Ethical Dilemmas

Relating to the Swine

Flu Outbreak
By Rabbi Joshua Flug

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I. Intro- The current outbreak of swine flu raises a number of ethical questions. In
this shiur outline, we will address the following questions:
a. To what extent should one risk contracting the disease in order to treat others?
Is there a difference between health care providers and others?
b. Is it ethical to force someone into quarantine? Is there a difference between
those who have contracted the disease and those who haven't? Along similar
lines, let's say Reuven has contracted the swine flu and was encouraged to
remain at home. Shimon notices that Reuven is ignoring the recommendation
and going about business as ususal. Does Shimon have an obligation to
inform the authorities or the places that Reuven is frequenting?
c. Is it ethical for a government or other organization to force inoculation on the
people in order to prevent the spread of the disease? Is it ethical for a school
or synagogue ban those who are not inoculated from attending classes or
services when those who refuse inoculation do so on grounds that they are
concerned about the side effects?
d. What does one do if there are limited supplies of medications or health care
providers to treat everyone?
II. Risking contracting the disease to save others
a. The Gemara questions the need for the verse that requires one to save another
life. After all, the mitzvah of hashavas aveidah should also include the
mitzvah to restore someone's life. The Gemara answers that the mitzvah of
hashavas aveidah would only include personally saving someone's life. It
would not require one to hire someone else. The mitzvah of lo sa'amod al
dam rei'echa includes hiring someone else to save a life. {}
i. Question: Is the only difference between hashavas aveidah and lo
sa'amod the obligation to hire someone else, or is the obligation to hire
someone else reflective of a greater effort that one must take to save a
life?
1. Assuming the latter, does that mean that one must risk his own
life (at least some degree of risk) to save someone else's life?
ii. There is a comment of the Talmud Yerushalmi about risking one's life
to save someone else. The Yerushalmi writes that R. Imi was captured
by a group of bandits. R. Yonasan (some have the girsa R. Yochanan)
said "prepare the burial shrouds." Reish Lakish responded "If they
want R. Imi they are going to have to kill me first." {}
 iii. Can one derive from the Yerushalmi (according to Reish Lakish) that
there is an obligation to risk one's life in order to save someone else's
life?
iv. Hagahos Maimonios- From the Yerushalmi we see that one should put
himself in safek sakanah in order to save someone else from certain
death. {}
b. Do we follow the opinion of Hagahos Maimonios?
i. R. Yosef Karo (1488-1575) cites the ruling Hagahaos Maimonios but
does not codify it in Shulchan Aruch. {}
ii. R. Yehoshua Falk (S'ma 1555-1614) notes that the reason why it was
omitted from Shulchan Aruch is that most Rishonim don't assume that
one must risk his life to save others from sakanah. {}
iii. R. Ya'akov Etlinger (1798-1871) explains that most Rishonim don't
subscribe to the ruling of Hagahos Maimonios because the
aforementioned Bavli seems to disagree. The Bavli in noting the
difference between hashavas aveidah and lo sa'amod should have
noted a greater difference- that you have to risk own life to save
someone else for lo sa'amod and not for hashavas aveidah. The fact
that the Gemara doesn't present this as a difference implies that you
are not required to risk your life. {}
iv. R. Moshe Feinstein (1896-1985) asserts that you can't be required to
put yourself in danger to save someone else's life: {}
1. Lo sa'amod is just a regular lo sa'aseh and the same way you
are not required to endanger yourself to keep Shabbos, you are
not required to endanger yourself to avoid violation of lo
sa'amod.
2. Nevertheless, because there is hatzalas nefashos involved, it is
permissible to endanger oneself in order to save someone else.
3. This provides us with a different perspective on the
Yerushalmi. Perhaps Reish Lakish risked his life out of
volunteerism and not out of obligation.
c. How this issue is addressed with regards to treating people with contagious
diseases:
i. R. Hershel Schachter writes that during one of the Cholera pandemics,
R. Chaim Soloveitchik (1853-1918) ruled in accordance with Hagahos
Maimonios and therefore, all those who are healthy must help those
who are faint even though they themselves risk contracting the disease.
{}
 1. [Interesting note on cholera: the rabbinic literature spells it
‫ חולירע‬or ‫חולי רע‬, bad disease. According to some scholars this
is actually the origin of the word cholera.]
ii. R. Akiva Eger (1761-1837) wrote a letter detailing the necessary steps
that should be taken during a cholera outbreak. One of things he
recommends is hiring people who are trained in treating patients to be
on call to treat those with cholera. {}
iii. R. Shmuel Wosner (b. 1913) sees this as a proof that a health care
professional may not abandon his position during an outbreak out of
concern that he is going to contract the disease. {}
iv. Dr. A.S. Abraham writes (with concurrence from R. Neuwirth) that a
health care provider must assume a greater degree of risk than an
ordinary person because when he takes the position, he accepts that
risk. {}
III. Forced Quarantine
a. Background: Quarantine has significant impact on an individual and certainly
on an entire population. The decision to force quarantine must account for the
fact that people may not have enough food supplies to last through the
quarantine. Additionally, there is significant economic impact from
quarantine. Quarantine can be accomplished by quarantining only those who
are affected or quarantining the entire population. We will deal with each
case separately?
b. Is a person carrying a contagious disease considered a rodef? [This section
was dealt with more extensively in the shiur outline on "Life and Death
Medical Decisions".]
i. The concept of Rodef (Mishna-Sanhedrin) {}
1. The Gemara states that in ordinary situations it is prohibited to
kill one person to save the life of another. In fact, this is one of
the three cardinal transgression in which one must give up his
own life and may not kill someone else to save his own life.
2. R. Moshe Sokolofsky (d. 1931, a talmid of R. Chaim
Soloveitchik) explains that there are two reason why this is
permissible: {}
a. In order to save the victim
b. Because this is one of the aveiros that one may disable
the violator before he violates the aveirah.
3. R. Sokolosfky discusses a rodef who plans to kill his victim via
gerama (e.g. he plans to plant a bomb in the victim's car).
 Because he is not chayav misah for killing via gerama,
neutralizing him is only warranted because it is to save the
victim.
4. The most relevant application of this idea in the context of
medical decisions is the comment of the Vilna Gaon (1720-
1797) that someone can be considered a rodef even if he has
absolutely no intent of endangering someone else. If we have
to choose between two lives and one is endangering the other,
we neutralize the one who is endangering in order to save the
other. {}
ii. Safek rodef- This is a case where we don't know if inaction on the part
of the rescuers will necessarily lead to death. There are a number of
scenarios how one can become a safek rodef (discussed in the
aforementioned shiur outline). We find two approaches to this
question:
1. R. Yitzchak Shor (d. 1776)- One can argue that in principle,
you can't choose one life over another. The only exception is
when one of them is classified as a rodef. If you can't certainly
classify him as a rodef, you return to the original principle that
you can't choose one life over another. {}
2. R. Yosef Babad (1801-1874, Minchas Chinuch)- One can
argue that the mitzvah of saving a life already incorporates the
concept of saving a life by neutralizing a life and therefore, the
same way you can violate Shabbos to save a life, even when
there are doubts involved, you can also violate lo sirtzach in
order to save someone from a rodef, even when there are
doubts involved. Minchas Chinuch writes that anyone who
commits an act of negligence would be considered a rodef for
these purposes. {}
iii. Applying these discussions to someone with a contagious disease:

1. R. Yosef S. Elyashiv's position

a. R. Yosef S. Elyashiv (b. 1910) was asked regarding the
case of a promiscuous woman who was infected with a
lethal STD (presumably HIV). She has now decided
that she is going to take others down with her by
sleeping with other men without letting them know that
she is infected. The questioner compared this woman
to a moser. To give context to the question:
i. Rambam (1135-1204) writes that in order to
consider a moser a rodef, one must warn him
 and he must accept the consequences of
becoming a moser. Furthermore, once he
commits the act, one may not kill him unless he
has an established pattern of doing this. {}
ii. R. Yitzchak ben Sheshes (1326-1408) explains
that we don't kill a moser for what he did, but
for what he plans on doing. In reality, the
punishment for mesirah is not death. This is an
act to prevent him from endangering other lives.
Therefore, unless we know that he is certainly
going to do this and he knows the consequences,
we can't do anything to him. We also can't
assume that he is going to do this again unless
there is an established pattern. {}
b. R. Elyashiv ruled that she is not considered a rodef for
two reasons: {}
i. The concept of moser is not really a direct
application of rodef. Rather the rabbis instituted
that a moser should be treated like a rodef.
Therefore, we don't extend this institution to
comparable cases.
ii. She is not actively involved in affecting anyone.
She is trying to entice men and they choose to
engage in these activities with her. [It sounds
like we don't need to have rachmanus on the
people who choose to have relations with her.]
2. R. Shlomo Zalman Aurebach's position
a. Dr. A.S. Abraham quotes R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach
(1910-1995) that someone who has AIDS and refuses to
inform his/her spouse is considered a rodef and
therefore, a physician is permitted to violate
confidentiality in order to save the spouse. {}
i. R. Shlomo Zalman writes that someone who
threatens to kill someone else unless he fulfills
certain demands is considered a rodef. This
implies that he does not limit the moser concept,
but rather sees it as a direct application of rules
of rodef. {}
3. How do we apply this discussion to someone with swine flu
who refuses to quarantine himself?
 a. According to R. Elyashiv, this case is similar to the case
of the woman who was infecting others and one cannot
consider this individual a rodef. However, one can
argue that R. Elyashiv's ruling may be limited to cases
where those were getting infected were engaged in
activities that assumed such a risk.
b. According to R. Shlomo Zalman, it is possible to
employ the rodef principle, but only under the
assumption that a safek rodef is also considered a rodef
(this would be a case of negligence). If one does not
assume that a safek rodef is a rodef, the disease is
(currently) not lethal enough to consider the person a
rodef.
c. If the person is considered a rodef, one can take
measures necessary to stop his pursuit. This may
include reporting him to the authorities or informing his
business, school, etc., even if it will cause him financial
loss or embarrassment.
c. Quarantining an entire area
i. R. Akiva Eger was asked whether minyanim should be held during a
cholera outbreak or whether public gatherings should be avoided
altogether. His response was that they should continue holding
minyanim but in an open area, in groups no larger than 15, where the
same 15 people always daven together. {}
1. This is a compromise where one limits the spread of the
disease without giving up tefillah b'tzibbur.
ii. While common sense dictates that one should follow the
recommendations of the experts, there will always be people who defy
the recommendations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider these
people rodfim if they have not contracted the disease. They are merely
susceptible to receiving the disease and transmitting it to others. This
seems to be comparable to someone who after passing airport security
was told to make sure he keeps his eyes on his luggage at all times.
This person decides to leave his luggage unattended which allows for
the possibility of a terrorist placing a dangerous item in his luggage.
Does that make the luggage owner a rodef? On the other hand, one
can argue that if there is a pandemic and quarantine is recommended
on a massive scale in order to contain it, someone who interrupts this
attempt might be considered a rodef. There is a dispute whether
someone who prevents the rescuer from saving the victim is
considered a rodef:
 1. R. Shmuel de Medina (1505-1589) discusses a case of a boat
carrying passengers and property that was captured by pirates.
The pirates were willing to release the hostages on condition
that they can keep the property. There was a property owner
who was not on the boat and refused to give up his rights to the
property. Maharashdam ruled that since he is preventing their
rescue, he is considered a rodef and one should use whatever
means possible to convince him to give up his rights to the
property. {}
2. R. Yitzchak Shor discusses of a case of a woman with an
illness that can't be treated while she is pregnant. He writes
that one cannot consider the fetus as a rodef because the fetus
is not causing her a life threatening situation. He is only
preventing her treatment. Someone who prevents a life-saving
act is not considered a rodef. {}
IV. Forced Inoculation
a. Background: In 1976, a soldier died from swine flu. The U.S. government
was concerned about a potential pandemic and started a massive campaign to
inoculate the entire population. Because there was no time to test the safety of
the vaccine, it was quickly discovered that the vaccine increased the risk for
Guillian-Barre syndrome. Twenty-five people are believed to have died from
the vaccine, while the only person who died from the swine flu was the
original soldier. [Click here to read more] After the debacle of 1976, you can
expect that there would be resistance to another attempt at inoculating the
population.
b. Is vaccination considered pikuach nefesh?
i. R. Yechezkel Landa (1713-1793) discusses whether it is permissible to
perform an autopsy on someone who died of a disease where the
physicians want to learn more about the disease. He writes that one
cannot consider a situation as pikuach nefesh unless there is a choleh
l'faneinu that we are trying to treat. One cannot violate nivul hames
simply because the physicians want to learn more about a disease just
in case it appears again. {}
ii. R. Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz (1878-1953) writes that the criteria are
not really based on whether there is an actual choleh or not. Rather the
criteria are whether there is public concern about the situation such
that the public would hold special prayers (or public fasts) to deal with
the situation. If there is no public concern, one cannot consider it
pikuach nefesh.
1. It is interesting note that R. Shlomo Amar, the Chief Sefardic
Rabbi, declared a fast due to the swine flu outbreak. His basis
 is the comment of a Gemara that one should fast when there is
a disease among pigs. {} [click here to access article]
iii. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach follows R. Karelitz's opinion with a
slightly different formulation. He writes that if people panic the same
way they panic in the face of an illness it is considered pikuach nefesh.
The example he gives is vaccinations. If a child reaches an age where
he is due for a vaccination on Shabbos (measles, mumps, etc.), one
may not vaccinate him on Shabbos because delaying a vaccination by
a day or two is not something people ordinarily panic about. However,
if someone was in a situation where he would either have to vaccinate
on Shabbos or wait four or five years, it is permissible to vaccinate on
Shabbos because that is something people would panic about. {}
c. Forcing someone in a life-threatening situation to take medication.
i. R. Avraham Gombiner (c. 1633-1683) writes that if an ill patient needs
medication and he refuses to take the medication (ostensibly because
he does not want to violate Shabbos) we force him to take the
medication. {}
ii. R. Ya'akov Emden (1697-1776) suggests that this only applies when
there is no counterclaim from the patient or another physician.
However, if the patient or the physician feel that the medication, will
not work, we can't force him. Furthermore, if he claims that he doesn't
want to take the medication because it will cause him more harm than
good, we cannot force him to take the medication. However, this only
applies to medicines that are taken for internal conditions and the
medicine is only based on estimates. Medicines that are taken for
external conditions, where the data is readily available, is considered a
certainty and one may not oppose the opinion of the physician. {}
1. He might agree that nowadays, many medicines for internal
medications are also treated like the external because we have
means of knowing their effectiveness and it is not based on
estimates.
d. Application to the current situation
i. In order to entertain forcing people to take medications, one would
have to consider the situation such that it is considered pikuach nefesh.
If there is no justification to vaccinate on Shabbos, ostensibly, one
cannot be compelled to take the medication. If there is panic and there
is a massive effort on the part of the WHO or CDC to get everyone
inoculated immediately, one can entertain forcing inoculation.
ii. Nevertheless, based on R. Ya'akov Emden's comments, the vaccine
would have to be proven safe. If not, one can claim that he doesn’t
 want to be inoculated because he is worried that the vaccine will harm
him.
V. Dealing with limited resources- [An article by R. David Etengoff deals
extensively with this topic. Click here to access the article.] There are two
situations to discuss:
a. There is a scarcity of medicine and the person holding the medicine needs it
for himself. This is contingent on a dispute between Ben Peturah and R.
Akiva. The case involves two people travelling through the desert and one of
them has a jug of water. If they share the water, both of them will live a little
longer and die in the desert. If they don't share the water, the one who drinks
the water will make it out of the desert alive and the other will die sooner.
Ben Peturah is of the opinion that it is better that both of them drink and live a
little longer rather than have one person live and one person die sooner. R.
Akiva is of the opinion that the person who is holding the jug should drink the
water because his own life takes precedence over everyone else's. {}
i. This means that if a physician or pharmacist has a limited supply of
vaccines, he may take the vaccine for himself before giving to others.
b. When there is a limited supply of medicine or there are a limited number of
health care professionals, who receives treatment first? This depends on how
one understands a sugya in Horiyos:
i. The Mishna states that a man comes before a woman for "livelihood"
(l'hachayos) and hashavas aveidah. A woman comes before a man for
receiving clothing and redemption from captivity. The Mishna then
states that a Kohen comes before a Levi who comes before a Yisrael
etc. However, a talmid chacham mamzer comes before a Kohen
Gadol Am Ha'Aretz. {} There are two ways to understand "l'hachayos"
1. Tosafos writes that l'hachayos refers to pikuach nefesh. When
people are trapped under the rubble, one would follow this list
to determine who should be saved first. {}
2. Rashba (1235-1310 cited in Shita Mekubetzes) writes that
l'hachayos refers to distributing food. {}
ii. If one assumes that the Mishna refers to saving a life, we ostensibly
should follow the Mishna's list in cases where there are limited
resources. If one assumes that the Mishna is dealing with distributing
tzedakah, perhaps there are other criteria when it comes to pikuach
nefesh.
iii. Rama writes that if two people are drowning in the river, you follow
the list in the Mishna. {}
iv. R. Nassan Gestetner notes that since many Rishonim seem to disagree,
one is not required to follow the list in the Mishna. {}
v. These two approaches serve as the basis for the various positions
mentioned in R. Etengoff's article.
 ‫‪ .6‬ערוך לנר סנהדרין עג‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .1‬סנהדרין עג‪.‬‬

‫‪ .2‬תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות ח‪:‬ד מז‪.‬‬

‫‪ .3‬הגהות מיימוניות הל' רוצח א‪:‬טו )דפוס קושטא(‬

‫‪ .7‬אגרות משה יו"ד ב‪:‬קעד‬ ‫בירו' מסיק אפי' להכניס עצמו בספק סכנה‪.‬‬
‫‪ .4‬בית יוסף חו"מ ס' תכו‬

‫‪ .5‬סמ"ע תכו‪:‬ב‬
‫ובהג"מ כתבו דבירושלמי מסיק דצריך אפילו‬
‫להכניס עצמו בספק סכנה עבור זה והביאו‬
‫הב"י וכ' ז"ל ונראה שהטעם הוא מפני שהלה‬
‫ודאי והוא ספק עכ"ל גם זה השמיטו המחבר‬
‫ומור"ם ז"ל ובזה י"ל כיון שהפוסקים הרי"ף‬
‫והרמב"ם והרא"ש והטור לא הביאו בפסקיהן‬
‫מ"ה השמיטוהו ג"כ‪.‬‬
‫בדבר? והסכים אתי מו"ר הגרי"י נויבירט‬ ‫‪ .8‬נפש הרב עמ' קסו‪-‬קסז‬
‫שליט"א והוסיף שאם יסרבו לטפל בו יעברו‬
‫על לאו דלא תעמוד על דם רעך‪ .‬אמנם אם‬
‫הסיכון הוא גדול ואמיתי‪ ,‬אין על המטפל חיוב‬
‫לסכן את עצמו אך יכול לעשות זאת אם רצונו‬
‫בכך‪.‬‬

‫מש' סנהדרין עג‪.‬‬ ‫‪.12‬‬

‫אמרי משה ל‪:‬ט הגה‬ ‫‪.13‬‬

‫‪ .9‬איגרת סופרים מכתב ל'‬

‫שבט הלוי ח‪:‬רנא )ז(‬ ‫‪.10‬‬

‫נשמת אברהם יו"ד שלה‪:‬כב‬ ‫‪.11‬‬

‫אך צלע"ג למה אין רופא‪ ,‬אחות או כל מי‬
‫‪ .14‬רמ"א וביאור הגר"א חו"מ ס' תכה‬ ‫שמטפל בחולה שיש בו סכנה מחויב לטפל‬
‫רמ"א סע' א‪ :‬מי שמסכן רבים‪ ,‬כגון שעוסק בזיופים‬ ‫בחולה כזה )כמובן אחרי נקיטת כל האמצעים‬
‫במקום שהמלכיות מקפידות דינו כרודף ומותר למסרו‬ ‫להגן על עצמו מלהידבק מהחולה( כשהוא‬
‫למלכות‪.‬‬ ‫מופיע אצלו במרפאה או בית החולים? לכאורה‬
‫מי ביקש מהם להיות רופא או אחות וכו' אלא‬
‫ביאור הגר"א ס"ק יא‪ :‬מי שמכסן רבים‪ -‬אע"פ שאין‬ ‫הם נכנסו לתפקיד זה ביודעין שיש חולים עם‬
‫כוונתו לסכן‪.‬‬ ‫מחלות מידבקות ולמה לא התחייבו מכבר‬
‫בכניסתם לתפקיד לטפל בכל חולה אם הוא‬
‫חולה שיש בו סכנה או חשש סכנה – גם אלה‬
‫עם מחלות מדבקות ואפילו אם יש קצת סיכון‬
 ‫שו"ת הריב"ש ס' רלח‬ ‫‪.18‬‬ ‫שו"ת כח שור א‪:‬כ‬ ‫‪.15‬‬

‫משנת פיקוח נפש ס' נא‬ ‫‪.19‬‬

‫מנחת חינוך ס' רצו‬ ‫‪.16‬‬

‫רמב"ם הל' חובל ומזיק ח‪:‬י‪-‬יא‬ ‫‪.17‬‬

‫נשמת אברהם ב‪:‬א‬ ‫‪.20‬‬

‫אדם שאובחן שהוא נושא הנגיף של איידס‪ ,‬האם חייבים‬
‫לאמר גם לאשתו )וה"ה במקרה הפוך(? לפי הידע הקיים‬
‫היום )מנ"א תשמ"ט( ‪ 59‬הסיכון להידבק ע"י הנגיף‪ ,‬בקרב‬
‫שו"ת מהרשד"ם חו"מ ס' שדמ‬ ‫‪.23‬‬
‫שו"ת כח שור א‪:‬כ‬
‫אנשים החיים חיים תקינים לפי חוקי התורה‪ ,‬היה בעבר‬
‫בעיקר בין אלו שקיבלו עירויים מדם שנלקח מאדם נגוע‪,‬‬
‫כגון הסובלים ממחלת ההמופיליה וכו'‪ .‬אצל אנשים אלה‬
‫)מקבלי העירויים( נמצא שכשמונה עד עשרה אחוזים‬
‫מנשותיהם היו נגועות למרות שלא היה כל סימן של מחלת‬
‫האיידס אצל הבעל )פרט להימצאות הנגיף בדם(‪ .‬משערים‬
‫שבזוג כזה המקיים יחסי אישות רגילים יש סיכון גבוה של‬
‫הדבקת בן‪/‬בת‪-‬זוג במשך הזמן‪ .‬הסיכון‪ ,‬אמנם הרבה פחות‪,‬‬
‫אך עדיין קיים גם אחרי טיפול של החולה‪ .‬בזמן כתיבת‬
‫המהדורא קמא של ספרי התמותה מהמחלה היתה ‪100%‬‬
‫אך היום עם טיפול יש הוכחות ברורות שתוחלת החיים של‬
‫חולים אלה – אמנם עדיין נגועים – ארוכה יותר‪ .‬בקבוצות‬
‫הסיכון )דהיינו המשתמשים בסמים או העוסקים במשכב‬
‫זכר וכו'(‪ ,‬אחוז ההדבקה הרבה יותר גבוה‪.‬‬
‫‪.24‬‬
‫מפרסום מעיתון רפואי ‪ 60‬עולה שבשנת ‪ 2005‬למנינם היו‬
‫‪ 40‬מליון חולים במחלת האיידס בעולם כשבאותה שנה‬
‫התוספו ‪ 4.9‬מליון מקרים חדשים ומתו ‪ 3.1‬מליון איש‬
‫ברחבי העולם מהמחלה‪ .‬ב‪ 25-‬השנים אחרונות )מאז‬
‫המקרה הראשון אובחן( יותר מ‪ 65-‬מליון איש נדבקו‬
‫בהמחלה עם יותר מ‪ 25-‬מליון קרבנות ‪ – 61‬מגפה כפי שלא‬
‫היה בהסטוריה של העולם‪ .‬בארה"ב ישנם בערך ‪40,000‬‬
‫מקרים חדשים כל שנה ‪.62‬‬
‫גם לפני המספרים שבפיסקא אחרונה‪ ,‬ברור היה שהחולה‬
‫הנגוע יש לו דין של רודף‪ ,‬וחייבים להגיד הדבר לבן או בת‪-‬‬
‫זוג כדי להצילם מסכנת נפשות‪ .‬והסכים אתי הגרש"ז‬
‫אויערבאך זצ"ל‪.‬‬
‫מנחת שלמה א‪:‬ז )ב(‬ ‫‪.21‬‬
‫איגרות סופרים ס' כט‬ ‫‪.22‬‬
 ‫מגן אברהם שכח‪:‬ו‬ ‫‪.29‬‬ ‫שו"ת נודע ביהודה יו"ד ב‪:‬רי‬ ‫‪.25‬‬

‫מור וקציעה או"ח ס' שכח‬ ‫‪.30‬‬

‫חזון איש אהלות כב‪:‬לב‬ ‫‪.26‬‬

‫תענית כא‪:‬‬ ‫‪.27‬‬

‫מנחת שלמה תנינא ס' כד‬ ‫‪.28‬‬

‫בבא מציעא סב‪.‬‬ ‫‪.31‬‬

‫מש' הוריות ג‪:‬ז‪-‬ח‬ ‫‪.32‬‬

 ‫תוס' נזיר מז‪ :‬והתניא‬ ‫‪.33‬‬
‫וקא ס"ד דקדים לכל מילי קאמר אלא בקונט' פי' דידע שפיר‬
‫המקשה דבהוריות )דף יג‪ (.‬מתניא לענין להחיותו לפקח עליו את‬
‫הגל קודם לסגן דאם נפל גל על שניהם ומכל מקום פריך דאי סגן‬
‫עדיף לענין טומאה הוה לן לפקח את הגל תחלה על הסגן ומשני‬
‫מר זוטרא דודאי לעניין להחיותו לפקח עליו את הגל משוח‬
‫מלחמה עדיף דתלו ביה רבים ולענין טומאה סגן עדיף דנתמנה‬
‫לעבודה ומיהו גם בהוריות מוקי לה הש"ס לענין להחיותו כי הכא‬
‫משמע דבברייתא לא נשנית בהדיא הך לענין להחיותו‪.‬‬

‫שיטה מקובצת כתובות סז‪.‬‬ ‫‪.34‬‬

‫שלחן ערוך יו"ד רנב‪:‬ח‬ ‫‪.35‬‬

‫שו"ת להורות נתן יב‪:‬פ‬ ‫‪.36‬‬