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Abstract: Electromagnetic bombs became devices technical feasible due to research results in
High Power Microwave technology and High Power Electromagnetic Pulse allowing
development of both weapons and protective measures at strategic and tactical level.
The development of e-bomb devices allow their use in non-nuclear and even non-lethal
confrontations.
This paper present aspects related to technology base, weapon employment and protective
measures to be enforced against electromagnetic bombs attacks.
Keywords: electromagnetic, weapon, bomb, military
1. INTRODUCTION
The history of military conflicts is full of examples when the use of high technology
weapons made the difference on the battlefield: 1232, Kai-Keng battle when Chinese
achieved victory over Mongol using some rudimentary rockets called arrows of flying
fire, 1914, the use of automatic weapon by German army gave them an important
advantage over conventional armies across Europe, 1991, the use of precision-guided
bomb and stealth fighters forced the numerous Iraqi army to knee. All these examples
have in common the use of high-technology kinetic weapons to achieve the victory on the
battlefield (Ertekin, 2008).
Nowadays, in a television - war era, a perfect weapon will shut down
telecommunications networks, fry adversary computer networks and unshielded
electronic equipments but will leave intact bridges, buildings, highways and human
beings won`t be affected.
A kind of weapon which fulfills these requirements, the electromagnetic bomb is, at
this time, under engineer investigations, some testing models components being produced
for research purposes.
2. TECHNOLOGY BASE
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a term used for any nuclear or conventional
device able to generate a very intense but short electromagnetic field transient which, in
weapons applications, must be intense enough to generate electromagnetic power
densities which are lethal for electronic and electrical equipment (Kopp, 1996).
EMP was observed during early testing of nuclear weapons high altitude burst when
for hundreds of nanoseconds an intense electromagnetic pulse was generated and
propagated away from source along with decreasing of intensity, we can say a veritable
electromagnetic shock wave.
A tragic event happened in 1967 on aircraft carrier USS Forestal when cruising off the
coast of North Vietnam having some A-4 Skyhawk jets on the deck fuelled and combat
loaded with 1000 pound bombs, air to ground (AGM) and air to air (ATA) missiles.
Investigations of the incident related that one missile with a cable incorrect shielded
was illuminated by a shipboard radar and radio frequency voltages were developed in
cable resulting in missile firing across the deck and striking another aircraft resulting in
$72 million of damage and 134 men lost or missing (Ertekin, 2008).
POWER
SUPPLY
RF
GENERATOR
FORMING
AND
SHAPING
WAVE
WAVEGUIDE ANTENNA
CONTROL
UNIT
FIG. 1. HPM weapon system
A typical coaxial FCG consist of a cylinder copper tube (armature) filled with
explosive. The armature is surrounded
by a helical coil the stator.
A structural jacket made from
non-magnetic material will prevent
intense magnetic forces produced
during operation to disintegrate
prematurely the FCG.
The explosive is initiated when
the start current peaks and an uniform
plane wave burn front in the
explosive then, the front propagates
through the explosive in the armature,
distort the armature that will expand
up to the full diameter of stator when
a short circuit is produced between
the ends of stator coil isolating start
current and trapping current into
device resulting in a ramping current
pulse which will disintegrate the
device.
FIG. 3. Explosively pumped FCG (Kopp,
1996)
Ramp times were determined as tens to hundreds of microseconds, peak current tens
of mega Amperes and peak energies of tens of megaJoules. The current multiplications 60
times was demonstrated.
The paramount issues in weapon system are space and weight so the start current is
desirable a small FCG used to initiate a larger FCG (cascade).
2.2 The vircator
This device is able to overcome shortcomings of FCGs related to frequencies below 1
MHz and energy output.
The vircator is a mechanic simple and robust one shot device able to produce a very
powerful single pulse of radiation, its output power can be focused and has ability to
couple energy into a wide range of targets.
The most common configurations for vircators are axial vircators (AV) and the
transverse vircators (TV). The AV has the simplest design - built into cylindrical
waveguide structure and produces the best power output which can be extracted by
transitioning the waveguide into a horn structure functioning as an antenna.
Issues posed by vircator design are related to output pulse duration a microsecond
limited by anode melting, stability of oscillation frequency, conversion efficiency and
total power output.
3. COUPLING MODES
In the open source literature there are described two coupling modes of power into
targets:
Front door coupling the power from an electromagnetic weapon is coupled in an
antenna of radars or comms equipments. Antenna assembly is designed to couple power
in and out of the equipment thus assuring a path for power flow from weapon to target
damaging it.
Back door coupling electromagnetic field from a weapon delivers large transient
currents or electrical standing waves on fixed electrical wiring and cables interconnecting
electrical or electronic devices causing damages to such equipments even by penetrating
equipment by transient currents.
Some typical semiconductor devices are protected with a protection circuit able to
sink electrostatic discharges but sustained or repeated application of a high voltage will
defeat the protection.
HPM weapons operating in the centimetric and milimetric bands offer an additional
coupling mechanism directly coupling into equipment via ventilation holes, gaps
between panels and poorly shielded interfaces the microwave radiation forming a
spatial wave within the equipment which will damage exposed components.
4.
E-BOMB LETHALITY
(a)
(b)
FIG. 6. Lethal footprint in relation to altitude (a) low frequency e-bomb (b) HPM e-bomb (Kopp,
1996)
5. E-BOMB EMPLOYMENT
Identifying valid targets to be engaged with e-bombs is a complex task. Some targets
are easy to be identified and engaged: government offices, production facilities, military
base, radar and commo equipments sites, e.g. are examples of targets geographically fixed
and can be engaged by means of aviation at GPS precision, weapons can be programmed
to detonate at optimal position in order to obtain maximum of electrical damage.
Mobile or camouflaged platforms like air defense equipment, mobile commo nodes,
naval vessels, wheeled or trucked vehicles are targets that can be located by means of
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) or Emitter Locating System (ELS), data linked to
launch platform and due to their inability to escape from lethal footprint they can be
efficiently engaged.
Difficulties are encountered in locating and engaging mobile targets and platforms
that do not overtly radiate, they can be located just by interpreting features of their
unintentional emissions (UE) or emanations from equipment poor shielded.
UE occurs at low power levels Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or other aerial platform are
required to overfly adversary territory to gather useful intelligence.
With GPS guidance, even without differential improvement, guided e-bomb are
precise enough due to their features.
The best solution for e-bomb launching are glide-bombs offering advantages of
releasing outside target air defense range minimizing the risk for the launching platform.
E-bombs can be used in a wide range of operations like electronic combat
operations, strategic air attack operations, maritime air operations, offensive counter air
operations, battlefield air interdictions operations, defensive counter-air operations and air
defense operations.
6. DEFENSE AGAINST E-BOMB
The best way to provide protection against e-bomb is to prevent their delivery by
destroying the launch platform or delivery vehicle (the case of nuclear weapons). This
option is not always available so systems could be exposed to electromagnetic bomb
attack effects they must be properly electromagnetic hardened.
The most efficient method is to place the equipment to be protected in an electrically
conductive container called Faraday cage in order to prevent electromagnetic field to
access and affect the protected equipment. This solutions have its own vulnerabilities the
equipment can still communicate with outside space, so can be electromagnetically
affected, via supply conductors. This vulnerability can be addressed by using optical fiber
for transferring data in and out equipment enclosure.
In the most situations in the entering points of conductors the enclosure have
arresting devices in these cases a challenge consists of determining their parameters to be
sure that they will successfully deal with rise time and strength of electrical transients
produced by electromagnetic devices, for example reports indicate that protective
measures intended to protect against nuclear EMP bombs are not effective against some
conventional microwave electromagnetic device designs.
Hardening of system should be performed at system level even one single
vulnerable component could inhibit or bring down the whole system.
In terms of financial costs we can say that hardening of new equipments will rise the
production cost of equipment meanwhile older equipments are impossible to be hardened
and must be replaced hardening must be a design task.