Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created
through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental
protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding
provinces
and
towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality
studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not
taken
to
check
the
same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the
LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by
the
term
Laguna
de
Bay
Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges
in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens
&
fish
cages
to
the
consternation
of
the
LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish
pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the
lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna
Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages
& other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March
31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally
charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise
demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery

privileges
is
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

concerned?

Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD
813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other
hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to
grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do
not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as
much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue
purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose
of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay
region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most
demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of
police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist
order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish
cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA (Environmental Law)

GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
FACTS: The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance from LLDA
as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST
ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the
dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government
of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order?

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that

the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to
carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting
and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously
has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction
are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

APPLICABLE LAWS:
Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4.
Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time
within which such discontinuance must be accomplished
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w
here the special law provides for another forum

RULING:

MINORS OPOSA V. SECRETARY OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT

OF

Title:
Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources
Date:
30 July 1993
Summary:
A group of children, including those of renowned environmental activist
Antonio Oposa, brought this lawsuit in conjunction with the Philippine

Ecological Network, Inc. (a non-profit organisation) to stop the destruction

of the fast disappearing rain forests in their country.
The plaintiff children based their claims in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, which recognises the right of people to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation (see Section 16, Article II). Oposa also raised the idea of
intergenerational equity before the court, which is the idea that natural
resources belong to people of all ages and that if adults were to harvest
all of a countrys resources, they would be stealing from their children,
their childrens children, and all future generations.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the children, and made several
groundbreaking and powerful statements, finding:
The right to a clean environment, to exist from the land, and to provide for
future generations are fundamental.
There is an intergenerational responsibility to maintain a clean
environment, meaning each generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that environment, and children may sue to enforce that right on
behalf of both their generation and future generations.
The Philippine Constitution requires that the government protect and
promote the health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them. (see Section 15, Article II).

Oposa vs Factoran

1.
country;

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the

2.
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises. They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the
act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:

1.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class

suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational

Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS: A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et
al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation

as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,

utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys

forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on nonimpairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power
of the state in the interest of public welfare.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to

preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.

The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited worldwide for its
concept of intergenerational responsibility, particularly in cases related to
ecology and the environment. For example:

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through
their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their
generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop
deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the
timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist
from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The
children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners
claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop
issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural
law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the
law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children
had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment
carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the
succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to

Relevance

Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of "intergenerational responsibility" was

cited in a case in Bangladesh.[1]
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) considers Oposa vs.
Factoran a landmark case in judicial thinking for environmental
governance.[2]
In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by Larry O. Gostin, Oposa vs.
Factoran is cited as a significant example of the justiciability of the right to
health. [3]
In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development by the IUCN
Academy of Environmental Law Research Studies, a study cites Oposa vs.
Factoran as basis for asserting that the right to breathe is part of the right
to life as an acknowledged human right.[4]
Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)
Nature of the case
Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence
agreements which allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts;
Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine;
inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and
standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on State
Summary
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing
timber license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new
ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and

healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the

Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others of
their
generation
as
well
as
generations
yet
unborn.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated
in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. The right is linked to the constitutional
right to health, is fundamental, constitutionalised, self-executing
and judicially enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing
the
environment.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for
others of their generation and for succeeding generations as the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs

alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his

agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel
all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question.

Significance of the case

This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in
cases relating to forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the
Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and cultural rights has
proved somewhat inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in the
enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521
(1989); Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R.
No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at least one instance in which the
Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights are not
real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No.
100150, 5 January 1994).

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

ISSUES:

FACTS:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.

RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section
4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government
agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated
in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent)
to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect
and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to
a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for
the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the
Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive

and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by
which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and
the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

XXXXXXX
Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998.
Subsequently
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan,
Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species
of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying
that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as
unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless
and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no
showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow
any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the
State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called preferential
right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources
is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the
state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

RP (Hon. Heherson Alvarez as Sec. Of the DENR, Clarence

Baguilat as the Reg. Executive Dir. Of DENR- Region XI and Engr.
Bienvenido Lipa as Reg. Dir. Of the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI v. THE CITY OF
DAVAO
G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002
SYNOPSIS
Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)
for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The same, however,
was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo
the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a
petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter
ruled in favor of respondent.
As the project in issue is not classified as environmentally critical or within
an environmentally critical area, the DENR has no choice but to issue the
CNC. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be
compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued herein by the trial
court. The petition filed by the Republic was denied.

XXXXX
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT; FUNCTIONS. Section 15 of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local
government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to
be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs dual

functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are

those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public
good or welfare as affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are
those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary
profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. When exercising
governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an
agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities,
it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.
ASDTEa
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586
(ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM). Found in Section 16 of
the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the
peoples right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City
of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a
body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty
to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective
of PD 1586. Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of
a statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the enactment. Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states
that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative. The Civil Code defines a person as
either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the
local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local
government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586. Lastly,
very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the
policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic
development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of
sustainable development. The first paragraph of the Whereas clause of
the law stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where
all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and
the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery
of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of
the EIS system.
3.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT,
GENERALLY RESPECTED; EXCEPTIONS. The trial court, after a
consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is not

within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally

critical project. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, when
fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding upon this Court
and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. There
are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual findings
of the trial court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and j)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. None of these exceptions, however, obtain in
this case.
4.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; PROPER FOR THE
PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTERIAL DUTY. The Artica Sports Dome in
Langub is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an
environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but
to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty,
the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as
that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
FACTS:
1

August 11, 2000- respondent filed an application for a Certificate of NonCoverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports
Dome, with the EMB- Region XI ; attached to the application

EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed
project was within an environmentally critical area

Basis: Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the

Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment

Policy the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact

assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project

*Notes:

Sec. 15, RA 7160 (LGC)

Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC of
Davao with the ff. Allegations:

local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with

powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.

project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an

environmentally critical area

it was the ministerial duty of the DENR to issue a CNC in favor of

respondent upon submission of the required documents

performs dual functions, governmental (those that concern the health,

safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the
public generally ) and proprietary (those that seek to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit)

RTC ruled in favour of the City of Davao and hence directed the DENR ro
issue the CNC for the project (PD 1586 as basis)

Ratio:
i

there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of

Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA
system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law.

ii

Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government,

including GOCCs, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are
mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which
have significant effect on the quality of the environment.

iii

A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the

National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius

iv

based on the certifications of the DENR- CENRO, site for the Artica Sports
Dome was not within an environmentally critical area . It therefore
becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve
respondent's application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements
for its issuance

RULES:

When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental

duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government

When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the

community in the administration of local affairs.

Sec. 16, RA 7160 (LGC) duty of the LGUs to promote the people's right
to a balanced ecology

an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the
coverage of PD 1586

As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the

duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same
objective of PD 158
ISSUE: WON the LGUs are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one
which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to
secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
HELD: No.

Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied.

1

Hence, this petition.

Section 4 of PD 1586 - "no person, partnership or corporation shall

undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or

area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate

issued by the President or his duly authorized representative."
a
2

LGUs are juridical persons

Section 1 of PD 1586 - law intends to implement the policy of the state to
achieve a balance between socio-economic development and
environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable
development
Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where
all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and
the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery
of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of
the EIS system.

HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports

Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither being a critical
project... findings of the trial court becomes binding with the SC

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated in Presidential 2146 (proclaiming areas and
types of projects as environmentally critical and w/in scope of the EIS).
Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said
project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an
environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but
to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty,
the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as
that issued by the trial court in the case at bar. ^ TC affirmed ^

Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao

FACTS:Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage

(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with
the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the
ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical
area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance

Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:WON the LGUs are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one
which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to
secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
HELD: No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative." We note that LGUs are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports
Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither being a
critical project. The said project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the
DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It
becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled
by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at
bar.
Donald Mead vs. Hon. Manuel A. Argel, G.R. No. L-41958, July 20,
l9g2
Facts: On March ll,1975, Donald Mead (Mead) and a certain Isaac Arivas
were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9,
in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931. The information alleged
that Mead and Isaac Arivas "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or
otherwise dispose into the highway canal and./or cause, permit, suffer to
be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other
waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil
Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution
of such waterway with the resulting damage and./or destruction to the
arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard, to health and property
in the same vicinity." The case was subsequently assigned to Branch
XXXV of the court of First Instance of Rizal (caloocan city) presided over
by Judge Argel. On August lI,1975, Mead filed a motion to quash on the
grounds that the trial court has no jurisdiction and that the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted
information. Lower Court's Ruling: The motion to quash was denied by
Judge Argel in an Order dated September 5,1975. Judge Argel in his Order

of November 10, 1965 also denied a Motion For Reconsideration filed bv

Mead.
Issue: Whether Judge Argel acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
denied the Motion to Quash and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Mead and thus holding that the Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file
an information for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act
Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission
(NWAPCC)." Supreme Court's
Ruling: The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the questioned Orders
of Judge Argel and ruled in favor of Mead. Judge Argel was ordered to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. The last
paragraph of Sec. 8 of RA 3931 delineates the authority to be exercised
by NWAPCC and by the ordinary courts in respect of preventing or
remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the
Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority of NWAPCC only the
determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations of the
New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on maffers not
related to nuisance 'ono court action shall be initiated until NWAPCC shall
have finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that
a court action involving the determination of the existence of pollution
may not be initiated until and unless NWAPCC has so determined the
existence of what in the law is considered pollution. The Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information charging Mead with a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931. There was no prior
finding or determination by NWAPCC that the act of Mead had caused
pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not to be
understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not file an
information for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if NWAPCC
had made a finding or determination that the law or any of its orders had
been violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there had been
no prior determination by NWAPCC that the supposed acts of the
petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The filing
of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is, therefore,
premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, Judge Argel is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged therein.

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA and Solar Textile Finishing

Corp., G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991
Facts: Solar Textile Finishing Corporation (Solar) in Malabon is involved in
bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles. Solar directly discharged its
untreated wastewater into a drainage canal leading to the TullahanTinejeros River. Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) issued an ex parte
Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installations. The National Pollution Control
Commission (NPCC) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) based the Order on findings of several inspections of
Solar's plant. Lower Court's Ruling: Solar went to the RTC of Quezon City
on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board. The
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that appeal and not certiorari from
the questioned Order of the PAB as well as the Writ of Execution was the
proper remedy, and that the PAB's subsequent Order allowing Solar to
operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA reversed the trial court's order of
dismissal and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.
The CA also held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the PAB Orders
may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case
might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question
of due process be settled.
Issue: Whether the PAB denied due process to Solar Supreme Court's
Ruling: There was no denial of due process. Under PD 984, an ex parte
cease and desist order may be issued by the PAB (a) whenever the wastes
discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set." On the one
hand, it is not essential that PAB prove that an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an
ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if PAB finds
that the wastes discharsed do exceed "the allowable standards set." In
respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have
been set by the NPCC, PAB may issue an ex parte cease and desist order
when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such
allowable standards. Whereo however, the effluents or discharges have
not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the NPCC,
then PAB may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie

proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate

threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life."
Since the applicable standards set by the NPCC existing at any given time
may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste
discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

G.R. No. 137174

July 10, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION

ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR) vs. MARCOPPER MINING
CORPORATION

FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings
sea disposal system. In the meantime, the National Pollution Control
Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192 dated June 10, 1987,
and its powers and functions were integrated into the Environmental
Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).
On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of
the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to "cease and desist from
discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the
MMC with the Office of the President (OP).
In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation
Project (CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00
a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF)
thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings
in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits to the
ETF.
The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP,
however, the CA acted on Marcoppers petition and ordered the PAB to
refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid Order.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 984, with respect to the power and function of petitioner
Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the
discharge of the mine tailings.
HELD:
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to
issue the Order from the
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of
authority to act on pollution-related matters in mining operations is
anchored on the provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
However, Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to
adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines
the term "pollution" as referring to any alteration of the physical,
chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources
of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or
solid wastes as will or is likely to create a harmful environment.
On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is
complementary to that of the PAB. While the mines regional director has
express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations
and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for
violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the
ruling of the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines
Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB.
Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and
the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The
scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication
Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility
over pollution cases.