the various persons can but only underline that
each and every one of them were alerted to certain errors. Each and every one of them simply
failed to take appropriate action to seek to redress any errors for so far this was within their
capacity. For example Mr Wayne wall could have withdrawn the Fire prevention Notice where
he was alerted to it being in violation to the provisions of the Country Fire Authority act 1958.
Likewise so Buloke Shire Council and so its councillors were notified and ought to have acted.
The legal representatives also should have checked out the Fire prevention Notice as to ascertain
from onset if the notice was valid in law. And even when they all failed to do so the Premier
and/or the Attorney-General could have taken over as in the end Municipal Fire Prevention
Officer was exercising its delegated powers. Despite the numerous writings by me about this and
numerous other issues there was a blatant disregard to address any or all of those failures. In fact
there was a continuation of failures. Granted that Buloke Shire Council and its legal
representatives didnt have to file a Notice of Appearance if they didnt desire to do so because
they abandoned their legal argument but then the Counsel should neither have appeared on 30
October 2015 before His Honour Mulally J!
As humans we all make errors and it is what we do afterwards gto appropriately address
that is relevant.
When ES&a lawyers claimed that it had the wrong form filed as to the Notice of Appearance, it
was in contrast to what the email of the court stated that was quoted in that email the send to me,
that there was no Notice of Appearance.
When Counsel for Buloke Shire Council was asked by His Honour Mullaly J about the full
brief Counsel came up with a fabricated answer that the request was received yesterday when
it was in fact on 27 October 2015. And, the full brief should have been on the record in view of
the 17 September 2015 hearing before the magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud.
His Honour Mullaly J (having been misled about the date of the request) ordered that by no later
than 9 November 2015 the full brief was to be posted via Australia Post. Again, Buloke Shire
Council could have decided to abandon the litigation and not do so but then it should have
notified me as the appellant. This it failed to do. Instead, it then fabricated a version of a full
brief with a form 11 that clearly related to 18 March 2013 hearing. This as if the alleged offence
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of 17 November 2014 was pre-listed for an 18 March 2013 hearing. Then when I notified AS&a
Legal Practitioners (as well as others) about the Form 11 having an 18 March 2013 hearing date
that was concocted the legal representatives for Buloke Shire Council then decided to replace the
Form 11 with one showing a date for 22 February 2016 hearing.
I do not accept that a full brief can be served out of time in such defective manner,
without any application for leave to serve out of time being pursued.
It is clear that by 25 November 2015 the full brief had not been posted via Australian Post on
or before 9 November 2015 and as such for Buloke Shire Council to maintain litigation against
me an Application for leave to serve out of time would have been required. Clearly no such
application, at least to my knowledge, was made let alone granted. Worse is that while a full
brief requires a Form 11 Buloke Shire Council legal representatives took it upon themselves to
decide that they only had to replace the Form 11 without a full brief. As such they were relying
upon an invalid alleged service to base a Form 11 replacement upon this instead of requesting
leave to serve out of time as to serve the entire full brief. I submit the lawyers realised that to
request for leave to serve out of time they likely wouldnt have a hope in the world to succeed
with this considering what had transpired before His Honour Mullaly J and my exposure of the
deceptive conduct by Counsel to claim yesterday.
As I had indicated in writing not to accept out of time service it is reasonable to assume that the
lawyers were well aware that any application for leave to serve out of time likely would be
denied. As such its course appears to me to be to totally ignore the requirement to seek leave to
serve out of time as they did with the failure to file and serve a Notice of appearance and just
see if the judge will go along with their rot. After all so far the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St
Arnaud did so with issuing orders without a shred of evidence to legally justify those orders.
It cannot be held that Buloke Shire Council (so its legal representatives) served me with a full
brief regarding the 22 February 2016 hearing, this because it purportedly provided me (didnt
serve) a mere Form 11 without any full brief itself.
I do not accept that an invalid bunch of papers provided to me regarding an 18 March 2013
purported hearing somehow can be deemed service where it was not even in compliance with
legislative provisions and/or the 30 October 2015 orders of His Honour Mullaly J. There is no
such thing as to swap some pages as to try to make it lawful. Either lawful service eventuated or
it didnt. As the Form 11 was signed on 25 November 2015 then clearly it was long before the 9
November 2015 last posting date, and this proves that no lawful service was affected. It cannot
turn an invalid delivery into a valid service merely by replacing the Form 11 with a different
court date and a different court name. My request related to the full brief that was before the
Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud on 20 August 2015 and/or 17 September 2015 and up
to this date has not been provided. Hence I am still unaware what precisely transpired before the
court as to what was on file before the court at the hearings. Neither was I served with any
full brief regarding the 22 February 2016 hearing as a separate form 11 is not a full brief.
Service must be in compliance to legal requirements unless the parties from time to time make
alternative arrangements. In regard of a court order it is defined and as I placed in writing my
objection not having been served as per orders of His honour Mullaly J it cannot be claimed that
I somehow accepted service regardless being out of time.
My elaborate writings exposed these issues time and time again, and if Mr Wayne Wall, Buloke
Shire Council and so its councillors, the lawyers, the Premier and/or the Attorney-General had
considered my writings then each and every one should/could have known that the litigation
against me had fatal errors and should have been abandoned.
When being a senior citizen as I am then time is of the essence and I should have been enjoyed
the time with my 83 year old ill wife better then to having to write time and time again trying to
get others to act appropriately. Their blatant disregard to do so and in the process misuse and
abuse the legal processes cannot be endorsed by this court. I should be able to enjoy my
retirement with my wife and not be subjected to this protracted vexatious litigation where if this
matter where to go for a full hearing, not that I view it should go that far, then it will be the
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Appeal 15-2502
informer rather than myself who will prove to be so to say the villain. Yet, despite my exposure
in my writings about this his conduct has persisted unabated and this may underline that this is
about power abuse and not about what is best for the general community.
Again, this is not some once of human error but rather appears to be a concerted deliberate
conduct to blatantly disregard the rules of the court as well as court orders and I submit that
exemplary damages are justified to be of the highest order to make clear that the courts
cannot tolerate this kind of perverting the course of justice.
It ought to be understood that the entire conduct of this matter by Buloke Shire Council and its
legal representatives as well as by the State Government has been utterly deplorable and caused
considerable time and expenses upon me to fight of the vexatious charge.
Without seeking to limit the scope of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION it ought to be
clear that where the Fire Prevention Notice in itself was in clear violation to the legal provisions
of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 and contained requirements not within the delegated
powers of the Municipal Fire Authority Officer then all and any charge must fail.
Any attendance by me is and would be under objection and is not intended and must not be
perceived that I waive any objections. Despite of my objection that the Ballarat venue of the
Country Court of Victoria is the wrong venue, I am force to attend. And despite my written
request for the physical address of the Ballarat venue none has been provided. It is not for
me to try to find it on the internet and then find it might be the wrong location. It was for the
court to provide me with the physical location of the Ballarat venue, this it failed to do.
The failure of any time table regarding the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION also means that
I have been denied for this also to prepare for any hearing, this as if the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION were to be (finally) upheld then there is no need to prepare for a hearing De
Novo. The denial by the State government to provide the requested relevant to these proceedings
FOI Act material means that the State government effectively is obstructing the course of justice
and preventing me in that regard also to prepare for any hearing.
It should be understood should that the litigation pursued against me that Buloke Shire Council if
on behalf of the State of Victorian regarding criminal proceedings and as such the lawyers for
Buloke Shire Council by this are acting in the capacity of being the Public Prosecutor.
It then is concerning (consider also the quotation below) that the lawyers forwarded their first
correspondence to me dated 10 June 2015 in which they concealed their contact details and
address of their office and stated:
QUOTE
If you have any queries or wish to make payment please contact Councils Local Laws Officer, Wayne Wall
on (03) 5478 0180
END QUOTE
In my view this conduct violate that of a Public Prosecutor (again see below quotation) as the
lawyers appear to be conducting the case as like a civil case representing Buloke Shire Council
as their client. And this basically is in the overall how it appears to me Buloke Shire Council
legal representatives have conducted themselves, to inappropriately deal with matters while
purporting to pursue criminal sanctions against me. Because Buloke Shire Council is acting
within delegated powers of the state government then as the High Court of Australia held in
Sydney City Council v Commonwealth 1904 the council was acting by delegated taxation
powers within s114 of the constitution as if the State itself. Likewise, the lawyers representing
Buloke Shire Council are actually to be impartial and should never have concealed their contact
details and address and neither refer to the Local Laws Officer as it was the Municipal Fire
Prevention Officer who was to exercise the delegated powers. While it may be one and the
same person occupying the positions nevertheless where ES&a Legal Practitioners represent
Local Laws Officer then this is regarding the so called Local by-laws of Buloke Shire
Council, whereas where it relates to the Municipal Fire Prevention officer than it has got
absolutely nothing to do with the Local law Officer as the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer is
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Appeal 15-2502
acting under the delegated powers of the State and then ES&a Legal Representatives are really
representing the State of Victoria with Mr Wayne Wall as the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer
being the informant.
Whereas a Local Laws Officer may or may not rely upon by-laws that are specific to a
shire/municipality the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer, albeit appointed by the
shire/municipality is in fact exercising State delegated powers, but within the Country Fire
Authority Act 1958 has no legal powers to create by-laws or stipulate conditions in violation to
the provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958.
As such, my submission is that Buloke Shire Council legal representatives have no legal standing
to litigate for and on behalf of the Local Laws Officer Mr Wayne Wall. As no local laws of
Buloke Shire Council were relevant to the issue, nor did Buloke Shire Council possess any
delegated powers to make such by-laws, neither could instruct its legal representatives as it is a
matter where the Municipal Fire prevention Officer acting under delegated powers of the state
government should have been the person to instruct the lawyers and any claimed payments
made payable to the state consolidated Revenue funds and not to Buloke Shire Council.
ES@a Legal Practitioners didnt present themselves to act for and on behalf of the State of
Victoria as its correspondence of 10 June 2015 refers to acting on behalf of Buloke Shire Council
regarding an unpaid Infringement Notice. The tone of the correspondence was to pay the fine and
not as to any fire danger per se. As such ES@a Legal Practitioners acted not as the Prosecutor
but as some Debt collection agency lawyers. And this much is reflected in its conduct in the
overall.
Because it relates to a criminal matter allegedly an offence against State legislation then any
payment demanded to be made to Buloke Shire Council in itself I submit is fraud, this as
payment must be made to the States Consolidated Revenue Funds.
http://lawyerslawyer.net/2012/03/01/prosecutors-obligations-in-criminal-and-disciplinary-cases/
QUOTE
A prosecutor is a minister of justice. The prosecutors principal role is to assist the court to arrive
at the truth and to do justice between the community and the accused according to law and the
dictates of fairness.
A prosecutor is not entitled to act as if representing private interests in litigation. A prosecutor
represents the community and not any individual or sectional interest. A prosecutor acts
independently, yet in the general public interest. The public interest is to be understood in that
context as an historical continuum: acknowledging debts to previous generations and obligations to
future generations.
QUOTE
As such my submission is that ES@a Legal Practitioners failed to act appropriately as a

Prosecutor ought to do. The courts ought to be the last resort and yet other than ES&a 10 June
2015 correspondence pursuing a payment it failed totally to seek to address the numerous issues I
had placed before Buloke Shire Council by then already.
It also ought to be questioned if Mr Wayne Wall was duly qualified to act for ES&a and if he is
the holder of a legal practitioners certificate as law officer for Buloke Shire Council. Also if he
has sufficient training in legal studies that he understands/comprehend the provisions of the
Country Fire Authority Act 1958 and the required legal pro visions. This in particular where Mr
Wayne Wall has continuously ac ted in violation of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 legal
provisions and by this caused/inflicted undue harm upon the objector.
The Hobsons Bay City Council case deals with a magistrate ordering cost but in relation to the
17 September 2015 orders by the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud there was not a
shred of evidence before the court to justify orders for cost, as the audio recording of the court
itself proves no evidence was presented.
p8
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Appeal 15-2502
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2010/386.html
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
QUOTE
COMMON LAW Appeal from Magistrates Court cost award in criminal proceeding Costs awarded
covered disbursements fees only - Review of discretionary judgments - Presumption in favour of the
correctness of the decision - Appellant must demonstrate a vitiating error of law - It was open to the
Magistrate to exercise his discretion in award of costs Consistency of cost awards - Proportionality of cost
awards - Magistrates Court Act 1989 s 131(1)
END QUOTE
QUOTE
6 After the Magistrate awarded costs in the sum of $180.80[1] he was asked to give reasons for his order. He
then stated:
The application for legal costs is refused on the basis that I think that theyre disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct. I believe weve had this discussion in the past Mr Prosecutor, but the
same reasons apply. It seems to me to be unfair to award costs based on the defendants bad luck in being
prosecuted by a council rather than by the police as a matter of principle, it cannot be or should not be the
defendant that incurs the additional liability of substantial costs based on who prosecutes. It strikes me as
unfair that an award of costs against the defendant when thieves, drug traffickers and other wrongdoers who
do far more harm than the defendant has, are not asked to pay costs. Additionally, citizens pay rates and taxes
for services, including the cost of prosecuting, supervising and imprisoning wrongdoers. It seems to me that
principle ought to apply to this prosecution as well and as I also say that the costs are disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct (sic). In the exercise of my discretion, the application for costs is
refused.[2]
END QUOTE
QUOTE
11 As counsel for the respondent emphasised, the latter part of s 131(1) emphasises the full power of the
Court to determine the question of costs.
12 The grounds of appeal allege that the Magistrate failed to exercise his discretion properly or at all, and in
the alternative that he purported to act for improper reasons and/or took into account irrelevant matters. In the
further alternative it is alleged that the Magistrate failed to take relevant considerations into account.
13 The fundamental question raised by the appeal is whether it was open to the Court to exercise its
discretion as it did. The general principles governing appeals from the exercise of discretion as to costs were
expressed by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth:[4]
..the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions
involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the
decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is
satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the
presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or
giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant
considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable,
but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer
that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first
instance: House v. The King[5]....
14 His Honour went on to endorse the following statement by Jordan CJ in Schweppes Limited v Archer:[6]
In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a
Taxing Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of
p9
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Appeal 15-2502
determining the principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining
whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is
involved, and the question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he
possesses and is purporting to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to
review the Taxing Officer's decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so
freely on a proper case, using its own knowledge of the circumstances, but it will in general interfere only
where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is
manifestly wrong; and where the question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case.
(Citations omitted)
15 In Urban No 1 Co-operative Society v Kilavus & Anor,[7] Hedigan J observed that in cases involving the
review of discretionary judgments there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision
appealed from and the general rule is that the decision should be affirmed unless the appellate court of review
is satisfied that it is clearly wrong.
16 In Kenyon v Drissen,[8] Ashley J (as he then was) observed:
It is true that an exercise of discretion is not to be tested by an appeal court asking itself whether it would
have exercised the discretion in the same or a different way to the way in which it was exercised in fact. On
the other hand, the appeal court, before it interferes with an exercise of discretion, must be satisfied that the
decision was clearly wrong. In my opinion the correct approach is that in considering that question an appeal
court is not constrained to hold that an exercise of discretion was wrong only by reason that weight was given
to some irrelevant consideration, or by reason only of complaint that insufficient weight was given to some
relevant consideration. It may be, despite such matters, that the decision was very evidently supportable by
pertinent grounds relied upon by the decision-maker.
17 These observations and the observations of Hedigan J were made in the context of appeals from the
Magistrates Court to this Court. These reflect the need for an appellant in an appeal on questions of law to
demonstrate not only that an error of law occurred but that it was a vitiating error.[9]
18 In Kymar Nominees Pty Ltd v Sinclair,[10] Cavanough J stated:
There is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of a discretionary judgment of a court, and all the
more so in relation to the taxation of costs. Although, strictly speaking, the present question is not one of
taxation of costs but of the extent of the parties respective liability, a reviewing court will rarely interfere on
such a question, especially in an appeal limited to questions of law.
19 The right of appeal to this Court from final orders within criminal proceedings of the Magistrates Court is
one on questions of law only.[11] Accordingly, just as it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant
factors in reaching a conclusion of fact, it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant factors bearing
on the exercise of a discretion.[12] The critical question is whether it was open to the Magistrate to conclude
as he did having regard to relevant factors.[13]
Preliminary questions
20 The appellant relied on the decision in Latoudis v Casey.[14] It must be recognised however that the
present case is not one such as Latoudis, where a successful defendant, having been brought to Court by the
informant, is ordinarily entitled to his or her costs.
21 In Oshlack v Richmond River Council[15] Kirby J observed:[16]
The decision in that case [Latoudis] does not, and could not, lay down a general rule that the only
consideration to be taken into account in the exercise of a statutory costs discretion is the compensation of the
successful party for the recoverable expense to which it has been put by the litigation. With respect to the
learned judges of the Court of Appeal, this reads too much into Latoudis. Such a rule was required neither by
the matter which was before this Court for decision in that case nor by the majority's reasons.
22 Likewise, cases such as Ohn v Walton,[17] which was concerned with a power in the Medical Tribunal of
New South Wales to order the complainant ... to pay such costs to such person as the Tribunal may
determine, are of no real assistance in the present case.
Appeal 15-2502
23 It was next submitted that if costs were not ordinarily recoverable by the Council then the Council would
be deterred from bringing further prosecutions of the type in issue. I do not accept this inference should be
drawn. Such prosecutions enforce a system of parking regulation from which municipal councils derive
significant revenue and the evidence simply does not establish the conclusion contended for.
24 The appellant also placed substantial emphasis on the following observations by McHugh J in
Oshlack:[18]
Nor is the status of the respondent as a public authority presently relevant. The law judges persons by their
conduct not their identity. In the exercise of the costs discretion, all persons are entitled to be treated equally
and in accordance with traditional principle. The fact that a successful respondent is a public authority should
not make a court less inclined to award costs in its favour. Gone are the days when one could sensibly speak
of a public authority as having available to them almost unlimited public funds.[19] Moreover, if costs
awards are not made in favour of successful respondents such as the Council, the public services which those
authorities provide must be adversely affected. Every irrecoverable dollar spent on litigation is one dollar less
to spend on the services that public authorities do and ought to provide. Often enough the services that will be
reduced will be those that favour the politically weak children, the unemployed, the disabled and the aged.
Such results cannot be in the public interest.
25 These observations do not assist the appellant because:
I do not accept that the learned Magistrate refused the appellant costs simply because it is a municipal
council. Rather as I have said, he considered the issue of costs by reference to broader notions of consistency
and proportionality.
Oshlack was concerned with fundamentally different proceedings. It was concerned with the costs of a
successful council responding to an unsuccessful claim for injunctive relief, brought by a member of the
public seeking to ventilate issues of the public interest.
McHugh Js observations were made in dissent and the majority of the High Court affirmed the breadth of
the discretion available to the Court of first instance.
Consistency
26 I turn then to the underlying bases of the Magistrates reasons. In my view it cannot be said that it was not
open to the learned Magistrate to take into account questions of consistency. Counsel for both parties referred
to the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis[20] (a case concerning the exercise of
discretion as to costs under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)):
The point of preserving the width of the discretion which Parliament has created is that it maximizes the
possibility of doing justice in every case. But the need for consistency in judicial adjudication, which is the
antithesis of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, provides an important countervailing consideration
supporting the giving of guidance by appellant courts, whether in the form of principles or guidelines.
27 Brennan J, who agreed generally with the reasons of Mason and Deane JJ stated at 536:
The orderly administration of justice requires that decisions should be consistent one with another and
decision-making should not be open to the reproach that it is adventitious ... An unfettered discretion is a
versatile means of doing justice in particular cases, but unevenness in its exercise diminishes confidence in
the legal process.
28 In the present case it should be noted that breaches of the Victorian Road Rules with respect to parking
infringements may be prosecuted either by a police officer, an authorised council officer or certain other
authorised persons.[21]
29 It was open to the Magistrate to form the view that the discrepancy in costs outcomes between police
prosecutions and council prosecutions in respect of the same offence and more generally raised a relevant
issue of consistency. Inconsistent outcomes do not support a system in which the public may be expected to
have confidence. They give rise to a system which may appear adventitious and arbitrary in its outcomes.
p11
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Appeal 15-2502
END QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
It also should be considered that despite my 9 December 2015 comprehensive FOI request with a
supplement 1 dated 11 December 2015 FOI request to the Premier of Victoria Mr Daniel
Andrews (and copies to the Attorney-General) regarding Fire Prevention Notices issued by
Buloke Shire Council in the wording offending the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 and later
further request about it has been left unanswered despite that the FOI Act requires 45 days
maximum to respond.
In my submission as Buloke Shire Council is acting under delegated powers of the State of
Victoria then it was appropriate to make the FOI request to the Premier, as the Premier would
have access to a greater data base then Buloke Shire Council may have regarding the same.
If the FOI requested material/details could establish that Fore prevention Notices were habitually
issued in violation to the limited delegated powers of the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer and
not just a one of issue then obviously this could place in that regard the competence of Mr
Wayne Wall being an expert witness, in case this were to be pursued that he is so by his
position.
of%20time"%20"
Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Steuler Services GmbH & Co KG; BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd v
Steuler Services GmbH & Co KG [No 2] [2015] VSCA 123 (28 May 2015
QUOTE
The test governing the erroneous exercise of discretion, including the discretion to award costs, was famously
stated in House v The King[56] as follows:
If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him,
if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination
should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the
materials for doing so.[57]
END QUOTE
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2001/92.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="leave%20to%20serve%20"out%20of
%20time"%20"
DPP v Craib & Coad [2001] VSCA 92 (15 June 2001)
QUOTE
I find it difficult to criticise the Director for waiting upon the transcript before instituting the appeals; it is
obviously undesirable for an appeal in a criminal matter to be commenced only to have it abandoned if that
appears proper when the transcript becomes available[7].
END QUOTE
I was well aware that if I didnt file and serve the appeal in time against the 17 September 2015
orders of the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud I could face a difficulty having to
explain that I had so far been denied any sealed copy of the orders and reason of judgment (and
still be 13 February 2016 so) despite written request for them. Hence, I was left no alternative but
to file the appeal without any formal sealed orders and reason of judgment without knowing the
true version of orders, but holding that the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION was unlikely have
been disposed of and as such the appeal could be justified also for orders that ought to have been
made but were not made, as the court to invoke jurisdiction, as it allegedly did to issue orders
should have issued first orders to dismiss the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION (not that I
concede this was appropriate to do so) and where it failed to issue those orders then it never
invoked jurisdiction.
At times the conduct of one party might be of concern to a court but it cannot have an impact
upon the final determination of the court if the conduct is not one that should be considered to the
legal justification of litigation.
p12
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Appeal 15-2502
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/36.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=anz%20and%20volume%20and%20evi
dence%20and%20consider
CGU Insurance Limited v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36 (29 August 2007)
QUOTE
257.
At the outset we should say that we agree with the Chief Justice and Crennan J that a lack
of utmost good faith is not to be equated with dishonesty only. The analogy may not be taken too far,
but the sort of conduct that might constitute an absence of utmost good faith may have elements in
common with an absence of clean hands according to equitable doctrine which requires that a
plaintiff seeking relief not himself be guilty of tainted relevant conduct. We have referred to the
doctrine of clean hands because, as with another equitable doctrine, that he who seeks equity must
do equity, it invokes notions of reciprocity which are of relevance here. That is not to say that
conduct falling short of actual impropriety might not constitute an absence of utmost good faith of
the kind which the Insurance Act demands. Something less than that might well do so. Utmost good
faith will usually require something more than passivity: it will usually require affirmative or
positive action on the part of a person owing a duty of it. It is not necessary, however for the
purposes of this case, to attempt any comprehensive definition of the duty, or to canvass the ranges
of conduct which might fall within, or outside s 13 of the Insurance Act.
258. We have already foreshadowed that in our opinion the conduct of the appellant did leave something to be
desired. It does seem to us that there was certainly a degree of opportunism on the part of the appellant in
dealing with the claims against the respondent by the investors. As Kirby J has pointed out[147], this
insurance was effected in a market in which ASIC had an important and powerful presence. It follows that
it ought to have been within the contemplation of the appellant that the respondent might come under
pressure from ASIC to settle claims. It may be another question, however, whether it would have been
within the contemplation of the appellant that ASIC would act in the way in which it did, that is to say, on
the respondent's case possibly high-handedly. We would make no judgment about this as ASIC is not a
party, but it is right to point out that there was nothing in the Law or elsewhere disentitling a licence holder
such as the respondent from defending claims and actions which it believes to be defendable. But there
were other factors in play. The respondent seems to have been just as keen to stay out of court as ASIC
was to keep the investors out of court. The respondent was anxious to protect its name and goodwill, and
to that end to keep the appellant at a distance from the management of the claims.
END QUOTE
In this case the court went through copious amounts of correspondences and boxes of material
but in the end While CGU had pursued this all it still succeeded in its appeal and AMP was the
loser, this eve n so it had ongoing provided required details.
The issue of leave to file/serve out of time.
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCCA/2014/1251.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="leave%20to%20serve%20"out%2
0of%20time"%20"
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Cole v Quest Software Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 1251 (18 June 2014)
QUOTE
The Principles of Procedural Fairness and Case Management
61.
As the Court is aware the previous leading case on the manner in which the principles of case
management should be applied in proceedings was formerly Queensland & Anor v JL Holdings Pty Ltd
[1997] HCA 1; (1997) 189 CLR 146.
62.
However on 5 August, 2009 the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian
National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 delivered three separate judgments which have
had a significant impact on the conduct of litigation, when judges, magistrates and decision makers are
required to exercise their discretion in matters of case management under the current rules of procedure
requiring the just resolution of the real issues in dispute.
63.
There was a separate decision by French CJ, a joint judgment by Gummow, Hayne, Crennan,
Kiefel and Bell JJ [19] and a separate decision by Heydon J.
What did AON -v- ANU decide?
p13
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Appeal 15-2502
64.
The three separate judgments unanimously held:
a.
The starting point for any application, and by inference the effect of the application on the
court's timetable, are the rules of the relevant jurisdiction [at 55]: in AON this was the ACT Court
Procedure Rules (in the Federal Jurisdiction the equivalents are the Federal Court of Australia Act
1976 (FCA) and Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (FCCR));
b.
The case management principles embodied in the ACT Rules (and by extension the
FCCR and the inclusion of PART VB in the FCA) postdate the High Courts decision in
Queensland v JL Holdings and the purposes stated in the rules cannot be ignored: the rules are
to be applied having regard to the stated objectives, being the timely disposal of the proceedings at
an affordable cost [at 97] or as the Chief Justice put it the just resolution of the real issues in
the proceeding with minimum delay and expense" [at 36];
c.Speed and efficiency in the sense of minimum delay and expense are essential to a just
resolution of proceedings which remains the paramount purpose of the FCCR as embodied in
Rule 1.03[20] and s.37M of the FCA; limits may be placed upon re-pleading, and by extension
the failure to serve evidence in accordance with the timetable set by the Court, when delay
and cost are taken into account [at 98];
d.There is no entitlement to raise an arguable claim by an amendment to a pleading subject to
payment of costs by way of compensation [at 111 and French CJ at 5] and therefore it can be
argued there is no entitlement to an extension in terms of failures to comply with court mandated
timetables subject to the payment of costs. In other words costs should not always be viewed as a
panacea for delay; and
e.Inefficiencies in the use of a court as a publicly funded resource by reason of late applications, and
by extension continuing delays, are to be taken into account in the proper exercise of a primary
judges exercise of discretion to grant an application and by extension leave to serve out of time:
so too is the need to maintain the publics confidence in the judicial system [French CJ at 5] and
the effects on other litigants in the court system [101].
How has AON v ANU changed the landscape of Case Management?
65.
Statements in JL Holdings, which suggested a limited application for case management, should not
be applied in the future [at 111].
66.
JL Holdings cannot be taken as authority for the view that a waste of public resources and undue
delay should not be taken into account in the exercise of interlocutory decisions [French CJ at 30].
67.
The obligation imposed by the Rules to minimise costs implies that an order for costs may not
always provide sufficient compensation and therefore achieve a just resolution [at 98].
68.
In jurisdictions having rules similar to Rule 21 (See ss.37M, 37N, 37P of FCA and Rule 1.03 of
FCCR) and Rule 502 of the ACT Court Procedure Rules, JL Holdings has ceased to be of authority. It is
necessary to apply the rules without any preconceptions derived from what was said in JL Holdings
[Heydon J at133].
69.
JL Holdings has had a damaging influence on the conduct of litigation [Heydon J [133] and
created a culture and mentality of uncomplaining supine liberality for delinquent litigants
(referring to Bryson J in Maronis Holdings Ltd & Ors v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2000]
NSWSC 753 at [15] in a passage which merits preservation from the oblivion of unreported judgments).
70.
There was no explanation offered for the delay in seeking to amend [53]: this was critical to
the exercise of any discretion in favour of AON [114]; therefore there was no basis for a finding of
oversight [108] or mistake of judgment [109]; it can be inferred that there could be no reasonable
explanation in the absence of any explanation [108]; French CJ regarded the failure to raise the new
claim as an apparent deliberate tactical decision in those circumstances [4].
The Greater Relevance of Case Management Principles
p14
71.
AON confirms that case management principles have changed significantly by the rules of
procedure enacted by various jurisdictions since JL Holdings.
72.
The statutory duty imposed by civil procedure rules such as the FCA, FCCR and the CPA in NSW
requires a court in mandatory terms to give effect to the overriding purpose of case management rules
being the just resolution of disputes...(b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible" [21] including
limiting "the number of documents that may be tendered in evidence" [22].
73.
That duty is a significant qualification to the power to grant leave to amend and by extension the
power to grant leave to vary from the Courts mandated timetable with respect to evidence in the
proceedings.
74.
AON is a significant and unanimous recent decision of the High Court considering the principles
of proper case management in the context of current rules of court concerning practice and procedure that
14-2-2016 Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
since that time has been applied by state and federal courts with respect applications to adduce further
evidence at hearing (See Platinum Investment Management Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
[2009] NSWSC 998, Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council [2009]
NSWSC 17 & Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1370).
75.
It should not be overlooked that even before AON, the NSW Court of Appeal in a judgment by
Chief Justice Spigelman (with which Basten and Campbell JJA agreed) had held that JL must be
understood as subject to the statutory duty imposed on courts by the rules of civil procedure: Dennis v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2008] NSWCA 37 (1 April 2009) at [28] [29].
END QUOTE
See also:
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2009/27.html
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 (5 August 2009)
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1996/25.html
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 139 ALR 1;
(1996) 70 ALJR 866 (2 October 1996)
QUOTE
Even before the passing of the Limitation Act 1623 (Imp), many civil actions were the subject of time
limitations[13]. Moreover, the right of the citizen to a speedy hearing of an action that had been commenced
was acknowledged by Magna Carta itself[14]. Thus for many centuries the law has recognised the need to
commence actions promptly and to prosecute them promptly once commenced. As a result, courts exercising
supervisory jurisdiction over other courts and tribunals in their jurisdictions have power to stay proceedings
as abuses of process if they are satisfied that, by reason of delay or other matter, the commencement or
continuation of the proceedings would involve injustice or unfairness to one of the parties[15].
The effect of delay on the quality of justice is no doubt one of the most important influences motivating a
legislature to enact limitation periods for commencing actions. But it is not the only one. Courts and
commentators have perceived four broad rationales for the enactment of limitation periods. First, as time goes
by, relevant evidence is likely to be lost[16]. Second, it is oppressive, even "cruel", to a defendant to allow an
action to be brought long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed[17]. Third, people should
be able to arrange their affairs and utilise their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made
against them[18]. Insurers, public institutions and businesses, particularly limited liability companies, have a
significant interest in knowing that they have no liabilities beyond a definite period[19]. As the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission has pointed out[20]:
END QUOTE
of%20time"%20"
DPP v Hayden [2006] VSCA 152 (25 July 2006)
QUOTE
10 The merits of the proposed appeal are relevant on such an application. In Darby it was said that it was the
Courts practice not to grant any considerable extension of time unless the Court were satisfied
"that there are such merits in the proposed appeal that it would probably succeed." [17]
11 In OKeefe, the Full Court said:
"An applicant who has been dilatory or has acted in such a way as to indicate that he does not intend to
appeal has small if any claim to the exercise of the discretion of the Court in his favour. On the other hand, if
the applicant has acted promptly, his case will be considered very differently. Where there has been a long
delay the practice of the Court has not been to grant the extension sought unless it is clear that the decision is
attended with such doubt as to make it probable that the appeal will succeed." [18]
12 Winneke ACJ took a similar approach in R v Davis, when he said:
"It is to be emphasised that the courts decisions upon applications of this kind involve discretionary
considerations, and the longer the time which elapses between the closure of the statutory time limit and the
date of the application, the more exceptional will the circumstances have to be. Certainly the applicant must,
in any case, put forward material to demonstrate satisfactory reasons for the failure to comply with the time
and also to show, in the event that the time lapse is considerable (as it is in this case), that there are such
merits in the proposed appeal that it will probably succeed."[19]
13 Even where the time lapse is relatively short, as in the present case, we would still expect the Director to
file material showing that the appeal had sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave. As
appears later, no such material was filed.
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Appeal 15-2502
END QUOTE
%20time"%20"
QUOTE
On these applications Mr. Coghlan told us that much had been learnt by the prosecuting office from this
experience, but the question remains for us whether, in the exercise of discretion, service should now be
permitted out of time. Criticism can of course be made of those responsible in the one office or the other for
failing to effect service within time, but at least the failure to serve in time has been explained to the extent
that we now know how it came about. Whether that explanation is "reasonably satisfactory" is of course a
different matter; much depends upon what is meant by "satisfactory". Deliberate inaction, if inexcusable,
would obviously be not a satisfactory explanation for delay; but unintended default is different, even delay
occasioned by a blunder or a mistake[8]. If the failure to serve within time must be shown by the applicant to
be altogether excusable, I doubt that that has been achieved in this instance. But in the end I need not pursue
that to a conclusion because, when all is said and done, what has to be decided is not just the issue of delay
but the matter of leave. That is to be decided in all of the circumstances, not just one of them, and the
discretion cannot be curtailed by undue emphasis on one consideration or another. No other case can dictate
the result in this: each case must depend upon its own facts and a fair consideration of all the circumstances
when taken in conjunction[9].
END QUOTE
%20time"%20"
QUOTE
1.
The decision whether to grant leave to the Director of Public Prosecutions under s.567A(3) of the Crimes
Act 1958 to give a notice of appeal more than one month after the passing of sentence is a discretionary
one. Whilst rigid restrictions cannot be imposed on the exercise of discretion, in general the Court will
require special and substantial reasons for granting leave and a reasonably satisfactory account of the
failure to comply with the statutory requirement "needs to be forthcoming".[17] In Bishop v. The Queen[18]
Deane, J. (with whom Bowen, C.J. agreed and Davies, J. substantially agreed, though with a qualification)
said in a passage cited since:
"In the special circumstances of an appeal against sentence, it would, in my view, be wrong and unjust after
that period had expired without a notice of appeal being served to accede to an application by the Crown to
extend the period of time in which service could properly be effected unless there were evidence disclosing
an acceptable explanation of the failure to serve within time ...".
Similarly, in Morres v. Papuan Rubber and Trading Co. Ltd.[19], a civil case concerning relief from
default in complying with the rules as to lodging appeals, Cullen, C.J. said[20]:
"[The applicant] has to satisfy the Court that justice requires that that default of his should be overlooked,
and he must satisfy the Court that there is some reasonable kind of explanation or excuse for his neglect of
the rules."
Although one at least of the statements which I have cited is expressed as a binding rule, the truth of the
matter is that, since a discretion is conferred, a binding rule cannot be laid down save, perhaps, in
exceptional cases of which this is not one: Norbis v. Norbis[21] and Dix v. Crimes Compensation
Tribunal[22]. As the statement by Cullen, C.J. shows, the ultimate question is whether justice requires the
grant of leave.[23] That requires a weighing of various factors pro and con. The account or explanation of
the failure to comply is one such factor[24]. It will often be significant and sometimes preponderant.
Another factor, of similar effect, is prejudice.
31. With the assistance of the intending appellant and the intended respondents the Court, on this opposed ex
parte application[25], has received a detailed account of the failure to comply with the statutory
requirement. But I do not think that this is what a "reasonably satisfactory account" means. Rather, in my
view, a reasonably satisfactory account means an explanation, in appropriate detail, of how the nonp16
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compliance came about, which shows the applicant to have acted in a way which is reasonably satisfactory
or, to use Deane, J.'s word, acceptable.
END QUOTE
It stands to reason that if it involved a real and not an imagined fire danger then Buloke Shire
Council would have pursued legal action in the alleged fire danger period and not wait from 17
November 2014 till 20 August 2015 to commence litigation. The lack of appropriate conduct
may also underline that this was neve r about a real fire danger but about trying to extort monies
from me to the tune of $1,476.00.
Because ES@a legal practitioners failed to file within time any Notice of appearance and later
sought to fabricate that the wrong form was used, whereas the courts email indicates no Notice of
appearance was file, then that to indicates there never was any legal standing for ES&a Legal
Practitioners to appeal.
It is clear that the Magistrates Court of Victoria Act requires a full brief to be served no later
than 14 days before the hearing that commenced on 20 August 2015, but ES&a Legal
Practitioners failed to do so, as it appears to me they never understood that they were acting in a
prosecutor role and not representing a client in a civil suit. The fact that then the Form 11 dated
25 November 2015 was with a concocted full brief purportedly for a non-existing 18 march
2013 hearing underlines also how deceptive ES&a Legal Practitioners acted.
http://online.hillsdale.edu/file/constitution-courses-library/constitution-101/week-1/2nd-Treatiseof-Government.pdf
QUOTE
Second Treatise of Government
John Locke (16321704)
Lockes Two Treatises of Government presented a critique of the divine right of kings and outlined the
principles of natural rights and government by consent. Written during the 1670s, they were not published
until after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Locke was
the political theorist quoted most frequently by Americans in the 1770s.
END QUOTE
Reading the writings of John Locke about Governmental powers and what the judiciary is to do
then the fact I have my self-professed crummy English should make no difference to the
standards of the judiciary providing to each party appearing before the court.
As John Locke makes clear there is an implied consent to be subjected to the laws by the
community that was made by the majority (not minority) but it also entitles me to the proper
application of the law and not that the court make exceptions for a particular party such as ES&a
Legal Practitioners to flaunt legal requirements of procedures and so also act in defiance of the
orders of His Honour Mullaly J of 30 October 2015 to serve on or before 9 November 2015 via
Australia Post the full brief.
Despite my repeated written submissions of OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION so far this
continually was blatantly disregarded and this means not a single court order was validly issued.
At http://lawyerslawyer.net/2006/10/03/an-incomplete-list-of-victorian-admission-cases/
October 3rd, 2006 An incomplete list of Victorian admission cases one can find some
issues but it fails to address the issue of citizenship required for any judge to be deemed to be a
peer to adjudicate.
The Commonwealth published the following:
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs187.aspx
Citizenship in Australia Fact sheet 187 History of Australian citizenship
QUOTE
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The records
The relationship between citizens and government is blurred by the absence of a clear definition of Australian
citizenship, its rights and obligations. Relevant records are spread widely across government agencies
covering activities such as immigration, passports, franchise, jury service, public service employment and
social security.
END QUOTE
On 30 September 2003 I published:
INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
(ISBN 0-9580569-6-X prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9580569-6-0
Despite that I used constitutional grounds in both successful appeals on 19 July 2006 before the
County Court of Victoria about citizenship and what it really stands for it appears the
Commonwealth still has not understood/comprehended its true constitutional meaning and
application
My submission is that without State citizenship no person can be appointed as a Legal
Practitioner or as a judge. State citizenship is essential to be part of the local community within
the State. When after more than 115 years of federation the Federal Government and so also the
States do not understand/comprehend the true constitutional meaning and application of what
citizenship stands for then I might have my self-professed crummy English but at least I do
a lot better than judges/lawyers/politicians all together.
http://lawyerslawyer.net/2012/03/01/prosecutors-obligations-in-criminal-and-disciplinary-cases/
QUOTE
Prosecutors obligations in criminal and disciplinary cases
March 1st, 2012 Comments (0)
The late Renee Rivkins chauffeur Gordon Wood was recently acquitted by the NSW Court of Appeal of pushing
his girlfriend Carolyn Byrne off a cliff at Sydneysiders favoured spot for suicide, The Gap: Wood v R [2012]
NSWCCA 21. He spent more than three years in jail. The Court was not terribly impressed by the conduct of
the prosecutor. It provided a handy restatement of the obligations of prosecutors in criminal cases. At least
insofar as the obligations referred to by the unanimous Court are sourced in the Bars conduct rules and are
equivalent to Victorias obligations, Victorian barristers prosecuting disciplinary cases have the same obligations
by virtue of the definition of prosecutor and criminal proceedings in the Bars conduct rules (r. 9(f)).
Here is what McClelland CJ at CL said:
574. The second issue is concerned with the Crown Prosecutors invitation to the jury to consider a list of fifty
questions which the prosecutor told the jury were the salient questions in order to decide the outcome of the
case. The fundamental submission was that by adopting this approach to his address the prosecutor
committed the error discussed in R v Rugari [2001] NSWCCA 64; (2001) 122 A Crim R 1 at [57].
575.
The examination by an appellate court of whether a miscarriage of justice occurred was considered in Libke v
The Queen [2007] HCA 30; (2007) 230 CLR 559. At [83], Hayne J considered whether submissions made by
the Crown Prosecutor were comments that suggested (whether directly or indirectly by appealing to
prejudice or passion) that the jury should follow some impermissible path of reasoning: see R v DDR (1999)
99 A Crim R 327 at 340-343; [1998] 3 VR 580.
576.
At the time of the trial, the duties of a Crown prosecutor were set out in Rules 62-65 (now rules 82-85) of the
New South Wales Barristers Rules . The Barristers Rules then in force were made by the Bar Council under
s 702 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 and were binding on legal practitioners by virtue of s 711 of that Act.
Rules 62-65 were as follows:
Prosecutors Duties
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62. A prosecutor must fairly assist the court to arrive at the truth, must seek impartially to have the
whole of the relevant evidence placed intelligibly before the court, and must seek to assist the court
with adequate submissions of law to enable the law properly to be applied to the facts.
63. A prosecutor must not press the prosecutions case for a conviction beyond a full and firm presentation of
that case.
64. A prosecutor must not, by language or other conduct, seek to inflame or bias the court against the
accused.
65. A prosecutor must not argue any proposition of fact or law which the prosecutor does not believe on
reasonable grounds to be capable of contributing to a finding of guilt and also to carry weight.
577.
Section 13 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 empowers the Director to furnish guidelines to
Crown prosecutors in respect of the prosecution of offences. Section 15(2) further provides that prosecutors
to whom the Director has furnished guidelines are obligated to comply with those guidelines. The current
Guidelines were in force at the time of the applicants trial, and the Barristers Rules set out above were
incorporated into Appendix B to the Guidelines. Relevantly, Guideline 2 sets out the Role and Duties of the
Prosecutor as follows:
A prosecutor is a minister of justice. The prosecutors principal role is to assist the court to arrive
at the truth and to do justice between the community and the accused according to law and the dictates
of fairness.
A prosecutor is not entitled to act as if representing private interests in litigation. A prosecutor
represents the community and not any individual or sectional interest. A prosecutor acts
independently, yet in the general public interest. The public interest is to be understood in that
context as an historical continuum: acknowledging debts to previous generations and obligations to
future generations.
In carrying out that function:
it behoves him Neither to indict, nor on trial to speak for conviction except upon credible evidence of guilt;
nor to do even a little wrong for the sake of expediency, or to pique any person or please any power; not to be
either gullible or suspicious, intolerant or over-pliant: in the firm and abiding mind to do right to all manner
of people, to seek justice with care, understanding and good countenance.
(per RR Kidston QC, former Senior Crown Prosecutor of New South Wales, in The Office of Crown
Prosecutor (More Particularly in New South Wales), (1958) 32 ALJ 148).
It is a specialised and demanding role, the features of which need to be clearly recognised and understood. It
is a role that is not easily assimilated by all legal practitioners schooled in an adversarial environment. It is
essential that it be carried out with the confidence of the community in whose name it is performed.
It cannot be over-emphasised that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to
lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.
Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and
pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any
notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none
charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the
dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.
(per Rand J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Boucher v The Queen (1954) 110 CCC 263 at p 270).
In this State that role must be discharged in the environment of an adversarial approach to litigation. The
observance of those canons of conduct is not incompatible with the adoption of an advocates role. The
advocacy must be conducted, however, temperately and with restraint.
The prosecutor represents the community generally at the trial of an accused person.
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Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The accused, the court and the community are
entitled to expect that, in performing his function of presenting the case against an accused, he will act with
fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of establishing the whole truth in accordance with the
procedures and standards which the law requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the accuseds
trial is a fair one.
(per Deane J in Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at pp 663-664).
Nevertheless, there will be occasions when the prosecutor will be entitled firmly and vigorously to urge the
prosecutions view about a particular issue and to test, and if necessary to attack, that advanced on behalf of
an accused person or evidence adduced by the defence. Adversarial tactics may need to be employed in one
trial that may be out of place in another. A criminal trial is an accusatorial, adversarial procedure and the
prosecutor will seek by all proper means provided by that process to secure the conviction of the perpetrator
of the crime charged.
578.
The duty to present a case fairly, completely and with fairness to the accused was emphasised in Livermore v
The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 334; (2006) 67 NSWLR 659 at [24] where this Court cited with approval the
dicta in McCullough v The Queen (1982) 6 A Crim R 274; [1982] Tas R 43 at 57:
[It is] quite impermissible [for a Crown Prosecutor] to embark upon a course of conduct calculated to
persuade the jury to a point of view by the introduction of factors of prejudice or emotion. If such a situation
should develop and there is a real risk that the conduct complained of may have tipped the balance against the
accused then an appellate court will not hesitate to follow the safe course and order a new trial.
579.
In Livermore at [31] this Court held that a number of features of a Crown address, either alone or in
combination, might require censure by an appellate court. These include:
(i) A submission to the jury based upon material which is not in evidence.
(ii) Intemperate or inflammatory comments, tending to arouse prejudice or emotion in the jury.
(iii) Comments which belittle or ridicule any part of the accuseds case.
(iv) Impugning the credit of a Crown witness, where the witness was not afforded the opportunity of
responding to an attack upon credit.
(v) Conveying to the jury the Crown Prosecutors own opinion.
580.
Additionally, where submissions are made that contain matters which the appellant is asked to explain, the
onus of proof is inappropriately reversed: Rugari at [57].
581.
When it is submitted that a trial has miscarried by reason of the prosecutors address, it is necessary to
consider the whole of that address. Each case will depend on its particular circumstances: Causevic v The
Queen [2008] NSWCCA 238; 190 A Crim R 416 at [6] (McClellan CJ at CL; Barr and Price JJ agreeing).
632.
A Crown prosecutor has a role of great significance in ensuring that an accused person receives a fair trial.
That role has been discussed most recently in Livermore at [24]-[30] . It is appropriate to repeat what the
court said on that occasion:
The Role of the Crown Prosecutor and the Limits of Trial Advocacy
24 This Court recently had occasion to repeat those aspects of the decision in R v McCullough (1982) 6 A
Crim R 274 (at 285), touching upon the duties of a Crown Prosecutor, in KNP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA
213 at [32]. McCullough has also been referred to, with approval, in the course of this Courts decisions in R
v Joseph Attallah [2005] NSWCCA 277, R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 at 563ff and R v Rugari
(2001) 122 A Crim R 1 at 10. For present purposes, it is necessary to set out the following aspects of the dicta
in McCullough :It cannot be too often made plain that the business of counsel for the Crown is fairly and impartially to
exhibit all the facts to the jury. However, it should also be said that the observance of those canons of
conduct is not incompatible with the adoption of an advocates role. Counsel for the Crown is obliged to put
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the Crown case to the jury and, when appropriate, he is entitled to firmly and vigorously urge the Crown view
about a particular issue and to test and, if necessary, to attack that advanced on behalf of the accused. But he
must always do so temperately and with restraint , bearing constantly in mind that his primary function is to
aid in the attainment of justice, not the securing of convictions. As the New Zealand Court of Appeal said in
Roulston it has always been recognised that prosecuting counsel must never strain for a conviction, still
less adopt tactics that involve an appeal to prejudice or amount to an intemperate or emotional attack upon
the accused.
The feel and atmosphere of one trial may make it reasonable and even necessary for tactics to be employed
that would seem out of place and disproportionate to the circumstances of another. Nevertheless, it is wrong
for Crown counsel to become so much the advocate that he is fighting for a conviction and quite
impermissible to embark upon a course of conduct calculated to persuade a jury to a point of view by the
introduction of factors of prejudice or emotion. If such a situation should develop and there is a real risk that
the conduct complained of may have tipped the balance against the accused then an appellate court will not
hesitate to follow the safe course and order a new trial (emphasis added).
25 A seminal statement of the responsibilities of a Crown Prosecutor in a criminal trial appears in Whitehorn
v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663-664 per Deane J:Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The accused, the court and the community are
entitled to expect that, in performing his function of presenting the case against an accused, he will act with
fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of establishing the whole truth in accordance with the
procedures and standards which the law requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the accused trial
is a fair one. The consequence of a failure to observe the standards of fairness to be expected of the Crown
may be insignificant in the context of an overall trial. Where that is so, departure from those standards,
however regrettable, will not warrant the interference of an appellate court with a conviction. On occasion
however, the consequences of such a failure may so affect or permeate a trial as to warrant the conclusion
that the accused has actually been denied his fundamental right to a fair trial. As a general proposition, that
will, of itself, mean that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice with a consequence that any
conviction of the accused should be quashed and, where appropriate, a new trial ordered. (Italics not in
original)
26 In R v Callaghan (1993) 70 A Crim R 350 at 356, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that it was not
appropriate that Crown Prosecutors use the dignity of their office to tell a jury something that is not in
evidence and that counsels role is to make submissions, not express personal opinions or enter the fray as a
contestant.
27 In R v Kennedy (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 at 41; [2000] NSWCCA 487, Studdert J, with whom Heydon JA
and James J agreed, found submissions by the Crown Prosecutor, which were critical of a Crown witness who
was not sought to be declared unfavourable, improper. It was held that the submissions may well have
influenced the jury to reject evidence that the witness gave which was favourable to the accuseds case and
which impacted on the credibility of the complainant. This was said to be a serious irregularity resulting in
a miscarriage of justice.
28 In Rugari , Carruthers AJ, with whom Spigelman CJ and Sperling J agreed, explored a number of breaches
by the Crown Prosecutor of the reasonable restraints imposed upon him. In particular, an expression by the
Crown Prosecutor of his own view of the quality of the evidence was said to be inappropriate. There were
other inappropriate comments, which when taken together, gave rise to the prospect that in convicting the
accused, the jury was actuated, partly at least, by the inappropriate and prejudicial remarks made by the
Crown Prosecutor (at 12).
29 In Liristis , the description by the Crown Prosecutor of the accuseds evidence as pathetic and comments
in the course of the Crowns address which included his own reaction to the evidence given by the accused
were said not to exhibit the fairness and detachment which a Crown Prosecutor is expected to have, in
accordance with Deane Js statement in Whitehorn.
30 Similarly, in KNP , the introduction in the closing address of the Crown Prosecutors personal thoughts
was said to be a gross breach of his duty to present the Crown case in an impartial and fair manner. By
imposing his own view on the jury there was a risk that they might believe that they were required to decide
whether the prosecutor was correct in his personal views rather than assessing for themselves whether the
evidence proved the Crown case. (per McClellan CJ at CL at [53]).
Appeal 15-2502
633. In GDD at [55], Grove J said:
[T]here must remain a risk that a jury would consider a Crown Prosecutor a figure of public authority and
whose expressed personal opinions were therefore of particular weight and reliable. It is to avoid that risk that
the law requires counsel to make submissions based upon the evidence and proscribes the expressions of
personal opinion.
634.
When a prosecutor fails to comply with the required standards of fairness an accused person may be denied a
fair trial. Whitehorn v The Queen [1983] HCA 42; (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663-4. See also Cittadini v The
Queen [2009] NSWCCA 302 at [99]-[101] (McClellan CJ at CL, Fullerton and Schmidt JJ agreeing);
Causevic at [4], (2008) 190 A Crim R 416 at 418 [4] (McClellan CJ at CL, Barr and Price JJ agreeing); GDD
at [21], [44]. I am satisfied that this occurred in the present case.
See also:
A fantastic criminal law web resource: John Strattons site

Da Fink reckons the Bureau should act with the fairness of Crown prosecutors
Prosecutors duties in professional discipline cases
Admissibility rulings may be revisited
Legal Services Commissioners obligations of fairness
Tags: Ethics litigation ethics

END QUOTE
I maintain to reiterate that I persist in my objection to jurisdiction and any appearance is not
intended and neither must be perceived that I somehow discontinued my objections.
What is of concern to me, as set out in my writings to Buloke Shire Council and its legal
representatives, Mr Wayne Wall, the Premier and the Attorney-General is that the provisions of
the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 has been misused and abused as some gold digging
exercise to fill the coffers of Buloke Shire Council and in the process creating a situation for fire
fighters to be placed in peril of danger. Fire fighters are human beings with families and we as a
society earn them a great debts and we should never allow gold diggers to misuse legislative
provisions and needlessly place their lives at peril. While Buloke Shire Council used my
writings, without filing them, as a reason to pursue orders of cost against me, I have no doubt
that if the court had actually considered the content of those writings it may have so to say
thrown the book at Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives. Time will tell if the court
will denounce gold diggers and deplore the abuse and misuse of the Country Fire Authority Act
1958. Let the true villain(s) be exposed!
I deny any proper service having been executed upon me, and no evidence therefore can be
before the court to be considered as time to file and serve has passed well and truly. In my
submission Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives would do better to immediately
advise me that they will; not contest my objection to jurisdiction and neither the appeal and will
accept the orders the court may pronounce, as eventuated on 19 July 2006 In the Country Court
of Victoria when I then succeeded in both appeals.
I submit that the court should reverse its orders and reason of judgment so it can consider
the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and this ADDRESS TO THE COURT supplement 1.
This written submission is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all relevant
issues and oral supplement may be made. After all it is unknown to me what, if any, other matter
may arise before the hearing is held.
Appellant
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G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502

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Page 1 AP 2502 ADDRESS TO THE COURT Suppl 1, Hearing date 22-2-2016 (or alternative date if allocated)

ADDRESS TO THE COURT (Written submissions) Supplement 1

Elliott Stafford and Associated

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J. judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Some of the issues but not in any of priority

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL (Our name is our motto!)

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(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

As such my submission is that ES@a Legal Practitioners failed to act appropriately as a

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

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(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

On 30 September 2003 I published:

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

A fantastic criminal law web resource: John Strattons site

Tags: Ethics litigation ethics

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

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