The Philosophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas

THE PHILOSOPHICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF
IMMORTALITY IN
THOMAS AQUINAS
J. Obi Oguejiofor
University Press of America, Inc.

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Oguejiofor, J. Obi (Josephat Obi)
The philosophical significance of immortality in
Thomas Aquinas / J. Obi Oguejiofor.
p. cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
I. Immortality (Philosophy)-History. 2. Thomas, Aquinas,
Saint, 1225?-1274. 1. Title.
BD421.038 2000 I 29-dc2I 00-048857 CIP
ISBN 0-7618-1910-X (cloth: alk. ppr.)
e~The paper used in this publication meets the minimum

requirements of American National Standard for Information
Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48-1984
To the memory of late Archbishop S. N. Ezeanya
I
Contents
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
vii
ix
xi
CHAPTER I THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE QUESTION OF

IMMORTALITY IN THE 13TH CENTURY
I
1.1. Immortality and Philosophy in the Early Thirteenth
Century
1.2. Doctrinal Impetus to the Discussions on Immortality
1.3. The Example ofS!. Albert the Great
1.4. Some Trends in the Defence of Immortality before St.
Thomas
1.5. The Issue of Latin Averroism
3
11
14
21
CHAPTER 2 IMMORTALITY AND AQUINAS' CONCEPTION

OF THE HUMAN SOUL
33
2.1. The Man of Aquinas
33
2.2. The Human Soul: A Subsistent Form
38
2.3. Body and Soul
50
2.4. Problems ofthe Intellect
55
2.5. The Soul in Activity
62
CHAPTER 3 ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALY

3.1. Method and Intention of the Arguments
77
77
3.2. The Arguments:

I. In the Scriptum super libros sententiarum II
2. In the Summa contra gentiles
3. In the Questiones quodlibetales
4. In the Summa theologiae
5. In the Questiones disputate de anima
6. In the Compendium theologiae
CHAPTER 4 SOME PROBLEMS OF IMMORTALITY
4.1. The Question of Death
4.2. Why are Brute Souls not Immortal?
4.3. The State of the Separated Soul
4.4. Resurrection and Immortality of the Body
4.5. Immortality and the Platonism of Aquinas
CHAPTER 5 AQUINAS, IMMORTALITY AND THE
SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY
5.1. Reappraisal of the Arguments for Immortality
5.2. Some Critics of Aquinas: Scotus, Pomponazzi
and Cajetan
5.3. Subsequent Trends in the Question ofimmortality
5.4. Immortality and the Scope and Limit ofphilosophy
86
86
98
118
127
139
139
146
151
159
164
175
175
182
192
201
211
215
CONCLUSION
BmLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
229
vi
Preface
107
III
Though philosophical discussions on the question of uninterrupted
existence of the human soul post mortem is today very few and far
between, the doctrine is still a widely held conception about the human
. destiny. This fact alone merits the issue of immortality a serious place
in the scheme of philosophical endeavours. This is because it is a
vaunted characteristic of philosophy not to exclude a priori any aspect
of reality from its embrace. That is perhaps why the question of
immortality found a place in the philosophy of many epochs. Still a
most perfunctory survey of the history of philosophy indicates that
debates on the reality of immortality have been uppermost in times of
special philosophical awakening.
The thirteenth century is in a special way one of the most sigoificant
centuries in the history of such philosophical aWakening. The
importance of the century in the history of philosophy immediately
brings to the fore the relevance of examining the question of
immortality in the philosophy of the time, and especially how the most
towering thinker of the century, Thomas Aquinas, attempted to show
through the power of reason that immortality is tenable.
The philosophical reinvigoration of the century encountered many
obstacles occasioned by the consequences of the integration of
Aristotelian naturalistic philosophy into the then prevalent scheme of
thought. Many of the problems arose from the new conception of man
and his soul engendered by this naturalism, and its logical implications
for the doctrine of immortality. Aqninas played a pivotal role in the
eventual triumph of Aristotelian philosophy not ouly in his time, but
also much later. This study attempts to explore how he tried to solve the
problem of immortality within the context of Aristotelian philosophy. It
highlights the importance of the issue in the century, starting from the
philosophical forebears of the angelic doctor. It also examines how the
question of immortality can be said to be one of the most determinant
vii
Introduction
A remarkable feature of studies on Thomas Aquinas, even those
devoted specifically to the question of the soul, is the perfunctory
treatment that is given to the question" of immortality. This is partly
because the question of metaphysical immortality has in recent times
progressively been of very peripheral interest in philosophy in general.
This tendency has a lot to do with the growing disinterestedness in
religion, coupled with the religious undertone which the whole question
of immortality has had since its inroads into philosophical discussions:
A consequence of this tendency is that medieval scholarship has very
" often also been affected by the desire to work within the mainstream,
and to concentrate on themes that are aIdn to the dominant
philosophical interests of the age. While such an influence has very
positive aspects, it can also have the effect of relegating to the sideline
a doctrine which perhaps more than any other was determinant in the
shaping of the philosophical movement of the thirteenth century.
The relatively few studies of immortality in the philosophy of
Thomas Aquinas have other features which are no less remarkable. In
the first place, they are mostly published in the form of short artieles,
whose amplitude is obviously not enough to allow a comprehensive
overview of the issues, let alone determine their importance. Second,
most of them take account only of the few arguments outlined in the
Summo thealagioe, and consequently, the significance of the theme in
Aquinas, as in the general philosophical trend of the thirteenth century
pales under this background. Another feature is that the context of the
thirteenth century, in which Aquinas worked, and which had enormous
influence on his treatment of immortality, is often not given due weight.
Vet the question of the immortality of the rational soul detennined
more than any other single factor the history of Aristotelianism in that
century. Again, due to the style of argument in which most of the
discourses of the angelic doctor are couched, those studies have either
been aimed at raising problems with regard to the tenability of the
xi
xii
Introduction
The Philosophical Significance a/Immortality, in Thomas Aquinas
proof, or at showing in what ways the proof is acceptable as adequate

demonstration of immortality; not to mention the current of opinion
which seeks to show that Aquinas never intended that his argwnents
were rational proof ofimmortality.
With this background in view, we have tried in the following pages
to provide as much as possible a comprehensive understanding of the
issue of the immortality of the human soul in the philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas, and also to review the importance of the theme in philosophy
in general. Our view is that this aim is served better by a more global
understanding of the influence of the theme of immortality in the epoch
which forms the immediate background of Aquinas' philosophy, and by
reference to the thoughts of the authors preceding him on the issue.
This will give more insight into the sources of the angelic doctor, while
highlighting his originality in the treatment of the age-old problem. A
special study of the thought of Aquinas on immortality acquires special
importance because of his special position in the reintroduction and
integration of Aristotle's philosophy in the West in the thirteenth
century. Aquinas was among the first scholastics to accept fully the
conception of the soul as form of the body. Tinough the length and
breadth of the volumes of his works he argues resolutely for the
tenability of this conception and for how it is in consonance with the
Christian faith, including the inunortality of the soul. The absence of
any clear doctrine of inunortality in Aristotle, and the fact that the
Neoplatonic idea of the soul is a much more comfortable background
from which to defend inunortality meant that special efforts were
needed to wade through the obvious difficulty that is consequent upon
the full acceptance of apparently disparate positions. Still there is no
doubt that one of Aquinas' most important contributions to philosophy
is his conception of the human nature which comes out of these
seemingly conflicting backgrounds. Given the influence of the question
of immorality in Aquinas' view of man - his nature, his specific
activities, and his ultimate aim - to study his philosophy while not
adequately taking account of the question of immortality is to neglect
one of the most potent influences on his philosophy.
In view of this, we will try first to situate Aquinas within the
philosophical context of his time by reviewing briefly the emergence of
the question of inunortality within the intellectual ambience of the early
thirteenth century, the doctrinal factors which made this emergence
possible and how some of these factors played in the works' of the
thinkers who flourished just before him. Albert the Great is cited as an
example of how a conception of the soUf is heavily influenced by the
doctrine of immortality. The concern for inunortality, which is a special
feature of the first half of the thirteenth century, resulted in the efforts
xiii
of the thinkers of the time to defend the doctrine with diverse

arguments. The inconsistencies that are prevalent in their positions,
marked by the juxtaposition of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrines,

are indicative of the inadequate internalization of the influx of
II
!
t
I
I
doctrines, which already started in the twelfth century, and the level of
their philosophical aWareness. Some sparks of originality, nevertheless,
emerge from the efforts of these thinkers to prove immortality On
rational grounds: the spinning of doctrines and principles to suit old
argwnents, the spinning of new argwnents, the rejection of some older
proofs, as well as the grading of demonstrations according to their
perceived convincing power. The so-called Latin Averroism is ./
reviewed to show that it -is a factor which the inunediate predecessors
of Aquinas may not have been fully aware of, but which exerted an
important influence on Aquinas' discourses on immortality.
Aquinas' philosophical anthropology is very much influenced by the
doctrine of inunortality. Man is a hylemorphic composite in the best
tradition of Aristotle. Though the soul and the body are so intimately
united, Aquinas' philosophy of man is not much more than his ideas
about the soul. That these are also very much affected by the issue of
inunortality is seen by a review of his conception of the soul as a
subsistent form, the plurality of forms and individuation in the human
composite, as well as the nature of the intellect, the process of
intellectual knowledge, and the nature of knowledge itself. These issues
are examined in the second chapter with the aim of highlighting the
often hidden nuances and slants given to them which can, in the final
analysis, be taken as preparation for the defence of inunortality.
The study of his view of man and his soul is all the more necessary
because most of what he said on immortality is encapsulated in the
passages in several of his works where he expressly defends the
doctrine with proofs. These proofs are reviewed in chapter three. They
are mostly founded on the philosophical presuppositions that had
become the patrimony of the thinkers of the period, on the assumption
of the accepted principles of the time, and on appeal to the conscious
experience of humankind. Thomas follows very faithfully in his
argwnents the thirteenth century style of outliuing objections to issues
at stake, as well as the contrary position before seeking re_conciliation.
Very often the objections highlight important difficulties in the

discussion. Where it is deemed that such objections are of weighty
import, they are also analysed, together with the answers given to them
where doing so is thought to bring out more clearly the stance of
Aquinas in the text concerned. Before then however, there is an effort
xiv
Introduction
The Philosophical Significance of Immortality, in Thomas Aquinas
to ascertain the intention of St. Thomas about the proolS in order to

settle the contention that he never intended to prove immortality. The
review of the arguments fol\ows the established chronological order of
the writing of the texts of Aquinas. This is done in order to facilitate the
tracking of the evolution of his thought and method on immortality and
other issues touching on it. Special efforts are made in the weighing of
each of the arguments to throw it back to its immediate sources in the
immediate predecessors of the angelic doctor, and also to observe the
difference in the employment of the same principles by Aquinas and his
immediate predecessors. In al\, the analysis attempts to balance the
over-critical stance of total rejection of the proofs without taking
account of the import of the project as a whole, with the oversympathetic reading that gives special privilege to some proofs as real\y
demonstrative of inunortality without taking sufficient note of the
problems involved. This balance will be struck through a broader
appreciation of the project of demonstrating immortality, not only in St.
Thomas, but also in other thinkers of his time.
Our balancing act is not however intended to cloud the presence of
some serious problems in the effort to demonstrate immortality in a
philosophical manner. There is first the question of death, which in a
way speaks against the close-knit hylemorphic unity between the two
principles in the human composite. The question of whether animal
souls are inunorta\ is also raised by some of the arguments which
Aquinas employs, and even where other arguments preclude the
immortality of sensitive souls, it is seen that some of such arguments
are built on foundations which are very tendentious. The state of the
separated soul is not less problematic, especially its ability to know,
separated from the body, which has telling implications on the
meaningfulness of its existence in act in that state. Aquinas' use of the
principles of Aristotelian philosophy to explain the state of separation
of the soul from the body links his theory of immortality to the
Cluistian doctrine of the resWTection, but the resurrection also implies
the inunortality of the body. In wading through all these issues under
the context of immortality, Aquinas draws very close to Platonism,
notwithstanding that the whole of his anthropology is expressly directed
against the philosophy of Plato. We shall examine how closely Aqninas
draws to the teaching of the Greek, and how far he succeeded in freeing
himself from it, while defending a doctrine which is best defended with
the presuppositions of the main principles of Plato's philosophy.
The last chapter of the work starts with an overview of the
arguments employed to defend inunortality, asking specifically whether
he succeeded in proving inunortality in accordance with what we have
identified as his intention. The opinions of some of the classical critics
t
t
!I
xv
of Aquinas, John Duns Scotos, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Cardinal de Vio

Cajetan, are examined to see some of the reasons why they thought that
the issue of inunortality is not one that philosophy can determine with
any measure of certainty. This section naturally leads to the
continuation of the history of the theme in philosophy by a brief
overview of how subsequent major philosophers - Descartes, Berkeley,
Hume, Kant, Voltaire, Mill and some contemporary thinkers - see the
question of inunortality. The general view of philosophical minds about
the theme of immortality leads to a brief reconsideration of the place of
immortality in the scheme of philosophy in general as well as a reexamination of whether the failure to arrive at generally acceptable
proofs disqualifies the topics of immortality from being a candidate for
philosophical reflection.
.
In general we have tried to adopt a critical, historical, contextual and
comprehensive approach in analysing the arguments of Aquinas, in
determining its place in the whole of his thought, and in arguing for the
place of the question of inunortality in philosophy. Given the
importance of the theme in any background understanding of Aquinas'
philosophy, the paucity of comprehensive works on the theme of
inunortality shows a lacuna in a balanced appreciation of his whole
philosophy. It is hoped that the following pages will make some
contributions in achieving this balance.
Chapter 1
THOMAS AQIDNAS AND THE

QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY IN
THE 13TH CENTURY
1.1 Immortality and philosophy in the early 13th century
The thirteenth century is by all computations a watershed in the
history aod evolution of philosophical thought inthe West. There is no
doubt that one of the most enduring aod most influential legacies of that
century is the philosophical aod theological syothesis of Thomas
Aquinas. Aquinas himself was in turn a product of his time, aod of the
convergence of factors that ineluctably gravitated towards the
reinvigoration of learning. It is perhaps a mere coincidence, but a very
consequential one, that the rediscovery of aocient Greek philosophy was
contemporaneous with the restructuring of wllversity learning, aod the
dissemination of Arab aod Jewish thinkers together with the spectacular
work of translators of all these sources. The confluence of all these, aod
other factors, not only assured the presence of a new impetus to learning,
but also more importantly ensured that what was available was first
assimilated, then internalized aod ahnost inevitably exerted indelible
influence in the shaping of both philosophical aod theological learning.
One prominent feature of the century, which has been described as
the century of philosophical revolution, ' is the interest of maoy thinkers
in the queslion of immortality. This interest has been noted by historians
of the century. 2 However, the importaoce of the theme of immortality in
the philosophy of the epoch should be judged more from the influence it
The Philosophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
had on the reflections of the thinkers of the thne than from the mnnber of
pages consecrated to it. Even then, a perfunctory survey of the history of
texts on immortality reveals a spectacular increase in interest on the

subject starting from the tum of the twelflh century and going on well
into the first half of the thirteenth century and beyond. Most major
authors of the thirteenth century devoted pages to the question.
The preponderance of texts on innnortality is in fact one of the
distinguishing marks of thirteenth century philosophy. As R.-M. Martin
pointed out many years ago, neither in Greek nor Latin patrology, nor in
the philosophical literature of the high Middle Ages do we find a wide
choice of texts on immortality.3 Augustine's De immortaZitate animae

was to wait more than seven centuries for another treatise on the same
theme.' Cassiodorns wrote De anima around 540 A.D., but exhibited no
appetite for the discussion of innnortality. For him, it was enough that
the book of Genesis mentioned that man is created in the image of God,
and this would not be possible if the human soul were to perish at dealb.'
Like Cassiodorus, such an eminent thinker as Anselm of Canterbury
devoted just one cursory paragraph to show that the soul is innnortal.'
Gilbert of Poitiers held that only by the grace of God are angels and
human souls innnortal,' while Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard said
virtually nothing on the subject. Nor did Hughes of St. Victor, Aicher of
Clairvaux, William of SI. Thiery and Isaac of Stella, even though the last
two wrote treatises such as De natura corporis et animae, and Epislo/a
de anima, which would ordinarily be appropriate for the discussion of
the innnortality of the soul.
Viewed from this background, the preponderance of discourses on
innnortality in the thirteenth century stands out prominently. Within the
early decades of the thirteenth century, John Blund and Alexander
Nequarn wrote treatises in which they argued for the innnortality of the
soul.' After them Philip the Chancellor, John of La Rochelle.' Alexander
of Hales,1O Odo Rigaldus," Bonaventure," Albert the Greatl' devoted
varying lengths of their work to the issue. William of Auvergne wrote the
De immorlalilale animae, and gave more than half of his large De anima
to the question. I'
The structural organization of the universities, which was one of the
factors that indirectly engendered interest in the question of innnortality,
was accompanied by a change in the content of university learning in
general. Before the thirteenth century, theology dominated university
study. Philosophy was not much more than logic, and the Neoplatonism
that Augustine gave a Christian interpretation determined the
fundamental thought structure of the age. This was made all the more
Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Immortality in the 13th Century
preponderant because the medieval Church was the sole custodian of

acadentic learning. F. Van Steenberghen notes that the preponderance of
Augustinian theology retarded the development of philosophy, and that
by offering men a vision of the world which satisfied their natural
curiosity, the Church obviated the need for any serious quest about man's
origin and his destiny, invaluable stimuli towards philosophical
research. IS
The neat thought-scheme generated by the dominance of Augustine
and thinkers of his ilk was to experience a crack with acquaintance with
more sources of philosophical learning, especially Aristotle and
Avicenna at the begiuning of the thirteenth century. The inroads of such
influence could not naturally go without a fight from more conservative

quarters. The ban on the libri naturales of Aristotle in 1210, and its
reaffirmation by Robert of Curcon in 1215 is only an indication of the
situation on the ground. It is evident that even before the ban, the
relationship between the faculty of arts, which was the first recipient of
the new influences, and the faculty of theology was not at its best, and
the question of the soul is a flashpoint in the discord. John Blund started
his De anima written around 1208 with an argument over whose
specialty it was to inquire about the nature of the soul. I' For Blund,
theologians should occupy themselves with the question of merit and
demerit, and what conduces to salvation and what to perdition. The
question of the nature and the essence of the soul, to what predicament it
belongs, when it is infused into the body, should be reserved to arts
masters.
Blund's treatise was the last such treatise written by a notable arts
master till Siger of Brabant, well into the second half of the century. Still
the theologians who occupied themselves with the question of the soul
and its innnortality were not strangers to the arts faculty and the new
sources. They were, thanks to the organization of wrlversity learning,

graduates of the arts faculty, and in spite of the repeated ban on
Aristotle, these theologians continued to read the new sources and used
them in their writings. They were therefore adequately exposed to the
doctrinal turns, which regenerated the question of the innnortality of the
soul.
1.2 Doctrinal Impetus to the Discussions on Immortality
Most prominent among the sources that exposed the thinkers of the
early thirteenth century to new doctrines, and hence to new ways of
thinking, was Aristotle. The Stagirite came in a retinue of ancient
commentators including Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and
The Philosophical Significance of Immortality In Thomas Aquinas
Simplicius. Major Moslem thinkers like Algazeli, Alkindi, Avicenna and

Averroes had also studied his writings. There was a plethora of pseudoAristotelian works, among them the very influential Liber de causis,
which was regarded as the height of the theological expression of
Aristotle's metaphysics. Plato was present in the rimaeus, the Phaedo
and the Meno. But the omnipresence of his doctrine was assured by a
host of Neoplatonic thinkers, among them Plotinus, Augustine,
Macrobius, Marius Victotinus and Boethius. To all these must be added
the works of Jewish thinkers, the most prominent among which were the
Fans vitae of Solomon Ibn Gabirol and the Guide of the Perplexed of
Mosche ben Maimon. The influence of most of these sources on the
reinvigoration of interest in immortality is indirect. It consists mainly in
bringing to the fore certain teachings whose consequences were logically
inconsistent with the docttine of immortality.
One of Plato's books, widely available in the Middle Ages, the
rimaeus. contains a mythical account of creation and immortality. In the
rimaeus, the creator gave the gods the power to create men and gave
them immortal parts, thus ensuring that if men lived well, they would
enjoy everlasting life." The Phaedo and the Meno, in which Plato
argued most consistently for immortality, were not widely read in the
early 13th century. It still remains a matter for conjecture and
disagreement why these dialogues that lend themselves so well to the
defence of immortality were hardly used. It is possible, as C. Steel said,
that it is because Plato's teachings were already widely known among the
medievais,18 and the novelty of Aristotle and his commentators drew
attention away from the translation of Heuricus Aristipus made around
1150. G. Wieland also alluded to the scientific development of theology
at the time for which Aristotle's system, in spite of its naturalism, was
more suitable.19 Still such reasons may not say all, or even much, given
that such sources as the Liber de causis, which was mainly Neoplatonic
in character, were very widely used both in philosophy and theology in
the guise of genuine Aristotle. It would perhaps be beneficial to weigh
seriously the influence of limited circulation on the use made of these
books of Plato.
There are nevertheless some brief references to Plato's Phaedo in the
works of Albert the Great and William of Auvergne. Albert in one of his
passages on immortality cited Plato's statement that philosophy is the
practice of death.' William cited the third argument of the Phaedo in
defence of immortality, but the hesitation he exhibited in the passage
{puto hone fuisse intentione Platonis}" indicates that he may not have
had direct acquaintance with the two works of Plato. Again, while citing
Thomas Aquinas and the Question Of Immortality in the 13th Century
the Phaedo, he attributed the argument from motion to the dialogue, an

argument found in the Phaedrus.
By the turn of the century, Aristotle was no longer known merely as
the logician. The prohibitions of his libri naturales indicate that more of
his doctrines had become known at the University of Paris.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that acquaintance with his works did
not initially engender disturbing reactions with regard to immortality.
Most authors of the early thirteenth century took Aristotle as a defender
of immortality, and the difficulty of interpretation latent in his doctrine
of the intellect was not initially evident to scholars of the century. Albert
the Great cited him as One of the authorities who defended immortality,
and in the Summa de creaturis, concluded a section of his discourse with
the statement that philosophers have two inspirations, Platonists and
Aristotelians, and both agree that the soul is immortal. 22 Aquinas himself
would later inveigh against the interpretation of Aristotle's teaching on
the intellect in a manner that entails' the mortality of the hwnan soul.
William of Auvergne used ad nauseam the phrase Aristoteles et
sequaces eius in, his De anima, but when arguing for immortality, he
made one direct reference to Aristotle's De anima in cotUlection with the
theory of the intellect. William warns about the opinion that Aristotle's
words meant that only the intellect is separable from the body, and
immortal. For him, there is no sense at all in talking of parts of the soul,
since the absence of such parts constitutes one of the bedrocks of his
defence of incorruptibility."
However, as Aristotle's philosophical theories gradually sipped into
the philosophical heritage of the time, disquiet gradually emerged about
certain aspects of his doctrine. This fact was compounded by the
obvious admiration of most thinkers for him, and was by no means
clouded by the repeated ban on aspects of his philosophy. Alexander
Nequam praised him in well-chosen hyperboles: Doctor Athenarum, dux
caput, arMs honas.24 For Alexander, to try to laud Aristotle is like trying
to increase the luntinosity of the sun with torchlight." Albert the Great
must have appeared very strident in reminding his contemporaries that
Aristotle was a hwnan being, and consequently fallible. 26 There is no
doubt that the attitude of these thinkers towards Aristotle prepared the
ground for their obvious eclecticism. One of the points in which this
eclecticism appeared was in their conception of the soul.
At the beginning of his De anima, Joim Blund set out to define the
soul, but was immediately presented with the problem of its immortality
on the supposition of Aristotle's defiuition. Blund raised a possible
objection and problem:
Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Immortality in the J3th Century
The" Philosophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
types of souls is owed to the diversity of matter that enters into their
composition. On intellection, he stated in the De anima that the agent
But there is the objection that form gives being. and that matter in itself
is imperfect. Hence perfection comes from form. Therefore if the soul is
the perfection of an organic body with the potency of having life, the
soul is fonn. But no form exists separately from substance. Therefore if
the soul is form, it cannot be separated from the body. but perishes with
intellect is responsible for the evolution of the material intellect into the
habitual by making material forms intelligible. As the agent intellect is
the highest material form, it communicates its intelligibility to other
lower intelligibles. Actual abstraction is, of course, carried out by the
human intellect, but this act is enabled by the agent intellect conferring
on intelligible objects the propensity to be amenable to the abstractive
powers of the human soul." In the De intelleetu, the noetic function of
the agent intellect was slightly altered. It no longer acts on the potential
objects of intellection, but rather on the material intellect itself to endow
it with abstractive power. In the De anima, Alexander further identified
the agent intellect with God or the first cause of Aristotle, and following
Aristotle, enumerated its characteristics as separate, impassable, and
unmixed, being completely outside the realm of matter. It is also
immortal because it is always in act, and therefore independent of all
potentiality.
The logical implication of Alexander's exegesis of Aristotle is that the
material and the habitual intellects are perishable. He nevertheless
asserted a kind of inunortality for man, arising from the identity between
the thinking subject and the object of thought. If the object of thought is
material form, it is inextricably bound up with matter and is perishable.
When on the other hand the object is intrinsically intelligible, and hence
the body.17
Thus Aristotle's definition of the soul hung like an albatross around

the neck of most of the philosophers of the thirteenth century. Blund's
escape route was to align himself with Avicenna's teaching that the soul
is in a substance, but has a specific function of vivifying the body with
which it is united, and it is because of this function that it can be called
the perfection of the body. Blund therefore had to rally round on the
substantiality of the soul in order to preserve its inunortality, while at the
same time retaining the definition of Aristotle. Most authors of the thue
followed the style of Blund in affirming the substantiality of the soul and
its nature as form. Philip the Chancellor did not use the definition, but
indicated he was aware of it, and did not raise any objection against it. 28
Albert rejected the definition of the soul as form,29 and we shall see that
when he did so, it was essentially in the name of immortality. One was to
wait till Thomas Aquinas to see the complete acceptance of the
definition of the soul as form, coupled with an effort to justify by
argumentation why it is not a normal form, but rather a self-subsistent
form. All the members of the early Franciscan School accepted
Aristotle's definition in the company of other definitions without making
any serious effort to dissipate the inconsistency of an independent
substance that is at the same time described as form or perfection of the
body.
However, if Aristotle's bare definition of the soul proved disquieting
to the doctrine of immortality, it is really the interpretation of the details
of his theory of the intellect that was to be the touchstone of the
discussions of the doctrine of immortality before the time of Thomas
Aquinas. One such interpreter who cwiously exerted enormous influence
was Alexander of Aphrodisias. In late antiquity the commentary of
Alexander on Aristotle's teaching on the intellect elicited reactions from
thinkers like Themistius and Philoponus. 30 In the medieval times,
Moslem peripatetics allied with Alexander to attest that the separate
agent intellect was the source of intelligibility, but parted company with
him over the corruptibility of the material intellect. 31
Alexander of Aphrodisias distinguished three types of intellect: the
material, the habitual and the active. The soul is a mixture of'the
elements that are constitutive of material entities. The difference between
imperishable, the intellect, which is its subject, becomes similar to the
imperishable and becomes immortal. 33 For Moraux, what is actually

imperishable is in Alexander's not the human soul, but rather the idea of
the divine which the human intellect acquires in its contemplation of the
divine.J4 This circuitous theory of immortality did not, however, filter
down to the Latin West by the beginning of the thirteenth century. By
that thue, the complicated exegesis of Alexander had become very much
simplified by Moslem thinkers, and the he was known simply as that
philosopher who taught that the intellect arises from the body and dies
with it. For Christian thinkers, he became known as the philosopher
whose doctrine was most opposed to Christian teaching and to all raison
d'litre of religion."
The teaching of Alexander had exerted enonnous influence on the
thinkers of the early thirteenth century. Auvergne and Albert attacked his
teaching on the nature of the soul, not so much for the content of his
theory as for the adoring following it was apparently commanding.
Albert described them as peripateticos graecos, cuius doctrinam multi
de peripateticorum schola sequuntur. 36 For William, Alexander's
doctrine would not have merited any reply if not for the disciples that it
was raking in.
37
Nevertheless, it is not certain that both Albert and

William, together with their contemporaries, had any direct knowledge
of Alexander's writings.
Gerald of Cremona (d.lIS?) translated the De intel/eetu within the
second half of the twelfth century, but the De anima of Alexander was
not available in Latin till William of Moerbeke translated it in the second
half of the thirteenth century. One obvious source of the knowledge of
Alexander was Averroes' commentary on the De anima of Aristotle."
Averroes took issue with Alexander because of the latter's materialist
conception of the huroan intellect. In the process of his criticism,
Averroes outlined the essentials of this materialism: that the material
intellect is only a corporeal faculty with which it perishes at death. It is
mainly on this issue that Auvergne and Albert attacked Alexander. The
two schoohnen wrote well after Averroes had been translated into Latin,
as it is evident from their knowledge of the Moslem philosopher.
William of Auvergne's summary pf Alexander's teachiug about the
origin of the soul indicates that he was well aware of the essential
content of the doctrine." He employed a host of arguroents against him,
but when he came to attack his noetics, he revealed a yawning gap in his
understanding of the teachiug of the peripatetic. 40 When Auvergne later
outlined arguroents for immoriality, he made no reference to the
Aphrodisias, though it is clear that such extreme materialism as
Alexander's was the object of his criticism in many passages. On the
other hand, Albert left no doubt that his arguroents for immortality in the
De natura were directed against Alexander. The passage preceding the
arguments was headed De errore alexandri de statu animae post mortem

et dissolutionem corporis. Like William, Albert endeavoured to present
both Alexander's teachiugs and the impossible consequences that would
result from them. However, it is instructive that Albert gave evidence
that there was no other major figure whose thought the Christian thinkers
of the early thirteenth century were attacking on the question of
immortality when he wrote that only Alexander of all philosophers
denied that the soul was immorial.41
Yet there were other philosophical ideas whose implication aroused
reactions in defence of immortality. In fact Averroes' De anima from
where the Latin West learnt the doctrine of Alexander was not available
in Latin translation until around 1225, and other thinkers who attempted
to confirm immortality did not mention Alexander nor did they give
adequate sign that his theory was a threat to the doctrine. Alexander
Nequam, John of La Rochelle and Philip the Chancellor are cases in
point. It means that other influences were at work, and here we would
like to mention the universal hylemorphism of Solomon Ibn Gabirol.
The teaching of Gabirol became available to the West through the
translation of the Fans vitae by John of Spain and Dominic
Gundissalinus in the twelfth century. For Gabirol, God excepted, all
beings are composed of matter and form. There is in creation a potential.
and universal essence made up of universal form and universal prime
matter. Each being is the bringing into actualization of this common
essence. While this philosophy was a handy tool with which Christian
theologians made a distinction between God and creatures, it introduced
a disturbing element into the usual conception of the soul as a simple
spiritual substance. In universal hylemorphism, spiritual substances are
also composed of spiritual matter and form, which explains adequately
the facts ofindividuation and change in them.
However, the mingling of spiritual matter in the metaphysical
composition of the soul detracts from its simplicity, and any attenuating
of simplicity seriously endangers the immortality of the rational soul.
Matter is after all the principle of corruption in organic beings because it
introduces contraries in these beings. To accept matter as an essential
composition of the soul was therefore very uncomfortable. Many authors
of the time rejected the theory of Gabiro!. Albert the Great equivocated
on the issue and then put forward an alternative theory which amounts to
its acceptance. From Odo Rigaldus on, the doctrine was repeatedly
. accepted by a succession of Franciscan thinkers. In any case, whether
they accepted the theory or not each of the thinkers had to tackle the
disjunctions it hrought in connection with the tenet of immortality. John
Blund, for instance, was very circumspect lest the doctrine got in the way
of consistent defence of immortality. He outlined the arguroent of the
proponents of the doctrine as follows:
Among the things created by the first cause in effect there are two types
of causes, one of which is corporeal and the other spiritual. But it is
such in the corporeal that their essence is constituted from matter and
fonn. But spiritual essences are even' more constituted. Therefore when
the more stable have being, they have this by way of stronger being in
effect through spiritual m"atter and spititual fonn. When therefore the
soul is one of the spiritual creatures, it will have composition from
matter and fonn, and so the rational soul is composed of matter and
fonn.42
Furthermore, the objector argues, the soul is a substance, and should

therefore contain the requisite composition of substantiality: matter and
10
The Philosophical Significance o/Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
II
definition, relationship to the body, and intellectual capacity was the

doctrine of immortality which the system supports so well. 45
form, as every species possesses the defining characteristics of the genus

to which it belongs.
In reply, Blund raised the possibility of infinite regress if indeed the
soul were to be composed of matter and form. The two components
must either have life essentially or not. If they have life, their life must
come from a soul, and this soul must in turn be composed of matter and
form, and if they have no soul, they cannot be alive. However, Blund
does not reject Gabirol's theory completely. He asserts that the soul
derives its simplicity from its nearness to the first cause in the order of
being, and thus that the matter-form composition does not apply to it.
Yet universal hylemorphism can be allowed in John Blund with the
proviso that the incorruptibility of the soul is not hampered.
1.3 The Example of Albert the Great

Moody's conclusion about Auvergne's analysis of the human soul is
even more applicable to St. Albert the Great. According to V. Schall
immortality is in fact the line that runs through all of Albert's philosophy:
The central theme in Albert's philosophy is indeed immortality.
Inunortality is to Albert what the One is to Plotinus, the Unmoved is to
Aristotle, doubt to Descartes, changelessness to Plato and Augustine.
Immortality is the thread that constantly links his thinking into an
intelligible whole. 46
And even if there were spiritual matter and spiritual form in the soul. it
will nevertheless not be corruptible, since it lacks contraries, which are
the cause of corruption.43
We have already remarked that Albert was among the rare figures of
the thirteenth century who rejected AriStotle's popular definition of the
soul. A fair-minded thinker that he is, he reviewed two definitions drawn
from the Stagirite. The first definition, which views the soul as the first
act of an organic body with the potency oflife, he accepts with measured
reservations. To be the act of the body is, for him, intrinsic to the nature
of the soul. However, the definition is an attempt to comprehend the
soul from the perspective of its substantial activity. The soul can be
understood from two perspectives: from its relationship with the body, in
which case it is actus corporis physici. The second way is to take the
soul in itself, in its essence as soul. From this second point of view, the
soul's relation with the body is secondary or accidental to its essence,
even though it is also pennissible to define the soul a posteriori from the
point of view of this relation.
Albert turned to Avicenna in order to appreciate Aristotle's definition.
He borrowed the Persian philosopher's simile of the soul as a mover.
Whatever is moved has a mover. A mover can be defined from the point
of view of his activity of moving or in so far as it has its proper existence
as a substance. The soul considered as a mover has something essential
to it over and above its function as a mover. It not only functions in the
body, but has also its own existence and activity independent of the
body. Albert thus makes a complete turn to Plato's idea of the soul
occupying the body as a sailor his ship.47 But his line of argument is not
capricious. It has an underlying logic, the logic ofimmortality. The soul
viewed as a fonn would not have an independent existence, and that is
why Albert refused to accept Aristotle's first definition as adequate,48
The second definition that is regarded as acceptable states that the
soul is "principium et causa hujusmodi vitae, scilicet corporis organici."
The attitude of Blund shows that his ulterior concern was the
preservation of immortality. That same attitude would mark the
philosophical works of most of the thinkers of the thirteenth century,
including Thomas Aquinas. Some of the factors we have outlined were
not directly seen as posing a problem for the doctrine of immortality, and
again they did not have an equal impact on all the authors. There is
much to be said about the view that with the rigidly structured university
education, and then with the interdependence of the thinkers on one
another, a stereotype in the explanation of the soul and the defence of its
immortality became quickly widespread. Still the philosophy of the
major thinkers was deeply marked by the question of immortality.
William of Auvergne strongly rejected any doctrine that would either
bring the soul into too close a contact with the body or the world of
matter. He thus rejected the theory of abstraction in order to be able to
argue that the soul is completely independent in knowledge. Again, in
order to preserve its simplicity and consequently its immortality, he
rejected the idea that the soul has different types of intellect
distinguishable one from ,the other." E. Moody rightly expresses the
tailoring of Auvergne's doctrine to fit immortality:
The doctrine of inunortality fits fairly easily into William's system; the
arguments he advances are like a review of the different topics
previously dealt with and they reveal the fact that one of the dominant
influences guiding William's analysis of the soul, with respect to its
Il
12
To say that the soul is the source of life leaves undisturbed ils essential
independence of the body. Indeed, f9r Albert, it is first and foremost
because the soul is a source of life that it can serve as the life-giver. the
first act or the perfection of the body. Thus its essential parts are not
sununarized by the function of perfecting the body. This enables Albert
to hold that the soul is a separate and independent essence, without
denying that it has a basic link with the body. In the De anima"Albert
pursued the same argument on the grounds that a higher being embodies
the perfection of the lower being. Hence it is impossible that an essence
that is not separable from the corporeal should be the subject of a
separable essence. On the contrary, operations can flow down from a
separate spiritual power to a corporeal being, just as the separated prime
mover is the cause of movement in the first mobiles. In the same way,
the separable rational soul can perform its normal function in the body
while remaining essentially an immortal substance.
When he came to the structure of the soul, Albert also reasoned with
the logic of immortality as an ulterior intention. For him the soul is a
simple substance, and though it is also vegetative, sensitive and rational,
all these powers exist in the soul only potentially as a triangle exists
potentially in a rectangle. Just as the potential existence of triangles in a
rectangle does not compromise the nature of the latter, so the presence in
the soul of the sensitive, vegetative powers in the rational soul does not
compromise the substantial unity of the soul.
In relation to the unity of the soul, Albert distinguished three types of
wholeness. The first is tatum universale, exemplified in the universal
which applies to many individual, concrete things. The second is tatum
integrale, the wholeness of a thing composed of integral parts. None of
these two explains the unity of the soul which is rather understood as
tatum potentiale, midway between tatum universale and integrale. The
soul is completely present in each of its faculties, as it is appropriate for
a tatum universale, yet each of these faculties can, in a certain manner,
b~ named a soul. The soul carmot also be dismembered; as it is possible
Wlth a tatum integra/e, but it is at the same time true that its perfection is
not realized completely in any of its faculties.
Albert used the analogy of political power to explain the unity
between the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul. In a political entity,
the highest authority embraces the power of subordinate officials as it is
the ultimate unity of power that makes a political entity what it is: Much
in the same way, he tried to unite the diverse powers that the soul
possesses in one indivisible substantial entity. Isolated, the powers of
the soul are no more than accidents, with the impllcation that what
Thomas Aquinas and the Question oj Immortality in t,~e 13th Century
13
affecls the accident leaves the substance intact. By so doing, Albert

prepared the ground for the rational defence of the immortality of the
soul at the disintegration of the body.
If the soul is an independent substance and substance, in the best
tradition of Aristotle, is composed of form and matter, what of the
composition of the soul? Some thinkers of Albert's time accepted the
universal hylemorphism of Ibn Gabirol as a convenient way of
explaining substantial composition in the soul conceived as substance.
Alberi rejected the doctrine without reservation. In the Summa de
creaturis, he argued that beings that are subject to generation and
corruption are composed of matter arid fann. Man, for instance, is
composed of body and soul. The soul is the form of the body, but in the
state of composition, the soul plays an additional role. It delineates the
common nature of the composed substance: the nature of man. It is as
though another form emerges over and above the form that is called the
form of the body in hylemorphic composition. This is the form of the
human being. Albert named this form the forma totius. He agreed with
Boethius that spiritual beings must be composed in some manner to
distinguish them from the Creator, who alone is absolutely simple. But
the composition present in spiritual beings carmot be that of matter and
fann, rather it is the composition arising from potency on account of the
privation in their being. He explained this special composition as that
between the suppositum andforma totius. Theforma totius of the solil is
rationality. The soul is thus a substance in the Aristotelian sense because
it is a subject (suppositum) determined by rationality (forma tolius).
This special composition is not hylemorphic because there is no presence
of matter of any kind. On the contrary, the subject that is determined by
rationality is a simple subject. Albert understood this composition in
terms of the quod est and quo est distinction. Quo est is equivalent to the
determining characteristic of the subject. In man, it is rationality. In
spiritual beings this determining quality or principium intelligendi is
equivalent to form in material composition. It means that because of the
absence of matter in spiritual things, their forma totius is not
distinguishable from their substantial form, contrary to what is found in
corporeal beings.
Needless to say, Albert's new type of composition does not lay to rest
the problem raised by universal bylemorphism, and by the mere
avoidance of the description, spiritual matter, does not seem to do away
with Ibn Gabirol's theory completely. It has been pointed OU~50 for
instance, that whatever name that is given to the suppositum of Albert, it
plays exactly the same role as Ibn Gabirol's spiritual matter. Still, it is
remarkable that Albert was led by the concern for immortality to
14
propound what to him is a new theory about the metaphysical

composition of spiritual beings. To introduce the nebulous concept of
spiritual matter would somehow introduce contraries into the soul, and
contraries are the cause of corruption. Like all the authors of his time,
Albert believed that agere sequitur esse, and therefore if the soul is
immortal, this must clearly be shown in its operation, especially in its
principal act of knowledge. In Albert's system, knowledge results from
the coordinated working of the possible and the agent intellects. Heavily
influenced by Islamic thinkers, he taught the process of the transmutation
of the possible intellect from pure passivity (hylealis), to the stage where
it gains the power of knowing principles (habitus prineipiorum), and
thus becomes intelleetus in habitu. Actualization of this power makes
the intellect intel/eetus in effeetu, and when the acquired knowledge is
applied in operations, it reaches the highest possible level of its capacity
to become intelleetus speculativus. For Albert, the agent intellect is part
of the SOul,51 and in fact the agent together with the possible intellect
constitute, strictly speaking, the whole intellectual soul.
In spite of his theory of the intellects however, Albert could not
extricate himself from almost extreme Platonism. Man as man, he says,
is the intellect (homo secundum quod homo solus intelleetus sit). The
mixture of this intellect with corporeal powers shrouds its contemplation
of the truth. Still Albert's theory of abstraction is almost the one that will
become classical in Thomism. Abstraction is necessary in intellectual
knowledge because all that is understood must be simple and devoid of
matter. Albert distinguished two types of matter: matter that is subject
to motion and matter that is not. The former is the matter of each thing
which in hylemorphic composition is perfected by the form of that thing.
The latter is the matter described as materia substans universali. The
intellect abstracts from matter that is subject to motion. It is matter in
the sense of forma totius, that is the rationality of a thing, and is not
therefore subject to abstraction. Man, for example, can be abstracted
from the idea of this particular body, but not from the idea of the body in
general" because the body enters into the very idea of man. All natural
knowledge begins from the senses. This beginning can either be mediate
or immediate. When we perceive sensible fann, we have an immediate

knowledge of the subject of that form. On the contrary, we can know the
subject of motion through the perception of motion, but only mediately.
It is in the mediate manner that the human intellect comes to know God
who is infinitely distant from the sensible. That is why such knowledge i~
imperfect. Knowledge from abstraction goes from experience received
from the senses to memory, and from there to the nniversal. The
15
possible intellect that has reached the level of the universal becomes
intellectus adeptus, which, being the repository of pure knowledge, is
immortal and perpetual. The possible intellect which is mixed up with
the sensible, inasmuch as it makes use of reminiscence, is corruptible.
But considered as a part of an indivisible soul, it is incorruptible.
However, it is the state of intellectus adeptus, with its possession of
perfect knowledge and contemplation, that is the root of inunortality. It
is in that state that the soul is able to obtain felicity post mortem. 53
For Albert, the agent intellect, as the efficient cause of knowledge,
makes what is potentially intelligible to be actually so. In its process of
perfection, the possible intellect continually receives the light of the
agent. Abstraction involves the continuous illumination of the' possible
intellect by the agent. This illumination, which takes place within the
soul, is made possible because the agent intellect is pure intelligibility,
having in itself the ideal form of all things. Indeed the real nature of the
agent intellect is no more than the totality of all these forms. In a way,
therefore, the illumination of the possible by the agent intellect is not
much more than the reception of the agent by the possible. Only when
the reception is total, that is to say, when the possible becomes the agent
S4
intellect can the latter become adeptus and at the same time become the
ground of inunortality. Why then did Albert say that all natural
knowledge begins from the senses if indeed the agent intellect possesses
a priori the ideal forms of all things? The answer is that for Albert these
fonus do not exist in a distinctive manner in the agent intellect, and the
phantasms are therefore necessary for their detennination; otherwise,
these forms will be received as undifferentiated by the possible intellect.
The mainly Aristotelian noetics that is outlined above is very much
tempered when Albert later emphasized divine intervention in the
knowledge of supernatural objects," and also the insufficiency of the
light of the agent intellect in abstraction." But from the brief outline of
some of the theories we can see that Albert's philosophy, especially his
philosophical psychology, can be described as a seam of different
doctrines, which on completion naturally grows into the immortality of
the soul. His explanation of the metaphysical structure of the soul, his
theory about the perfection of the intellect, and also his statement that
man as man is in fact only the intellect are all geared towards the defence
of the doctrine of immortality.
1.4 Some Trends in the Defence of Immortality before St. Thomas
Albert's quest for doctrinal consistency in his philosophy is mirrored

by all the prethomistic writers of the thirteenth century in their defence
16
of immortality. That they sought doctrinal consistency indicates. that

they all intended to pursue their discourse and their ar~ent on rat~onal
grounds. That is why their philosophy was in gm:eral ~allored ~o swt the
philosophical defence of the doctrine. While therr attitude powts to the
growing recognition of the philosophical method, or what one would
generally regard as arguments of reason, it also shows that they were
aware of the fact that the challenges to immortality did not arise from
other sources than from philosophical doctrines and their ~nfluen~es.
They attempted to challenge the perceived dangers on philosophical
grounds. It is therefore not surprising that hardly any ~uthor of the ear~y
thirteenth century drew direct conclusions from scnptural sources m
support of immortality. Odo Rigaldus :","S amon~. the rare fi~es who
referred to the Scripture while enumerating authontles that are m support
of the doctrine. 57 Albert the Great, the only writer who followed
Rigaldus in giving simple and unargumentative. enumer~tion of
authorities (autorititates philasophorum) in support of unmo~ahty, e~en
avoided notable Christian writers on the subject. The ten phil~so~hical
authorities he named did not include Augustine. But Albert mdicated
that his avoidance of Christian writers was far from oversight when he
stated that the saints said everywhere (saneti ubique dicunt) that the soul
is immortal." Consequently, he did not feel the need to enumerate them
as well. Aristotle is named five times; Algazelli, Avicenna, Averroes
and Plato are mentioned two times each. Authors mentioned once
include Constabulus, Pythagoras, Ptolemaeus, and Macrobius. William
of Auvergne on his part priced what he ca!Jed the theo~ogical. ar~ents
as having stronger convincing power.
Yet neIther m his De
immortalitate nor in his De anima did he give them any pride of place.
The authorities cited both by Rigaldus and Albert would be taken as a
clear indication of the sources of the thinkers. In this regard, it is
remarkable that St. Augustine's arguments for innnortality in th~ De
immor/alitate and the Soli/oquia were not repeated, and there IS no
evidence to suggest that the reasons for the absence. of these ,,:orks were
difficulties inherent in the arguments used by the BIshop of HIppo. The
same could be said of the arguments of Plato in the Phaedo, and the
Meno, although it must be added that in spite of what w~ ~ave called ~e
possible accidents of circulation, the doctrine of renumscence, .which
Plato's discourses on innnortality presupposes, would be reprehensIble to
the Christian writers. There are sigus that some of the proofs of the
Enneads of Plotinus60 were used; for instance, the arguments drawn from
the simplicity of the soul, and the conception ?f the ~oul a~ the .source of
life. But it is most surprising that despite AVlcenna s obvIOUS Influence,
Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Immortality In the J3th Century
17
his highly metaphysical proof of innnortality was used only by Albert,

who virtually copied the argument and designated it as a necessary
argument in defence of innnortality. It is possible that the sophistication
and obscurity of the argument precluded an easy addition of it in the
plethora of arguments outlined. One example of Avicetma's proofs61
states that whatever is destroyed possesses the potentiality of corruption,
and before this corruption is effectuated, the actuality of persistence.
Corruption and persistence cannot be simultaneously in one and the same
thing because the two concepts are contradictory. However, in beings
that are composed, the actuality of persistence can exist with the
potentiality of destruction, but in silnple separate entities, this is
impossible. Strictly speaking, the actuality of persistence and the
potentiality of destruction cannot coexist in a being which has a urdtary
essence, because anything which persists with the potentiality of
corruption has persistence in potency only, since its persistence is not
necessary. When the actuality of persistence and the potentiality of

destruction exist in one entity, they do not thereby become the same
reality, since the actuality of persistence is the same thing that occurs to a
being with the potentiality of existence. The usual consequence is that a
being that has the two qualities must also have at least two components,
from one of which it derives actual existence. It can thus be said that if
the soul is not composed it will not admit of corruption, since it will not
possess the actuality of persistence together with the potentiality of
destruction. In beings that are composed, the potentiality of corruption
is due to their material component and not to their substance as such.
Therefore the assertion that all that is generated is subject to corruption
due to its finltude is applicable only to beings composed of matter and
fonn.
Of course, the kernel of Avicennats argument is found here and there
in many writers, especially in the fonn of the assertion that the soul has
no material component, and that destruction is due to contraries in
matter.
Again, Avicenna's famous example of disembodied man was
dear to such thinkers as William of Auvergne. But no one went into any
detailed explanations of Avicenna, leaving the bland assertion of
incorruptibility on account of matter with the uncertainty of its origin.
Avicenna's argument presupposes the simplicity of the soul which he

argued for before arguing for its immortality. With the exception of
Blund and Albert, authors of the early thirteenth century did not provide
any prior proofs of the soul's simplicity. They argned straight for its
innnortality with some of the arguments which other writers, including
Avicenna, employed in favour of simplicity only, in most cases with the
18
presupposition that the simple must be incorruptible, lacking the

principle of destruction - matter.
Most of the arguments were taken from thinkers of previous times.
There were arguments from the conception of the soul as an incorporeal
and spiritual substance;62 from the idea of an ontological order of being
which is linked together like a chain, and whose most important link is
assured by the hwnan soul;63 from the soul as imago dei/4 as an

unceasing source of life (fans vitae), and of motion." They also argued
for immortality from the operation of the soul in knowledge. The soul is
a receptacle of knowledge that is universal and imperishable;" it shows
its natural distaoce form the perishable through abstraction;" it has an
uniimited desire to acquire knowledge;" it is self:knowing, knowing
itself as simple and uncomposed;" it can becolI!.e all things in
knowledge. Again the soul has by nature the desire for the most
comprehensive knowledge and infInite happiness,70 and nothing in nature
is futile.
Many of the arguments were repeated, and their underlying ideas used
to fashion new arguments. What the early thirteenth century owed their
sources was not so much ordered arguments as principles, the
consequences of which were drawn in an attempt to prove immortality.
Generally such principles were not demonstrated because they were
either assumed to be acceptable to all or to be supported by authorities
which needed no further justification. Such for instance is the saying
that whatever is received is received in accordance with the nature or
condition of the receiver; or that the intellect is self-knowing (Aristotle),
and again that one needs a ship to reach a port but does not need one to
stay there (Augustine). The immediate prethomistic authors exhibited
individual originality in their dexterity in applying such principles. Such
for example is the use made by Philip the Chancellor of the well known
golden chain of being to fashion many arguments for immortality. Many
of the discourses were lifted from previous authors. La Rochelle's
arguments are almost all to be found in the Summa de bono of Philip and
the Quesliones of Alexander of Hales. Alexander Nequarn aimost
copied word for word the argument of Robert of Melun. It is not to be
forgotten that through the renewal of learning and also the restructuring
of the seats of learning, there came to develop more communication
between intellectuals, and more exchange of written sources. And again,
the question of plagiarism had another meaning and implication for men
of the time. Still it is within such circumstances that some sparks of
originality emerged and left in their wake a host of new arguments for
Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Immortality in the J3th Century
19
inunortality, even though most of them cannot withstand serious

criticism.
'Joim Blund is adept at drawing out the logical implication~' of
supposedly accepted principles. He contrived an argument with the
meaning of death and the idea of corruption (Mars sit corruptio, et
corruptio sil mulatio). For him the fact of change requires that a
substratum remain when the process is completed. It means that change
does not imply reduction to nothingness. Thus if there is no subject on
which change would inhere, then there cannot be any change. If deatlf;
understood as a type of change in the soul, then there will be an impasse
as to what remains after the soul has died, or changed. 71 Presupposed, 'of
course, in Blood's reasoning is the idea that the soul is an indepen4,~nt
substance, and a simple substance, a conception he had earlier attempie.d
to argue for in his De anima.
Alexander of Hales, whose discourse on immortality is. not
extraordinary, spectacularly rejected the argument very dear to William
of Auvergne that the soul is the source of life (fons vilae), and therefore
immortal. 72 For him, if indeed the argmnent were correct, then there is
no reason why the same principle should not apply to vegetative and
sensitive souls. In Alexander we find one rare instance of rejecting an
argument already used for immortality. His position would in effect
imply a rejection of all considerations of the soul as a substance the
nature of which is life, as found in st. Augustine, in St. Albert, and also
to a large extent in St. Thomas Aquinas. However, Alexander also used
a peculiar proof. He combined the presence of the instinct of selfpreservation with what he takes to be the demand of the virtue. of
fortitude to prove that there must be immortality. The instinct of selfpreservation entails that no mortal creature desires its own death, and the
virtue of fortitude enables individuals to accept death willingly. If then
the will to die is an endowment of fortitude, it follows that by virtue of
self-preservation such death cannot be the end of the soul as well,
otherwise the lie is given to the natural instinct 73 Alexanderts reasoning
here is reminiscent of Plato's statement that philosophy is preparation for
death, and is also evocative of Socrates' acceptance of death on account
of an unjust judgement. Still this reasoning does not hold much water, as
Alexander's understanding of fortitude is not defensible. Fortitude
enables the individual in extreme circumstances to accept death instead
of compromising fundamental religious or human principles. Whether
this can be in any guise described as desire for death is to say the least
very questionable.
La Rochelle devised another peculiar argument from the comparison
of prime matter with the rational sou1. 74 According to him, prime matter,
20
The Philosophical Significance a/Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
21
arguments. Auvergne, of course, following Gundissalinus, mentioned

that he was following Aristotle's arguments because of the weakness of
Plato, but he did not prove to have understood the teachings of any of
these Greeks. La Rochelle was the first to distinguish the arguments into
which is the ultimate matter, is incorruptible, and so must its opposite in

the realm of forms, or perfection - the rational soul. Prlme matter being
susceptible to every corporeal form, and the soul being receptive to all
intelligible and spiritual forms attests to this correlation. The kernel of
John of La Rochelle's argument is found in Philip the Chancellor" where
it is used to establish a parallelism between prlme matter and rational
sou~ and to show why prlme matter should be a correlate of the rational
soul. However the two arguments do not seem to go far enough in
sorting out the right correlates. If prime matter is in fact understood as
pure potentiality, which is in any event conceptual, there is no reason
why its correlate in the realm of forms should not be pure actuality,
lacking all potentialities, which is not the case with the rational soul.
The two writers were of course referring to the order of nature alone.
But here again, why not extend the correlation to the universal chain of
being which at least Philip the Chancellor used to good effect in his
discourse?
Our emphasis, however, is the ingenuity of the eclectic early
thirteenth century writers who attempted to use all the resources at their
disposal to argue for inunortality. Albert, for example underlined the
phenomenon of human culture and religion as indicative of
immortality.76 For him, there is an essential affinity between the subject
and its object of quest to make natural attraction possible. Honourable
things are naturally attractive to man, and so is religion which is the
worship and care for the divine. Such tendencies, according to Albert,
are not found in beings, unless the object perfects them, and unless they
have a certain affinity with the object of their desire. Again the love and
quest for the honourable and the religious is not owed to the body, which
is naturally directed towards the material and cannot rise above it. If
what he called rah'ones commune and rationes proprie, but was silent on
the criteria for his grouping and on the relative weight he assigned to
each of the groups. Only Albert the Great made clear distinctions on the
convincing power of his arguments. In the Summa de creaturis, he
named autoritate philosophorum, and later divided his arguments into
signs (signa) of immortality, probable, and necessary arguments. In the
De natura, his discourse is merely entitled "Necessary arguments in
defence of immortality." It is instructive that many of the proofs
designated as signum and as probable arguments are used by other
writers of his rlme without any specific designation. Thomas Aquinas
was not to follow Albert's innovation in this matter, but we are to see that
some of the trends we have seen in the defence of immortality in the
early thirteenth century are abundantly replicated in his own philosophy.
1.5 The Issue of Latin Averroism
The above trends do not indicate that the prethomistic thirteenth
century masters had any interest in explaining what type of inunortality
they were talking about. There is hardly any single author of the time
who as much as tried to define the term inunortality, nor tried to show
even obliquely how the term is to be understood in relation to the human
soul. The need was to show that the soul must be inunortal, and the
understanding and reception of new theories were tailored by this need.
It was therefore enough that there was any sign, any believable inflection
of doctrine which would add to the conflrmation of this doctrine already
taken to be certain on grounds of Christian religious convictions. The
question of which type of inunortality that answers the need of
philosophical proofs would be more clearly raised in the second half of
the century, and it would be a question which not only affected
profoundly the academic community, but also Aquinas' treatment of the
question of the soul, and specifically its immortality. The problem arose
in the context of the upsurge of the movement which has come to be
known as Averroism. 77
The background to the problem of Averroism in the thirteenth century
is the continued assimilation of the new sources of learning. In spite of
the fact that the ban of 1210 was not lifted a host of thinkers both in the
faculties of arts and theology continued the utilization of the available
works of Aristotle including the libri naturales. A prominent thinker
indeed such tendencies were corporeal, other animals would also possess
them. It follows that whatever pines for the honourable and the material
does not depend on the body. Consequently the rational soul does not
depend on the body and does not perish.
The obvious weakness of some of these proofs points to the state of
the philosophical development of the age, and the failure of the thinkers
to resolve conflicting theories into a coherent system. Their discourses
especially their arguments, are not however to be taken in isolatio~
because the authors did not seem to have taken them as such. Their
method was rather to call to witness any conceivable principle, theory Or
saying deemed to be generally acceptable, and to draw from such the
conclusions that could be shown to speak for immortality. This is why
most of the authors did not weigh the strength or weakness of the
22
like Albert the Great was to declare his intention of making all the works
of Aristotle intelligible to the Latins. There was no donbt thet the ban on
Aristotle was a rule kept in the breach, and even with the confirmation of
the ban, together with the statutes of the University of Paris in 1263 by
Pope Urban IV," none was left in doubt that the ban had become an
anachronism. In 1252, the English nation at Paris included in its
programme required reading of Aristotle's De anima,79 which Roger
Bacon had been reading years before then. When therefore the
remodelled programme of arts imposed all the known works of Aristotle
as obligatory reading in 1255, it was not doing more than confirming the
facts that were already on the groWld. 80 It was obvious thet the more
conscious and reactionary tendency in the university was losing out to
the more innovative, ebullient and audacious tendency.

The presence of Aristotle was, however, not so important as the
honour with which he was handled. He remained the philosopher to all,
including Aquinas. His works had not yet been completely Wlderstood,
and the obvious laCWla, which existed, was filled in by a host of pseudoAristotelian Neoplatonic sources and the commentaries of Avicenna and
Averroes particularly. The legalization of Aristotle's work and the preeminence given to his De anima <as shown by the English nation)
brought, among others, the problem of the soul to the fore, and especially
the problem of the intellect over which Aristotle's commentators had
joined battle in ages past. In the tWrteenth century, it was the Moslems
who were regarded as the privileged interpreters of Aristotle, and by the
second half of the century; it was obviously Averroes who had the upper
hand, and was respectfully known as the commentator. His commentaries
were initially seen as useful for the Wlderstanding of Aristotle. 81 The
problem came with the bold and independent interpretation of the
teaching of Aristotle by some arts masters. Such confidence in the
philosopher was fostered by a long development,82 starting from the
begiruring of the century and leading more and more to the independence
of philosophical learning vis-a-vis theology. Most other thinkers of the
cenllll?' had also exhibited similar rational attitude which is a testimony
to therr attempt to prove immortality strictly on philosophical grounds.
However, the new and troublesome tendency went all the way to draw
conclusions in philosophy based on the interpretation of Aristotle even
though such conclusions did not fit the tenets of the Christian faith.
Thus between 1265 and 1270, a group of arts masters, prominent
among whom were Siger of Brabant and BoetWus of Dacia, were boldly
propagating doctrines which were not all in accordance with Christian
teaching. The tendency of their thought could be seen in some doctrines
I
,
23
taught by Siger before the condemnation of Etienne Tempier, the then

Bishop of Paris in 1270." On the crucial issue of the intellect, Siger in
his Questiones in tertium de anima 84 followed Averroes' interpretation,
with the intention, no doubt, of reaching the thought of Aristotle. The
intellect, for Siger, is completely inunaterial. having no other
composition except that of genus and specific difference. Made up of
two powers agent and passive or possible, it is incorruptible, eternal and
even though created, it is one for all human beings. The other individual
part of the human being is a corporeal substance that is animated by a
sensitive soul. This lower soul, in an operative/functional union with the
common intellect, is what constitutes the human soul. In knowledge, the
common intellect cooperates with the individual human being through
the phantasm of the imagination, In abstraction, the intellect receives
from the human imagination its object of thinking. The passive intellect
receives the species that the agent abstracts from the hwnan imagination,
and it is in tWs manner that the intellect is involved in the multiple acts
of knowledge of different individuals. This individual person is entirely
corruptible, and only the common intellect is immortal. Thus there is no
after-life punishment, as these are taken care of here on earth by the
natural consequences of human action, good or bad.
Siger's position was to change considerably, but that was like a post
mortem. Already in 1267 and 1268, Bonaventure decried the turn the
interpretation of Aristotle was taking. However, it was Aquinas who
addressed the most severe critique to Siger and his fellow arts masters in
the De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. The polemical stance of
the opuscule is set right from the beginning. Aquinas states the history
of the problem, and the issues at stake: the pervading error that
originates from the writings of Averroes. According to Aquinas,
Averroes held that for Aristotle, the possible intellect is one for all men,
and declared his intention to refute the error decisively." Aquinas'
concern is thus concentrated on the monopsychism, which the arts
masters had professed in their search for the real doctrine of Aristotle.
His effort throughout the De intellectu is to show that the interpretation,
which the yOWlg masters were following, contradicted the writings and
the intention of Aristotle. It goes without saying that such a controversy
will have a remarkable influence on the discussions of immortality.
Even though Aquinas had in some of his former works cOWltered the
teaching of Averroes, his concern'from the outbreak of Averroism will
be more concentrated on defining the type ofimmortality he argues for ..
The factors we have outlined in the foregoing as contributing to the
discourses on. immortality and also the tendencies we have traced in
these discourses had a strong influence on Aquinas. His philosophy can
24
The Philosophical Sign,ijicance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
be seen as a continuation, as well as the improvement of the legacies of

the early thirteenth century in its encounter with new philosophical
tendencies coming from many quarters. His ingenuity notwithstanding,
he was an active player on the scene, using the materials 'and the
resources at the disposal of the thinkers of the time. Such factors as the
teaching of Alexander on the intellect was important to him as much as it
was to Albert,86 and in the Summa theo!ogiae,87 he had to face squarely
the universal hylemorphism of Ibn Gabirol before arguing for
immortality. It is reasonable to suppose thst the question of immortality
also played a central role in his conception of the human soul, just as the
resulting difficulties in some of Aristotle's theories and those of his
followers, Aquinas may have shown special commitment by upholding
some uncomfortable theories of Aristotle, and at the same time resolutely
defending the doctrine of immortality, We shall see that in doing this he
was well ahead of his contemporaries, . But his advance wouid leave
behind a host of some philosophical consequences and problems,
Most immediate forebears of Aquinas were not privy to the doctrine
of Latin A verroism and the conflict it engendered. Albert's work against
Averroists was in real tenns against "Arabism,,88 (or do we say
Islarnism?) as Salman noted many years ago, Aquinas on the other hand
was specifically pitched against Averroes and his followers in the faculty
of arts. The reason he gave for writing the opuscule links him directly to
the issue of immortality: monopsychism is both erroneous and against
the Christian faith because without the diversity of the intellect, there
will be no personal immortality, Such a doctrine would have adverse
consequences on morals.89 The rest of the treatise is devoted to arguing
that the soul is immortal, that this immortality is personal, and that the
teaching of Aristotle supports such views. In some subsequent works,
articles in which the errors of monopsychism are attacked closely follow
his presentations of the arguments for immortality.90
E.- H. W<lber published a work in 1970" in which he tried to trace
the doctrinal influence On Aquinas of his conflict and his friendly
relationship with Siger of Brabant. For Weber, Aquinas' theory of the
intellect was very Aristotelian before 1270, but his encounter with Siger
of Brabant nudged it towards Neoplatonism. If his conclusions are
anything to go by, a position which Gauthier does not seem to view with
much favour,92 it means that in fact Averroism had a much more far
reaching influence on the angelic doctor, It will lead us off course to
explore the intricacies of such an influence on the angelic doctor, The
main focus of our efforts in the following pages will be to see how the
concern for immortality of the soul in the context of the factors we have
Thomas Aquinas and the Question oj Immortality in the 13th Century
25
outlined above affected the philosophy of Aquinas, starting with his

conception of the soul.
NOTES
D. Knowles. The Evolution 0/ Medieval Thought, 2nd ed. (London:

Longmans, 1988). p. 201.
22 R.-M. Martin, "L'immortalite de l'ame d'apres Robert de Melun," Revue
neo-scolastique de philosophie, 36 (1934), p. 145; O. Pluta, Kritiker der
Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin in Mittelalter und Renaissance (Amsterdam: R.
Grunner, 1986). p. 2: ''Die Frage nacb der Unsterblicbkeit der Seele gehort in
Spaten Mittelalter zu den meistdiskutierten und meis~~pften The~en.".
3 R.-M. Martin. op. cit., p. 129:-''Ni dans la patrologxe, SOit greque SOit l~tine,
ni dans la litterature du haut moyen age. nous ne trouvons un grand chOlx de
textes sur l'immortalite de I'arne."
4 The date of one treatise on the theme, Liber Alcidii de immortalitate animae,
ed. P. Lucentini (1984), is not yet certain. If it is accurately dated after
Augustine and before the 13th century, it may be th~ only lmown .instance ,ora
De immortalitate after Augustine's. The authorship of the De lmmortalltate
attributed to Gundissalinus is still disputed, and many affinn it is in fact the
work of William of Auvergne. If indeed this view is correct, then it would
mean that the next treatise came in the 13th century and not in the 12th. For
discussions about the authorship, see A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergre a
S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 2nd ed. (Milan: Universita Catholica del Sacre Cuore,
1946). vol. 3, pp. 120- 123; B. C. Allard, "Note sur Ie 'De Immortalitate
animae' de Guillaume d'Auvergne," Bulletin de philosophie medtevale, 18
(1976), pp. 68 - 72; R. J. Teske's introduction to his translation of William .0J
Auvergne: The Immortality of the Soul (Milwaukee: Marquette Umv~rslty
Press, 1991). pp. 2 - 4; 1. O. Oguejiofor, The Argumentsfor the Immortahty of
the Soul in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century (Louvain: Peeters, 1995),
pp. 238 - 243
5
Cassiodorus De anima (Migne, P. L. 70, 1285): "Nain quemadmodum
poterat esse i~agO aut similitudo Dei si animae bomine mortis tennino
clauderentur?"
6 Anselm, Monologion, Opera ominia, ed. F. S. Schmit (Edinburgh: Thomas
Nelson, 1946), c. 69 p. 79.
7 Gilbertus, Commentaria in librum de duabus naluris (Migne, P. L., 64, 1369
- 1370)
..
8 Jolm Blund, De anima, ed. D. A. Callus & R. W. Hunt (London: BntIsh
Academy, 1970), xii, 296 - xxii, 328.
26
See Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, ed. N. Wicld (Bern: Franke,
1985), 265 - 277; John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima. ed. J. C. Bougerol
(paris: J. Vrin, 1985), 1. 42.
10
Alexander of Hales, Questiones disputate, ed. Doucet (Quaracchi: St.
Bonaventure College, 1960), 1. 32.
II For Odo Rigaldus' text on inunortality, see S. Vanni Rovigbi, L'immortalita
delf'anima ne; maestri francescani del secolo XIII (Milan: Vita et Pensiero,
1936), pp. 241 - 248.
12 See St. Bonaventure's conunentary on the Book of Sentences of Peter
Lombard (Quaracchi: St. Bonaventure's College), 19 v. 2, p. 457 - 461.
13 _ Albert the Great, De natura et origine animae, opera omnia, v. xn, ed. B.
Geyer (Aschendorf: Milosler, 1955), II, c. 6 pp. 25 - 28; Summa de creafuris,
ed. Borgnet (paris, 1894), II, q. 59, a. 2; De anima, Opera omnia. v. vn, ed. C.
Stroick (Aschendorf: Miloster, 1986), ill, 3, c. 13.
14 William of Auvergne, De immortalite animae, ed. G. BUlow, Beitriige, II, 3
(MUnster, 1897), pp. 39 - 61; De anima, opera omnia, II, Suppl., (1674,
reprinted, Frankfwt a. M: Minerva, 1963), pp. 65 - 226
IS F. Van Steenbergben, Aristotle in the West, tr. L. J. Johnston (Louvain: E.
Nauwe1aerts, 1970), pp. 32 -33.
16 De anima, II, ii, 22: "Theologus habet inquirere qua via contingat animam
mereri et demereri, et quid sit ad salutem quid ad penam. Quid autem anima sit,
et in quo predicamento sit, et qualiter infundatur corpori, non habet ipse
inquirere. Ex quo ista scire magis pertinet ad alium artificem. Ex quo ergo
theologus solum habet docere qual iter sit merendum et demerendum, non habet
ipse proprie do cere quid sit anima nee quid sit eius essentia."
17 Timaeus, 41b - 42b
\8 C. Steel, "Plato Latinus (1939 - 1989)," in J. Hamesse & M. Fatrori (eds.),
Recontres des cultures dans la philosophie mediivale (Louvain-la-Neuve: I. S.
P., 1990), p. 309

19
O. Wieland, "Plato oder Aristoteles? Uberlegungen zur AristotelesRezeption des lateinischen Mittelalters," Tijdschrift vQor Filosofie, 47 (1985),
pp. 605 - 630.

Albert the Great, Summa de creaturis, ii, 61, 13: "Et propter hoc Plato dixit
quod philosophia est cura et sollicitudo mortis."
21 William of Auvergne, De anima, VI, 14, p. 170, a b.
22 Summa de creaturis, ii, q. 59, a. 2 p. 524b: "Philosophorum autem duae sunt
rationes, scilicet Aristoteles et Platonis et patet per jam dicta, quod ambo
concordant in hoc quod anima sit inunortalis."
23 De anima, VI. 9. 162a: 'lEt hoc forsitan concedet aliquis propter sermonem
Aristotelis in libra suo de anima, partem animae separabilem iIlam videlicet
qua intelligit .... Iste autem intellectus non solum erroneus est, sed impossibilis.
lam enim declaratum est tibi in eis quae praecessenmt in hoc ipso tractatu
declarationibus multis, et demonstrativis animam humanam in corruptibilem
esse, et quoniam non est in ea pars et pars, neque potentiae quae ei attribuntur
sunt u110 modorum partes ipsius, neque aliqua earum est in ea tamquam pars."
20
27
24 De laudibus divinae sapientiae, De natura rerum, ed. T. Wright (1863, repr,

London: 1967), p. 300.
2S
Ibid., 174, p. 309: "Ingenium Aristotelis commendare superfluum esse
censeo, qua supervacuis laborat impendiis qui solem nititur facibus iuvare."
26
Physicis, VIII tr. 1, c. 14: "Dixit aliquis forsitan nos Aristotelem non
intellexisse et ideo non consentire libris ejus et ad ilIum dicimus, quod quid
credit Aristoteles fuisse deum, ille credere debet quod numquam erravit, si
autem credit ipsum esse hominem, procul dubio errare potuit sicut et nos,"
27 Jolm Blund, De anima, ii, 15. All the translations of the quotations from
Jolm Blund are mine.
28 Summa de bono, 156, 19 - 27.
29 Cf: Summa de creaturis, II, q. 1, a. 1.
30 A. P. Fotinis (tr.), The De anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Washington
D. C: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 331 - 333.

31 See O. Thery, Autour du decret de 1210, II: Alexandre d'Aphrodise (Kain:
Le Saulchoir, 1926), pp. 23 - 27.
n p, Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exegete de la noetique d'Aristote
(Liege: Faculte de philosophie et lettres, 1942), p, 93: "C'est donc d'une faeon
tres indirecte que l'intellect agent est cause d'habitus de ]'intellect materiel: il
fournit au sujet connaissant des etres qui en raison de leur structure
ontologique (matiere et forme), pourront devenir objets de connaissance
intellectuelle ...
lJ
Alexander, De anima, 90, 2 -11
34 p, Moraux, op. cit.,p. 98,
35 G. Thery, op. cit., p. 46.
36 Albert the Great, De natura et origine animae, it 5., pp. 78 - 80
37 William of Auvergne, De anima, iii, 3,.p. 116b: "Interim autem prosequar
destructionem erroris istius hominis, qui error parum curandus esset nisi tantum
fuisset nomen ejus, et authoritas in philosophia. lam enim dixi tibi quod
homines imbecillis intellectus quasi mole magnitudinis authoritas dejiciuntur in
errores, et permittitur ne resurgant ab eis tanquam si nomen et auctoritas non
solum verificaret, sed etiam quasi deificaret homines hujusmodi, atque
infallibiles efficeret; quod etsi rebus disciplinalibus saepe et multwn fiat, in
rebus tamen divinalibus non fit." Cf also p. 14b: "inter graecos philosophos, et
apud Aristotelis expositores non mediocriter claruit iste Philsophus, eo
studiosius et perscrutatius exterminanda est ejus sententia, errorque
destruendus, quo validior est ad nocendum et subvertendum parum exercitatos,
et ad modicum doctos ejus error: twn quia ejus auctoritas et sapientia
sententiam ejus credibilorem efficiunt ..."
38
O. Pluta, "Averroes als Vennittler der Gedanken des Alexander von
Aphrodisias." in Averroismus in Millelalter und in der Rennaissance, F.
Niewohner and L. Slurlese (eds.), (Ziirich: Spur Verlag" 1994), pp. 201 - 203.
39 William of Auvergne, De anima, v. 3, 114b: "Nec praetereundus est hic
error Alexandri quo insanissime deliravit de natura et originae animae
humanae, dicens eam oriri et esse ex contemperantia elementorum, ac si diceret
ex bonitate cornplexionis tanquam ex conjuctione ipsorurn qui per illud dicitur
28
The Philosophical Significance 0/ Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
esse inductus, quia videlicet dyscratia, excessusque in 000, vel in pluribus

elementis vitam distrahit in hominibus et in aliis animalihus; inde enim primum
proveniunt aegritudines, et laesiones vitae, deinde mors in animalibus."
40 For instance, William went to great lengths to argue against the supposed
teaching of Alexander that the material intellect is inactive in lmowledge.
However in the De anima, Alexander attributed abstractive power to the
material intellect, but insisted that this power could not be consequential unless
the agent intellect conferred its intelligibility on the material intellect. In the De
intellectu, the role of the agent intellect becomes more expansive acting on the
material intellect to make it habitual (intelligencia agens per quam intellectus
materialis fit ut habeat habitum p. 76)
41 Albert the Great, De natura .. , ii,S, 80 - 97: "Solus inter philosophos
animam rationalem concedit perire pereunte corpore."
42 De anima, xxiv, 329
43 Ibid., xxiv, 334.
44 E. A. Moody, "William of Auvergne and his Treatise De anima," in Studies
in Medieval Philosophy, Science and Logic (Los Angeles: University of
California Press. 1975), p. 60: "Since the theory of the active intellect in his
eyes. ran counter to such fundamental doctrines as the indivisibility of the soul.
or its individual immortality, he refused to entertain it as an acceptable
explanation." See also R.-A. Gauthier, "Note sur les debut (1225 - 1240) du
premier "averroisme..... Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 66
(1982), p. 356.
4S Ibid., p. 101.
46
1. V. Schall. "Immortality and the Political Life of Man in Albertus
Magnus," The Thomist. 48 (1985), p. 29. See also B. Mojsisch, "Gnmdlinien
der Philosophie Alberts des GroBen," Freiburger Zeischriji for Philosophie
und The%gie. 32 (1985), p. 29: "Den Problemstellungen dieser Werke Alberts
ist zu entnehmen, daB er die philosophische Psychologie in das Zentrum seines
Denkens rUckte,"; A. De Libera, Albert Ie Grande et lei philosophie (paris: 1.
Vrin. 1991), p. 215: "La noetique d'Albert est Ie coeur vivant de sa pensee, Ie
foyer de son systeme. Ie principal terrain de son engagement philosophique."
47 Concerning Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the soul, Albert wrote,
"Ad aliud decendum, quod animam oonsiderando secundum se, consentimus
Platoni: considerando autem secWldum formam animationis quam dat corpori.
consentimus Aristoteli." Summa theologiae, II, tr. 12, q. 69,m. 2- a- 2; t. 18. p.
348.
48 On this E. Gilson wrote. "Albert veut naturellement maintenir la possibilite
d'une existence de l'ame separee, Ie probleme de l'immortalite de i'arne l'y
oblige. n va donc raisoner ainsi: exercer des operations vitales appartient it la
substance de l'arne en tant qu'inseparable du corps: or I'arne est separable du
corps: i1 faut donc qu' elle soit en elle-merne quelque chose de plus que I' acte
du corps organique." Cf: "L'ame raisonable chez Albert Ie grand." Archives de
l'histoire doctrinale et lilteraire du moyen-age, 4 (1944 - 1945), p. 27
29
De anima, II, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 70 a - b: "Cuius causa necessaria est, quia cum

partes animae sint naturales potestates eius ab ipsa fluentes, impossibile est,
quod ab essentia conjucta cum corpore fluat potestas separata. Sed e converso
possibile est, quod ab eo quod essentialiter est separatum, fluant potentiae
operantes in corpore, quia onmis potestas superior potest, quidquid potest
virtus inferior. et non convertitur; cuius probatio est, quia nos videmus quod a
primo motore simplici. qui maxi me separata essentia est inter omnes essentias,
fluit virtus motiva primi mobilis, quae nullo modo explet operationem suam
sine corpore, eo quod nihil est localiter mobile nisi corpus."
so E. Gilson, ''L'arne raisonnable chez Albert Ie grand," p.43.
51 De anima, m, tr. 3, c. 11, p. 221, a. 25 - 27: "Per hoc enim videtur nobis,
nec de hoc dubitamus, quin intellectus agens sit pars et potentia animae."
S2 Summa de creaturis, II, quo 8, a. I, p. 501: " ... onmes,intelligibile secundum
quod est intelligibile, habet illam simplicitatem quae fit per resolutionem a
materia et appendiciis materiae. Sed duplex est materia, scilicet subjecta motui,
et substans universali. Materia autem quae' est subjecta motui, non est illud
quod est res, et est in potentia ad formam quae est pars rei et non est totum, et
propter hoc non praedicatur de reo Materia autem quae substat universali, est id
quod est res, quia ipsa est hoc particulare demonstratum, et forma sua est forma
totius et non partum et propter hoc praedicare de tota re: et appendicia illius
materiae S\Ult salis supra materiam quae est particulare. Et cum dicitur, quod
intellectus abstrahat a materia, intelligitur de materia quae est particulare: quod
patet: hominem enim non abstrahit intellectus nisi ab hoc homine, et ab ilIo, et
non abstrahit hominem a semine et a corpore hominis. Et similiter abstrahit
Angelum ab hoc Angelo et ilIo, et similiter animam ab hac anima et ilIa, et sic
de aliis."
S3 Ethica. 1. I, t. vii, V. 17, vol. VII, p. 133: ..... intellectus adeptus radix est
immortalis ... Ille autem intellectus de sui natura semper est contemplatione
admirabilissimorum firmissimorum, et purisimorum theorematum, quorum ipse
propria imago est et susceptiwm. In his autem felicitas potissima est, ut dicit
Aristotles. Patet igitur ex omnibus his, quod animae quas virtute et scientia
hunc intellectum adeptae sunt. felicitatem habent post mortem."
54 De anima, ill, 3, C. 11. p. 221b, 83 -222a5 : "Et haec fiunt intellectu agent
intluente eis intellectualitatem. et faciendo haec hi.tellecta secundum actum esse
intellecta intellectua agens conjungitur nobis ut efficiens: Et quia in omnibus
his influit intellectualitatem et denudationem. sunt omnia sibi similia i hoc
quod separata sunt et nuda; et ideo in omnibus his accipit continue intellectus
possibilis lumen agentis et efficitur sibi similior et de die in diem. Et hoc
vocatur a philosophis maveri ad continuitatem et coniunctionem cum agent
intellectu, et cum sic acceperit omnia intelligibilia intellecta, habet lumen
agentis ut formam sibi adhaerentem, et cum ipse sit lumen suum eo quod lumen
suurn est essentia sua, et non est extra ipsum, tunc adhaeret intellectus agens
possibili sicut fonna materiae. Et hoc sic compositum vocatur a Peripeteticis
intellectus adeptus et divinus."
S5 Summa de creaturis, II, q. 55, a. 3, p. 468b - 469a.
49
30
Commentary on Dionysius'De coe/esti hierarchia, c. 9, 6, ad. 2; xiv, p.

283a: "Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio horninis incipit a phantasmate, et
tenninatur ad intellectum: et secundum bane viam potest etium illuminari ab
Angeli, cum non sufficiat ad abstractionem onmium specierum lumen
intellectus vel divinurn."
57 Odo Rigaldus, op. cit., pp. 241- 242.
S8 Summa de creaturis, q. 59, 8.2, p. 524b.
S9 De anima, VIT, 22, p. 176b.
60 For Plotinus' arguments for immortality, see The Eneads, Book IV, 7. 8.
61 See Avicenna's Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus, ed. S. Van Riet,
Avicenna Latinus (Louvain: Peeters), V, 4, 70 - 77.
62
John Blund, De anima, xxiii, 319j Alexander of Nequam, Speculum
speculationum, Ill, I, xxxviii. 1.
63 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, 265, 49 - 266, 109, Albert the Great,
Summa de creaturis, q. 59 . 21 pp. 524b" 526 .
64 William of Auvergne, De anima, VI. ,8, p. 164b; De immortalitate , pp. 50 _
51,59; Alexander of Hales, Questiones, 1. 32, 20, 30" 35.
65 William of Auvergne, De immorlalilale; p. 55, De anima, VI. 4, p. 170b;
John Blund, De anima, 1. v. 188b, 20" 23.
66 John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima, 1. 42; William of Auvergne, De
anima, VI. 3, p. 158b; Alexander of Hales, Questiones, 1. 32, 22, 5 " II.
67 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, 269, 183 - 184; Albert the Great,
Summa de ereaturis, q. 59, a. 2, 30, p. 529a.
68 WiliiamofAuvergne, De anima, VI., 18,p.173b.
" Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, 269,185" 195.
70
John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima, 1. 42, pp. 180 ff; William of
Auvergne, De anima, VI. 13 p. 168 a - b; De immortalitale, pp. 47 - 49;
Alexander Nequam, Speculum specu/alionum, ill, lxxxvii. 1.
n John Blund, De anima, xxiii, 320: 'lSi anima moritur, aliquid de anima
relinquitur post mortem. llIud relictum non erit corpus. Aut ergo illud erit pars
corporis aut non. Si non est pars corporis, aut est anima aut intelligentia:
quorum neutrum potest esse. Ergo anima mori non potest. Ergo anima est
irnmortalis ...
72 Alexander of Hales, Questiones, 1. 32, 28, 26 - 27: "quia sic sensibilis et
vegetabilis in plantis esset immortalis."
13 Ibid., 1. 32.4, 15, p. 558, 2: "nullum mortale in quantum mortale appetit
mortem, quia unumquodque appetit esse et sui esse conservationem. Sed
anima rationalis secundum virtutem fortitudines in summa appetit mortem, quia
fortitudo est virtus difficilimorum operativa in sustinendo, difficillimum autem
est mors. Ergo, cum virtus sit habitus voluntarius, voluntus mortis est in
anima; ergo anima rationalis non est mortalis; ergo non moritur cum corpore."
74 Summa de anima, 1. 42, p. 180.
" Summa de bono, 266,102" 207,108" 109.
76 Albert the Great, De natura el origine imimae, II, c. 6, p. 27, 85: "Animam
autem rationalem haec appetere et qaerere et invenire non est, qui ambigat.
56
cr.
Thomas Aquinas and the Question oj Immortality in the 13th Century
31
I 'tur ad corpus non habet secundum esse et operationes huiusmodi

d~pendentiam; et quod ad corpus non dependet, non destruitur ilIo destructo;
.
anima igitur rationalis non perit pereWlte corpore."
77 F. Van Steenberghen argues repeatedly against the use of the t~rm LatIn
Averroism because for many reasons those designated by the appelatlOn do not
profess A;erroism as a doctrine. He proposes the term radical or heterodox
Aristotelianism as an alternative. His conclusion is largely correct, but we have
retained the term because it has its origin among the thinkers of the thirteenth
century especially Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Again, though the
arts masters who were at the centre of the trouble were more the admirers of
Aristotle than Averroes, some of the points of contention which they raised, !;
especially with 'regard to the morphology of the h~man intellect, accord ~th
Averroes and Moslem thinkers in general. More Importantly, the alternatIve
suggested by Van Steenberghen, heterodox Aristotelianism, is not without its
own problems: KIUker and Sandktihler were correct when tt;ey ~ote :'Es soil
hier nicht das in der philosophiegeschichtlichen Forschung dlskutlerte, m erster
Linie terminologische Problem erortert werden, ob die Schule, der Siger von
Brabant angehort, als "Iateinischer Averroismus" oder als "heterodoxer
Aristotelismus" bezeicimet werden sollte. Der zweiter Ausdruck beinhaltet eine
Bewertung der RechtgHiubigkeit, die nur aus einer dogmatischen Perspektive
im Hinblick auf die weitere LehrentwicklWlg des Mittelalters siImvoll
erscheinen k8lUl. Anderseits ist zu beachten, daB auch die BezeicimWlg
lateinischer Averroismus" leicht miBzuverstehen ist: in ihr wird nicht deutlich
rl'aB nicht allein die Philosophen urn Siger von Brabant, sondern auch aIle
anderen Autoren des 13. Jahrhundert, die sich mit Aritoteles beschfiigen, die
Schriften des "Konunentators" Averroes benutzen." Cf: Menschliche Seele und
Kosmischer Geist: Siger von Brabant in der Auseinandersetzung mit Thomas

von Aquin (Stuttgart: Freies Geistesleben" 1988). For the views of Van
Steenberghen, see, Aristotle in the West, E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1955, pp.
198 - 208, La philosophie au XIIle siec/e, 2 nd edition, 1991, pp. 354 - 359.
78 Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au Xllle siecle, p. 363,
79 Chartularium. I, no. 246, pp. 277 - 279.
80 F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XlIIe siecle, p. 359.
Averroes' chequered history in the Latin West has been very much
reconstructed by a series of studies within the last century. As we have earlier
seen, he was very well received at first, and only with the tombles of the
second half of the century did his doctrines become a cause of controversy.
Dominic Salman wrote a series of articles to show that neither in Jo1m of La
Rochelle nor even in Albert the Great (the first to write a De unitate intellectus
contra averroistas) was there any trace of what would later be called Latin
Averroism. Cf. "Albert Ie grand et l'averroisme latin," Revue des sciences
philosophiques et theologiques, 24 (1935); ''Note sur 1a premiere influence
d' Averroes," Revue neo-scolastique de philosophie, 40 (1940); "Jean de la
Rochelle et les debuts de l'averroisme latin," Archives de l'histoire doctrinale
et litteraire de moyenne-age, 16 (1948), pp. 135 - 144. See also R. Miller, "An
Aspect of Averroe" Influence on St. Albert," Mediaeval Studies, 16 (1954),
81
32
pp. 57 - 71; H. A. Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes," Speculum, 36

(1961); For the dates of the first influence of Averroes, see R- A. Gauthier,
''Notes sur les debuts (1225 - 1240) de premier Averroisme." Revue des
sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 66 (1982), pp. 322 - 373.
82 See for instance F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siecle, p.
362: "Mais cette attitude audacieuse ... se reveve1e plutOt, d'une longue
evolution et de tendences qui se dessinent a la faculte des arts de Ie debut du
siecle."
83 With regard to the soul, the propositions condemned by Tempier are the
following: "Quod intellectus omnium hominum est unum et idem numero;
Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: homo intelligit; Quod anima, quae est fonna
hominis secundum quod homo comunpitur corrupto corpore; Quod Deus non
potest dare" immortalitatem vel incorrupcionem rei corruptibili vel mortali;
Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corjJorea."
Chapter 2
IMMORTALITY AND AQUINAS'
CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN SOUL
2.1 The Man of Aquinas
Charlularium, 543 - 58.

84
Siger did not write any work before the eruption of the controversy of
Averroism. The points that were condemned and the attack of Aquinas were
based on a reportatio of his lectures. The De anima intel/eetiva which was
written aroWld 1273 expresses substantially the main points though with
fundamental modifications and with much hesitation. For the text of the
Questiones, see Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant d'apres ses oevres
inedils, v.1 (Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophie, 1931), pp. 21 - 156,
and also, Questiones in tertium de anima. De anima intel/eeh'va, De aeternitate
mundi, ed. B. Bazan (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1972)
85 Aquinas against the Averroists, Latin text with English translation by R.
McInerny (West Lafayette: Purdue Univ. Press, 1993), p. 18.
86 In the Contra gentiles, Aquinas prefaced his arguments for immortality, like
Albert in the De natura el origine, with a long attack on Alexander of
Aphrodisias.
87 See 1a. 75, 5: ''Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma."
88 D. Salman, "Albert Ie grand et l'averroisme latin," p.42.
89
Aquinas against the Averroists, p. 18: ''Nec id nunc agendum est ut
positionem predictam in hoc ostendamus esse erroneum quod repugnat veritati
fidei christiane; hoc eoim satis in promptu cuique apparere potest. Substracta
enim ab hominibus diversitate intellectus, qui solus inter animae partes
incorruptibilis et immortalis apparet, sequitur post mortem nichil de animabus
hominwn remanere nisi unicam intellectus substantiam; et sic tollitur retributio
premiorum et penarum et diversitas eOfWldam."
90 See for instance Compendium theologiae, Opuseula theologiea, ch. 85 87; Questiones quodlibetales, q. 3, a. I, resp.
91 La controverse de 1270 a I'universite de paris et son retentissement sur la
pensee de St. Thomas d'Aquin (paris: J. Vrin, 1970).
92
R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur Siger de Brabant," Revue des sciences
philosophiques ellheologiques, 67 (1983), pp. 201 - 234.
Chapter I shows, among other things, that the teaching of the socalled Latin Averroists was of great concern to Thomas Aquinas, for it
touches on mmt can be viewed in many ways as one of his greatest
contributions to philosophicalleanting. More than all his ancestors in
the philosophical enterprise, Aquinas not only works with the common
acceptance of Aristotle the philosopher among his contemporaries, he is
singularly the first to follow the consequences of his interpretation of
Aristotle, \\hlle struggling, sometimes, successfully, and sometimes not
so successfully, to bring these in accord with the tenets of his faith. The
driving motive of Thomas is his enduring conviction that when properly
exercised, reason or philosophy cannot but confonn to the truth of
faith.' The great difficulties encountered in such a grand project are
most clearly seen in his effort to bring to bear the instrwnent of
Aristotle's philosophy on the understanding of the human soul. That
effort is bedevilled by the almost impossible mission to confonn
Aristotle to the accepted views of man and his soul, and consequently,
the outcome retains a great deal of the ambivalence characteristic of the
thirteenth century reception of Aristotle. Aquinas may have shared a
great deal of this ambivalence, but however the result of his synthesis is
judged, it can easily be seen that, set against the background in which
he worked, his work remains monumental, and in all the history of
philosophy, his achievement is one that not many figures can boast of
marching.
The man of Thomas Aquinas is a composite of body and soul,
matter and fonn, like all material substances in hylemorphic
composition. The thirteenth century was heir to the two opposed
34
conceptions of man derived ultimately from Plato and Aristotle. While

for Aristotle man is subject to the general ontological composition of
matter and fonn, for Plato, man as man is the SOul,2 a complete
independent substance, which, descending from a previous existence, is
only uncomfortably living In the body, playing the vital role of ruling
and commanding the body In which it lives, while ideally tending
towards its primordial origln, to which it can only come by complete
separation from the material body. For Plato, the body is vile, and is the
source of evil for the soul. The soul found In such an uncomfortable
material existence with it is in a state of punishment, and such existence
can be of benefit only to the body. The Platonlc explanation of the
be1ng of the soul and body enjoyed a long histOlY of adherence, from
late antiquity through the patristic times down to the time of Thomas
Aqulnas, and beyond.
For Christian thinkers, it was a neat
philosophical background for the belief in, if not the defence of,
immortality. Augustine for One shows here and there some lnsights,
which would have led to somethlng slntilar to the Thomistic position of
unity of the human being. He describes anyone who would like to
separate the body from human nature as stupid,' and clearly states that a
soul united to the body does not make two persons but one. 4 Gnmted
that the details of what he means by the oneness of the human
personality are subject to diverse Interpretations, Augustine clearly
indicates his basic anthropological stance when he defines the soul as a
rational substance congenlal to rule the body,' and man as a rational
soul that has a mortal and earthly body at its service.' It goes without
saying that Augustine is too steeped In Platonlsm, which forms the
basic metaphysical foundation ofhis thought, to be able to really go all
the way with the consequences of man described as a composite.
Augustine's dominant influence in the medieval times ensured that
deep within the thirteenth century, the Platonlc framework of his
doctrine still controlled the conception of the rational soul. Even though
this conception had to face the diverse influences to which the age was
subject, it was still seating very queerly with the Aristotelian view of
the man as consisting of soul and body in hylemorphic union. We have
seen that in spite of the Aristotelianlsm of Albert the Great, man as man
is for him the soul. For William of Auvergne, man is a soul using the
body .as instrument,1 so much so that with Avicenna, Auvergne
subscnbed to the metaphor of the disembodied man who does not
recognize the body as part of his nature. 8
Despite the convenlence of the conception of man as the soul,
Aqulnas firmly malntalns the contrary position, and goes to great
Immortality and Aquinas' Conception ofthe Human Soul
35
lengths to argue against it. In the Contra gentiles, after an exploration

of the ways a spiritual substance (soul) can be united to matter (body),
Aqulnss takes on the Platonic position, describing it as that in which
body and soul are united only as mover to the moved. But this would be
impossible for several reasons. In the first place such a union will be a
tmion of power, a union which carmot give rise to a being that is
unqualifiedly one. It would then mean that soul and body do not form
one thing. which is contrary to experience since from their union results
a man. Again, followlng the principle that operatio sequitur esse,
Aquinas argues that it is impossible that things as diverse as body and
soul should have a single operation from the point of view of the agen~
if Indeed they do not form a single being. But In man, even though there
are activities proper to the soul, several others can be identified as
being the acts of man as a unitary being, simply speaking. Among such
activities issuing from the common nature of man, he lists fear, anger,
and sensation. 9
Furthermore, Aqulnas tries to counter the Platonic conception of the
soul as self-moving by arguing from the understanding of death as the
separation of the soul from the body. If indeed Plato were correct, it
would mean that the two entities, body and soul, are of distinct beings,
and the body would not owe its being to the soul. It means that with the
separation of the soul from the body, the body would still retain its
being unhampered, and would be In a position to perform operations
proper to its species Independent of the soul. For Aquinas, this is
contrary to common experience, since the body can only be equivocally
called a human body after death, not being able to undertake any action
proper to living being without the soul. \0 The underlying thrust of these
points is that the soul and the body are bound up In their being, and in
their operation. They cannot be understood as separate entities with
distinct being independent of the other, and existing side by side
through some mechanlcal relationship. This is the import of the
response to the same question in the Summa theologiae which can be
viewed as a summary of the arguments he outlined In other places to
show that body and soul form a composite, man.
Man for Aqulnas forms a specific type of being, distinct from other
beings, and the nature of such a specific being must involve whatever
the strict and correct definition of the being must include. In the case
of material beings, Including man, such nature must Include matter and
fonn, body and soul. Matter, in the general sense, is thus part of the
specific difference of material thlngs, for the essence of the species
must take account of all that belongs In general to every one member of
36
that species. It means that in the case of man, just as it belongs to the
nature of the individual man to have a soul, and a body, the materiality
that is characteristic of his body must enter into the conception of
man. 11
Mans nature as a composite of soul and body has consequences

which go well beyond his being, to the general, universal order of
created existence. It is in this regard that he is called a microcosm of
the macrocosm,12 a sort of parvus mumJus, for Aquinas, like many of

his predecessors, views the wriverse of beings or the world in tenns of
two apparently natural incompatibles - matter and spirit. While matter
is all that comes to the view of rational man, the perfection of creation
requires spiritual beings existing in greater nearness to the all-perfect
Creator, sharing in his being, and being able through its operation to
return to the source of beings." In addition, creation itself is endowed
with an intelligent and orderly disposition of beings, a thought which
for Aquinas points to the existence of the Creator. Consequently, it
would not lack the good of order,14 and if matter and spirit are
contraries, they are nevertheless not parallels. Man is the being that
contains in itself the materiality and the spirituality that mark the great
divide in the world of being. In his being are the two realities not just
existing side by side, but uniting as matter and form to issue into a
being, one and independent The unity that is in him is in a way
archetypical of the universal order of being in which the highest
member of the lower order touches the lowest member of the higher."
Man stands thus as a middle point in the universal order, sharing the
characteristics of the two, being at once spiritual and matenal,
knowledgeable and ignorant, free and constrained. He is, as Verbeke
has rightly expressed, a frontier. 16 And from this focal point he is and
can become everything. As microcosm and as frontier, the man of

Aquinas requires a union as intimate and binding as that between a
form and its matter.
The old idea of a universal order of being, from which arises the
thought of man as a microcosm, as being on the horizon and as being a

frontier was used directly by a good number of the immediate forebears
of St. Thomas as a point of departure for the defence of the immortality
17
of the soul. But for Thomas, what is important is to establish the
~tr?ng unity in man, and the necessity of such a being that incorporates
m Itself the most notable characteristics of existence. The position thus
established will of course have an influence in his explanations of the
~pecific nature of the soul, and also on his defence Ofimmorality, but it
IS of utmost importance that man is one, that it is the composite, not the
37
soul alone that is a person, incommwricable, substantial and rational,18

a being at home in the whole of nature, spiritual and material.
The unity that exists between mans body and his soul is such that it
has been suggested that man can in a way be said to be a body in tbe
philosophy of St. Thomas" This is because he is one substance, one
being, and that being is a corporeal being, being constituted like other
corporeal beings of matter and form. He is a mobile being which is not
possible without a body. But if man is a body, it is to be understood in
a generic sense, in the way he can be said to be an animal, a substance,

and a rational being. Given that man has just one substantial form
(more on this later), and this form, the soul, together with matter
constitutes the body, matter alone does not constitute the body, since
that matter would be nothing without the only form that is present in
man. The material side of man, if it were to exclude the spiritual,
would not in fact be a body. It means that conceptually separated, the
body is indicative of the union that is found in man. It is also a
composite of matter and form, and because of this, it is literally a body.
For the same reason, and in deference to the spiritual nature in man, the
body can be said to be spiritual; since its proper existence involves the
presence of the spirit, it can be rightly said to be the spirit itself in a
somatic form. 20 In this position, the body puts man in direct relation
with the world, with the material world; it is the exteriority of the soul.
Thomas' man is thus of a unitary nature, it is not made up of two
substances, one material, another spiritual with two natures. Body and
soul make up one nature only. It is the hallmark of human nature, that
even though it is made up of matter and spirit, it carmot be adequately
expressed as having two natures, one of which would be material and
the other spiritual. The nature of man is thus a third type of nature aside
from the material and the spiritual, and this is the source of its
uniqueness. 21 The matter in man would only be prime matter without its
form (the soul), and were the soul itself not to be united to its matter,
the body, it could perhaps be an angelic nature, but not human.
Still, the unity of soul and body in man should neither be
overemphasized nor in fact misunderstood. True man is in a way the

body, but Aquinas' philosophy hardly ever gives any detailed attention
to man as such, or to the body distinct from the soul. In practice, his
anthropology is little more than the totality of his treatises on the soul,22
and where he is led to write about the body, it is almost always in
circumstances where the soul is also at issue or where such will lead to
the understanding of the nature of the soul and its activities. This
treatment is, however, not at variance with the basic tenets of Aquinas,
38
who while squarely against the Platonic understanding of man, did not
completely succeed, as we shall see later, in extricating himself from
the most fundamental strand of Platonism. Man is a distinctive nature,
but his distinctiveness is constituted by his rationality, which is owed to
the soul in the final analysis. The proper activity of man as man is the
act of understanding. 23 It is not because he has a body that he is a man,
it is not because of his incomnuullcability, nor because of his
substantiality that he is a person, for brute animals also possess these
qualities. The fact is that man is man because he reasons and
understands, so that for Aquinas, the very being of man is to
understand. If man has one nature, one being, and this being is
intrinsically linked with the quality of spirituality, it follows then that
all that is human in man is so because it is somehow cOIlllected to his

being as spirit, as soul, and as such is of an intellectual nature. 24
There is thus in Aquinas an umnistakable subordination, of the body
to the soul, of the material to the spiritual, of the sensual to the
intellectua1. Man becomes "an intelligence living in - and on matter, ,,2S and the intimacy of the composition of the substantial
principles in man does not bespeak of equality between the body and
the soul. Even though the two are the fundamental principles in man,
there is no doubt in Aquinas that the inferior principle exists for the
sake of the superior, and that consequently matter exists for the sake of
its form, and the body for the sake of the soul. 26 Is the unity on which
Aquinas seems to have laid much emphasis now unravelling? The
human body is spiritualized, man is both corporeal and spiritual, but he
is primarily and eminently spiritual since it is spirituality that marks him
out as a specific nature. That there is nothing in him that is. not geared
towards his intellectual nature indicates the supreme position of the
soul in the man of Aquinas. How he tried to weld together the two
strands of inseparable unity in man and the special position of the soul
in the composite is the central knot in his philosophy of man. It is a
knot introduced by the consideration for immortality and the ultimate
destiny of man. The genius in Aquinas lies in accepting for the first
time the naturalism of Aristotle, with its definition of the soul as form
of the body, and welding it into his own doctrine.
2.2 The Human Soul, A Subsistent Form
The soul is defined by Aquinas as the first principle of life in a living
being." The first import of the description is in consideration of the
fact that there can be other principles of life in a living being. Parts of
Immortality and Aquinas' Conception of the Human Soul
39
an animal can be principles of life of some sort. The lung is the

principle of the act of breathing, and the heart is the principle of the
circulation of the blood. All these are vital acts in a living organism,
but they are not thereby independent and in themselves sufficient. It is
conceivable that an inquirer seeks the source of life in these organs, and
one is forced to seek further, to find the source of these vital activities.
This enquirer will no doubt come to a stop when he hits the ultimate
source of life in the living substantial organism concerned. It is this
type of explanation of the life of an organism that is generically
understood as the soul. For Aquinas, such a principle cannot be a body,
otherwise there would be nothing preventing any material thing from
having life. It means that there is a logical necessity to look beyond
activities associated with material organs or bodies to the fundamental
source of their vital activity. When the human being is the locus of
such an inquiry, one cannot but terminate in what in Aristotelian
terminology is called the rational soul, for over and above the
vegetative and the sentient activities of the man, he is endowed with
thinking, with rationality, which constitutes for Aquinas the specific
difference in the human species. He therefore adopts the Aristotelian
definition of the human soul as the first actuality of an organic body
having life in potency?' Since form is the actuality of being, it means
that a soul for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, is any form, which, united to
any material organism, gives life to the composite.
The human soul is the form of the human body, but it is different
from all other forms by being a subsistent form, a form capable of
existing on its own. The soul understood as a subsistent fonn is one of

the cardinal points of Aquinas' philosophy of man. The difficulty of
this position and the importance he attaches to it is shown by the ardour
with which he tries to dissipate the attendant problems and doubts in all
the passages he wrote on the soul. The fundamental problem of
introducing hylemorphism in the body-soul composition is the teaching
that form and matter are meant one for the other, and that none can
exist on its own. Even though Aristotle had named form as one of the
ways in which things can be said to be substance in his Metaphysics, it
is obvious that he was using reductive implication of the term, and is in
no way intended to mean that a fonn could exist apart from matter,
acting on its own in separation." Matter is the principle of potentiality,
and form is its actua1ity, while an uninformed matter is not more than a
concept in Aristotle's metaphysic, a form without matter can only be a
conceptual reality. Each of the thirteenth century thinkers had to face
the same problem, and we have mentioned that none of them before St.
40
Thomas accepted the implications of the definition of soul as form of

the body. Even though most used the Aristotelian definition of the soul,
they all later went back on the definition by really explaining the nature
of the soul in the best tradition of Platonism as an independent
substance. Aquinas is among the first major thinker of the thirteenth
century to subscribe to Aristotle's definition of the soul and to try to
show that its implications can fit into the traditional conception of the
soul as substance, or as subsistent. How did he argue for these
apparently irreconcilable positions?
In the Contra gentiles, he states two conditions under which
sometlting could be the form of another. The form must be the principle
or source of the substantial being of the thing for which it serves as a
form in such a way that it is what makes it a particular being. Second,
such a form must be united to the thing in question in such a way that
there is one act of being for the composite. For Aquinas, tltis is exactly
the relationship which exists between the soul and the body whose form
it is, in that the soul, the primary principle of life in man, is so united
with the body that it communicates its life to the latter." The essential
points of tltis union are stated as a more formal proof to the effect that
the thing by virtue of which sometlting goes from potential to actual
being is the form of the tlting thus educed in being. Aquinas holds that
such is the relation between the soul and the body that the very being of
the body is derived from the soul. If tltis is so, it is the soul, which must
be the actuality or the form of the body."
The implication of the arguments of Aquinas is very far-reaching.
What the soul communicates to the human body is not just life, but
being. That means that without the soul, the body will not be a being at
all. It entails that it is on accoWit of the union of matter and form that
the form becomes a body, and a living being. This in itself entails that
what the soul unites with is not a lifeless body, but a beingless matter to
make it a human body. The matter of the union will, conceptually, be
prime matter, indeterminate matter, not one that has in any way been
united to any type of form. Such a theory will not only have
consequences for the weighing of the other activities of .the human
person, but will also affect the status of the soul and the body after
death.
Aquinas had to show that in fact such a close unity of being exists
between the body and the soul to warrant the soul being taken as the
form of the body. In the Summa the%giae, he restated that the primary
source of the activity of a being is the form of that being, because a
thing is able to act only by virtue of that by means of which something
41
is in act or in being. It is due to the soul that the body is capable of

having life. Life in man may indeed be manifested in the various
activities of vegetating, sensing and knowing, but the soul is the
ultimate source of all these, and indeed of all other vital activities that
man is capable of. He therefore draws the conclusion that since the
soul is the principle of intellectual activity, it must be the form of the.
body."
It is significant that while in the Contra gentiles, Aquinas
concentrates on the being of the body to show that the soul must be its
form, in the Summa theologiae he dwells more on the various activities
which are properly the activities of the person. Again, without dwelling
exclusively on intellectual activity in the premise, he asserts as a
conclusion to the arguments that the soul can be form on grounds of
being the primary principle of intellectual activity. However, it must be
said that he carefully subsumes all other activities under the soul by ,
designating it as their proper ultimate source. Yet the emphasis on
intellectual activity testifies to the use he makes of the fact of the ability
of the soul to understand, into which eventually he zeroes in his
argument for soul as form by making it an ad impossibile based on the
corrunon conscious experience of every man: anyone who rejects the
position that the intellective soul is the form of the body would have the
onus of explaining why the act of understanding is commonly taken to
be the act of a particular person, J3 Aquinas then explores other
possibilities of explaiuing how the understanding belongs to a person in
.order to show that only when the soul is understood as form can the
belonging of intellective activity to a particular person be made
reasonable.
For Thomas, and in line with Aristotle,34 an act can be attributed to
someone either when the whole entity acts, or when the entity performs
the act with any of its parts or organs, or by accidental attribution when
the quality used to express the perforroance of the act belongs to the
person only by accident. The act of understanding carmot be attributed
to man as though the whole composite is performing the act, uniess one
subscribes to Plato's anthropology in which the intellect is in fact the
man, and the thing that understands, That tltis possibility is not tenable
is attested to by the unity in man by virtue of which both the act of
understanding and sensation belong to the same man, It implies that if
man understands and senses, and sensation is part of the body, man can
in no way be said to be the body alone, and Plato's conception of man
defies conscious experience. It is also not in an accidental manner that
man can be said to understand, given that the act of understanding is an
42
The Phr1osophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
act of man by virtue of his essence. The only possibility is that the
intellect, \\hich is the principle of understanding, is united to the body
of man as form. For Aquinas, this seems to make understandable the
intrinsic unity of the intellectual acts to man. It also obviates the need
for assuming that the principle of understanding (the soul) is the whole
person.
The conclusion reached by drawing the consequence of the human
act of understanding is further confirmed by the consideration of the
nature of the human species. 3S The nature of each being is known
through its activity, and what is peculiar to man, what makes him a
member of a specific species is that he can understand. It is the most
characteristic of all the activities of man, and, according to Aristotle,
that through \\hich his ultimate happiness is attainable. It follows that
the source of such an activity should be the defining principle of man, a
form making it possible for him to belong to a determinate species.
The soul is therefore the substantial form in man, or more precisely,
the form of the body. It is not only the source of its life activities, but
also of its being. This position will most naturally lead to the
clarification of other issues, including the unity or otherwise offorms in
man, and also how precisely the soul is related to the body as form,
\\hich will in turn touch on some problems in relation to death.
However, it is remarkable that Aquinas undertakes to provide solutions
to the problems instead of seeking a simple escape route, as indeed a
thinker like Albert the Great had done, by adopting Platonic view of
man, \\hich provides a good foundation for the defence of immortality.
However, it is not to be forgotten that if indeed Aquinas held to
Aristotelian hylemorphism in the soul-body union, it is because he was
firmly convinced that immortality could still be defended from such a
background. The series of doubts he puts in the mouth of his objectors"
show that he is well aware that his theory "strains the form-matter
principle of the Aristotelian physics and metaphysics."" And more: that
the form-matter principle when applied to the human soul and body
"strains" the doctrine of immortality. This awareness explains his
concern to stress what is in his view the specificity of the soul, even
while emphasizing hylemorphic composition. Hence afier arguing for
the soul as form of the body from the point of view of the species of
man, Aquinas in the next paragraph makes a digression which gives

38
away this concern. He reminds the reader that a form dominates

matter, and the higher the form, the more that dominance is. Then he
goes on to the gradation of different types of forms from those of
chemical substances to the highest, \\hich is the human soul itself.
43
Being so high, the power of the human soul so transcends matter that it
has activities in which matter does not participate at all; the power of
understanding is responsible for this act.
The content of this paragraph fits in very well with Aquinas'
philosophy, and is repeated in several other passages of his work,39 but
coming in this case just afier a defence of the soul as form against the
positions of Plato and Averroes, it would seem out of place, if not
understood as a dress rehearsal, for the defence of immortality. There
appears to be some fear that the link between the body and the soul,
which Aquinas has consistently argued for in the long chapter, would
be submerged in the general Aristotelian conception of form-matter
relationship, and therefore the reader requires a reminder of the special
status of the soul as the highest. of forms, which, dominating matter
most completely, has the power of carrying on activities independent of
matter. Even though the move from the total domination of matter to
activities completely transcendent of matter is not logically warranted,
to be noted is that the aim of Aquinas' passage is to underline the
capital that he makes of the power of understanding in the nature of the
rational soul. The same power is again raised, and for the same purpose
in the discussion of the subsistence of the soul.
The question of subsistence is evidently closely linked with that of
immortality, even though Aquinas discusses subsistence without clear

reference to the later doctrine. For the soul, the form of a mortal body
to be the subject of immortality must also possess the power of
independent existence, existence as a substance in its own right, a hac
aliquid. While Aquinas argues strenuously for the understanding of the
soul as form, the subsistence of the soul touches more directly its
immortality. It is for that reason that he carefully delineates this
character ofthe soul. In the Q.D.de anima, it is discusse<\in the context
of whether the rational soul can be both a form and a hac aliquid in the
very first chapter of the treatise, while in the Summa thea/agioe it is
tackled immediately after the question of whether the soul is a body
was dealt with in the section devoted to man. The arguments of the
Summa thea/agiae encapsulate the strongest of the numerous points
used in defence of the nature of the soul as a substance. 40
The first of these arguments is based on the premise that through
understanding, man is a in position to know the nature of all bodily
things. The ability to know all things in this way indicates that the
nature of the things known cannot be in the nature of the knowing
subject, otherwise the form of the object of knowledge will obstruct
further knowledge of other objects of that nature. Consequently, if the
44
intellectual principle has the nature of matter in any way, it will be

incapable of knowing all bodies. The same reason argues against
understanding through any bodily organ, for that would also prevent the
knowledge of all bodies.
The reasoning goes in favour of the intellect being an incorporeal
power, for even though the question under consideration is the

subsistence of the soul, Aquinas shows clearly in the reply that his
arguments would establish both incorporeality and subsistence. The
reason for this is because the only way in his system to arrive at the
subsistence of the soul, and indeed any knowledge of it, is to observe its
activity in intellection, which, for him, adequately establishes the soul's
capacity for separate existence. The point he makes for subsistence is
then the conclusion of the argument for inunateriality: the intellect has
operations specific to it in which the body does not participate, and
nothing can act in that manner unless it also has the power of
subsistence.41
Kelly gives a scathing critique of these proofs of subsistence in a

short article published many year ago, the major points of which still
retain their actuality for our purpose.42 He frrst concentrates on the
premises of the argument based on the ability to know all bodies. Man
is the subject of the first premise of the argument, and even though the
second is in the impersonal form (quod aulem pelesl), there is no
reason to suppose, according to him, that the subject of the second
premise should be the intellectual principle and not man. To suppose
that the intellect is in fact the subject would be to assume what the
statement is intended to prove. If man is the referent of the second
premise, and man is corporeal, it would not be true that what knows all
bodies cannot be itself a body. For Kelly, the arguments of Aquinas
appear to assume a prior determination of what bodies can do or cannot
do, but if it is the case that what is only a body cannot know all bodies
it does not follow that knowing all bodies is an operation in which th~
body does not share at all. What is required for a problem-free
argument would be for Aquinas to show that what is a body, and not
what is only a body cannot know all bodies by showing that certain
characteristic belongs to the body which intrinsically prevents it from
knOwing all bodies. However, before a proof is furnished to the effect
that it is only the intellect that is the source of cognitive activity there is
no way one can prove that the body as such has such a characteristic.
This conclusion is in turn based on the premises of Aquinas' argument
which refers to man, and not just his soul as the knowing subject.
Immortality and Aquinas' Conception o/the Human Soul
45
Another point of Kelly's critique appears to be more telling. He

corroborates the argument of Aquinas by reference to the parallel
passage in the Commentary on the De anima where Aquinas employs
the act and potency poles of existence to prove the same point.
Everything which is in potency to and receptive of another is in want of
that which it receives. The senses are receptive of colours because they
lack all colours. In the same way the intellect is receptive of all
intelligible things in knowledge because it is in potency to them, for
which reason it cannot have the nature of those things it understands in
its own nature. 43 The implication of this statement, according to Kelly,
is that "if the mind were in potency to and receptive of what it knows as
the senses are vis-a-vis what they sense ... the mind, because it can
know all things, could not itself be a being.""
The issues raised above are only some of the problems that follow
Thomas' efforts to fit in the soul developed in a mainly Platonic
tradition into Aristotelian metaphysics' and physics more of which we
shall see in a later section. For the moment, it suffices for us to not~at
many of the observations of Kelly are correct, even if they are
considered on the grounds of logic alone. It should however be noted,
with regard to the rererenls of the premises of Aquinas' argument, that
he could have very easily substituted the soul for man without altering
the point of the argument. Indeed, while he argues firmly that it is the
human being that understands and senses to assert the formal nature of
the soul, he also holds to the independence of the intellect, such that it
becomes better to say man understands by the sou!." Even though such
can be taken as a mere modus loquendi, the dividing line between the
soul considered as subsisting and acting independently, and man as a
unity is very often blurred. Kelly also makes some of his points by
holding at abeyance certain doctrines which on account of the structure
of Aquinas' work were treated later. Such, for instance, is the insistence
that before the proof of subsistence, the soul was only known not to be
material, but not yet a form. The reality is that Aquinas outlines his
points in a sort of backward and forward movement. Many points are
repeated, ahnost ad nauseam, others, which are presupposed in
previous arguments, are later argued for specifically. The difficulties of
such critics as Kelly would be avoided if the particular doctrine were
viewed in the context of the whole philosophy. Still it is not being
suggested that if this is done, all the difficulties raised will peter out.
The unity which Aquinas insists on as regards human nature and the
relationship between body and soul is also found in the relationship of
the different types of activities as they are found in the human
46
composite. Since there are different levels of activities - nutritive,

sensitive and intellectual" and these are all different in their genre, it is
easy to suppose that there are different types of souls responsible for
these activities. Again, it is also not easy to see how such a theory, if
accepted, would have been detrimental to the doctrine of innnortality,
given that it could be said that the nutritive and sensitive souls die with
the death of the body, while the rational soul survives, being the
detenninant soul in the human composite. But such a position would
introduce intractable problems in the coherence of the theory of the
soul as form of the body, and would in no way fit into the Aristotelian
metaphysics, which is the philosophical background of Thomas' theory
about the soul, and its hnmortality.
The question of the relationship between the three types of "souls"
in man was also a preoccupation of many of the inunediate
predecessors of st. Thomas. While some of the thinkers, such as
Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus, did not come to any clear
conclusion about the relationship between the vegetative, sensitive and
the rational, there is no doubt that the most prominent thinkers before
St. Thomas, including Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great and John
La Rochelle, held the view that there could not be more than one soul in
man, and thus that the sensitive, vegetative and the rational were all
powers of the same intellectual soul. 46 La Rochelle, for example, stated
the classical response to the question, ahnost in the terms which
Aquinas would later do. He asserted that form is the perfection of
being, and that it is one and the same human being that is vegetative,
sensitive and rational. Being a single substance, it must have a single
perfection, a single form. Coming to the relationship between the three
powers, he borrowed an analogy from geometry found in Aristotle' s De
anima,47 which states that the nutritive and the sensitive are inclusive in
the rational soul. As a triangle is contained in a rectangle and a
rectangle in a pentagon, so does the sensitive in man' embrace the
vegetative, and the rational the sensitive. 48 William of Auvergne on his
part was so intent on adhering to the unity of the soul which he
conceived in the Platonic sense that he tried to bring the position of
plurality of forms to ridicule. Because of the multiplication of senses,
which he was the first to introduce into scholasticism from Avicenna,"
he said that if indeed each operation of the human being must be due to
different souls, there must be altogether fifteen souls in man,50 a
consequence which no proponent of multiplicity would accept.
The novelty of st. Thomas' treatment of the issue, according to D.
A. Callus, is in his giving it a metaphysical grounding, instead of seeing
47
it only on the psychological plain, on which, according to him, the

prethomists all dealt with the problem involved.'1 St Thomas grounded
his solution on the formal nature of the soul, on its union with the body,
on the true nature of prime matter and substantial form, and on the
distinction between substantial and accidental form. 52 One should
however not overlook the obvious fact that most of the arguments used
by Thomas in support of the thesis of unity of form are based on the
impossible consequences of the supposition of the presence of three
forms in man.
The impossibility of there being more than one soul in man is
directed in all of Aquinas' work specifically against the position of
Plato. The methodology consists mainly in supposing that Plato's view
were correct, and then highlighting the possible consequences from this
supposition, just as Auvergne did before. Most of the consequences
follow from the understanding that there is an essential unity between
the matter of any being and its substantial form. In the Q, D, de anima,
three impossible results are outlined. First, the supposition of diversity
of forms entails that the diverse souls in man differ in a substantial
manner. The impossibility here stems from the fact that something that
is one in being cannot be made of more than one thing existing as hoc
aliquid. It would follow that except one, the rest of the forms must be
predicated on man only accidentally. But there are nevertheless
examples where two forms are predicated essentially to one thing, but
this is only when the two are by nature related, one to another. When it
is said that a surface is coloured, for example, it is not because colour is
part of the nature of the surface as that the surface is presupposed by
the notion of colour. But this second predication would not work
because, for Aquinas, the sentient is related as matter to the rational
soul, and thns applying the special type of essential predication would
imply that animal is not essentially predicated of man, but that absurdly
man is predicated essentially of animal. Another difficulty is that the
thing through which a substance belongs to a particular genus must be
one substantial form, and in man, the sentient soul through which being
an animal is possible must be'the thing that constitutes the body into a
hoc aliquid, giving it the act of existence in an absolute manner. It
would mean that it is no longer through the rational soul that the body
receives its act of existence, for then the form of rationality will be
superimposed on something already existing. That would mean that
rationaiity, is an accidental form in man, and cannot make man what he
is, a rational animal. 53
48
These two arguments presuppose Aquinas' theory of generation of

man in which he holds that the nutritive soul is first generated, and
prepares the way for the oncoming of the vegetative soul, which in turn
gives way when the rational is present. In fact in the version of the
argument presented in the Contra gentiles, this assumption is made
explicit. 54 It could be argued that such a gradual assumption of different
fonns may not be necessary, and therefore the rational soul does not
have to come into the body already formed by the sentient as colour to
a surface, or that, with reference to the second argument, that it may not
need to wait till the body is made a subsistent substance to be joined to
it. Even so, the question of unity poses itself, and Aquinas, considering
the question of what could possibly make the many souls, concludes
that their unity must be the unity of an aggregate of things which are
many absolutely speaking, and one only relatively.
A consideration independent of the consequences of assuming
Plato's view to be true is the attempt to prove the singularity of the form
in man by the statement that diverse powers not arising from the same
principle do not hinder one another in their act, but that diverse
operations of the soul hinder one another, for when one is intense, the
other is hindered. This is used as a point to show that in fact all the
powers of the soul are essentially rooted in the same principle. Even
though this point is repeated in several passages, there is hardly any
explanation given to what is meant, and in the Q. D. de anima, he adds
to it the statement that there is in man an overflowing of one power into
another, which proves the same point of common origin of the powers.
The issue of one power hindering another could be traced to as far
back as Dominic GWldissalinus' De immortalitate animae in which the
weakening of the body in such phenomena as ecstasy and prophecy is
used t? show that the soul is most active when the body is weakened,
and WIll therefore be all the more alive when removed completely from
the body." Hindering one another in Aquinas' sense would mean that
when the intellect is most active, for instance, the concentration of the
senses would be much less. It is possible, for example, for a person
deep in contemplation to be seen to be physically gazing at an object
which in fact he is not perceiving. This raises the whole issue of
subliminal perception, but it is doubtful whether such an example can
be terme? .~ impediment of the sense by the understanding. Again,
some actIVItIes of the human composite, like the nutritive ones, have
many .asp~cts ~at are unconscious, going on relentlessly so long as the
orgamsm IS ahve and has no malfunction. Is it conceivable that with the
intensity of the understanding or sensing the activities of the vegetative
49
organs are hindered short of maladies which disturb such activi~es?

Difficulties as these are usually inherent in the employment of doctrmes
which arise from sources in which they served different purposes for
other ends different from their original use.
If the problem of the unity of the human soul is indirectly linked
with immortality, that of its hylemorphic composition is more directly
linked with it. Matter in the Aristotelian system is the principle of
potentiality, and form that of actuality. Parting from such a theo,?,: the
first difficulty arises from how to distinguish God from other spmtual
creatures including the ratioual soul. God is pure act, without any
potentiality in him; his essence in the terminology of Aquinas im!,l~es
his existence. What of other spiritual creatures? If they have potentiality
in their being, do they not thereby have some form of matter in them,
and if they do not have potentiality, will they still be distinguishable
from God? This in a spectacular way shows both the influence of
Aristotelian teaching and the problem attendant on its acceptance by
Christian thinkers of the thirteenth century. We have seen that despite
the usefulness of Ibn Gabirol's universal hylemorphism, its introduction
of matter in spiritual beings was susceptible to viciating the theory of
incorruptibility of the soul. The theory of spiritual matter was rejected
by many theologians of the thirteenth century, but it became a
trademark of most of the members of the Franciscan School, including
prominently, Bonaventure.
Thomas rejects this theoryS6 because the soul as form must either be
so wholly or in part, but if it is wholly form, it cannot have matter in its
being since the very notion of form excludes materiality. If, on the other
hand, it is conceded that only part of such a soul is form, while the rest
is matter, then it is only the part that is form which can be rightly called
a soul, and the matter it is joined with will receive the primacy ?f the
actuation of the principle of actuality. It means that if the meamng of
form and its relation with matter in Aristotle's metaphysics is well
understood, there is no way, even taking the issue logically, that the
soul can have matter in it. In fact, as J. de Vries says, for Thomas all
that have form and matter are bodies. 57 Second, Aquinas goes back to
the operation of the soul, asserting once again that the nature of a thing
is known by the way it operates. If so, we can know the nature of the
soul by its cognitive activities. The soul knows things immediately and
absolutely in such a way that the form of the thing known is in the soul.
Were the soul composed of matter and form, things would be known
only in their individuality and not as forms, in which case the soul
50
51
spiritualized, such that man as a whole becomes a spiritual being, at

least metaphorically.
The first question that arises from such a theory is the
proportionality between the co-principles of the composite that is man.
Is it not more convenient to say that the human being is the soul using
the body? The union is after all for the good of the soul, just as in
nature matter is for the sake of the form. Again the soul being a form is
subsistent; it does not really need the body to exist, and its state of
union supplies everything that is important for the normal being and life
the composite. The soul is the most perfect fonn, spiritual in nature, but
it is in a hylemorphic union. It is often not taken account of that in the
system of Aquinas and Aristotle the soul is in fact not united with the
body, strictly speaking, but with prime matter, for to be united with the
body means to be united with something, while the body is nothing
without the soul. Thus the objection in the Q. D. de anima to the effect
that the soul being the most perfect form should be united to the most
perfect body, which the human body does not seem to be, misses the
point." The objection should have been why the most perfect form in
nature should be united to the least in the perfection of beings, prime
matter, which lacks all perfection, since form is the perfection of being.
However, it must be stated that Aquinas always presents his questions
in terms of the union between soul and body, and in the De anima, the
question is how the soul should be united to this body of ours.
The answer to the question of the fitness of the soul to be united to
the human body has to do to with the primordial relationship between
soul and body. Since matter exists for the sake of its form, it is in the
soul that the explanation of its union with the body must be sought. The
most obvious reason why the soul needs such a union is that it is not
endowed with intelligible species without which there can be nO
intellectual activity in it. Naturally, the soul possesses a potency to
receive intelligible species from the senses, which cannot exist
otherwise except as organs of the body.61 Aquinas argues further that the
fact of the presence of the soul in the body implies that there must be a
predisposition of the body for the activities of sensation, most
important of all, of tactile operation. This is because, according to him,
touch is the basis of other senses, and the body that the rational soul
will unite with must have a specially developed sense of touch. He goes
on to show that in fact the sense of touch is basic in sensory operations,
and that it is highly developed in human beings: touch can perceive
contraries, and hence those who have a finer touch are more intelligent.
Again, man has a larger brain; his head is placed on high; he is the only
would know only singular and particular things. This for Aquinas is
surely not the case.
The foregoing argument makes no distinction between the matter
that is present in the composition of the soul, and the nonnal matter that
is the object of our sensitive knowledge. It is however doubtful whether
outside the materialists of ancient philosophy, any thinker known to
Aquinas would count the rational soul as a citizen of the world of
beings characterized by the qualities which Aquinas is presupposing in
the foregoing refutation. The designation spiritual matter in itself
speaks for this supposition. Aquinas is perhaps assunting that in any
way matter is understood, it must in some way be reducible to surface,
to weight, and to quantity. But certainly, Bonaventure, for instance,
would not accept that spiritual matter has any of these qualities.
Thomas accepted the quod est and quo est composition in answer to the
objection that only God is purely actual, and that hence other
subsistence spiritual creatures must have matter as the basis of their
potentiality." These descriptions traceable to Boethius were much used
before Thomas as an answer to the same problem. 59 Albert the Great
took it up, in his distinction between suppositum and form. Gilson is of
the view that whatever Albert understands as suppositum, it essentially
plays the same role as spiritual matter in those who uphold hylemorphic
composition in the soul. If so, does the same comment not apply to the
quod est of Thomas, among other thinkers of the thirteenth century, and
does the whole problem not lie in the use of the terminology spiritual
matter? Again, the whole thought of Albert on the soul, including the
attempt to replace spiritual matter by the term suppositum, is tailored to
suit immortality, and the same can be said with regard to Aquinas.
3.3 Body and Soul

The details of how the soul and the body are in the mysterious union
between the two principles in the human being can be seen much in the
same light. The union of the body and soul has been presented as so
intimate that man can be figuratively called the body. Aquinas argues
repeatedly against the Platonic understanding of man. With Aristotle he
insists that man is a composite, a hylemorphic union of matter and
form, the most intimate union that can exist in nature. Still the soul
subsists on its own independent of the body. It brings its life to the
union, and as such the body has no life of its own. In fact its very
existence as body is due to the soul, and that is why the body is thereby
f,
52
erect animal; there is an abWldance of heat in him to enable him to keep

to the erect position,62 etc. Some of these remarks may have some
points in the evolutionary development of the human species.
However, they are generally based on physiological ideas that have
long since been overtaken if they were once in vogue.
The question of the medium of the relationship between the soul and
the body is also resolved through an appreciation of the implication of
their hylemorphic union. In fact, even though Aquinas very often takes
up the issue of the mode of the union, the question is more relevant
from the point of view of a Platonic view of man and the soul. For if
man is soul using the body, the obvious question is how do the two
manage to corporate in acts that we know as the acts of man?
Nevertheless, the question of a soul-body union was never satisfactorily
resolved as we see much later from the philosophy of Rene Descartes.
On the other hand, if the soul is understood as giving to the body its act
of existing, it implies that it comes to body immediately, and must thus
precede any other modification or qualification of that matter." If
indeed the soul is not so related to the matter of the human body, then it
would not be substantial but accidental form. In the Summa
theo!ogiae," the question is put in the form of whether there is an
accidental disposition that helps to prepare that union, and the answer
shows that the most fundamental issue of existence is at stake in the
issue of relationship between soul and body. Thus the matter of the
body cannot be anything, it cannot be hot or cold; in fact no accidental
disposition can act on it before it receives its substantial fonn, which is
the soul.
Again, since it is the union with its substantial form which keeps the
body in existence, it is impossible to think of the body without the soul,
or without this hylemorphic union. This fact in tum obviates the
question of the position of the soul in the body, since it must be present
in all the body to make it what it is. It must also be present in each part
of the same body to keep it in existence (necesse est quod sit in toto et
in qualibet parle corporis). It is so because the soul is indivisible. It
cannot be in even the smallest cell of the body in an incomplete
manner, but it needs to be there for the cell to have existence and to be
alive. It is the presence that goes for the body taken as a whole. But
here one must not think of a logical impossibility or literary paradox.
The fact is that, in reality, the overall presence of the soul in the body is
not distinguished from its presence in the smallest part of that body.
Still being in the body as a whole is a very general statement subject
to diverse interpretations. In fact there are three ways the soul can be
53
conceived as being wholly in t."e body, and given that the concept of
whole implies divisibility into smaller entities, one can also think of
three ways such wholeness can be divisible. A whole is either divisible
into quantitative, conceptual or functional parts. Quantitative division
can apply only to such forms as whiteness, which still remains
whiteness in each section of a dismembered white table. In this case,
the division of fonn is per accidens. The second type of wholeness and
its parts would apply to a species and its principles: matter and form,
genus and difference. The third type of wholeness applies to the active
and passive powers that a being possesses which can be taken in the
sense of parts of the whole in so far as these operations are manifested
in diverse ways. It is only in the last two ways of being whole and part
that the soul can also be said to be in the whole of the human body and
its parts. While the soul is in the whole and in each part, it is
inconceivable that all its powers are realized in each part of the body. If
it were so, that would mean that the eyes can smell and the ears can
hear. On the contrary, Aquinas says that the soul's power of sight is in
the eye, and hearing in the ear (secundum visum in oculo, secundum
auditum in aure)." The power of the soul is realized in each part
according to the specific perfection of each of these parts.
One vital function which the body performs for the soul is that the
body serves to mark the distinction between souls, and thus designate
them as individuals. This is indeed a very important function since
forms of the same species are not distingnishable by their specific
difference. The fact that souls are the first perfections of organic bodies
does not make them differ one from the other, for, in this respect, they
are all equal and indistinguishable. In his theory of individuation of the
'soul, Aquinas followed a lead given by Avicerma, though the specific
context of the two theories on individuation is quite different. Avicenna
argued against the pre-existence of the soul on the grounds that if the
soul existed before the creation of the body, there is no way one soul
can be distinguished from the other given that the essence of the soul is
one for all. It would therefore be impossible to have a multiplicity of
souls if we presuppose their existence before the body.66 For him, the
factors which individuate rational souls are either their quiddity, their
relation with matter, or the causes which detemtine their material
existence. As there is no difference of quiddity in the soul, the cause of
their differentiation must be sought in the particular body to which each
soul is attached. Each soul begins to exist as soon as the body fit for it
is created, the body fit to serve as its instrument," for which it has a
yearning (affectio) to be united. This inclination of the soul for a
54
particular body continues forever," even after the death of the body,
i.e. after the soul has lost its body.
Aviceuna follows this theory of individuation even though he was
far from being as radical as Aquinas in applying the full implication of
the conception of the soul as form. So, for Avicenna, soul and body
constitute two substances, not one, even though he did accept the
definition of the soul as form of the body. For Aquinas, just as for
Aviceuna, it is matter that is the principle of individuation. Thus the
soul owes its individuality to its union with the body. It is because a
particular soul is adaRted to a particular body that it is different from
the rest of the souls, ' such that in Aquinas' philosophy angels which
are spiritual beings without bodies do not form one species, since there
is no way of differentiating them. Each angel must therefore be the lone
member of its own species.

What Aquinas means by matter in the individuation of the soul is not
matter as such; it is matter already designated by quantity 70 (materia
signata quantitate). The reason for this is also not far-fetched. Prime
matter, without designation, can only be a conceptual formless mass,
and thus incapable of being numbered, for anything that can be
numbered is already detennined in its individuality by some form. It is
certain, as F. C. Copleston'\' warns, that one should not think of a
universal form that is then made individual by union with matter. But
one cannot but think of the specific mode or moment of individuation.
If the soul is responsible for the being of the body as body, there is
some difficulty in specifying how and when the body starts being the
individuating principle of the soul. Is it the body formed by the soul, or
is prime matter already adapted in some way for this function? One can
imagine that the moment is instantaneously going back to the precise
origin of the soul. But the pursuance of the question leads straight to the
creationist theory of Aquinas. This theory of individuation is
incidentally one of the doctrines condemned in 1277 because it was
degrading to the soul that corruptible matter constitutes its
individuality. It only goes to show the tension that existed in the epoch
between the effort to follow the consequences of Aristotelianism and
the fear that some aspects of the new philosophy could not be
reconciled with the understanding of the implications of Christian
doctrine by the men of the century. Aquinas however believed that the
right understanding of the Aristotle was compatible with the Christian
belief in the immortality of the soul. Still he was to face further
controversy on the nature of the human intellect.
Immortality imd Aquinas' Conception of the Human Soul
55
2.4 Problems of the Intellect

It is clear that many of the foregoing doctrines of Aquinas are
anchored in the Aristotelian theory of the soul as the form of the body,
which Aquinas could be said to have brought to perfection by
employing it extensively to serve his ends, many of which Aristotle was
not so much aware ot: However, it is not as if the theory of Aristotle
about the soul is without problems. The details of the nature of the soul
in ancient Greek philosophy were the subject of the most enduring
controversy in the history of philosophy. The most acrimoniously
disputed aspect of the doctrine concerns the intellect. The kernel of the
controversy is the obscure statement of the De anima:
Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is
something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the
individuals, and something else which ~s their cause or agent in that it
makes them all - the two being related as an art to its material - these
distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind in the passive
sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another
aspect in that it makes all things; this is a kind of positive state like
light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. Mind in
this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially
an activity; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the
originating cause to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its
object. Potential is prior in time to actual knowledge in the individual,
but in general it is not prior in time. Mind does not think
intermittently. When isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and
this alone is immortal and everlasting (we do not remember because,
while mind in this sense cannot be acted upon, mind in the passive
sense is perishable). and without this nothing thinks. 72
The statement of Aristotle is an attempt to apply the act-potency

theory of his natural philosophy to the soul and its activity. It is clear
enough that just like all in nature, there must be a priociple to bring
what is in potency of understanding to the actuality of i~ just as matter,
which is potentiality, is brought into act by form. In the question of the
soul, there must be an active or agent intellect that actuates the potential
possible intellect into thinking or understanding. But that is as far as it
goes. The irredeemable obscurity of the statement made it the subject of
intractable controversy right from late antiquity with almost each major
thinker taking a different and peculiar turn. We have mentioned that
among the peripatetics of the late antiquity, Alexander of Aphrodisias'
interpretation of this doctrine, which made the soul corporeal, was one
56
The Philosophical Significance ofImmortality in Thomas Aquinas
of the reasons why many authors of the thirteenth century rallied round
in defence of the immortality of the soul. Aquinas attacks the teaching
of Alexander in many passages. 73 Moslem peripatetics were also not
happy with the interpretation given by Alexander. Avicenna tried to fit
in the doctrine of the agent intellect with the doctrine of emanation,
which came to be a trademark of Moslem peripatetics. On top of the
emanationist scale is found God himself, who is responsible for all
other existents because his self-reflection necessarily gives rise to other

beings. The first of these is the first effect which must be one because
from the one no multiplicity can arise. This first emanation then thinks
of the necessary being, to produce the second intelligence. When it (the
first intelligence) thinks of itself as necessary by the first being, it gives
rise to the soul of the outermost sphere, and when it thinks of itself as
possible, the body of this outermost sphere emanates. This process of
emanation goes on from sphere to sphere, each superior sphere

producing the other till the moon and the tenth intelligence, which is the
agent intellect. It is from the agent intellect that specie's come into the
human soul, or into the possible intellect, but not directly, since there
must be a preparation by comparison with sense images. These
operations prepare the human possible intellect for the process of
abstractlon, which for Avicenna is no more than the emanation of
intelligible forms. These intelligible forms are not retained in the
possible intellect, but in the agent. In order to think, the possible
intellect which alone belongs to the individual human being must revert
to the separate agent intellect, since the possible intellect is not
sufficiently endowed for that operatlon. 7
In spite of the doctrine of Common agent intellect in Avicenna, he
strongly defends personal immortality, though his separatlon of the
agent intellect from the possible goes against the closely-knit unity
which Aquinas has argued for the soul. Aquinas shows more
understanding for the view that the agent intellect is outside the soul
than for a similar view about the possible intellect. This is so because
ordinarily, an agent exists separately from the thing which it brings to
actuality. This for Aquinas is the reason why many Christian thinkers
held that the agent intellect is God himself.7S But for Aquinas, the
argument cannot hold water because the action of the agent intellect in
human cognition is essential, i.e., the action of abstracting intelligible
species, to make them actually intelligible. However, this action is what
we experience in ourselves, and- if indeed the action is in ourselves, it

means that it must be ours since each being possesses formal specific
principles of operation which cannot exist apart from it. In the Contra
57
gentiles," Aquinas argues against Avicenna's teaching namely that the

intelligible species is not retained in the possible intellect. The p?ssl~le
intellect, according to Aquinas, is in a complete state of actuahzatlOn
when it is in the process of exercising its power. When it is not acting,
it is no longer in the former state of full actualization, but rather in a
sort of intermediate state between the states of actuality and
potentiality." It is like a human being who having learnt a certain art is
not adverting to his knowledge at a particular moment, but possesses
the intrinsic ability to reactivate and make operational the knowledge of
the art.
This last analogy is however limited by the fact that for Aquinas
memory is a power of the sense and does not belong to the intellect,
because, according to him, memory does not know things abstracted
from the universal. How is it then that the possible intellect, lacking
memory, is able to revert to knowledge that has been actuated in it?
This is indeed one of the reasons for the position of Avicenna - that the
possible intellect must turn to the agent whenever it thinks. Aquinas
merely says that the question of memory being a sensory power does
not prevent retention of intelligible species abstracted from all
particularities of existence." It means that somehow the intellect has a
memory peculiar to it. In the Summa theologiae, he becomes more
explicit about the question of intellective memory. If indeed memory is
taken in the sense of retaIning the past together with its particularity, it
cannot be in the intellect which knows in a universal manner only. If it
means the power to keep thought in mind, then it is admissible that
memory exists in the intellect." Be that as it may, there is a clear logic
of immortality underlying even this position of Aquinss. He would
presently use the fact of knowledge in the soul to argue for its
immortality. Such an argument would be rendered meaningless if
indeed the possible intellect does not possess such knowledge, or if
each time that it thinks it has either to reactivate the whole process of
knowledge (which would be meaningless) or would have to borrow
from a source independent of itself. It therefore has to be that the
possible intellect is in fact endowed with intellectual knowledge, not
only at a particular moment when it is in act, but that it retains in its
being the link with knowledge, which not only indicates its nature, but
also argues for its incorruptibility.
Averroes stretches the position of Avicenna to its limit. Not only is
the active intellect not in the soul, the possible intellect is also not part
of the s,oul. The consequence of his position is far-reaching. If the
possible intellect is not in the soul, how does he still retain Aristotle's
58
conception of the soul as the form of the body? In addition to being

completely outside the soul, the possible intellect is one for all men. In
order to undercut the materialism of Alexander of Aphrodisias,
Averroes argues that the possible intellect must be a simple, spiritual
and impassible substance. In order to retain these qualities, it must be
completely unntixed with matter, and must not be multiplied to ensure
its capacity to lmow universals. According to Averroes, the highest
powers in man are the memory, the imagination, and the cogitative
80
powers. Since these powers are in fact not much higher than sensory
powers, the first implication of his doctrine is that man is not much
higher in being than other non-rational animals.
The highest human powers have the task of making the sensory
species ready for the operation of the intellects. The agent intellect
brings into act the intelligible species present in the phantasms that
have been made ready by the sensory powers of man. Only then can the
possible or material intellect be brought into activity, and become the
repository of lmowledge so derived. The ultimate material for human
lmowledge is the human phantasm. And if per impossibile man did not
provide the intelligible species, lmowledge would not be possible. 81 It
is because man makes intellectual lmowledge possible by providing
phantasms that his position in the whole process of lmowledge is
indispensable. Hence, in an effort to preserve the immateriality of the
possible intellect, Averroes unwittingly makes it completely outside the
human being, and because there is no way of making it individuated
without matter and the body, it cannot but be the same for all men.
This position is diametrically opposed to all that Aquinas thought of
the human soul. It not only makes nonsense of the doctrine of the soul
as form, it also makes the defence of any reasonable doctrine of
immortality impossible. The works of Aquinas are replete with efforts
to counter the errors of both monopsychism and the separation of the
intellect from the soul.82 The rise of the so-called Latin Averroism was
only to make polemical a doctrine that has long been identified as false,
and against which Albert the Great had already written his own De
unitate intelleetus. There is evidence however to think that due to the
phenomenon of Averroism, the issue assumed more importance and a
sort of urgency in the work of Aquinas. Hence not only that he wrote
De unitate intelleetus against the Averroists, in the Q. D. de anima
written around the same time, the discussion of the doctrine of Averroes
(and Avicenna) came second only to the discussion of the soul as a
subsistent form.
59
The first strategy employed against Averroes' position in the De

unitate is to show that the doctrine of the unity and separateness of the
intelleet cannot be derived from any right interpretation Il'f Aristotle.
Aquinas departs from the acceptance of the definition of the soul by
Aristotle as the first act or form of an organic body, and shows by
reference to the various statements of Aristotle drawn from his various
works that there is no way Aristotle could have meant that the soul does
not exist in the body as its form. As to the statement of Aristotle that
only the intellect comes from outside and that it alone is divine,83
Aquinas replied that every form is educed from the potency of matter,
but this means only that matter, in reference to potency, pre-exists with
regard to form. Taken in this sense, the body can be said to pre-exist in
potency to the rational soul. However, due to the fact that potency is
always commensurate with act, the potentiality of each thing must be in
reference to its nature while in act. If forms that are bound in their
being to the composite in which they exist are taken into consideration,
they must exist in such a way that their being is totally bound up with
the being of their composite. It is for this reason that such forms can be
educed from the potency of their matter. It is clear that for Aquinas, the
same relation of potency and act does not apply to the soul because it
has life and operation independent of the body with which it is in
composition. Hence it cannot be educed from matter like other souls,
but must come from a source extrinsic to the body."
Here again, Aquinas makes exception with regard to the rational
soul in the form-matter relationship, and if he does so, it is, as in every
other place, on account of the power of the soul to perform independent
operations. In this particular respect, he also calls the authority of
Aristotle to support." He wants to show the errors of the Averroist
interpretation of the philosophy of Aristotle by reference to other
peripatetics lmown to the thinkers of the epoch among them, Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Theophrastus, Themistius, Avicenna and Algazel. In
the end he wonders whether the followers of Averroes were less
comfortable in being right with all these than in being wrong with
Averroes whom he names the perverter of peripatetic philosophy." It is
remarkable that all these interpreters of Aristotle defend theories about
the soul, drawn from their understanding of Aristotle, which Aquinas
would be totally in opposition to. However, it also serves his purpose
that they all agree that the possible intellect is part of the soul. Over
and above the authority of other thinkers, Aquinas insists that the
arguments of reason also speak against the view that the possible
intellect is outside the soul and one in all men.
60
The first argument he adduced has one foot in the statement of

Aristotle and another in the common experience of mankind. Aristotle
clearly states that the soul is that by which men understand. 87 Aquinas
tries to show that there is no way that statement can be understood
except in the sense that this particular person understands. The fact is
confirmed by the very act of asking questions about the intellect, and
when such a question is asked, it seeks information about our principle
of understanding. 88 Such an intellect must be the form of the body since
it is the first principle of operation of the human being, on account of
which that being is first brought into act. If, as Averroes states, the
possible intellect is not in man as the form of his body, it is then
necessary to explain how the important act of understanding can be said
to be an act of this particular man.
Aquinas shows clearly that there is no way it is possible to follow
the theory of Averroes and still explain satisfactorily how
understanding is an act of man and consequently how the intellect,
which is its principle, is the form of the body. On the strength of
Averroes' noetics one must accept that in fact the form began to be the
form of man not from the beginning of his being but rather at the very
moment that the intellect establishes contact with the phantasms from
which it derives sensible species, and which is the first and only point
of contact between man, so called, and the possible intellect due to
89
human operation. The implication Aquinas intends to draw from this
is that there is a big problem of explaining what type of being man is, if
the contact with the intellect begins at the specific moment that he
begins to understand. This is particularly important because Averroes
has clearly said that other powers of man are at the level of the sense
and he calls them passible intellect to indicate that they are bound u;
with the corporeal.
There is also a problem with regard to the type of union that really
exists between the possible intellect in Averroes' theory and the
phantasm. This is because, according to him, intelligible species carmot
be in the phantasm except in a potential marmer. Actualized by the
agent intellect, they must be in the possible intellect. If in fact the
possible intellect is not part of the human composite, it follows that the
contact Averroes tried to establish between man and the intellect is a
tenuous one, for the reallmowledge, which cannot be in existence until
intelligible species are actualized, is in the separate possible intellect,
not in man. The problem is not resolved if one concedes that since the
intelligible species can only be single, they can exist both in the
phantasm and in the possible intellect at the sarne time. They are
61
instrumental to understanding because through them the objects of

knowledge are understood. Seen from the point of view of the subject,
it is said that through them, the subject understands. Aquinas compares
the relationship between Averroes' intellect and man as that between a
coloured wall and the sight in which there is the intelligible species of
colour. Just as the patch of colour on the wall does not see, but is only
seen, so also the intelligible species in the phantasms do not understand
but are understood by the possible intellect viewed in the light of
Averroes. 90
The question of the number of possible intellects is a natural followup from the question of where it exists. For, on the supposition that it
exists outside the body, it must be accepted that, given that matter is the
principle of individuation, it carmot but be one in number. 91 Aquinas
does not do much more than try to highlight some of the unacceptable
consequences of this supposition.
For instance, given that the intellect is the principal source of all
operations in man, especially the operations of willing and knowing, the
supposition of the unity of the intellect would entail that this intellect is
the agent who wills and who exercises the vital act of choice in man. It
follows that there will be no difference in the choice of the individuals,
and such a consequence will make all forms of morality untenable.
Furthennore, there would be one act of understanding at one time in
respect of one species, since it is the same singular agent responsible
for the operation of understanding. It means that no matter how it is
united to the diverse phantasms, its act with regard to the sarne
intelligible species carmot be multiple at the sarne time, in the sarne
place and in the sarne respect. This gives rise to the third anomaly: that
there will be only one intellectual action for all men. This is because the
distinctive qualities of men do not share in the act of understanding in
the view of Averroes, since phantasms carmot constitute the diversity
because they are only a readying process for the vital action of
understanding, which is operated by the possible intellect. Aquinas
discounts the claim that it is because phantasms come from man that his
intellectual knowledge is distinctive on the ground that in two men who
know one and the sarne thing, the operation of the intellect carmot be
diversified by the diversity of the phantasm.
It is noticeable that Aquinas is talking about the sameness of the act
of knowing, of the operation involved in acquiring intellectual
knowledge, and not of knowledge itself. It is indeed a stronger
argument that the operation itself carmot be distinguished by the
phantasm, though in some other places Aquinas refers explicitly to the
62
very content of knowledge. 92 Hence he uses the experience that science

is in one man and not in another to show that the possible intellect
cannot be one in all men. It goes without saying that Averroes would
not have accepted the impossible consequences of his theory drawn up
by Aquinas. But it is also obvious that Aquinas argues against the
theory of Averroes from his own background or his conception of the
act of understanding. For instance, there is conceivably nothing that
prevents a very powerful possible intellect to have the ability to operate
two acts of understanding on the basis of Averroes' noetics. If indeed
such a possible intellect is like the possible intellect of man as we know
him, then such a possibility will be discounted, but it is on the basis of
it not being like our own intellect that Averroes outlined his theory.
Again, the act of knowledge that originates from diverse intelligible
species can possibly be diversified by the difference in the particular
perspectives of different subjects of perception, and the conditions
surrounding human knowledge are never exactly replicated, even when
the objects of knowledge are the same.
The issue of the nature of the intellect is of fimdarnental importance
to the whole structure of Aquinas' soul, and thus to his project of
defending its immortality. Averroes' theory wouid cut the ground from
much of the basis on which Aquinas' philosophy of mind rests. If
indeed Averroes were correct, then the theory of the soul as form of the
body, as life-giving and as subsistent would be very difficult if not
impossible to maintain. That would also compromise a consistent
explanation of its activity in such a way such that it remains a foothold
for the defence of immortality.
2.5 The Soul in Activity
It is clear from all the above that the act of intellection is the mainstay
of Aquinas' theory about the rational soul. One would even think that
the only important operation of the intellect is to understand. But
clearly Thomas recognizes the bipolar dimension of the activities of the
soul. In addition to intellection, therefore, the soul has appetitive
powers which manifests itself in the act of willing. The appetitive
powers of the soul are a very important aspect of the soul's operation,
and it is the foundation of the whole of Thomas' moral teaching which
Can be considered as being even of greater importance to him than
I'al
. 3 We shall see that some of the arguments of
.
eplstemo
ogIC questions.
Thomas for immortality are founded on the appetitive endowment of
the soul, such that to analyse the arguments for immortality, one must
63
pay attention to the life, both of the intellect and the will. 94 As the
intellect is naturally glued to knowledge as its actualization, so is the
will to happiness, and therefore human beings are inevitably moved by
the quest for happiness or well-being. If this aspect of the ,quest of the
will looks detenninistic, one must take aCCO'lUlt of Aquinas' insistence
that there is no determination as to the specific means of seeking that
happiness." Man is free as regards the determining aspects of volition.
By freedom Aquinas means free decision or free judgement (liberium
arbitriurn). The link between the two aspects of the soul's basic powers
or faculties is very close, since it is the intellect which enlightens the
soul on possible options available for the attainment of an end, while
the will provides the drive that issues in desire and decision, and
striving in view of that end through a chosen means. In this regard, the
question of which of the two is of greater importance is basically
polemic, as each in its proper aspect is an essential power of the same
unitary human soul, and each is indispensable for its being and
operations.
It must however be underlined that all the arguments Aquinas used
to explain the soul's nature are one way or another linked with the
power of understanding which the soul can exercise. The implication
of this power is also traceable to the doctrine of the soul as form, and as
subsistent; the question of plurality of form; the position of the soul in
the body; hylemorphic composition of the soul; the whole issue of the
unity of the intellect, and whether it exists outside the human composite
or not. Aquinas' theory is based on the principle that operation follows
from essence, and thus from the activities of beings we are enabled to
gain knowledge of their nature.
Following closely the theory of Aristotle, Aquinas holds that all
human knowledge is derived from sense experience. By this he rejects
not only all Platonic epistemology according to which our knowledge
of constant truth is derived from another world wherein exist the
constancy and certainty we see in knowledge;' but also turns his back
on the Augustinian theory of illumination according to which the
human soul depends on direct illumination from beyond, at least for
knowledge of every reality that is above the sensible. This theory that
very much suits the defence of immortality and independence of the
rational soul was the standard epistemological doctrine among the
thinkers of the thirteenth century" and Aquinas is, perhaps, the first
Christian philosopher to accept in full the theory of Aristotle about the
terrestrial origin of human knowledge.
64
The soul, as we have seen, is subject to the general metaphysical .

principle operating in nature. For Aquinas, it is in potency to becoming
all things in knowledge. That means that through cognition it becomes
actualized by becoming in a way its objects of knowledge." But the
reality from which the intellect derives its cognition is made of
individual, particular things: colour, sound, tactile sensation, etc. The
soul has the power not only to receive these, but to link thein into
complexes. Again, it is able to draw new inferences from its cognition.
It follows from these already that there is a differentiation in intellectual
knowledge, from reasoning, to judgement and finally to sciencia, which
is the peak of intellectual activity. To be in the state of scientia with
respect to a thing is to possess full and sure knowledge of its truth, on
premises that stand as guarantors of the truth, The outline of sciencla is
manifested in a demonstrative syllogism, and hence Aquinas holds that
one is justified in holding the end result of a demonstration if there are
grounds to affirm its premises. Nevertheless, for him, the principle of
inference is not completely tutiversal.

There are propositions which are not inferential. They have their
truth value not by virtue of any demonstration, but directly by virtue of
themselves. These are the first principles of knowledge that are per se
nota.The first reason why one must affirm a non-inferential justification
is that, without it, there cannot be any inferential deduction. 99 This is
because without non-inferential justification, the line of inference must
go on to infinity. Second, we have non-inferential justification of
propositions drawn from our thorough knowledge of an object. That
means, for example, that one who knows the nature of a human being
will need no demonstration to conclude that man is an animal or that he
is rational. That first principles are per se nota does not necessarily
entail that we are endowed with knowledge ofthem.!OO For Aquinas, the
more formal logical and mathematical a priori propositions are more
likely to be known than a posteriori propositions, because the former is
independent of matter. Again such propositions as "God exists" may be
self-evident, but one would need knowledge of the nature of God to be
able to draw the non-inferential conclusion that he exists, and human
beings are not endowed wih such knowledge, Thus we can attain
knowledge of God and innnaterial beings only by analogy, in so far as
these are related to material things and are reflected by them.
If our real knowledge must begin from particular material things,
how does the mind arrive at concepts that are universal? In the first
place, with Aquinas, universals do not distingnish themselves from the
particular sensory knowledge by existing extra-mentally like particular
Immortality and Aquinas' Conception of the Human 8,oul
65
objects. Real existents are in fact only particular, so that the universal
man that can be predicated of Socrates and of Plato is not .an
independent man. From individual human beings, it is possible for Q,\1i6
..
intellect to abstract the most common characteristics that map men . ,
into members of the same species. Such a similarity in the essenti~1 .
nature of each man with that of all other men is what constitutes the
basis of the universal man in the intellect.!01 The acquisition of the
knowledge of universals is the culmination of two distinct but
intrinsically related acts or levels of cognitive operation.
The sensible species received through external objects by the senses
are transmitted into the internal senses. But sensaton is not just.
physical, but rather psycho-physical because mere physical alteration
does not suffice for the generation of impressions. 102 The interior senses
synthesize the various "patches of sensation derived from the external
ll
objects. These species are in turn collated by the sensus communis, and
are conserved by the phantasia and the imagination. It is at this point
that the work of conversion. of particular sensible species to universal
and intelligible species really starts. The power of the intellect that is
responsibe for the transition is the agent or active intellect. The human
soul is usually in potency of knowledge, so that the agent intellect is
necessary to act on the phantasms of the sense level. Again, Aquinas
maintains that no material species can have. any effect or rather impress
itself on an immaterial being.!03 It is thanks to the agent intellect that
the universal nature of species which are in the phantasia in their
particular determination is sieved from the phantasm. This is called
abstraction. 104 The result of abstraction is the intelligible species which
is the proper object of the possible intellect. The active intellect thus
transmits the intelligible species to the possible intellect which knows
them as universals. It does not however mean that the two levels of
knowledge diverge diametrically at this point. While the possible
intellect is in the possession of universal natures, it is also capable of
knowing the particular. This is again achieved by reference to the
phantasm.!OS Indeed the knowledge of the particular in the phantasm is
the first order of knowledge. It is only from the particular that the .
intellect abstracts the universal that can be predicated of the several
members of the same species. "The universal concept is primarily the
modification of the intellect by which a thing is known according to its
form or essence. 1I106 This implies that the senses as well as the intellect
have knowledge of the external individual objects, While the senses
have only particular specific knowledge of these, the intellect possesses
the knowledge of universals in addition to the ability to subsume a
66
67
particular instance of the species under the universal in the posssible

intellect. The latter action is possible only when the intellect refers back
to particular images or phantasms on the lower level of knowledge.
The veracity of human knowledge is nevertheless not the outcome of
the process briefly outlined. Sense impression or even sense knowledge
cannot on its own be true or false. It is when the mind makes one of its
From the foregoing, it goes without saying that the statement of E.

Moody to the effect that William of Auvergne's doctrines in his treatise
De anima are so shaped to fit the consistent affirmation of immortality
can apply to Aquinas with little or no modification. Aquinas'
explanation of the nature and activities of the soul fits very neatly into
the project of the defence of immortality. One of the special
principal acts - judgement, that; depending on its accord or otherwise
characteristics of Aquinas is his courage in' assuming positions and
with what is, it can be said to be true or false. Hence, for Aquinas, truth
is primarily in the mind. But we must not forget that it is not in the
intellect as a physical objective presence. Rather it is like a mental
state, a state of conformity of the judgement of the intellect with reality.
As such truth belongs to the intellect. It is so because, even though the
sense has a correspondence between itself and the thing sensed, it lacks
the distance to be able to make a judgement of that which can only be
true or false. The mind, on the other hand, has the ability not only to
apprehend intelligible species, but also to make judgement about what
it understands.
Given the capital Aquinas makes of the operational independence of
the intellect in understanding, one may inquire at what point do the
senses, both external and internal, cease to participate in the act of
intellectual knowledge? The begirming of the act of sensation may
indeed be only physiological, but the recognition of an object as this or
that involves a judgement which cannot be described as purely sensory,
since it involves bringing some particular perception under a universal
species to which it belongs. Again, according to Aquinas, the phantasm
is very much involved in the application of the universal essence or
quiddity which the soul derives from the act of the agent intellect by
abstraction from particular nature. However, this act of reference to the
phantasm may not constitute the participation of the sensory in
intellectual cognition. The paradigmatic act of the intellect, sciencia
does not involve a reference to the sensory particular or image. Again,
the act of judgement which constitutes truth, and the inferential process
of drawing from prior cognition new consequences for intellectual
enricinnent may not involve a throw-back to the particular and the
material. Yet, despite Aquinas' constant use of the understanding in an
attempt to vindicate the peculiar nature of the soul, human knowledge
in the soul is a whole process that is so tightly interconnected that each
level is of vital importance in bringing the human intellect from its
potency to actuality. The insistence on the special nature of the soul
does not therefore diminish the importance of sensory image or
phantasm, as he rightly emphasized in the De Trinitilate.!07
wading through them with all the arsenal of his reasoning and the
thorough knowledge of sources available to men of his epoch. As
Kreyche says, no one can say that he is "a coward who refuses to face
issues.,,!08 Aquinas tackles such difficult issues as the doctrine of the
soul as form and as subsistent, and which while being subsistent,
contains no matter in its nature, even the so-called spiritual matter. The
soul is intimately linked with the body, so inthnately in fact that it is
metaphysically bound up with the body, yet the body exists for the sake
of the soul from which it derives life. The materiality of the body does
not necessarily mean that the soul that serves as its substantial form
must be submerged in matter, and there is no need to foist an intellect
separate and unique in order to ensure a certain kind of immaterality
and immortality for the soul. Aquinas assumes the full consequence of
his understanding of Aristotle, to the extent that all human knowledge
begins with the senses, but then goes on to a level which enables him to
argue for the "right" of the intellect to be granted exception in the world
of form/matter relationship. Whether all his positions as regards the
nature and the activities of the soul are defensible is altogether another
matter. The boldness of his efforts is not in doubt. It is from the
background which is briefly outlined above that he goes on to argue for
immortality in several of his works. To some of these arguments we
direct our attention in the next chapter.
NOTES
I R. Reyna "On the Soul: A Philosophical Exploration of the Active Intellect
in Averroes, Aristotle aod Aquinas, The Thomist 36 (1972), p. 149.
2
3
Alcibiades, 1, 12ge. 130 c.

De anima e/ ejus origine, IV, 2, 2 (p.L., 44, 525)
68
4 Injoan. Evang. XIX,S, 15 (p.L., 35, 1553). The description of the Wlion of
soul and body as one man or one person is still consistent with the Neoplatonic
position whereby the real person is in fact the soul. It could for instance be a
way of expressing that there is only one soul, one man, one person in the whole
outcome of the body~soul relation that is in the human being.
, De quantitate animae, xm, 23.

6 De moribus ecclesiae. 1,27,52 (p.L., 32,1332)
De anima, 1. 3, p. 67b "manifestum est nullum instrumentum esse propter

operationem, ad hoc videlicet ut ei serviat in operationihus quae fieri habent
per ipsum. Cum igitur corpus bumanum organicmn sit quod est dicere
instrumentaie, imo cum sit instrumentum Wlum ad multas operationes aptum,
natum et fabricatum necesse est operationem esse cui naturaliter serviat, quique
eo naturaliter uti debeat."
8 Ibid., p. 102 a.
, S.C.G., II, 57, 3, 6; cf. also S. T., la. 75, 3. "Sed Aristoteles posuit quod
solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo eorporeo exereetur. Sentire
vero et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae manifeste aecidunt cwn
aliqua corporis inununitatione, sicut in videndo inunutatur pupilla per speciem
coloris (et idem apparet in aliis). Et sie manifestum est quod anima sensitiva
non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed onmis operatio
sensitivae animae est conjuncti. n
10 S. C. G., II, 57, 10
II
S. T., 1a. 75, 4: "Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat
definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum,
sed formam et materiam, unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus; non
quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis, sed materia
communis. Sicut enim de ratione hujus hominis est quod sit ex anima et
camibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quiquid est
communiter de substantia omnium individuorwn sub specie contentorwn."
12 L. Elders, The Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas (Frankfurt a.
M.: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 339 - 340. For a study of the idea of man as
microcosm in thirteenth century philosophy, see 1. McEvoy, "Philosophical
Developments of the Microcosm and the Macrocosm in the Thirteenth
Century," in C. Wenin (ed.), L 'homme et son universe au Moyen-Age, v. 1
(Louvain-Ia-Neuve: Institut SupCrieur de Philosophle 1986), pp. 374 - 381.
13
S. C. G., II, 46, 2; 3:- "Oportet igitur, ad consununatam universi
perfectionem, esse aliquas creaturas quae in Deum redirent non solwn
secWldwn naturae similitudinem, sed etiam per operationem. Quae quidem non
potest esse nisi per actum intellectus et vohmtatis: quia nec ipse Deus aliter
ergo seipswn operationem habet. Oportet igitur, ad perfectionem optimam
universi, esse aliquas creaturas intellectuales."
14 S. C. G. 11,45,8.
" S. C. G. II, 91,4.
16 G. Verbeke, "Man as Frontier" in Aquinas and the Problems of his Time
(Louvain: Louvain University Press, 1976), pp. 204 - 223.
Immortality and Aquinas' Conception ofthe HUman Soul
69
17 For instance, Philip the Chancellor used many nuances of the order of being
to spin many arguments for immortality in his Summa de bono.(269 - 276) St.
Albert the Great used the same as the necessary arguments for immortality in
the Summa de creaturis (II, q. 59). For an analysis of these arguments, see J.
O. Oguejiofor, The Arguments for the Immortality o/the Soul in the First Half
ojthe'Thirteenth Century, pp.186 - 206, 345 - 358.
IS S. T., la. 29, I
19 See J. Owens, "The Unity in a Thomistic Philosophy of Man," Mediaeval
Studies, 25 (1963), pp. 63 - 64.
" M.-J. Nicholas, "Le corps humain," Revue thomiste, 79 (1979), p. 358
21 J. Owens, op. cit., p. 70.
22 L. Elders, op. cit., p. 220
23 F. J. Crosson, "Psyche and Persona: The Problem of Personal Immortality,"
International Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1968), p. 169.
24 M.- J. Nicholas. ''Le corps hurnain," p. 374: "11. n'est rien dans retre
hwnain, si materiel que cela paraisse, qui ne soit hwnain en lui parce
qu'intrinseqement ordOlUle it l'esprit." See also A. C. Pegis, "Man as Nature
and Spirit," Doctor communis 20 (1951), p. 56: "The totality of the composite
called man cannot be more than an intellectual nature."
2S A. C. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death: Some Further Reflections on
the Summa Contra Gentiles," The Monist 58 (1974), p. 3.
26 S. T., lao 76, 5: "cum fonna non sit propter materiam sed potius materia
propter formam, ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit tali-s, et
non e converso. to Ibid., 77. 6: "minus principale est propter principalius,
materia est propter fonnam substantia."
27 S. T. lao 75, 1. See also, N. Kretzmann & E. Stump, eds., The Cambridge
Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.
128 - 131.
28 Cf. Aristotle, De anima, n, 1, 412a 29, S. T, la, 76, 1, Q. D. de anima, I,
ad. 15.
29 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. H. TrendelUlick (Cambridge M A: Harvard
University Press, 1948) V. vii, 4: "Thus it follows that "substance" hal two
senses: the ultimate subject, which cannot be further predicated of something
else; and whatever has an individual separate existence. The shape and form of
each particular thing is of this nature." Aquinas is evidently not laying claim to
the second meaning of substance in reference to the soul. Aristotle also makes
clear what he understands by substance in the real sense, by, for instance
distinguishing between primary and second&y substance. "Substance in the
truest and strictest, primary sense of that term, is that which is neither asserted
of nor can be found in a subject." "Evetything else but first substance is either
affinned of first substance or present in such as its subject." Catogries, tr. H.
Cooke (Cambridge M A: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 19, 21.
30
S. C. G., II, 68, 3 :"Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit fonna substantialis
alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorwn unum est, ut forma sit principiwn essendi
substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principiwn autem dico, non factivum, sed
70
fonnale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliod, scilicet quod
forma et materia conveniant in uno esse .... Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit
substantia composita, quae -est wm secWldwn esse, ex materia et fonna

constans. Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, .. , esse fonnale
principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suurn communicans materiae."
31 S. C. G., II, 57,14.
J2 S. T., la, 76, 1.
33 Loc. cit.: "Si quis autem vetit dicere animam intellectivam non esse corporis
formam, oportet quod inveniat modum quo ista actio quae est intelligere sit
hujus hominis actio,"

l4 Physics, V, 1. 224a21 23.
" S. T., 1.. 76,1.
36 In the Questiones disputatae de anima, q. 1, on whether the soul can be
fonn and a particular thing (hoc aliquid1 he raised and answered a total of
eighteen objections relating to the question. This fact does not however need to
be overemphasized as much depends on the structure of the treatise in
question. In the Summa theo!ogiae, only six objections are raised, but this does
not mean that the matter is of less importance, the Summa in general has
usually fewer objections to questions.
37 A. C. Pegis, "Man as Nature and Spirit," p. 55.
38 S. T., la, 76, I, res: "Sed considerandum est quod quanta fonna est nobilior
tanta magis dominatur materiae corporali et minus ei immergitur et magis sua
operatione vel virtute excedit earn. Unde videmus quod forma miXti corporis
habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et
quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate fonnarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus
formae materiam elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam
forma metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima autem
humana est ultima in nobilitate fonnarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit
materiam corporalem quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo
modo communicat materia corporalis; et haec virtus dicitur intellectus." The
translation of T. Suttor (Blackfriars, London, 1970, p. 47) seems to have
reinforced the oblique presence of the concern for immortality in this
paragraph, by rendering the ".habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua
nullo modo communicat materia corporatis," as "it has an activity and
permanent power, to act to which materi,!l forces contribute nothing." The
translation of virtue here by "pennanent power" seem to suggest that this
power goes with the soul always, which, even though it accords with Aquinas'
philosophy, is not suggested by the phrase it translates.
39 Cf. Q. D. de anima, a.l,resp, S C. G.II, 68. The distinction in the D,! anima
concludes with the assertion of the subsistence of the soul, and its existence at
the boundmy between the spiritual and the material, while in the Contra
gentiles, it is used to show that the union of the soul to the body is in order to
complete the species of humanity. The Summa the%giae passage ends with
the bare assertion of the soul to have knowledge independent of matter.
71
S. T., la, 75, 2, res: "Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum
cognoscere potest naturas omnium corpomm. Quod autem potest cognoscere
aliqua oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei
naturaliter impediret cognitionem alionun, sicut videmus quod lingua infinni
quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore non potest percipere aliquid dulce,
sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se
naturam alicujus corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem
corpus habet aliquam naturam detenninatam. Impossibile est igitur quod
principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat
per organwn corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata iHius organi corporei
prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum."
41 Loc. cit.: "Ipsum igitur intellectualle principium":'quod dicitur- mens vel
intellectus habet operationem per se cui non comnl'lUlicat corpus. Nihil autem
potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit. .."
42 M. Kelly, "Aquinas and the Subsistence of the Soul: Notes on a Difficulty,"
Franciscan Studies 27 (1967), pp. 213 '219.
43 In III De anima vii, 680.
44 M. Kelly, op. cit., p. 219.
4~ cr. S. T., 1a 75, 2.
46 D. A Callus, "The Problem of the Plurality of Fonn in the Thirteenth
Centwy: The Thomist Innovation," in L 'homme et son destin d'apres les
penseurs du moyen age," (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960), p. 577. See also ''The
Origin of the Problem of the Unity of Fonn," The Thomist24 (1961),257
285.
47 De anima, II, 3. 414bI932. Cf. S. T. la, 76, 3.
48
Jolm of La Rochelle, Summa de anima, 1.24 : "similis est proportio
vegetativi ad sensitivum, sensitivi ad rationale, sicut triangu1i ad
quadrangulum, et quadranguli ad pentagonum; quia sicut triangulus in
quadrangulo, et quadrangulus in pentag()'no, ita vegetativum in sensitivo, et
sensitivum in rationali. Sed cum triangulus in quadrangulo non differat
secWldum substantiam, inuno idem SWlt secundum substantiam; ergo
vegetabile cum sensitivo, et utnunque cum rationali non differunt secWldum
substantiam...
49 E. A. Moody, op. cit., 48.
~o William of Auvergne, De anima, p. 108a-b: " ... si pluralitas atque diversitas
operationum sufficeret facere debere esse pluralitatem animarwn, esset
numerus aniniarum tam in homine quam in illis sive ex illis. Quare juxta
numerum quinque sensum essent quinque animae in hOmine, et aliae quinquae
juxta numerum viriurn alianun, ... "
" D. A. Callus, ''The Problem of the Plurality ofFonn ..... pp. 582583. It
must be said that Callus somewhat overstates the claims he made for the
innovation of St. Thomas. John of La Rochelle was not referred to in Callus'
article, but at least in him, the problem was tackled on the basis of the unity of
being provided by a fonn, a solution not less metaphysical than the basic one
provided by Thomas.
40
72
51
Ibid" p. 585.
" Q. D. de anima, q. 11; S. T. la, 76, 3; S. C. G., 58.

54
S. C. G, 58:4 " ...Nam intellectivum sensitivo, et sensitiwm nutritivo
posterius secundum generationem est,"
55 GWldissalinus, De immortalitale animae, p. 6, 5~ 10: "Omne mortale sua
ipsa duratione paulatim debilitatur et deficit, donee deveniat ad defectum
ultimum, qui est mors. Virtus autem intellectiva sua ipsa duratione proficit et
invalescit, ut quanto fuerit diutumior et antiquior, tanto sit ex omnibus modis
Buis fortior,"
56 S. C. G, II, 50, Q.D. de anima, a. 6; S. T. lao 75, 5.
51 J. de Vries, "Zum thomistischen Beweis der Immaterialitat der Geistseele,"
Scholastik 40 (1965), pp. 3 - 4.
58 S. T. lao 75, 5, ad. 4: "In substantiis intellectualibus est compositio ex actu
et potentia, non quidem ex materia et fonna, sed ex fonna et esse participato.
Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est. Ipsum enim esse
est quo aUquid est/'
59 See Lottin, 0, ''La composition hy16morphic des substances spirituelles.
Debut de la controverse," Revue neo-scolastique de philosophie, 34 (1932), pp.
matter. In the De potentia 9 a 5, ad 13, he named two principles' of

individuation which can in fact be reconciled to the same theory of- the
mUltiplicity belonging to the fonn, and being effectutated by maner.
''Dicendwn quo in rebus creatis principia individuantia duo habent: quorum
unum est quod sunt principium subsistendi (natura enim communis de se non
subsistit nisi in singularibus); aliud est quod per prinCipia individu~tia
supposita naturae communis ab invicem distinguantur."
71 F. C. Copleston,Aquinas, p. 95.
De anima, ill, v.
S. C. G. II, 62; 68, 2; 76, 9; Q. D. de anima, a 6, obj. 1l.
.
74 CfE. Gilson, History o/Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp.198205; B. Zedler's "Introduction" in St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Unity of the
Intellect Against the Averroists (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1968), p. 2.
72
73
75 This position is very widespread among prethomistic .thinkers, especially in

colUlection with the doctrine of illumination (see the next section). For the
view of the Franciscans of the 13th century. see L. J. Bowman, "The
Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of
21 - 44.
Q. D. de anima, a.9, obj. 20.
the Thirteenth Century," Modern Schoolman 5 (1972), pp. 251 - 279. William
60
of Auvergne rejected the doctrine of agent intellect completely because he
Ibid., a.9, resp; S. T. la, 76, 5, resp.

62 Loc. cit.
63 S. C. G., II, 71, 1; Q. D. De anima, a 9, resp.
64 S. T., la. 76, 6, res: "Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile
est ergo intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam quam esse in actu.
Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter,
...Unde impossibile est quod quaecumquae dispositiones accidentales
praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque
ante animam."
6S S. T, la.76, 8, resp.
66 AviceIUla, Liber de anima, V. 3. 58 - 60: "Cum enim nudae fuerint omnino,
non different per id quod diximus: ergo impossibile est inter ilIas esse
alteritatem et multitudinem."
67 Ibid., V. 3. 77: " ... manifestum est animae incipere esse cum incipit materia
corporalis apta ad serviendum eis, et corpus creatum est regnum eius et
instrumentum ...
68 Ibid., V. 3. 25 - 27: "Postquam autem singularis fit per se, impossibile est ut
sit anima alia nwnero et ut sint una essentia."
feared that it detracted from the inunortality of the soul. Cf. E. A. Moody, op.
61
" S. C. G., II, 81, 8.

70
Aquinas has here and there other more complicated ideas about
individuation, which Copleston refers to in general as "various obscure
refinements" of the same theory. What is clear however is that Aquinas is not
saying that multiplicity is due to matter entirely. In the S. C. G, it is due to the
substantial diversity of the fonns themselves, which is due to the
commensuration of the soul to the body, and this commensuration is due to
cit., p. 60~ R.-A., Gauthier, "Note sur les debuts ... ", p. 356.
76
77
s. C. G., II, 74, 16.

Ibid., 74, 17.
Loc. cit.
S. T., la 79, 6.
80 Averroes, Commentan'um Magnum in Anstotelfs de Anima, Libras ill, F. S.
Crawford, ed (Cambridge MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1953), conun
78
79
4, pp. 383 - 384; comm. 5, pp. 388 - 389; conun. 19, p. 441; II, conun. 32, p.
178.
SI Ibid., comm. 33, p. 476
82 S. C. G. II, c. 74; Q. D. de anima, a. II, III; S. T. 1a. 76, a. 2.
83 Aristotle, On the Generation ofAnimals, II, 3, 736b 27 - 29.
84 Aquinas Against the Averroists, op. cit., 46, p. 63 - '64: "Sed quia potentia
dicitur ad actum, necesse est ut unumquodque secundum earn rationem sit in
potentia, secundwn quam rationem convenit sibi esse actu.... aliis fonnis, que
non habent operationem absque communicatione materiae, convenit sic esse
actu ut magis ipse sint quibus compos ita sunt, et quodammodo compositis
coexistentes, quam quod earwn est in concretione ad materiam, ita totaliter
educi dicWltur de potentia. materie. Anima autem intellectiva cum habeat
operationem sine corpore, non est esse suwn solum in c~ncreti~ne ad
materiamj unde non potest dici quod educatur de materia, sed magis quod est a
principio extrinseco.'" .
74
Loc. cit: "Ex hoc ex verbis Aristotelis apparet "Relinquitur autem

intellectum solum deforis advenire et divinum esse solum"; et causam assignat
subdens "Nichil enim ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio."
86 Ibid, 51 - 59, pp. 71 - 79
87 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 414a, 12 - 14.
88 Aquinas Against the Averroists, 62, p. 80 - 81: "Manifestum est eoim quod
hie homo singularis intelligit: numquam enim de intellectu quereremus nisi
intelligeremus; nec cum querimus de eo quo nos intelligimus."
" Ibid., 68, pp. 86 - 87.
90 Ibid., 65 - 66, pp. 82 - 86.
91 Q. D. de anima, a. 3, resp.
92 Ibid" III, resp: .... .it is obvious that not all men possess the same scientific
knowledge, because some know sciences which others do not. Now it is
evidently incongruous and impossible for one and the same primary subject to
be in act and in potency with regard to the same fonn. For example, a surface
cannot be at the same time potentially and actually white."
93
N. Kretzmann and E. Stump, "Thomas Aquinas," in Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998) vol. I, p.
338
94 J. Lamaire, "Les preuves de l'immortalite de l'fune d'apres S. Thomas d'
Aquin," Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1 (1927), p. 49
9S De veritate, q. 24. 7, ad. 6: " ... dicendwn, quod felicitatem indeterminate et
in universali omnis rationalis mens naturaliter appetit et circa hoc deficere non
potest; sed in particulari non est determinatus motus voluntatis creaturae ad
quaerendam felicitatem in boc vel illo. Etsi in appertendo felicitatem aliquis
peccare potest, si earn quaerat ubi quaerere non debet, sicut qui querit in
voluptatibus felicitatem; et ita est respectu onmium bonorum: nam nihil
appetitur nisi sub ratione bani ... Quod ideo est, quia naturaliter inest menti
appetitus bani, sed non huius vel HUus boni: unde in hoc peccatum incidere
potest."
" Plato, Cratylus, 439 b - c; EUlhyphro, 5 d 1 - 5; 6d9 - e6; Phaedo, 100 d.
For Aquinas' position, cf. De veritate, q. 10, 6, resp.: "Sed ista etiam opinio
non videtur rationabilis: quia secundum hoc non esset dependentia necessaria
inter cognitionem mentis humanae et virtutes sensitivas; cuius apparet
contrarium manifeste: tum ex hoc quod deficiente sensu deficit scientia de suis
sensibilibus, tum ex hoc quod mens nostra. non potest actu considerare edam ea
quae habitualiter scit, nisi formando aliqua phantasmata; Wlder etiarn laesa
organo phantasiae impeditur consideratio. Et praeterea praedicta positio tollit
proxima rerum principia, si omnia inferiora ex substantia separata inunediate
fonnas consequuntur tam intelligibiles ,quam sensibiles."
97 Cf. for instance, Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, 85, 94 102, John
of La Rochelle, Summa de anima, II, 36. p. 292; Albert the Great, Summa de
creaturis, Id, 2., a 5, sol; XXV, p. 60a, Super Dionysium de coelesti
hierarchia, c 9, 6, ad. 2.
85
75
98 S. T. 1a. 84, 2, ad.2 :"Philosophus dicit quod anima quodammodo onmia.

Cum ergo simile sirnli cognoscatur, videtur quod anima per seipsam corporalia
cognoscat."
99
Sententia super posterior analytica, 1.4.
Ibid., 1. 5. 7; ''Thomas Aquinas," in A Companion to Epistemology, J.

Dancy & E. Sosa, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 20.
101 F. C. Copleston, op. cit., p. 181.
100
S. T. la, 78, 3.
Ibid., la, 84, 6: ''Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem
incorpoream. "
104 Ibid., la, 12.4.
lOS Ibid., 1a, 84, 7; 85, I ad. 5: ''Dicendurn quod intellectus noster et abstrahit
species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, in quantum considerat naturas rerum in
lUliversa1i; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere
etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata ....
107 In librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, 2, ad. 5: " ... phantasma est principium
nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens,
sed sicut pennanens ut quoddam fundarnentum intellectualis operationis; sicut
principia demonstrationis oportet manere in onmi processu scientiae, cum
phantasmata comparentur ad intellecturn ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne
quod inspicit vel seclUldum perfectum repraesentationem vel per negation em.
Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitio hnpeditur, oportet totaliter impe4iri
cognitionem intellectus etiam in divinis."
108 G. F. Kreyche, ''TIle Soul-Body Problem in St. Thomas," The New
Scholasticism, 46 (1972), p 474.
102
\03
Chapter 3
ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY
3.1 Method and Intention of the Arguments

The foregoing excursus into the nature of the soul shows clearly that
Aquinas sets his exploration against the doctrines of Plato. The basic
reason for the discordance between him and Plato appears to be the
consistency of maintaining a Platonic position and at the same time
asserting the specific characteristics of Aquinas' doctrine of human
nature like the essential unity of the human composite. We shall see
later that such a doctrine has far-reaching implications for Aquinas that
not only end with what can be called the philosophical aspects of his
teachings, but reach on to areas that can be properly regarded as the
preserve of theology, backed up, as it were, by truth accepted not just
on grounds of reason, but on grounds of direct revelation by dod
himself. Aquinas thus reaches out to Aristotle to explain the nature of
the soul, its activities and the relationship between the soul and the
body. However, it can be said that despite his predilection for theories
and principles drawn from Aristotle, the basic structure of his theory
about the soul is Platonic. According to J. Owen, Aquinas could be said
1
to have tried to get the best of the two worlds of Plato and Aristotle.
"
78
That is one way his arguments for immortality can be seen. For even
though he read Aristotle as supporting the immortality of the soul, it is
clear that nowhere did the philosopher try to show that immortality can
be demonstrated by rational argument. The whole practice of arguing
for inunortality is thus decidedly a legacy of Platonic tradition.
Such influence of Platonic tradition on Aquinas appears almost
inevitable given its long duration and the enormous influence it exerted
on the literal world of the time, including the pillars of Christian,
Moslem and Jewish thinking of the age just before the thirteenth
century, and also given the fact that the influence of Aristotle had hardly
dug in deep enough to dislodge the already entrenched Platonic world
view. We have seen that the very presence of some Aristotelian
doctrines, as that of the soul as fonn, could be one of the factors
underlying the increase in the defence of inunortality in the thirteenth
century, and that the argument which thinkers of the time used was most
often discordant with their understanding of the soul, which was
basically Platonic or Augustinian. The fact that Aquinas draws very
close to Aristotle in his anthropology is an indication that despite the
influence of Platonic theories on all the thinkers, Aquinas, for one, took
seriously what he understood to be the consequence of the basic
doctrines of Aristotle on the soul. The arguments he used are not
different, and are all drawn from thinkers and sources that were
contemporary to him. The sources of the arguments are never
mentioned, and they are often given different interpretations and
different functions, but the bases of all the arguments used by Thomas
are to be found in authors who flourished shortly before him.
Aquinas argues for inunortality of the soul directly in at least six of
his works written at different periods of his intellectual evolution. But
these should be read in conjunction with other passages not written on
the rational soul, but under which the rational soul can be subsumed.
When, for instance, he argues for the inunateriality and incorruptibility
of intellectual substances, including the angels, the same arguments and
procedure are used that apply without any qualification to the human
soul. The arguments used are very diverse, even though there are basic
lines that could be traced through most of them. Such considerations as
the nature of intellectual knowledge and the operation of knowing can
be said to be basic to the whole structure of his philosophy of mind, but
it is not for that reason that they should be singled out in the context of
the arguments for immortality. The arguments Aquinas used are marked
by the state of the maturity of his thought at the moment of writing. 2 The
doctrinal points under consideration, the purpose and circumstances
Arguments for Immortality
79
surrounding the particular work in which the arguments are found also
influence them. These cumulative influences on the. proofs can be
divided into external and internal factors. External factors would
include the historical context in which the particular work was written
which very often touches on the slant of the arguments, and on the
specific intention or purpose of the proof. The internal factors will be
such circumstances that surround the text irrespective of the content of
the proof, the position of the argument within the text and the literary
style adopted in the text, which invariably determines the way the
arguments are pursued.
In general, Aquinas' arguments are based on his general theory about
human nature and specifically about the nature of the rational soul. Thus
the points, some of which were briefly discussed in the previous
chapter, should always be taken as the background for any reading of
the specific arguments outlined. Aquinas himself makes numerous
cross-references in the texts on inunortality to doctrines for which he
has argued in different contexts, but which come to support the
arguments for immortality. The implication of this is that the weight
which he gives to the general project of defending immortality should
not be taken as indicated by the specific words used, nor indeed by the
length and number of the arguments proffered. Usually such
considerations as number and length are more influenced by the internal
and external contexts of the text than by Aquinas' judgement about the
feasibility of the whole process of arguing for immortality. Again, his
arguments are also based on the presumption of the principles taken for
granted by the intellectual world of his time.' It is therefore not very
correct to grade any particular argument as secondary just because the
principle on which it stands requires itself to be proven.' Where he does
not refer to a principle for which he has previously argued, and does not
argue for a new principle which he cites as background, Aquinas bases
his reasoning on the conunon experience of hwnan nature. This is
indeed the strongest starting point of his arguments, and except for a
few of them which are grounded on logical deduction from generally
accepted principles, the rest are all ultimately based on appeals to the
conunon structure and certitude of hwnan conscious experience. s His
method is to call those who are endowed with human consciousness to
look inwards, and by so doing to encounter their rationality, their
spirituality and their inunortality. Such introspection used in defence of
immortality cannot therefore be the exclusive preserve of highly
developed intellects that can in any age be few in number. 6 It is obvious
that what he appeals to is the common nature of humankind. Problems
80
can of course be raised about those who are not able for one reason or
another to reach this general development, but that is not to say that
only some realize the experience on which he based his arguments for
immortality.
Like most of his immediate predecessors, Aquinas believed that
through such appeals combined with deduction from commonly
acceptable principles and practices, even the. unbelievers can be brought
to accept the fact of immortality. Not that all the texts are written for
unbelievers, it is rather a realization that the challenge to immortality is
in fact not found among belief except in the modified sense of
specifying the type of immortality to which a particular explanation of
the nattue of the soul leads. With regard to the latter, the texts written
alier the conflict of Averroism will be found in the context of the
obvious attempt to specify what sort of immortality is implied. Apart
from these, the generality of the arguments are presented in such a way
as to leave no doubt that he intends to counter his opponent on
philosophical grounds. There is nevertheless no reticence to cite the
authority of revelation, or any authoritative teaching for which one

would normally require no argumentation. As we have already
mentioned, all of Aquinas' arguments should be taken with the
understanding that right philosophy leads directiy to the truth of the
Catholic faith. Thus his position against the unicity of intellect is
accompanied by an assertion of the accord of what he was outlining
with the faith. In the same way, at the end of his lengthy proofs for
immortality in the Contra gentiles, he expresses the accord of the point
he was defending with faith,' citing Genadius of Masseille' s De
ecclesiasticis dogmatibus in support. It is however remarkable that
these few and isolated citations of authorities of faith are not used as
arguments. They stand as the affirmation of orthodoxy of a
philosophical position.
The method applied in the arguments is the sic el non method which,
developed from the twelfth century from such thinkers as Abelard and
others of his ilk, had become the standard method of writing by the time
of Aquinas. In line with this, Aquinas outlines all the possible
objections. to his stand before stating his own position in what can
generally be regarded as the solution to the question that is raised. The
amplitude of his writing allows him to follow different methods of
approach in different works. Thus there is the well-ordered and
systematic works like the Summa Ihe%giae and also the Contra
genliles in which he very often does not present in a very ordered
fashion the position of the opponent, and also such works as the
81
Compendium Ihe%giae in which there are short presentations and

explorations of hundreds of different theses. In arguing for immortality
in the context of these works, the methods applied in the works are
naturally adhered to. Aquinas does not always argue for incorruptibility,
nor even for immateriality before embarking on arguing for immortality.
We have seen that there was no common practice on this matter among
his contemporaries and that in fact only a few like John Blund and
Philip the Chancellor distinguished the two concepts. 8 Most identified
the two and we have in Aquinas enough indication that he also makes
no fundamental distinction between them. In passages where he argues
either for immateriaiity and for incorruptibility separately, it is first seen
that the points he calls to witness are also those he use for immortality,
and in other places, it is only with regard to spiritual substances that
incorruptibility is argued for, arguments which, as we have said, would
apply to the rational soul and to its immortality without any
modification.
Aquinas does not follow the practice of some of his predecessors in
ordering the arguments according to their power of conviction. In John
of La Rochelle one finds for the first time the grouping ofthe arguments
into what he calls ratione commune and ratione proprie, even _though
John does not indicate what lies behind the distinction, and which of the
groupings should be given pride of place in the attempt to prove
immortality. Odo Rigaldus groups his own arguments into those from
authority and those from reason. It was Albert the Great who makes the
most balanced weighing of the arguments for immortality, making a
fourfold categorization of the arguments.' We have also seen that there
is no effort by Albert to show the reasons behind his groupings,
especially the distinction between probable and necessary arguments.
However, latent in this practice is the acceptance that not all the
arguments used to prove immortality are of equal convincing power,
thus implicitly leaving room for critical questioning of even those he
regards as necessary arguments.

The arguments of Aquinas are outlined one alier the other, without
any indication that there is any preference whatever for any of them. It
is perhaps because he intended the cumulative effect of all the
arguments to constitute their convincing power, and not the perceived

force of any of them taken separately. This method is also found in his
immediate forebears, with the possible exception of Albert the Great.
Here, Aquinas. chooses to follow not the method of his master but other
thinkers of his epoch like William of Auvergne and John Blund. The
procedure he adopts here has occasioned two reactions among scholars
82
as regards the intention of Thomas with regard to the whole corpus of

the arguments for immortality.
The first of these reactions is to try to determine which of the
arguments are necessary for Aquinas and which are not. In the absence
of any objective guide on what should be the determinant factors
influencing the choice, one fmds discordant voices on the issue. J.-Y.
Jollif, for instance, asserts very correctly that one must try to bring the
particular argument into the general problematics that stand at their

origin," and which, we may add, can give them the real meaning and
explanation. He seems however to mean by this that the argument from
the desire for perpetual existence which Thomas regards as present in
every man should be brought Wlder the quest for being which only the
philosopher can attain. Even if this is true, there is no indication that
this was the intention of the angelic doctor, especially as Jollif seems to
have depreciated the proof which Thomas presented with the assertion
that there is no reason to give special consideration to the desire for
inunortality, nor to insist that this desire, more than any other htunan
desire, must be fulfilled. II While Jollif appears to redeem the argument

by bringing it rOWld to the question of being, G. St. Hilaire upholds the
argument from natural desire over and above all other arguments. He
divides the arguments of Aquinas into those which are deductive and
those which are inductive, and affirms that those who attempt
philosophical proof of immortality are bOWld to be stuck in a mesh
because there can be no ntiddle term which does not beg the question if
one proceeds deductively." However, the only argument which he
terms deductive is the argument from desire which, like Jollif, he brings
rOWld to the desire for the source of being" which is God." The proof
from the desire shows that Thomas was Wlshakably convinced about the
positive aspect of immortality as provable philosophically, as well as
the present insertion of the soul in immortality."
It is of course correct to say that Thomas sets a lot of store on the
common experience of the normal human being, and we have seen that
ultimately the strength of his proofs is meant to rest on this
consciousness, for all of them are ulthnately resoluble into human
experience without which there can be little or no proofs in human
affairs at all, except proofs that are a priori which do not in themselves
provide us with any fresh insight. However, st. Hilaire's disparagement
of the process of deduction is very tenuous. Aquinas goes from his
assertion of what one can learn from intuition, and proceeds from
deduction from these to conclusions about immortality. If St. Hilaires
takes such procedures as induction, then it can be said that there is no
83
argument in St. Thomas that is purely from deduction, in which case

there will be no need at all to foist the argument from desire as special.
But because he in fact does so, one can conclude that the meaning he
attaches to induction differs from what we have stated. In that case,
however, the onus will be on him to explain the purpose of other
arguments in which, according to his Wlderstanding, Aquinas was
clearly deductive. The basic problem is to hang on the proofs of
Aquinas a categorization, which the author himself does not indicate is
necessary, and which does not advance his purpose. While Aquinas'
proof should be read in their specific historical and philosophical
contexts, to try to advance their aim by bringing in extrinsic
distinctions, which Aquinas does not make, and which is not
Wlequivocally supported by his texts seems to compoWld the problems

inherent in the proofs.
The view of st. Hilaire discussed above is a reaction to J. F.
McCormick's interpretation of Aquinas' proofs consequent upon the
absence of gradation among them or any indications of preference for
some over and above the others. McCormick groups the issue of
immortality and that of the state of the separated soul in Aquinas among
questions that "are asked seriously because the questioner does not
know the answer." Using this as a principle, he asserts that "St. Thomas
does not attempt to prove the immortality of the soul."" McCormick

does not deny that Thomas asserts the future life of the separated soul.
The import of his statement is that in fact the arguments, which were
apparently enWlciated to prove immortality, were not intended to be
strict demonstrations. It would mean that while Thomas argues for
immortality, he is well aware that the fact of the question can only be
accepted on groWlds of faith. One would have expected to see some
reasons for this position which he himself regards as "challengeable,"
however the only support he provides for it is the observation that in the
Q.D. de anima, Thomas ends his question about immortality of the soul
by saying that the soul is therefore incorruptible. St. Hilaire adequately
replies to this view by pointing out that what is in fact incorruptible is
immortal, and that St. Thomas himself uses the two terms
incorruptibility and i.nu1Jortality interchangeably in other contexts. 16
Still it is surprising that the mere use of incorruptible in place of
immortal was enough to read a contrary intention into the clear efforts
of Thomas to defend immortality. on what for him were rational
groWlds: A more recent presentation of such a view is that made by B.
Davies, which we quote at some length:
84
Arguments/or Immortality
...people for Aquinas, are rational, lUlderstanding animals, and they are
what they are by virtue of what is not material. This aspect of people
must. he concludes, be capable of surviving the destruction of what is
material. He does not think we can prove that the soul of Fred must
survive Fred's death. In his view, whether or not Fred's soul survives
the death of Fred will depend on whether God wills to keep it in being.
and Aquinas does not think that we are in a position to prove that God
must do that. For him, therefore, there is no 'proof of the immortality of
the soul.' He holds that Fred's soul could, in principle, cease to exist at
any time. But he does not think that it is the sort of thing of which it
makes sense to say that it can perish as bodies can perish. 17
The above view dilutes the position of Aquinas so much as to make

it irreconcilable with his project of proving innnortality. There is no
evidence from Aquinas himself to support the position that he only held
that the soul is not the sort of thing that perishes, but that we have no
way of proving this. Again the question of innnortality in the whole of
the thirteenth century was posed side by side with the question of
whether God can annihilate the soul. The answer that was given to this
question by all the authors who considered it was based on the
omnipotence of God because of which he can in fact annihilate every
creature, including the angels. About this question, there is no dispute,
and it is in view of this that the question of immortality was posed in
terms of whether the soul is immortal by nature.
When Alexander Nequam, for example; considered the question he
asserted unequivocally that the soul is not absolutely simple, since such
simplicity in his view implies the eternity of being, thus true simplicity
cannot be found in things that do not have their being from eternity.
What is not really eternal, i.e., what has come from nonbeing into
being, can also pass from being back to nonbeing. If then the soul
receives its being in time from the highest being through creation, there
is the possibility that by the fiat of its creator, it can go from being to
nonbeing, which implies that it is innnortal. Stenuning from this
consideration, Nequam considers the objection that the soul is by nature
mortal, but receives immortality by grace from God. His reply to this
objection is that the soul is neither mortal nor corruptible, for there is no
property or power in it which can lead to death. Nevertheless, it can be
said that it can die in the sense that the word "can" implies possibility in
relation to God's power. But given that no power, which is inferior to
the Supreme Being, can lead to the death of the soul, it is said to be
innnortai. Nequam further says that when it is said that whatever has a
beginning can also slide to nonbeing, the statement is also in reference
85
to God's omnipotence. Again the possibility of passing from being to

nonbeing implies logical possibility: the intellect can conceive the soul
as not existing." William of Auvergne also considers the question of
what can possibly lead to the death of the soul, and affirms that only the
Creator can do so, but that this is not likely given that the continued
existence of the soul leads to the greater glory of God because of the
soul's ability to rise to a higher perfection, separated from the body. I'
The point here is that there is a clear distinction between the natural
immortality of the soul and the omnipotence of God, whose power to
annihilate any of his creatures is not put in .doubt by any thinker of the
thirteenth century. The fact of God's omnipotence is not enough to
interpret the argnments for immortality as if it is not certain whether the
soul will survive the body, or that its survival depends on the will of
God. The authors of the thirteenth century were convinced that it was in
accordance with the will of God that the soul should survive the death
of the body. Hence the question about immortality was whether the soul
was in fact by nature innnortal. Aquinas himself asks: Utrum anima
ra/ionalis secundum suam subs/an/iam sit incorruptibilis.2 Again, the
argnments from God'sjustice, which is found in many places, including
the texts written by Aquinas,21 indicate the certainty of the thinkers that
God in fact intended that the soul survives the death of the body, in
spite of his power to annihilate any being. It is quite clear that Aquinas
intended to prove the immortality of the rational soul by rational
argnment, and as J. Weisheipl writes:
For Thomas the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated
conclusively from its functions in this life; the natural philosopher, to
whom psychology pertains, can know the fact of immortality, even
though he cannot know much about the state of its separation from the
body."
The view that Thomas does not intend to prove innnortality may be
one of the results of his failure to grade the argnments, and to indicate
which are considered necessary, as Albert has done. However, this
should not be overemphasized. Even though there is much to be said
about the view that Thomas intended the convincing power of his proofs
to come through the cumulative influence of all the arguments, we can
decipher in the outline of the argnments for immortality, that he makes
selections from the store of proofs available, and that from one of his
writings to the other he changes the method used and drops some of the
argnments used previously. There is certainly more in this procedure
than meets the eyes. It shows in fact that he does not consider all the
86
arguments to be on the same level of acceptability even if he refrains

from saying so explicitly. Be that as it may, that he returns over and
over again to adumbrate proofs for immortality, and that he tries to
clarity in many places the type of immortality he intended to
demonstrate is enough reason not to discount his intention to prove
immortality by rational argumentation. The apparent weakness of some
of the arguments is no reason to impute intentions to him which he very
likely has not, nor to make distinctions among the arguments which he
does not make. Our effort here will therefore be concentrated on
reviewing all the arguments of Aquinas in order to ascertain at the same

time his intention, the origin of the argument in previous authors, the
special slant that he gives to them, the external and internal
circumstances surrounding their composition, in addition to their
relative strength and weakness. Given that many of the arguments are
repeated in several texts, our analysis with regard to their tenability or
otherwise will be left until the last appearance of the particular proof in
the whole corpus of Aquinas's arguments for immortality so far as our
study goes.
3.1 The Arguments

1. In tbe Scriptum super IIbros Sen/en/larum II
By the time Thomas Aquinas became a student in the University of

Paris, certain practices, which were introduced partly as a result of the
fast evolution of university studies in the thirteenth century, had become
commonplace. One of such was the practice of lecturing on Peter
Lombard's Book of Sentences for some years before inception in
theology." The details of the reason why this practice came to be
entrenched are not clear, but its origin is attributed to Alexander of
Hales from whom the practice spread, supplanting the earlier practice of
commenting on the Bible, a practice for which Roger Bacon accused
Hales of being responsible for what, in Bacon's view, was the decline of
theological learning in the thirteenth century." It is thus not surprising
that the first writings of most of the thinkers of the thirteenth century
who passed through the crucible of the new university education are to
be found in the form of commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.
Aquinas' own commentary was written between 1252 and 1256,
Though such works are usually called commentaries, they involve
elaboration of texts in the form of questions, and concomitant
87
discussions on various themes arising from or suggested by the book of

Peter Lombard. Thomas' commentary followed this form, and is marked
by the historical origin of the text. The passage on immortality clearly
indicates the early stage of his intellectual evolution. The encyclopaedic
mind of the angelic doctor is already manifest in the conunentary. 25
Most of the points raised in the arguments for immortality in thirteenth century scholasticism are present in this short text. But the manner of
their presence belies the youthful mind of the thinker. The points are
barely mentioned, and there is hardly any sustained effort to outline
proofs that are logical, ordered and consistent. It is also remarkable that
the work is a compendium of citations and references to classical
authors, which for Aquinas, are in support of the immortality of the
soul." Specifically, the text seems to be a sustained effort to use
isolated statements found in Aristotle in defence of immortality, a
method which he would drop almost completely when writing his last
texts on immortality.
The text found in the first article of the first question of Dis/inctio 19
begins with the usual presentation of possible objections to the
inunortality of the soul, then progresses to present some contrary
positions before going on to outline solutions to the problem under
discussion and answers to objections.

Seven objections against immortality are presented, most of which
are repeated in other texts where he argues for inunortality. It is
remarkable that in these objections, Thomas presents what, in his view,
are the strongest possible philosophical considerations against the
assertion of the immortality of the soul, even though here and there one
also finds interjections of scriptural quotations. The reply he brings to
the objections usually consists in assertions of positions already proven.
Otherwise, they are meant to point out some issues, the clarification of
which should take care of the misgivings of the supposed objector.
The first objection arises from the citation from the Ecclesiastes to
the effect that all is vanity because both men and beast have the same
fate, and hence no special state of inunortality should be reserved for
men over and above mere beasts. Another quotation from the same
book stating that human beings go back to their Creator is enough for
Thomas to take care of this possible objection, The second objection
brings him to face a philosophical problem. The point of objection here
is based on the mode of participation of beings in their conunon
characteristics. All individuals of the same genus share equally the
inferior perfections of that genus if they share its superior qualities. All
animals, for example, share in the characteristics of having a body or
88
The Philosophical Significance oj Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
being corporeal, because sharing in the higher quality of animality,

which involves much more than being body, they must also share in
corporeality. If then all animals also share the quality of being
corruptible because their form reverts to non-being, so should it be in
humans on the grounds of the fact that corruptibility is an inferior
feature of the genus of aoimality, and man, who participates in the
quality of being an animal, should have also a corruptible form.27 This
apparently strong point arises from the subsuming of the rational soul to
other natural phenomena. But for Aquinas, the soul is the only being in
nature that deserves a single exception: it is spared corruptibility. His
outline of the nature of the soul is like a preparation for the granting of
that exception, and to some point of that outline he turns to provide an
answer to the argument from the general trend in nature.
For Aquinas things cease to be because by their nature they are
amenable to non-being or corruption, and not because of what happens
to them, from outside. Such a statement appears to be contrary to our
experience, given that in the normal COlU'Se of events, we see trees fall
when they are cut by a chain saw. We see people die when they drown
in a river or when they are run over by a motor vehicle or when then are
shot by an assassin, and animals die when their throat is slit by human
beings. In his view, corruption is the transition from being to non-being
by that which in itself is fitted for corruption, in such a way that it can
be deprived of its being. This is possible because the being of such
composites derives from the conjunction or union of form and matter,
and the separation of the two leads directly to the. loss of the being
which they have by virtne of their composition. Thus whether forms
lose their being is dependent on what type of form we are talking about.
If there is a form which is non-dependent and possesses being as such, a
form in whose being matter participates, and which it helps to perfect, it
would follow that the destruction of the composite will result in the
destruction of this perfecting function, but such a form would retain the
being which appertains to it, irrespective of the composition in which it
2S
was found. This explanation is not linked directly to the soul, but it is
obvious that the previous outline of the nature of the soul as a subsistent
form is at issue. It is indeed on that conception of the soul that all his
texts on immortality are founded, as we shall see in the next objections
and his replies to them.
Aquinas insists very strongly against Plato and his followers on the
unity that exists between the soul and the body. Man is not his body,
and the composite of body and soul is seen as a hylemorphic
composition, which, according to the tradition of Aristotle, can only
89
produce one and only one being. A problem arises from the destiny of
this single being that is the result of the composition. If there is one
being, and corruption is understood as the change from being to nonbeing, one part of the composite cannot be corrupted without the other,
because the one being that has emerged is owed to the union of the two.
Ifthe soul is the form of the body, the corruption of the composite must
entail that of the soul. The fourth difficulty is an anticipation of a
possible answer to this objection." It could be said that the soul is form
and substance at the same time, and if the soul ceases to exist inasmuch
as it is a form, it does not do so in so far as it is a substance. However
such a soul can either be form essentially or by virtue of one of its
accidents. If it is essentially a form, and no one thing Can have a
plurality of essences, it follows that if the soul does not survive
inasmuch as it is a form, then its only essence is indeed corruptible. If,
on the other hand, it is supposed that the soul is form by one of its
accidents, then, given that it is the substantial union of soul and body
that makes a man, man will be being by accident, which, to all intents
and purposes is an absurd conclusion.
The basis of the response to the above problems is that the soul is a
different form from other material forms, and has being absolutely. As
to the disappearance of the being of the soul with that of the being of the
composite, the soul does not owe its being to the composite. Aquinas
refers to its operations which show its independence of the composiie,
while other forms, which perish with the death of the composite, have
no operation that is not mediated by matter. Here, one of the difficulties
of immortality is only broached: if human soul is immortal, why does
the soul of aoimals which is also immaterial die? It will be treated more
extensively in other works on immortality, but the unity of being which,
on theoretical grounds, and without reference to activities, seems to
support the mortality of the aoimal soul is raised against immortality.
The answer to the fourth difficulty is that the soul is not only a
substance, but also hoc aliquid, designations that apply only to the soul:
among all other forms. It is on this ground that two considerations are
relevant to it: first as a substance and then as a form. As a form it should
not be taken that the many qualities it possesses are divergent, and
independent, such that one thing is its essence and another its being as
form, as a colour would be in a body. It is not as form that the soul
survives the body, but because of its possession of absolute being and
being subsistent. Aquinas gives an example to explain his response: man
has understanding not because he is an aoimal, but because he is
90
rational, even though both rationality and animality are essential to his
being."
Thomas does not say here that the essence of the soul as form is
destroyed by the destruction of the body, nor does he also answer the
issue raised by the difficulty with regard to whether the soul, if
essentially fonn, loses its nature as fonn or continues to be fonn, even if
separated from the body. However, it is clear from several other
sections of his work that he still maintains that the soul remains a form
after separation, even though it does not vivify a body any more." Such
a position will be very useful later when he comes to reflect on the
resurrection. The '\Ilalogy with man being rational and animal at the
same time does not seem to be a suitable answer. What is at stake is
whether the soul, understood as essentially form, continues to exist if
this essence ceases to exist, since one being cannot have two essences at
the same time. A proper application of the analogy to the issue would be
to consider the status of man ifhe loses any of those properties, i.e., can
a human being remain human if he is no longer rational? The proper
answer to the objection is linked to the status of the soul after separation
and also to what is considered to be its natural endowment for future
resurrection, and these are points which are properly suited for the soul
alone, as special fonn, deserving special consideration.

The issue of the state of the soul post mortem is again touched on in
the answer to the sixth difficulty raised against the theory of
immortality. The difficulty is one that will be taken up again in other
forms and in pursuance of diverse themes. Here it is stated with support
from John Damascene that no substance can exist without its proper
operation, and since the proper operation of the soul is to understand, it
is impossible that the soul can continue to understand if indeed it cannot
understand without phantasms. If therefore understanding through
phantasms ceases, then the being of the soul must also cease. The
attempt to resolve this difficulty involves two distinctions in
understanding with something or without it. In the first instance, that
which is understood is a participant in the act of understanding. An
example is when the organ of visible power sees with the power of
sight. This is possible, according to Aquinas, because to see is not a
simple operation. In this regard, the intellect understands completely
without the body. The second distinction is that whereby what is seen is
the object of the operation of seeing, as the act of seeing cannot take
place without colour. In the second way, Our intellect cannot perform its
operation without phantasms so long as it is still in this earthly
existence. However, that the intellect cannot understand without
91
phantasm does not indicate any essential dependence on the body, given
that it has some operatim;s which flow from it in an absolute manner. As
to the question of a being not existing without its operation, Aquinas
answers that the soul will have another mode of understanding at
death."
The two remaining objections are linked with the question of the
origin of the soul. It is impossible that a being lasts forever if it did not
exist forever because that power which enables it not to cease to exist is
the same that makes it possible for it never to have ceased to exist. If
therefore the soul begins to exist with the body, it means that it has not
existed always and will also not last forever. The seventh objection
mentions the doctrine of creation explicitly. All that is from nothing can
also revert to nothing, and if the soul is created from nothing, it cannot
be incorruptible. That the soul did not start to exist from infinity is due
to the fact that its being is not from itself. If indeed the being of the soul
were from the soul, it would have beeri infinite in the sense outlined in
the objection. Thus for Aquinas, what the argument proves is no more
than that what has the power always to be, as long as it retains this
power cannot cease to exist. As regards the soul's reverting to non-being
whence it comes, he answers that it does not also prove more than that
the soul depends for its being on the principle from which it receives
this being in the first place, and in the absence of this inflow of being
from their origin, all beings will revert to non-being. It has already been
noted that this idea of the dependence of finite beings on their Creator is
found in most of the thinkers of the thirteenth century, and that it is not
a reason to suppose that Aquinas does not intend to prove immortality
from rational argumentation. In fact the raising of ser'lous objections and
the answers he tries to give to them, even though in ~ccordance with the
style of the time, can be an indication that the arguments outlined are
intended to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. The objections are
like the clearing of the ground, but we notice also that in them, he
makes references to many convictions in the name of which he argues
for immortality on rational grounds. Among these are especially his idea
about the nature of the soul and its activity in understanding. The rest of
what he wrote on immortality are contained in the rebuttals he used
prior to the solution which is usually intended to present the final
answers to the problem at issue but which in this case does not serve
that purpose. Like in what we have so far seen, Aquinas remains
tentative and haphazard in his presentation of the arguments.
It is in fact within the context of the rebuttal that he attempts to
present few of the clear independent arguments for immortality. Of the
92
four statements he presents, three are arguments for immortality, while

the remaining one is a reaffirmation of the doctrine that the soul is a
certain type of substance (subslantia quaedam), subsisting in itself and
that it is therefore incorruptible.
The first of the arguments is based on the statement of Aristotle in
Book Eight of the Nichomachean Elhics that the joy of contemplation is
much superior to that of activity because it lasts longer. Aquinas then
argues that joy that is derived from activity lasts till the end of this
present life. To last longer therefore, contemplative joy must remain
after this present life, and this joy cannot have any other subject but the
soul which therefore must survive longer than the duration of terrestrial
life. The second argument departs from a prior conception of God, and
his justice in governing the world. It asserts that it is part of a provident
God that he should care for all that occurs in the world, but in an
eminent way this care should be extended to human beings, and other
beings which resemble God, among which the human being stands first.
It would be unjust, the argument goes, for any provider and ruler not to
provide means of punishing evil and rewarding the good. Since it is not
possible to think of God as being unjust, he must punish all evil and
reward every good, a situation which is not realized in this life where
often the good get punished and the bad get rewarded. There must
therefore be another life where the bad are punished and the good
rewarded. The final proof goes to the act of the soul in knowing. The
soul, as Aristotle says, is the place of species, and it follows from this
that the soul must conserve intellectual species only. Just as the senses
apprehend sensible species, the intellect must also understand only
through intelligibles. For Aquinas, this is in itself an indication of the
intellect's ability to understand without recourse to anything from the
body, and this shows that it can also exist without the body in
accordance with Aristotle who said in the De anima that if indeed the
soul has operations independent of the body, it shows that it can also
exist without the body."
It is only in the II Senlenliarum that Aquinas uses the statement on
contemplation and the supposition of the justice of God in support of
immortality. However, these two proofs appear to have simply been
picked out of the statements of his forebears on immortality without
much modification or review of their strength. The point from
contemplation can be traced back to Alexander of Hales who used the
nature of contemplation to argue for inunortality. Alexander combined
st. Victor's definition of contemplation as liber animi in Deum
defix"," and the idea of St. Augustine to the effect that the last stage of
Arguments for Immortality,
93
contemplation is the stage at which the soul is in union with God, in

which it is apud Deum el in Deo." To be able to reach this stage, the
intellect, according to Alexander, must be free from the type of
corruption that bedevils the body." The version of Aquinas, of course,
departs from the statement of Aristotle instead of Augustine, which can
be seen as an indication, faint as it may be, of the height of the influence
or the preference for Aristotle at the time. Still the two presentations of
the arguments are founded on the same premise: that for the soul to
attain the joy of contemplation, it must be in a state in which it can live
without the body, and ifit must do so, it must at least survive the body.
That, however, is as far as it goes; there is no convincing reason to think
that the soul which reaches the state of contemplation by surviving the
body must be inunortal, for the enjoyment of contemplation is logically
compatible with the future demise of the soul after the experience of
such joy. It is conceivable that Aquinas would argue that once any being
has reached that state, it would in fact be difficult to conjecture any
reason why it should again lose its being. He did not do so, however,
and it is also safe to suppose that the argument is meant to be taken
together with those in which inunortality is argued for by appealing to
the nature of the soul itself, not just by pointing out the logical
implications of the words of Aristotle.
The above doubt about what the argument from contemplation can
prove applies wholly to that from justice of God. Unlike the argument
from contemplation, however, which is found in rare sources as
Alexander of Hales, the one from justice has enjoyed a long life coming
alive again in Kant who, after rejecting any proof for immortality in his
Critique of Pure Reason, accepted it as a postulate of practical reason.
Before Kant and Aquinas, the argument from God' s justice has been
used by Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales,"
among others. William of Auvergne took the argument further by
considering it among the theological" arguments, which for him are
stronger than the ones he regarded as the arguments of reason. Thomas
does not seem to have viewed this argument from God's justice as less
philosophical than theological as William of Auvergne. But the
unquestioned presuppositions of the arguments seem to make it a
natural candidate for Auvergne's grouping, if Aquinas had cared at all
for such distinction in his defence of immortality. Among these
suppositions are the idea of God who must be providential, whose
providence must care in a special way for man, to whom man is more
similar than any other worldly creature; and God who must reward and
punish because there cannot be injustice in him. Though there is no
" i
94
reason why any of these presuppositions should not be a topic for

philosophical investigation, taking their results for granted is not in
consonance with time-honoured philosophical methodology.
What Aquinas presents in the solutio is what he takes to be the four
possible positions before the question of immortality: the positions of
natural philosophers; of Pythagorians and Platonists; that of those who
defend the unicity of the intellect; and the position of the Christian faith.
Aocient natural philosophers, according to Aquinas, failed to make any
distinction between the sense and the intellect. Because the senses
depend on the body for their existence, they assumed that the intellect
must be so too. To counter this view, Aquinas made references to
Aristotle and Liber de Causis to buttress the position that the soul has
being on its own absolutely because it has an operation in which it does
not depend on any bodily organ. This assertion is proved by three
points. First the intellectual operation in question has to do with the
apprehension of all corporeal forms. The nature of the soul must
therefore be free from all such forms if it is to be able to apprehend
them. Second understanding has only to do with the universal, while
only individual forms can be received in corporeal organs. Again the
intellect understands itself, which is not possible in faculties which
operate through bodily organs. 39
Let us here examine the import of the third point in favour of the
absolute possession of being by the rational soul. To support the
absence of organ in self-understanding, Aquinas refers to Avicenna's
view that with reference to any power operating through a corporeal
organ, the organ through which it operates must be a medium between
the power and its object. The power of sight, for instance, cannot
perceive anything if the species of the object of perception does not fall
on the pupils of the eye. Since it is not possible for this to be otherwise
with faculties involving physical organs, no faculty operating with
physical organs can know itself. What this is intended to show is that
the soul does not have operations through a corporeal organ, and if so, it
must be spiritual and does not die with the death of the body.40 The
principle of self-understanding was mentioned briefly by Aristotle, and
was subsequently used by Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great in
defence of immortality. The argument is fraught with problems.
Aristotle did not explain how, according to his epistemology, the
intellect comes to know itself. Philip the Chancellor faced the problem
before Aquinas even though unlike Aquinas, he used the argument in
conjunction with the perception of the universal by the intellect.
95
Philip first asserts that the nature of the object of intellectual

knowledge is such that it must be abstracted from all accretions to
matter. However self-intellection cannot be the result of the process of
abstraction. If Socrates understands himself that does not mean that he
understands himself by understanding the. universal man, which is the
product of intellectual abstraction. This is because self-understanding
involves the apprehension of something that is personal, something that
cannot be grasped through the universal idea of man. That the universal
is not meant is also shown, according to Philip, by the process of
knowledge by which what is known as universal is first of all
apprehended by the sensitive and the imaginative faculties. The intellect
cannot apprehend itselflike a material object. Philip concludes that the
intellect must therefore understand itself as a separate, individual and
immortal substance.'l It is remarkable that Albert groups the
demonstration not even among the probable arguments, but among the
signa of immortality, and the reason is perhaps due to a perception of
the difficulties involved. His approach to the argument is also peculiar.
Albert states that no corporeal organ apprehends itself and its
instrument. He attempts to prove this by induction. By induction we can
be clear that the exterior and interior senses do not perceive themselves,
because their perception is made possible only by impression made on
the organ of the body. Because it is impossible for these senses to be the
origin of impression made on them, they cannot perceive themselves.
On the other hand, the intellect and other powers of the rational soul
have the capacity to understand each other, and this makes it quite
obvious that the powers of the rational soul cannot be corporeal."
Aquinas does not consider the difficulties involved in the
employment of the intellecfs self-understanding in connection with the
arguments for immortality, nor does he use it as a mere sign as Albert
did. But in other passages such as the Summa theologiae he gives
adequate thought to the issues involved in self-knowledge, even though
he does not completely succeed in avoiding the problem in which the
Chancellor found himself. Self-knowledge for Aquinas cannot mean
that the soul knows itself as pure essence. The soul's knowledge of
itself, at least in so far as it is united with the body, does not absolve it
from the general epistemological requirement of knowing by abstraction
from material things. 43 Even the knowledge of God is derived oniy
through this means. 44 Aquinas therefore sticks to hls logic by affirming
that the intellect is the object of its own cognitive activity only in so far
as it is actualized by species abstracted from material things by the usual
96
function of the agent intenect. It is thus through the mediation of its own
acts that the intellect knows itself.
None is left in doubt that, like Aristotle, Aquinas insists on the
material, sensory origin of all human knowledge. We cannot have a
direct knowledge of pure essence, even if it is the essence of our own
intellect. It is by the actualization of the cognitive ability of the intellect
that we come to know, as it were, by a sort of inference from the very
act of the intellect. Thus we cannot know whether we can argue or
judge, unless we in fact enga~e in these acts. It means that our selfknowledge cannot be direct. 4 The manifestation of intellectual acts
involves the reference of these act to and use of objects of knowledge
which are all originally sensible. It is therefore correct to say that the
first thing that the intellect knows is a particular object, then it comes to
know the activity by which the object is known. Through this activity
the intenect knows itself through thinking, which is its proper
function. 46
There is the possibility of infinite regress in such a recurring process
of knowing through activity, and knowing that one knows through
knowing and so on," but the more serious problem is the status of such
knowledge because the proof of inunortality is based on it. Given that
the proper object of the intenect is the universal, is the intellect's selfknowledge universal or particular? Philip has rightly pointed out that
Socrates' knowledge of himself cannot be the same as the universal
knowledge of humanity. If this knowledge is to be of the individual self,
it is necessary that it is not altogether devoid of phantasm, otherwise
there is the problem of making it a particular knowledge of the intellect.
For Philip the Chancellor, such knowledge must be of the individual as
separate and immortal substance, but the question of what role
phantasms play is not addressed It could be argued that what is meant
by self-knowledge can be reduced to a certain type of awareness or
introspection of the act of knowing. But this does not seem to be enough
in this context for the effect that self-intellection is intended to achieve.
Again the analogy Aquinas makes with faculties using material organs
does not indicate that he does not mean real, direct knowledge of the
intellect of itself. It is indeed because he presents the intellect as in
some way focusing on itself that the example of physical organs makes
sense. It seems then that the type of particular knowledge the intellect
has of itself will require the presence of individuating phantasms, since
the soul does not know its essence, and its self-knowledge cannot be
universal knowledge of man. It is possible also to say that the essence of
the soul is spiritual, and inunaterial, and thus its direct knowledge is in
97
some way akin to knowledge of the universal in the sense of not

requiring the mediation of phantasm. However, the spirituality and
immateriality of the soul are what the argument from self-knowledge is
intended to prove.
The two other positions on the question of immortality are barely
mentioned by Aquinas. What he calls the position of the Platonists and
the Pythagoreans is the transmigration of the soul at death from one
body to another. In his view fonns are detennined to their matter, and
thus a particular soul cannot be the form of any other body except its
own. This view is of important consequence' on account of the doctrine
of the resurrection of the body which Aquinas links very tightly with his
theory of immortality. The particular body that will be resurrected will
be the one the soul had served as form, and only which it is in fact fitted
to be in. The third position, advanced by those who taught the unity of
the human intellect, holds that the soul is partly mortal and partly
immortal. Those aspects of the soul which properly belong to the
particular human being, and only which are immersed in matter, do not
survive the corruption of the body. The actual intellect, the possible and
the agent are unique in all human beings, and at the corruption of the
individual body, these continue to exist. The type of inunortality
accepted by this position is collective inunortality, which Aquinas
vehemently argues against throughout his writings. The constant
reference to this position shows that what is important to him is not just
any type of inunortality, but one that is personal, and makes individual
responsibility defensible. Even though he argues against it mostly with
rational considerations, there is little doubt that morality and religious
faith are also very much at play here. As we have hinted, Aquinas does
not hide the fact that the question of inunortality has serious
implications for the Christian faith, and that in fact that is one reason
why he defends the doctrine so strongly. The last position which he
outlines shows this clearly. It is the affirmation of a point of view,
joined with rebuttals of other contrary views." The intellective soul is a
substance not dependent on the body (against materialists), and there
are many such substances in accordance with the numerality of bodies
(against unicists); when the body is destroyed, it remains separated, and
does not transmigrate to other bodies (against Pythagoreans), and at the
resurrection, it asswnes the same body which it had served as fonn.
98
2. In the Summa Contra Gentiles

If Aquinas is clear about the religious intention of his project of
providing rational proofs for immortality in other works, the
circumstances under which the Contra gentiles was written makes that
intention even clearer. The monumental work is said to have arisen from
the order of Raymond of Penafort, the then master general of the order
of preachers, to st. Thomas to write a work against the errors of infidels
for members of the order who were engaged in ntissionary work against
Moslems, Jews and heretical Chtistians in Spain and North Africa. The
actual date of the composition is disputed, and in any case the work
must have taken quite some time to complete. It is said to have been
started around 1258, but Book Two, in which Aquinas discussed
49
creation, is believed to have been written around 1261. The origin of
the work has been cited as a reason why the Contra gentiles contains
many arguments for inunortality. The intention is that Chtistian
ntissionaries who were engaged in intellectual disputations could have a
source from which to draw against their opponents. so
. This background also has an influence in the structure of the work.
Its central argument, just as in many other works of Aquinas, is that
Chtistianity is in full accord with human reason, and consequently also
in full accord with right philosophy which does not deviate from the
natural light of reason. It is thus a call to reason to explore its
potentialities so as to arrive at its natural end, which is the revelation,
found in Christianity. This theoretical background must have had an
influence on the general ordering of themes in the Contra genliles.
While the Summa theologiae first takes up the Trinity, then the
incarnation, and sandwiches man between these two poles, the Contra
gentiles first discusses God, creation and man: aspects of the faith that
are open to the investigation of philosophy. The doctrines of the Trinity
and the incarnation are Ireated in the last book of the compendium. 51
The second book begins with a discussion of creation, and quickly
establishes that multiplicity of being is in accordance with the perfection
of creation, which must possess the good of order. The good of order
entails the necessity of having immaterial, spiritual creatures, which are

nearer to God in the scale of being, and possessing more than other
lower creatures, the reflection of the being of God." Such spiritual
beings must be immaterial and incorruptible. 53 Aquinas then goes on to
establish the reality and the mode of the union of some spiritual
creatures with matter. The rest of the book is on the outcome of this
union, the composite that is the human being.
99
The importance of the theme of immortality in tile whole of the

Contra gentiles has been emphasized. "The theme which, more than any
other, is the focal point in the mutual influence between Chtistianity and
Aristotelianism in the SCG," says Pegis, "is the doctrine of the

inunortaJity of the soul."" Aquinas argues for inunortality directly in
chapters 79 to 81 of the work. However, these chapters do not represent
all that he says on the subject. In fact from the moment he comes down
to deal with the type of spiritual substances that are naturally united to
the body, it can be said that the constant underlying theme was
immortality. Hence the length of the text on immortality, even though
more than what he wrote in other places does not exhaust his concern
for inunortaJity in the Contra gentiles.
When therefore Aquinas comes to argue for immortality he makes
direct references to the arguments for the incorruptibility of spiritual
creatures, saying that since the soul is a spiritual creature, it must be

incorruptible like all other spiritual creatures." This means that the
arguments used to prove the incorruptibility of spiritual creatures should
also apply to the rational soul, even if not primarily so. Most of these
arguments are in tum supported by the preceding proofs that the
intellectual substances are not bodies, are inunaterial and are not
material forms (cf. chapters. 49 - 51). st. Thomas constantly makes
direct references to these. One such proof of incorruptibility of
intellectual substance is based on a prior argument that intellectual
substances are subsisting forms. It states that a quality that belongs to a
thing through itself remains in it inseparably. Theroundness in a circle
and in a coin is a good example. Because roundness does not belong to
a coin by nature, but by accident, it is possible to think of a coin that is
not round. That is not so with the circle, which must be round if it is to
be a circle at all. The presence of being is due to the presence of form
on account of the nature of the form itself. Things which are not form
may lose their forms, but this would not be so with substances which are
forms themselves. Given that intellectual substances are subsisting
beings, they cannot lose their form or their essence, and hence are
incorruptible."
Another proof of incorruptibility is an adaptation of one of
Avicenna's proofs ofinunortality in his De anima." It is founded on the
absence of matter in intellectual substance. Anything which is
corruptible has a potentiality to non-being. The intellectual substance
has no potentiality to non-being, for in it the complete substance is the
recipient of being. That means that it is wholly being. Aquinas then
states that the proper recipient of any act is related to the act in the form
100
of potentiality, such that it cannot be in potentiality to the opposite of

the act it receives. Fire is given as an example, and fire is so related to
heat that naturally it cannot be in potentiality to coldness, which is the
opposite of heat. Given that the spiritual substance does not contain
matter in any way, its whole substance cannot have any potentiality to
non-being, for even in corruptible substances, it is from matter that the
propensity towards reversion to non-being arises. 58
Though Aquinas professes to be arguing for the incorruptibility of
intellectual substances in general, some of the points he raises can only
be applicable to the human soul. For instance, the argument from the
desire for perpetual existence can only reasonably apply to the human
being besieged by the factor of death, and in any case, whether such a
desire exists in angels or not is what a human being has no way of
knowing. ,Another such consideration is the contention that the sense
powers are destroyed by the excesses of their object of perception, like
sight being destroyed by excess of light. But on the contrary, the
intellectual power is made all the more capable of understanding the
more it understands. How this can serve as a proof of incorruptibility is
not clear, and the argument simply glides to the conclusion that the
intellectual substance must therefore be incorruptible. It is clear that
such considerations have relevance only in reference to the human soul.
That they are used for inunaterial substances in general confmns our
contention that Aquinas' texts on intellectual substances in this part of
the Contra gentiles has the rational soul as its point of arrival.
More arguments are then advanced in favour of the inunortality of
the rational soul specifically. Of these some are those already given in
the text on incorruptibility, like the question of the natural appetite in
man for endless existence, and that of prime matter being incorruptible.
Others are used only for inunortality, as the case of the twice-repeated
arguments from the mode of knowledge of the intellect in which it
knows only universals abstracted from matter, and the reinvigoration of
intellectual power through the weakness of the body. Of these, let us
concentrate for a while on arguments which are not present in the works
we shall treat in the rest of this chapter.
Aquinas begins one proof of immortality by citing the principle that
nothing is corrupted with regard to that in which its perfection consists.
The reason is that change directed to perfection and that directed to
decay are contraries since they work in opposite directions of being.
The middle of the argument is then drawn from what is supposed to be
the experience of the soul the perfection of which consists in a kind of
abstraction from the body. Abstraction from the body is made concrete
101
in the perfection of the soul through knowledge and virtue. This

perfection progresses in proportion to the degree the soul considers
immaterial things in knowledge, and also withdraws itself in the
acquisition of the virtues by the control or moderation of the human
passion through reason. If then the soul progresses in perfection in this
lintited withdrawal from the body, then complete separation cannot lead
to its destruction. 59 The argwnent here is very much close to another
attempt to prove immortality by the observation that the soul is not
weakened by the weakness of the body, and must therefore not die with
the death of the body.60 In this second argument, Aquinas contends that
in instances where it appears that the soul is weakened through a
weakness affecting the body, this occurs only accidentally so long as the
specific power of the soul operates with a corporeal organ. An
observation much according to him confirms this ophtion is that if the
organ affected by debility is restored, then the power returns in
operation. As Aristotle said, if indeed an old man is given the eyes of a
young person, he will see as much as the young person can see. For
Aquinas, the reason for this is that the intellect is a power that needs no
physical organ to operate, and it does not weaken at all; not by itself,
and not by old age. In cases where the intellect is known to get weak on
account of any infirntity, he states that this must be on account of the
weakness of other powers that the intellect needs, powers like
imagination and memory. The same conclusion must therefore be
drawn, i.e. that complete separation from the body will not lead to the
corruption of the soul.
The view that the soul remains unscathed in case of the debility of
the body is a very Platonic understanding of the soul, but it came to be
widely used as a point for immortality with Gundissalinus' De
immortalitate animae. Viewed against the background of
Gundissalinus, Aquinas' employment of this argument moves at least a
step further, given that Aquinas does not go as far as saying that the
weakness of the body is a condition for the strengthening of the soul.
Gundissalinus argues first, like Aquinas, that the operation of the
intellect is hindered by the body, and that a clear indication of this is
that the more the soul is enmeshed in the body, the more its powers are
weakened, while distancing from the body enhances its activities, and
frees it from error. Gundissalinus goes further to argue that if indeed the
intellect were to be essentially dependent on the body, the intellectual
powers would be stronger when the body is invigorated and weaker
when the body is debilitated. This is contrary to experience, since in the
old, the body grows weaker mule the intellect develops in the opposite
102
direction. Such a trend in the growth of the intellect is contrary to

mortality, since all that is mortal experiences diminishing vitality till it
reaches its end, which is death.'! The activities of the soul in the state of
ecstasy and prophecy are supportive of this argument. For
Gundissalinus, and in line with Avicenna," prophecy is the highest
activity of the soul while in the body, and it is observable that such an
operation in which man is disposed to receive direct revelation from
above does not take place except in the condition of extreme weakness
of the body.
Given Aquinas' strong view about the urdty of the soul and body,
such an argument would appear incongruous, unless it is kept in mind
that he veers very much in the direction of Platonism in the attempt to
defend inunortality. To start with, the perfection of a being is its act,
according to Aristotelian metaphysics, which Aquinas consistently
defends. Just as knowing perfects the intellect, the senses are perfected
by sensing, since it is their nature to sense. After saying that the excess
of their object destroys the senses, it seems incongruous to use the
principle that nothing is cOll1lpted with regard to that in which its
perfection consists. Again, to foist knowledge as an abstraction from the
body appears to overturn the whole epistemology in which the senses
are indispensable for any knowledge. It is perhaps because of the
awareness of this implication that he qualifies the abstraction
(abstractione quaedam a corpore). Of course, it is safe to say in favour
of Aquinss that by knowledge here he means the higher level of
thinking in which the intellect does not need the body's assistance any
more, but given that, according to his anthropology, the body is. there
for the sake of the soul, the perfection of which is the reason for the
urdon, the argument seems to go back on its opening principle that
nothing is destroyed by that in which its perfection consists, for the
body plays a very vital role in knowledge, which perfects the soul.
However to say that withdrawal from the body perfects the soul is to
entail that its urdon with it is a disservice to the soul in the first place.
Another comment on the two arguments is that the physiology
whereby the old man would see as much as the young if indeed he
receives the eyes of the young tends to support the position that sight is
a thing which belongs to the organ of sight, and not something lent to it
by the soul. It is perhaps possible in the future with scientific
development to transplant an eye that will make it possible for a
completely blind person to see clearly again, but scientific development
is yet to reach that stage. But supposing it does, it is not for that reason
that it should be concluded that sight is just a power inherent in the soul,
103
which becomes activated with the appropriate organ. Before such a

development is arrived at however, the contention of Aristotle would
remain a supposition only. The same goes for the contention that the
intellect in the old weakens because of the weakness of other powers.
That would mean that intellectual powers remain intact, undiminished
even when it is obvious that very often there is debility of intellectual
powers with old age. Given that Aquinas bases his philosophy very
much on human experience, such a conclusion as the perpetual
invigoration of the intellect would have to depend on prior proof that
the obvious weakening of the intellectual powers with old age is only
due to the weakening of other inferior powers (like the memory,
imagination and the cognitive power), which are corporeal.
The next argument departs from a comparison of the rational soul
with prime matter. Aquinas uses such a comparison both in the prooffor
incorruptibility and that of inunortality with slight variations. We have
already seen that the argument from analogy with prime matter is found
in Philip the Chancellor and Joim of La Rochelle," even though it was
only the latter who used it as a proof of immortality. The first
employment of the comparison is in the context of the principle that in
whatever that is composed of potentiality and actuality that which
stands as the first subject is indestructible. That is why prime matter,
which, in relation to all corruptible material subst!1l\ces is in the position
of first potentiality, is incorruptible. When we come to intellectual
substances, the subject of the first potentiality does not differ from the
substance itself. Given this identity, what is incorruptible in intellectual
substances, or that which satisfies the incorruptibility of the subject of
the first potentiality is the whole substance, which must therefore be
incorruptible. The presupposition is that the soul is spiritual and
inunaterial, and would thus lack the first subject of potentiality, which is
to remain forever. It is practically the same argument, which is found in
John Blund64 when he states that death is change, and in change there
must be a substratum, which remains after the change has taken place. If
the soul dies, being spiritual, there will be no substratum which will
serve as the subject of the motion of change.
Next, Aquinas argues from the durability of intellectual being over
and above the sensible. Even though the intelligible lasts longer than the
sensible, prime matter, which is the first potentiality in the sensible, is
incorruptible with reference to its substance. All the more so will be the
possible intellect which receives intelligible forms. Being a part of the
soul, the soul itself must also be inunortal. 65 Here Aquinas draws very
close to the argument of John of La Rochelle, who claimed that because
104
the lowest among material nature, prime matter, is incorruptible, the

highest fonn in nature, which for him is its opposite, must also be
immortal. The difference Thomas brings in here is the metaphysical
explanation of prime matter as the first recipient of the act of sensible
being. It is not clear however whether it is intended in the passage that
the receptivity of the possible intellect should be correlated to the
receptivity of prime matter. If it is so, there is an incongruity arising

from the fact that the receptivity of prime matter is what constitutes a
material being into real existence, while the receptivity of the possible
intellect is more the perfection of something which already has an act of
existence. In fact the comparison of prime matter with human intellect

does not seem to be very appropriate given that prime matter has no real
existence. It is only the result of the operation of the mind conceiving
matter without the fonn of any kind. Prime matter is of course
conceptually real, but to talk of such a conceptual reality does not seem
to be without some real problems.
The next argument departs from another hypostatization: intelligibles
in act are incorruptible. Thus intelligibles are taken as though they are
real substances in nature, which can remain forever on their own. This
view is the unexpressed presupposition in all instances in which
Aquinas uses the presence of universal in the mind to argue for
immortality. He says that the maker is superior to the made, given that
the intelligible in act is incorruptible and the agent intellect actualizes
such intelligibles, all the more : _.orruptible will the agent intellect be.
Being immortal and part of the soul, the soul must also be inunortal."
Very unusually, Aquinas deals with possible objections to the
arguments for inunortality after he bas presented his arguments, a
procedure that is found only in the Contra gentiles. He uses the
opportunity to raise certain important points and to present some
clarification in respect of the question of inunortality. One of such is
again the question of what type of activity a soul, which has lost its
body, can perfonn. Here he delves into a long explanation ofthe state of
the rational soul after separation, which is essentially the same as what
he has already said in the II Sententtarum, and which we shall discuss
more fully in the next chapter. There are other objection with obvious
answers: the one based on the eternity of the world, a doctrine which is
not acceptable to Aquinas, and another which supposes that if the soul is
indeed able to live without the body, it would mean that its union with
the body is accidental to it, and thus man is human only by accident.
Two related objections from the principle of individuation merit our
consideration here. First if the numerality of souls accords with that of
105
the body, then if it is supposed that bodies are separated from souls at
death, either all the souls die or only one of them remains. The reason
for this objection is that if multiplicity and individuation is in fact due to
matter, then the absence of this principle of multiplicity will entail that
human souls will merge into one being, since' they have one essence.
Credence would then be given either to Alexander of Aphrodisias (who
says that a single agent intellect survives the body) or to the disciples of
Averroes. for whom what survives the body is the unitary possible
intellect. The answer that Aquinas gives to this possible difficulty is that
the soul is not dependent for its being on the body, and so, even though
the soul is multiple in accordance with the multiplicity of the body, it is
not the body that is the cause of this multiplicity. The principle in which
he anchors this response is that things that must be proportioned and
adapted to one another must derive their multiplicity or unity each from
its own cause. If it is supposed that one of these is dependent on another
for its being, then its multiplicity or otherwise must also depend on the
thing that is its cause. If not, it must depend on something else. This
does not however obviate the matching of matter to fonn, for, according
to Aqninas, the proper act (fonn) is produced for its proper matter, and
therefore matter and fonn have to accord with one another with regard
to multiplicity and unity. It follows that if the being of the fonn is bound
up with matter, its multiplicity or unity will also depend completely on
matter. If however a fonn is independent of matter, even though it has
to be multiplied or united in accordance with its matter, it is not on
matter that this unity or multiplicity is based. Aquinas is here calling for
a mental conception in which the soul is viewed as existing apart from
the matter, full in its life, but has the necessity of being proportioned
and adapted to matter. Because such a soul has prior existence, nothing
essential to it is due to its matter. Still because it must be in proportion
to matter, to a particular matter that is its body, it must be multiplied to
realize this fundamental aspect of its nature." It means in effect that
multiplicity in the soul is due to the substance of the soul, not to its
union with the body. All problems are not thereby satisfactorily
resolved, as another objection shows.
The objector insists that to the fonnal principle is owed the diversity
of species." If, however, it is supposed that souls remain multiple after
separation from the body, they must be divergent one from the other. In
souls that are separated, the only possible cause of diversity is the fonn,
given that in the soul, there is no composition of matter and fonn. For
souls to be diverse without matter of any kind means in effect that they
belong to different species after separation from the body. This
106
supposition is Wltenable, since to change from one determinate species

to another involves corruption of the original being. To suppose the
specific diversity of souls at separation, one must thus also agree that
even before death, individual human beings were members of different
species. This impossibility makes it untenable that the soul survives the
death of the body.
Avicenna has had to face the above problem before Aquinas in the
context of the issue of the pre-existence of the soul. The Persian
philosopher held that there is no pre-existence of the soul before its
union with the body (anima non foit prius existens per se et deinde
venerit in corpus). His reason for this position is related to the point of
our objector: human souls have exactly the same essence. If one
supposes that souls existed before being united to the body, it would be
impossible to have a multiplicity of souls, since they would lack the
elements that make them multiple. For Avicenna, the elements that can
constitute multiplicity in souls can either be their essence or their
relation with matter, and the causes, which detennine their material
existence. Between souls, there is no essential difference, and therefore
the difference between them must be looked for in the particular body to
which each soul becomes attached. This theory entails that if the soul
were to be without the body, there could not be a multiplicity of souls,
as they could not be differentiated by pure essence. Furthermore, it is
not possible that there is only one soul, for in that case, the rest of the
souls will be parts of the one soul, and then what has neither weight nor
magnitude would be potentially divisible, or two bodies would be
sharing one soul, which is an impossible alternative. For him, therefore,
the only reasonable option left is to say that the soul comes into
existence when a body suitable for its use as an instrument also comes
into existence. 69 Such a soul has a natural yearning for the body, and it
is this yearning (affeetio) that binds it to its particular body. This
process of particularization or individuation which arises form the
affeetio of the soul for the body and from its experience in the body is
irreversible,70 even after the death of the body.
The major difference between Aquinas and Avicenna on this issue is
that for Aquinas, it is not the body that is responsible for the distinction
between souls. There is of course an adaptation of this soul to this
particular body, and this continues even alier the separation of the soul
from the body. But such an adaptation or detemtination is not owed to
the body. Souls are, in their substances, forms of the body, and so their
union is not accidental. For him, this view is backed by the realization
that it is not every diversity with regard to forms constituting a species
that leads to diversity with regard to that species. Different fires

different forms, but they belong to the same species of fire.
107
hal
3. In the Questlones quodlibetales

The amplitude of the texts on immortality in the Contra gentiles is in
sharp contrast with the few words one finds on the same theme in other
works, even in the pivotal Summa theologiae. But in most of Aquinas'
works, the chapters that precede and follow the very text on immortality
are like preparations for the defence of the doctrine. That is not the case
in the Questiones quodlibetales. This must be due to the nature of the
treatise, which is made up of discussions on any subject usually held
during Advent and Lent, for which reason they are also called Christmas
and Easter sermons." Aquinas' Quodlibetales are traditionally divided
into two groups. The earlier group comprises numbers 7 - II, while I 6 belong to the later group. The first group belongs to the first regency
of Aquinas at Paris. Number ten is said to have been delivered at
Christmas in 1258.
The doctrine of inunortality is discussed in question 3 of the tenth
Quodlibet. The text appears to be almost a sununary of what was
presented on inunortality in the II Sententiarum, especially the section
on objections where the four objections in the earlier work are repeated.
Again in the sed contra he repeats the argrunent from contemplation in
the II Sententiarum. There is no extensive inquiry into the nature of the
soul before arguing for its inunortality. The whole discussion on the
soul is divided into issues relating to its nature, then those relating to
grace, to sin and to glorification. Immortality is treated with the issue of
whether the soul is identical with its powers under the section devoted
to the nature of the soul. This, once again, confirms that Aquinas' ahn in
all his writings on inunortality is to show that in accordance with the
essence of the soul, it remains immortal in the midst of all other natural
creatures.
With regard to the-response to the question of inunortality, there is a
marked difference from the procedure of the II Sententiarum. Instead of
merely outlining possible positions on the issue of inunortality and
dismissing them with statements intended to contradict them, Aquinas
goes straight to present points in favour of immortality, even though
these points are, on close reading, also in line with the II Sententiarum.
He first takes up the factor of corruption, and states that whatever is
corrupted is so either by accident or in itself. The latter possibility can
only take place if the being in question is composed of matter and form
108
which have contraries, and this is in tum possible on the supposition

that the being is either an element or is- composed of elements, a
position which the ancient philosophers of nature held, and which
Aquinas has already argued against. Accidental corruption would occur
if the thing in question has no being in itself but has being in union with
another thing. Here he gives the example of material forms, which, in
his view, have no being on their own, except the being of the subsisting
composite. The being of such forms corrupts accidentally with the
corruption of the being of the composite in which the forms are found.
For Aquinas this cannot be said of the rational soul."
As to why the latter type of corruption can apply to material forms
but not to the soul, Aquinas delves into his familiar point that nothing
that has no operation of its own can have a being on its own. Other
types of forms do not operate. It is only the things that are composed
that in fact have operative powers. The soul, on the other hand, has
operations on its own, like understanding, in which no physical organ
mediates. From here he goes further to show that the soul must be free
of contraries from matter, and that it must not operate through an organ.
It is not possible, Aquinas says, that the soul can know all sensible
forms unless it lacks these forms, or unless it is in potency with regard
to all things. If therefore the soul understands through an organ, such an
organ must lack all sensible forms since all sensible forms, are by nature
meant for understanding. A verification of this principle is such a
corporeal organ as the pupil of the eye, which lacks all colours in order
to apprehend all colours. Given that it is impossible to have a corporeal
organ lacking all sensible forms, Aquinas concludes that the soul must
not have such an organ, and must be inunaterial and incorruptible."
All that Aquinas presents in the actual defence of immortality in the
treatise is an assertion of incorruptibility per se or per accidens, and the
two comments concerning the mode of understanding and the nature of
intellect (which knows all sensible forms) are meant to be supportive of
the statements made in denying corruptibility in the soul. Since we are
to dwell shortly on the issue of the mode of understanding, let us stop to
consider the question of the universal comprehensibility of all sensible
forms, which has been the subject of some severe criticisms by
commentators. What Thomas meant to draw attention to is first that the
soul has the capacity to understand all sensible forms, and that
following from this, it is not possible for it to be in a position to be the
source of any of those forms. This is because, in the Aristotelian
noetics, which he defends, sensible forms are abstracted originally from
material objects befoEe they travel the road of knowledge to the point
109
where they are thought by the intellect. If indeed there is a proviso that
the intellect is unable to receive or know anything sensible, then it could
be said to have the nature of that particular thing, which must be
material, since all sensible forms have their origin in sensible matter.
Aquinas draws this point from the common experience of man, drawing
an analogy from the senses, which he applies to the soul.
Aquinas' use of the argument is more consistent than many other
thinkers of his epoch who used it before him, even though in it he still
upholds an epistemology mainly inspired by Plato. Some commentators
have not been less critical because of his obvious consistency. We have
already seen the points made by M. Kelly, especially the contention that
holding on to the logic of the argument, it is also possible to prove that
the soul is not a being, since it apprehends all beings in knowledge."
Compelling as the argument of Kelly may appear, it seems not to have
taken adequate account of the epistemology, which is the foundation of
Aquinas' argument. It can be argued on the side of Aquinas that man
does not in fact have direct and unmediated knowledge of being as such.
Given that all that man knows about the immaterial, including God, is
derived from analogy from the material, from the sensible, it is at least
not certain that Aquinas would in fact hold that the type of knowledge
he is referring to also includes the mediate knowledge of non-material
things, which is by analogy. If this contention is anything to go by, it
would follow that the type of knowledge man has of being, mediated by
his knowledge of the sensible forms, must also be subject to the same
conditions, at least at their origin.
The critique of Kelly was axed on the text where Aquinas employed
the same argument for his explanation of the subsistence of the soul. It
is in fact on the same text in the Summa thea/agioe that another
commentator, A. Kenny, rests his critique. First, Kenny rightly says that
the argument is not for subsistence, but that it proves that the soul is not
a body which, in the Summa thea/agioe, was first tackled prior to the
issue of subsistence7s However, it must be noted that Aquinas uses the

same argument for immateriality, incorruptibility, subsistence and
inunortality. It is in fact the same observation that leads him to affirm
all these, depending on where and what he is arguing for, and, in the
texts we are considering, it is used to prove immortality, even though

the argument ends with incorruptibility, which, as we have already said,
Aquinas uses interchangeably with inunortality. Coming to the principle
that the sense must lack all sensible forms to be able to know them,
Kenny states that it appears to turn another principle which Aquinas
seems to subscribe to on its head, i.e., that like must be known by
110
111
likes." Furthennore, Kenny says that the principle of the subject of

knowledge lacking the nature of the thing it knows is far from selfevident. Referring to the example which Aquinas gave in the Summa of
the tongue not containing any taste in order to taste something, Kenny
wrote, "The problem is that the premise is false; the tongue does have a
important to him even in contexts where it is not being directly

discussed.
taste ~ a very pleasant one, as fanciers of ox tongue will agree. lI77 How
One of such contexts where he did not refer to the specific mode of
inunortality is the text on incorruptibility in the Summa theoiogiae, but
here also he shows that the question is not unimportant by other
passages where he dwells on it, just as in the Contra gentiles. In fact, it
must be borne constantly in mind that the type of immortality Aquinas is
defending is the one that will give enough room for individual moral
far do these critiques go in undennining the intention of Aquinas?

First, Aquinas uses the apprehension of the universal, which he
desiguated as inunaterial and incorruptible, to prove that the soul must
also be incorruptible and immaterial. The argument under consideration
seems in fact to be a reversal of this principle. However, coming to the
case of the taste of the tongue, it does not seem that Aquinas means that
the tongue as a piece of meat has no taste; that would be in fact too far
fetched, nor can he be interpreted as saying that the pupil of the eyes as
an instrument, a tactile, visible organ has no colour. It seems that
Aquinas means the type of medium represented by the example of a
man wearing coloured glasses who can only see the colour of the
spectacles he is wearing. This interpretation is more in consonant with
the example given by Aquinas himself about the sick man to whom
everything tastes bitter because, on account of his sickness, there is a
medium intervening between his tongue and the new object of his taste.
However, this interpretation does not dissolve all the difficulties of
Aquinas' argument, as Kenny's comment indicates.'s

In the conclusion of his short argument, Aquinas returns to a mode
of inunortality which he is not ready to accept, and for which reason he
wrote the De unitate intellectus. He states that some have placed this
incorruptibility outside the soul, since they thought that part of the
intellect which is part of man perishes, while that which is separate
continues to exist after the corruption of the hWDan composite. He once

again names two ways this view is held. First, there are those who hold
that it is the active intellect which is separable, while the possible
intellect corrupts with the body, and those who go further again to hold
that in addition to the agent, the possible intellect is separate from the
body and is incorruptible. He dismisses these two positions by saying
with regard to the frrst, if indeed the agent intellect were to be outside
us, then the only species we can receive in knowledge will be material
species, and therefore we will not be intelligent beings. With regard to
the second, he says that if indeed the two intellects were not in us, then
we would lose the factor by which we are what we are, namely rational
creatures. 79 Here, as in other places, he indicates that what is at stake is
not immortality of any sort, and that the specific type of immortality was
4. In the Summa The%giae
responsibility, and the resw-rection of the dead, pivotal points of the

Christian faith. Hence he would not accept a hypothetically rich
inunortality, whereby man is dissolved into the being and the bliss of
the almighty.
The Summa theoiogiae is known as the crown of Aquinas' genius. It
is a monumental and most systematic work -which is meant to be a

comprehensive guide for beginners of theology. The work was started
during his period ofteaching young Dominican students at Santa Sabina
in Rome. The first part, which contains the discourse on immortality,
was completed in 1268. It is possible that the purpose of the work is one
reason why inunortality is so briefly treated in such a monumental work,
although this can also be read ~s fonning a part of a whole which
includes all he wrote on man, which he expressly meant to be a
discourse on the soul. so As in the Summa contra gentiles, anthropology
influences the structure of the work. 81 Thus before coming to
inunortality, many related questions such as whether the soul is a body,
whether it is subsistent, whether it is a fonn were given some attention.
As most of the arguments employed in discussing these themes are
related to the issue of inunortality, Aquinas must have decided to
concentrate on those which apply more specifically to the question of
immortality. In fact strictly speaking, one can say that there is only one
argument for inunortality in the work, and two others used as illustration
or confinnation.
The one proof in question is the same that has been repeated in other
works: that the soul is not corrupted neither per se nor per accidens.
However, here Aquinas shows more sophistication than hitherto in his
elaboration of this thesis. He begins by asserting that it is impossible for
a subsistent thing to cease to be by accident, because something comes
into being or reverts to non-being in accordance with the mode of
existence that is proper to its nature, that is, in consonance with the way
112
The Philosophical Significance oj Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
Arguments Jor Immortality
113
it had being or the way in which it was devoid of being. This means that
if something had being by itself, it can only lose that being through a
knowledge of being is only sensory and bound up with the limitation of
cause that is internal to its being, whereas if it has being accidentally,
natural, and natural desire caunot be in vain; it caunot be without

attaining its object. So intellectual substances, which can apprehend
then it can lose its being indirectly when something else in which it
inheres as an accident loses its being. The souls of animals die in this
way with the death of the body because their being is dependent on the
being of the composite. However, rational souls can only cease to exist
through internal causes. But, given that the soul is subsistent form, it is
not possible that it passes away on its own. This is shown by a brief
analysis of the way in which things lose their being. Fonn is the
actuality of a thing, and hence the matter of a thing has existence ouly
when it acquires a form. When it ceases to be, it is because it has lost its
fonn. It means then that something, which, like the human soul, is itself,
a subsistent form, cannot cease to be. 82

It is noteworthy that he goes from arguing with fonn to conclude
with a qualified fonn, a subsistent fonn. With the statement of the
principle of corruption, two things come immediately to mind, the
question of animal souls, which are also fonns in their own right. That is
why he alludes to his proof that animal souls are corruptible, and why
he aflinns that only subsistent souls do not cease to exist. Another point
is the issue of the existence of matter in the soul. We have already
hinted that even though Aquinas does not say so, the complete rejection
of that doctrine is in view of hrnnortality. The next paragraph proves
this beyond doubt. Aquinas grants for the sake of the argument that the
soul is composed of matter and fonn, but insists, like John Blund, that
even so one must suppose that it is incorruptible. While in his own
concession Blund merely states that the soul has no contrary, Aquinas
goes further than that to explain the fact that corruption is due to the
contrary state of being because coming into existence and departIng
from it are contrary states of being. That such contrary states do not
exist in the soul is shown by the way it receives what are its contraries.
In knowledge contrary ideas are received in one relationship, so that
they cease to be contraries in the soul. This dissolution of contraries by
the act of intellectual knowledge shows that it is impossible for the soul
to corrupt."
Another point, which he makes as an indication of incorruptibility, is
the natural desire for endless existence. In fact Aquinas expressly calls
it a sign (signum) of hrnnortality. First, the desire of each being to exist
conforms to the type of existence proper to it. If by nature a thing has
the ability to conceive being as such without the limitation of time, then
its desire for being will also be for that which is timeless, while if its
time, it cannot but desire being in that mrumer. The desire for being is
being as timeless, are immortal so as to attain the object of this natural

desire. S4
Aquinas uses this argument at least four times in his effort in several
works to prove hrnnortality. It may show how dear the point is to him,
but the predilection for this argument seems to be a constant in the
efforts to prove hrnnortality among the scholastics of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. Thus we encounter the argument in St. Anselm,
Dominic Gundissalinus, Robert of Melun, Alexander Nequam, William
of Auvergne, etc. However, the line that constantly runs through all
these is the factor of natural desire and the conviction that it caunot be
in vain. What this natural desire focuses on is different from author to
author.
In his single proof of immortality in the Mon%gion, Ansehn of
Canterbury reasons that God's magnificence, which created rational
creatures to love the highest essence, must be created either to love it
pennanently, to love it intennittently or to be deprived of this love by
violence. Only the first possibility fits the wisdom and magnificence of
God, for which reason the soul must be immortal to be able to love the
highest good forever." For Anselm, that which the soul desires is not
hrnnortality but the highest good. Gundissalinus' own argument from
desire can be said to be resolvable into the same gist. For
Gundissalinus, there is a natural motion or inclination in man, and all

natural inclinations must have the possibility of being fulfilled,
otherwise there will be something in nature which is useless or
erroneous. One such inclination or natural tendency is the desire for real
and complete happiness, together with the inclination to avoid
unhappiness. From common human experience this desire caunot be
satisfied by something material, because the soul is spiritual and nothing
inferior to it can give it everlasling satisfaction. If lower creatures have
natural means of satisfying their own inclinations, then such a higher
being as the human soul must not lack its own satisfaction. But what
constitutes the satisfaction of the human soul must not only be
incorporeal, it must also be everlasting, and thus immune from death,
since anything associated with death smacks of unhappiness. 86 If then
the human soul longs for endless beatitude, it must be immortal, since
nothing mortal can be the subject of perennial happiness." William of
Auvergne also uses the desire for happiness, but again, gives it his own
114
slant. According to him, the worst evil in the natural order is death or
destruction, and its opposite is complete happiness. The soul constantly
tries to avoid this evil, and this is an indication that it must be contrary
to its nature. That this is so is supported by the fact that the movement
of the soul is always towards higher things, which indicates where its
end lies. That type of happiness to which the soul tends is perpetual or
endless happiness, and if such a desire is innate in the soul, it must be an
attainable end, and an end, which is contrary to death, given that all
88
natural motions are unidirectional.
From the above insttmces of the application of the principle of
natural desire not being in vain, we can already see the distinctive
characteristic of Aquinas' use of the principle. First of all, Aquinss
obliquely designates it a sign of immortality. This is reminiscent of
Albert the Great's grouping of some proofs of immortality as only signs
while others are considered as probable and necessary proofs. It has, of
course, been said that Aquinas did not follow that aspect of Albert's
style, stiII it can be said that he is not altogether uninfluenced by that
aspect of his master's innovation. Again, it would seem that by the time
he wrote the Summa rhe%giae, the angelic doctor had started being
selective with the argoments. The question would appear to have arisen
which argoments to use, and which can serve merely as support for or
elucidation of major and more fundamental ones. He does not anywhere
express unequivocally his preferences among the argoments, but we can
see that some are dropped, others are reshaped and others restated
repeatedly, and the reason for this does not appear to be accidental or
without any design.
Another characteristic of Thomas' presentation of the argoment from
desire is that he links it to the phenomenon of intellectual knowledge.
"Each time Aquinas presents his proof from desire, writes St. Hilaire,
II
"he makes sure that he includes the intellect's part in the tendency.""
This is indeed a special insight brought to the old argoment from desire,
although it is founded on the well-known cooperation between knowing
and willing. In rational beings, the intellect has the function of
apprehension, and where it is not in a position to do this immediately, of
research and judgement after reasoning. The tendency of the will has to
be enlightened by the light of the intellect in order to see an obj ect as
good to be desired or evil to be avoided, depending on the context and
the airo at stake. Thus, bringing in the role of the intellect, Aquinas is
intent on highlighting that it is not just blind desire that is propelling the
soul, but a cognition, an awareness of the object of desire, which in the
present context he designates as timeless being.
115
Scholars ofSt. Thomas who tried to give this proof from desire some
pride of place among other proofs used by st. Thomas have rightly not
failed to notice that it is not mere desire that is at stake in the proof, but
the general hwnan quest for being, and not just for being, but for total
being. Our view is that taking Aquinas' proofs for immortality as an
ensemble, there is no reason for highlighting that proof over and above
others. J. - Y. Jollif seems to support this view when he says that one
needs only little reflection to become convinced that there is no good
reason to accord special consideration to the desire for immortality, and
to make it the foundation of a proof. Again he says that there are many
other desires as fundamental to man as the desire for immortality, but
which no one argnes must be realizable.
The different presentations of the argoment from desire show in fact
that what one desire does not necessarily need to be immortality. While
some say that the desire for justice is natural, others concentrate on the
desire for happiness. Thomas upholds the desire for everlasting being as
fundamental. All these lead the thinkers to the affirmation of
irrunortality, but if one insists that such desires must not be in vain, it is
difficult to find reason why only those desires the authors highlight must
be fulfilled. It is on this consideration that Jollif asserts that the desire
for immortality would not be of any philosophical value, if it is not
understood as founded on a more fundamental ontological structure. of
the spirit of man." It is thus not the desire for empirical existence which
will last forever, but a desire directed to being as such, emanating from
a spirit which in itself has the power of questioning being as such. Such
a desire, named psychological desire therefore refers to a more
primordial desire inscribed deep in the being of man.
We have noted that when Jollif reserves such a desire for the
philosophers alone, while supposing that non-philosophers live such
desire daily without being conscious of it, he seems to go too far in his
interpretation of the argoment. In fact he seems to undermine the
intention of Thomas, for the angelic doctor laid the convincing power of
his proof on the doorsteps of the common experience of mankind. Such
an interpretation as Jollifs will further raise the ante, demanding a
demonstration that the desire exists or is more conscious in the learned

than in others, and if consciousness of it is only in the philosopher, the
next question will be, how in the world do we confirm that it is the
corrunon experience of man in order for it to qualify as a natural desire

in the first place.
Unlike J ollif, George St. Hilaire does not cast any sceptical glance at
the desire for immortality as the basis of a proof. He sees the
116
demonstration as the strongest evidence that despite all appearances, St.

Thomas based his proofs of immortality more on an inductive than on
deductive method. "Here Aquinas seems least deductive. It He does not
attempt to link the desire for endless being with any philosophical
enlightemnent. Quite the contrary, in the proof, St. Thomas is calling as
witness primordial experience, which, anthropologists say, has been in
man since his early years of evolution. For St. Hilaire, the natural
tendency in man is the tendency for the very principle of being, which is
God himself. Man therefore grasps esse perpetuum through his intellect.
From the desire for and the grasping of esse in the intellect, there is, for
St. Hilaire, a progression to call to witness such demonstrations as that
from self-knowledge, by which, according to him, the soul knows its
spirituality, and knows itself as transcendent. There is then the
phenomenon of judgement with certainty, and that of planning for the
future, all of which convince us that, our innermost life is "supramaterial and supra-temporal."" It is doubtful how some of the points
used here are deductive" in Aquinas' method, even if we accept for the
sake of the argument that such difference in method is supported by
Aquinas' texts. The question of knowledge of the future, or the issue of
judgement appears to be part of the special cognitive ability of the
intellect, from which Aquinas draws proofs for immateriality, for
subsistence as well as for immortality. This will occupy our attention
presently.
We must note however that none of the two commentators takes any
account of the fact that at least in the Summa the%giae, the argument
from desire.is called a sign of immortality. Due to the fact that Aquinas
does not give full attention to the question of sign with regard to
immortality, it carmot be argned that this has a strong implication in his
supposed weighing of the arguments. Nevertheless, it is safe to take that
designation as a caveat that it may after all not be safe to give much
more importance to desire than to other proofs. Furthermore, this proof
is linked in all its forms with the intellectual lmowledge of being. That
means that, strictly speaking, Aquinas reverts to the proof from
knowledge viewed here from another perspective. By doing this, and
fixing this lmowledge to that of timeless being, he has apparently gone
further than his predecessors who used the argument from desire. He
backs the argument with a metaphysical foundation. Yet, from that
moment on, he leaves the shores of induction to navigate in the waters
of deduction, and in the whole epistemological question of the status of
our intellectual knowledge and the implication of this knowledge for
man. Such a sail is by no means a calm one, as we shall see later.
117
Be that as it may, the desire for immortality in man can serve as a

pointer that man is not sunnnarized by matter, nor by the here and now
which inevitably goes with it. A phenomenological investigation of
man, which does not pay serious attention to this tendency, this
unavoidable accretion in his innermost nature seems to miss the point.
The result of such an investigation may indeed be the subject of
divergent positions and counter-positions, but this tendency to the other
is transcendent in the sense that it is not satisfied with the present, with
the temporary. That it constantly seeks for more appears indeed futile if
in fact it ends with itself, i.e. with desiring for more. In that case, there
will be another use for it; it can then serve the secondary but important
purpose of providing the constant zest that the fmite being requires to
keep up with the struggle of life, the struggle of facing the arduous
challenges of his banal existence. The general tendency of human
cultures seems to indicate that the desire does not ~pear as a mere
endowment for continuing the "battle" of life. Its presence in many
forms in all cultures is well noted. Even in contexts where there is no
suggestion of continued personal or ontological immortality, there is the
preference for longer-lasting presence even if this is limited to the fond
memories of the deeds of the departed. While Plato is generally known
for his thoughts on immortality in the Phaedo, he also gives place for
continued existence of the individual through his deeds. In the
Symposium," the tight argument from the conception of man as soul
gives way to continued existence through procreation, through fame,
and through the imparting of philosophical virtues. In the Somnium
Scipionis, the uncertainty of the duration of such immortality based on
temporal fame is a reason for Cicero to argue, with the aid of Plato' s
Phaedrus, for an immortality that goes beyond this life." It is important
that even among the ancient Greeks where the type of immortality that
Plato had. argued for was still far from being generally accepted, men
still sought for some type of eternal existence. Harmah Arendt's
nostalgia-evoking words highlight the assurance of this type of
immortality as one of the important fimctions of the Greek city-state, the
polis:
Menrs life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the
most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible
and most ephemeral of man-made "products", the deeds and stories
which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organisation
of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and
physiognomically guaranteed by its laws - lest the succeeding
generations change its identity beyond recognition - is a kind of
118
organised remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing

existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes
from being seen, being heard, and generally appearing before an
audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the
short duration of the petfonnance and therefore need Homer"and "others
of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there. 94
It is because the desire for imperishability in man is backed up by the

type of being he is that he can contrive such elaborate structure with the
hope of some type of continued existence after his fleeting earthly life.
Man's endowment with an intellect makes the extent of his desire for
immortality different. However, is this difference not limited to the
appreciation of what is at stake? Does the difference extend to the very
desire for permanent life? ht this regard, it is interesting to ask how this
desire for life is different from the instinct of self-preservation, which,
for thinkers like Spinoza, is the main drive in all beings. William of
Auvergne's presentation of the argument from desire makes this desire
identical to the tendency to self-preservation, and if common experience
is the foundation of this principle, its version in Thomas has at least
some affinity with self-preservation. If there is any conceivable link
between the two, why is it that this desire for continued existence does
not argue for innnortality in brutes? Thomas appears to be well aware of
this latent difficulty, and in most versions of the arguments, brute souls
are discounted as subjects of innnortality because man can know eternal
being and desire it, while brutes cannot. If knowledge makes all the
difference, would it not be simpler to end with the argument from the
cognitive capacity of man?
S. In the Quesllones dispulale de anima

Thomas takes up the two issues of desire for innnortality and its
intellectual support in a cluster of disputed questions on the soul. These
questions constitute the longest single work of the angelic doctor
devoted especially to the soul. Written between 1266 and 1269 (very
probably within the later part of that period), it takes up and elaborates
on iss~es th~t :-vere strongly discussed around that time at the University
of Pans. ht ~t IS found the longest passage on innnortality, but what one
encounters IS barely more than a repetition of Vlhat is found in other
~Iaces. ~ many. as twenty one objections are raised in the chapter on
ImmortalIty, but It seems that the method of complete elaboration used
in the book accounts for their number more than any other special
119
reason in conoection with innnortality. Of these objections, our

attention will be directed only to a few. The rest are skipped either
because they have already been discussed or because they have obvious
answers from the point of view of Aquinas' philosophy.
The first of this is the fifteenth objection, which departs from the
idea of the order of being. os It is important to remark that very
surprisingly, Aquinas does not use the concept of the order of being to
prove immortality in any of his works, even though the argument from
the order of being is very much used by the greatest thinkers of the
thirteenth century before him: Philip .the Chancellor" and Albert the
Great." While Albert tries to draw out the logical implications of the
order, Philip on his part attempts to use the metaphysical implication of
the nearness of the human soul to the level of beings that are by nature
immaterial and therefore innnortal. The objection that Aquinas raises in
conoection with the order of being hinges on the lack of complete
imitation of the higher order by the lower one, and the view that it is
only on the assumption that the soul is intellective that it can be said to
be incorruptible. The soul, it says, cannot be intellective because the
highest part of an inferior category of nature strives to be like the higher
level. This striving does not however speak for the possession of similar
characteristics, just like apes which try to imitate human beings, but
never succeed in attaining the level of humans. In the same way, human
beings in intellection appear to imitate the separated intellects, but do
not attain their level, and must therefore be mortal.
Aquinas agrees that the human soul does not have the same mode of
understanding peculiar to separated substances, but adds that it
understands in ways that are proper to it, and the knowledge it acquires
is enough to show that it is incorruptible. Two subtle points are worth
noting here. First, there is no rejection of the statement that it is only on
the assumption of intellection that the soul can be proved to be
immortal. That seems to throw back to the argument from the desire for
innnortality, which Aquinas consistently links with the fact of
understanding in man. There are, however, other arguments, which may

not have any strong link with the intellectual activity of the soul: the
argument from the debility of the soul, and also from the soul as the
image of God. This shows clearly that some arguments have stronger
impressions on Aquinas, and that for him they appear to have firmer
convincing powers. Again, as we have argued, he does not feel the need
to grade them accordingly, and he presents them all on an equal footing.
Secondly, the fact that here he gets very close to the same assertion his
forebears used to prove innnortality, without using it in the same way
120
shows, once again, some discrimination in his choice of arguments. His

method of seeking a cumulative influence of the arguments does not of
course give much room for thorough discrimination, but in the eloquent
omission of the argument from the order of being, we can see that
Aquinas is not satisfied with all the arguments of his forebears from
which his own arguments are all derived. A perplexity which may dei)'
any definite answer is why this particular argument is among those
tipped for omission while other weaker ones are enumerated in the
course of his work. The raising of this objection may be a pointer to the
fact that somehow the fact of an order of being is in itself not enough to
argue for similarity, for one can reasonably ask why apes do not share
the higher characteristics of human beings. But again, in st. Albert, for
example, man is taken as the link between the material and the spiritual
order. He would not occupy this position if he were completely
corruptible. Even then, Albert groups the arguments from the order of
being among the probable arguments.
The next objection that attracts our interest is a rare one. Aquinas has
hitherto argued from the point of view of an ideal human soul, endowed
with the normal capacity to understand, to judge and to reflect on its
own activities. The objector questions that assumption. If a property
belongs to a given species, it is fitting that all or at least most of the
members of that species will possess that ability. In the case of humans
however, experience indicates that only very few people are intelligent,
for which reason to understand carmot be the proper characteristic of the
98
human soul. This objection presupposes the assertion of the previous
one - that inunortality or incorruptibility can only be known from the
intellectual activity of man. The answer Thomas proffers is that even
though only very few people arrive at perfect understanding, all people
achieve some level of understanding, and this is shown by the presence
of the first principles in all human intellects.
The answer given to the objection seems to overlook the slide from
understanding as being the characteristic property of human nature as
such and to the phenomenon of intelligence. It is correct to say that in
the actual world, only very few people are intelligent, intelligence
understood as special endowment or capacity for quick and deep
understanding. However, being intelligent is a concept that can allow
much fluidity. When specifically is intelligence to be attributed to a
human being, and at what point can we say correctly that someone is not
intelligent? A lot of relative factors must come into play for such a fine.
line to be drswn. What is clear however is that the usual, conventional
employment of the word intelligence is not synonymous with
Arguments for Immortal!'ty
121
understanding. The answer that Thomas gives takes the two meanings
on board. The few he takes as being able to attain perfect understanding
(pauci perveniant ad perfecte intelligendum) are in fact those that
would be described as intelligent, while the normal common ability to
understand, he attributes to the generality of mankind, by their ability to
perceive the first principles of demonstration. The question that arises
from this answer is whether in fact the point for inunortality is vitiated if
there are some human beings unable even to attain the knowledge of
first principles, either because of deformity or age. It seems that it
would be enough to show that such an act as understanding is a general
endowment of human nature, and that where it is not in fact present, it

must be due to some abnormality, which constitutes an obstacle to the
normal natural trend. This would not require that all human beings
actually acquire even the first principles of demonstration.
The penulthnate objection in the Q. D. de anima takes as given the
point Thomas constantly makes, that is, that the life of the body is given
to it by the soul. The soul is form, and form is the actuality of matter. If
this is taken for granted, the objection goes that if indeed the soul were
to be inunortal, then its life-giving will continue unhampered, and
therefore the body would also be inunortal because an effect does not
cease if its cause continues to operate. 99 The exit way that is contained
in the statement of this objection is that such an operation of the cause
needs to be in conjunction with the effect in order to sustain it in being
as before. That means that for the objection to be true, one must
suppose all things to be equal. st. Thomas picks on this loophole. The
soul, the cause of life, is incorruptible, and retains its life-giving ability,
but the body, which receives this life, is not always in a position to do
so. This is because it is subject to change. When change is mentioned
here, we must understand more than mere change from potentiality to
actuality, for the soul is also subject to change. Thus the type of change
that makes the body incorruptible must be peculiar to its state of
materiality to which the soul is inunune. Matter is the principle of this
corruption, and we have asserted that that is why Aquinas refuses to
entertain any kind of matter in the soul. An hnportant argument for
inunortality in his works is that the soul lacks contraries in its nature,
and the way it knows shows this absence of contrary very clearly.
That the soul is devoid of contraries is one of the points raised in the
sed contra, in addition to its description as the hnage of God, and the
fact that even the heavenly bodies that are material are incorruptible.
because they are endowed with some special type of matter, so much so
that the soul, which is completely devoid of matter, must be
122
The PhUosophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
incorruptible. Aquinas then goes to make a resume of his thought on the

immortality of the soul, recalling many points and arguments raised
previously. In sum: what belongs to a thing naturally cannot be taken
away from it; existence is due to fann, and things corrupt when they
lose their form; a form in itself cannot be corrupted (it cannot be
deprived of itself), and forms that corrupt do so accidentally because
they exist by virtue of their composite. If therefore there is a form that
has existence on its own, it cannot be corrupted. The hwnan soul is an
example of the latter type of form, and this is shown by the soul not
exercising any act through bodily organs to accord with its nature. Such
a soul can also not be composed of matter and form otherwise it would
not be able to know universals, which are devoid of matter and material
conditions. It follows from all these that the principle by which man
understands must have its own act of existence, and must therefore be
incorruptible. Aquinas supports the foregoing proof with two more
arguments: one from the desire for immortality and the other from the
facts involved in intellectnal understanding. Things, which are naturally
corruptible, are received in the intellect in forms that are incormptible,
and this is shown by the intellect grasping things in and through
universals, which are not subject to corruption. JOo In the rest of this
section, we shall consider some of the implications of this argument and
others associated with intellectual knowledge in Aquinas' effort to prove
immortality.
In a way, the phenomenon of intellectnal knowledge is the basic
point in Aquinas' anthropology, and in any case in his philosophy of
mind. It is present directly or indirectly in his proofs of immateriality,
subsistence, incorruptibility, and simplicity. It appears in different forms
in such arguments as the soul knowing itself, and not needing any
bodily organs. It is also present in the assertion that the soul apprehends
existence in an absolute sense, and in the mode of knowledge of the
intellect shown by its ability to know universals. Many problems are
latent both in the assertions related to the issue of intellectnal
knowledge and consequently from some of the conclusions drawn from
them. For instance, in respect of the argument from the desire for
immortality, Aquinas says that the soul knows esse absolute101 or esse
simpliciter, et non hie et nunc,102 This does not mean that the intellect
apprehends only absolute being, but that in addition to apprehending
being here and now, it also has the ability to apprehend being
absolutely. What exactly does this mean? It goes without saying, as
Aquinas holds, that the intellect grasps more than the here and now in
its apprehension of being. It not only knows the present, but also the
Argumentsfor Immortality
123
past, and can project into the future, a capacity we are not quite sur~
exists in animals in any elaborate sense. But how can we come to"
explain our knowledge of being as such, in such a timeless m3IU1er from
the background of Aquinas' epistemology? Our knowledge of being is
not direct. It is only through their activities that we come to know being,
fIrst through the senses, and the extension of our knowledge is the
elaboration or refIuing of the original knowledge derived from the
senses. Even our knowledge of God must depart from the knowledge we .
have of material things, for the human intellect cannot have any direct
apprehension of the infinity that is God. That is in fact why man's
knowledge of God is never free from anthropomorphism. The same
epistemic principle applies to the rational soul, which, according to
Aquinas, is known only through its acts. What St. Thomas calls the
absolute knowledge of being cannot but come through a certain via
negativa. By imagining the absence of the limitation of the here and
now, of the empirical with which our knowledge is in fact always
bound, we can consciously exclude these limitations from timeless
being. However, given the inherent human limitation, it is difficult to
see how this knowledge can be seen as apprehension of timeless being.
The un.iversal concepts have a similar origin in Aquinas. They arise
from the abstraction of the common features of the species from the
particular individual features. But their existence is mediated by sense
impression, and going through all the process of the formation of
images, abstraction by the agent intellect, and the reception of the
common characteristics by the possible intellect forming a general idea
of what is perceived. With this background, Aquinas' position on the
pristine problem of universals is that contrary to the followers of Plato,
universals are not independent existents. They actnally exist, fIrst in
material things, as esse naturale, and later in the mind, intentionally or
as esse intentionale,103 and through them, the intellect acquires the
formal elements of different species of being. This really is the decisive
difference between sense and intellectual knOWledge, and between
human and animal knowledge. Going from this, Aquinas infers that the
intellect that is the repository of such universals or general concepts
cannot operate through material otgans, because, being incOiruptible,
the intellect, which is their repository or which knows things through
them, must also be immortal.
The use of similar conception of human knowledge has been the
most recurrent starting point from which the simplicity and the
immortality of the soul were proved. Its beghming goes back as far as
Plato's Fhaedo. In the Christian era, Augustine made the possession of
124
knowledge the focal point of his argument for immortality. His only
argument for immortality in the Soliloquia is that truth is eternal, that
even if the whole material universe were to perish, truth as such must
remain. Science (disciplina) is true in virtue of the truth itself, and is
even identifiable with truth (esl aulem disciplina verilas). If science
exists in the soul, the soul itself must be immortal, since it is the
receptacle of science, which is imperishable. 104 The same argument is
taken up in the De immortalitate, with some elaboration, and here he
plunges into infinite regress by his assertion that science must exist
somewhere. Many authors subsequently make use of the same idea, but
with the exception of Philip the Chancellor, lOS the rest modify
Augustine's line of reasoning to suit their own style and purpose.
Auvergne talks of the idea of infinity in the soul, and gives the example
of geometry, in which many truths have been discovered, and which still
remains open to many more discoveries. That the soul is so open to this
infinite knowledge shows, for William, that it must have infmite
capacity by nature. 106 Dominic Gundissalinus and John of La Rochelle
among others employ the infmite capacity of the soul to unllerstand as
an indication of its nature, sometimes referring to the fact that the
infinite idea of God can be in the soul, which points to its ability to go
on endlessly in existence. What distinguishes all these from Thomas
Aquinas is not just the variation in the use of knowledge in the soul, but
also the fact that none of the authors prior to him defends an
epistemology that is so close to Aristotle's as Thomas does. Most of
them presuppose the hypostatization of intellectual knowledge, but it
seems that such practice accords more with Neoplatonic epistemology
to which these authors, with the exception of Thomas, more or less
ascribe.
What Aquinas makes of the presence of universals in the mind raises
the question of how the mental presence of these universals is to be
explained. Universals of course exist in the mind, but it does not appear
that they exist in such a way that we can lay hold of independent
substantive entities called universals. 107 The existence of the universals
cannot be well understood independently of the existence of the intellect
itself. It seems then that their presence in the intellect is more like the
modification of the intellect; that their existence is more akin to the
existence of accidents than of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
substitute universals for Plato's ideas, even though the universals would
now have the intellect as their world instead of extraterrestrial world
that Plato postulated. What this would entail is that universals, taken in
this sense, may not be the type of thing one can attribute immortality or
125
incorruptibility to. If, in fact, its mode of existence is more akin to the
accidental than to the substantial, it would mean that whether it is
incorruptible or not depends on whether the intellect itself is
incorruptible, but the incorruptibility of the intellect or the soul is
exactly what the nature of universals is called to be a witness to. If this
were so, then it would appear to be a case of begging the question ..
Another difficulty is the nature of the universals themselves. They
are usually understood as general concepts abstracted from the
particular conditions of here and now. That makes the universal or
concept applicable to several individual instances, because the formal
nature of these particulars is what is contained in the universal. IOB
However, the universal in the intellect is not altogether cut off from the
sense, or from images. It seems that no matter how our concepts are, for
us to be conscious of them requires some form of particularization, or
some fleshing out. One who has the concept or the universal house
knows what a house is wherever he sees it, but he can in no way think of
a house without having some walls, roofed and with doors. Because of
the universal state of his knowledge, any colour can be substituted for
the colour or the door, or it may even be colourless doors, but it seems
an unattainable feat to think of a house without some iIlljlges, without
some particularization. Kenny says as much when he gives the example
of a universal idea with a logical prlnciple or proposition, or with such a
statement as "Every road leads to some place." This is no doubt a
general idea. Yet he asserts that "there must be some exercise of sense
or hnagination, some application of concepts or the application of the
knowledge of necessary truths."For a man to apply the concept red, he
must either discriminate this concept from other concepts of coloW', or
have an hnage of red in his intellect. He can also have a ''mental echo of
the word red, or be reading or writing about redness." Even when the
passive knowledge of such concepts is presupposed, "it seems that
without some vehicle of sensory activity, there could be no exercise of
the concept.." For all intents and purposes, knowledge of general truth
operates in the same way. There is apparently no way they can be
actualized, so to say, without being cormected to image, symbol, or
action etc. 109 What it means then is that universals in act are always
accompanied by some hnage, symbol, action, which is not all too
general. Now, given that it is through acts that we come to the
knowledge of being, i.e., that the humans beings have no direct
knowledge of being, the general concepts we are able to know are those
that are applied. While not negating the general applicability that is
characteristic of universals one can ask from where comes our
126
knowledge of their incorruptibility, if our knowledge of them is always

linked up with the particular?
A possible way to solve some of these problems is to concentrate
more on the act of intellection than on its object. J. de Vries follows this
route in his quest to represent the argument from intellectual knowledge
in a way that could be acceptable or devoid of too many problems. He
first presents the argument (used in conjunction with inunateriality) in a
syllogistic form: the object of intellectual knowledge is universal, this
universality shows the inunateriality of intellectual knowledge, since
matter is the principle of individuation; the inunateriality of the object
proves that of the act and the subject of the act, the rational soul. IIO De
Vries raises many possible problems against all three of the premises,
but the more telling one is that most interpretations of Thomas take their
theoretical support for arguing for the soul's immateriality from that of
the object of intellectual knowledge from the implication of proportion
between the object and the subject of knowledge. There must be some
sort of proportion between the two, but, according to him, this should
not be drawo to the extent of equality. If indeed the proportionality is
taken too seriously, then one falls into the error of Empedocles: earth
through earth, water through water, etc. - an error that Aquinas
expressly rejects. Again such proportionality will lead to a
contradiction, for it would follow that because the intellect knows God,
it is godly, and because it knows the material, it is material. To object to
the latter consequence will raise the onus of proving why the
proportionality should apply only in the case of the inunateriality of the
soul. 'l1 His solution to all the problems raised by this proof is to
interpret it as proving the inunateriality, not of the object of knowledge,
but of the act of knowledge. It would then entail that the proportionality
that Aquinas speaks of will be sought between the act and the
potentiality that receives this act. What the argument for inunateriality
should seek to establish is the wide gap between sensible and
intelligible knowledge. The intelligible has the power of making
judgement while the sensible knowledge is unable to do so. Even if in
making this judgement, the intellect arrives at falsehood, the power of
judgement is peculiar to it. The senses do not know their being, and they
lack the ability of self-criticism. Sense perception is relative; it does not
always grasp the content of the object, and carmot even be aware of this
relativity. Contrasted with this is the intellectual knowledge, which
possesses absolute value. It grasps the being of beings and is aware of
this act. The intellect is then complete reflection, a complete return to
one's self. If this is so, it entails, according to Aquinas, that the soul is
127
immaterial, since no material being has the possibility of self-
reflection. 112
The hitch with this solution is that it pushes aside the instances
where Aquinas leaves no doubt that he is speaking of the object of
knowledge, and not the act of knowledge. In some places he makes
statements that seem to concentrate more on act than on the very being
of the object of knowledge. In the II Sent, he asserts that to understand
has to do with the universal (intelligere est universalium)'IJ, and in the
Summa contra gentiles,' 14 he states that it pertains to the act of
understanding to apprehend objects, universal and incorruptible. Even
in these instances, it is because of the nature of the object of the act that
the subject from which the act emanates is said to be incorruptible. In
the end, however, de Vries seems to turn the argument round to that of
self-knowledge, which has its owo difficulties.
6.
In the Compendium Thea/agiae
Some of the points raised with regard to the whole issue of the
incorruptibility of intellectual knowledge are relevant to the only
argument used in the Compendium thea/agiae. The treatise is a
presentation in summary of the whole of the Catholic faith, with the
exception of the sacraments. It contains 246 short chapters. Reminiscent
of the Summa contra gentiles, it spins the doctrine on the rational soul
from the consideration of spiritual substances in general, thence to the
necessity <if the possible intellect receiving intelligible forms from
sensible things. Reading between the lines, this necessity establishes the
natural connection of a spiritual creation (the rational soul) with the
body. There is then a chapter on the necessity of positing the agent
intellect, followed by another on the incorruptibility of the human soul
(chapter 84). All these themes, together with the chapter on the unicity
of the intellect in man which comes immediately after summarize the
cardinal doctrine of. Thomas on the rational soul.
The choice of argument is remarkable in a work that is written in
summary form. There is thus no place for the cumulative method
applied in such works as Summa contra gentiles and the Q.D. de anima.
That Aquinas chose the argument from the absence of contraries can be
an indication of how much he values the argument. The same proof is
used in many other works including the Summa thea/agiae, Q. D. de
anima, and the Summa contra gentiles, and indirectly in all the passages
where he argued against Ibn Gabirol's theory of universal
hylemorphism. Like all the rest of the proofs which Aquinas employs, it
128
The Philosophical Significance 'oJImmortality in Thomas Aquinas
is also a constant presence in the attempt of previous thinkers of the

period before Aquinas to defend immortality.'" However, with the
exception of the employment of the argument by Gnndissalinus,l16 most
other writers before St. Thomas end with the assertion of the absence of
contrary in the soul. In this respect St. Thomas links the argument again
to epistemological considerations just as he does in the case of the
argument from the desire of immortality.
The first phase of the argument, which has been described as the
metaphysical phase, says that matter is the subject of generation and
corruption. This is indicated by the fact that in the degree in which
something is removed from corruption, in the same degree is it removed
from matter. Thomas then says that the things that are composed of
matter and form are corruptible by their very nature. He returns to the
corruption of forms: material forms are corrupted by accident, while
inunaterial forms are completely incorruptible. It follows that the
intellect, which is not material, as evidenced by its not nndersttmding
anything except what is separated completely from matter, is
incorruptible by nature.117 As if in an attempt to bring support to this
proof, he goes on to assert that there can be no corruption without
contraries, since all corruption is due to the contrary of the particular
thing nnder consideration, so that in those things in which there are no
contraries, corruption is also absent. According to St. Thomas, and in
accordance with the general opinion of his time, the heavenly bodies,
even though they are material, have no contraries, and are thus
incorruptible. The evidence that the soul also lacks contraries is that
things which are contraries in themselves are without contraries when
grasped by the intellect. The principle of contraries is therefore one in
the rational soul. Only an immaterial substtmce can operate in that
marmer, and hence the rational soul carmot be corrupted. llS
The first part of the argument is based on the Aristotelian principle,
which serves as its introduction. It is on this principle that all who use
the argument from contraries hinge their argument. Natural corruption
and generation come from the potency of matter. That means, for
insttmce, that a piece of wood, which becomes a table has in its being
the possibility or potency of the wood receiving another form, the form
of the table. It is by losing its form and assuming another that such
change takes place, and the actuality of the change, or of the new form
means the corruption of the former reality. However, the mere assertion
of the absence of contrary from the soul is not enough unless backed by
the simplicity or immateriality of the soul, which Aquinas in fact argues
for in other passages, but not here in connection with immortality.
Arguments Jor Immortality
129
However, the next argument seems to lend this much-needed support for
the absence of contraries. Aqufuas presents it in the Summa
thea/agiae ll ' by saying that even if the soul were to be composed of
matter and form, it will still not be said to be corruptible because ofits
mode of nnderstanding. That means that even if one accepts some
nnderstanding of the matter-form composition in the soul, to read back
from its activity to its nature will still impose the conclusion that the
soul does not contain the type of contraries which will lead to
destruction, because things that are contraries in themselves are not
received as such in the soul. There is a mtity in the act of nndersttmding,
which enables the intellect to apprehend contraries without their
opposing each other. Given that the opposition of contraries in external
nature is due to the potency of matter, the conclusion one must draw is
that the soul is immaterial and is'indestructible. Thomas affirms the
existence of contraries in the soul, but for him their mode of existence
(Le., in actuality) is a strong indicator of the nature of the soul itself.
F. D. Witheimsen tries to expatiate on the implication of Aquinas'
reasoning on the mode of existence of contraries in the soul. In his
opinion, there is no alternative in real life because each being exists
according to the principle of identity. However, the indubitable human
ability to consider alternative courses of action points to a phenomenon
transcending the limitations of the material order. It is only in the human
mind and never in sensible existence that one can contemplate an
"either-or" situation.12O Still for him such situations are real. That
Aquinas reintroduces the mode of existence of contraries after arguing
that the soul is free of any matter from which contraries can arise is a
transition from the metaphysical to the epistemological order, aimed at
coming back again to confirm the earlier conclusion. For Withehnsen,
there is an important significance in this move. Aquinas points to the
fact that we consttmtly work with contraries, but this is the work of
nnderstanding as distinguished from sensation. That man entertains an
either-or situation alludes to the fact that such is the most intimate
nature of his reasoning, and without such ability, he will be not more
than an automaton. Thus, even though there are in material existence no
active contraries, this is the nonnal situation in the intellect, endowed,
as it is, with the ability to ask questions and to "balance alternative
answers." To be able to do this indicates the existence and the exercise
of a special kind of being: "spiritual being, totally absent from the
material world wherein the possibility of contraries is rooted in matter
but where actuality always precludes both being in act.,,121
130
"
There is no doubt that the operation of the human intellect sets it

apart from the normal behaviour of material entities. Such activities
constitute the strongest point against those who would like to suppose
that there is no distinction between mind and matter or between the
body and the soul. The difficulty of explaining the experience of man in
lmowledge on the supposition of complete materiality of man as a whole
is in fact much more than that of postulating something of whatever
name that is the principle of such operations. Be that as it may, the
argument from the absence of contraries in the soul and also the
exegesis given it to it by Wilhehnsen does not seem to take adequate
thought of the mode of existence of contraries in real things, and eitheror in the mind. Is it unproblematic to argoe from the nature and,
behaviour of one to the nature and behaviour of the other without
further ado? Can we draw principles from contingent existents and
apply them to logical beings, which is a way of describing the presence
of contraries and lmowledge in general in the intellect? It seems that
here there can be room for what A. Kenny described as "confusion
between abstract and concrete." 122 We have seen that the same difficulty
bedevils the use of the presence of general concepts as a witness to
immateriality and incorruptibility. Most often such arguments are
connected with the hypostatization of things which, rigorously
understood, can only be said to have the mode of being of an accident.
131
Materialisten notwendig als Petitio principii erscheinen; er ist offenbar nur als
argwnentum ad hominem denen gegenUber gedacht, die die Unkorperlichkeit der
Seele zugeben."
5 J. de Vries. "Zwn thomistischen Beweis ... ," pp. 4 - 5.
6 J.-Y. Jollif, "Affinnation rationelle de l'immortalite de l'fune chez St. Thomas,"
Lumiere et vie 4 (1955), p. 75: Jollifs view is that the desire for unending existing
which he reads as desire for being is only realized explicitly by philosophers ..... ce
rapport l'etre qui constitue la nature meme de l'honune, et que Ie non-philosophe
vit quotidienement sans en prendre conscience. Le philosophe qui retrouve en lui
cette puissance toujours donnee de connaissance ontologique atteint -de meme
mouvement la certitude d' exister <toujours>.....
7 S.C.G. II, 79, n.15
8 Cf. Ch 1, sec. 4.
9 Cf. Albert the Great, Summa de creaturis. q. 59.
10 J.- Y. Jollif, p. 66.
II Ibid., p. 73: "II suffit de refl6chir quelques instants pour se persuader qu'il n'y a
aucune raison valable de privilegier Ie desir de l'immortalite et d'en faire Ie
fondement d'une preuve. L'argument psychologique ne prouve rigoreusement rien
s'il n'est que psychologique, et ron aura beau jeu montrer que l'homme eprouve
mille desirs apparement aussi fondes que Ie souhait de l'immortalite et..dont on ne
saurait dire cependant quoits se reaiiseront necessairement."
12 George 8t. Hilaire, "Does 8t. Thomas Really Prove the Soul's Inunortality?", The
New Scholasticism 34 ( 1960), p. 352.
Ibid., p. 345.
Ibid., pp. 352 - 353
" J. F. McConnick, "Questiones disputandae," The New Scholasticism, 13 (1939),
pp. 368 -369.
16 G. St. Hilaire, p. 341.
17 B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), p. 216.
18
Alexander Nequam, Speculum speculationum, m. Ixxxvii. 5: "Anima enim
13
14
NOTES
1. Owens, "The Soul as Agent." The New Scholasticism 48 (1974), p. 40
Cf. E. Bertola, "II problema deU'immortalita dell anima umana nelle opere dei
Tommaso d' Aquino," Rivista difilosofia neoscolastica 65 (1973), p. 250
3 1. Lemaire, "Les preuves de l'immortalite...." p. 35.
4 1. de Vries made the distinction between arguments that are secondary and
primary based on this criterion. See his article "Zum thomistischen Beweis der
hrunaterialiUl.t der Geistseele," Scholastik 40 (1965), p. 4: "Von all diesen Beweisen
sind aber einige offenbar sekundarer Natur, insofem ihr Ausganspunkt selbst wieder
des Beweises bedUrftig ist. So die Beweise, die davon ausgehen, daB die Seele Fonn
des Leibes ist. Das gleiche gilt von dem Beweis, der davon ausgeht, daB die Seele,
d. h. das erkennende Prinzip, kein Korper ist; gerade dieser Beweis wiirde dem
I
humana potest intelligi non esse; secus de Deo ... Scribe ergo intellectu 'non est',
sume 'est', Quid restat? Nihil. Ubi ergo precedit non-esse et sequitur esse redire
potest non-esse quoad intellectum."
19 William of Auvergne, De anima, V. 24, p. lSI a.
Questiones quodlibetales, 10, q. 3, a. 2.

See, for instance, II Sent, d. 19, q. I. a.1.
22 J. Weisheipl, Frair Thomas D'Aquino (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 233.
23
For the influence, the structure and doctrines of Peter Lombard's Book of
Sentences. see B. Mondin, St.Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy in the Commentary on
the Sentences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 1 - 4.
24 Cf. J. Oguejiofor, The Argumentsfor the Immortality of the Soul... p.272.
25 B. Mondin described Aquinas' Commentary on the Sentences as the "most
impressive, 'nionumental and ftmdamental work" of St. Thomas.(cf. St. Thomas
20
21
132
Aquinas' Philosophy in the Commentary on the Sentences ... p. 2). This does not
however detract from the characterization of the work as tentative, and as marked by
an effort to cite authorities in support of position. As distinct from most other works
of Aquinas, the conunentaJy is marked by these features.
" E. Bertola, op. cit., p. 258.

27 II Sententiarum. d. 19, q. I, a.l: "differentiae superiores participantur Wliformiter
ab his quae coDveniWlt in aliquo inferiori; sicut omne animal aequaliter 5e habet ut
dicatur corporeum. Sed incorruptibile et corruptibile SWlt differentiae entis. Ergo
eadem modo coDveniWlt omnibus quae soot in aliquo determinato genere. Sed in
omnibus animalibus accidit corruptio per hoc quod forma eorum in non ens secedit.
,.
Ergo videtur quod similiter in hominibus:'

28 Ibid., ad. 2.
" Ibid., 3 ,4.
30 Ibid., ad. 4: "anima potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet secundum quod est
substantia, et scclUldum quod est fonna, non est intelligendwn quantum ad diversa
quae in ipsa sMt, quasi aliud sit essentia sua et aliud ipsam esse formam, ut sic esse
fromam accidat sibi sicut color corpori: sed distinctio accipitur seclUldum ejus
diversam considerationem; non enim ex hoc quod est forma habet quod post corpus
remaneat, sed ex hoc quod habet esse absolutum, ut substantia subsistens: sicut
etiam homo non babet quod intelIigat ex hoc quod est animal, sed ex hoc quod est
rational is, quamvis utrumque sit sibi essentiale."
31 Cf. S.C.G., II, 81, 8.
32 11 Sententiarum., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1 ad. 6: "inteIligere cum aliquo vel sine aliquo
dicitur dupliciter. Vel hoc modo quod illud etiam intelligatur esse particeps
operationis, sicut organum virtutis visivae simul cum virtute visiva videt, quia
videre est compositi, et sic intellectus oronino sine corpore inteIligit, ... vel ita quod
illud sit objeeturn operationis, sicut visus non potest videre sine colore, et hoc modo
etiam intellectus in statu viae non potest intelligere sine phantasmate, quod se habet
ad intellectum sicut color ad visum....Ex hoc non ostenditur quod anima intellectiva
babeat esse dependens ad corpus, cum operatio egrediatur ab ipsa absolute. Sed post
mortem alium modwn intelligendi habebit. .."
33 Ibid., q. 1. a. I, sed. contr.
34 H. orst. Victor, Homilie in Eeel., I (PL, 175, 117 A)
35 St. Augustine actually wrote, "Jamvero in ipsa visione atque contemplatione
veritati, qui septimus atque ultimus animus gradus est; neque iam gradus, sed
quaedam mansio, quo ilIis gradibus pervenitur; quae sint gaudia, quae perfructio
summi et veri boni, cujus serenitatis atque aetemitatis afilatus quid ego dicam." (De
~uantitate animae, IV. 33, 76)
6 Alexander of Hales, Questiones, 1. 32, 24, 26 - 28: "Si ergo contemplatio ultimus
actus sit, erit quando anima Iiberata erit a corruptione corporis. Sed secundum hanc
est non deficiensj ergo secundwn intelligentiam est non deficiens."
37 Ibid., 1. 32.
38 William of Auvergne, De anima, VI, 22, p. 176b.
39 11 Sententiarum., d. 19. q. I, a. 1, sol.
133
Lac. cit.: "Visus enim nihil cognoscit nisi mud cujus species potest fieri in
pupilla. Unde cum non sit possibile ut organum corporale cadat medium inter
virtutem aliquam et ipsam essentiam virtutis, non erit possibile ut aliqua virtus
operans mediante organo corporali cognoscat seipsam....Ex quibus omnibus patet
quod anima intellectiva habet esse absolutum, non dependens ad corpus;' unde
corrupto corpore non corrumpitur."
4\ Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono. 269,185 - 195
42
Albert the Great, Summa de creaturis. q. 59, 518b - 519b: ..... nulla virtus
corporea apprehendit se nec suurn instrumentum. Quod probatur per inductionem
omnium: nullum enim sensuum, eJderorum sentit se, vel instrumentum suum.
Similiter etiam in interioribus imaginatio non imaginatur se vel instrumentum suurn,
et sic est de omnibus a1iis. Et ratio hujus est, quia tales virtutes non apprehenduntur
nisi organa corporis aliquid passo: nullum. autem organum patitur a seipso, nec a
virtute quae est in ipso, quia sic semper pateretur: sed intellectus et caeterae virtutes
animae rationalis apprehendlUlt se et omnium. 'instrumenta virtutum: ergo non sunt
virtutes corporeae."
43 S. T. la. q. 87, a. 1: " .. sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit
actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis ....Non ergo
eer essentiam suam, sed per actum suurn se cognoscit intellectus noster."
cr. s. T. la, 13,2.
45 Cf. G. Verbeke, "Man as Frontier.... ," p. 219. When Owen says "that,man's
Imowledge of himself is from within" (cf. "The Unity in Aquinas' Philosophy of
Man," p. 73), it should not be understood as though man has a peculiar way of
knowing itself over and above the way of knowing other realities, be they spiritual
or material.
46 S.T., la, 87; a.3, res: "Id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano est
huiusmodi obiectumj et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur
obieeturnj et per aeturn cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum
intelligere."
47 cr. A. Kenny, Aquinas on the Soul (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 122.
48 II Sententiarum. d. 19, q. 1. a.1, sol.: "Quarta positio est quam fides nostra tenet,
quod anima intellectiva sit substantia non dependens ex corpore, et quod sint plures
intellectivae substantiae secundum corporum multitudinem, et quod, destructis
corporibus, remanent separatae, non in alia corpora transelll1tesj sed in resurrectione
idem corpus numero quod deposuerat Wlaquaeque assumat."
49 J. Weisheipl, op. cit., p.'360.
" G. St. Hilaire, op. cit. p. 345.
51 A. G. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death .. p. 2
D
'
cr. s. c. G. IT, 45, 8 and 46.
" Ibid, 50, 55.
54 A. G. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death .. p. 2
ss
' '
S. C. G., IT, 79, n. 2.
56 Ibid., 55, 3.
57 See his Liher de anima V. 4, 50 - 77.
40
134
" S. C. G. II., 55, n. 5.

Ibid., 79, 3: ''Nulla res corrumpitur ex eo in quo consistit sua perfectio: hae enim
mutationes sunt contrariae, scilicet ad perfectionem et corruptionem. Perfectio
autem animae humanae consistit in abstractione quadam a corpore. Perficitur enim
anima scientia et virtute: secundum scientiam autem tanto magis perficitur quanta
magis immateriale considerat; virtutis autem perfectio consistit in hoc quod homo
corporis passiones non sequator, sed eas secundum rationem temperet et refraenet.
Non ergo corruptio animae consistit in hoc quod a corpore separetur."
60 Ibid, 79, n. 11.
61 Gundissalinus, De immortalitate anima, p. 6, 5 - 10: "ODUle mortale sua ipsa
duratione paulatim debilitatur et deficit, donee deveniat ad defectum uitimum, qui
est mors. Virtus autem inteUectiva sua ipsa duratione proficit et invalescit, ut quanta
fuerit diuturnior et antiquior, tanto sit ex onmibus modis suis fortior."
62 Ibid., p. 18, 18 - 19j 7, 14 - 16: "Istum est potissima ac nobilissima eius
perfectio, dum in corpore est." For Avicenna' view about prophesy, see A.
Alamrani- Jamal, ,,De la multiplicite des modes de Ia prophetie chez Ibn Sina," in J.
Jolivet & R. Rached, eds., Etudes sur Avicenne (paris: 1984) p. 125.
63 Summa de anima, 1.42.
64 De anima, xxiii, 320: "Si anima moritur, aliquid de anima relinquitur post
mortem. IIlud reIictwn non erit corpus. Aut ergo illud erit pars corporis aut non. Si
non est pars corporis, aut est anima aut intelligentia: quorum neutrum potest esse.
Ergo anima mori non potest. Ergo anima est immortalis,"
6S S. C. G. II, 79. n. 8: "Esse intelligbile est pennanentius quam esse sensibile. Sed
id quod se habet in rebus sensibilibus per modum primi recipientis. est
incorruptibile secundum suam substantiam, scilicet materia prima. Multo igitur
fortius intellectus possibilis, qui est receptivus formanun intelligibilium. Ergo et
anima humana, cuius intellectus possibilis est pars, est incorruptibilis."
66 Ibid., 79, n. 9.
67 Ibid. 80 & 81, n. 9: "Non enim quaelibet formarum diversitas facit diversitatem
secundum speciem. sed solum illa quae est secundum principia fonnalis, vel
secundum diversam rationem fonnae: constat enim quod alia est essentia fonnae
huius ignis et ilUus. nee tamen est alius ignis neque alia fonna secundum speciem
Multitudo igitur animarum a corporibus separatarwn consequitur quidem
diversitatem fonnarum secundum substantiam, quia alia est substantia huius animae
et iIlius: non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium
ipsius animae, nec est secundum diversam commensurationem enimarwn ad
corpora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem alii,
et sic de onmibus. Huiusmodi autem conunensurationes remanent in animabus
etiam pereuntibus corporibus: sicut et ipsae earum sibstantiae manent, quasi a
corporibus secundum esse non dependentes. Sunt enim animae secundum
substantias suas fonnae corporum: alias accidentaJiter carporl unirentur et sic ex
anima et corpore non fieret unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Inquantum autem
formae sunt, oportet eas esse corporibus conunensuratas. Unde patet quod ipsae
59
I
I
135
diversae commensurationes manent in animabus separatis: et per consequens

pluralitas...
68 Ibid., 80 & 81, 3
69 Avicenna, Liberde anima V. 3. 77: " ... manifestum est animas incipere esse cwn
incipit materia corporalis apta ad serviendum eis, et corpus creatum est regnum eius
et instrumentum."
70 Ibid., V. 3. 25-27:' "Postquam autem singularis fit per se, impossibile est ut sit
anima alia nwnero et ut sint una essentia."
12 Q. Quodlibetales., 10, q. 3. a. 2, resp.
7J lbid.2, resp.: ''Non enim posset omnium sensibilium formas cognoscere, nisi ab
onmibus fomUs sensibilibus esset denudata, vel nisi esset actus omnium, cum nihil
recipiat quod iam habet. Oportet ergo, si anima per aliquod organum intelligeret.
quod suum organum careret onmi forma sensibili, CUDl onmes fonnas sensibiles sit
nata intelligere; sicut pupilla caret omni colore ad hoc quod visus possit omnes
colores cognoscere. Impossibile est autem esse aliquod organwn corporale carens
omni fonna sensibili."
74 Cf. Chapter 2, sec. 2.
" A. Kenny, op. cit., p. 132.
76 Indeed Aquinas makes much of this principle that like must be known by like,
especially in all the passages where he tries to show that the soul must be immaterial
because its knowledge of material things is somehow abstracted from the material in
order to accord with its nature which is immaterial or spiritual. It is the same
principle that is expressed by "omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur in eo per
rnodum recipientis" (S. T. 1 a, 75, 5) and again he said "Cum ergo simile simili
cognoscatur, videtur quod anima per seipsam corporalia cognoscat." (la, 84. 2, ad.
A. Kenny, op. cit., 132.

~
78 Ibid., 133 - 134.
79 Q, Quodlibetales. 10, q. 3, a. 2: "Sed primum horum esse non-potest: quia si in
nobis non est aliqua virtus nisi materialis, lumen intellectus agentis non poterit in
nobis recipi nisi materialiter, cwn receptum sit in recipiente per modum
recipientis; .... secundum esse non potest: nam phantasmata sunt in nobis per nostram
operationem. quae sequitur esse substantiate; quia sic homo non haberet esse
specificum ex hoc quod est rationalisj cum non sit rationalis nisi ex hoc quod
intellectui coniungitur."
so
T., la, q. 75 - 93, pro!.
81
G. Verbeke. "Man as Frontier.... ". p. 215.
82 S. T., 1a. 76. 6.
83 Ibid., 6, resp.
84
Loc. cit.: ''Potest etiam hujus rei accipi signwn ex hoc, quod unwnquodque
naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus
sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed
intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundwn onme tempus. Unde omne
77
cr. s.
cr.
136
i,
i
~j
II,
"
L~
I;
II
II
habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper. Naturale autern desiderium

non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis."
8S Anselm of Canterbury, Mon%gion, c. 69, p. 79.
86 Gundissalinus, De immortalite animae, p. 17, 16 - 19: "Haec autem si perennis
non fuerit, non erit felicitas neque a miseria vera inununitas. Quiquid enim est morti
obnoxium, beatum non est, immo eo ipso miserum, quod extremae mise'riae
obnoxium."
87 Ibid., p. 18, 5 - 6: "Subiectum enim contrarie dispositionis, id est mortale, non
potest esse receptibile huiusmodi felicitatis."
88 William of Auvergne, De anima, VI. 13, p. 168 b: "Quapropter non est possibile
eam per naturam venire in mortem vel eXtremam miseriam: causa autem in hoc est
ut praedixi quia unius mobilis naturaliter, non est nisi unus motus, et ab uno ad
unum: quapropter 'cum sit ei motus naturaliter in sursum sublime quod dixi non est
possibile ut sit ei motus naturalis contrarius qui est deorsum, ut antedictum est."
89 O. St. Hilaire, op. cit. 345.
90 J . Y. Jollif, op. cit., p. 74.
91 G. St. Hilaire, op. cit., pp. 348 - 350
92 Of course the exact nature of immortality in the Symposium is disputed. For the
discussion see R. Hackforth, "Immortality in Plato's Symposium," C. Rev., 61
(1950), pp. 43 45; J. V. Luce, "Immortality in Plato's Symposium: a Reply," in C.
Rev., 62 (1952), pp. 137 140; E. Tsirpanlis, "The Immortality of the Soul in
Phaedo and Symposium," Platon; 17 (1965), pp. 224 234.
93 Cicero, Somnium SCipionis, 20
94 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), pp
197 198.
9S Q.D. de anima, a.14, obj. 15.
96 Cf. Summa de bono, 265, ff..
97 Summa de creaturis, q. 59, a. 2, 21, pp. 524b - 526b.
98 Q.D. de anima, a.14, obj. 16: "ad operationem propriam speciei pertingunt vel
omnia vel plurima eorum quae sunt in specie. Sed paucissiini homines perveniunt
ad hoc quod sint intelligentes. Ergo intelIigere non est propria operatio animae
humanae; et ita non oportet animam humanam esse incorruptibilem eo quod sit
intellectualis."
99 Ibid., a. 14, ob. 20: "manente causa manet effectus. Sed anima est causa vitae
corporis. Si ergo anima semper manet, videtur quod corpus semper vivat; quod patet
esse falsum."
100 Ibid., a. 14, resp: "ea etiam quae sunt in seipsis corruptibilia, secundum quod
intellectu percipitur, incormptibilia sunt. Est enim intellectus apprehensivus rerum
in universali secundum wuem modum non accidit eis corruptio."
101 S. T. la. 75 a 6 resp.
102 Q. D. de anima, a. 14, resp.
103 B. Davies, op. cit, pp. 127 - 128.
104 St. Augustine, Soliloquia, ii. xiii. 24: "Onme quod in subjecto est, si semper
manet, ipsum etiam subjectum maneat semper necesse est. Et omnis in subjecto est
137
animo disciplina. Necesse est igitur semper ut animus maneat, si semper manet
disciplina. Es autem disciplina veritas, et semper... Semper igitur animus manet, nec
animus mortuus dicitur."
lOS Summa de bono, 268, 157 - 159: "veritas in quantum huiusmodi est immortalis.
Ergo substantia eius cognoscitiva est inunortalis. Sed anima rationalis est substantia
huiusmodi; ergo est substantia immortalis."
106 De anima, VI. 3. p. 158 b. A hint of this infinite capacity to understand in the
intellect is present in such statements of Aquinas as the following: "But the possible
intellect is endowed with a certain infinite power, since by it we judge of things
infinite in number, inasmuch as by it we know universals, under which potentially
infinite particulars are contained." (S. C. O. II. 59, 8). Aquinas puts the statement in
the mouth of an objector to the possible intellect being a part of man,' even though
the idea has an important implication in his philosophy of man. As M. Brown puts it
"although at any given time one's knowledge is finite, there is no intrinsic limit to
what one can know about the universe. Aquinas says that the human being is the
matrix of the universe, the only being which is both material and immaterial." (The
Romance of Reason: An Adventure in the Thought afThomas Aquinas, St. Bede's.
Petersham, 1991, p. 77) Such statements command accent by some intuitive or
introspective feeling of each human person. The problem with it though is that since
the human being is very finite, there is no type of witness or verification that can
possibly be produced for it.
107 Cf. S. C. G., II, 75.
108
S. T., la, 75, ad 4, 5: Aquinas refers to this capacity as infinite range in the
universals. What he sometimes seems to mean is that there is theoretically no
conceivable limit to the application of universals to particulars, or again that the
soul through its general concepts can always invent alternative tools, ways of action,
etc. ''Dicendum quod anima intellectiva, qui universalium comprehensiva, habet
virtutem ad infinita ... homo habet naturaliter rationem et manus, quae sunt organa
organorum, quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum
modorum, et ad infinitos effectus."
109 Cf. A. Kenny, op. cit., pp. 96 97.
110 J. de Vries, op. cit., p. 6
111 Ibid., pp. 10 - 11: "Wenn dies abgelelmt wird, miiste ein besonderer Grund
angeben werden, warum die Wesensgleichheit zwischen ErkelUltnisgegenstand und
Erkenntnisakt (bzw. Erkenntnisflihigkeit) gerade im Fall der Inuuaterialitiit
notwendig ist."
112 Ibid., p. 16.19.
113 II Sententiarum., q. 1, a. 1. sol.
114 Ch. 79, n. 5.
lIS See Gundissalinus, De immortalitate animae, pp. 28 - 29; Robert of Melun. in
R. M. Martin, op. cit. pp. 141 142; John Blund, De anima, xiv, 334; Albert the
Great, De natura et origine animae, IT.c. 6, p. 26a, 23 - 31.
116 It can indeed be said that Thomas follows the presentation of Gundissalinus who
first argues that the soul has no contrary by arguing against the composition of
cr.
138
matter and form in it. There is also a very close resemblance in the statement
accepting for the sake of the argument that the soul is composed of matter and form,
and still arguing it would even then be without contrruy. Blund and Thomas used
this line of argument. Gundissalinus link the question of contrary to knowledge by
saying ''Non est igitur destructibilis per divisionem formae a materia, cum forma
eius contrarium habere non possit, sed sit ad omnes fonnas intelligihiles,
quamadmodum hyle ad omnes visibiles." (Cf. p. 29). St. Thomas says almost the
same by referring to the mode of existence of contraries in the soul.
117 C. the%giae. c. 84, 147: "Proprium subiectum generationis et corruptionis est
materia. Intantum igitur unumquodque a corruptione recedit, inquantum recedit a
materia: ea enim quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, sunt per se corruptibilia;
formae autem materiales sunt corruptihiles per accidens, et non per se; formae
autem inunateriales, quae materiae proportionem excedunt sunt incorruptibiles
omnino. Intellectus autem omnino secundum suam naturam supra materiam
elevatur, quod eius operatio ostendit: non enim intelligirnus aliqua nisi per hoc quod
ipsa a materia separamus. Es igitur intellectus secundum naturam incorruptibilis."
118 Ibid., c. 84, 148: "Corruptio absque contrarietate esse non potest, nihil eniro
corrumpitur nisi a suo contrario: unde corpora caelestia, in quibus non est
contrarietas, soot incorruptibilia. Sed contrarietas lange est a natura intellectus, in
tantum quod ea quae sec\.Uldum se sunt contraria, in intellectus contraria non S\.Ult:
est enim contrariorum ratio intelligbilis una, quia per \.Ulurn intelligitur aHud.
Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus sit corruptibilis."
119 S. T. la, 76, a. 6.,: "Dato etiam quod anima esset ex materia et forma composita,
ut quidam dicWlt, adhuc oporteret ponere earn incorruptibilem."
120 F. D. Wilhelmsen, "A Note on Contraries and the Incorruptibility of the Human
Soul in St. Thomas Aquinas," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67
(1993), pp. 334 - 335.
I2l Ibid., pp. 337 - 338.
122 A Kenny, op. cit., p. 134.
Chapter 4
SOME PROBLEMS OF IMMORTALITY
4.1 The Question of Death

Our review of the arguments, which Aquinas proffers for
immortality, brings certain points to the fore. In the first place it is clear
that without any exception, all the arguments iu question are taken from
the predecessors of the angelic doctor, especially those who flourish
around the first half of the thirteenth centtuy. From this context shines
his originality in trying to reconcile these arguments which have
Platomc background with his understanding, and reinterpretation of the
philosophy of Aristotle. The review also highlights some problems
specific to the arguments some of which are already noticed by many
Thomistic scholars, and where feasible, it suggests possible ways of
interpreting the text to make the positions less problematic. Again, it is
clearly underlined that even though Thomas, like most thinkers of his
time, believes that immortality can be adequately proved from the
rational point of view, and even though this conviction follows the
whole project of proving immortality, he nevertheless leaves us in no
doubt that what he is doing accords with the Christian faith, and that in
fact it is in defence of important aspects of that faith that the whole
Some Problems o/Immortality
project is undertaken. The present chapter concentrates on some of the

more general problems associated with the effort to prove the
immortality of the soul from an Aristotelian perspective. While Aquinas
operates on the grounds of philosophy in outlining the arguments, faced
with some of these problems, he gravitates more and more to
theological positions, bringing into play principles acceptable to the
believing mind.
First, let us consider the phenomenon of death. We bave seen that
among the thinkers of the thirteenth century, Aquinas' description of the
relationship between the human soul and the body is peculiar, if not
revolutionary. This peculiarity comes from the closeness that he defends
between the body and the soul, based on the Aristotelian hylemorphic
theory. Aquinas more than any other author pushes the form/matter
conjunction between the body and the soul to its ultimate implication.
As the existence of form and matter is one, so is the existence of body
and soul, since it is in fact form that gives existence to matter.' The two
have one being, notwithstanding the constant affirmation that matter
exists for the sake of form, and the body for the sake of the soul. The
union of body and soul is so intimate that the buman being can be called
a body, or a soul depending on different perspectives. But this is not so
that the order of precedence is overturned. The soul is the life-giver, its
life flowing naturally down to the body, so that as the soul is spiritual,
the body can be understood as spiritualized. And as M. Brown rightly
says, "the essential structure or pattern or meaning of the body is
contained in the rational soul. ,,2 Now, the rational soul, which is so
determinant of the nature of the composite, is endowed with its own
life. It is self-subsistent, proven by, among other points, its ability to
exercise activities not requiring any bodily organ, or any participation
by the body, even though these activities are linked with its union with
the body, since it is on account of these that the union is naturally
explicable in the first place. Such a naturally self-sufficient source of
life is imperishable. But if so, and under the background of the union
between soul and body, why does the soul die?
Aquinas refers to the phenomenon of death in the course of his
arguments for immortality. In the De anima, for example, be dwells
briefly on it in answer to a possible difficulty arising from an immortal
soul existing in a mortal body. The objector asserts that if the cause
continues in operation, its effect must also continue. Since the soul is
the cause of the life of the body, and continues in existence, so should
the body, which means that it will be immortal like the soul.' The
objection fails to distinguish the locus of the activity of the cause, for
there is no reason to suppose that a cause that continues to act in

another place cannot also produce different effects unconnected with
the previous effects it had produced. Aquinas does not take on the
imaginary objector from that perspective; rather be delves into the
reason why the body does not continue perpetually to be receptive of
the life-giving activity of the soul. It is not because of the cessation of
this activity, but because the body which receives life from the soul is
changeable, and, as a result, can lose the dispositions on account of
which it is fitted to receive life from the soul, that the buman composite
is subject to death"
Neither the objection nor the answer given to it refers to the strong
unity between the soul and the body, whicb Aquinas has constantly
defended, and which is to play a role in his discussion of the
resurrection. It is true that decomposition in material things is owed not
to form, but to the propensity in matter to assume another form. A mass
of cement dust when mixed with water and allowed to harden will
assume the form of the mould in which it is poured. If it is used to build
a fortress, it will assume the form of the fortress conceived by its
builder. Again, if a bomb blows up this fortress, the cement with which
it is build will divide into chips of rocks of different forms. In all cases,
it is the original cement component that changes from one form to
another depending on a particular physical force that is in operation.
One would have thought that given the strong unity between the rational
soul and the body, this general tendency in the physical world would
have been spared the composite. And if indeed the soul is the only
exception in the world of forms, does it not entail, at least on grounds of
proportionality, that the body enjoys some exceptions also in the family
of matter? Not to grant the body any of sucb exceptions would seem to
entail that the force governing physical nature supersedes the unity
between the soul and the body. Before this problem, it seems one must
either sacrifice the close-knit unity already established between the two
components in man or find another reason why the unity must succumb
to the general tendency in nature.
Most reflections of Aquinas on death are found in the context of his
writings on original sin. In the Summa the%giae, he asks whether
death and other infirmities of the body are the result of sin. He first
makes a distinction between direct and indirect cause. A direct cause
produces an effect that accords with its natural power. In this case, tbe
effect follows the purpose and the natural intent of the cause. Viewed in
this light, Aquinas says that sin is not the cause of death, since the one
posing the act of sin does not include death as one of the effects of his
140
141
142
act. An indirect cause removes an obstacle, making it possible for an

effect to be realized. It is as an indirect cause that death results from
origioal sin.' But here, it is obvious that Aquinas is dwelling on the
plane of theology, and even then approaching the question obliquely. In
the next article he is more direct, and asks whether death and other evils
are natural to man. The objector opines that death is natural to man
since man does not differ generically from other animals, which are
corruptible. Again, all that is by nature composed of contraries is also
subject to corruption, and the human body, being so composed, must
also be perishable.' The response to these objections is found in a long
section in which Aquinas gives his position on the issue at stake. Here
also there are two possible ways of viewing corruption. Things can be
said to corrupt from the point of view of general or universal nature or
from that of particular nature. From the perspective of particular nature,
all corruption is contrary to nature because each particular nature is
geared towards the conservation of itself, since its nature is its proper
active and conserving force. What Aquinas is explaining here is akin to
the tendency in things for self-preservation; an aversion to their
annihilation, which is in the nature of everything which exists.
The second mode of corruption, that is, what pertains to general
nature, refers to some active power in some universal principle of
nature, caring as it were, for the general preservation and well being pf
the whole universe. Such preservation and continuous perfection require
the conjoined working of corruption and generation in particular beings.
From this standpoint, i.e. for the sake of the well being of general
nature, corruption in some things is natural. Aquinas adds that even then
such natural corruption is not on account of form, but because of an
intrinsic co-existential principle in matter, giving it the natural tendency
towards corruptibility. If natural corruption in things is not due to the
form, it means that by nature, forms should be perpetual. This is in fact
true so far as tendency is in question, but it is not possible in reality for
the form of any corruptible being to achieve perpetuity. Here again
there is ouly one exception: the rational soul and the reason for this
exception is also because it has operations that are peculiar to it,
independent of the body. If therefore man is seen as form, then
incorruptibility is more natural to him than to other beings. Because his
form lives in union with matter, he is not spared incorruptibility and this
results in the corruptibility of the human composite. It means that man
7
is naturally corruptible, even though his form is not.
The necessary presence of corruption and generation in universal
nature could be said to be on account of its continuous maintenance and
Some Problems a/Immortality
143
perfection through these processes, even though it could be asked

whether there is a necessity that this should be so. The thought can be
taken as an effort to find an explanation or a justification for an existing
and constant part of nature, the generation and corruption of things, an
effort which can offer some eulightenment to an enquiring mind. It
would seem that the human body must then go through the general
natural part. Aquinas further adds that the incorruptibility of the human
soul is in line with the end of man, which is everlasting happiness. How
does the corruptible body fit into this scheme of incorruptibility and
everiasting happiness? Aquinas says that the body is, in a sense,.
proportioned to its form, that is, to incorruptibility and, in another
sense, it is not. Here he gives an illustration of this dual consideration
from nature. In all material things, two factors must be taken into
account: the condition that is determined by the agent cause and the one
that is embedded in the nature of the thing itself. An artisan chooses a
piece of iron to make a knife because it is hard and can respond to his
act of fashioning the iron into a knife. However, that the piece of iron is
subject to rust by its very nature has nothing to do with the will or
machination of the artisan. Viewed as such, what is in the nature of the
body leads to corruption, but this is not the choice of nature, if nature is
substituted for our artisan.'
Even though Aquinas clearly affirms that human nature is
incorruptible, he also says that were nature to choose, it would in fact
choose incorruptibility. This is important in view of his earlier
statement that every particular nature tends to perpetual existence.
Again, the corruption found in nature in general is not due to form, but
to the presence of contraries, wl\ich is the natural state of matter.
Already in the sed contra of the same article 6 he goes from the point of
view of proportionality to the conclusion that the human body is
incorruptible by nature, even though it cannot be said that this is a
presentation of his view. What is present here is the tension between the
natural immortality of the human composite, the indubitable fact of
death, and its explanation through original sin. Over and over again,
Aquinas draws very close to the position that the body by nature must
be immortal, but seems to pull back at the brink of this position in
deference to the physics of Aristotle. It means that death is at the same
time a punishment for sin as well as a fact of nature attendant on the
composition that is found in man.
What then becomes of the unity between the soul and the body,
which has been described as the greatest contribution of Aquinas to the
understanding of man? And how can something that is natural be
144
Some Problems of Immortality
inflicted as a punishment? At this juncture, one must note that St.

Thomas has left the shores of philosophy and is deep into theological
reasoning, backed by revealed truth and dogma. In article 5 of question
85, he alludes to the absence of original justice, because of which
absence the body becomes subject to corruption, and at the end of the
next article, after clearly stating that man is subject to death on account
of the body, returns again to the concept of original justice whereby
God bestowed incorruptibility as a gift to man: It is here described as a
certain type of incorruptibility, emphasizing by that description that it is
not the normal incorruptibility that is being talked about.
The state of original justice is found in what Aquinas calls the state
of innocence, i.e. before the fall of original sin. It means that God the
creator made man in a sort of rectitude in which reason was submissive
to God, and the lower powers in man to the reason, and the body to the
soul. This establishes an interconnected chain of submissiveness in
which the lower members depend on the first, so that the lower powers
submit to reason so long as reason is in submission to God. tO It is in fact
because of the disruption of this order that death is said to result, since
the body becomes independent, apt to act in accordance with its nature,
and is liberated from the complete control of the soul, which would
have assured it this special type of immortality. When Aquinas comes to
consider whether the soul is immortal in the state of innocence, the
answer that suggests itself seems obvious, but he again distinguishes
three types of immortality. The first is natural innnortality, which is due
to something on the ground of its nature lacking any material
composition. The second type is with reference to the form. It is called
innnortality of glory, in which something that is naturally perishable is
endowed with some dispositions that prevent it from decaying. The
third type, that which applies to man in his state of innocence, Aqninas
names imperishability on the part of the efficient cause, indicating that
it is the creator, through original justice, who bestows this innnortality
on the human composite. This type of innnortality is one that is
dependent on the integrity of the line of submissiveness in creation, and
that is why it can be lost by sin. But from here Aquinas returns to
rational consideration again. This third type of innnortality is not
against reason; it goes very much in accordance with the nature of the
soul and body. The soul is so much above the body that it is reasonable
that it should be able to cover up the natural lack in the composition of
the body." In other words, the fact of immortality in the state of
innocence justifies the supposition that if indeed the soul were so much
higher than the body, and if they were so intimately united, the body
should possess something of its innnortality too. It must be borne in

mind, however, that even though Aquinas says that this is reasonable, he
does not say that it is actually so except by special favour of the creator
due to original justice.
The picture that emerges from all these turns is the human
composite, essentially corruptible even though the nature of its
components argues for innnortality. Through original justice it regains
that incorruptibility that is in accordance with reason and then loses it as
a punishment for original sin. William of Auvergue was the first in the
thirteenth century to abstract the man, specifically the soul from his
present state, in an attempt to find out what must have appertained to it
by nature without the intervention of original sin." For Auvergue, the
consequence of sin is so pervasive that it influences the mode of
knowledge of the soul. His philosophy of the soul is therefore aimed at
rmding out what the soul must have been before the fall; that for him is
the nature of the soul, while what appears to be its nature in the present
dispensation is only a distortion. In the original state of innocence, for
instance, man could know both the universal and the particular without
recourse to the senses. Now, however, after the fall, it is as though the
soul lost all its natural capacity, and must stoop to beg for information
from the senses in order to know." There is no doubt that when the
argumentation proceeds in this marmer, no one is left in doubt about the
theological intention of the author; only that it should not be forgotten
that most of the authors of the time make no strict distinction between
philosophy and theology. Aquinas does not go so far as Auvergue to
hold that the real nature of the soul was already manifested before the
fall. His teaching is that, even before the fall, the death of man is
natural, but God, due to original justice, provided him with a sort of
innnortality which was dependent on the continued submission of his
intellect to God. The problem is whether the natural tendency due to the
material composition in man was suspended by God's favour. If so, and
if this state of bliss was intended to last forever, what does one make of
the natural inclination of matter which Aquinas takes into account even
in the state of innocence? Again, one must remember that for Aquinas,
the suspension of the natural tendency of matter in the original state of
innocence is not only due to God's justice, but is also reasonable on
natural grounds. It is, as we have said, the tension between his religious
faith and the evidence that COmes from his philosophical inclination that
makes him not to say outright that the relationship between the soul and
body means that the human composite is innnortal originally. That
could still have allowed space for him to affirm that death is indeed a
145
146
punishment, although then that punishment would have scathed the

order of nature. Pegis' review of the question of death in the Summa
contra gentiles concludes that "inunortaiity is the main direction of
human existence: this is what the order of human nature says." 14 We can
say that this statement is acceptable, if for nothing else, because of the
nuance that Pegis provides before the assertion. From what we have
seen however, it appears more correct to say that even though
inunortality is what the order of human nature would argue for, St.
Thomas never gives up the view that because of the presence of matter,
the human composite is naturally mortal.
4.2 Why are Brute Souls not Immortal?
While the problem of death arises on account of the strong unity
which exist, between the soul and the body, there is an obvious problem
arising from the fact that brute souls are not inunortal. This is ftrst
because they share the nature of forms, which is described by Aquinas
as having a tendency towards perpetual existence. On account of this,
corruption in all cases is not due to form, but to matter. It also means
that taken separately, the form (if not given to corruption) does not
contain contraries that in Aristotelian and Thomistic physics give rise to
corruption. Yet in spite of all these, the soul of brutes is not considered
as a member of the class of inunortal things. Aquinas shows that he is
constantly aware of the question of immortality of brute souls. In many
instances, he attributes the contrary position to ancient philosophers
(antiqui philosoph!), especially to Plato, against whom he argues for the
mortality of the animal soul. The error of the ancients is, according to
him, that they did not distinguish between the sensitive and intellective
powers, taking the two to be equally corporeal. Plato who goes far
enough to make a distinction between the two holds that sensation and
intellection are equally actions of the soul, and what applies to the
rational soul for the sake of being a special operation of the soul must in
like manner be Ime of the sensitive. Aquinas' reflections in this respect
are found in the context of answering the question whether animal souls
are subsistent, inunediately after responding to the same question with
regard to the human soul in the preceding article of the Summa
theologiae. What concerns subsistence concerns immortality, for a
being that is not subsistent cannot be immortal, but that he deals with
the question of brute souls inunediately after the treatment of the human
soul, be it in the Summa theologiae or in the Contra gentiles (after
inunortality), indicates that he does in no way underestimate the
Some Problems 0/ Immortality
147
problems involved. The answer given to the question in the Summa

theologiae derived from the oft-repeated principle that beings act as
they exist (similiter unumquodque habet esse et operationem). It asserts
that sensation, which is the highest operation of the animal soul, does
not take place without some physical change in the body. In seeing,
colour affects the pupils of the eyes, touching affects physically the
surface of the body, etc. This obvious fact is, for Aquinas, enough to
conclude that the activity of sensation is a compound activity of the
body and the soul. Since, uu1ike the rational soul, the souls of brutes
have no activities that are proper to souls alone, they do not subsist."
The same issue resurfaces in many texts where inunortality is argued
for. In the Summa theologiae, in response to the usual objection that
animal and brute souls must slave the same fate, Aquinas says that the
souls of brute are produced by a certain material force, whereas animal
souls are produced directly by God. l This does not mean that God is
not ultimately the creator of everything. It means that uu1ike other souls,
which result from the seed of the generating pair, the human soul is
directly created at the moment of conception, the seed of parents
providing ouly the required matter for the action of God." Needless to
say, this provides a background from which to state that the soul going
back whence it comes means its going back to God. In the Questiones
quodlibetales," he also repeats the statement that the sensitive soul
does not act uu1ess it is moved by some sensible object that is outside
the soul, showing its intrinsic dependence on the material.
Over and over again, Aquinas goes to the phenomenon of
knowledge, which indicates that brute souls have no independent
operations. What of other points on which his defence of immortality is
based? For instance, that the soul has no contrary or that natural desire
cannot be in vain, and man desires perpetuity in being. His examination
of two of these points is not unconnected with the phenomenon of
knowledge in man. It is ultimately on the presence of contraries in the
same unitive act of knowledge that he grounds his use of the point to
prove inunortality. It is also for that reason that he is ready to concede,
for the sake of the argument, that the rational soul is made of matter and
form. It is possible that one comes back to the question of the mortality
of the brute soul if the hypothetical concession is lifted. Even then the
grounds for removing matter from the soul would revert to the
arguments which were offered in rejection of spiritual matter. One of
such arguments would suit perfectly the nature of brute souls. l9 The
soul is a formative principle, and it is such either wholly or in part. If it
is so wholly, then no part of it can be material, given the implication of
148
potentiality in the very notion of materiality. The very conception of

fonn excludes its being in potency, and logically what is in actuality
cannot have as its part what is in potency. If, on the other hand, the soul
is only partly a form, then only that part that is fonn can be called the
soul, the intrinsic matter that it first comes in conjunction with will then
be the compound that is ensouled.
The argument from the nature of fonn applies to all fonns, and if the
absence of contraries coming from matter is given pride of place, then
all fonns would be inunortal, a position that is completely untenable in
Aquinas' system. For him the decisive point against such a direct link
from the inunateriality of fonn to its inunortality will be the absence of
knowledge or any other indication that any of the lower fonns has any
activity which is completely independent of the body. That brings into
focus the question of natural desire. We have already seen in the
previous chapter that the phenomenon of natural desire has been used in
connection with a diversity of things that are desirable to the human
being, and the fulfihnent of which is not possible in the present
corporeal dispensation. They include justice, being, happiness, and
perpetuity, etc. It is obvious that some natural desires are found in lower
animals, and that one of such desires is to stay in existence. It can be
called the instinct of self-preservation, which impels beings to avoid
what leads to destruction. If one dwell on the bare principle that no
natural tendency can be in vain, why does one not also concede that
animal souls can be subjects of immortality? This is all the more so
because while man has the same tendency, it is possible that he decides
to take his life for whatever reason this is done. Such a possibility is not
reconcilable with the way animals behave, so that if the kernel of the
argument is that natural desire cannot be in vain, it may seem necessary
to explain why anima1 souls die.
Such explanation is the task Aquinas sets for himself in one of the
contexts where he uses the argument. 20 He begins with the statement
that every intelligent being desires to last in perpetuity, not as species
but as an individual being. This tendency is what is called natural
appetite, and he goes on to explain what this means. There are things
that are desired because they are perceived as good and desirable in all
animals. However, there are other things which whet the appetite or the
desire irrespective of their being apprehended or not. In this case, such
an appetite arises fonn the being of the thing as such. Beings are desired
in two ways: either because they are perceived as good or the desire for
them is connatural with the things that are the subject of the desire. This
is shown in all beings in that they seek to preserve themselves with the
Some Problems ofImmortality
149
means available to them, and thus knowledgeable beings resist their

annihilation with the equipment of their knowledge. Aquinas then
speaks of things which have no knowledge, but which have in
themselves the principle of maintaining themselves in existence forever.
~ere he me~ the heavenly bodies, which, according to the physics of
his lime, are mcorruptible. There are then other beings which have no
power to remain forever individually in existence, whose desire for
be~g is for the perpetuation of the species. It is to this group that the
arumals must belong. For Aquinas, they desire the perpetuation of their
species, since they can only perceive being here and now, and not being
as. such. Their de~~e is therefore not such that leads to everlasting
eXlstence because It IS not accompanied with knowledge, and the desire
for. the. peq;etuation of their species is due to the power of generation,
which IS SUItable to the perpetuation of the species, and is not subj ect to
knowledge, but precedes it in existence. The only reason why natural
desire in man leads to immortality is that to his desire is added an
apprehension of everlasting being.
There are several points in such an argument which are both difficult
to understand and even more difficult to accept for modem minds. One
must, first, not forget that Aquinas is arguing within his time and is
influenced enonnously by the context within which he is arguing. It is
an intellectual context in which the heavenly bodies are unquestionably
regarded to be incorruptible'l and where astronomy has not developed
to the extent of tracing the history of the evolution and continuous
adjustment in the .ord~r of the heavenly bodies. Still the designation of
the deSire for bemg m brutes as realizable only on the level of the
species is not convincingly argued, if at all. The desire for the
generation of new members can be easily subsumed under that aim, but
what of the tendency present in the individual brutes to avoid
~estruction whi~h ~quinas alludes to in the course of the argument. If
mdeed the specIes IS the only thing at stake, why the constant desire to
avoid individual destruction in the brute? A possible answer would be
the one obliquely referred to in the argument, i.e. since brute souls can
ap?rehend being. only here and now, they cannot desire everlasting
bemg. However, Irrespective of their inability to apprehend the future
the natural desire to continue in existence in unceasing succession
here an~ now is, in the fiuaJ auaJysis, what makes up the human
~OnCe?tlOn of a lo~g future. As Augustine says," the apprehension of
tnne IS made pOSSIble not by any objective, external existence, but
bec~use of the pos~ibility in man to retain the past in memory, and
project the present mto the future. The so-called desire for everlasting
of
Some Problems of Immortality
being has problems not only in the context of st. Thomas' theory of
knowledge, but also in the specific meaning of the duration, the
apprehension of which is objectified in the argwnent.
When Aquinas examines the immortality of the animal souls
immediately after arguing for immortality in the Contra gentiles, he
returns again to natural desire, but then he has taken it for granted that
brute forms do not have the type of natural desire that can lead to
immortality. With this he asserts that in each thing capable of attaining a
certain perfection, there must be the desire for this perfection, and we
find in animal souls no desire for endless existence. On the contrary,
their desire is limited to apprehension and their apprehension carmot
extend beyond the here and now." Furthermore he argues that since that
which is separate is understood in act, and in that case, and in
accordance with the word of Aristotle, with separate beings that which
is understood is identical with that which understands, it would follow
. that animal souls would be intellectual if they are separate from the
body, and this too would be impossible. 24 Aquinas also swipes against
Plato's argwnent from motion, which has a consequence of affirming
the immortality of all that is self-moving. 2S He considers what Plato
means by self-motion in his argwnent, but rejects all possibilities of the
argwnent leading to the immortality of brute souls, on the supposition
that the operation of brute souls, evidenced in such activities like
sensation, is intrinsically bound up with bodily organs. Thus the
movement that Plato speaks about in the soul carmot be separated from
the organs of the body, showing again that the soul carmot have
operations that are independent of the body, which is required if it is to
be considered immortal.
In spite of the problems latent in some argwnents for immortality
arising from their possible applicability to the soul of brutes, Aquinas
shows his awareness of this problem and tries repeatedly to provide
answers to it because of the common conviction that the souls of
animals are not immortal. This is a rare procedure in the attempt to
argue for immortality in the thirteenth century, since most authors ofthe
time who wrote on immortality did not regard seriously the
consequence of any of their argwnents on other types of souls.
Alexander of Hales was in fact the first to reject an argwnent for
immortality because accepting it would also imply that the souls of
plants and animals are immortal (quia sic sensibilis et vegitabilis in
plantis essent immortalis).' The argwnent that Alexander rejects is the
one that holds that the soul is the source of life, and if so carmot be
deprived of life itself. This argwnent was very dear to Augustine, to
Cicero, to Auvergne, and it also enters into the basic structure of

Aquinas' project by his insistence that the life of the soul is what keeps
the human in being. The more elaborate consideration given to the
question shows that by the time Aquinas is arguing for immortality, as
against the period of his immediate predecessors, the awareness of the
philosophical problems involved in the attempt has grown considerably.
Aquinas tries as much as possible to provide responses to some of these
problems, even though his answers are not completely satisfactory.
150
151
4.3 The State of the Separated Soul

The question of the mortality of brute souls underlines Aquinas
conviction that the rational soul, conceived as form of the body,
deserves special treatment among all other natural forms. It is so
because it is the only exception in the order of nature straddling the two
great divides of the spiritual and the material worlds as an accredited
citizen of the two even though its relative positions in them are
diametrically different, being the highest in the material order and the
lowest in the spiritual. In spite of the special status of man in the chain
of being," the fact that when the composite dies, the soul survives, and
remains immortal without the body brings other serious problems. What
is specifically the state of the separated soul, and how does its new
existence stand in relation with the affirmation about the nature of the
man and of the soul that Aquinas otherwise holds very dearly? Even
though the soul shares the qualities of the material and the spiritual, it
would seem natural that man remains in his composite where he would
realise his membership of the two spheres without problems, leading a
material existence, but patticipating in an immaterial nature and
operations by his knowledge. If it is in such a state that the soul attains
perfection, and if the union of the body and the soul is justifiable
philosophically on account of the perfection of the soul,28 then death, as
we have said, is a real problem. Why does it not continue in that state,
given the background of the strict bond of hylemorphic union between
the body and soul, and going on forever purveying benefits of
perfection to the soul, though without ever reaching infinity, an attribute
that belongs only to God? We have seen that for Aquinas death is first a
fact of nature, which, through God's grace, was removed from man in
the state of innocence provided that he remained submissive to his
creator. This grace was lost when reason became disobedient to the will
of God. Going back to the natural order therefore death is natural to
man. That means that if we abstract from the situation of special grace
and later sin, man is mortal. It means that naturally his soul, if immortal,
must be able to remain apart from the body in some manner.
Aquinas insists repeatedly that the union of the soul to the body is
for the good of the soul because it is there that its perfection lies.29 Still
there seems to be in his thought an enduring conflict between this idea
inspired by his reading of Aristotelian philosophy and another
inspiration coming more from the Platonic influence on his philosophy,
aided by some latent theological considerations. It is therefore not
surprising that much as Aquinas affinns the usefulness and naturalness
of the union of the body to the soul, he speaks in some places as though
the body is a burden and that it is only with liberation from it that the
soul comes to the perfection that is proper to its nature.' Sometimes it
is placed in the context of a direct vision of God," but the awareness of
the implication of this for Aquinas, the theologian, displays more
clearly the tension between the natural and the supernatural in his
philosophy of the soul and its separation from the body.
However, wherever specifically this tension nudges St. Thomas, he
still retains the conviction that the separated soul does not lose its
nature, i.e. it is still the human soul in its separation from the body and
does not therefore suddenly acquire a nature it did not possess
previously. Two issues merit our attention against the teaching of the
sameness of nature in the united and separated soul. In the first place,
whence does the separated soul derive its individuation, and what
happens to its ability to know which constitutes one of the pillars of its
perfection?" J. Mundhenk examines briefly the problems associated
with the separated soul, and concludes that the picture one derives from
Aquinas' thought on it is fragmented, and wonders whether the author
himself regards the result of his researches as insufficient or whether he
intends each of these attempts to appear in a fragmented manner to us. 33
What Mundhenk does not point out is that the enquiry is almost bound
to be as he describes it because of the question at stake. Before the
problem of the soul in separation from the body, there is evidently no
help from Aristotelian philosophy available to the angelic doctor. There
is also no help from the common human intuition on which he depends
so much in arguing for immortality. So either he draws the
consequences that are latent in the philosophy of nature of Aristotle,
which he follows very closely in outlining the nature of the soul, and
with the help of which he argues further for its immortality, or he brings
in other convictions that are extrinsic to this philosophy from faith and
theology. But the second option does not present any wide area of
choice of means, for, according to St. Paul, the state of the soul after
death is not so clear to the human being subject to the limitations of his
nature. In reality, Thomas mainly retains the conclusions of his natural
philosophy and tries to extend deductively their implications to the
separated soul, then shifts here and there to other grounds which are not
very much in consonance with his philosophy. If from Thomas' point of
view such a procedure is not contradictory, at least it projects a picture
that is not easy to understand and integrate completely.
For St. Thomas, matter is the principle of individuation. Even though
materia signata quantitate does not for him explain all about why
human beings are multiple, there is no doubt that it is at least the
material cause of individuation in man. It therefore remains true to the
spirit of Aquinas that there is no other thing in the soul by which it is
individuated." The fonnal principle of multiplicity is other than matter.
It is the substantial fonn. But the part matter plays is essential in this
process. If, as Elders says, "individuality consists in a proper mode of
the specific essence in respect of the other individuals of a species""
how is one individual soul separated from the body distinguishable from
the other if they belong to the same species? It cannot be that, like
angels, each separated soul belongs to a different species. The question
is already raised as an objection to immortality, and in response to it,
Aquinas refers to the proportion that must exist between a particular
fonn and its matter, and a commensuration of souls to their bodies. It
means that, on separation, the soul retains its proportionality, and its
commensuration to a particular body, which is however not caused by
this body, but must be a prior fitness to be united to the body.
By this theory, Aquinas achieves the effect of not making the body
as such exercise in its own right a detennination on the essential nature
of the soul as individual, for that would entail that a lower being is
somehow an active agent in the production of a higher spiritual being.
In further explanation of the fonnal source of individuality, he gives the
example of two fires which, though possessing different fonns, have the
same essential principle. It would seem however that this example does
not solve the problem involved. Different fires must have different
substrates on which to inhere unless they are substantive fires, which is
difficult to comprehend.. Being in different substrates (their fuel" for
example), they must also be in different places, and consuming different
oxygen to keep them burning. These are material things that surround
the being of fire, which cannot go with the nature of the separated soul.
A similar problem arises when wax is given as an example of how
individuation follows the separated soul irrespective of the body.'" If
the commensuration or proportionality of the soul to the body is enough
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153
to account for multiplicity and individuation, what role does the body
play in the matter? Such a question is not discussed as such by Aquinas,
and there is a cacophony of voices on what he exactly taught on the
question of individuation. For the moment however, let us note that the
fitness of the soul for a particular body plays a significant role in the
doctrine of the resurrection.
A more intractable problem however is the operational status of the
soul in the state of separation. The issue is raised in several places in the
text where Aquinas argues for immortality." The point at issue in all
cases is the objection that each being must have its specific operation,
and the special operation of the soul, knowing, is intrinsically linked
with the body. How then does the soul continue in knowledge if it is
separated from the body and thus deprived of the long process at the
end of which intellectual knowledge results in the noetics of Aquinas?
The fleeting answers he gives to such objections are always that the soul
will have another mode of operation when separated from the body. But
he is deeply aware of the problems involved and it is in connection with
this question that he expressly admits that a question is very difficult."
His analysis of the difficulty shows how a Platonic conception of the
soul would have solved the problem, for then separation would be a
liberation from the impediment of the body, and the soul would receive
its species purely and directly from a higher source. But such a solution
would not be suitable to him because it goes against a very important
principle: that the union of the soul and the body is for the good of the
soul, as matter is in general meant to serve the fonn.
As the soul in Aquinas' teaching has operations independent of the
body, it is possible also to think of a situation where it would depend on
the knowledge it has already acquired while joined to the body, and
perhaps through reflection and meditation, with such knowledge as
foundation, maintain some activity which takes care of the difficulty of
conceiving a being without its proper activity. He takes adequate
account of the knowledge which the rational soul acquires while it is
united to the body. Nevertheless, limiting the intellectual operation of
the soul to what it knows already would have many consequences. First
there will be the problem of what knowledge it would have of higher
beings including God in the separated state, and again it would be
difficult to see how such knowledge would be restrained only to what
the soul was able to acquire in the body. Further, rational souls which
cannot acquire much knowledge, or those which do not acquire
knowledge at all while on earth would then not be immortal or would be
limited to stunted existence. In general, however, given that knowledge
is the perfection of the human soul, there will still remain the problem
of whether the separated soul is in a better or worse state than when
united with the body. It is not certain yet that Aquinas would
unequivocally admit that life in the composite of the body is in every
case better for the soul, as we have already seen. The choice is then
open whether to conclude that given the persistence of the nature of the
soul, its capacity for knowledge remains as when incorporated, or that
the soul has now a new mode of knowing different from the fonner
natural mode. Our view is that through all his works, Aquinas retains
the two positions, and here and there he makes a significant shift from
one to the other.
This view is a bit different from the conclusion of Pegis in his study
?f the nature of the separated soul in the works of Aquinas. Pegis
Identifies a real change in the position of st. Thomas from the
beginning of his career when he held 'a position very much preAristotelian to the time he wrote the Summa theologiae by which time
the Aristotelian notion of nature has entered into his discussion and
replaced the fonner position held in the Contra gentiles. "The emphasis
on the role of nature in characterising the embodied and separated states
of the soul is a new -and Aristotelian - development in the teaching of
St. Thomas. ,,39 He carefully traces the change of position through some
important works of Aquinas, and groups the works under these two
poles. The Commentary on the Sentences, the De veritate and the
Compendium theologiae contain the same teaching that is found in the
Contra Gentiles, and the later revised position is advocated in the
Summa theologiae and the De anima." For our purpose, let us
concentrate our review of the two positions of St Thomas on the Summa
the%giae, and Summa contra gentiles which mark the two main poles
between which the change takes place.
In the Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas' response to the supposition
of the impossibility of the soul to exist outside the body on account of
its inability to know without phantasm is that the soul has a different
mode of understanding when in the body and when separated from it.
The principl~ that grounds this assertion is that a being acts in
accordance With the way it exists (unumquodque enim secundum hoc
agit secundum quod estl). From here, Aquinas admits the natural mode
of knowledge of the soul. Even though the soul has its own act of
existence independent of the body, it understands only through the
phantasm while in the body. This way of understanding perishes when
the composite dies. However, the soul, which has its own independent
act of understanding, will not fulfil this with reference to the phantasm,
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157
but will understand itself like substances that are not w1ited at all to the
body. Again the soul will receive an inundation of intelligibles through
these spiritual substances, and thus understand even more perfectly than
when it was in the body. A series of quaint illustrations attempt to
clarii)' these otherwise un-argued assertions: the more the soul is freed
from the body, the more it is able to understand higher things. Sleeping
persons are able to perceive the future from higher beings; the same
experience is observed in fainting and ecstasy, since these involve a
good deal of withdrawal from the body. From all these, the angelic
doctor concludes that when the soul departs from the body, it will be
completely similar to other spiritual substances that are not w1ited to the
body and will also acquire their mode of understanding and receive
sufficient influx from these.42
It is clear from the explanation of the way of knowing in the
separated rational soul that Aquinas has no space at all for all his former
theories about the nature of the soul and its activity. In fact, he virtually
abandons the whole issue of the soul as form of the body on which his
whole philosophy of man is based. The soul is assimilated to the status
of angels. As a being acts the way it exists and exists the way it acts,
one can easily argue that as the soul understands like angels, it could be
counted as one of them. Furthermore, the continued exercise of the act
of understanding by the soul is assured by the abundant influx of
species from higher beings, and as such influx is from superior beings,
the knowledge of the soul in this state must be, if anything, more
perfect. Aquinas' view in the Contra gentiles represents clearly the
strand of thought in Aquinas in which the soul is understood as reaching
its fulfilment with separation. It is important that there is hardly any
better argument for the position except that a thing acts the way it
exists. Here the corruption of an important part of the nature of the soul,
its way of understanding, is qulte compatible with immortality.
When the angelic doctor comes to the Summa theologiae, this
perspective completely changes. The question is the same, but put in a
more direct mrumer: utrum anima separata aliquid intelligere possil.
The objector clarifies the issues at stake. First the human soul is
impeded in understanding by the influence of the senses and by the
disturbance of the imagination. If then at death these organs are
completely destroyed, there is no reason to suppose that the soul will
continue to know without them. Again the separated soul, if it
understands, must do so through species. Such species caunot come
from itself since it is from origin devoid of any. It caunot also be
species abstracted from objects of knowledge, having lost all the powers
by means of which such operations are performed. It caunot even be by

species it had before death since if one defends that position, then the
souls of children who died before acquiring species caunot know. It
caunot also be species received from God, since only by God's grace
can such species be given to the soul, and if it is so given, we have then
crossed the bounds of knowledge natural to the soul."
This presentation of the problems in itself shows a different
appreciation of the difficulties involved. Aquinas is no longer going to
take refuge in assimilating the rational soul to the life and activities of
angels without much ado. Thus he gives the details of the implications
of the soul which understands by abstracting species from the senses.
Knowledge that would come from a supernatural source, like God,
would not be sufficient to allay the difficulty since this would be due to
grace and not nature, and would not be the type of knowledge under
discussion. It is instructive that in the Contra gentiles, the complete
change in the way of understanding of the soul projected is not given
any justification which takes account of the fact of grace. The answer to
these objections confirms the assertion that Aquinas intends to see the
separated soul from the natural, Aristotelian viewpoint.
The first shot at an anSwer coopts the noetics which Aquinas has
accepted from Aristotle: since the nature of the soul after separation
remains unchanged, if indeed the soul knows through recourse to the
senses, then it must be accepted that on the natural light the separated
sonl caunot understand because it is cut off from the images of the
senses. 44
Still Aquinas considers this situation as an embarrassing problem
which he must find a way of sidetracking. To do so, he repeats the first
dictum of the passage of the Contra gentiles: operations of beings
accord with their being (modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur
modum essendi ipsius). He therefore asserts that the soul has different
modes of understanding in the body and outside it, but he tempers the
statement by adding that this is so even if the nature of the soul remains.
This addition to the same principle used in the previous passage is an
indication of a shift in emphasis, for the Contra gentiles does not even
refer to the nature of the soul. It is enough that the soul understands in a
different way to foist a mode of understanding which must be suitable to
angels. How does this nuance influence the outline of the solution?
Thomas adds that in spite of the soul understanding in a different
way, it does not mean that w1ion with the body is accidental to the soul,
and it is the same nature that accompanies it in the body or outside it.
This unchanged, underlying nature, when w1ited to the body, turns to
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160
It is also in connection with this that the basic principle of his theology
meets the most important human hope in the Christian revelation. The
earlier teaching of Aquinas on the relationship between the body and
the soul reaches its ultimate consequence in its application as a
justification of the resurrection of the body. In that teaching, which is
inspired by Aristotle but goes much further than him, Aquinas holds
that the two principles in the human being are so united that they have
one single existence. It means that ontologically, the life of the body is
the same as the life of the soul, even if that life, in a way, flows down to
the body from the soul. Thus there is room for some kind of
subordination of the body to the soul, since the union is for the good of
the soul, just as, in general, matter is for the sake of fonn. Because the
life of the composite is, so to say, lent to it by the soul, and because the
soul enjoys some operations in which it has no need of any bodily
organ, it is said to be self-subsistent and immortal. In spite of this
special characteristic, which sets the soul apart in the world offonns, it
is by nature adapted for union with the body in which lies its means of
perfection. It is because of this natural ordination that the soul must
receive phantasms from the body in order to lmow, and it is in
lmowledge that its perfection consists. On account of its ability for selfsubsistence, the soul at the death of the composite can live apart from
the body. However, this is not its due mode of existence. Hence
contrary to the vision of some passages of the Holy Scripture, the soul
separated from the body lives in a sort of exile. And even if it is given
another means of lmowing from the spiritual being, it still carves an
image which resembles that of an impostor occupying an office which
legally and by natural endowment it is not fit to occupy. Its lmowledge
in this state, even though received from superior intelligibles, remains
general and confused because it is praeter naturam.
Because its new mode of existence is unsuitable to its nature, the
separated soul is thus in constant yearuing for its natural abode, and this
requires a reunion with its proper body, a continuation of its nonnal
mode of existence, an existence in which its perfection is ensured. This
natural necessity finds expression in the Christian doctrine of the
resurrection. What is new here is that the resurrection is a natural
requirement, explicable by an ingeuious interpretation of Aristotelian
philosophy. There is no juggling of Aristoteliauism in which the
concept of the resurrection can be made understandable to the unaided
reason. Aquinas does not entertain any illusion about this fact. In the
very passage in which he tries to give some philosophical reflections on
the question of the resurrection, he underlines that it is a dogma of the
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Christian faith: "es igitur de necessitate fidei credere resurrectionem

mortuorumfoturam. ",a It is thus not the natural yearning of the soul for
the body that is the cause of the resurrection. The cause is rather
Christ's resurrection which, in the order and history of the religious
phenomenon, is a first cause. Being first in the order of cause, Christ's
resurrection extends its effect to things more remote by the institution of
God himself. S1 The resurrection is clearly for Aquinas a religious
doctrine, and it is in an attempt to counter the errors of those who claim
that the resurrection the Holy Scripture talks about means a spiritual
resurrection that he goes on to give some insight from the nature of the
soul which may lend reasonability if not religious credence to the
doctrine of the doctrine. Est ... contra veritatem fidei ponere
resurrectionem spiritualem, et negare corporalem.
Having gone at length in soliciting scriptural quotation to make his
point, St. Thomas asserts that reason also supports the future
resurrection of the body as such. He refers to the proofs for immortality
which he has outlined in Book Two of the Summa contra gentiles. Its
immortality means that after death, the soul is completely away from the
body. But this position is uncomfortable because earlier he had gone all
the way to prove that the soul is naturally united to the body as its fonn.
The implication is that the soul that remains outside its body is in a state
that is against its nature (contra naturam). If there is any truth in the
teaching of Aristotle that nothing that is against nature can exist forever
it means that the state of the soul outside the body cannot also las;
perpetually. Since the soul is immortal, it will rejoin its body at the
resurrection. From this it appears that the immortality of the soul
requires the future resurrection of the body.'2
What ~q~nas is saying is that there is a natural indication, a pointer,
to the direction of immortality which goes in line with the basic
principles of his philosophy. The resurrection is therefore not
preposterous in the order of nature, even though it is a revealed
religious truth. The demonstration here follows the naturalistic line
which is very much projected in the Summa theologiae and the D;
anima. Even though it is in consonance with the doctrine of the nature
of the soul in the Contra gentiles, the idea of the chapter eighty-one of
the book, in which the separated soul has an influx of more perfect
fonns from more perfect beings, is almost completely forgotten. It is
obvious that if indeed the soul is understood as so well placed after the
corruption of the body, the link between the resurrection and Aquinas'
philosophy would have been impossible to establish. That link is
established by the outline of the nature of the soul in which it is
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intrinsically bound up with the body, for its nonna1 existence and its
perfection. In the passage on the resurrection, the tenn contra naturam
is used instead of the more benign praeter naturam of the Summa
theologiae. The latter tenn applies in relation to the knowledge of the
soul in separation which, though coming from a superior source, is not
in cousonance with its nature. It is because the available mode of
exercising its being is beyond its nonna1 capacity, giving it ouly
confused and general knowledge that it is against nature: contra
happiness will be enjoyed ouly by an immortal soul, for as

Gundissalinus says, nothing that is linked with death is perfect.
Needless to say, the immortal soul carmot be in the body without
fulfilling its natural function of vivifying the body, and forming with the
body the composite which is the human being. It is not our aim to go
into the details of how possible this is, and what will bring about the
wonder of the reunion of the body and the soul, matters which belong
deeply to theological consideration backed by revelation. However the
theological implication of the naturalism which is projected in the
teaching on the resurrection is significant. Aquinas' view of the soul on
the natural level may seem to have given hostage to Aristotelian
philosophy, but the terminus ad quem of his thinking completes a circle
to bring his theory back to the original promise of Christianity, which is
the resurrection of the body, and not the immortality of the soul.
Aquinas' reinterpretation of Aristotelian doctrine about man serves the
doctrine of the resurrection because it brings it into the threshold of
philosophy.
What then becomes of the body and its nature? According to the
teaching of Aquinas, the body is by nature mortal on account of the
potency of matter. Original justice lent it immortality, sin deprived it of
this immortality, now it seems that the resurrection will again return
immortality to the body since the soul which itself is immortal carmot
live in perfection estranged from the body. That is the truth in Pegis'
statement that the order of nature says that immortality is the main
direction of human existence. 55 The status of the body as serving the
soul means that it must live as a servant of an immortal soul which
depends on it for its fulfihnent. "The unity of the human being," says
Brown, "is so strong that the immortality of the rational soul is the
immortality of the body."S6 1n short, the implication of Aquinas' theory
is that the body is immortal by association. Is violence not thereby done
to the body, the nature of which is now no longer taken into account? It
could be argued that the mortal body, being immortal, is an advantage
to it. Again Aquinas says that if indeed nature were left to choose, it
would have chosen incorruptible matter for the body." Still the
in;;istence on taking natural line in respect of the soul should in
principle be applied to the body. All we can say here is that the solution
to the difficulty will not be to do violence to the soul which, in Aquinas'
thought, is the superior of the two partners in the human composition. In
any case, it must be kept in mind that the resurrection restores what was
lost in the initial state of man where he was shadowed by original
justice. It is thus a return to the land of birth where God himself
naturam.
Immortality is said to require resurrection, otherwise the soul that is

separated from the body will remain forever in a deprived state. It is in
view of the fulfihnent for the soul that it is fitting that it rejoins its body.
But Aquinas does not refer to the resurrection in any of the proofs of
immortality, showing that his intention as well as that of other thinkers
of the time was to show that immortality could be proved from the
philosophical standpoint. He does not mean that immortality as such
must be followed by the resurrection of the body. The soul that he has
displayed would still be immortal if there were no resurrection. Duly
that then it would not be an advantageous endowment of the soul's
nature, for then it is plucked off from its natural habitat to live in
estrangement forever. That is why Aquinas writes in another place, "if
the resurrection of the body is denied, it is not easy but difficult to
uphold the immortality of the soul."" In spite of this, the angelic doctor
is not too categorical on the connection between immortality and the
resurrection; they appear, he says, to require each other, from the nature
of the soul itself.
It is to that sarne nature that he alludes in the other places where he
shows the fittingness of future resurrection and its connection with
immortality. In one of these, he says that the human soul desires perfect
happiness. Imperfect happiness carmot assuage this quest for happiness,
since the soul would naturally taste for the next felicity that follows
what is imperfect. But the human soul while outside the body is in some
way imperfect because every part that is out of the whole in which it is
naturally constituted is imperfect. It is therefore not possible for the soul
to enjoy the perfect happiness it is seeking if it is not joined to the body
in resurrection, especially as it is impossible to derive this happiness
from present human existence. l4 Aquinss does not use the quest for
happiness as proof of immortality, but he employs it as a way of
explaining the rationality of resurrection. What is peculiar to its use
here is that it is necessary, even after the soul has left the body to return
to it in order to fulfil the quest for perfect happiness. That perfect
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164
provides that man, whose reason remains submissive to his creator will
be immortal. The resurrection is, in the final analysis, a basic dogma of
faith, and not a comfortable subject for mere philosophical review.
4.5 Immortality and the Platonism of Aquinas
That Aquinas was able to bring resurrection and immortality very
close, while retaining the levels of thought to which each of these
belongs, is a fine indicator of the expanse of his philosophical
enterprise. It is an enterprise that is grand both in its conception and
execution, and no other factor attests more to this than the fact that he
departs from the mainly Aristotelian standpoint, trying through the
length and breadth of his thought to retain his personal understanding of
that standpoint, while at the same time arguing strenuously for a
position that is best served by the philosophy of Plato. It is almost
natural that the result of such an engagement, "though expressed in the
language of form and matter, is native to the world of St. Thomas and
cannot exist in the world of Aristotle."" If this aspect of Aquinas is
included in what Reyna describes as "manoeuvring philosophy into the
theological position,"" one must not fail to remember that the whole
issue of immortality has been native to philosophy almost from the
point of its inception. The philosophical system that almost gave birth
to and nurtured the tradition of arguing for the after-life of the human
soul is Platonic. And if we go to Plato himself, the religious influence
which his tradition was loaded with in its passage through history is not
very much traceable to Plato himself, except perhaps in the
hermeneutical sense in which H.-G. Gadamer describes Plato's
arguments in the Phaedo as a reaction to the scientific enlightenment of
his time. 60 Despite the historical and doctrinal affinity of the question of
immortality with Platonism, Aquinas expressly sets aimost every aspect
of his theory on. the theme, both in terms of its background doctrines
and aimost the specific argument proffered as proof against different
positions of Plato. His counter-positions are easily legible in some of
the major themes: the soul as form, the origin and development of
knowledge, the importance given to the body in its general relation with
the soul, etc. But if the grandeur of Aquinas' project lies in this stance
against Plato, how successful was he in freeing himself from the
trappings of Plato's system?
Our brief review of the outcome of Aquinas' project will be set
against the barest essence of Platonism. Historically, Platonism
gathered a lot of accretions through its long presence and influence that
165
straddled the ancient world, as well as medieval Christianity, Islam and

Judaism, and flowing down aimost to contemporary times. On account
of its historical and doctrinal mutations in many circumstances, it is
very difficult to find many common strands binding the different shades
of Platonism. Nevertheless, some common denominators traceable to
Plato himself would include the theory of forms, the tripartite division
of the soul and status of the soul vis-a-vis the body. D. A. Rees lists a
number of correlates linked with Plato's philosophy." These include the
view of a metaphysical philosophy directed towards transcendent
~eality, belief in the power of the human thought to grasp these realities,
m the degree of reality, and in the doctrine of the immortality of the
soul. Marked more or less by these correlates, Platonism, in a general
sense, has a profound influence on the thought of the thinkers of the
thirteenth century through such sources as Augustine, the Liber de
causis, Nemesius, Arab and Jewish paripatetics, etc. Aquinas is a
pioneer in the sense that historically he is the first among his
contemporaries to go full length into the philosophical doctrine of
Aristotle, applying it in an area in which Platonism fits in much more
comfortably than Aristotelianism. But like most pioneers, Aqulnas
appears to have ended up in surreptitiously accepting the main object of
his attack. No other theme shows this more than the notion of the soul
and its immortality.
For Plato, body and soul are two different things, which must exist
one within the other. The extreme consequence of this position is the
. statement in Alcibiades often quoted by Aquinas that the man as man is
the soul. Corporeal existence, far from being of any help to the soul that
exists in it, is a prison house hindering the soul from coming to its full
realization in knowledge of the forms. The body is also viewed as the
instrument that is at the disposal of the soul. Though in some passages
of Plato, it can be said to be of some use to the soul in the act of
sensation, the body intrinsically has not much that is positive to offer to
the soul because of the lowly state of being of the body. That is why for
Plato, the duty of the man (soul) who has come to philosophic
awareness is to liberate himself from this prison house and to return to
his original source.62 Nothing in Aquinas can be said to be equlvalent to
these views of the relationship between the soul and the body. However
there is a lining in the thought of Aquinas which is marked by the effort
to keep the soul somewhat apart, even in the presence of the
proclamation of the composite having one act of existence. One such
lining is the subtle implication that the union of the body and the soul is
a sort of hindrance to the soul to complete knowledge, although
166
Aquinas states this in an attempt to argue for the conforming of the soul
to its natural state of existence, which speaks more for his
Aristotelianism.3 However the admission that the soul after separation
can have other means of knowing, even from grace, seems to revert the
clear naturalism to something akin to the Platonic view. This reading is
ouly helped by such statements as that man thinks by his soul,64 or again
that the soul rules the body despotically.s Though they do not consign
Aquinas to Platonism on the grounds of the context in which they are
found, they are ouly signs that in fact he is not so free of Plato as his
expression may sometimes seem to indicate.
Something similar can be said about the theory of matter as the
principle of individuation. Though the question of individuation is very
much disputed among scholars of St. Thomas, it is clear that he
attributes matter a role in the individuation of the soul. But this role is
not as thoroughgoing as that of Aviceuna. Still the role that Aquinas
gives to the body is not something that Plato would accept as a normal
relation between body and soul. Nevertheless the theory of
individuation is presented in such a way that the body all alone is not
what makes the soul individuated or multiple. The nature of the soul
itself plays an important part, constituting the formal principle of
multiplicity. That entails in fact that without matter, the soul maintains
its multiplicity and individuation. This retrieval of individuation within
the very nature of the soul suits the defence of inunortality admirably,
for if indeed the body all alone was responsible for the individuated
condition of the soul, a question could arise as to how this effect of the
body on the soul goes on long after the separation of the two. It
however presents a picture of the soul that conforms very well to a
return to the world of ideas where the soul continues to exist in its real
world.
That extraterrestrial world of Plato is one from which real,
unchangeable knowledge originates. The employment in Aquinas of the
phenomenon of knowing to defend the nature of the soul and especially
its inunortality draws very close to this view of knowledge as something
that is substantive and able to exist on its own. It must be said for him
however that in many places, he concentrates on the process of
knowledge instead of knowledge itself. But it is also true that he
presents universals of knowledge as having independent existence, by
considering their existence not in relation to their nature as bound with
their subject, the rational soul. The first presentation66 of the state of the
separated soul tends to give full support to this view of knowledge
which smacks of the view of Plato. The soul in separation receives more
perfect knowledge from sublime forms, just as the one which has left
the hindering material world in Plato's system. In the second
presentation, Aquinas seems to have come back to the dominance of
Aristotelianism. But there is the need, even in the new and more
Aristotelian interpretation, for the soul to keep on in activity, since
activity in being is one of the demands of reasonable inunortality for the
soul. It is therefore necessary that the basic thrust of the state of
separated soul in the Summa contra gentiles is retained: the soul can
still receive more perfect forms directly from spiritual beings, but a
concession to its nature is that such knowledge presented as perfect for
the soul, now becomes general and confused, except where the grace of
God provides perfect knowledge for the glorified souls.
The foundation of this inconvenience though is Aquinas' view about
the substantiality of the soul. Aquinas does not directly call the soul a
substance. It is a hoc aliquid in the sense that a part of a whole can be
said to be a hoc aliquid. 67 This means that it can subsist on its own
independent of the body on grounds of its ability to perform acts that do
not require bodily organs and are independent of the body. However,
the full understanding of the soul is not very much different from that of
a substance. For this reason commentators on Aquinas have often
described the soul as incomplete substance. 8 It is usually employed in
reference to separated souls which though able to exist on its own does
not attain its complete fulfilment outside the body, and thus yearns for
reunion, under which condition it will resume its function of giving life
to the body, while receiving species from material things. The notion of
incomplete substance is bound up with some obscurity. It is not clear in
what the incompleteness of substance consists, or whether between
substance and accidents, there is room for a category that is neither
accident nor substance. Aquinas describes the existence of the soul
outside its natural habitat as contra naturam, and the knowledge it can
receive is described as praeter naturam. That means that its new estate
is not in accord with its nature. But does it also mean that it is
incomplete in the species of substance? Aquinas says that the soul is a
part, not a whole. In that sense, it can be said to be incomplete. The
problem of his teaching is how such a part can exist and do all that it is
required to do as a subsistent entity. However, given that it is able to
live in that state independently, the yearuing for and the adaptation to
the body that still persists in it does not make it answerable to the
description of incomplete substance. In the sense of the lack that
accompanies the separated souls, all finite imperfect beings have lacks
in their nature that create a' yearuing for the ultimate. In that respect,
167
168
only God can be complete substance with the fullness of being on its
own. The only option is to regard the soul as an exCeption, defying most
of the general principles govern1og physical things and forms in
Aristotelian philosophy. However some aspects of the exception bring
the theory very close to Platonic theories.
In conclusion, Aquinas attempts to apply the doctrines of his
philosophical mentor Aristotle to the issue of innnortaiity. The result
though is very much pre-Aristotelian in many of its aspects. He draws
conclusions which are neither Aristotelian nor really Platonic. His
defence of innnortality with the basic tools of Aristotelian philosophy is
a bold effort which he is the first to make in the thirteenth century world
where the novelty of Aristotle was revered before him. Still the
execution of that project gives so many concessions to Platonic
inspiration" that it can be described as mediation between the two
giants of ancient Greek philosophy.
NOTES
S. C. G., IV, 81, II.

M. Brown, The Romance a/Reason, p. 81.
3 Q.D. de anima, 14, obj. 20.
4 Ibid., 14, ad. 20: "licit anima quae est causa vitae sit incorruptibilis, tru.nen
corpus, quod recepit vitam ab anima, est subiectum transmutationis. Et per hoc
recedit a dispositione per quam est aptum ad recipiendum vitam; et sic incidit
corruptione hominis."
1
, S. T., 1a 2ae, 85, 5.

Ibid., la 2ae, 86, 6, obj. 1, 2.
Ibid., 1a 2ae, 86, 6, resp.: "quamvis omnis fonna intendat perpetuum esse,
quantum potest, nulla tamen fonna rei corruptibilis potest assequi
perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est subjecta
omnino materiae corporali sicut aliae fonnae; quinirrnno habet propriam
operationem immaterialem, ut in Primo habitum est. Unde ex parte suae fonnae
naturalior est homini incorruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et
ipsa habet materiam ex contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur
corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc homo est naturaliter corruptibilis
secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non secundum naturam fonnae."
8 Loc cit.
Some Problems a/Immortality
169
Ibid., 1a 2ae 85, 6, resp.: "Sed Deus, qui subjacet omnis natura, in ipsa
institutione hominis supplevit defectum naturae; et dono justitiae originalis
dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quamdam.... "
10 Ibid., la, 95, 1. resp.
II Ibid., la, 97,1. resp.: "Nee enim corpus ejus erat indissolubile per aliquam
immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam
supematuraliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione
praeservare quamdiu ipsa Deo subjecta rnansisset. Quod rationaliter factum est.
Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra
dictum est; conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur per quam corpus
conservare posset supra naturant corporalis materiae."
12
Cf. M. Baumgartner, Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelms von Auvergne,
Beitrage II, I (MOnster, 1893), p. 20: "Als Theologe beschliftigt er sich mit
besonderer Vorliebe mit dem Erkenntniszu'stand des Menschen vor der SUnde."
13 William of Auverge, De anima, V. 18, p. 143b: "Nunc autem, hoc est
tempore miseriae et corruptionis praesentis, necesse habent animae hwnanae
mendicare a rebus sensibilibus per sensus cognitiones eorum sensibus propter
obtenebrationes virtutis intellectivae, quae ad exteriora particularia et sensibilia
penitus caeca est et ad illa omnino non attingens nisi sensibus adiuta et
aliquatenus illuminata."
14 A. C. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death,", p. 8
15 S. T., la, 75, 3, resp.: "Sentire vero et consequentes operationes animae
sensitivae manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis inunutatione, sicut in
videndo inunutatur pupilla per speciem coloris (et idem apparet in aliis). Et sic
manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam
per seipsam, sed onmis operatio sensitivae animae est conjuncti. Ex quo
relinquitur quod cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non
sint subsistentes smiliter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem."
16 S. T. la, 75, 6 ad. 1.
17 Cf. Ibid., la, 45, 5; S. C. G. II, 87.
18 Q. Quodlibetales. 10, q. 3, a. 2, ad. 1.
19 S. T., 13, 75, 5, resp.: "Dicendum quod anima non habet materiam. Et hoc
potest considerari dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ratione animae in communi. Est
enirn de ratione animae sit fonna alicujus corporis. Aut igitur est forma
secundum se totam aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si secundum se totam,
impossibile est quod pars ejus sit materia, si dicatur materia aUquod ens in
potentia tantum. Quia fonna, inquantum forma, est actus. Id autem quod est in
potentia tantum non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote
contra actwn divisa. Si autero sit fonna secundum aliquam partem sui, illam
partern dicemus esse animam, et ilIanl rnateriam cujus primo est actus dicemus
esse primwn animatum."
20 Cf. S. C. G., II, 55, n. 13.
21 Reference is also made to the incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies in
Aquinasarguments in the Summa theologiae (la, 75, 6). T. Suttor points out
9
170
the theological interest of the theory which he describes as "quaint": ~tter and
incorruptibility cannot be takeo as incompatible since the resurrection ~f the
body after which the body will have to live forever does not pemut the
assertion of such incompatibility.
22 Confessions, XI.
23 S. C. G., II, 83, 4
24 Ibid., 83, 3.
,
25 Ibid., 83, 9 19. The argument from motion is the mai~ thrust of Pl~to. s
proof of immortality in the Phaedrns (245C - 246A find) ~Icero employs It m
the Somnium Scipionis, and became well known tn the Middle Ages through
Macrobius' commentruy on the work of Cicero.
26 Alexander of Hales, Questiones, 1, 32,28, 26 ~ 27
27 Cf. S. T., la, 47,1,2.
28 S.C. G., 68, 12.
29 Cf. De spirt. creal., 2, ad 5: "Anima, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non
habet perfectionem suae naturae nisi in unione ad corpus," .De unilate
intellectus. p. 333 b (In ed. Marietti): "Concedimus autem quod anIma h:mrnna
a corpore separata non habet ultimam perfecti~nem suae na~ae, cum. SIt pars
naturae humane; nulla enim pars habet ommmodam perfectionem, SI a toto
separetur.": S. T., la, 90, 4c: "Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae,
non habet naturalem perfectionem, nisi secundum quod est coropori unita."
30 Cf. Exp.super librum Boethii de Tinitate, 1, I, ad. 4: "In nobis autem lumen
hujusmodi est obumbratum per conjunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corpor~as,
et ex hoc impeditur, ut non possit libere veritatem etiam naturahter
cognoscibilem inspicere"; III, I, c: "Quaedam vero divinorum sunt, ad q?~e
plene cognoscenda nullatenus ratio hwnana sufficit, sed eorum plena COgnltlO
exspectatur in futura vita, ubi erit plena beatitudo."
31 S, T .. , la, 12, 11, c: "Ab homine puro Deus videri non potest nisi ab hac vita
mortali separetur."
32 Cf. S. C. G.
79, 3: "Perficitur enim anima scientia et virtute... "
33 J. Mundhenk, Die Seele in System des Thomas von Aquin (Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1980), p. 128.
34 Sent. I, d. 8., q. 5,2 ad 6: "In anima non est aliquid quo ipsa individuetur."
3S L. Elders, The Philosophy ofNature ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, p. 143
l6 See J. Mundhenk, op. cit., pp. 126 - 127
37 A text that presents the problem very well is the following: "si anima potest
a corpore separari, oportet quod sit aliqua operatio eius sin~ corp~re, 00' quod
nulla substantia est otiosa. Sed nulla operatio potest esse anlmae sme corpore,
neque etiam intelligere, de quo magis videtur; quia non est intelligere sine
phantasmate, ut Philosophus dicit: phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo
anima non potest separari a corpore, sed corrumpitur corrupto corpore."
38 ST., la, 89, 1, resp.: "Dicendum quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex
hoc quod anima, quamdiu est corpori conjuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere
nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet, Si autem hoc
n.
171
no~ est ex .natura ani~e, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei ex eo quod corpori
alhgatur, SICut PlatonIcl posuerunt, de facili quaestio solvi posset. Nam remota
impedimento corporis, rediret anima ad suam naturam ut inteIligeret
intelligibilia simpliciter, Don convertendo se ad phantasmata 'sieut est de aliis
sub~tantii~ separ~tis..Se~ secu.ndwn hoc, non esset anima cori>ori wlita propter
mehus arumae, SI ~eJus tntelhgeret corpori Wlita quam separata; sed hoc esset
solum propter mehus corporis: quod est irrationabile, cum materia sit propter
formam, et non e converso."
39 A. C. Pegis, "The Separated Soul and its Nature in St. Thomas," in St.
Tho,!,as AqUinas (12741974): Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical
J:,'stltute of~ediaeval Studies, 1974), vol. 1, p. 137.
.F.or Pegls, the change of doctrine about the separated soul has a very
deCIsive consequence. He draws this consequence from his conviction that the
change is defmite: "The introduction of the intellectual nature of the Soul as
the essential factor in dealing with the way in which the soul knows is a
de~isive chan~e in St. Thomas' .attitude towards he separated souL" p. 137.
This lea,ds PegI~ to s~ggest dates tn the works of Aquinas taking accoWlt of this
change m dO"?,,,e WIth ';he belief that it is not likely that Aquinas goes back to
the. old doctrine after hIS change of attitude. He thus argues against all the
datmgs that ,:"ould make ",:,y of the work in which Aquinas holds the pre;}'istotehan vIew to be later m writing. Cf. esp., pp. 150 _ 158.
S. C. G., 81, 12.
42 .Ib~d., .81. 12: 'V~?e et, quando totaliter erit a corpore separata, perfecte
~slmIl~bltur substant~ls separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi, et abunde
tnfiuentlam eorum reclpiet."
43 S. T., la, 89, 1. obj. 2, 3,
44 Ibid. 89, 1, resp.: "Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad
phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri: sed esse separatum a
corpore. est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine
converSlOne ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et idoe ad hoc unitur
corpori, ut sit et operetur secWldum naturam suam."
" Ibid, 89, 1. resp.: ''Et ideo ad hanc difficultatem tollendam considerandum
est. quo.d, cum .nihil ,operetur nisi inquantum est aetu, ~odus operandi
lUl1USCuJusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem anima alium
modum essendi ~um unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente
tamen .eadem ammae natura; non ita quod uniri corpori sit ei accidentale, sed
per rationem suae naturae corpori unitur; . . . Animae igitur secWldum illum
modum ~ssendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per
conversatlOnem ~d phantasmata corpororum, quae in corporeis organis sunt:
cum aute.m fuent a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per
conversatlonem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter sicut et aliis
substantiis separatis."
,
46 Lo
't "M .,
C. Cl .:
anllestum est autem inter substantias intellectuaies secundum
naturae ordinem, infirmas esse animas humanas. Hoc autem perfec~io Wliversi
172
Some Problems 0/ Immortality
exigebat, ut diversi gradus in rebus essent. Si i~tur an~e hum~.e sic ess~t
institutae a Deo ut intelligerent per modum qUI competit SubStantIlS separatls,
non haberet cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in conununi. Ad hoc er~o
quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus h~bere p.os~ent, SIC
naturaliter sunt intitutae ut corporibus uniantur, et SIC ab IPSIS rebus
sensibitibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant; sicut homines rudes ad
scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla. Sic ergo p~tet quod
propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur, et intelligat per convers.ation~ a~
phantasmata; et tamen esse potest separata, et alium modum mtelhgendl
habere."
47 Cf. Ibid., 89, 2 - 4.
48 Ibid., 89, 2, ad. 3: " ... in cognitione substantiarwn. sep~atum. non
quanuncumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed sohus Del, qUi non
. .
.
"
potest videri nisi per gratiam."
49 This is the position that A. C. Pegis defends m hiS article The S.epara~ed
Soul and its Nature.... " Pegis believes that in this question we are W1tnessmg
with a major change in position about an important. is~ue (151),. and that
consequently St. Thomas having arrived at the naturalIst Interpretation of the
separated so~l, he could not have gone back in works like ~~ Qu'!'!libet, said
to be written after part one of the Summa theologiae. Pegts position IS very
much supported by the improbability of Aquinas returning to the old doctrine,
but it may wen be that Aquinas does not see the change as senously as Pegls
sees it and the presence of the two modes of explaining the soul in separation
which 'we have alluded to may have nudged him. even as a slip to put again the
position of the Contra gentiles in the Quodlibet.
so S. C. G. IV, 79, 4.
51 S.T. 3a, 56, 1.
" S. C. G. IV, 79, 10 : "Ostendum est enim in Secundo (c.79) animas
hominum immortales esse. Remanent igitur post corpora. a corporibus
absolutae. Manifestum est etiam ex his quae in Secunda (cc. 83, 68) dicta s~t,
quod anima COlpori naturaliter uniter: est ~im secundum suam essentl.~
corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam antmae absque corpore esse. Nih~l
autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum, Non igitur perp~~o ent
anima absque corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam carpon I~erato
caniungi: quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere vldetur
resurrectionem corporum futuram."
" I ad Corinthios, 15 L 2.
.
54 S.C.G., IV, 79, 11 "Ostensum est supra, ... naturale hominis desiderium ad
fe1icitatem tendere. Felicitas autem ultima est felicis perfectio. Cuicumque
igitur deest aliquid ad perfectionem, nond~ habet felicitate~ pe~ectam quia
nondum eius desiderium totaliter qUletatur: omne emm Imperfectum
perfectionem consequi naturaliter cupit. Anima autem a corpor~ separata. est
aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum totum eXlstens: anona
enim naturaliter est pars humanae naturae. Non igitur potest homo ultimam
173
felicitatem consequi nisi anima iterato carpori conhmgatur: praesrtim cum

ostensum sit ... quod in hac vita homo non potest ad felicitatem ultimam
pervenire."
p. 8
"S6 A. C. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death"
'
M. Brown, The Romance 0/Reason, pp. 79 ~ 80
57 S. T., 1a 2ae 85, 6 resp.: "corpus humanum est materia electa a natura
quan~. ad hoc quod est ..temperatae complexionis .... Sed quod sit
co~ptIbtle, hoc est ex conditione materiae. Nee est e1ectum a natura; quin
PsotlUS natura eligeret materiam incorruptibiIem, si posset."
H A. C. Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death"
' p. 13 .
R. Reyna, "On the Soul: A Philosophical Exploration of the Active Intellect
in Averroes, Aristotle, and Aquinas," The Thomist 36 (1972), p. 145.
60
H. ~ G., Gadamer, "Die UnsterbIickkeitsbeweise in Platos Phaidon," in
~esammelte Werke (TObingin: J. C. B. Mohr), v. 6, 1985, p. 187.
D. A. Rees, "Platonism and the Platonic Tradition," in Encyclopaedia of
;hilosophy, P. Edwards, ed. (London 1967), vol 6, p. 334.
2 Phaedo,67e
OJ S. T., la, 12, 11.
~ Ibid., la, 75, a 2 ad 2: "Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus
Vldet; sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligit per animam "
"Ibid,la,81,2ad2..
.
66 That is, the view that is presented in the S. C. GIl, 81, Commentary on the
Sentences, ill, d, 5, q. 3, a 2; De veritate' 19 and Quodlibet III , q 9 , a I
67
S. T., la, 75, 3, ad. 1: "Unde manus potest dici ,,hoc aliquid" primo modo
sed non .s~cundo I?o~o. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae,
p.otest. dlCl hoc abqwd promo modo, quasi subsistens; sed non secundo modo,
c emm co~positum ex anima et corpore elicitur "hoc aliquie."
See for mstance F. C. Copleston, Aquinas, p. 160; F. D. Wilhelmsen, "A
note on Contranes ad the Incorruptibility of the Human Soul in St. Thomas" p
:i
, .
n~
69 As we have already mentioned above, we are using Platonism in the very

broad sense an~ w,e are not gOin,g into the details it s influences on Aquinas.
M.uch of PlatoDlc mfluence on him came through Augustine, who was till the
thlrt,eenth century and much beyond the most influential theologian of
Chnstendom. Concerning his influence on Aquinas M.-D. Chenu wirtes'
"1'evolution du climat realiste de la doctrine augustinienne doit nous mettre e~
garde contre la maladressed de qui, commentant saint Thomas n'observerait
pas , ~e tre~ pres,. dans la Somme, cette acceptation integral; de 1'homme
chretien d ,A~gustm, sous pretexte d' etre fid61e
la plus aristotelicienne
analyse theonque de la na~ humaine." Introduction
['etude de saint
Thomas dAquin (paris: J. Vrin, 1950), p. 272.
Chapter 5
AQIDNAS, IMMORTALITY AND THE
SCOPE OF PIDLOSOPHY
5.1 Reappraisal of the Arguments for Immortality
Most of the issues discussed in Chapter 4 are problems that can

bedevil the project of demonstrating immortality from a philosophical
standpoint alone. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the
inevitable presence of death if the soul is immortal and has by nature
the closest union with the body. Animal souls may not be mortal if one
follows strictly the implications of some of the arguments without
necessarily giving concession to the hwnan soul at the sight of every
difficulty. The state of the separated soul creates a huge problem from
the background of Aquinas' acceptance of Aristotelian philosophy. Our
attention here will concentrate more on the imports of the arguments
themselves, some criticisms of the project of proving immortality,
subsequent development on the question, and the general implication of
the whole question for philosophy, its nature, scope and limit.
Before then however, it is necessary to note that in arguing for
immortality, and resolving some problems that are concomitant with it,
Aquinas arrives at some conclusions which, if not revolutionary, would
at least be startling to the ntinds ofhis time. It has been said already that
in arguing for immortality, he inserts himself in the tradition that
became particularly strong in the thirteenth century. He takes all his
arguments from his predecessors, and does not show any inventiveness
176
so long as the demonstrations themselves are concerned. What marks

him out is an Aristotelianism which, though not completely pure, goes
far beyond what most thinkers of his time could subscribe to. Still, he
retains a mainly Platonic conception of the soul in viewing it as selfsubsistent and immortal, while attempting to explain its natural
operations purely in terms of the philosophy of Aristotle. That is why
Owens describes him as attempting to have the best of two worlds, and
why his attempt can also be described as a mediation betwee.n
Platonism and Aristotelianism. How far he succeeds in tltis attempt IS
very debatable. He follows to its ultimate conclusion the naturalistic
philosophy of Aristotle in explaining the relationship of the soul and the
body, where the two are so united as to have one existence,' and where
the soul is so conditioned by tltis union that it must derive all its
2
knowledge, its perfection, through the senses. It is remarkable however
that the issues about which Aquinas adopts unmitigated Aristotelianism
are those that do not have a direct bearing on the question of
immortality. When he argues for subsistence, however, supported by the
conviction that the rational soul is the source oflife of the composite, he
appears to make a clean slide from Aristotle to Plato.
The move to Platonism is preparations in view of the subsequent
affirmation of the survival and immortality of the soul independent of
the body. The soul that survives is in one respect very much like that
Platonic soul which has escaped from its prison. But in another respect,
Aquinas makes a big concession to the naturalism of his Aristotelian
inspiration by affrrming that the soul derives its natural fulfilment from
the body. Even though one can quite rightly say that the mediation he
seeks between Plato and Aristotle does not succeed in completely
reconciling the two, he is well ahead of the thinking of his time by
insisting unequivocally that the soul that is independent of the body is
somewhat like a square peg in a round hole. It means in fact that the
soul that has left its body, even with the Christian belief in after-death
bliss in paradise, is not yet at its resting state, and the natural yearning
for the body still remains with it. Of course, there is the question of God
providing the vision of his presence to the blessed ones, but even that
does not assuage the yearning for union since tltis is part of the soul's
mode of being. While his position is completely different from the
general tltinking in his time, it also logically does away with such
arguments for immortality as those based on the immediate reward after
death for good work which was not or could not be rewarded here on
earth: an argument which Aquinas himself also employs in his
demonstration of immortality. The point such an argument makes can of
AqUinas. Immortality and the Scope 0/Philosophy
177
course be extended even to the point of resurrection, which Aquinas

connects ingenuously with immortality, but doing so would be putting
too much thought in the minds of several thinkers who use the
argument.
It must be said however that the discomfort about the status of the
soul as separated substance in a system, the major inspiration of which
is Aristotle, is not completely laid to rest. We have mentioned that
thomistic scholars very often apply the parenthetical term incomplete
substance to describe its state of being outside the body. 3 This
description would have no problem in so far as the soul is thought of
with reference to the composite, man, and a part is always incomplete
with r~ference to the whole wherein it is a part. It is nevertheless
important to ask in what sense the separated soul is a part, and in what
sense it is incomplete. In the Summo thea/agioe, Aquinas uses the
human hand that is separate from the body as an example of the way in
which the soul is a part. But apparently, subsequent descriptions of the
soul make the example of the hand appear somewhat unsuitable. The
hand that is sliced off from the body is a substance only in the sense that
for some time, it can be separate; an entity apart from the body, and not
inhering in anytlting else. Such existence is no doubt very much akin to
the existence of the human body that has lost its form, its soul, which is
often used to show that it is the soul which, as form, is responsible for
the existence of the body. The body begins to disintegrate in such
"formless" existence, and is, strictly speaking no longer the human
body. It is the same with the hand that is no longer joined to its body.
Only in a qualified sense can it still be called the human hand, and if it
can be said to be subsistent, the word can be used in a reductive sense
only. Not so with the rational soul, which not only can exist, since it has
life intrinsically, but can also carry out its perfecting activity,
irrespective of the difference between tltis activity and the one it carries
out when in union with the body. On tltis G. F. Kreyche says, "to say
that the soul subsists although incomplete in its specific nature and to
say that the hand subsists although incomplete in its own nature is to say
something very different. ,,4 If therefore a substance is understood in the
Aristotelian sense of that which, unlike the accident, can exist on its
own, without needing to inhere in something else, it must be said that
the soul, separated from the body, is a substance. From tltis perspective,
it would seem that with some attenuation which is a testimony to his
genius, Aquinas' position on the status of the soul is not, strictly
speaking, different from that of his immediate predecessors who
expressly designate the soul as a substance, and use that as a basis to
178
argue for its immortality. We have seen that the tenn incomplete
substance is often used in such a way as to suggest a sort of
intennediate existence between complete substance and accident. S The
soul's seeking for union with the body in separation, and for return to its
natural habitat (which is very often cited as an indication of its
incompleteness as a substance) may not be much different from the
quest in a finite being for something else. This quest, which is
actualized by drive in different directions of existence, is more of an
expression of finitude, and does not indicate that finite beings are
incomplete substances.
To Aquinas, the question of what type of immortality applies to the
soul is also a very important matter. Its importance is not only seen
from his slim treatise against the proponents of the unicity of the
intellect, but throughout the course of his discussion of immortality, the
significance of the matter to his project comes out clearly either in the
text on immortality itself or in the placement of the discussions on the
question of the unicity of the human intellect.' His basic position is that
the right interpretation of Aristotle would lead to the support of
personal immortality, even though it is generally accepted that Aristotle
nowhere subscribes openly to this theory. All chronologies of the work
of Aquinas show that this concern is quite early in his thought, starting
as far back as his commentary on the Books of Sentences. It points to
7
the commencement of a fresh understanding of the work of Averroes in
the thirteenth century, and another direction in the whole issue of
immortality. Before Thomas, there was hardly any attempt (except
perhaps in st. Albert's De unitate) to reflect on what type of immortality
was acceptable to their project. It must be noted however that hardly
any of the earlier authors of the century who wrote on immortality
understood the consequence of the so-called collective immortality, and
would conceivably have rejected it if it ever became a point of
contention.
We also said earlier that Aquinas believed in the cumulative effect of
the many arguments which he marshalled for immortality to achieve
convincing effect, notwithstanding that this can be said more
specifically of the Contra gentiles, due to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the work. The method of enumeration is what
most authors before st. Albert followed. It consists in simply calling to
witness all sorts of possible evidence in support of immortality, with the
apparent conviction that, taken separately, these pointers to the
rationality of the doctrine may not possess enough convincing power.
Very often absurd statements are made in this regard, for example,
Aquinas, Immortality and the Scope ofPhilosophy
179
when William of Auvergue writes that even vice, which can be said to
be the disease of the rational soul, does not lead to its demise, but that
vicious inclinations of souls are even strengthened the more they are
8
steeped in vice. This for William shows that the soul does not die,
otherwise its life would have been reduced by vice which is like ill
health in the rational soul. With Albert, there is a marked discernment,
which consigns some proof to mere signs, and others to probable
arguments. His handling of the question may have also been helped by
La Rochelle's grouping of proofs into rationes propriae and rationes
commune in the question of immortality, and by Alexander of Hales
who completely, and for the first thne, rejects an argument which some
authors use in favour of immortality. It must be conceded that in this
respect, Aquinas does not seem to have in any clear way risen to the
challenge set by some of his immediate predecessors.
However, the issue of neglecting important weighing of the
argument by his predecessors should not be overemphasized. An aspect
of Aquinas' argument for immortality that has not been adverted to is
the motive for his selection of arguments. Though there is no single
argument for immortality that is not traceable to his immediate
predecessors, it is easy to neglect that he does not make use of all the
arguments that are available in the sources present to him. Two
examples are enough to prove this point. First, there is the argument
from the creation of man in the image of God (imago dei). The
argument is generally presented in the fonn of the affirmation that man
is made in the image of God, and this would be false if indeed man were
to be mortal. It is found almost everywhere in the long tradition of
discussions on immortality among Christian writers beginning from the
patristic period. Cassiodorus, Hughes of St. Victor, Aicher of
Clairvaux, William of Auvergue, Alexander of Hales and Odo Rigaldus
etc mention it. Thomas, on the other hand, makes just one obvious
reference to it in a sed contra in the De anima. The preponderance of
the argument in the. thirteenth century makes it very unlikely that he is
unaware of its presence. Again the part that the doctrine of man as the
image of God plays in his thought on man is very well known" Why
then does he not make any serious use of it? One possible reason is that
Aquinas intended to prove immortality from the philosophical
standpoint alone. As Copleston says, he is very strongly convinced that
the power of reason can lead to an acceptable demonstration of the
teaching. to Given that the ultimate support of the imago dei argument is
a direct reference to the passage on creation in the Genesis, it is
reasonable to suppose that this argument does not fit very well into the
180
project of demonstrating immortality without recourse to religious

dogmas. Still, he is not averse to proclaiming the concordance of the
doctrine of immortality to the Christian faith. There are, of course, other
arguments which have no stronger foundation than the one under
consideration - the argument from contemplation as the ultimate end of
the rational soul for instance - but it is remarkable that the authority
behind contemplation is Aristotle, and not the Holy Scripture.
Another argument whose absence is spectacular in Aquinas is the
one from the order of being. Like the imago dei argument, this too has
had a long history. The idea of the golden chain of being is traceable to
Homer's Iliad, to Macrobius' s Commentary on the Somnium
Scipionis," and down to Isaac of Stella" who seems to have called the
attention of the later scholastics to the chain as providing a structure
that guarantees the flow of being from the highest member of the order
(God himself) to the lowest creature. It is not certain when the golden
chain began to be used as an argument for immortality. Gundissalinus
makes use of it in the De immortalitate animae. It is however most
priced by Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great in the thirteenth
century. Philip traces the idea of the golden chain of being to
Pythagoras, and basing it on the use of the argument by Gundissalinus
goes on to draw many corollaries from it in defence of immortality. The
fundamental idea behind the employment of the aurea catena as proof
of immortality is that there exists .in nature an order of gradation in
being, in which the members of the different levels are linked with one
another, and like nature which abhors a vacuum, permits no gap
between the different levels of the universal order. Man as a spiritual
and corporeal being is well placed to link the material and the spiritual
levels of this order of being. Ifhe is to serve this purpose efficiently, he
must possess important characteristics of the two major divisions:
material and spiritual. His body is corruptible, like all material beings,
and his soul must therefore be incorruptible to speak for the spiritual
side of the order. The idea of a universal chain of being is one of the
mainstays of Philip's arguments for immortality. \3 In Albert the Great, it
is the foundation of the three different proofs that he calls rationes
probabiles .14
Philip the Chancellor is one of the most influential thinkers of the
early part of the thirteenth century. His literary and doctrinal influence
has been noted by scholars, especially with the publication of the
edition of his Summa de bono. IS Albert's influence on Aquinas his
student is also very well known. Given these circumstances, it is very
unlikely that Thomas is imaware of the arguments for immortality from
181
the idea of the order of being. Furthermore, Aquinas in many sections of

his work dwells on the doctrine of the universal order of being. lo Why
then does he not use the idea as an argument for immortality? Barring
any ctear rejection of the argument in Aquinas' works, one can only
infer the reason from a reading of his major arguments. A general
survey of the arguments that Aquinas uses shows clearly that they are
all either derived directly from the phenomenon of knowledge in the
rational soul or they refer back to the same phenomenon. This practice
is maintained whether he uses the presence of contraries, or the desire
for immortality, or the question of universals, abstraction or the process
of knowledge itself. It is noticeable that the argument from the order of
being is not one that can ill any direct way be hinged back to the issue
of knowledge in man. The impossibility of a direct link to knowledge
could be a possible reason why it is deemed unsuitable as a major
argument for immortality. It does not say all however, because, given
what we have described as his method of basing the convincing power
of his arguments on their cumulative effect, the arguments could in fact
be given even a subsidiary place without any obvious harm to his
project. Viewed from this perspective, it could be that having
accidentally omitted the argumerit in his earlier works, he does not go
back to search for more proofs from his predecessors. Be that as it may,
the absence of such a proof, and the secondary position given to
otherwise age-old ones like that from the imago dei point to some
selections or unexpressed grading of the arguments. There is nowhere in
his works where Aquinas expresses dissatisfaction with any argument
for immortality. However, a closer reading points to the direction that
he does not consider all of them to be equally acceptable and
convincing.
Given that Aquinas is convinced that immortality could be
demonstrated by reason alone, it is important to ask whether the
arguments he puts forward do in fact prove that the .human soul is
immortal. The answer to this question must in some way remain
subjective, depending on what standard of proof that is required, and
whether one is ready to accept some of the major premises on which
subsistence and incorruptibility of the soul are based. We have in the
course of the previous chapters referred to commentators, some of
whom are very critical, and others who are less so. It may be claiming
too much to say, as St. Hilaire does that "we nearly all accept his
arguments,,,11 while Wilhelmsen's effort to show that the existence of
"either-or" situations in the mind argues for its lack of contrary and
implicitly for its immortality is very tenuous.18 Pegis' position may be
182
more defensible, for, according to him, "the philosophy created by St.

Thomas could not possibly exist anywhere but on Christian soil, and ...
could not live but in the mind of a theologian."' But even the
theologian must resolve the choice which Culhnann poses between
resurrection and inunortality, and his conclusion that "the teaching of
the great philosophers Socrates and Plato can in no way be brought into
consonance with that of the New Testament."' For Culhnann, the
emphasis on inunortality is only one of the trappings of Hellenism, and
the specific Christian hope is for the resurrection, not just of body, but
also of the whole man. There is no doubt that, taken separately, most of
the arguments for immortality are tlunconvincing," as Kenny says.21
However, there are others, which may not be very much so if the
premises that are there points of departure are accepted. Most of such
premises are interconnected, like the hypostatization of knowledge, the
sense in which universals are infinite, and the question of giving special
status to the soul as form based again on these premises. We have
indicated that these premises, which Aquinas clearly takes for granted in
the course of his arguments about the soul and its inunortality, are not
without serious problems, and any weighing of the convincing power of
the arguments for immortality must take full account of the problems.
Nevertheless, we are to argue presently that the philosophical import of
the effort to prove inunortality by Aquinas and thinkers of his ilk cannot
be sununarlzed by the judgement of the convincing powers of these
arguments.
5.2 Some Critics of Aquinas: Scolus, Pomponazzi and Cajelan
Many followers of Aquinas in the philosophic tradition do not accept
the premises on which the arguments are founded, and consequently,
cannot accept the arguments themselves. The rejection of the project of
proving inunortality started ahnost unwittingly well before the time of
Aquinas. The increased effort to demonstrate the truth of the doctrine,
which is a consequence of philosophical awakening of the century, did
not last long before doubts or aspersions started being directed either at
the project as a whole or at the arguments used in the demonstration. It
would in fact be a superficial reading of the history of the question of
immortality in the later Middle Ages to think that it is only with John
Duns Scotus, as though out of the blue, that doubts started being raised
about the project of proving inunortality from the point of view of
philosophy. When William of Auvergne asserted that theologically
arguments for immortality are more convincing based, as they are, on
183
the authority of God himself, he was directly implying that

philosophical demonstrations lack the effect found in those proofs he
terms theological. Alexander of Hales' rejection of the argument from
the conception of the soul as the source of life seems to introduce a
more critical look into the logic of the arguments, a perception that also
carries with it the possibility of rejecting at least some of them. And
when Albert the Great grouped the arguments into signs of inunortality,
probable and necessary arguments for inunortality, he seemed to have
taken to a more developed level an innovation that is incipient in Hales.
These would appear to have prepared the ground for the complete
rejection of the arguments as found in later authors. It must be noted
however that such writers as, William of Ockbam, Dons Scotus, Pietro
Pomponazzi and the later Cajetan never doubted whether the soul is
mortal. What unites them is the refusal to make it a doctrine that is
sustainable purely from the point of view of philosophy. A sununary of
the positions of three of these thinkers will illustrate this point of view
adequately.
John Duns Scotus (1270 - 1308) is no doubt one of the greatest
thinkers of the later Franciscan School. He was only a few decades
removed from being an inunediate contemporary of Thomas Aquinas.
While the zeitgeist within which the two scholastics lived and worked is
more or less the same, their positions on the question of demonstrating
immortality are poles apart. Scotus, unlike Aquinas, does not consign
the distinctions or grading of the arguments for inunortality to neglect,
but, like Aquinas, he groups all together as probable arguments in an
implicit scale which hypothetically contains other levels. Thus for
Scotus, there are reasons to think that the soul is immortal. But the fact
of its inunortality is not demonstrable. For Scotus, the attempt to prove
inunortality by rational arguments is bedevilled by a multiplicity of
factors. The very conception of being, the question of creation and even
the authority of philosophers do not provide any comfortable ground
from which to argue for inunortality.
On the authority of philosophers, especially Aristotle, on which
Aquinas relies so much, and in reference to which he wrote his De
unitate against Averroes, Scotus seeks to find out exactly what we can
learn from his philosophy about inunortality. In his view, Aristotle
speaks differently in different places, and one finds in him principles,
which are supportive of inunortality, and others beside these which are
squarely against it. If therefore philosophers have outlined arguments
for immortality, it is not for that reason that the soul should be taken to
be inunortal, and if they have, on the contrary, tried to show that the
184
The Philosophical Significance o/ImmortaUty in Thomas Aquinas
soul is mortal, it does not also imply that they have proved this by their
arguments. It is not possible to demonstrate that the soul is immortal;
what can be shown is that it is possible that the soul is immortal. The
authority of philosophers does not therefore lead to any measure of
certainty because they do not always give rational demonstration of
everything they regard as true. 22 They are more often than not satisfied
with reasonable probability, when they are not altogether allied with the
popular tenets of their philosophic forebears."
As regards the nature of the soul, Scotus believes that it should be
melted into the same pot as the angels. If therefore it is not possible to
have several angels belonging to the same species (as indeed Aquinas
holds), there should also be no defensible reason to think that diverse
souls should belong to the same species. Souls are pure forms, just as
angels are pure forms. With reference to Aquinas' position to the effect
that the union with the body gives the soul its individuation, and an
inclination which makes it naturally bound to the body, Scotus objects
that it is not the inclination in a being that constitutes its nature. It is not
because the soul has a certain inclination towards the body that it is this
or that soul, but because it is this or that soul that it is inclined towards
the body. Mere inclination cannot make a being a separate being or
entity. An inclination presupposes the being to which it inheres much
24
like an accident, which belongs to a substance.
The foundation of Scotus' argumentations against the possibility of
demonstrating immortality is, as seen from above, his conception of
being, which is also linked with his theory of creation. To say that the
soul has its own life independent of the body would entail that it was
created directly in itself and for itself. If therefore it can be
demonstrated that the soul is immortal, one would be in a position to
know that it can exist without the body, from where it can also be
concluded that it was created in itself, and not as form of the body.
However, it is not possible for a philosopher, uulike the Christian, to
imagine how God can create the soul as a being completely independent
of the composite. The point of divergence between the philosopher and
the Christian is that for the former, given that the soul is the act of the
body, it cannot have been created apart, with a separate destiny and
being, while for the latter, this is a real possibility. Scotus thus rejects
what we have called the Platonism of Aquinas, the foundation of which
is the conception of an act of being which the soul can exercise on its
own and which it can communicate to the body. If this idea of being
were granted, then there would be nothing to prevent the soul from
having a being that cannot be destroyed with the destruction of the
Aquinas. Immortality and the Scope ofPhilosophy
185
body. For the Franciscan, there is no special act of being by which an

essence would be constituted into a being (an entity). In his view, the
primary reference of being is to the real substance distinct from its
cause and outside its mental conception. Only in a secondary and
reductive sense can a part be called a being. It is not therefore possible
that the soul would communicate its being to the body, since the being
of both the soul and the body is not different from' the being of the
composite. 2s
Such a soul contains, for Scotus, indications, which can lead to the
affmnation of the possibility of immortality. Here he goes back to one
of the basic principles by means of which Aquinas tries to prove both
the spirituality and immortality of the soul, i.e. the fact of intellectual
knowledge. It is clear to all that the human being can understand, and
because it is on account of his form that man can carry out this activity
it constitutes a formal principle of the composite of his being. Human
beings everywhere know that they have the capacity to know and that
this activity is one that does not require the use of any material organ,
uulike all the operations of sensible knOWledge. Intellectual knowledge
is always about universals, and concerns the apprehension of the most
common principles of being. It is on account of this that the science of
metaphysics is possible, because the type of knowledge that the rational
being is capable of acqniring makes it possible for the science to have a
specific object. That human beings are capable of exercising the
operations involved in intellectual knowledge is because there is
something in their nature which is capable of receiving such knowledge,
and such a receptor cannot have in its nature anything associated with
corporeality. The receptacle of knowledge can either be the soul or the
human being as a whole by means of its soul, and if this operation is
formative to man as rational being, it means that the rational soul must
be the form of the human being. For Duns Scotus,it is very reasonable
that the soul that is capable of such an operation should be immortal, or
in fact that it is immortal. Nevertheless, one cannot prove this by force
of an argument from the point of view of philosophy. To support his
conclusion, Scotus reviews one of the arguments, which have been used
to defend immortality - the argument from the desire of everlasting
being.
Our review of the argument from desire shows that, first, Aquinas
seems to take it as a sign of immortality, at least in the Summa
thealagiae, and not as an indepehdent argument. Again, wherever he
states the argument, he links it with knowledge of rational beings as
such, distinguishing it from the desire of brutes for self-preservation,
186
Aquinas, Immortality and the Scope of Philosophy
and the preservation of their own species." For Scotus, the desire for
everlasting existence is not different from the inclination towards a
particular act. This inclination is equivalent to the tendency for selfpreservation which Aristotle hhnself attributes to all beings, e~dowed as
they are with natnral striving to remain in existence so far as .t d,:"ends
on them. That this desire is not fulfilled is seen in the corruption of
composites. In any case, there is no certainty that what living beings
desire is eternal existence as inunortal souls, or that what they actually
desire is not to continue to exist as they are. Even if it is admitted that
man has the natnral desire for inunortality, it is possible that he desires
the impossible. Where the onus of proof lies is to prove first that man is
inunortal, and not whether he desires inunortality.
It is remarkable from the above that Scotus does not take account of
Aquinas' linking of the argument from desire with the ~owle~ge of
infinite or everlasting being, which seems necessary to d.stmgmsh the
human desire from the desire of brute animals which are not immortal in
Aquinas' system. Again, Aquinas takes due account of the general
tendency of forms to persist in being, and adds that it is on account of
the contrariety of composition that other forms perish, and that human
souls are spared that fate because they are themselves the ve'!' s.ource. of
their being and do not depend for their being on the compos.te m which
they are found. 21 It seems obvious from what we have seen that the
basis of these exceptions is not acceptable to Scotus, but because of the
failure to take account of these, he ranges the rational soui in the same
category as brute souls. Referring to Aristotle's affIrmation that natnre
always desires what is better, he asserts that inunortality is better than
corruptibility, and consequently, man must desire the inunortality of the
soul. Even then, it does not follow that each particular soul must be
inunortal for natnre can very well achieve its desire by according
inunortality to the species through the process of generation and
corruption, which assures the perpetuity of the species, but not of the
individual." In fact, for Scotus, the argument from the desire of being is
not only ineffective in proving inunortality (omne. medium ex
desiderium naturali videtur inejjicax), it can also be srud to beg the
question at issue. Since the point in dispute is to prove inunortality, one
29
cannot go from the desire for it to its afftrmation. Hence the type of
incorruptibility that Scotus is ready to consider for rational souls on
philosophical grounds is the type that Aquinas accept~ for .b,:"te ~ouls
because of their inability to know being as such, which d.sttngmshes
them from intellective souls.
187
By the time Piettro Pomponazzi wrote, a hundred years later than

Scotus, the highest point of scholasticism had been overtaken and the
all too monop~listic co~centration on Aristotle had been tem~ered by
the r~newed mterest m Platonism in Italian renaissance, marked
especially by the work of Marcellio Ficino. Ficino's Platonism
infl.ue~ced Pompo~ a great deal, but he can in no way be said to be
a d~s~.ple of Plato Wlthout strong qualification. In reality Pomponazzi's
pos.tion on the natnre of the soul is allied to that of Alexander of
APID:0disias. The Aristotelianism of the thirteenth century was still
hol~mg sway, and the fame of St. Thomas was still recognized by all in
the mtellectual world of the time. Even though Pomponazzi's treatise De
immortalitate. animae is ,mainly a critical review of the position of St.
Thom.as on ~ortality, he shows deference to the Dominican, by

asserting that his attempt to review Thomas' position comes not from
hi.s own certainty, but doubt, and expresses hope that his e~gagement
Wlth the learned Thomas will reveal the truth to him. The circumstances
sun:o.unding. the co~position of the treatise is a critique of Thomas'
pos.tion on nnm~rtahty, which critique resulted in one ofPomponazzi's
students demanding a lectnre from him on immortality based on the
authority of reason and not of faith.' The problem of Pomponazzi is
therefore not whether the soul is immortal or not. This, for hhn, is
~learly s~ttled by the Holy Scriptnre and by faith, which support the
.mmort:,hty of the soul. The problem is whether philosophy or reason
can on .ts own demonstrate that the soul is inunortal.
Pomponazzi .hhnsel.f accepts the age-old view that man is of multiple
n:'tiJres, occuPy?,g an mtermediate position, which makes it possible for
~ to b~ cons.d~red as both mortal and immortal. The diffIculty for
thinkers .s ~o delmeate what these two qualities mean in man, i.e., in
wh~t. sense .t ~ be said .that man is mortal or inunortal. The possible
~os.tions, whic.h. he o~t1mes and attempts to weigh in his treatise,
mclude ~e pos.tion attributed to Averroes, according to which there is
?n1y one nnmortal soul which all human beings share. Another position
.s that of Plato who states that there are two souls in man - one mortal
d the other ~ortal. Pomponazzi rejects all such views, but he also
reJ.ects the pos.ti?n of Thomas according to which the human soul is of
uruq~e ~tnre,. snnple and absolutely immortal. For Pomponazzi, no
c~nvmcmg eVldence can support the absolute immortality of the soul.
L.ke Duns Scotus, he doubts that such a doctrine can be defended from
the teaching of Aristotle and that reason alone can defend immortality if
it does not call faith to witness.31
m:
188
The position, which he vouches for, is the one attributed to

Alexander of Aphrodisias, and which, according to Pomponazzi, is
more in accordance with the teaching of Aristotle. It states that the soul
has just one nature, is absolutely speaking mortal, and only in some
respect, in some reductive sense is it inunortal. That the sonl should be
considered corruptible is supported clearly by the fact that it does not
have any way of knowing without recourse to the senses.32 These
characteristics distinguish it from the angels or pure intelligent beings,
which are absolutely inunortal. But the soul is in a sort of via media
between the spiritual and the material, and while it must depend on the
senses for its activities, it is not like the souls of brute animals which
have matter, the body, as their subject. In this sense, according to
Pomponazzi, it may be said to participate in some way in inunortality."
Even then, this position has no status of certainty; it is only a
probability, which is more defensible from the philosophical viewpoint
than other rival positions, and more than them is in accord with the
teaching of Aristotle.
Pomponazzi takes on the argument drawn from Aristotle's statement
in the Ethics that contemplation is the highest end to which man can
aspire, and that this highest aspiration is unattainable without
inunortality. In St. Thomas, it does not appear in any prominent way as
a demonstration of immortality, and is seen only once in the texts we
have reviewed. Pomponazzi rejects the theory that the ultimate end of
man lies in contemplation. This end should be sought in the practical
reason with its perfection by moral virtue, which every human being can
attain. He tries to support this position by recourse to the normal
experience of human beings. Man has three types of intellect:
speculative, practical and technical intellects. The first of these is the
exclusive preserve of only a few human beings; everybody shares the
second, while the third is attainable both by human beings and brutes.
What should characterize human beings should neither be what they
have in common with brutes, nor what only II few of their members can
attain, but that which all human beings and only human beings share.
That this is so is seen to by the fact that human beings are called either
good or bad, not in reference to the tendency of their speculative or
technical intellect, but to the practical intellect, which is the subject of
vice and virtue which make people either good or bad. A good
philosopher (speculative intellect) and a good engineer (technical
intellect) may not necessarily be good men. That is why people would
not mind so much if they were called bad philosophers or bad
engineers, but would feel differently if they were called unjust, for
Aquinas, Immortality and the Scope 0/ Philosophy
189
example. It seems then that for Pomponazzi, the defining characteristic

of all men is the endowment of the practical intellect, which everyone
can attain, and not that of the speculative and technical intellect, which
is not always within their capability. The highest end of man must
therefore be defined in line with his most basic characteristic, which is
linked with the practical intellect. To foist the fulfilment of the
speculative intellect (or technical intellect) as the ultimate aim of man is
to imply that all men should strive to attain these aims, but it is neither
necessary nor desirable that all men should strive to be philosophers or
engineers.34
Pomponazzi also reviews the theory that God would be unjust if he
does not provide some reward for virtue and punishment for evil
committed on earth. From human experience, such rewards and
punishments are either not available, or even worse, the wicked are
rewarded and the just punished. Again, this argument, though found in
Aquinas, is, like the foregoing, a very peripheral one. Pomponazzi's
answer to the objection is based on Plato's theory that the reward for
virtue is found in virtue itself, and the punishment for vice is embedded
in the vicious act and state. There is therefore no grave consequence if it
seems that vice is not met with appropriate punishment and virtue by
reward, since these states contain their own reward or punishment.
Pomponazzi adds another consideration, which seems to be more
effective than the ethical theory of Plato. To act in expectation of
reward is less noble and less virtuous than to act without an eye on any
recompense for ones act. If therefore one were not externally rewarded
by one's virtuous act, it would appear that one even receives all the
greater reward in the end. In the same way, the wicked, who seem to
escape punishment are all the more punished because the inherent
punishment in their acts is made more painful by their apparently going
scot-free."
The reasoning of Pomponazzi here is remarkable in view of the
deep-seated belief that inunortality is a necessary postulate for the
rationality of morality. It is a presupposition that is not only commonly
believed among many religious people, but one, which finds strong
support among philosophers. For Kant, immortality will become a
postulate of practical reason in order to make way for morality. Aquinas
himself projects the question of morality as one of the reasons why he is
angry with the followers of Averroes. 36 Pomponazzi takes the whole
presupposition to task by insisting that those who have high moral
standards are attracted to virtuous act by the beauty of the act itself, and
are repelled from vice because of the nature of vice not because of the
190
The Philosophical Significance oJImmortality in Thomas Aquinas
fear of possible consequences that may follow the vicious act. Thus he
rejects completely the view that morals can only be maintaioed with the
presupposition of inunortaiity. His view seems, as Krysteller says, "far
superior to those contrary opinions that are often expressed and
propagated even in our days, and that usually go unchallenged.""
The conclusion of Pomponazzi as regards the question of
inunortality is that the matter is neutral so long as philosophy is
concerned. He does not however question the reality of inunortality.
hnmortality is a religious belief and must be admitted on the grounds of
faith alone. God himself has shovm beyond reasonable doubt in the
Bible that the soul is inunortal, and this must be accepted as such as an
article of faith. It follows that any attempt to prove the contrary must be
false and unacceptable. However, going on the strength of reason alone,
and in spite of the efforts of philosophers, there is no argument
convincing enough to show that the soul is immortal. 38
Thomas de Vio Cajetan, the great commentator on St. Thomas
Aquinas, concludes his philosophic life by affirming basically the same
position as his contemporary, Pomponazzi. But given his diametrically
opposed positions about the provability of immortality, we shall
distinguish the two periods of his life by naming them first and second
Cajetan. The first Cajetan, the faithful defender of Thomas Aquinas'
position, at times seems to go farther than his master in affirming, in a
more Wlequivocal manner, positions, which Aquinas asserts with a
measure of nuance. An example of this is the nature of the soul, in
union and in separation from the body. The soui for him is naturally
united to the body as form, and this union is effected propter melius
because of the soul's special way of knowing by reverting to the
phantasms. Even though the mode of knowledge by receiving species
from separate, non-sensible being is superior in itself, it is not so to the
soul because of its nature (est nobilius et melius simpliciter, sed non
animae). Such knowledge that is effectuated by a direct infusion of
species from spiritual being is for him not against nature, but lies above
the nature of the soul. The inunortality of the soul is demonstrable and
this truth is, to the first Cajetan, so clear that in obvious reference to
Pomponazzi's conclusion that inunortality is problema neulrum, he
poured invectives on anyone who is against the possibility of
demonstrating its truth." In keeping with such a diatribe, he goes on in
his writings and commentaries to defend the immortality of the soul.
All the arguments he uses in defence of immortality are the usual
ones knovm to the scholastics, even though he employs different
illustrations to make the same point. In a sermon delivered before Pope
191
Julius II in 1503, he refers to the contention that the soul cannot have in
its being the form of any of the things it is capable of knowing in order
to show its independence from the material, and hence its inunortaiity.
For the first Cajetan, the soul is like a judge who must not be
sympathetic to any of the positions that are presented before him ifhe is
to judge properly. In the same way, the rational soul must not share the
nature of the things it knows, but must be spiritual to know the way it
40
does. He also calls the presence of natural desire in man to the defence
of inunortality.41 But for him, its power of demonstration depends on
the soul not being fixated on a mere wishful desire or unreal
imagination, but rather that the nature of the knOwing soul strives
towards the absolute. Such a desire would not be vain because natural
striving is never in vain.
In his commentary on" Aristotle's De anima, he asserts that the
position of Aristotle on the problem of immortality is not unequivocal,
and seeks to clarify what he intended to say about the issue, especially
with reference to the famous passage of Aristotle in Book Three of the
De anima. For him, that Aristotle supports immortality can be read from
what he says at the begirming of the treatise to the effect that if indeed
the soul has some operation on its ovm independent of the body, it
would also be able to exist without it." In the same way, he tries to
derive from the teaching of Aristotle principles and statements from
which the immortality of the soul can be concluded. In the De anima, as
well as in his commentary on Aquinas' Summa theologiae, he describes
the human soul as a forma media,43 a form that is endowed with such
being that it is independent of matter, and can, at the same time, form a
composite with matter. The human soul is, as such, the lowest being in
the ladder of spiritual beings, and as a result of this is subsistent, as
distinct from material forms that are bound with the matter with which
they are united.
These teachings are all not more than the elaboration of Aquinas'
views but the second Cajetan appears to revoke them in his last writing.
While the first Cajetan is ready to pour invectives on anyone who would
describe the problem of inunortality as philosophically neutral, the
second clearly expresses doubt about the ability of reason to
demonstrate that the soul is immortal. In the commentary on Paul's
letter to the Romans he states his conviction that one truth cannot be
against another truth, but still that he does not know how to unite
divergent positions about matters such as the freedom of the will and
the providence of God, just as he is ignorant about the mystery of the
Trinity, the immortality of the soul and the incarnation of the word of
192
God. Nevertheless, the faith of the second Cajetan in these doctrines

remains firm. 44 Again in the commentary on the Ecclesiastes, he refers
to the doubt expressed by the writer of the book about the truth of the
immortality of the soul. He adds that till now, no philosopher has been
able to prove the immortality of the soul, that there is no effective
demonstration for the doctrine, and that we must take it as true only on
grounds of faith.
Cajetan's expressed exasperation at his inability to reconcile the
failure to prove immortality with his faith in the truth of the doctrine
brings up the contentious issue of double truth, according to which a
theory can be false in philosophy and true in respect of faith. The
doctrine of double truth was supposed to have been held by the
Averroists of the thirteenth century who are said to have arrived at
conclusions in conSOnance with Aristotle and the Commentator, while
also acknowledging the divergent stand of faith on the same issue.
Hence, they are said to have given rigorous and logical validity to
Aristotelian arguments while at the same time conceding the last
determination of the truth of the matter to the Christian faith. It has been
shown that none of the thinkers of the thirteenth-century, not even Siger
of Brabant himself, held such a view that would be rightly described as
double truth. 45 The three thinkers we have seen in this section are clear
in their position as to exclude any confusion in this regard. They all
assert the belief in immortality as true, but as a matter of fuith. They do
not share with Aquinas the conviction that right philosophy must lead to
the same conclusions as faith. Their position is more of an indication of
the limit of philosophy. On the question ofimmortality, their conviction
is that philosophy is not able, or has not been able so far, to demonstrate
convincingly that the soul is immortal. Still if this is the case, it is also
true that they do not try to show that philosophy proves the opposite to
be true, that the soul is mortal. To do so would have confirmed them as
holders of double truth. What they indicate is the limit of philosophy on
the issue, while leaving free the actual determination of the matter as an
article of faith.
5.3 Some Subsequent Trends in the Question of Immortality.
The critical spirit towards the question of immortality of the soul in
philosophy continued to grow with the passage of time. The renaissance
movement, as well as the subsequent enlightenment, ensured a degree of
independence of philosophical engagement from faith that one could
hardly expect at the epoch in which Aquinas lived. This, not
Aquinas. Immortality and the Scope of Philosophy
193
surprisingly, means that there were not only thinkers who were willing
not only to disparage the possibility ofphiiosophy proving immortality,
but others who were ready to deny the fact of the matter itself. Still it
must be noted that through the changes in spirit occasioned by the
passage of time, there still remained a host of serious philosophers for
whom the immortality of the soul is demonstrable by unaided reason.
The growing independence of philosophy as a science in the modern
epoch was accompanied by the progressive strides in the physical
sciences and mathematics which had enormous influence on the
evolution of philosophy. With Euclid's geometry and Newton's physics
foisted on the consciousness of thinkers as the epitome of scientific
progress, the reaction of many philosophers was to replicate the type of
progress realized in these fields in philosophy as well. While Hume
inveighed against metaphysics as a science in his book burning
campaign,46 Kant wanted to review the whole fabric of speculative
philosophy in order to determine how far it was possible as a science.
The effort to bring into philosophy the method and evident progress of
the natural sciences is traceable in most major thinkers of the modern
period. Descartes' quest for certainty led to his methodic doubt, while
the Ethics of Spinoza is a testimony to the effort to construct a
philosophy loaded, as in geometry, with axioms, definitions and
propositions.
Descartes seems to have initiated the quest for certainty with his
decision to put into doubt all the data of the senses because of their
latent possibility to deceive. In the end, he adopted a radical dualism of
mind and matter, a dualism so strict that it becomes almost impossible
to see how the two can act together as one being. Even though
Descartes lived and worked within the shadows of scholastic
philosophy,'7 his dualism and anthropology speak more of Platonism
than the hylemorphic relationship between soul and body, which was
the hallmark of scholastic anthropology. On the question of immortality,
Descartes was more concerned about the moral effect of the tenet that
after this present life, we have no more to hope for than flies and ants.
Outside the denial of the existence of God, there is nothing more
susceptible to turn weak characters from the pursuit of virtue than such
teachings. In his view, an understanding of how different the other
lower creatures are from us helps us to better appreciate the arguments
that seek to prove that the soul is totally independent of the body and
does not perish when the body perishes. In addition, since outside the
destruction of the body, we are not able to find any other possible cause
of its destruction, we must come to the conclusion that the soul is
194
immortal.48 Other rationalists like Spinoza outlined a radically monistic

philosophy in which the human being is but a mere mode in the attribute
of the infinite. Such metaphysics does not give any ground for
immortality, at least, not in the sense in which it is personal, and in
which it encourages the quest for virtue sought by Descartes.
Most empiricists adhere very strictly to Aristotle's and Thomas' view
about the origin of knowledge, but they generally differ widely from
them as regards the extent and nature of thought, the nature of the soul,
and the statns of universal knowledge. While Berkeley defends
traditional ideas about the nature of the soul and its immortality, Hume
makes the most scathing critique of not only the arguments for
immortality, but also the fact of immortality itself. Berkeley explains
that the natural immortality of the soul does not entail that it is
incapable of being annihilated even by the creator. Inunortality only
means that the soul is not liable to be destroyed by the usual law of
nature. In his view, bodies are merely passive ideas in the mind, and are
so different from the nature of the mind as light is from darkness.
Berkeley does not spend many words in fashioning demonstrations for
immortality. It suffices that he has shown that the soul is indivisible,
incorporeal and unextended to draw the conclusion that it is immortal.
The usual experience of men bears witness to this conclusion, since
nothing can be more evident than that motion, decay, dissolution and
similar changes for which bodies are known cannot affect a simple
substance such as the soul, which must be immortal by virtue of its
nature. 49
Hume's essay "Of the Immortality of the Soul" follows the general
sceptical slant of his philosophy in which the soul is regarded as an
aggregate of impressions. so He delineates the arguments for immortality
into three - the metaphysical, the moral and the physical - and tries to
show that from none of these can the soul be demonstrated to be
immortal. On the metaphysical grounds, he asserts that experience is
our only source of knowledge about substance, and what experience
teaches us is that substance is "an aggregate of particular qualities
inhering in an unknown something. ,,51 Matter and spirit consequently
remain fundamentally unknown to us, and we cannot, through abstract
reasonlng, arrive at any conclusion about fact or experience. He further
avows that what is incorruptible must also be ungenerated, and if the
soul is immortal, it must have existed at all times. If its existence before
this life does not concern us, there is no reason why its future existence
should be our concern. On the moral arguments for immortality, he
takes on the supposition of God's justice as the grounds of immortality.
Aquin~,
Immortality and the Scope o/Philosophy
195
The arguments from God's justice are, for him, grounded in the
supposition that God has other attributes than the ones that we are able
to learn from this universe. Hume is of the view that if we are to judge
by reason alone, the capacity of man is limited to the present life, and
the fear of the future in many people is a result of precepts and
education artificially maintained to ensure a livelihood for those who
teach them. 52 Concerning the question of reward and punisinnent, he
uses the principle of the chain of causality (even though he rejects the
principle in his own philosophy): if everything that happens must have a
cause, and this line of causality goes on to the ultimate cause, it means
that everything that happens is ordained by this cause, and cannot at the
same time be the object of its punisinnent. If for the sake of the
argument we concede the reality of such reward and punisinnent, more
difficulties will follow. The range of human merit is wide. For which of
these merits should we expect perpetual reward? Our idea of rightful
punisinnent is that it must have a proper end, and no end can in addition
be served by punisinnent "after the whole scene is closed." Again,
proportionality of punisinnent to the offence is in accordance with the
human conception of punisinnent. If so, it is incomprehensible to erect
eternal punisinnent for temporary offence. 53
The concentration of the above on moral arguments for immortality
seems to be in consonance with the trend of the epoch in which much
was made of the moral implication of the supposition of the mortality of
the soul. For Descartes as well as for Berkeley, a strong reason which
recommends the immortality of the soul, is its effect on morality or
virtue. From what we saw in Aquinas, the question of morality is in fact
a peripheral consideration in the question of immortality. Hume's effort
is to bring the moral defence of immortality under the judgement of his
sceptical philosophy, taking as given the conclusions of this philosophy.
Thus, for him, the origin of our moral distinction is the human
sentiment, and the main source of moral ideas is the consideration of the
benefit of human society, and such benefit cannot be so consequential
that it should be safeguarded by eternal punisinnent.
What Hume calls the physical arguments are indeed his argument for
the mortality of the human soul. These are in his view the only
philosophical arguments, which merit our acceptance. Only a few of
these are worth recalling here. The first is the demonstration from the
analogy from nature: when two things are so closely united that
whenever there is an alteration in one, there is also a proportionate
alteration in the other, it is reasonable to conclude that when a greater
alteration occurs in one of them, it must be accompanied by an equally
196
proportionate alteration, and a dissolution of one of these will entail a

dissolution of the other. The closeness between the body and the soul
enables us to conclude that the destruction of the one will lead to the
destruction of the other. The same analogy of nature leads him to assert
that beings do not survive in situations completely different from the
one in which they originate, and in which they flourish. Trees do no
survive in water, nor do fishes survive in the open air. Following from
this analogy there is no reason to suppose that the alteration occasioned
by the demise of the body and the subsequent loss of the senses and
other organs would still leave the soul with its usual life. 54 In clear
reference to the argument from the desire for eternal existence, he
attempts to turn the argument on its head by stating that if the horror of
destruction does not arise from our love of happiness, it would be a
point to prove that the soul is, mortal, for following the principle of
nature not acting in vain, nature would not put in us such a horror for
something that is not real. 55 The aversion from death serves the purpose
of preserving the human species, because it is that aversion that leads us
to avoid death by all possible means.
Voltaire, another philosopher with a strong empiricist inclination,
also takes issue with the question of desire for perpetual existence.
Unlike Hume, he expressly defers to the possibility of God making the
soul immaterial and inunortal. For him to do so would be just as
possible as his creating many more worlds in addition to the one he has
in fact created. But placing himself in the hypothetical position of a
stranger from another planet, whose only means of knowing is his
senses, Voltaire holds that if indeed God has created these things, for us
to believe that he has in fact done so, we need to have seen them. What
it means is that there is no way one can prove the immortality of the
soul, if the only way of affirming truth is by seeing the object of our
affrrmation. It is unreasonable to hold that there is something eternal in
man, while denying all other earthiy creatures the same quality simply
on the ground that man desires immortality. Such a desire for continued
existence can be a pleasant consolation in the face of the misery of this
life, but the probability of such an existence is very far-fetched. Voltaire
avows to his inability to furnish proofs against the spirituality and the
immortality of the soul, but adds that all the odds are weighed against it,
and, in any case, "it is equally unjust and unreasonable to demand proof
from an enquiry in which only conjectures are possible."" It means that
the question of inunortality and, in general, the whole issue of the
nature of the soul cannot be taken as a real subject of philosophical
inquiry.
197
This interpretation of Voltaire's view wonld link him obliquely to

Kant's critical philosophy, which subjects the issue of the soul and its
immortality to the general critique of speculative philosophy. Kant's
basic tenet is that our synthetic a priori knowledge is mediated first by
the sensory intuitions of space and time, and then by ideas or concepts
which must be schematized by reference to experience if they are not to
give rise to the illusions of metaphysics. Such illusions of metaphysics
arise from the tendency of reason to seek the unconditioned in every
condition, a tendency that is regulative and not constitutive. 57 They are
regulative in the sense that they are principles that are necessary for the
conduct of thought or inquiry. It is the attempt to apply this tendency in
a constitutive manner, that is, as a means of getting knowledge of the
object of the unconditioned that leads metaphysics to apply the
unschematized categories to supposed objects of knowledge." As
regards the soul, this illusion gives rise to paralogisms. The origin of
these paralogisms is the idea of the self that must accompany all our
representations in the transcendental unity of apperception. According
to Kant, it is, thaIiks to the presence of the "I tbiIik" that I can call all
my representations mine. In ratioIial psychology, the "I" in the "I tbiIik"
is thought of as a simple SUbstance. But the soul, viewed, as a simple
substance, is not given under Kant's stated condition for the knowledge
of substance. It is not, for instance, given in time. A statement about the
substantiality of the soul that is not given in time cannot be a valid
synthetic a priori judgement. Only from the supposition that the soul is
a substance can the demonstration of its immortality proceed. Kant goes
on to argue against the demonstrations for immortality, especially
against M. Mendelsohn's proofs in his Phaedo (cf. B. 414 ff., also A
443 -B 471).
Kant however asserts that his critique of the arguments for
immortality does not obviate the necessity or even the right to postulate
a future life "in accordance with the principles of the practical
employment of reason."" Accordingly, in the Crique of Practical
Reason, he argues for the immortality, which he had rejected, in the first
critique on the grounds of the moral imperative. The moral imperative
enjoins that man be perfect, but no material being can attain this state of
perfection. Still before God, a continuous and endless march towards
perfection is the same thing as perfection in the distributive justice of
the highest good (summum bonum). Such continuous and endless
progress is possible only on the assumption of the soul's immortality.
Hence the moral imperative can be realized only if the soul is also
endless in its being, i.e. if it is immortal. The person being who accepts
198
Aquinas. Immortality and the Scope of Philosophy
this imperative for himself must also suppose himself to be immortal.60

It is clear that following Kant's theories in the first critique, all his talks
of endless perfection would not be meaningful since the soul, to which
they apply, is, without the body, atemporal, and outside the scope of a
synthetic a prairi knowledge.
J. S. Mill, the English liberal philosopher, is a rare case of a thinker
who takes the onus of proof to the doorstep of the opponents of
immortality. Voltaire had exclaimed that he has no way of proving that
the soul is mortal since on the issue only conjectures are possible.
Against the position of Hume, Mill asserts that his rejection of the
arguments of Plato only amounts to defect of evidence, and that "they
afford no positive argument against immortality." He warns against the
attempt at "giving a priori validity to the conclusions of an a posteriori
philosophy. ,,61 His view is that science has no positive evidence against
the immortality of the soul, and that the only thing available is negative
evidence, which lies in the absence of evidence in favour of what is to
be proved. For Mill, the negative evidence is not even as strong as
negative evidence can be, for instance, against witchcraft. One can in
fact argue successfully that the soul does not have an existence
somewhere on this earth. "But that it does not exist elsewhere, there is
absolutely no proof.,,62 With reference to what Hume has called analogy
of nature, Mill reviews why the general natural condition should not
apply to man. For him, there are enough grounds to demand the
exception for man, since feeling and thought are at the opposite poles of
existence, no analogy from one can rightly apply to the other. Mind is,
the thing that is most intimately known to us, it is the only reality of
which we have real evidence, and no other reality should be compared
to it. Even if this is true, this is still no evidence that the soul is
immortal. It only means that those who claim exception for the soul in
the general order of nature have some reasons to do so. Indeed, the
theme of immortality is, for Mill, a rare case in which there is a total
lack of evidence on either side, and one in which the absence of
evidence for the affirmative position does not nudge us to the tenability
of the opposite view'"
From the above, it can be said that the attitude of Mill about the
arguments for immortality is ambivalent; still he says that the belief in
immortality is grounded in tradition and in the discomfort of giving up
existence. Mill examines the argument for immortality from the desire
for eternal existence, and affirms that what is called the desire for
eternal life is not more than the desire for life. To hold that the desire
for life guarantees endless life to the subject of the desire is the same as
I
Il
I
I
1
199
holding that the hunger for food assures us of an inexhaustible stock of

food for all eternity. As to what he calls natural theology, he also asserts
that there is no evidence from that source convincing enough to show
that the soul must be immortal.
It is remarkable from the foregoing that in more recent times, the
strongest considerations on which Aquinas and men of his time based
their arguments for immortality were almost completely abandoned or
given a very peripheral place. The whole issue of knowledge is
practically forgotten while attention is shifted to desire for endless life,
the moral implication of immortality, and especially the question of
reward or punishment. Bringing these secondary factors to the fore is
seen both in the opponents and the advocates of demonstration for
immortality. It can be interpreted as a sigu of a shift in emphasis in
philosophy in general. Additional evidence of that shift is all the more
apparent as we come closer to contemporary times.
Within the twentieth century, the strong emphasis on the empirical
and the spectacular advancement in the natural sciences and technology
decidedly influenced a change in the perennial concern for immortality.
Most philosophers who believe in immortality do not feel the necessity
as in the past era to show that immortality must find a comfortable
home in their philosophy. The effort to prove immortality has not
completely petered out. Maritain, for example, outlines proofs of
immortality, but what he presents are merely a paraphrase of the
arguments of Aquinas' Summa thealagiae. William James's lecture on
immortality is a potent advocacy for the belief in the doctrine, but it is
clear that his postulation of a stream of consciousness from which the
individual consciousness is derived and to which it returns at death is
very far from the usual attempt to present a logical demonstration of the
doctrine. The same can be said of the thundering outburst of Miguel de
Unamuno in favour of immortality. In all, Swinburne was right when he
says that the "arguments to the natural immortality of the soul are very
unappealing today.,,64 That does not however mean that the interest in
the question of immortality has abated. In fact it would seem that the
focus of debate has tilted to the nature of the soul, which is in fact more
ftmdamental than the question of its immortality, and which prepares
the ground for the philosophical treatment of the matter. It appears
therefore that just beneath the veneer of the contemporary discussions
on the nature of the soul or mind lies the question ofits immortality.
It is not to be supposed that when a scholastic like Aquinas speaks
about the soul, and contemporary philosophers argue about the mind,
they all mean one and the same thing. Still the common ground between
200
the two concepts is that whether the soul or mind is employed, it is

understood as that extra thing which makes intellectual knowledge
possible; on account of which man is termed rational; and which (if one
subscribes to its subsistence) constitutes the subject of inunortality. In
spite of many tendencies to the contrary, many thinkers continue to
defend traditional dualism. But many contemporary defenders of
dualism still tend to pay special deference to materialism by, in effect,
making the mind inconsequential in the human system. Such could be
the ultimate implication of epiphenomenalism, which while asserting
the reality of the mental, still holds that the mental is completely
dependent on the physical that alone has causal powers. os Against these,
there is the now popular position that the very concept of the soul is an
unnecessary assumption. Such a view gives rise to the type of neutral
monism defended strongly by Russell at one stage of his ever-changing
philosophy. In neutral monism, there is no distinction between mind and
matter, since the two are made of the same primitive stuff." A
furtherance of the same intent to do away with the soul altogether led to
the conception championed by Gilbert Ryle that the assumption of
another reality over and above what is observable in human operation is
Iak'
a categona
trust e.
In spite of some of these recent slants in the philosophical
discussions about the soul, a lively interest is still shown in relation to
the supposed extra-material side of the human person, although in
deference to the popular materialist inclination of the present age, this
appears in terms of quest for empirical evidence. Hence such
phenomena as reincarnation, extra-sensory perception, out-of-body
experience like astral projection and in near-death and after-death
experience continue to elicit serious attention in many quarters'" It
seems to indicate the presence of a conviction in the continued
existence of some important aspects of the human entity. Given the
background of the general shift towards the materially demonstrable,
the effort to collate such experiences seems to indirectly point to the
same direction that all the effort to prove the permanence of the soul has
been pointing in past ages.
Despite the observable shifts, and the new turns given to the question
of the soul that fundamentally remains the same, it is remarkable that in
terms of arguments aimed at proving immortality, subsequent
generations did not go beyond the points raised by the epoch of Thomas
Aquinas. The nature of mind, and of thought, the status of knowledge,
the distinction between mind and matter are still very intractable
problems in philosophy. We have pointed out that these questions are
Aquinas. Immortality and the Scope ofPhilosophy
201
strongly related to the issue of inunortality and the effort to prove it

through rational argumentation. If such questions remain central in
philosophical inquiry, there is no doubt that they, by and large, raise the
issue ofimmortality of the soul.
5.4 Immortality and the Scope and Limit of Philosophy
If Aquinas and the thinkers of his time were convinced in the ability
of reason to prove the inunortality of the soul without recourse to
religious dogmas, their efforts have a lot to say about their
understanding of philosophy, its scope and limits. Theirs was an epoch
when philosophy was still in the pangs of asserting its independence
from theology as a field of human knowledge. Our review of the several
attempts of the angelic doctor to prove immortality shows that many of
his fundamental assumptions are beset by problems. Some of the
assumptions that are the statting points of his demonstrations are not
what subsequent thinkers would subscribe to uncritically. Again, some
of his conclusions were drawn without sustained weighing of
consequences. If however the global outcome of the effort of Aquinas is
best described as problematic, thought should be given to the fact that
subsequent effort to engage the same issue also ends at more or less the
same level of consistency in reasouing, not to talk of those who fall
back to the bland assertion of natural desire and the demands of
morality as grounds for inunortality of the soul. If this is the reality of
much of the effort to prove inunortality, and if it seems that except for
fresh empirical evidence, the whole concern to prove immortality turns
around the same basic points, does that age-long effort not hit a deadend? If this is so, is .the question of inunortality not a fruitless theme to
tinker with in the philosophical engagement?
P. Boduntin describes the question of inunortality as arational,
meaning that the issue of inunortality should not be considered from the
point of view of whether it is rationally right or wrong, but rather that it
is not the type of issue which philosophy should deal with in the first
place, at least not in terms of whether it is true or false. Boduntin's view
can be seen as an expression of what Swinburne regards as the aversion
of the time to prove the natural inunortality of the soul from rational
argumentation. Such an aversion would effectively consign many
centuries of philosophical consideration of inunortality to the dustbin of
philosophical history, given that almost all attempts to discuss
immortality were codified in terms of proofs. That it is so is
nevertheless very much in consonance with the general trend in the
202
histol)' of philosophy. The vaunted reliance on the power of reason in

philosophy appears to have had as side effect, the attempt to settle most
controversial issues by arguments that are meant primarily to convince
even imaginary opponents. This characteristic is strongly seen in Plato,
who incidentally is the first to present a systematic defence of
immortality. Plato's method casts a long shadow on subsequent
discourses on immortality. The scholastics ally themselves with this
tradition, which is all the more reinforced by the sic el non method of
treating all issues, be they theological or philosophical. In the specific
area of philosophy,. however, we see already from the scholastics the
long tradition of the pretension to present issues to pure and unaided
reason, which continues beyond their time up until the modern
hermeneutical movement starts to take more seriously the unconscious
presumptions in man's supposedly pure reasoning.
It is remarkable that just as in the case of immortality, the long
tradition of proof in philosophy does not appear to have achieved much
in outlining arguments that would be acceptable to all. Much of the
evolution of philosophy is the attempt to lead reason to its utmost limit
by engaging particular problems: man, the world, society, God, etc.
Hardly any of the solutions arrived at by anyone thinker or in anyone
epoch ever gains general acceptability. Such solutions, usually
presented in the form of arguments designed to convince the other, are
based on the general assumption of the era in which they are thought
out. This partly explains why they are almost always overturned by
subsequent generations of thinkers intent on giving definitive answers to
problems that had been the preoccupation of their forebears. One would
think that such a characteristic is prominent in the more abstract and
recondite aspects of philosophy as metaphysics, epistemology and
philosophy of the mind, but that is far from being the case. In political
philosophy, for example, the question of who should rule has been a
most contentious issue. The giants of Greek philosophy, Plato and
Aristotle ascribe to aristocracy as the best form of government while
castigating democracy as the rule of the mob. Coming vel)' near to
them, Thomas Aqninas subscribes to monarchy, understood in the sense
of a kingly ruler whose aim is the weB-being of his subjects. Hobbes
teaches that the only means of securing peace in the polity is the
enthronement of a leviathan endowed with absolute power, while Jolm
Locke spends his ink defending representative government. Today, it is
almost inconceivable that a philosopher or any social scientist for that
matter would write a text that does not sanction democracy as such,
irrespective of the specific form it takes .. One would thus think that in
203
our thne, as far as philosophy is concerned, the inquiry on who sbould

ideally take the mantle of leadership has been given a definitive answer
in the emergence of liberal democracy. It is important to remember that
thinkers like Aqninas and Hobbes are as convinced about the systems of
government they advocate as Francis Fukuyama is in our time about the
virtues of liberal democracy.
It is not being suggested that it is impossible to arrive at any general
agreement in the philosophical enterprise. The point is that from the
perspective of what is proved as generaBy acceptable, the whole
enterprise of philosophy is indeed threadbare. In moral philosophy,
Alasdair MacIntyre's statement to the effect that ethical concepts are
constantly changing leads G. J. Warnock to write The Objecl of
Morality. Warnock argues persuasively that in whatever socio-politicalethical system one chooses to operate, such virtues as truth, nondeception, non-malevolence and justice must be prerequisites for the
proper working of the system. Such a broad theol)' is not difficult to
accept. What philosophers would take as the detailed understanding of
social virtues is a much more intractable problem. Is justice to be
limited to giving to each person what is his due, or is it better served by
Jolm Rawls' dual principles? How- does the whole question of
ownership of means of production, and of inheritance touch on justice?
If the evolution of philosophy serves as a guide, there is no reason to
believe that such issues wiB cease to be points of contention for
philosophic minds.
The inconclusive arguments that seem to bedevil all philosophical
endeavour are, to say the least, nauseating to philosophers. It is perhaps
the unconscious antipathy to the inconclusiveness that helps to explain
the emergence of the sic el non method which, initiated by Peter
Abelard, guides much of medieval philosophical discussions. That
method manifests the desire to present every issue as though it has
clear-cut answers. Much later, the whole project of modern
philosophers initiated by Rene Descartes, and exemplified by the efforts
of Hume, Leibniz, Locke, Spinoza and Kant to transfer the perceived
certainty in mathematics and natural sciences to philosophy appears to
be aimed at arriving at certainty. It seems to be driven by a latent
misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy, or by the unexpressed
wish that its nature is otherwise than it actually is. In more recent times,
RusseB's project to build a scientific philosophy that wiB be at once
general and a priori, as weB as the progranune of the Vienna circle to .
restrict philosophy as much as possible to the analysis of concepts
204
would seem to be an attempt to avoid the problem by limiting the scope

of philosophical ioquiry.
We cannot bui conclude that the ioberent ioability to arrive at
definitive answers speaks much more about the intriosic nature of
philosophy than the few certainties it can lay claim to. It means that
while much of the history of philosophy is cluttered with unsuccessful
attempts to fashion convinciog proofs or arguments, general
acceptability should by no means be upheld as the major criterion for
relevance in philosophic engagement. In any case, the failure to arrive
at acceptable proofs with regard to any theme is no reason to banish it
from the ambit of philosophy since doiog so will io fact consign
philosophy itself to only narrow and irrelevant corners. Philosophy is
the engagement of human reason io the exploration of human problems
and perplexities. It starts, as Aristotle says, with wonder. The wonder
tbat seems to lie at the begimting of philosophy does not however
disappear with advancement in the enterprise. That is why it is
inherently accompanied by the absence of conclusive answers, which
makes it possible for future generations to try agaio. While that
characteristic can be viewed as negative, a more positive perspective
would see that as a constant invitation to a display of the congenital
fecundity of human reason. Philosophical insights iovite their offspring
to juggle all over again with age-old problems. They will perhaps do so
with more determination and confidence but also with the certainty that
their solutions will be abandoned by the coming generation. It is io ibis
attempt to engage reason with all its accretions that philosophy almost
in an uncanny manner purveys its enlightemnent; its ability to offer
some possible explanations, opening new vistas with regard to
otherwise hackneyed issues. But it does so with the grim realization that
its solutions and poiots of views are far from beiog final.
If reason is the most characteristic quality of man, it means that ibis
effort of reason called philosophy should be all embraciog:
encompassing all that is of concern to the human being. It is therefore
not right to categorize the problem of immortality as arational. If
philosophy should continue to retaio some relevance io the human
scheme, it should not shy away from problems or concerns that are
properly human. And in a world where sciento-technology is registering
more progress than. ever io human history, a philosophy that will be
taken into account is not one that avoids issues relevant to man because
. of the absence of the fioality of answers or solutions. The hunger for
immortality in the human being, as Edwards says, is marched by the
hunger to possess evidence. If ibis hunger is human, philosophy
Aquinas, Immortality and the Scope of Philosophy
205
weakens itself by excludiog a priori the exploration of evidence for its

reasonableness. Still such exploration so long as philosophy is
concerned, should not set out with the undue expectation of arriviog at
answers that are unCommon io the philosophical enterprise. It is our
conviction that philosophical consideration of immortality must not
necessarily issue io proofs iotended to withstand all the scrutioy of
critiques. Still the repeated attempt to demonstrate the hnmortality of
the soul io St. Thomas Aquioas and other thinkers of his ilk is a richer
recognition of the nature of philosophy than the exasperation of other
thinkers who would prefer to consign the subject to the realm of the
arationa!.
NOTES
I
Cf. S. C. G., II, c. 68

Cf. ST. la, 12. 12; 79, 3; 88, I & 3, De veritate, 2, 2. For more details about
human knowledge in Aquinas, see Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind,

especially chapters 7 - 10. Kennys book explores Aquinas' philosophy of mind
by commenting on the relevant passages in the first part of the Summa
Theologiae. a short but more systematic treatment is found in L. Elders, The
Philosophy ofNature ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, ch. 8, pp. 287 - 311.
3 See for instance, F. C Copleston, Aquinas, p. 166; F. D. Wilhelmsen, "A
Note on Contraries and the Incorruptibility of the Human Soul in st. Thomas
Aquinas," p. 336; for Oscar Cullman's use of the term in his book Immortality
of the Soul or Resurrection of the Body? (London: Epward Press, 1958), see F.
J. Crosson, ''Psyche and Persona: The Problem of Personal Inunortality,"
[nternational Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1968), pp. 164 - 165; G. F. Kreyche,
"The Soul-Body Problem in St. Thomas" The New Schosticism, 46 (1972), p.
476.
4 "The Soul-Body Problem in St. Thomas", p. 477: "Without taking these
differences into account, he moves quickly to his conclusion affirming the
substantiality of the soul. The question may be raised as to the legitimacy of
this, for the example of "hand" argues to substance in one meaning (a purely
reductive one), whereas his notion of "soul" as substance in the argument given
takes on a different and non-reductive meaning. Is this warranted, or did St.
Thomas beg the question in his haste to aUy philosophy with theology?"
Kreycbe's critique is correct, but in fairness to St. Thomas, it should be said
206
The Philosophical Significance a/Immortality in
Thom~ Aquinas
that his reason for enumerating different ways of being substance is in fact
intended to show that the meaning of substance when applied to the soul
should not be taken as the normal sense of a whole being a substance, since the
soul is only part of the composite. Even if the end-result in fact succeeds in
making the soul a substance as other substances, in the passage, which Kreycbe
refers to, the intention of Aquinas is very different.
5 ht some passages, Aquinas clearly states that the soul is a spiritual substance
without much qualification. See for instance De sprit. creal, II, ad 4: " ...
dicendum quod anima secundum suam essentiam est fonna corporis, et non
secundum aliquid additum. Tamen in quantum attingitur a corpore, est forma;
in quantum vero superexcedit corporis proportionem," dicitur spiritus, vel
spiritualis substantia."
6 In works such as the Commentary on the Sentences, etc., he tackles the issue
within the text on immortality. In the Summa and Contra gentiles, it is given
separate sections, while in Compendium and the Quodlibet, he prefers to deal
with the issue inunediately after arguing for immortality. In all cases however
the cotulection with immortality, as in the De unilate, is clearly attested to.
7 B. H. Zedler argues that Averroes never denied personal immortality, and
that the attacks against him and the distortion of his thought is due in fact to a
prejudice derived from Christian religious belief. "Medieval Christians have
attributed to Averroes a position that he should perhaps have had. They have
done him the honor of assuming that his thought was fully coherent, consistent,
and well integrated. Logically, they thought, he should have denied the
doctrine of personal inunortality. Such a denial might have been more
consistent with his total position than an acceptance of the possibility of the
doctrine. But Averroes may not have been the logical well-integrated thinker he
was believed to have been." Cf. "Averroes and Immortality," The New
Scholasticism, 28 (1954), pp. 438 - (453)
8 The principle that leads William to such an absurd conclusion is stated as
follows: ''Non enim est possibile substantiam debilitari quantum" ad esse ex
quacumque dispositione cum ex ilia, invalescat in operatione ipsius." (De
anima, V. 25, p. 153a.). Elsewhere he uses the positive effect of ill health on
vice t~ argue or the same point: drunkenness can be forgotten in times of
serious ill health, and thus the soul is burdened with less vice, which means
more life for it (Cf. De anima, VI, 5, p. 165a)
9
See for instance chapter 3 of B. Mondin's book St. Thomas Aquinas
Philosophy in the Commentary on the Sentences ofPeter Lombard, pp. 58 -74
which is entitled "An Anthropology of Imago die."
10 F. C. Copleston,Aquinas, p. 174
II Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, 1, 14. 15.
12 Cf. Epistolade anima, Migne (p. L., 194), 1885.
\3 Cf. Summa de bono, 265, 10 - 266, 109.
14 See Summa de creaturis, q. 59, a. 2, 21, pp. 524a - 525a: Before outlining
the probable arguments, Albert states the main principle of the order of being
207
as follows ''Ubique contingit invenire duo extrema inter res naturae, contingit
accipere medium. Hoc probatur per id quod habetur in libro de Animalibus, ubi
dicit Aristoteles, quod natura non venit de marino ad agreste, nisi per gradus:
nec venit a vegetabili ad sensibile, nisi per gradus: et ideo inter animal hebens
sensum unum et animal hebens sensus omnes, sunt plura media. Et hoc est
quod dicit Dionysius, quod lex divinitatis est per propria media, et per media
ultima adducere."
IS
See O. Lottin. "L'influence litteraire du Chancelier Philippe sur les
theologiens prethomiste," RTAM, 2 (1930), pp. 311 - 326. See also Wichi's
introduction to his edition of the Summa de bono. Until the edition of this
treatise of Philip, the Franciscan Alexander of Hales was taken as the first
thinker of the thirteenth-century to elaborate the doctrine of the transcendals.
However, Wichi's work has completely revised this claim, and it is
uudoubtedly Philip from whom the first outline of the transcendals originated.
For more on the doctrine of transcendentals, see Jan Aertsen. Medieval
Philosophy and the Transcendentals (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996) (especially the
chapter on the beginning of the doctrine of transcendentals with Philip the
Chancellor, pp. 25 - 40)
16 Cf. S. T., la,47, I & 2; S. C. G., U, 45.
17 G. SI. Hilaire, op cil., p. 343.
" F. D. Wilhelmsen, op. ci!., 337 - 338.
19 A. C. Pegis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man (New York:
Macmillan), 1963, p. 49.
20 O. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Body,? p.60.
21 A. Kenny, op. cil., p. 175
22 Reportata. Parisiensa, Opera omnia XI, (repr. Hildesheim, 1969) I. IV, d.
43, q. 2, n. 17: ''Dnde non oportet quod onme quod dicit philosophus, sit
demonstratio, quia multa dixenmt philosophi quae acceperunt a prioribus
philosophis, persuasi per rationes probabiles eorum et non semper per
demonstrativas."
23 Opus oxoniense, I. N, d. 43, q. 2, n, 16: ''frequenter non habebant nisi
quasdam probabiles persuasiones vel vulgarem opinionem praecedentium
philosophorum. "
24 Ibid., I. U, d. 3, q. 7, n. 4; I. U, p. 279.
" Cf. Quodlibet, Opera omnia, XU (repr. Hildesheim, 1969) q. IX, n. 17: "Isto
modo compositum perfectum in specie dicitur esse, et solum illud; pars autem
ejus dicitur esse per accidens tantummodo, vel magis proprie participative isto
esse totius; sic igitur solum compositum est per se ens, accipiendo esse secundo
modo; anima autem intellectiva non dicitur subsistens nisi improprie et
secundum quid, Beet dicatur ens, et per se ens primo modo accipiendo esse."
26 See above Chapter 3, section, pp.
27 Cf. S. T., la, 75, resp., see above Chapter 3, section pp.
2S Rep. par. I, IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 15; Rep. par.!. IV, d. 43, quo 2, n. 26.
208
29
Scriptum in IV libros Sententiarum, in Dons Scotus, Philosophical Writings,
ed Wolters (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1962), p. 158: "planum es~ quod non potest
probari desiderium naturale ad aliquid, nisi primo probetur possibilitas in
natura ad illud, et per consequens e converso arguendo est petitio principi."
30 Cf. O. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford:
Stanford University Press., 1964), p. 79
31 Pomponazzi, De ;mmortalitate, in Abhandlung tiber der Unsterblichkeit der
Seele, ed.& tr. B. Mojsiseh (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990), p. 52: "De veritate
quidem huius positionis apud me nulla prorsus est ambiguitas, cum scriptura
canonica, quae cuilibet rationi et experimento humane praeferenda est, cum
Deo data sit, hane positionem sanciat. Sed quod apud me vertitur in dubium,
est, an ista dicta excedant limites naturales sic, quod aliquod vel creditum vel
revelatum praesupponant, et confonnia sint dictis Aristotelis, sicut ipse Divus
Thomas enuntiat."
32 The problem of the knowledge of the separated soul has also be raised in
another treatise where Pomponazzi tried to answer the question "utrum anima
sit mortalis." He raises essentially the difficulties which we have seen as
accompanying the theory of the soul existing apart from the body, but tries to
answer it in line with Thomas in obvious consideration of the reaction of the
teaching of the Church on the subject, especially as expressed by the fifth
Lateran council. On the knowledge of the separated soul he writes: "Altera
difficultas est quod operetur anima a corpore separata: Si nihil, anima erit
frustra; nihil autem videtur operari, quia hoc maxime esset intelligere, quia
anima per phantasmata intelligit, quae sunt in corpore. Si autem non habet
intelligere, nec habet velIe. Dico quod anima, cum est separata, non intelligit
per phantasmata, sed per species infusas a Deo; anima enim habet duas
operationes; prima est intelligere cum phantasmate, secunda intelligere sine
phantasmata quando est separata, sed me remitto Ecclesiae, et notetis quod de
inferno et paradiso, non tantum meminit Ecclesia,sed etiam Plato et philosophi.
praeter sceleratwn Aristotelem." (Questiones in libro De anima, cited in O.
Pluta, op. cit, p. 57)
33
De immortalitate, op. cit., p. 78: "Cum itaque primus modus ponens
intelIectivum realiter distingui a sensitivo in mortalibus secundum omnes
impugnatus sit modos et secundus ponens, quod intellectivum et sensitivum
sunt idem re et tale est simpliciter immortale et secundwn quid mortale, sit
valde ambiguus nee convenire videatur Aristoteli, reliquum est, ut ponamus
ultimwn modum, qui ponens sensitivum in homine identificare intellectivo
dicit, quod essentialiter et vere hoc est mortale, sed secundum quid inunortale."
34 Cf. Ibid, pp. 168 - 174.
3S Ibid., p. 194: "Quare magis essenialiter praemiatur, qui non accidentaliter
praemiatur, eo, qui a accidentaliter praemiatur. Eodem quoque modo qui
vitiose operatur et accidentaliter non punitur, minus reditur puniri eo qui
accidentaliter non punitur; nam poena culpae maior et deterior est poena
Aquinas, Immortality and the Scope 0/Philosophy
209
damni; et cum poena damni adiungitur culpe, diminuit culpam. Quare non
Eunitus accidentaliter magis punitur essentialiter eo, qui accidentaliter punitur."
6 Cf. Aquinas Against the Averroists, op. cit., p.1
37 O. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers o/the Italian Renaissance, p.84.
38 Cf. Pomponazzi, De immortalitate., pp. 228 - 236.
39 T. de Vio Cajetan, Opuscula, cited in B. Hallensleben, Communicatio:
Anthropologie und Gnadenlehre be; Thomas de Vio Cajetan, (MOOster:
Asehendorfliehes Verlag, 1985) p. 194 : "si ratione investigata et ad sensum
usque explorationem deducta humanae sententiae quietem tribunt ineruditi
problem~
indocilis. tardi, hebetis, stupidique est immortalitatem animorum
revocare neutram."
40 Ibid., p. 193: "sit qui iudicat, a rebus iudicandis alienus: nam si illanun
aliqua inhaeresit, aut totum sibi iudiciwn inflectit, aut falsam fecit aliarum
afferre censuram."
41 L~c. cit., "His autem iunctum si fuerit, quod intellectualis spiritus
desldenum tendat ad esse, non hac aut ilIa aetate conclusum, sed ab ornni
tempore elevatum (quoniam intellectu apprehensum solwnmodo cupit bonum,
quod ab omnium temponun differentiis, quia universale est, constat esse
ab~olutum) consequens est ut is, quo intelligimus et sapimus, animus, in
unlVersum tempus effusum habeat vivendi desiderium cum pari tobore, evadere
quippe quia non potest, quin aut certo tempore, aut semper esse desideret, cum
definito
non subsit tempori, reliquum est, ut ad sempitemwn se extendat ."
a
De anima, 403a 8.
43 "inter fonnas materiales (quae sciliCet educuntur de potentia materiae, ac per
hoc dependent secundum esse a materia utpote eanun causa) et fonnas
separatas. omnino a materia (quae in seipsis subsistunt, sine onmi
commumcatione sui esse in materia, quas angelos dicimus) rationabile medium
ponitur fonna secundwn esse independens a materia et tamen conununicans
secundum esse in materia (quae ex independentia habet quod non est educta de
potentia materiae, et ex corrununicabilitate quod in materia sit et quod materia
partieipet esse illius." (Cited in B. Hallensleben, op.eit., p. 197)
44 Zu Rom, 9, 23 in Ibid., p. 200: ''Respondeo me scire quod verum vero non
est contrarium. sed nescire haec iungere: sicut nescio mysterium trinitatis sicut
nescio animam irrunortalem, sicut nescio verbtun caro factum est. et si~ilia,
quae tamen omnia credo."
4S Cf. E. Gilson, History a/Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 397:;9; F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIlIe siecle, 1966, p. 388-391.
D. Home, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendel
(New York: Liberal Arts, 1955), p. 173.
47 See E. Gilson, Etudes sur Ie role de la pensee medievale dans la/ormation
du systeme cartesien (paris: J.Vrin, 1951).
48 R. Descartes, Discours de la Methode, sect 5 in Oeuvres de Descartes v. 6
(paris: J. Vrin, 1965), p. 59.
'
u:
210
The Phqosophical Significance o/Immortality in Thomas Aquinas
G. Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,

ed. C. Turbayne (New York: Liberal Arts), 1957, sec. 141, p. 94 - 95.
50 Cf. D. Hwne, A Treatise 0/ Human Nature (London: 1. M. Dent & Sons,
1951) bk. 1, pt. 4, sec 6, pp. 238 - 249.
51 "Of-the Immortality of the Soul," in D. Hwne, &says, ed. T. H. Green & T.
H. Grose (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1907), vol II, p. 399,
" Ibid., pp. 400 - 401.
" Ibid., p. 402.
" Ibid., pp. 43 - 44.
ss Ibid., p. 45.
56 Voltaire, Traite de metaphysique, ch. 6, in P. Edwards, ed., Immorta lty
(London: Prometheus, 1997) pp. 141- 147.
.
" Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. K. Smith (London: Macnullan,
1929), B.222 - B224
" Ibid., B 186 -187; A 147.
59 Ibid., B 424.
60
Our presentation of the argument here follows L. W. Beck s cle~er
restatement of it in his book A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pracflcal
Reason (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 267 - 269.
61 J. S. Mill, "Immortality," in Three Essays on religion, (1878) (repr. London:
Greg. International, 1969), p. 199.
62 Ibid., p. 201.
63 lbid.,203.
64
R. Swinburne, "Nature and Immortality of the Soul," in Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v.9, 1998, p. 46.
.
.
os Cf. K. Campbell, Body and Mind (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Umvers>ty
Press 1984)' J. Lacks, "The Impotent Mind," Review of MetaphYSICS 17
(1963), pp. i87 - 199; F. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical
Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 127 - 136.
.
66 See B. Russell's Analysis of Mind (London: Allen and Unwm, 1921), pp.
49
Conclusion
100 _ 117; For a critique of Russell's position
cr. W. T. Stace, IIRussell's
Neutral Monism," in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Shilpp, P. A.,

ed.(New York: Tudor, 1951) See also J. Ognejiofor, Has Bertrand Russell
Solved the Problem of Perception? (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 84
- 87.
67 See The Concept 0/ the Mind, (London: Hutchinson University Press, 1963),
pp.1l-24.
68 For a critical discussion of the belief in and the evidence for some of these
"experiences," see Paul Edwards (ed.) Immortality, mtroducticin, pp. 1- 70.
The doctrine of immortality, includiog the effort to provide

philosophical demonstrations for it, is a pivotal aspect of thirteenth
centwy philosophical engagement. It is one of the most detenninant
factors in the reception given to the influx of various new doctrines,
especially those of Aristotle and his Moslem and Jewish commentators.
Its influence is as determinant in Aqninas as in many of his innnediate
predecessors and contemporaries despite his spectacular wholehearted
acceptance of Aristotelianism, and his efforts to make it accord with the
basic tenets of the Christian faith. The acceptance of Aristotle as his
philosophical mentor does not therefore hinder his effort to defend
immortality from a mainly philosophical standpoint, even though a
Platonic background makes such a defence much more consistent. A
comprehensive understanding of this aim starts with the reading of
Aquinas conception of man, the relationship between soul and body,
the nature of the soul and its cognitive activities. Read with innnortality
in view, it is clear that Aquinas' major positions with regard to these
doctrines can be viewed as a dress rehearsal for the defence of
innnortality.
Aquinas depends very much on his immediate predecessors in his
effort to defend immortality. Even though his Aristotelianism by far
surpasses that of any of the thinkers who preceded him in the thirteenth
centwy, all the argnments he uses to prove innnortality are traceable to
early thirteenth centwy authors. Among the major argnments he
employs through the length of his texts include the phenomenon of selfunderstanding in the rational soul; the soul's ability to understand all
sensible forms, on account of which it must not have in itself any
212
sensible fonn; the desire for endless happiness; the intellects' grasp of
immaterial universal, which is a pointer to the nature of the soul itself;
the whole process of knowledge, which confirms all the more the
spiritual nature of the soul.
Through the dependence on his predecessors, Aquinas exhibits some
remarkable originality and independence in the use of the principles of
the old proofs. One therefore sees SOme progress and evolution in the
employment of these arguments. The fact that throughout the six texts
on immortality, the argument from God's justice, and that from the
implications of contemplation for immortality are used once each
indicates a measure of discrimination among the plethora of proofs at
his disposal. Even though the absence of any gradation of the
arguments would seem to suggest that Aquinas does not reach the level
of discrimination attained by Albert the Great or even Alexander of
Hales, that there is some sort of selection among the available proofs
would speak for the opinion that all the points he makes for immortality
are not intended to have equal convincing powers. That would explain
why relatively very few arguments are employed in the voluminous
Summa theologiae, which is the most mature and most comprehensive
of all his works. The curious omission of the popular argument from the
order of being can also be explained as a consequence of Aquinas'
silent weighing ofthe arguments.
Aquinas links all his major arguments to the phenomenon of
knowledge. Despite his Aristotelian epistemology, intellectual
knowledge is hypostatized in the fonn of universals, and this serves as
an independent standpoint to prove immortality. But such arguments as
those from the desire for endless existence and the presence of
contraries are so linked with the ability of man to know as was never
found in any of his predecessors. Thus it is not just that man by nature
desires to live forever, but it is his ability to apprehend what he desires
that makes the fulfihnent of this desire reasonable and necessary.
In outliuing these and other arguments, Aquinas intends to
demonstrate convincingly that the rational soul is by nature endowed
with immortality. There is no strong reason to doubt that he believes
that the project achieved its intended aim. Over and above the specific
problems linked with the proofs, the phenomenon of death, the refusal
to consider brute souls as candidates for immortality of any type, the
state of the soul after its separation from the body, as well as the fact of
resurrection and immortality of the body are general problems that
follow on the heels of the philosophical reflection on immortality. The
solutions to some of these problems, like that of death and resurrection,
Conclusion
213
naturally lead deep into the preserves of theology, bUlhe views this fact
as making even more comprehensible the reflection on immortality.
Our analysis of the arguments indicates that there is none of the major
arguments without serious problems. The critique of the details of the
arguments does not however lead to the rejection of the relevance of the
grand project of reflecting on immortality, both in the context of the
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and in philosophy in general.
Aquinas uses the method of enumeration of as many favourable
points as possible in support of immortality. The reason behind the
employment of this method is the latent belief that the cumulative
effects of all these points have more convincing power than the force of
any single consideration. This method also goes in consonance with his
predecessors with the single exception of Albert the Great. Our review
of the earlier critics of Aquinas, Scotus, Pomponazzi and Cajetan shows
that none adequately takes notice of this method. Thus they judge the
whole project of proving immortality on the strength of individual
arguments, especially the argument from desire and the moral
consideration of rewarding virtue in an after-life. Many modem
thinkers like Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Voltaire and Mill also
concentrate more on the implications of immortality for morality. In all,
whether they speak in support or against it, their reflections on the
theme are much less rigorous than that of Aquinas and the thinkers of
his time. Among these, J. S. Mill appears to be the only person who
even as much as refers to the fact of intellectual knowledge in relation
to immortality. This lack of rigour overflows into the contemporary
epoch where the combined forces of secularization as well as the
spectacular progress in empirical science and technology appear to
effectively shunt the theme of immortality off from the mainstream of
philosophical investigation. Though the character of mind in general
continues to be a potent object for contention, in which there is hardly
any hope of arriving at any general agreement, it is not surprising that
some have, like materialists through the history of philosophy, come to
question the reasonableness of erecting an extra category called the soul
or the mind over and above the matter of which the body is composed.
Despite the various turns in Aquinas' discussion of immortality, the
issue remains vital for a balanced understanding of his philosophy, and
~or explanations of the reasons for the positions he takes on particular
Issues. Even though these texts on immortality are all in the fonn of
proofs, following the tradition of his time, the importance of the theme
of immortality should not be consigned to the judgement of how much
the proofs are acceptable to the minds of today. The nature of
philosophy, in which hardly any issue is settled definitively, should also
214
speak for the continued exploration of the subject so long as it remains

an important factor in human life. It is in the repeated attempt to return
to human concerns and human problems, attempts that ironically never
arrive at generally acceptable solutions, that philosophy brings forth its
fruit.
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The Philosophical Significance of Immortality in Thomas Aquinas

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL

University Press of America, Inc.

e~The paper used in this publication meets the minimum

To the memory of late Archbishop S. N. Ezeanya

CHAPTER I THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE QUESTION OF

CHAPTER 2 IMMORTALITY AND AQUINAS' CONCEPTION

CHAPTER 3 ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALY

3.2. The Arguments:

The Philosophical Significance a/Immortality, in Thomas Aquinas

proof, or at showing in what ways the proof is acceptable as adequate

of the thinkers of the time to defend the doctrine with diverse

marked by the juxtaposition of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrines,

Very often the objections highlight important difficulties in the