NEWS

IN PHYSIOLOGICAL

SCIENCES

From Neuron to Mind

Mario Bunge
The main approaches
to the study of mankind,
and the corresponding
models of man, are sketched and examined.
The systemic model of man
as a biopsychosocial
entity is recommended.
Likewise the multilevel
approach
is favored over the holistic, the analytic,
and the synthetic
approaches.
Finally, the question of the reducibility
of psychology
to neurophysiology
is discussed.
Until midcentury
there was little communication
between
physiologists
and
psychologists.
Typically
the former were
interested
in the various systems and
subsystems of the organism, whereas the
latter studied behavior.
Hardly anyone
was interested in the mechanisms whereby neural
systems control
behavior,
much less in the nonmotor
and nonsensorial activities
of the central nervous
system (CNS) of higher vertebrates.
Consequently behavior appeared mysterious
and mind nonexistent.
That gap is now closing. Neuroscientists are becoming
more interested
in
behavior, perception,
emotion, and ideation, while psychologists
and ethologists
are happily ignoring
the paralyzing
injunction
Do not neurologize!
and are
starting to speculate on that which controls behavior and does the mentation.
The fusion of neurophysiology
with psychology, which Karl Lashley demanded
nearly half a century ago, is finally starting to happen.
Neurophysiologists
are becoming
aware that the nervous system is only
one subsystem of the whole animalalbeit the most interesting
of all-and
psychologists
are realizing
that real animals are not black boxes. The great wall
between
body and behavior
is being
bored from within (starting with the neuron) and from without
(starting with behavior). As the boring proceeds we realize that the wall is not in nature but in
philosophy
and theology.
Yet the fusion or merger tactics have
so far been delineated
in vague terms.
We should introduce
some precision
if
we want to know how best to integrate
M. Bunge is Professor
of Philosophy
in the
Foundations
and Philosophy
of Science Unit,
McGill
University,
3479 Peel St., Montreal,
Quebec I-DA 1 W7, Canada.

Volume 4/0ctober 1989

the various approaches,

methods,
and
results of the various sciences, from neurophysics to sociology, concerned
with
the problem of accounting
for behavior
and mentation.
In the first place we
should tackle the matter of the variety
of approaches to this problem and weigh
their comparative
merits.
Five approaches
of mankind

to the study

Humans can be studied from different

points of view: as a physical entity, as a
chemical
system, as an organism,
as a
psychosystem,
and as a component
of
social systems (family, firm, school, etc.).
Each of these approaches
has its virtues
and shortcomings,
and each suggests a
one-sided view of man.
Approach
1 (physical). No doubt this
is the basic approach
and one that has
proved fertile. But restricting
the study
of man to its physical components
and
aspects, i.e., adopting physicalism,
is ignoring whatever physics fails to explain.
And trying to reduce the supraphysical
features of man to physics is quixotic
if
only for being impractical.
The mere attempt to write down, and even more to
solve, the Schroedinger
equation
for a
brain, or even a neuron or an amino acid
molecule, is mind boggling. But even if
such tasks were feasible, a number
of
essential features of life, such as evolution, would
remain
in the dark. And
overlooking
evolution
amounts to forsaking the understanding
of the complexities of the nervous system and the
mental and social peculiarities
of humans.
Approach
2 (chemical).
First
the
chemical theory of heredity, then molecular biology, and finally neurochemistry
showed that biochemistry
is just as important a tool as biophysics
for under-

standing the nervous system. However,

the successes of the chemical
approach
should not be exaggerated,
if for no other
reason than that we still do not have an
adequate understanding
of a single organic molecule.
(To be sure chemists
have discovered
the composition
and
gross structure of millions
of molecules,
but they still owe us accurate theories of
even the simplest of molecules involved
in cell chemistry.
Bear in mind that not
even HZ0 has been calculated
quantum
mechanically.)
In short, chemism is inadequate.
Approach
3 (biological).
This is of
course the approach
characterizing
the
life sciences. This platitude
bears repetition in view of the fact that the alternative approaches
are still going strong.
(Thus most psychologists
believe that
they can afford to ignore biology, particularly neuroscience
and the theory of
evolution.)
And it also goes without saying that the biological
approach can and
should be combined
with the other approaches rather than being adopted to
their exclusion. The latter stand, namely
biologism,
is one-sided
for it tends to
forget the physical and chemical
components of living matter as well as the
psychological
and social dimensions
of
man.
Approach
4 (psychological).
The
proper task of psychology is of course the
understanding
of behavior and ideation
patterns. To be sure, all such functions
are biological:
they are performed by living organs; hence all good psychology is
basically
psychobiology.
However,
the
functions of the nervous systems of complex organisms are different from those
of simpler systems such as the cardiovascular or the digestive ones. For example, the former can learn and perceive, two functions that are far beyond
the capability
of all but highly evolved
organisms.
Yet such behavioral
and
mental abilities should not lead to psychologism, i.e., the claim that psychology
owes nothing to biology or to sociology,
which
is what behaviorists
and psychoanalysts have been saying.
Approach
5 [sociological).
There is no
understanding
the social animal
apart
from social science. In particular,
consciousness and language seem to be products (and in turn modifiers) of social life,
and so are stress, moral conscience, and
organizational
ability. However, it would
be a mistake to adopt sociologism, or the

0886- 17 14/4/89 $150 0 1989 Irk Union

Physiol,

Sci./Am.

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Sot.

attempt to explain man in purely sociological terms, For, although sociality has
biological
and psychological
roots, it
transcends
them. Indeed, unlike invertebrates and lower vertebrates,
higher
vertebrates possess social plasticity, i.e.,
the capacity to readjust their patterns of
social behavior in the face of internal or
external difficulties.
So much for the main legitimate,
albeit one-sided,
approaches
to the study
of man. The engineering
approach
has
not been included
for the simple reason
that animals are not machines: they are
alive and have not been designed. To be
sure, there are some similarities
between
man and machine, in particular
the computer; if there were none we would not
use them as labor-saving
devices. However, no analog is a substitute for the real
thing, particularly
when the analogies in
question
are so superficial
that they
overlook the specifically physical, chemical, biological,
psychological,
and social
properties of man, such as rational thinking, planning,
and ability to set up and
dismantle
social groups. In short, machinism is inadequate.
To sum up, there are five legitimate
and fruitful approaches
to the study of
man. But the adoption of any of them to
the exclusion
of the others, while unavoidable given the enormity
of the task,
should be regarded as only a temporary
expedient.
We should
carry on work
along each of the five approaches
and
should attempt to integrate them, for humans are complex systems exhibiting
all
five aspects.
Eight models of mankind
The understanding
of a thing begins
and ends with some conceptual
model of
it. The model is better the more inclusive
and accurate that it is. But even rough
models can be used to guide-or
blockresearch. Each of the five approaches
examined
in the last section has given
rise to a set of models of man, In addition,
technological
and religious
approaches
have resulted in a certain model. Finally,
an eighth model is in the making, which
brings together
all five scientific
approaches.
The first, or religious model, is that of
Plato and Christian
theology. According
to it man is a spiritual
being that uses
his body as a tool during his temporary
sojourn on earth. (As Sir John Eccles put
it, the self is to the brain what the pianist
is to the piano.) This animistic
model
was demolished
by Darwin and by physiological psychology,
but it still lingers
on among philosophers,
psychologists,
and even neuroscientists
unable
to
match their philosophy
with their science. It has effectively slowed down the
merger of neurophysiology
with psychology.
The second, or technological
model,

regards man as a complex information

processor, This model has captivated the
imagination
of many neuroscientists
and
psychologists.
To be sure the neuroendocrine system is, among other things,
an information
system; so is the neuroendocrine-immune
supersystem. However, it happens to be a biosystem, i.e.,
one characterized
by biological
properties. And computer science has no room
for such specific properties,
not even for
specific physical and chemical
properties. (As far as computer
science is concerned an information
system can be
built out of modules of almost any kind.)
Besides, it is a mistake to compare biosystems to artifacts, for this suggests that
the former, too, have been designed to
some purpose. Finally, machinism
is incompatible
with evolutionary
biology,
for machines are not subject to genetic
mutation
or natural selection.
The third, or physicalist
model, presupposes not only that physics is the
basic science, which is true, but also that
in principle
no other science is necessary, which is false. Not even chemistry,
the nearest neighbor,
is reducible
to
physics without
further ado. First, this is
because chemical systems have peculiar
properties
such as lack of inertia
that
physics knows nothing about, and second, physical theory, although necessary
to understand
chemistry, is insufficient:
one must add subsidiary
assumptions
concerning,
e.g., chemical
composition
and structure, that go beyond physics.
The fourth or chemicalist
model of a
human as a chemical reactor fares better
than the physicalist
model because it
is richer and, after all, the cell is constituted
by chemical
subsystems.
But
of course there is more to life than
just chemistry.
In particular,
animals
equipped with a neuroendocrine
system
have neural and hormonal
control systems in addition
to the genetic control
system. To be sure all such control systems are physicochemical,
but they happen to regulate
biofunctions
such as
feeding, reproduction,
self-repair,
and
defense.
The fifth or biologistic
model of man
although
far superior
to the preceding
ones, is defective in that it neglects the
specifically
human abilities
and shortcomings. In particular,
it overlooks the
unique psychological
and social features
of human beings. Thus it fosters the ancient animistic
doctrine of the soul as a
separate
entity.
The practical
consequence is clear, namely an unwillingness to use physical, chemical, and biological means to modify behavior
and
mentation
and the insistence on the potency of logotherapy.
Likewise
the sociologistic
model of
humans exaggerates
one aspect at the
expense of all others. This has two undesirable consequences.
One is to view

society as a whole rather than as a system and therefore

as existing by itself
and above the individual.
The other consequence is to deny that there are disorders of nervous cells and neural systems and blame
all behavioral
and
mental disorders on society as a whole.
(This is of course the gist of antipsychiatry.) Like psychologism,
sociologism
ignores biology and thus is scientifically
unacceptable.
Finally the eighth model, or systemism, pictures man as a biosystem composed of numerous
subsystems,
each
with its own specific functions,
as well
as a component
of suprabiological
(social) systems. This view includes whatever is valuable
in previous
models:
indeed the systemic model of humans
acknowledges
physical
and chemical
properties
as well as biological,
psychological, and social ones. In particular,
man as a whole as well as his every
component
possesses physical properties
such as mass, but from the cell upward
all the subsystems have peculiar supraphysical
properties,
i.e., features
not
studied by physics. Also primates can
feel and dream, imagine
and plan, as
well as enter into social relations
and
thus modify other animals
mentation
of which lie beyond
and behavior -all
physics and chemistry
although
rooted
to the peculiar
physical
and chemical
properties
of living tissue.
In conclusion,
there are (at least) eight
models of man, or rather kinds of model.
Two of them, the religious
and the engineering
models, are unscientific,
and
five are scientific but one-sided, for each
accounts for just one side of the whole.
Only the systemic model brings together
whatever
is valuable in each of the five
one-sided or partial scientific models, by
depicting man as a biopsychosocial
system with physical and chemical components,
Systems and levels
Every concrete thing is either a system
or a component
of a system, i.e., a thing
composed of interconnected
things. In
particular,
a human being is a component of several social systems (family,
firm, club, etc.) and is in turn composed
of a number of macrosystems,
in particular the nervous system, which are in
turn composed
of smaller subsystems.
This hierarchical
organization
goes up
to the world system and down to the cell
level and even further, to the level of
cellular subsystems (e.g., ribosomes) and
their molecular
components
(see Fig. 1).
This being so, to understand
the behavior of each module we must understand
its components,
environment,
and structure, as well as the supersystem of which
it is a component.
One may despair at
the complexity
of the task but may take
consolation
in the fact that the task is to
Volume

4/0ctober

1989

NIPS

207

spectrum that its individual components

do not possess; likewise, a molecule has
an energy spectrum that is not the mere
superposition of the spectra of its component atoms; and a neuronal system has
a connectivity
that is absent from its
components. In short, at every level
some properties (in particular laws) are
gained (or emerge) while others are lost
(or submerge). In short, there is both
emergence and submergence along the
evolutionary process.
The methodological morals of the preceding ontological considerations
are
quite obvious: 1) identify the level(s)
crossed by your object(s) of study; 2) do
not skip any levels; and 3) recognize the
genealogy of the higher levels. These injunctions help evaluate research strategies and projects. We may distinguish
four main such strategies or methodologies:
Holism. Holism is the study of every
thing as a whole and only on its own
level, e.g., the study of the brain as a
whole by means of the electroencephalogram or the holographic model of
memory.
Analysis. Analysis is the reduction of
the system to its components, or top
down.
Svnthesis. Synthesis is the building up

be performed by the entire scientific

community, perhaps with the help of
philosophers
eager to emphasize the
need for integrating the various partial
efforts.
Every level of organization is a set
composed of material things, each of
which is characterized by peculiar properties (in particular laws). The interlevel
relation in the hierarchy
(or better
level structure) is this. Any system belonging to a given level is composed of
things belonging to preceding levels. The
family of levels is thus ordered by the
precedence relation defined in this way.
So far our sketch of the level structure
has been static. But we know from various studies, in particular from studies
on development and on evolution, that
the level structure is far from being given
once and for all. In fact we know that
each system has self assembled (or self
organized) from things on the preceding
level (i.e., every system on a given level
is preceded in time by its components,
which are therefore rightly called its precursors).
The systems of any given level have
some properties in common with their
components and others that the latter
lack: these are their emergent properties.
For example, an atom has an energy

World

system

Social

levels

(e.g. hypothalamus)

Biological

levels

of the whole from its components, or

bottom up.
Multilevel approach. The multilevel
approach is the study of every system on
its own level as well as a component of
a supersystemand ascomposedof lowerlevel things.
Each of the first three strategies has
its virtues and shortcomings. Holism emphasizes that the whole has emergent
properties but refusesto explain them in
terms of composition and structure, so it
borders on irrationalism. The analytic
method stressesthe importance of the
composition of a system but missesits
emergent properties. The synthetic
method does not have the defects of the
other two methods but it is not always
practicable; for instance, so far biologists
have not synthesized a living cell. I submit that the multilevel approach is the
best of all four, for it recommends studying each system on its own level as well
as on its adjoining levels.
The multilevel approach is an eclectic
or catch-as-catch-can strategy, allowing
one to use whatever approaches, techniques, models, and data that may seem
promising. Hence it is integrative, although not holistic, an undeniable merit
at a time when excessive specialization
leads to artificial fragmentation. In particular, it is the one strategy capable of
bringing together all the studies in neuroscience and psychology and thus the
one capable of bridging the gap between
neuron and mind.
The multilevel strategy has proved its
mettle in a number of domains. Thus the
solid-state physicist builds a mathematical model of his crystal structure (the
ion lattice together with the electron
cloud) to explain such molar properties
as electrical and thermal conductivity.
The quantum chemist, even when intent
on adopting a purist or ab initio (synthetic or bottom up) approach, makesuse
of whatever knowledge he can get from
both classical chemistry and atomic
physics. And the neurobiologist studying
a particular system, such as the Wernicke area, approaches it on at least
three levels: as a system of neurons, asa
molar system with peculiar properties,
and as the organ of the formation and
understanding of linguistic expressions.
Explaining

(e.g. ribosomes)
Chemical

Physical

Elementary

particles

and

fields

FIGURE 1. The supersystems and subsystems of a human being.

208

NIPS

Volume 4/0ctober 1989

levels

levels

behavior

and mentation

The most ancient and popular explanation of behavior is of course the animistic or mentalistic one: it takes the
mind for granted and attributes to it the
ability to control behavior. The barrenness and untestability of mentalism
drove psychologists to the denial of the
mental, whereas the right attitude
should have been to regard the mental
assomething to be explained rather than
as self-explanatory. Behavioristic psychology attempted to dispensewith the

mind and to describe behavior in terms

of stimuli. But, because it ignored the
nervous system, behaviorism gave a superficial account of behavior-just
as superficial as the description of motion
given by pre-Newtonian
kinematics.
Biopsychology,
on the other hand,
while admitting the valid results of behaviorism, goes far beyond it by looking
into the neural (or neuroendocrine)
mechanisms
that mediate
(actually
effect) observable behavior. Thus it proceeds centrifugally, from the CNS to behavior. For example, it attempts to explain voluntary movement in terms of
the specific activity of certain neuron
assemblies located in the frontal lobes.
And, rather than regarding the CNS as a
mere information processor restricted to
transducing (or encoding) external stimuli, physiological psychology has learned
that the CNS has a largely autonomous
(nonstimulus-bound)
activity, that nervous activity is modulated by environmental stimuli
rather
than being
uniquely determined by them.
Physiological psychology is not restricted to the study of behavior: it also
studies mentation where it exists, from
emotion, perception, and imagery to deduction and self-consciousness.
The
strategy is the same in all cases, namely
to tackle the data of observation and selfobservation as problems, to make neurophysiological
conjectures concerning
the mechanisms of behavior and subjective experience, and to check such conjectures by means of further observations, measurements,
or experiments.
The ultimate goal is of course to put such
conjectures together into neatly stated
models (or special theories) of the various behavioral and mental processes.
Thus one would like to know the modus
operandi of the smallest neuron assembly capable of feeling fear or anxiety, of
thinking up a proposition, or of making
a decision.
Traditional (mentalistic)
psychology
was pure or untainted by physiology,
for it dealt with the putatively immaterial soul or mind. Physiological psychology, on the other hand, is based on (presupposes) neurophysiology
and, indeed,
several other branches of biology as well,
such as endocrinology, immunology, and
neurochemistry;
besides, it needs social
science to help explain some of the
higher functions, such as moral conscience. Thus physiological psychology
in effect brings together all the studies
relevant to the understanding of behavior and mentation. In other words, physiological psychology contributes powerfully to the synthesis we are after, the
one capable of bridging the gap between
neuron and whole animal, between processes at the subcellular level and biological and social processes.
Is this synthesis a reduction, in partic-

ular a reduction of psychology to neurophysiology? Not quite, and this for the
following reasons. First, even at lower
levels the derivation of one theory from
another usually requires premises not
contained in the reducing theory. Second, neuroscience itself needs the guidance of psychology; thus the study of
perceptual systems is a matter not only
for neurophysiology but also for the psychology of perception, which takes into
account characteristics
of the environment, sometimes even of the social environment. (Recall that perceptual error
can be caused by social factors such as
social pressures.) Third, there is more to
neurobiology
than
neurophysiology,
namely developmental and evolutionary
biology. This point deserves clarification.
Every contemporary organism is the
outcome of two different processes: the
result of an ontogenetic process and a
product of a multimillion
year evolutionary process. Either way nature accomplishes the integration we find so
difficult to conceptualize. Indeed the
processes leading from molecule to fertilized ovum to adult primate, and from
primitive cell to highly evolved animal,
are processes of self-assembly (or selforganization), hence integrative.
This has become a platitude, yet it is
apt to be temporarily forgotten by the
electrophysiologist
or the psychologist.
In fact, the division of scientific labor has
reached such a ridiculous extreme that
many workers in neuroscience and psychology tend to pay only lip service to
the importance of studies in development and evolution for the understanding of their subject. Such neglect of
development and evolution has had undesirable consequences,
such as 1)
overlooking the biological maturation of
the CNS, which, in the case of certain
systems such as the corpus callosum,
takes up to a decade, and 2) exaggerating
leaps at the expense of graduality (as is
the case with mentalistic psychology,
particularly of the information-processing variety, and its refusal to learn from
animal psychology), or, conversely, 3)
exaggerating continuity at the expense
of quantitative novelty (as in the case of
animal psychologists who claim that human mental abilities differ only in degree from prehuman ones).
To sum up, behavior and mentation
can be explained with the help of neuroscience and social science. The new
psychology, based on neuroscience and
willing to learn from social science, is at
the very heart of the attempt to explain
behavior and mentation in scientific
terms. And it constitutes a synthesis or
merger rather than a reduction, even
though the behavioral and mental processes are neurophysiological.
(A philosopher would say that this is a case of

ontological reduction without

temological reduction .1

full epis-

Conclusion

Physiology and psychology share one

ultimate goal, namely the scientific understanding of behavior and mentation.
No one branch of physiology or of psychology can attain this goal single-handedly, becausethe problem is a multilevel
one, and this becauseman himself exists
on all levels. Nor should philosophy be
left aside, becauseit too is interested in
the mind-body problem and can offer
valuable suggestionsfor facilitating the
integration or synthesis of disciplines
that the problem calls for.
Neurophysics, neurochemistry, neurobiology, psychology, and sociology
may be pictured as forming a pentagon.
Philosophy lies at the center of it, sometimes blocking the whole view, as in
psychophysical dualism; at other times
favoring the integration of research
fields; and at all times giving and receiving stimuli from the other disciplines.
To be sure one must specialize if one
wants to make original contributions to
knowledge. But specialization need not,
nay must not, exclude the elaboration of
a general scheme of things allowing one
to locate ones problems and thereby to
make use of any relevant scraps of
knowledge found in other fields. Such
integration is indispensable in bridging
the gap between neuron and mind.
This paper is based on the authors
books
A World
of Systems
[Boston,
MA:
Reidel,
1979)
The Mind-Body
Problem
[New York:
Pergamon,
1980), Philosophy
of Science
and
Technology,
Part 2 (Boston, MA: Reidel, 1985),
and Philosophy
of Psychology,
with Ruben
Ardila
[New York:
Springer-Verlag,
1987), as
well as on his articles
From neuron
to behavior and mentation:
an exercise
in levelmanship, in Information
Processing
in the Nervous System,
edited by H. M. Pinsker
and W.
D. Williams
(New York: Raven, 1980, p. l-16),
and From
mindless
neuroscience
and brainless psychology
to neuropsychology
(Ann.
Theor. Psychol.
3: 115-133,
1985).

I
Volume 4/0ctober 1989

NIPS

209

Fifty Years Ago in Physiology

In a real sense, 1989 has been the
50th anniversary of modern cellular
neurobiology.
In 1939, J. Z. Young (3)
published the full description, given
in shorter accounts two or three
years earlier, of squid giant axons.
Ontogenetically
arising from the fusion of smaller fibers, they were recognized as single nerve cells, a demonstration
that revolutionized
the
field. In that same year, building on
the work of Gasser and Erlanger,
who had developed the cathode ray
tube for measuring electrical potentials in nerves essentially free of time
artifacts, Hodgkin
and Huxley
(2)
first published
together. They recorded from inside a giant fiber impaled with a Ag-AgCl-sea
water
electrode and showed directly that
the action potential is a transmembrane event and that its magnitude
(80-95 mV) overshoots the resting
potential
(50 mV). And Cole and
Curtis (1) succeeded in demonstrating that action potentials
in squid
axons are accompanied by a 40-fold
drop in membrane
impedance with
~2% change in capacitance, all new
phenomena
in 1939 for which the
ionic bases are now well established.
1. Cole, K. S., and H. J. Curtis. Electrical
impedance of the squid giant axon during
activity. J. Gen. Physiol. 22: 649-670,1939.
2. Hodgkin, A. L., and A. F. Huxley. Action
potentials recorded from inside a nerve
fibre. Nature Lond. 144: 710-711, 1939.
3. Young, J. Z. Fused neurons and synaptic
contacts in the giant nerve fibres of cephalopods. Phil. Trans. R. Sot. Lond. B
Ser. 229: 465-503,1939.

Forty Years Ago in Physiology

Almost every issue of every journal reporting on cell physiology and
cell biology contains at least one paper in which the authors describe
micropuncture
experiments. A common purpose is to determine transmembrane
electrical potentials.
In
addition, more and more experimenters are using micropipettes
for injecting mRNA into Xenopus oocytes
to express a desired protein product.
Others inject fluorescent
or other
tracers into a variety of cells to
measure cell-cell
communication,
or antibodies to block specific cytoplasmic functions,
or foreign proteins to measure their interactions
with endogenous metabolites, or any
of a myriad of other compounds lim210

NIPS

Volume 4/0ctober 1989

ited only by the experimenters

imaginations.
All of this was made
possible in 1949 by Ling and Gerard
(l), who used micropipettes
as electrodes to impale frog muscle cells.
Others, including Ralph Gerard and
colleagues, had attempted
this before but had found that the pipettes
damaged the surface, resulting in local short-circuiting
current
leaks
and, in consequence,
disturbingly
variable, unstable, and transitory re-

time performance.
You need CODAS
time PC-based waveform recorder.

sults. Ling and Gerard showed that,

given sufficiently
small tip diameters (Cl pm), the cell membrane
sealed around the impaling
pipette
and permitted
highly reproducible
and stable (days) determinations
of
the membranes
electrical
properties. What followed is history.
1. Ling, G., and R. W. Gerard. The normal
membrane potential of frog sartorius fibers. I. Cell. Comp. Physiol. 34: 383-396,
1949.

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Our patent-pending
smooth
scroll waveform
presentatron
and
unequaled
plottmg speed keep you in command.
No guessing.
No surprises.

50 kHt Real Time Recording

to Disk

Focus your attention

on the real time display while up to 16 waveforms
simultaneously
record to disk. To 50,000 samples per second,
CODAS
ensures a gap-fr
1
Review megabyres OT recoroea
srgnais on your monnor m seconas with the
CODAS
Playback/Editor.
Then <eamlessly
extract,
analyze,
hard copy,
translate, and export waveform information
with simple keystrokes.
For the best way to see, record, and analyze your dynamic waveforms, call
us at l-800-553-9006.
Or write Dataq Instruments,
Inc,, 825 Sweitter
Avenue,
Akron, Ohio 44311, (216) 434-4284.

INSTRUMENTS, INC.
strumentetton should be