Content, Cause, and Stoic Impressions

Author(s): Glenn Lesses

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Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 1-25
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Content,Cause, and Stoic Impressions

GLENN LESSES

Accordingto the Stoics, only physical stuff exists.' To describeit in their

terms,the world consists of differenttypes of an airy substance,pneuma.
Some of these pneumatic stuffs instantiatepsychological propertiesor
states. Thus, psychological attributes,which they deny are completely
differentin kind from bodily properties,can be studied as part of the
naturalworld.2Within the context of their naturalism,the Stoics also
carefullyattendto the characterof psychologicalproperties.Despite their
differences,such states as sense-perceptions,emotions,and beliefs convey
informationto an agent. The complex physicalorganizationof the underlying pneumatic states determineswhy such psychological states have
content.Thus, the Stoics aim to providea unifiedtheoryof variedmental
phenomena.3
Accepted March 1997
' There are ontological complications since they also hold that there are things that
do not exist, such as sayables (lekta). See, e.g., Sextus M 10. 218.
2 Though the Stoics reject ordinaryversions of substance dualism, their own views
are complicated in ways I shall not explore. In particular,they do not appearto accept
either a version of reductive type-physicalism in which psychological states are simply identified with physical ones, or eliminativist theories. The Stoics are committed
to nothing more than that psychological propertieshave a physical basis sufficientfor
their real existence and their explanation. Accordingly, all that can be said here is that
the Stoics endorse some weak version of non-reductive physicalism. One apparent
dissent from this view is Deborah Modrak,"Stoics, Epicureansand Mental Content,"
Apeiron 26 (1993), p. 98, which is a review-discussion of Julia Annas, Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Modrak suggests
without argumentthat Stoic monism about the world provides a motive for a reductive physicalism. David Sedley, "Chrysippuson psychophysical causality," Passions
and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 1993), edd. Jacques Brunschwig and MarthaC. Nussbaum, pp. 313331, argues that it is a mistake to understandChrysippusto distinguish distinctly physical from mental descriptions of psychological attributes. The basic Stoic texts and
their fundamental arguments on behalf of their view are clearly presented in Julia
Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 3-6, 20-33, 37-70.
3 These general remarks help to reveal the attractionof Stoic philosophy of mind
for many contemporaryscholars. The Stoics are thoroughgoing naturalistswho conduct a serious inquiry into the ascription of propositional attitudes. Their analysis
of fundamental issues in philosophy of mind is often subtle and serves to remind
? Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, 1998

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Phronesis XLIIIII

GLENN LESSES

It quickly becomes evident that the Stoic view about the natureand
extent of the propositionalcontentof mentalstates is puzzling.They deny
that humanyoung or animalscan entertainbeliefs or have thoughts.The
existence of propositionalattitudesordinarilyis held to involve the attributionof some thoughtor belief. So, it would follow that the Stoics deny
small childrenor animalshave mentalstates with propositionalcontents.
Yet, thereis also evidenceto the contrary.For instance,in his well-known
example, Chrysippusattributeswhat appearsto be reasoningby disjunctive syllogism to a dog. One might argue that this kind of example commits the Stoics to the ascriptionof propositionalcontentseven in the case
of animals. Furthermore,if the mental states of non-rationalanimalsare
so impoverishedas to lack any propositionalcontent, the Stoics must
explain how it is possible for such animalsto functionadequatelyat all.
Doesn't, say, a mouse see that a cat is nearby?Recently,commentators
have debatedthe extent of propositionalcontentsin the Stoic accountof
psychological states. The discussion has focused, in particular,on perceptional states because for the Stoics perceptionand impulse are what
distinguishanimal life from other living things and perceptionhas a special prominencein their inquiryinto mentalstates.Two basic, competing
interpretations
have emerged.On what has become the orthodoxreading,
the Stoics sharply separatethe psychological states of non-rationalanimals from those of rationalanimals.Accordingto advocatesof the orthodox position, the mental states of, say, small childrenare too simple to
have the cognitive structurenecessaryfor the attributionof propositional
attitudesto them.4Non-rationalanimalscan perceiveonly qualities such
scholars of contemporarydiscussions. Here are just two examples. While Julia Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, does not discover the ancestor of any particularcontemporary position in Stoic thought, she does suggest, e.g., pp. 1-2, that the Stoics
construct the first philosophy of mind that is recognizably contemporary. Richard
Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," Phronesis 35 (1990), pp. 307-314, goes
much further. He argues that the Stoics would endorse the basic views of Daniel
Dennett on propositionalattitudesratherthan those of Donald Davidson.
4 Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," The
SkepticalTradition(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1983), ed. Myles Burnyeat,
pp. 65-93, is among the clearest and most forceful proponentsof this view. Others
include Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), pp. 73-75, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 239-241,
ChristopherGill, "Is there a concept of person in Greek philosophy?,"Companionsto
ancient thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), ed.
Stephen Everson, pp. 166-193, and Jean-LouisLabarriere,"De la 'naturephantastique'

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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

the Stoics
as sweetnessor whiteness.Accordingthe second interpretation,
deny thatthe sensoryperceptionsof animalsare completelydevoid of propositional contents. On this alternativereading, the Stoics much more
liberally ascribe propositionalcontent even in the case of non-rational
animals.5
In this essay, I argue that the Stoics draw some distinctions- as they
often are proneto do - that, as a result,enable us to locate a solutionto
the puzzle. The Stoics deny that there are any raw psychological states
completelydevoid of cognitivecontentbecause they discriminatebetween
a conceptionof more robustand more narrowcontent.It follows that the
Stoics occupy an intermediateposition,less severe thanwhat the orthodox
interpretationattributesto them and less generousthan what the alternative account finds. Thus, the Stoics hold that there is considerablecontinuity as well as significantdifferencesbetweenthe psychologicalstates of
rationaland non-rationalanimals.
I

Several basic featuresof Stoic psychologicaltheoryare relevantto issues

about content. The early Stoics speak of psuche in two senses (Sextus
M 7. 234).6 The term often is used to include many of the ways in which
des animaux chez les Stoiciens," Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), edd. Jacques
Brunschwig and MarthaC. Nussbaum, 225-249.
s Richard Sorabji is the principal advocate of this interpretation.See his "Perceptual Content in the Stoics," pp. 307-314, "Intentionalityand Physiological Processes:
Aristotle'sTheoryof Sense-Perception,"Essays on Aristotle'sDe Anima(Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 1992), edd. MarthaC. Nussbaum and Amelie OksenbergRorty, especially, pp. 195-206, "Animal Minds," Spindel Conference 1992: Ancient Minds, ed.
John Ellis, The SouthernJournal of Philosophy 31 (1993), supplement,especially, pp.
1-12, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the WesternDebate (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 20-28, 40-44. Although Julia Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 75-87, officially adopts a version of the orthodox
interpretation,she also occasionally attributesa kind of content to animal perceptions,
pp. 57-64, 71-72. At one point, p. 64, Annas says: "Hence there is a division of kind
between animal and human inner life. And hence the Stoics denied to animals not only
reasoning but emotions and even desires; since animals cannot articulateand interpret
in language the content of their experience...." Does she hold that non-rationalsensory perceptions have propositionalcontents that animals are unable to verbalize? If
so, her position ascribes content to the impressionsof non-rationalanimals and appears
very close to what Sorabji formulates more fully.
6 The
positions formulatedby Zeno, Cleanthes, and, especially, Chrysippusconsti-

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GLENN LESSES

both rationaland non-rationalanimalsfunction.'The pneumaticsubstance

constitutingthe soul, understoodthis way, is intimatelyblendedwith the
somewhatdifferentpneuma of a body to form a living animal. Yet, in
anothersense, the Stoics often refer to just one partof the soul, namely,
its ruling part (to hegemonikon).This part is restrictedto those activities
we typically regardas mental - thinking,believing, perceiving,and so
forth- ratherthan the entire range of living functions.Both rationaland
non-rationalanimals have a ruling part of the soul, though non-rational
animals cannot entertainthoughtsor desires. When anotherpart of the
soul is affected,such as in the case of sense-perception,it also produces
alterationsin the rulingpart.8Since the rulingpartof the soul is the location of desire and reasonin rationalanimalsand activitiessuch as senseperceptionalso affect it,9 it is particularlyeasy for the Stoics to speak
loosely - as they often do - and identify the soul with the ruling part. I
shall restrictmy use of "soul"to the notionof the soul's rulingaspectand
usually apply "mind" or "mental" to describe it.

Centralto whetherthe Stoics hold that mentalevents have content is

their view of perception(aisthesis).Ordinaryperceptualevents have two
conceptually distinct stages: phantasia and assent (sunkatathesis).Althe termrefersto a
thoughphantasia is often translatedas "appearance,"
mentalstate,which includesmuchmorethanvisual
basic, representational
The Stoic notionof phantasiaappliesto othermentalfuncappearances.'0
tions besides sense-perception.For instance,the hegemonikoncan generate non-perceptualphantasiai throughits own internaloperations(D.L.
7. 51). Somethingmore neutralsuch as "impression"capturesthe term's
wider range."
tute orthodox Stoicism. As is well-known, later Stoics such as Panaetius appear to
modify or reject several central tenets of early Stoicism about the soul.
I Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, p. 54, points out that in Stoic theory
some capacities of living things such as basic metabolism are not part of the soul's
functions.
8 See Calcidius in Tim. 220, Aetius 4. 21. 1-3, Plotinus 4. 7. 7.
See Stobaeus 1. 368. 12-15, Aetius 4. 23. 1.
10 It is helpful to survey the considerable scholarship about Aristotle's conception of phantasia. Two useful sources are: Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu
Animalium (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 221-269, for a general
discussion of Aristotle on phantasia, and Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in
Early Stoicism, for a succinct account of the general Aristotelian backgroundfor the
Stoics, pp. 9-17.
" Althoughphantasia is, of course, legitimately translatedas "appearance"because
it derives from the verb "to appear"and is just the way things appear to one, this ren-

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CONTENT,CAUSE,AND STOICIMPRESSIONS

The Stoics often describea phantasia as a kind of imprint(tup6sis).'2

Although this imprintis somethingphysical, the Stoics debated exactly
how one should construeit:
(1) We shall know this if we first learn what impression is, according to them, and
what its specific d1fferentiaeare. So, according to them, an impression is an
imprint(tuposis) in the soul. And they differedimmediatelyaboutthis. ForCleanthes
took imprint in terms of depression and elevation - just like the imprinton wax
made by seal-rings. But Chrysippus thought that such a view was absurd. For
first, he says, this will requirethat when our intellect has impressions at one time
of a triangle and a tetragon,the same body will have to have in itself at the same
time different shapes - triangularand tetragonal together, or even round; which
is absurd. Next, since many imprints exist in us at the same time the soul will
also have many configurations.This is worse than the first problem. [Chrysippus]
himself speculated, therefore, that imprintwas used by Zeno to mean alteration;
so that the definition becomes like this: "impressionis an alterationof the soul";
for it is no longer absurd that the same body at one and the same time (when
many impressions exist in us) should receive many alterations. For just as air,
when many people speak at once, receiving at one time an indefinite number of
differentblows, also has many alterations, so too the ruling part of the soul will
experience

something similar when it receives varied impressions.'3

[Sextus,

M 7. 227-231]

Both Cleanthesand Chrysippussharethe view thatan impressionis something physical, namely, a modificationof some pneuma. They disagree
about how to explain this physical change, but both rule out treating
dering might misleadingly suggest that it primarily involves visual images and the
sense-modality of sight. Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct
Impressions,"and A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1,
employ "impression."Various other attempts to render the term include: Julia Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, and Richard Sorabji, "Perceptual Content in the
Stoics," use "appearance,"Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy:
IntroductoryReadings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988), "presentation,"
(which also has the virtue of neutralitywith respect to sense-modalities, but doesn't
reflect the definition of phantasia in terms of tup6sis quite as well) and A.A. Long,
"Representationand the self in Stoicism," Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ed. Stephen Everson, pp.
102-120, uses "representation."A.A. Long, p. 107, n. 6, changes his usage from his
earlier "impression"to "representation"because he worries that the Humean associations of "impression"might mislead.
12 See D.L. 7. 50, Sextus M 7. 227-231, 7. 372-373, Plut. Ad Col. 1122C, Comm.
not. 1084F.
1' See also D.L. 7. 45-46, 50. Unless otherwise indicated, translationsare based on
Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: IntroductoryReadings, with
occasional modifications.

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GLENN LESSES

impressionsolely as a kind of image.'4Furthermore,

both Cleanthesand
Chrysippusattemptto explainphantasia in termsof the complexityof its
physicalstructure.Chrysippusrejectswhat he takes to be Cleanthes'view
that an adequate explanation of an agent's impressions must attribute
the same qualitative features to the impression as to that which they
represent.'1

The second stage involved in perception proper is assent (sunkatathesis). For perceptionto occur, an agent must not only be presentedwith
an impression,he or she also mustassentto it.'6In rationalanimals,assent
to an impressionis a voluntaryact.'7The Stoics often speak of sunkata14 For discussions of this passage in Sextus, see Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy
of Mind, pp. 72-75, Deborah Modrak, "Stoics, Epicureans, and Mental Content,"
p. 99, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 239, and
David Sedley, "Chrysippuson psychophysical causality," pp. 329-330. According to
Modrak, the passage suggests that Chrysippus does not accept that an impression is
an imprint. But the text indicates that the dispute between Chrysippusand Cleanthes
over what Zeno meant is instead a matterof interpretingthe natureof a tuposis. Both
appear to accept that an impression is an imprintof some kind.
's Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 74-75, points out Sextus might
not do justice to the dispute. It is possible that Chrysippussimply attemptedto develop
furtherwhat he held to be the same fundamentalview as Cleanthes' position.
However, Chrysippusappears to criticize Cleanthes for accepting a naive view of
mental representationthat implies that perceptualimpressions are copies of the qualities that the objects representedhave. For instance, on Cleanthes' account of impression, when we perceive a triangularobject the impression that we ordinarilyhave is
triangular.Some commentatorshave taken the remarks of Chrysippus to entail that
impressionsare propositionalin form or articulablein linguistic form. E.g., Annas, pp.
74-75, concludes that Chrysippus "analyzed perception in terms of the reception of
content and its articulationin linguistic form." This conclusion is too strong. All that
seems to follow is that the impressionconveys information.Whetherwhat is conveyed
requires propositional content is less clear. Why is it necessary that our perceptual
impressions of, say, squareness or redness, involve the propositionthat something is
red or square? As it stands, all Chrysippus has to accept is that the qualities that
impressions have are not necessarily similar to the characteristicsof their causes.
16 See D.L. 7. 49, Cicero Acad. 1. 40, 2. 145, Plut. Ad Col. 1122B-C, Stobaeus
1. 349. 23-27.
'7 The nature of assent for non-rationalanimals is a vexed and complicated question. Brad Inwood, Ethics and HumanAction in Early Stoicism, p. 72, denies that nonrational animals can assent. Jean-Louis Labarriere,"De la 'nature phantastique'des
animaux chez les Stoiciens," especially, pp. 243-249, argues that the Stoic position
is that animals can exhibit a type of assent to impressions. See also Julia Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 72-75, 89-102, Christopher Gill, "Is there a
concept of person in Greek philosophy?,"pp. 185-186, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley,
The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 322, A.A. Long, "Representationand the self

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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

thesis resultingin some sort of belief. Much dependson the natureof the
impressionto which agents are assentingsince assent is a sort of genus.
To outlinethe basic Stoic position,what agentsassent to, at least in many
cases, is a proposition(lekton)characterizedby the impression.Genuinely
conceptualthinkingarises subsequentlyto the occurrenceof impressions.'8
The Stoics hold thatconceptsare a type of impression,which resultsfrom
an agent, in effect, internalizingrepeated,similar impressions.'9The act
of thinking involves articulatingor reflecting about the proposition to
which one has assented.Althoughthe Stoics distinguishtheoreticallybetween the occasion of having an impressionand assentingto it, it is unclearwhetherthetwo stagesareactuallydistinctin cases of sense-perception.
II

The basic issues about mentalcontentwill become clearerif we compare

the two principal, competing interpretations.The accounts of Michael
Frede and RichardSorabjiare prominentrepresentativesof each. Let me
firstbrieflydiscuss Frede's perspicuousformulationof the orthodoxreading. Accordingto Frede,20
bothnon-rationaland rationalanimalshave sensory capacities that causally connect them with the world aroundthem.
Yet, they also differ significantlyin the natureof their sense-experience.
In particular,the impressionsthat occur in animals and humanyoung are
differentin kind from those of adult humans.Maturehumanbeings have
rationalimpressionswhich are propositionalin nature.When Dion sees
his house, his impressionis that it is brown, has two floors, needs to be
painted,and so forth. But a young child, Theon, cannot have these sorts
of impressionsand perceives only, say, brownnessand the characteristic
of having two floors. Infantand animal impressionscannot supportthat
something is the case and thus fail to have any propositionalcontents
at all.2'
in Stoicism," pp. 110-111, Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp.
40-42.
18 D.L. 7. 49, Sextus M 8. 56, Galen, Def. med. 19. 381.
19

Plut. Comm. not. 1084F-1085A, Aetius 4. 11. 1-5.

The summary of Frede's interpretationis derived from "Stoics and Skeptics on

Clear and Distinct Impressions,"especially pp. 66-73.
21 Frede also suggests that not all propositional impressions have the same degree
of propositional content. There can be grades of propositional involvement. Further,
Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,"p. 69, indicates that
we ought to distinguish the manner in which different impressions are held. Although
20

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GLENNLESSES

What is Frede's main evidence?Text (2) leads Frede to hold that any
impressionof a rationalbeing is rational.
(2) Of impressions, some are rational (logikai) and some are non-rational (alogoi).
The rational are those of rational animals, the non-rationalof non-rational.The
rational,then, are thoughtsand the non-rationalhave been given no special name.
[D.L. 7. 51]

Because the passage identifiesrationalimpressionswith thoughts,he also

Other
concludesthatonly rationalimpressionshave propositionalcontent.22
texts also sharplydistinguishbetween rationalimpressionsand impressions that are merely perceptual:
(3)

Through the senses alone one is not able to grasp the truth, as we indicated
before23and now shall explain briefly, for they [the senses] are by nature nonrational, and of more than being impressed by impressors [i.e., the things that
impress] they are not capable, as they are completely unsuitablefor discovering
the truth.For not only must one be moved to have a sensation of white or sweet
for one to grasp the truth in the underlying things, but one must be brought to
have an impression of that thing that "this is white" and "this is sweet." And so
the other like things [i.e., the other senses]. But to grasp a thing of this kind is
no longer the work of perception.For color only and taste and sound is its nature
to grasp, while that "this is white" or "this is sweet," which are neithercolor nor
taste, is unsuspected by sense.24[Sextus M 7. 344-345]

Frede identifiesthe results of sense-perceptionin this passage with what

are, accordingto (2), non-rationalimpressions.It follows thatby the exercise of sense-perceptionalone one would not be able to entertainimpressions with propositionalcontent. A statementthat somethingis the case
this point is generally less importantfor our purposes, it is worth noting that for Frede
rational impressions can give rise to distinct thoughts because otherwise identical impressions can be held in differentmanners. Sameness of content does not completely
determine identity of thoughts. See also, his "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of
the soul," The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 1986), edd. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker, especially pp.
103-107.
22 Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,"p. 67:
"Rational impressions have a propositionalcontent, they are impressions to the effect
that something is the case very much in the sense in which we might say ordinarily,
Frede also
'the impression,which one gets, if one looks at the evidence, is that..
appeals to Galen Def. med. 126 for additional support.
23 See Sextus M 7. 293.
24 The translationis mine.

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CONTENT,CAUSE,AND STOICIMPRESSIONS

is requiredfor us to determinetruthor falsity. But Fredetakes (3) to deny

that sense-perceptionitself can supplythe requisitepropositionalform. At
most, the senses can tell us aboutthe qualitiesof things- theirwhiteness,
say, or sweetness- when we are causallyaffectedby externalthings.This
is all that a tuposis, the imprint, can convey in such cases.

In anotherimportantpassage, Cicero appearsto confirmFrede's reading and also adds something:

(4) Those characteristicswhich belong to the things we describe as being grasped by
the senses are equally characteristicof that furtherset of things said to be grasped
not by the senses directly but by them in a certain respect, e.g., "that is white,
this is sweet, that is melodious, this is fragrant,this is bitter."Our grasp of these
is secured by the mind, not the senses. Next, "that is a horse, that is a dog." The
rest of the series then follows, connecting bigger items which virtually include
complete grasp of things, like "if it is a human being, it is a mortal, rational animal." From this class conceptions of things are imprintedon us, without which
there can be no understandingor discussion of anything.25[Acad. 2. 21]

For Frede, (3) indicatesthat the senses by themselvesare unable to produce impressions containing any propositionalcontent. This task, accordingto (4), requirescertainoperationsof the mind. Thus, rationaland
non-rationalanimals differ in the sorts of impressions of which they
are capable. Frede explains the capacity of rationalanimals to entertain
rationalimpressionsin terms of their ability to form concepts. Lacking
any conceptualapparatus,non-rationalanimals cannot entertainimpressions having propositionalform. In the Stoic account of psychological
development,concepts (ennoiai) arise later than perceptualimpressions
(Aetius 4. 11. 1-5). The Stoics separateconceptualthinkingfrom the mere
occurrenceof perceptualstates.
Although Frede's formulationof the Stoic account has considerable
plausibility,RichardSorabjirejects the orthodoxreading. He challenges
both the philosophicalunderpinningsof Frede's interpretationas well as
its textual support.Let us first consider Sorabji's objection to a philosophical argumentemployed by Frede and next describe his own fresh
interpretiveproposal.Sorabjiis unimpressedby the theoreticalargument
that conceptsare necessaryfor propositionalthought.It is a controversial
matterfor manycontemporaryphilosophersof mindwhetherin every case
the employment of concepts is requiredfor propositionalattribution.26
2' This translation basically follows A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic
Philosophers.
26 See Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," pp. 308-309, "Animal

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10

GLENN LESSES

Some argue that despite the necessity of concepts for belief-attribution

there is no such requirementfor other sorts of mental states. Consider
a typical example: agents can perceive a structureas ten-sidedwithout
having a concept of ten or any other relevantconcepts. Perceptualcontent for Sorabjionly demandsa sort of predication- i.e., one thing being
another.27
Althoughhis conceptionof propositionalcontentas predication
is neverfully explained,let us deferour discussionof it until later.At this
point, all we need to see is Sorabji's strategyfor underminingFrede's
argumentabout concepts and propositionalcontents.28
Sorabjialso addressesFrede's textual arguments.First, Sorabjiargues
that it is consistentwith text (2) that non-rationalimpressionshave propositional form. Rationalimpressionscan be a subset of impressionsthat
have propositionalcontent.29The passage does not rule out that otherimpressionsalso have propositionalcontent. Sorabjithen suggests that our
sources give us reason to distinguishbetween two types of verbalizable
linguistic form correspondingto impressions.Some phantasiai- rational
impressions- are articulableby theirowners,while others- non-rational
impressions- are articulableonly by non-owners.Althoughrationalagents
can, in principle,articulatethe content of their rationalimpressions,in
contrast, an infant, say, cannot verbalize the content of its perceptual
impressions.30
Minds," p. 6, "Intentionalityand Physiological Processes," pp. 200-210, and Animal
Minds and Human Morals, pp. 30-31. He refers particularlyto the work of Peacocke
and Evans who deny that concepts are required for propositional thought on every
occasion. See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982), and Christopher Peacocke, "Analogue Content," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society (1986), supp. vol. 60, pp. 1-17.
27 Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 307, Animal Minds and
Human Morals, pp. 12, 21.
28 If the doctrine that content requires conceptual apparatusfails to be settled for
contemporaryphilosophy, then Sorabji points out it is a mistake to regard it as incontrovertible for ancient authors. In any case, how far can Frede's objection take us?
Although any interpretationwill be driven by a principleof charityto attributeas plausible an account as the evidence allows, it is always worth being reminded that the
Stoics and other historical figures are not immune from adopting patently unjustified
positions. Hence, even if the thesis that concepts are requiredfor propositionalcontent turns out to be warranted,it still doesn't follow without considerable additional
argument that the Stoics realized that it must be so.
29 Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 311, Animal Minds and
Human Morals, p. 25.
1 For the moment, let it suffice to point out a more naturalreading of (2), which is
somewhat weaker than Frede's yet does not requirethat we endorse Sorabji's strategy.

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Accordingto Sorabji,many of Frede's other importantsources should

also be read differently.Sorabjitentativelysuggests that text (3), Sextus
M 7. 344-345, does not reflectgenuine Stoic doctrine.3'But even supposing the passage is orthodoxStoicism, Sorabjiarguesthat it togetherwith
(4), Cicero Acad. 2. 21, entail that perceptualimpressionshave content.
For, he argues, if it is true that the senses can only perceive in a way,
say, that somethingis white, then such impressionsin a way have some
propositional content. Accordingly, a perceptual impression must be
"as of something's being white" rather than an impression simply of
whiteness.32

On Sorabji's account,the impressionsof, say, a newbornor a cat do

have propositionalcontentin the sense that their impressionspresentone
thing to be predicatedof another.Our sourcesalso only speak of impressions as verbalizable,not actually verbalized.33
To be sure, non-rational
animalscannotarticulateor conceptualizewhat they perceive.But, Sorabji
argues, it doesn't follow that non-rationalanimals cannot have impressions with content solely because their impressions are not verbalizable by them. It suffices for the attributionof propositionalcontent that
the verbalizableimpressionsof non-rationalanimalscan be articulatedby
other animalsthat are rational- namely, US.34 He concludesthat animals
cannot articulatethe content of the impressionsthat arise in perception
and in other mental functioning,but their impressionshave articulable
content.35
The passage only establishes that not all impressions are to be identifiedwith thoughts
or beliefs. Rational animals alone can have impressions of the latter sort, but the passage simply leaves open whether the attributionof content requires that impressions
are thoughts.
31 Though most commentatorsaccept that Sextus is describing a Stoic position here,
it is difficult to determine whether in this text Sextus refers to Stoic doctrine because
there is no explicit attributionof the view to a particulardogmatic school. Richard
Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," pp. 311-312, presents no argumentthat it
cannot be a reference to Stoicism. But it is also not obvious that Frede's inference
about the passage follows. The fact that the senses can "only grasp color, flavor, and
sound" doesn't tell us exactly what is entailed by such grasping.
32 Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 311.
33 See D.L. 7. 49, Aetius 4. 12. 1, Sextus M 7. 244, M 8. 70.
3 Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 311, Animal Minds and
Human Morals, pp. 22-23.
3S In supportof his interpretation,Sorabji also appeals to additional sources, which
our sketch of his position can only survey in passing. For instance, he refers to
Chrysippus'well-known example of the dog engaging in something analogous to the
application of disjunctive syllogism (Sextus, PH 1. 69). Chrysippus explicitly states

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GLENN LESSES

Despite the considerableforce and elegance of Sorabji'sinterpretation,

we shouldhave reservationsaboutit as well. Firstof all, obviouslymuch
dependson an assumptionthatunderlieshis readingof the Stoics.He accepts
the principlethat we ought to ascribeintentionalityto the impressionsof
non-rationalanimalsif rationalanimalscan articulatetheircontent.In this
respect, Sorabjiacknowledgesthat he is following Dennett.36Of course,
one could have reasonabledoubts about the success of Dennett's instruYet, regardless
mentalismfor the attributionof propositionalattitudes.37
it
has
a
certain lack of
position
plausible,
of whetherwe find Dennett's
fit with Stoic theory. Dennett is an anti-realistabout propositionalattitudes.38On his view, we ought to accept explanationsof humanbehavior
that employ beliefs and desires solely because of their usefulness. But,
althoughthis metaphysicalissue will not be discussedfully here,it is clear
that the Stoics really admit desires and beliefs into their ontology. They
are robustrealists about propositionalattitudes.Impulsesand perception
that the mental activity of the dog is only in effect or passes for (dunamei) reasoning.
The Stoics deny that a dog can have beliefs, so it must grasp throughperceptionthat
one or more of the paths ahead of it does not have any scent. Sorabji also refers to
passages from Hierocles, Seneca, and Chrysippus in which these authors discuss the
early stages of an animal's life. Self-awareness is necessary for self-preservation,an
impulse which the Stoics claim all animal life possesses from the very start.The Stoic
analysis of self-awareness requires that animals are aware that they have particular
body parts, that their prey have weaknesses, and so forth. In "PerceptualContent in
the Stoics," p. 312, he holds that such instances of self-awareness can only be understood by attributingpropositionalattitudes. In addition, he cites passages in Plutarch
and Sextus (Plut. On the E at Delphi 386F-387A, Sextus M 8. 276) in which rational
and non-rationalanimals are distinguished in terms of whether they are capable of
inferential reasoning. Sorabji says that only rational animals can draw inferences.
Although the Stoics are silent in these sources about the nature of animal perceptual
impressions, the texts suggest to Sorabji that the difference between rational and
non-rationalanimals has little to do with whether or not their impressionshave propositional form. Consequently, these other sources also lead Sorabji to deny that nonrational animals are only capable of impressions completely devoid of propositional
contents.
`6 See Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 314, "Intentionality
and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," p. 206, and
Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 28. He cites, in particular,D. Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood,"in A. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University
of California Press), pp. 175-196.
37 E.g., see Jeriy A. Fodor, "Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation:The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum,"A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge,
Massachusetts:The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 6-8.
38 See Jerry Fodor, "Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent
Auntie's Vade-Mecum,"p. 7.

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are what distinguishanimal life from otherkinds of living things.39When

they speak more precisely, the Stoics restrictdesire (orexis), which they
define as a kind of impulsethat requiresbelief, to rationalbeings, though
some animal impulses can be relatively similar in nature to human
desires.' In any case, impulses, desires, and beliefs are identifiedwith
movementsof the soul. Thus, the Stoics take such psychologicalstates to
be instancesof actuallyexisting physical states.
Sorabji tells us very little about his predicationalnotion of propositional contents.His positionappearsto come to this: thereis a weak sense
of "propositional"which means only that one thing is connected with
another.4'Animals have impressionsthat a is relatedto b. On his view,
we should attributepropositionalcontents to the mental states of nonrational animals because their impressionscontain the propositionthat
one thing is predicatedof another.Sorabji commits himself to nothing
more than the position that propositionsare what that-clausesintroduce.
As we alreadysaw, the orthodoxinterpretationshares this core analysis
of propositions.Sorabji also adds a distinctionbetween perceiving-that
and perceiving-as.42Accordingly,one might hold that animals can perceive, say, somethingas sweet even if one denies that they can perceive
that somethingis sweet. If we arguethat the impressionthat gives rise to
the latter sort of perceptioncorrespondsto lekta, then non-rationalanimals cannot entertainit. However, it is unclearwhat importanceSorabji
places on this distinctionsince he concedes that neitherwe nor the Stoics
neatly distinguishin this way betweenas and that.43
A more importantproblemis that Sorabji'sattributionof propositional
contentsis far from restrictive.To say that non-animalsperceivethat a is
relatedto b or that a is predicatedof b is to attributea huge class of what
the Stoics must hold are impressionsexpressinglekta. If the Stoics deny
that animals can entertainthe impressionthat somethingis white, it is
hardto see why they would attributepredicationalmentalcontentsto animals or what real theoreticaladvantagefollows. On what basis is it rea39

D.L. 7. 86.

Stobaeus 2. 86. 17 - 87. 6. For a discussion of Stoic distinctions among kinds

of impulses, see Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, pp. 224242. See also Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 89-102.
41 Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 307, Animal Minds and
Human Morals, pp. 12, 17, 21.
42 See Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 309, Animal Minds
and Human Morals, pp. 21-22.
41 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 22.
4

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GLENN LESSES

sonable to accept that animalscan have, for example, impressionsthat a

white thing is to the left of a blue thing, yet not attributeto them the impression that somethingis white? Frede and other proponentsof orthodoxy are right to deny that the Stoics would accept so generousa view
since impressionswith predicationalcontentsalso correspondto lekta and
as such are accessible only to rationalanimals.
Finally, there are also textualreasonsto be wary of Sorabji'sreading.
The sources to which he appeals often might reasonablybe read more
weakly. In particular,I cannotfind any passage that supportshis position
that the contentof the impressionsof non-rationalanimalscan, in principle, be articulatedby rationalanimals.For instance,D.L. 7. 49, one passage on which he places much importance,distinguishesbetween two
mental operations:(i) the occasion of having an impressionand (ii) formulatingin wordshow one is affectedthroughhaving it. The text is silent
aboutrationalanimalshaving the capacityto verbalizethe impressionsof
non-rationalones. It is possibleto readit simplyas assertingthatthe agent
in whom the impressionoccurshas the abilityto expressits content.Moreover, some passagesweigh againstSorabji'spoint.Considerpartof Aetius
4. 12. 1, which statesof an impression:"[giventhroughsight]we are able
to say (eipein ekhomen)thatthereexists somethingwhite which moves us
(hemas);similarlyfor touch or smell."44In this passage, an impressionis
linked to what the agents themselves presentedwith an impressionare
capableof verbalizing.Its contentscan be expressedby the same subjects
in whom it occurs. Althoughsuch passages indeed show that the Stoics
distinguishbetweenwhat can potentiallybe expressedand what actually
is verbalized,no mentionis made of one person'simpressionbeing articulable by anotheror of an animal's perceptualimpressionbeing verbalizreadingthan Sorabji'sis
able by us. A more naturaland straightforward
availableto us. The Stoics do distinguishbetweenwhat is articulableand
what actually is articulated.However, this point applies only to rational
agents presentedwith an impression.Although rationalagents normally
can express the contentof some of their impressions,they do not always
actually articulatewhat these impressionsconvey. In other words, the
Stoics are sensitive to the differencebetween occurrentverbalizationand
I Aetius 4. 12. 1 is partof text (5) below. See RichardSorabji,"PerceptualContent
in the Stoics," p. 309, for his additional citations. Sextus M 7. 244 says of certain
impressions that it is possible to make a true or false assertion as a result (the true,
persuasive ones, a true assertion, the false persuasive ones, a false one). Sextus M
8. 70 similarly says of rational impressions that their content can be expressed in
words. See also Sextus M 8. 10, D.L. 7. 65, Sextus M 9. 211.

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an agent's abilityto verbalize.Thus, it is consistentwith the evidence that

the Stoics are makinga much more obvious point in these passages than
Sorabjisuggests.
III

The Stoics investigatethe initial stages of animal developmentin terms

of their doctrineof oikeiosis. In the process that they describe, animals
come to have inclinationsto act and become aware of themselves.45Animal life is distinguishedfrom other kinds of living and non-livingthings
in virtueof having impulses(hormai)and perception(aisthesis).4 For the
Stoics, perceptionis priorto impulsebecauseanimalsmust perceivethemselves in order for impulses to occur.47 Such impulses arise as a result of

impressionswith which animals are presented.48

Animals perceive themselves (aisthanesthai heautou, Hierocles 1, 34-9, 51-7) continuously from
birth (Hierocles 1. 37-50, 3. 52-4. 53, 4. 53-4. 58). Chrysippus states that

an animal's initial inclinationis based on "the firstthing for every animal

belongingto it - its own constitution(sustasis) and the self-consciousness
(suneidesis)of this" (D.L. 7. 85).49 If self-perceptionis a species of perception, then self-perceptionalso requiresthe occurrenceof phantasiai.S0

D.L. 7. 85, Cicero Fin. 3. 16.

See Hierocles 1. 30-37, especially, and D.L. 7. 86. Hierocles' argumentsare discussed in Brad Inwood, "Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century
A.D.," OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), pp. 151-183, and in A.A. Long,
"Hierocles on oikeiosis and self-perception,"Hellenistic Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. K.J.
Boudouris (InternationalCenter for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1994),
pp. 93-104. Long's essay is a summary of more extended discussion in the edition
of Hierocles that he together with Guido Bastianini have completed for the series
Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) I, vol. 1** (Florence, 1992).
47 See Cicero fin. 3. 16, Seneca Ep. 121. Cicero actually refers to the desires of
infants ratherthan their impulses. When the Stoics speak precisely, they typically distinguish desire (orexis) from impulse (horme) and deny that non-rational animals
including human young can have desire, which is a species of impulse. Stobaeus
2. 86. 20 - 87. 6 indicates that orexis is a kind of rational impulse. See Brad Inwood,
Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, pp. 225-230, 235-237, A.A. Long and
D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. I1, p. 318, note on Stobaeus 2. 86.
17 - 87. 6, and Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 91-97.
48 See Stobaeus 2. 86. 20 - 87. 6, Origen, Prin. 3. 1. 2-3.
He refers to self-consciousness in this passage, not self-perception. We have no
4
sources of which I am aware where Chrysippusspeaks explicitly of self-perception.
`0 One way to understandthe continuous self-perception to which the Stoics refer

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GLENN LESSES

Whatis the natureof the initialimpressionsof self-perception?Answering this questionwill help determinethe extent of the Stoic attributionof
propositionalcontents.Since these impressionsoccurfrom the momentof
birth,the initial impressionscannot be the result of repeatedexperience.
Stoic examplesof self-perceptionoften referto specific animalbody parts
and functions.For instance,snails perceivetheirflesh and shells and birds
perceive theirwings are for flying.5'Self-perceptionsometimesis said to
involve perceivingthat somethingis the case but since such descriptions
are far from typical we should exercise cautionabout drawingtoo much
from this evidence.52The Stoics often seem to be searchingfor a way of
speakingthat is less cognitively loaded and appearto be reluctantto attributetoo much cognitionto animalsand humaninfants.53In any event,
these kinds of examples - such as the bull perceivingthat its horns are
for self-defense - appeal to later stages of oikeiosis. But self-perception
also occurs duringthe initial stages of oikei6sis.
What about the originalimpressionsthat arise in self-perceptionin the

is that animals have a steady disposition to perceive themselves. It is also possible

that they intend to make the stronger claim that animals are continuously perceiving
themselves occurrently. A.A. Long, "Hierocles on oikeiosis and self-perception,"pp.
93-104, proposes an account along these lines of continuous self-perceptionin terms
of proprioception,i.e., the notion of self-monitoring.
51 See Hierocles 1. 51-2. 3, Seneca Ep. 121. 18-20.
52
See Hierocles 3. 2-6 and Seneca Ep. 121. 21.
S3 For instance, Seneca, in a remarkreminiscentof Chrysippus,says that every animal is aware of its constitution or physical makeup from birth (Ep. 121. 5-6). Their
awareness is the developmental basis for the other things that they perceive (Ep. 121.
12). But he also thinks that it is a mistake to take animals or humanyoung to be capable of explaining their makeupor defining their constitution(Ep. 121. 11-13). Although
non-rationalanimals are aware of their ruling part, they cannot elucidate or express
what it is (Ep. 121. 13). Seneca makes an analogy (Ep. 121. 12) between the awareness that adult humans have of their souls and the awareness of non-rationalanimals
of their constitution.Though we perceive our souls, this awarenessdoes not entail that
we know the soul's nature or even its location. Similarly, when non-rationalanimals
perceive themselves, the impressions that occur do not include enough information
to define what they perceive or to say anything clearly about it. See also Seneca Ira
1. 3. 7. Richard Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 312, is, of course, correct that these texts and similar ones where the Stoics speak of the vagueness or lack
of clarity of the perception of non-rationalanimals underdeterminewhether their impressions are propositional. My point here is simply that Seneca marks non-rational
animal perceptualimpressionsas somewhat weaker than the perceptualimpressionsof
rational animals. Though Seneca does not say exactly what is ruled out, he places
restrictionson what the initial impressions of self-perceptioncan contain.

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initial stages of oikei6sis? In the following passage, the Stoics refer to

basic sense impressions:
(5) Chrysippus says that these four things differ from each other. Impression, then,
is an experience (pathos) which occurs in the soul and which, in [the pathos]
itself, also indicates that which caused it. For example, when we observe something white by means of vision, there is a pathos which has occurredin the soul
by means of vision; and <in virtue of> this pathos we are able to say there exists
something white which stimulates us. And similarly for touch and smell. Impression (phantasia) gets its name from light (ph6s); for just as light reveals itself
and the other things which are encompassed in it, so too impressionreveals itself
and that which caused it. The impressed thing is that which causes the impression. For example, the impressed thing is the white and the cold and everything
which is able to stimulate the soul. [Aetius 4. 12. 1-3]

In conjunctionwith (5), consideralso anothersimilar text, which further

helps us to understandand explain differencesin mentalcontent:54
(6) And this pathos must be indicative both of itself and of the phenomenonwhich
produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that
an impression is a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the
other thing [i.e., its cause]. For example, Antiochus says, when we look at something we are put into a certain condition with respect to sight and we do not have
our sight in the same condition as before we looked. In this sort of alteration,
we take hold of (antilambanometha)two things, one, the alterationitself, which
is the impression, and, the second, that which produced the alteration,which is
the visible thing. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So, just as light
(phos) reveals both itself and everything in it, in this way the impression too,
which is the beginning of the animal's cognitive functions, like light, must make
apparentboth itself and the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it.
[Sextus, M 7. 161-163]

Neitherof these passagesprimarilyconcernsthe kindsof examplesof selfperceptionprovidedby Hierocles such as the bull's awarenessof its own
horns for self-defense.The accountshere are generaldescriptionsof any
impressionof sense. In addition,text (6) speaks of the impressionsas the
source of any cognition, which strongly suggests that these descriptions
pertainto the earliest stages of oikeiosis.
First, a preliminaryquestion must be addressed. Do these passages
apply to both non-rationaland rationalanimals?55There is no reason to
I

The language of (6) is so similar to (5) that we should suppose that Antiochus is
speaking in his Stoicizing mode and that the passage genuinely reflects Stoic doctrine.
S5 This question is raised by Jean-LouisLabarrire, "De la 'naturephantastique'des

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GLENN LESSES

think that these texts are restrictedto a discussion of the beginningsof

cognitionin rationalanimals.(5) speaksgenerallyof the notionof impression and gives an account of its etymology. If these sources mean to
include the impressionsof humannewborns,then they are likely also to
text (6)
refer to the impressionsof any non-rationalanimal.Furthermore,
refers very broadlyto the impressionsof an animal(to z6on). Even more
significantis that in (6) we discover that impressionsare relatedto the
"beginningsof an animal's cognitive functions."Thus, we should conclude thatour sourceshere describetheoreticalfeaturessharedby impressions generally.
An examinationof these generalfeaturesproducesa relativelycircumscribed notion of propositionalcontents. First of all, we are told that
impressionsof this sort reveal theircauses. The Stoics do not say that an
impressionhas featureswhich copy the characteristicsof its cause. As an
example, sight is said to perceive the white, which is identifiedas the
cause of the impression.There is no indicationthat the perceptionof the
white includes the impressionthat somethingis white. Accordingto (5),
the white, the cause of the impression,is the impressedthing(phantaston)
and is indicatedin the impressionitself. Recall that in text (4) Cicerodistinguishes between what the senses perceive - whiteness - and what is

actuallyperceivedby the mind,not the senses - the propositionthatsomething is white. There are puzzles about this passage to which we will
returnshortly,but for the momentat least it is reasonableto suggest that
the sense-impressionhas the impressedthing, viz., the white, as partof its
contentsbut does not have the propositionthatsomethingis white as part.
Passages (5) and (6) also stipulatethat a sensoryimpressionis capableof
conveying some additionalcontentfor we are told that the sense impression reveals itself. Thus, provisionallywe can say that sense impression
of white includes the following contents:(i) the white, which indicates
the cause of the impression,and (ii) the occurrentimpression(i.e., of the
white) itself. At this point, we do not have to commitourselvesto specifying that these mentalcontentsare propositionalin form. But it is clear
that the propositionthat somethingis white goes beyond the ascriptionof
these modest contents.
Accordingto (5), the impressionof white is then the basis of our saying that"thereexists somethingwhite."The Stoics are cautioushere about
animaux chez les Stoiciens," pp. 238-243, though in the context of whether animals
have any self-consciousness. As a result, he never directly poses the question about
the cases of self-perceptionon which we focus.

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the source of that propositionalinformation.Is the propositionthat something white exists alreadycontainedin the impression?If it is, then it is
temptingto conclude that non-rationalminds are incapableof discerning
all the contents already containedin the impression.But an alternative
reading is also possible. It must be conceded that the evidence underdetermineseither interpretation,however, the second reading is preferable
for the sake of consistencywith our earlieranalysis of (5) and (6). These
sources are fairly specific aboutwhat narrowcontentsare containedgenerally in impressions.In addition,(4) tells us that rationalanimals bring
other mental operationsinto play which affect their impressions.On the
preferredreading, a rational mind contributes some new information,
which expresses the propositionthat somethingis white, to the contents
A propositionalmentalstate of this sort
of the originalsense-impression.56
might well be broadlydescribedas inferential.A rationalanimal is capable of inferringthat, e.g., if a white thing causes my impression,then it
is the case that somethingis white.For the Stoics, any inferenceaboutthe
cause of the impressionof whiteness requiresan ability of which nonrationalminds are incapable.Even in the well-knownChrysippeanexample, the dog employing disjunctive syllogism is only said to simulate
reasoning.57One might plausibly hold that inferentialreasoning, however minimaland automaticthe inference,requiresotheroperationsof the
mind besides perception.
Let us returnto text (4), which makes some distinctionaboutcontent.58
The senses are said to perceivethingssuch as whiteness.Yet, Ciceroholds
that the senses perceive only in a way propositionalclaims such as that
somethingis white. It is not altogetherobvious how to unpackthis passage.59If we read Cicero ratherliterally here, he distinguishesbetween

56
Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 82-84, discusses a parallel set
of interpretationsfor kataleptic vs. non-katalepticimpressions in rational animals.
S7 Sextus, PH 1. 69 states that the dog in effect (dunamei) is reasoning. Richard
Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics," p. 313, takes this instance of simulated
reasoning to be more or less a legitimate case of reasoning.
58 I am making a weaker point here than Frede, who argues that text (4) rules out
the possibility of non-rationalimpressions having content at all.
59 We saw that the passage, according to Sorabji, "PerceptualContent in the Stoics,"
p. 311, commits the Stoics to impressions having propositional form. He proposes
that if the senses can perceive in a way that something is the case then in a way
such impressions can have propositional form. He states that to be "propositionalin
a way" when the senses perceive that, say, this is white can be understood as the
senses "presenta non-verbalizedappearanceas of something's being white."

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GLENN LESSES

what the senses can perceive only in a way and what the mind - here,
referring to mental operations in the hegemonikon other than senseperception- perceives fully. Perceptioninvolves assent so that in each
instance the mind assents to what is presented.On the orthodoxview,
there is simply less to assent to in the case of what is presentedonly to
the senses. There also appearsto be a readingconsistentwith Sorabji's
interpretationif what the mind contributesis an articulationof the content that is already present in the original impressionof sense. Let me
suggest a thirdpossibility.If animalminds are incapableof makinginferences from what they do in fact perceive,then Cicero's remarksthat the
mindalone securesthat, say, this is white appliesonly to rationalanimals.
The senses of rationalanimals alone can grasp in a way that something
is white because they alone can draw inferencesbased on their sensations. Frede's orthodox interpretationis mistaken in supposingthat (4)
supportsthe view that animalsperceivesonly qualities.Sorabji'salternative is also incorrectbecause non-rationalimpressionsare not the issue
here. The context of Acad. 2. 21 shows that the impressionsbeing consideredare only those of rationalanimals.So Cicero's discussionapplies
only to impressionsof rationalanimals and has little to do with impressions of sense generally.Y0
In texts (5) and (6), we saw that the impressionsof sense are said to
reveal their causes. In the case of an impressionof whiteness, the cause
of the impressionis the white, which is the impressedthing (phantaston).
The passagesspeakof "thewhite"(to leukon)or "thevisible"(to horaton),
which could refer, of course, either to the quality of an object or to an
object itself. But we do not need to commit ourselves to either alternative and so will speakjust of qualitiesin what follows. Additionally,the
claim that the impression'scause, the white, is revealed might be taken
in two ways. First, one might hold that the impression reveals something, which, as it happens,caused it. In the case of the impressionof a
white thing,what gets revealedis just whiteness.If all the Stoics mean is
that the perceiversees whiteness, then nothingmore is containedin the
impressionthan the rudimentaryperceptionof a quality,whiteness.This
reading of the texts is consistent with the orthodoxinterpretation.But,
what gets revealedwhen an
accordingto a second possible interpretation,
impressionrevealsits cause is considerablymorecontent-laden.The white
is revealedas the cause of the impression.So, when these passages say

61

I am grateful to John Ellis for clarifying my point on Acad. 2. 21.

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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

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that a sensory impressionreveals its cause, they mean that, generally,a

qualityis revealedas the impression'scause. On this reading,the subject
can have an experienceof causal relations.
The second interpretationis preferable.Why? The language and context of these passages supportsthis alternativefor two reasons.First, the
use of the term "reveals"must be consistent throughoutthe passages.
Hence, we should apply how "reveals"is employedwhen an impression
is said to reveal its own occurrenceto the case of an impression'scause.
In texts (5) and (6), the Stoics describe impressionsso that even nonrationalanimals perceive that an impressionbelongs to them. The point
is that the subject- rationalor non-rational- is aware of its impression.
If, as seems likely, this awarenessrequiressome propositionalattribution,
then it is also likely that an impressionreveals more thanthe rudimentary
awarenessof a qualitywhen the impressionreveals its cause. Second, text
(6) speaks explicitly of the subjectalso having the capacity to be aware
of or grasp "the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it"
(heauten te emphanizein opheilei kai tou poiesantos auten enargous

endeiktikekathestanai).6' This descriptionof what an impressionreveals

aboutits cause entails thatmore is revealedthanjust some quality,which,
as it happens,causes the impression.The contentof the impressionclearly
points to what producedit. In other words, somethingis revealedas the
cause of the impression.The contentof such an impressionexplicitlycontains causal relationsof which a perceivercan be aware.
In an interestingway, this readingof the contentof an impressioncan
also be linked to Stoic remarksabout self-perceptionand oikeiosis. The
contents of an impression make possible, in part, the awareness that
the impressionis occurringbecause the impression'soccurrenceis itself
conveyed in its contents. If an impressionreveals itself in this way, we
can formulatea kind of self-perceptionthat has been unnoticedby comA perceivingsubject can be aware of its own basic mental
mentators.62
state - the impressionitself. It is possible to analyze the initial instances
of self-perceptionto which oikei6sis refers in terms of such awareness.

61

My renderingclosely follows Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, here. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, translates the passage "[the impression]must be capable of revealing the self-evident object
that caused it," which even more strongly suggests that more than just a quality is
revealed. A self-evident feature is that the quality or object is related to the impression as its cause.
62 Nothing in this discussion is meant to suggest that such impressionsare kataleptic.

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GLENN LESSES

Very generally,oikei6sis describesa processof somethingcoming to belong. If applied to individuals,the process refers to that which comes to
"belong to me" or is "of mine."'-6 The account of mental contents we have

describedthus fits well with oikeiosis. The Stoics hold that in the early
stages of oikei6sis impressionsoccur because all animals from birth on
come equippedwith impulsesand the basis of theirinitialimpulsesis selfperception.These impressionsinclude as part of their contents that the
impressionitself belongs to the perceiver.In this minimalsense of selfperception,the Stoics attributesufficient cognitive functioningto nonrationalanimals so as to discriminatebetween their own psychological
states and whatever is alien64to them. The contents of the impressions
themselves indicate that they are the perceiver'sand not of something
independent.65

An example might help to illustratethe basic featuresof mentalcontent that have emerged in our discussion. Suppose that Dion has a dog,
Zeno. Whatare the contentsof Zeno's sensoryimpressions?If Zeno sees
his paw, he has an impressionwhich, first of all, he is aware of as his.
In addition,variouscausal relationsconstitutepartof the contentsof his
impression.Zeno's impressioncontains at least somethinglike the following: his impressionis causedby his paw. Thus, it can be said of Zeno
that he perceives his paw. What cannot be attributedto Zeno is that he
perceives that it is a paw. The Stoics also deny that Zeno draws inferences from what he perceivesor that he can assess the truthof the contents of his impressions.The basic point is that the Stoics are making
some sort of distinction between perceiving and perceiving that. They

want to explain why Zeno perceives his paw but doesn't perceive that
it is a paw. They construct their explanation in terms of a somewhat
restrictedset of propositionalcontents.

63 See S.G. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis,"Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press,

1971), ed. A.A. Long, pp. 115-116, Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 262-263. "Oikeiosis,"the verbal noun which becomes
Stoic technical usage, is related to the adjective "oikeios."This latter term originally
meant "of the household" and picks out members of a household, their relations, and
others connected to it less immediately. The term applies also to propertyand, derivatively, comes to have the sense of "anythingbelonging to a person."
6 I.e., allotrion, the opposite of oikeion.
65 In addition, we can conjecture that awareness of this feature of mental content
can constitute a kind of assent to the impression. If we could establish this case, the
two-stage model of perception- having an impression and assent to it - still can fit
the account of impressions with modest contents.

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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

23

is correct,the Stoic positionmight

Of course,even if this interpretation
turnout to be muddled.For one thing, it might plausiblybe held that an
awarenessof causal relationsrequiresconcepts.Yet, the Stoics deny that
non-rationalanimalsare capableof conceptualthought.In addition,there
is the fundamentalproblemthat non-rationalimpressionscannot express
lekta. But in the interpretationthat we have developed,non-rationalanimals perceive causal relations:that one thing causes somethingelse. It
is unlikely that the Stoics can make these kinds of propositionalcontent consistent with their official position about lekta. Perhapsthe content of such impressionsis restrictiveenough that they did not notice the
problem.'
In any case, the Stoic accountof the initial stages of animal development also supportsa conceptionof mental contents that is narrowand
restrictive.In this sense, the contentof an impressionhas only to be adequatelyrich (i) to representcertaincausal relationsand (ii) to signal that
the impressionitself is occurringin the perceiver.The Stoics can try to
explain the ability of non-rationalanimalsto functioncognitivelyin terms
of their power to entertainsuch impressions.The Stoics are also adamant
that non-rationalanimals are incapable of belief.67Thus, the nature of
impressionsin rationaland non-rationalanimals is readily distinguished.
By formulatingan accountof a more restrictedmentalcontent,the Stoics
can explain the observed,cognitive behaviorof non-rationalanimals and
also differentiatebetween non-rationaland rationalanimals.
In this essay, I have tried to show that there is interpretivespace
between the austerity of Frede's orthodox view and the too charitable
alternativepresentedby Sorabji.Frede is mistakenthat all non-rational
impressionsare devoid of propositionalcontent.Not only do animalsperceive whiteness,sweetness,and otherqualities,they also can be awareof
causal relations.On the otherhand,Sorabjiis wrong to attributerelatively

These problemscould have led the Stoics to offer a more familiar theory of causal
contents in which the meaning of the impressionis simply whatever causes the impression. This kind of content does not require attributingany propositionalcontent at all
to non-rationalanimals. Such a position would then be consistent with the orthodox
view. But there is little evidence that they do, in fact, propose a version of this sort
of causal theory of content.
67 On the Stoic view, it is clear that rational animals have impressions that are
robustly propositional in form. Roughly, beliefs involves assent to an impression
which contains what are termed"sayables"(lekta). Sayables are rathersimilar to statements. Earlier,we saw that impressions containing sayables are equivalent to thoughts
and occur only in rational beings.

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GLENN LESSES

unrestrictedpropositionalcontentto non-rationalanimals.' Both accounts

fail to notice anothersort of propositionalcontents,which the Stoics can
effectivelyemploy in their systematicand carefulinquiryinto philosophy
of mind.69Thus, the Stoics hold a position that is intermediatebetween
the two interpretations.
The morenarrowpropositionalcontentsof impressions includea type of self-perceptionof mentalstates and an awareness
of causal relations.The applicationof this more restrictivenotionenables
the Stoics within the context of their overall naturalismto develop a

" Sorabji evidently tries to formulate something weaker than full-fledged propositional content when he employs his conception of predicationalcontent. Though he
never completely explains his notion, it enables him to distinguish between predicational content and the strongertype of content involved in assenting to a belief. However, he at least must clarify why saying of an animal's impression that, for instance,
the scent is in a certain direction commits him to so much less in terms of propositional contents than the position that there is an impression that something is white.
There obviously are complex issues of reference and opacity to be dealt with in both
cases, which we will put aside.
See A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 240, for
one attempt to explain a position that at first appears similar to Sorabji's. They discuss this sort of impression in terms of an example. Imagine seeing a John Wayne
movie in which "we get the impression of John Wayne's being on the screen in front
of us, but not of course the impression that John Wayne is on the screen in front of
us (p. 240)." Their point is really to distinguish a person having beliefs from merely
having impressions. For Long and Sedley, only the second is a case of belief. However, they do not explicitly deny the first case also has propositionalcontent. Their
example shows we must exercise caution about specifying the propositionscontained
in an impression, not that there is none. One might argue that the first case also
involves beliefs, though there are issues about what is believed. Long and Sedley deny
that non-rational animals can have concepts and agree with the orthodox view that
non-rational impressions are empty of mental content. But this illustrationconcerns
questions about a person's impression of Wayne's being on the screen. Hence, issues
about whether their account commits us to denying the ascriptionof impressionswith
propositionalform to non-rationalanimals never really arise.
69 The project undertakenin this essay is limited to constructing an interpretation
that is intermediatebetween the two standardones. There are a numberof open questions. Perhapsthe most importantis how the two-stage model of perceptionapplies to
impressions having only modest mental contents. The natureof assent in the case of
narrow content must be distinguished from that of robustly propositionalimpressions.
How exactly does the mind assent in the former case? There are related questions
about the nature of impulses since perception is the basis of impulse. Any impulses
to which non-rationalimpressions give rise must be differentin kind from the impulses
generated by rational impressions. Ultimately, these issues can affect Stoic moral
theory because the Stoics tie their account of moral development to the nature of
impulse.

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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

25

remarkablyunified and subtle theory of mental content. The distinctions

that they make about types of contentyield an accountof the continuity
and contrastbetween non-rationaland rationalminds.70
College of Charleston
Charleston,South Carolina

70 My initial work on these issues began while I was a visiting scholar at Harvard
University, where I was generously allowed the use of its resources. I have delivered
differentparts of early versions of this essay to a numberof audiences to whom I am
grateful, especially, to those present at the American Philosophical Association meeting in Chicago in April 1995. I have benefited from suggestions and criticisms on all
these occasions, and, in particular,from the subsequent written comments of Shaun
Nichols and Joyce Carpenter.I owe a special debt to John Ellis, the respondentat the
APA meeting, whose stimulatingdiscussion and written remarksgreatly improved this
essay.

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