POLITICALLAWREVIEW

VOLUMEI
BasedontheoutlineofJusticeVicenteV.Mendoza
April1996RevisedEdition
_______________

CompiledbyJoseSalvadorY.Mirasol

UpdatedbyUPLawBatch1995

UpdatedandEnlargedbyRodellA.Molina
UPLawBatch1996
This revised edition is intended to further improve a previous edition of this work.
ImportantpointstakenfromJusticeIsaganiCruz'sbookinPoliticalLawhavebeensummarizedin
thiswork.
SpecialthankstoLianneTanforlendingmeherdisketteinPoliticalLawReviewasupdated
byUPLawBatch1995,Ma.RosarioBernardofordigestingsomeofthecasesinvolumeI,Shirley
Alinea for lending me her notes in Political Law, Non Lerrer, Buddy Carale and TJ Matta for
patientlyprintingthiswork.
ThisworkisdedicatedtoUPLawBatch1996,towhichIbelong,mostspeciallytoSection
A.MaythisworkhelpusinpassingPoliticalLawthiscomingbarexamsinSeptember1996.
Letusallprayforaonehundredpercentpassingrate.

"ToHimbethegloryandhonorforever."

_______________

GENERALINTRODUCTION

I.DEFINITIONSANDCONCEPTSINPUBLICLAW
A.PoliticalLawdefined

RAM

Thatbranchofpubliclawwhichdealswiththeorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentorgansof
thestateanddefinestherelationsofthestatewiththeinhabitantsofitsterritory.(Sinco,PhilippinePolitical
Law1,11thed.,1962)
ScopeofPoliticalLaw.Theentirefieldofpoliticallawmaybesubdividedinto(a)thelawofpublic
administration,(b)constitutionallaw,(c)administrativelaw,and(d)thelawofpubliccorporations.These
foursubdivisionsmaybebrieflydescribedforthetimebeing,asfollows:Thefirstdealswiththeorganization
andmanagementofthedifferentbranchesofthegovernment;thesecond,withtheguarantiesoftheconstitution
toindividualrightsandthelimitationsongovernmentalaction;thethird,withtheexerciseofexecutivepowerin
the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with governmental
agenciesforlocalgovernmentorforotherspecialpurposes.(Sinco1)

MacariolavAsuncion,114SCRA77(1982)
SpanishCodeofCommerceProvisionDisqualifyingJudgesfromEngaginginCommerceisPartofSpanish
PoliticalLawAbrogatedbyChangeofSovereignty
F:

ThecomplainantallegedthatrespondentjudgeoftheCFIviolatedparagraphs1and5,Art.14oftheCodeof
Commerce(w/cprohibitedjudges,amongothers,fromengagingincommerce,eitherin person orin proxyorinthe
financialinterventionincommercialorindustrialcompaniesw/inthelimitsofthedistricts)whenheassociatedhimselfw/
theTradersMftg.&FishingIndustries,Inc.asastockholderandpres.,saidcorp.havingbeenorganizedtoengagein
business.

HELD:AlthoughthisprovisionisincorporatedintheCodeofCommercew/cispartofthecommercial
laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
governmentandcertainpublicofficersandemployees,likejusticesandjudges.Politicallawhasbeendefined
asthatbranchofpubliclaww/cdealsw/theorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentalorgansoftheState
anddefinestherelationsofthestatew/theinhabitantsofitsterritory. Specifically,Art.14oftheCodeof
Commercepartakesmoreofthenatureofanadministrativelawbec.itregulatestheconductofcertainpublic
officersandemployeesw/respecttoengaginginbusiness;hence,politicalinessence.
xxxUponthetransferofsovereigntyfromSpaintoUS,andlateronfromUStotheRepublicofthe
Phils., Art. 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of
sovereignty,thepoliticallawsoftheformersovereign,whethercompatibleornotw/thoseofthenewsovereign,
areautomaticallyabrogated,unlesstheyareexpresslyreenactedbyaffirmativeactofthenewsovereign.There
appearstobenoenablingoraffirmativeact.Consequently,Art.14oftheCodeofCommercehasnolegaland
bindingeffectandcannotapplytorespondentJudge.VV.

B.ConstitutionalLawDefined
Aconstitutionisbothalegaldocumentandapoliticalplan.It,therefore,embodieslegalrulesaswellas
politicalprinciples.Andsowhenwespeakofconstitutionallawinthestrictsenseofthetern,werefertothe

legalrulesoftheconstitution.xxx
xxx
Inthesenseinw/ctheconceptisunderstoodinAmericanandPhilippineJurisprudence,constitutional
lawisatermusedtodesignatethelawembodiedintheconstitutionandthelegalprinciplesgrowingoutofthe
interpretationandapplicationmadebycourtsoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutioninspecificcases.xxx
Constitutionallawformsadistinctbranchofjurisprudencedealingw/thelegalprinciplesaffectingthe
nature,adoption,amendment,andoperationoftheconstitution.(Sinco67.)

TypesofConstitutionalLaw.Ingeneral,therearethree(3)differenttypesofconstitutionallaw,namely,
(1)theEnglishtype,characterizedbytheabsenceofawrittenconstitution(Sinco67)
Anunwrittenconstitution,andthepowerofjudicialreviewbythecourts. Thus,thecourtscannot
invalidatetheactsoftheparliamentasbeingunconstitutionalbecauseof"parliamentarysupremacy."(Mirasol
notes.)
(2)theEuropeancontinentaltype,wherethereisawrittenconstitutionw/cgivesthecourtsnopowerto
declareineffectivestatutescontrarytoit(Sinco67.)
A written constitution but nopower of judicial reviewby the courts. The socalled Constitutional
Courts of France do not exercise real judicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional
questionsupontherequestofthegovernment,notofpartiesinactuallitigation.(Mirasolnotes.)

(3)theAmericantypewherethelegalprovisionsofthewrittenconstitutionaregiveneffectthroughthe
powerofthecourtstodeclareineffectiveorvoidordinarystatutesrepugnanttoit.(Sinco67.)
Awrittenconstitutionandtheexerciseofjudicialreviewbythecourts,whichisthepowerofthecourts
todeterminetheconstitutionalvalidityoftheactsoflegislatureandotherbranchesofgovernment. (Mirasol
notes.)

C.ConstitutionDefined
Itis"alawforthegovernment,safeguardingindividualrights,setdowninwriting."(Hamilton.)
SuchaviewfoundacceptanceintheworkofTanadaandFernando:
"Itmaybemorespecificallydefinedasawritteninstrumentorganizingthegovernment,distributingits
powersandsafeguardingtherightsofthePeople."
FromMalcolmandLaurel:
"Itisthewritteninstrumentbywhichthefundamentalpowersofgovernmentareestablished,limited
anddefined,andbywhichthosepowersaredistributedamongtheseveraldepartmentsfortheirsafeanduseful
exerciseforthebenefitofthebodypolitic."
AccordingtoSchwartz,"aconstitution isseenasanorganicinstrument,underwhichgovernmental
powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is

fundamentalinAmericantheory.'Theofficeandpurposeoftheconstitutionistoshapeandfixthelimitsof
governmentalactivity.'"(Fernando,TheConstitutionofthePhilippines,2021,2nded.,1977.)

TypesofConstitutions
ClassificationofConstitutions:
Constitutionsareclassifiedasfollows:(1)writtenandunwritten,and(2)rigidandflexible.
WrittenandUnwritten(Classificationastowhenitisadopted.)
(a)Awrittenconstitutionisonetheprovisionsofw/chavebeenreducedtowritingandembodiedin
one or more instruments at a particular time. The US Constitution is a classical example of a written
constitution.
Writtenconstitutionshavebeenalsocalledconventionalorenacted,bec.theyaregivendefiniteformby
asteadilyconstitutedbody,theconstitutionalconvention,ataparticulartime.
Writtenconstitutionsareeitherdemocraticormonarchical.Democraticconstitutionsessentiallyspring
fromtheauthorityofthepeople.Monarchicalconstitutionsarethosegrantedbyamonarchasanactofgraceto
hissubjects.Thisclassofconstitutionsarealsocalledoctroyedconstitutions.Theybelongtothepastage.
(b)Anunwrittenconstitutionisonew/chasnotbeencommittedtowritingatanyspecifictimebutis
theaccumulatedproductofgradualpoliticalandlegaldevelopment. TheEnglishConstitutionisthemodern
exampleofthisclass.
Unwrittenconstitutionshavebeenknownalsoascumulativeorevolved,bec.theyarenotformulatedat
anydefinitetimebutarerathertheoutcomeofapoliticalevolutionaryprocess.

FlexibleandRigidConstitutions.(Classificationaccordingtoamendmentprocess.)
The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and
inaccurate bec. no written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain
substantiallyunchangedinitsoriginalconditionotherthanbyformalamendments.xxx.
Toclassifyconstitutionsintorigidandflexibleistouseabasisthathastodomorew/theirnaturerather
thantheirmereform.
Rigid. Aconstitutionisclassifiedasrigidwhenitmaynotbeamendedexceptthroughaspecial
processdistinctfromandmoreinvolvedthanthemethodofchangingordinarylaws.Itissupposedthatbysuch
aspecialprocedure,theconstitutionisrendereddifficulttochangeandtherebyacquiresagreaterdegreeof
stability.
Flexible. Aconstitutionisclassifiedasflexiblewhenitmaybechangedinthesamemannerand
throughthesamebodythatenactsordinarylegislation.TheBritishConstitutionisflexible.
Aconstitution'sstabilitydependsuponotherfactorsthanthemererigidityorflexibilityoftheamending
process,suchas(1)thegeneraltemperamentofthepeopleandtheirleadersand(2)thedegreeofanation's

politicalmaturityandsocialhomogenity.(Sinco6870.)
ThePhilippineConstitutionisbothwrittenandrigid(SeeArt.XVIIontheAmendmentprocess).

II.THEBACKGROUNDOFTHEPRESENTCONSTITUTION
HistoricalBackgroundofthe1987Constitution
Thehistoryofthe1987Constitutionbeganon11April1899,thedatewhentheTreatyofParisbetween
theUnitedandSpainof10December1898becameeffectiveupontheexchangeofinstrumentsofratificationof
bothcountries.Butthesourcesofthe1987Constitutionare(i)McKinley'sInstructionstotheSecondPhilippine
Commission;(ii)SpoonerAmendment;(iii)PhilippineBillof1902;(iv)JonesLawof1916,otherwiseknownas
thePhilippineAutonomyAct;(v)1935Constitution;(vi)1973Constitutionand(vi)FreedomConstitutionof
1986anditsimplementingorders.
TreatyofParis
UndertheTreatyofParis,thePhilippineswascededbySpaintotheUnitedStates.Spainrelinquished
its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, and with this, all laws of a political nature were automatically
abrogated.
The Treaty provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands was to be
determinedbytheUSCongress.
ThePhilippinesinturn,wasnotgiventhestatusofan"incorporatedterritory"(astomakeitacandidate
forstatehood)andso expropriovigore,theUSConstitutiondidnotapplytothePhilippinesunlesstheUS
Congressexpresslyenacteditsprovisions.
McKinley'sInstructions
President McKinley, legislating as CommanderinChief, issued on 7 April 1900 his "Letter of
InstructiontotheSecondPhilippineCommission"underTaft.
Itsetupa"dividedcivilandmilitarygovernment"withtheexistingMilitarygovernorastheExecutive,
and a Philippine Commission, created on 1 September 1900, as the Legislative, both representing the US
PresidentasCommanderinChief.
ItalsoextendedtothePhilippinesalltherightsintheBillofRightsoftheUSFederalConstitution,
excepttherighttobeararms(becausethecountrywasinrebellion)andtherighttoatrialbyjury(becausethe
Americans distrusted the Filipinos capacity to be a just judge of his peers). The right to jury trial of an
AmericanchargedwithacrimeinthePhilippineswasdeniedbythecourtsinUSvDorr,2Phil332(1903)by
virtueoftheLetterofInstruction.
ThiswasthefirstOrganicAct(alawwhichestablishesthestructureandlimitationsofthegovernment)

of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people, and the right of
amendment(whichwasreservedsolelytotheUSPresident).
Thejudiciarywassubsequentlyestablishedon11June1901,withaSupremeCourt,CourtsofFirst
Instance,andJusticeofPeaceCourts.
SpoonerAmendment
On 4 July 1901, the Spooner Amendment, which was actually a rider to the "Army and Navy
AppropriationsAct,"changedthethen"divided,militaryandcivilgovernment"intoafullycivilgovernment,
under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippine Commission would now begin: "Be it enacted by the
authorityoftheUSgovernment,"andnolongerbyauthorityoftheUSPresident.
PhilippineBillof1902
TheUSCongressnowincontrolofthePhilippines,ratifiedalltheorganicactsofthePresident,inorder
topreventdisruptionofgovernment,andon1July1900,passedthePhilippineBillof1902,whichwastobe
organic act of the Philippines from 1902 to 1906. The organic act introduced significant provisions to
constitutionalhistory.
ThePhilippineCommissionwastheupperhouse.ItwasundertheGovernorGeneralwhoretainedall
theexecutivepower,includingthepowertosuspendthewritof habeascorpus uponrecommendationofthe
PhilippineCommission.
ItestablishedanelectivelowerhousecalledthePhilippineAssembly,composedentirelyofFilipinos.It
calledforthefirstelectioninthePhilippinestofillup,themembershipinthelowerhouse,assoonasthe
Philippine insurrection stopped and there was a condition of general peace, except in the Moro and Non
Christianprovinces.
Acensuswastakenandcompletedon28March1903andwithacertificationofpeaceandofFilipino
acceptanceoftheUSgovernmentmadebythePhilippineCommissionon29March1907,theelectionforthe
PhilippineAssemblywasconductedon10July1907,withOsmenaasspeaker.
TheBillalsodefinedforthefirsttimewhothecitizensofthePhilippines were. Theywereallthe
inhabitantsofthePhilippineislandswhoweresubjectsofSpainasof11April1899,whocontinuedtoreside
therein,andallthechildrenbornsubsequentthereto.Thisdefinitionisstillgoodlawtoday.
JonesLaw
On 29 August 1916, the US Congress passed the Jones Law, otherwise known as the Philippine
AutonomyAct.
It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our
presentsetup.TheexecutivepowerwasinthehandsofanAmericanGovernorGeneral,whowasindependent

oftheLegislature,andwhowasgiventhepowertosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusandimposemartiallaw
withouttherecommendationoftheLegislature.TheLegislaturewascomposedoftheSenateandtheHouseof
Representatives,allcomposedofFilipinos.ThejudiciarycontinuedtobemadeupoftheSupremeCourt,the
CFIsandJusticeofPeaceCourts.
Underthissetup,whiletheFilipinoshasallthelegislativepower,theAmericanshadalltheexecutive
powerandthus,alsothecontrolofthegovernment.Thus,intheBoardofControl(NationalCoalCorporation)
cases,theUSSupremeCourtruled,despitethedissentofHolmesandBrandeis,thatthePresidentoftheSenate
andtheSpeakeroftheHousecouldnotvotethestocksoftheNCCandelectitsdirectorsbecausethiswasa
politicalfunction.OnlytheGovernorGeneralcouldvotethegovernmentshares,saidthecourt.
ThedefinitionofwhowerecitizensofthePhilippinesfirstenunciatedinthePhilippineBillof1902,
wascarriedoverbytheJonesLaw.
TydingsMcDuffieLaw
Althoughthiswasnotanorganicact,itisimportantintheconstitutionalhistoryofthePhilippines
becauseitwastobetheenablingstatute,providingthemechanismwherebytheconstitutionofanindependent
Philippinescouldbeadopted.Thelaw,uponitsacceptancebytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthe
Philippines,providedfor(i)thecallingofaConstitutionalConventiontodraftaConstitutionforthePhilippines,
(ii) the adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights, and a
separationofchurchandstate,(iii)thesubmissionofthedrafttotheUSPresidentforcertificationthatthe
ConstitutionwasinconformitywiththeconditionssetbytheTydingsMcDuffieLaw,and(iv)itsratificationby
thepeopleinaplebiscite.Completeindependencewastotakeplaceten(10)yearsafteritseffectivity.

1935Constitution
Accordingly, on 30 July 1934, an election was held to choose the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Claro M. Recto was elected President of the Convention. On 8 February 1935, the Concon
approvedthedraft.On23March1935,thedraftwascertifiedbythePresident,FranklinDelanoRooseveltas
conformingtotheTydingsMcDuffieLaw.On14May1935,itwasratifiedbythepeopleinaplebiscite,with
theprovisionsonthequalificationsofthePresident,VicePresidentandmembersofCongresstakingeffectupon
ratification.InSeptember1935,thefirstelectionunderthe1935ConstitutionwasconductedwithManuelLuis
QuezonasPresidentandSergioOsmenaasVicePresident.
On15November1935,upontheinaugurationoftheCommonwealth,the1935Constitutiontookeffect.
ThisConstitutionwastoserveasthecharteroftheCommonwealth,anduponwithdrawalofUSsovereignty,of
theRepublic.
TheConstitutionprovidesforatripartitegovernment,withtheexecutivelodgedinthePresidentwho
hadasixyearterm,thelegislativeinaunicameralNationalAssembly,andthejudiciaryinaSupremeCourt,
CFIsandJusticeofPeaceCourtsasbefore.

In 1940, it was amended to provide for (a) a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of
Representatives;(b)atermoffouryearsforthePresident,butwithreelectionand(c)theestablishmentofan
independentconstitutionalbodyknownastheCommissiononElections.
Warensued,andthePhilippines wassodevastatedthatthedeclarationofitsindependence,due15
November1945hadtobepostponed. Atanyrate,on23April1946,theelectionofthefirstofficialsofthe
PhilippineRepublicwasheld,andon4July1946,theRepublicwasinauguratedandthePhilippinesbecame
"politically"independentoftheUS.
Theoretically,toanextentthatsovereigntyisnevergrantedtoapeoplebutisearnedbythemasthey
asserttheirpoliticalwill,thenitisamisnomertosaythat4July1946wasthedayUSgrantedindependenceto
thePhilippines.Moreappropriately,itwasthedaywhentheUSwithdrewitssovereigntyoverthePhilippines,
thusgivingtheFilipinopeopleanoccasiontoasserttheirownindependence.
Butnot"economically". On30April1946,oneweekaftertheelection,theUSCongresspassedthe
BellTradeActwhichwouldgrantPhilippineprimeexportsentrytotheUSfreeofcustomsdutiesfrom1946to
1954, and a gradual increase in duties from 1954 to 1974 (LaurelLangley agreement), provided that the
PhilippineswouldgrantUScitizensandcorporationsthesameprivileges,andinaddition,therighttoexplore
naturalresourcesofthePhilippinesinparitywiththeFilipinos,andtooperatepublicutilities. Thismustbe
acceptedbyCongress,embodiedinanExecutiveAgreement,andreflectedasanamendmentintheConstitution.
TheSenateapprovalofthisbillgaverisetothecaseofVeravAvelino,77Phil192(1946).TheSenate
then had 11Nacionalistasand 13Liberals. ThreeNacionalistaSenatorselect (Vera, Diokno and Romero),
knowntobeagainsttheBellTradeAct,werepreventedbytherestoftheSenate,inwhatisknownas"exclusion
proceedings,"ongroundsthattheirelectionsweremarredwithfraud.Thepoliticalmotivationwasclearbutthe
SC was conned into lifting the injunction it issued for the withholding of the suspension, because of the
unfulfilledpromisethattheSenatewouldnotcarryoutthesuspension.Withthebalanceofpoweroffset,the
BellTradeActwaspassed.Subsequently,theSChadtodismissthepetitiononthegroundthattheprincipleof
separationofpowers,itcouldnotorderacoequalbranchtoreinstateamember.
TheSenateauthorizedPresidentRoxastoenterintoanExecutiveAgreement,whichhedidon3July
1946,theeveofthedeclarationofPhilippineIndependence.
ThencametheamendmentoftheConstitutioninordertoincludetheParityRightsAgreement,which
gaverisetothecaseofMabanagvLopezVito,78Phil1(1947).UndertheAmendatoryProvisionsofthe1935
Constitution,Congress,actingasconstituentbody,needed3/4votetoproposeanamendmenttotheConstitu
tion.ButwiththethreeSenatorsstillsuspended,onlythe21remainingwereusedasthebasisforcomputingthe
3/4requirement.Whenthiswasraisedincourt,itbeggedofffromrulingonthegroundthatitwasapolitical
question.ItalsousedtheEnrolledBillTheory.
Sowiththeamendmentproposed,itwassubsequentlyratifiedon5March1947.
ThethirdtimetheConstitutionwasamended(1940,1947)wasin1967.AResolutionofbothhouses
providedfor(a)theamendmentoftheConstitutionbyaConvention,(b)theincreaseofseatsintheHouseof

RepresentativestomaketheConconsufficientlyrepresentative,and(c)allowingmembersoftheHouseasdele
gateswithoutforfeitingtheirseats.Thefirstwasapproved,thesecondandthirdwererejected.Thisbecamethe
subjectmatterofGonzalesvCOMELEC.
ElectionofdelegatestotheConcontookplaceon10November1970.ThentheConConmeton1June
1971.Beforeitfinisheditswork,itcameupwitharesolutioncallingforanamendmenttothe1935Constitution
reducingthevotingagefrom21to18,sothatawiderbasecouldvoteintheratificationoftheConstitutionthen
beingdrafted.AplebiscitewassetbytheCOMELECfor8November1971butthiswasenjoinedbytheSCin
thecaseofTolentinovCOMELEC,thecourtrulingthatapiecemealamendmentwasnotallowedbythe1935
Constitutionsinceitprovidedthattheamendmentsweretoberatifiedat"anelection"whichmeantonlyone
election.TheCourtuphelditsjurisdictionovertheConConbyarguingthatsincetheConconderiveditspower
fromtheConstitution,itwasthuslimitedbytheConstitution.
ButitwassubsequentlyovertakenbyMartialLaw.On30November1972,theConventionsubmittedits
"draft"tothePresident,whocalledonaplebiscitetoratifytheConstitution.Thiswasquestionedinthecaseof
PlanasvCOMELEC,49SCRA105(1973)onthegroundthattherecanbenofreedomofexpressionunder
MartialLaw. ButthecasewasrenderedmootandacademicwhenthePresidentcancelledtheplebisciteand
insteadheldacitizens'assemblyon10to15January,1973.On17January1973,thePresidentcameupwitha
proclamationthattheConstitutionhadcometofullforceandeffectafteritsoverwhelmingratificationbythe
peopleinavivavocevote.

1973Constitution
ThevalidityoftheratificationprocesswasquestionedinthecaseofJavellanavExecutiveSecretary,50
SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as
unconstitutionalforceditintotheconclusionthat"therearenofurtherobstaclestoconsideringtheconstitution
inforceandeffect."
The1973Constitutionwasamendedfourtimes.
Thefirst,in1976,gavethePresident,legislativepowerseveniftheInterimBatasangPambansawas
alreadyoperating.
Thesecond,in1980wasnotsignificant.ItmerelyraisedtheretirementofjusticesoftheSCfrom65to
70astokeepFernandoforfivemoreyears.
Thethird,in1980changedtheformofgovernmentfromParliamentarytoPresidential.
Thefourth,in1984,respondedtothesuccessionproblembyprovidingforaVicePresident.
ThestartoftheendoftheMarcosyears,ofcourse,couldbetreatedasearlyas21August1983.Butits
immediateprecursorwastheSnapElectionwhichthePresidentwasforcedtocallandseton7February1986to

respondtotheclamorforpopularmandate.
Thevalidityofthe"SnapElectionLaw"calledbytheBatasangPambansawasraisedinthecaseof
Philippine Bar Association
v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the
conditionalletterofresignationsentbyMr.MarcostotheBatasan,makinghisresignationeffectiveonlyupon
(i)theholdingofaPresidentialelection,(ii)theproclamationofawinner,(iii)theassumptionintoofficebythe
winning candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973
Constitution,foritdidnotcreateavacancy,andwithoutavacancy,therewasnoreasontocallforanelection.
ButtheSCfailedtoissueapreliminaryinjunctiontoenjointheCOMELECfrompreparingfortheelection,thus
making"theinitiallylegalquestion intoapoliticalone." Inthemeantime,thepoliticalpartieshavestarted
campaigningandthepeopleweresoinvolvedintheelectionthattostopitonlegalgroundswouldfrustratetheir
verywill.Andso,failingtocomeupwiththemajoritytoholdtheSnapElectionLawunconstitutional,theSC
couldnotissuetheinjunctionprayedfor.Theelectionwentahead.
Therestishistory. Theresults oftheelectionwereproclaimedbytheBatasan,namingMarcosand
Tolentinoasthewinners.ButtheFebruary2to25,1986,EDSArevolutiontookplace.On25February,Marcos
wasproclaimed inMalacanang byMakasiar,while Aquino wasproclaimed inClubFilipinobyTeehankee.
Laterthatevening,MarcosfledtoHawaii.

A.TheFebruary1986RevolutionandtheProclamationofProvisionalConstitution.
FreedomConstitution
WhatwasthebasisoftheAquinogovernment?Diditassumepowerpursuanttothe1973Constitution,
orwasitarevolutionarygovernment?
Proclamation No. 1, 25 February 1986 (Provisional government). But Proclamation No. 3 which
announcedtheProvisionalConstitution,seemedtosuggestthatitwasarevolutionarygovernment,sinceinone
ofitswhereasesitannouncedthatthe"newgovernmentwasinstalled,throughadirectexerciseofthepowerof
theFilipinopeopleassistedbyunitsoftheNewArmedForces,"referringtotheEDSArevolution.
Thebetterviewisthelatterview.TheAquinogovernmentwasnotanoffshootofthe1973Constitution
forunderthatConstitution,aprocedurewasgivenfortheelectionofthePresidentproclamationbythe
BatasanandthecandidateBatasanproclaimedwasMarcos.
LawyersLeaguevAquino(GRNos.73748,73972&73990,May22,1986).Thisviewwasaffirmed
inLawyersLeaguevAquinowherethelegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisquestionedonthegroundthatit
wasnotestablishedpursuanttothe1973Constitution.TheSCruledthatpetitionershadnopersonalitytosue
andtheirpetitionstatesnocauseofaction."ForthelegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiable
matter. ItbelongstotherealmofpoliticswhereonlythepeopleofthePhilippinesarethejudge. Andthe
peoplehavemadethejudgment;theyhaveacceptedthegovernmentofPresidentAquinowhichisineffective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and lawa de jure

government.Moreover,thecommunityofnationshasrecognizedthelegitimacyofthepresentgovernment.All
theelevenmembersofthisCourtasreorganized,havesworntoupholdthefundamentallawoftheRepublic
underhergovernment."
TheAquinogovernmentwasaresultofa"directstateaction."Itwasnotasifasmallgrouprevolted
andsucceededinwrestingpowerintheend.Rather,theentirestaterevoltedandoverthrewthegovernment,so
thatrightfromthebeginning,theinstallationwasalreadylawfulandthegovernmentwasatalltimesdejure.
Inthisregard,itmustbenotedthatthereisnosuchthingasaconstitutionalrightofrevolution. A
revolution,fromthepointofviewofaState,isalwayslawfulsinceaStatecannevergowrong;itcanchangeits
governmentinwhateverwaythesovereignseesfit.Butthisrightofrevolution,inherentinsovereignty,cannot
berecognizedinaConstitution,forthiswouldbeselfdestructive.ThenatureofaConstitutionistosetupa
governmentandprovideforanorderlywaytochangethisgovernment.Arevolutioncontradictsthisnature.
Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution). At any rate, the Provisional
ConstitutionorFreedomConstitutionwasadoptedon25March1986throughProclamationNo.3.Itabrogated
thelegislativeprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,modifiedtheprovisionsregardingtheexecutivedepartment,
andtotallyreorganizedthegovernment.(Itsuseofthe1973Constitution,however,isnotbetoconstruedthatit
wasacontinuationthereof.)ThenitprovidedforthecallingofaConstitutionalCommission,composedof30to
50membersappointedbythePresidentwithin60days. (Inourhistory,allmajorconstitutionsMalolos,
1935,1971weredraftedbyelecteddelegates.)
ThePresidentappointed48Commissioners,whoworkedontheConstitutionfrom1Juneto15October
1986.Thedraftwassubmittedtothepeopleinareferendumon2February1987.On11February1987,the
President, through Proclamation No. 58, announced its overwhelming ratification by the people and that,
therefore,ithadcomeintoforceandeffect.
InRe:SaturninoBermudez(145SCRA160)(1960).InthecaseofInRe:SaturninoBermudez,theSC
held,quotingthepreviouscaseofLawyersLeaguevAquino,that:
[T]helegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiablematter.Itbelongstotherealmof
politicswhereonlythepeopleofthePhilippinesarethejudge.Andthepeoplehavemadethejudgment;
theyhaveacceptedthegovernmentofPresidentAquinowhichisineffectivecontroloftheentirecountry
sothatitisnotmerelyadefactogovernmentbutinfactandlawadejuregovernment.Moreover,the
communityofnationshasrecognizedthelegitimacyofthepresentgovernment.Alltheelevenmembers
of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.

B.AdoptionandEffectivityofthepresentConstitution
ProvisionalConstitution,Art.V.
ARTICLEV

ADOPTIONOFANEWCONSTITUTION
Section1.WithinsixtydaysfromthedateofthisProclamation,aCommissionshallbeappointedbythe
PresidenttodraftaNewConstitution.TheCommissionshallbecomposedofnotlessthanthirtynormorethan
fiftynaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,ofrecognizedprobity,knownfortheirindependence,nationalismand
patriotism.TheyshallbechosenbythePresidentafterconsultationwithvarioussectorsofsociety.
Section2.TheCommissionshallcompleteitsworkwithinasshortaperiodasmaybeconsistentwiththe
needbothtohastenthereturnofnormalconstitutionalgovernmentandtodratadocumenttrulyreflectiveofthe
idealsandaspirationsoftheFilipinopeople.
Section3. TheCommissionshallconductpublic hearingstoinsurethatthepeoplewillhaveadequate
participationintheformulationoftheNewConstitution.
Section4.TheplenarysessionsoftheCommissionshallbepublicandrecorded.
Section5.TheNewConstitutionshallbepresentedbytheCommissiontothePresidentwhoshallfixthe
datefortheholdingofaplebiscite.Itshallbecomevalidandeffectiveuponratificationbyamajorityofthevotes
castinsuchplebiscitewhichshallbeheldwithinaperiodof60daysfollowingitssubmissiontothePresident.

1987Constitution,Art.XVIII,sec.27.
Art.XVIII,Sec.27. ThisConstitution shalltakeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbya
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede the all previous
Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the
ConstitutionalCommissionof1986onthetwelfthdayofOctober 1986,andaccordinglysignedonthe
fifteenth dayofOctober1986atthePlenaryHall,NationalGovernmentCenter,QuezonCity,bythe
Commissionerswhosesignaturesarehereunderaffixed.
ProclamationNo.58(ProclaimingtheRatificationofthe1987Constitution),February11,1987
DeLeonvEsguerra,153SCRA602(1987.)
The1987Constitutiontookeffecton2February1987.
F:

ThecasearoseduetoArt.III,Sec.2ofProclamationNo.3,whichprovidedthat:"Allelectiveandappointive
officialsandemployeesunderthe1973Constitutionshallcontinueinofficeuntilotherwiseprovidedbyproclamationor
executiveorderoruponthedesignationorappointmentandqualificationoftheirsuccessors,ifsuchappointmentismade
withinaperiodofoneyearfrom25February1986."
DeLeonwasabarriocaptaininTaytay,Rizal.On9February1987,hewasreplacedbytheMLG(DLG).Sothe
questionaroseastowhenthe1987Constitutiontookeffect.Ifittookeffecton2February,thereplacementwasnolonger

valid, since Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. But if it took effect on 11 February (the date of
proclamation),thereplacementwouldhavebeenvalid.

The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the framers of the
Constitutionwastomakeiteffectiveonthedateofitsratification. Art.XVIII,Sec.27clearlyprovidedthat
"thisConstitution shall takeeffect imme

diately

upon itsratification byamajorityofthevotescastinthe

plebiscite." The1987ConstitutionwasratifiedinaplebisciteonFeb.2,1987,superseding theProvisional
Constitution. Consequently,afterthatdate,respondentOICGovernorcouldnotdesignaterespondentstothe
electivepositionsoccupiedbypetitioners.Petitionersmustnowbeheldtohaveacquiredsecurityoftenure.
Thedissentingopinionpointedoutthatbycontemporaneousconstruction,the1973Constitutionhada
similarprovisionasthepresentoneinissue(Art.XVII,Sec.16,ThisConstitutionshalltakeeffectimmediately
uponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscite),andyetittookeffectonthedayofthe
proclamation.The1981and1984amendmentscontainedsimilarprovisions(validwhenapproved),andyetthe
practicehasalwaysbeentomakethedateofproclamation,thedateofeffectivity.
Furthermore,iftheeffectivitywas2February,thentheappointmentsmadebythePresidenttoCAposts
afterthatdatewouldbeinvalidfortheywerenotsubmittedtotheJudicial
andBarCouncil.Onthispoint,however,TeehankeenotedthatthePresidentissuedtheappointmentsintheend
ofJanuary.
A concurringopinion notedthedebatebetweenDavide(date ofproclamation) andBernas(dateof
ratification),andDavide'scommentthathewasgivingupduetotyrannyofnumbers.
VV: TheSCwascorrectforthatwastheclearintentoftheframers.Theonestobeblamedarethe
framersthemselves.Effectivityshouldreallybethedateofproclamation.
One,howcanonecanbeexpectedtocomplywiththeprovisionsoftheConstitutionwhen,priortoits
proclamation,thereisnowaytodetermineifithasbeenratifiedornot?ShouldtheDirectorofPrisoncontinue
thescheduledelectrocutionofadeathrowconvicton3Februaryinviewoftheabolitionofcapitalpunishment
inthe1987Constitution;ifhedoes,hewouldtechnicallybeviolatingtheconstitutionundertheaboveholding.
Ifhedoesnot,hewouldbeinderelictionofduty,incasetheconstitutionisnotratified.
Two,noanalogycanbemadebetweentheelectiontoofficeofapublicofficerwhoisdeemedelected
onthedayofelection),andtheeffectivityoftheconstitution,becauseapublicofficer,thoughdeemedelected,
doesnotassumeofficeonthedayofhiselection,notevenonthedayofhisproclamation.

III.THESUPREMACYOFTHECONSTITUTIONANDTHEROLEOFTHECOURTS

A.TheoryofJudicialReview
AngaravElectoralCommission,63Phil139(1936).In1935,theNationalAssembly

adoptedaresolutionthat"allmemberselect,withnoelectionprotestfiledonorbefore3December1935are
deemedelected."TheElectoralCommission,aconstitutionalbody,ontheotherhandsetthe9December1935
asthedeadlineforthefilingofelectionprotest.
Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was
entertainedbytheElectoralCommission.AngaracontendedthatthedeadlinesetbytheNationalAssemblywas
controlling.Whoprevailed?
The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral
Commission,inviewoftheconstitutionalprovisiongrantingtheElectoralCommissionjurisdictionoverelection
protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated
constitutionalboundaries,itneitherassertssupremacy,norannulstheactsofthelegislature.Itsimplycarries
outtheobligationsimposeduponitbytheconstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsandtoestablishforthe
partiestherightswhichtheconstitutiongrantstothem.

ConditionsfortheExerciseofJudicialReview
InPeoplevVera,66Phil56(1937),J.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybe
exercisedinanactualcaseandcontroversy.
This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a
constitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime,and(4)aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylis
motaofthecase,i.e.anunavoidablequestion.
Seven(7)rulesofavoidanceofconstitutionalquestions(J.Brandeis):
Inthefollowingcases,thecourtmustrefrainfrompassingontheissueofconstitutionalityorfrom
exercisingjudicialreview:
1.Friendly,nonadversaryproceedings.(novitalconflict)
2.Anticipationofaquestionofconstitutionallawinadvanceofthenecessityofdecidingit.(premature
case)
3.Formulationofarulebroaderthanisrequiredbytheprecisefactstowhichitisapplied.
4.Existenceofothergroundsuponwhichthecasemaybedisposedof(nottheverylismota)
5.Acomplaintmadebyonewhofailstoshowinjuryastoitsoperation.(nostanding)
6.Instanceofonewhohasavailedhimselfofitsbenefit.
7. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional
question.

Policyofstrictnecessity(RescueArmycase)

Thecourtmust,asmuchpossible,refrainfromexercisingjudicialreviewunlessalltherequirementsfor
itsexercisearefulfilledbecauseof:
1.Thedangerofexercisingthefunction,inviewofpossibleconsequencesforothersstemmingalso
fromconstitutionalroots.
2.Comparativefinalityofthoseconsequences.
3.Considerationduetothejudgmentoftheotherrepositoriesofconstitutionalpowerconcerningthe
scopeoftheirauthorities.
4.Necessityforeachtokeepwithinitsownpower.
5.Inherentlimitationsofthejudicialprocessitslargelynegativecharacter,anditslimitedresourcesfor
enforcement.
6.Withalinparamountimportanceofconstitutionaladjudication.
Thus, the following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and
academicissues,and(iv)nostanding.

PoliticalQuestion
Anissueisapoliticalquestionwhenitdoesnotdealwiththeinterpretationofalawanditsapplication
toacase,butwiththeverywisdomofthelawitself.Whenajudgeattemptstoresolveapoliticalquestion,heis
notexercisingajudicialfunction,butisrathersupplantinghisconsciencetothatofthepoliticalbranchofthe
government.
Bakerv.Carr,369US186(1962)hasattemptedtoformulatesomeguidelinesfordeterminingwhethera
questionispoliticalornot.
Prominentonthesurfaceofanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionisfoundatextually
demonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoapoliticaldepartment;oralackofjudicially
discoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingit;ortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackoftherespectduecoordinatebranchesof
government;oranunusualneedforunequestioningadherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymade,orthe
potentiality of embarrassment from multafarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.

AdvisoryOpinion
A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands
constitutionalconstructionforitsresolution.Thismaytaketheformofdeclaratoryrelief.Itisnotwiseforthe
courttoengageinanadvisoryopinionbecause:
a)Thisonlyleads todialectics, toabstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting

Frankfurter)
b)Thejudicialfunctionisimpoverishedsinceitthrivesonfactsthatdrawoutthemeaningofthelaw.
Mootness
Acasebecomesmootwhentherearefacts,injuriesandheatedargumentsbutforsomereasonthelegal
problemhasbecomestale. Whenacaseismootandacademic,itceasestobeacaseandcontroversy. Any
decisionreachedbythecourtwouldnotbeconclusiveontheparties.
Exceptionstomootness:
1)Ifthequestioniscapableofrepetitionandevasiveofreview.
2)Ifthereexitsamerepossibilityofcollaterallegalconsequencesifthecourtdoesnotact.
3)Voluntarycessationfromthewrongfulactbythedefendant,ifheisfreetoreturntohisoldways.
Ripeness
Aconstitutionalquestionmaycometothecourteithertooearlyorprematurely,sothatitisstillabstract
(advisoryopinion),ortoolate,sothatthecourt'sdecisionwouldnolongeraffecttheparties(mootness).The
courtmustresolveconstitutionalissuesonlywhentheycometoitattherighttime(ripeness).
NoStanding
Apartyhasastandinginacaseifhisinterestissuchthathestandstobebenefitedifthecaseisresolved
inhisfavor,andhestandtobereallyinjuredifitisdecidedagainsthim.
Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being
questioned,orhisstatusandtheprecisenatureoftheconstitutionalinfringement.
The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversyastoassuresuchconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthe
courtsolargelydependsforilluminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions(BakervCarr,supra.)
Apersonhasstandingtochallengethegovernmentalactonlyifhehasapersonalandsubstantialinterest
inthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultotitsenforcement.(Peoplev.Vera,
infra.)
PhilippinePractice
InreSaturninaBermudez(145SCRA160,1986)
TheactionwasfordeclaratoryrelieftointerpretSection5ofArt.XVIII,whichprovidesthat:Thesix
yeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedinthe7February1986election,isforpurposes
ofsynchronizationofelection,herebyextendedtonoonof30June1991.Thequestionwaswhothe"incumbent

President" referred to in said provision was whether Aquino (the one in office) or Marcos (the one
proclaimedbytheBatasan).TheconfusionarosebecauseinProclamationNo.3,Pres.Aquinoreferredtothe
"directexerciseofthepoweroftheFilipinopeopleassistedbytheunitsofthenewAFP"asthecauseforthe
installationofthenewgovernment.IfPresidentAquinowasnotelectedbutcameintoofficeasaresultofthe
EDSARevolution,theshewouldnotbethe"incumbent"whowaselectedintheFebruary7election,referredto
intheprovision.
TheSCruledthat(a)thepetitionerhadnostanding,(b)theSChadnojurisdictionoverpetitionsfor
declaratoryrelief,c)thesuitwasagainstthePresidentwhocannotbesued,d)thepetitionerhadnocauseof
actionbecause,reiteratingthedecisioninLawyer'sLeagueforaBetterPhilippinesvAquino,thelegitimacyof
theAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiablematterbutisapoliticalquestion.
Andyet,theSCruledthatthe"incumbent" referredtowasPresidentAquinowhowasineffective
controlofthecountryandhadbeenrecognizedbytherestoftheworld.
(The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the
legitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentsoastoavoidanydoubtastoitsveryownlegitimacy.Itmustbenoted,
thoughthathiscaseistheentitlementofanactualcaseandcontroversy.)
DumlaovCOMELEC(95SCRA392)
Section4ofBP52providedthatanyretiredelectivelocalofficialwhohadreceivedretirementpayto
whichhewasentitledunderthelawandwhohavebeen65yearsoldatthecommencementofthetermofoffice
towhichhesoughttobeelected,wasnotqualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehad
retired.
Dumlaofiledforprohibitiontoenjointheenforcementofthelaw,claimingthatthiswasdirectedathim
asformergovernorofNuevaVizcaya.
TheSCheldthat(a)hehadnostanding,sincehehadnotbeeninjuredbytheoperationofthelaw,no
petitionforhisdisqualificationhavingbeenfiledand(b)theactionwasarequestforadvisoryopinion.Andyet,
theSCupheldthevalidity"becauseofparamountpublicinterest",declaringthatthelegislativepurposeof
infusingyoungerbloodinlocalgovernmentwasvalid.Adapted.
IgotvCOMELEC(95SCRA392)
Sec.4ofBP52alsoprovidedinpartthatanypersonconvictedofsubversion,insurrectionorrebellion,
orsimilaroffenseswasdisqualifiedfromrunningforanylocalposition,andthefilingofchargesforsuchcrimes
beforeacivilormilitarycourtafterpreliminaryinvestigationwasprimafacieevidenceofsuchfact.Igotsought
toquestionthevalidityofthisprovision.
TheSCheldthathehadnostandingbecause(a)hehadneverbeenconvictednorchargedofanythese
crimes,(b)hehadnotbeendisqualifiedfrombeingacandidate,(c)hehadnopersonalnorsubstantialinterestat
stake,and(d)hecouldnotsueastaxpayersincethestatutedidnotdirectlyinvolvethedisbursementofpublic
funds.

Andyet,althoughabstainingfromrulingonthefirstpartoftheprovision,theSCheldthatthesecond
partregardingthepresumptionofguiltwasunconstitutionalforviolatingthepresumptionofinnocence.

PoliticalQuestions
In PBAvCOMELEC,140SCRA455,weseeareversalofjudicialreview. Thecasewasclearlya
justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election,
proclamationandassumptionintoofficebytheelectedPresident,avalidresignationastoauthorizetheBatasan
topassaSnapElectionLaw?TheCourtcouldhavevalidlyissuedaninjunctiontostoptheCOMELECfrom
proceedingwiththepreparationsfortheelection.Butitdidnot,citingitsdelayindecidingthecaseandthe
sentimentsofthepeoplethatdevelopedinthemeantimeasreasonforitsinaction.Accordingtothecourt,what
atfirstwasalegalquestionbecameapoliticalquestionbecauseitwasovertakenbyevents.
VV:ACourtwhichdoesnotissueaninjunctiontoenjoinanofficialactwhenitcouldhaveissuedone
isactuallydecidingthecaseinfavorofthevalidityoftheact. Failuretoissueaninjunctionisasmuchan
exerciseofjudicialreview.
InRomulovYniguez,infra,weseeanothertrendofjudicialreview.Whatseemslikealegalquestion
when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for
impeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroader
context(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofacoequalbranchtocompelhimbymandamusto
recallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionofthe
Batasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.)
Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerase
doubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.

C.FunctionsofJudicialReview
1.CheckinginvalidatingalaworanexecutiveactthatisfoundtobecontrarytotheConstitution.
2.Legitimating(legitimizing)upholdingthevalidityofthelawwhichresultsfromameredismissalofacase
challengingthevalidityofthatlaw.
WhentheCourtexercisesthisfunction,itusesthedoublenegativebydeclaringthatthelawis"not
unconstitutional".Thisisnomeresemantics.TheCourtcannotdeclarethelawconstitutionalforitenjoysthe
presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more
constitutional.Ontheotherhand,anyonewhochallengesthevalidityofalawhastheburdenofprooftoshow

itsinvalidity.Declaringthatthelawisnotunconstitutionalistantamounttosayingthatthechallengerhasnot
mettheburdenrequired.

LegitimatingandCheckingAspectsofJudicialReview.DismissalofChallengetoaLaw'sValidityLegitimizes
it.
InOccenavCOMELEC,104SCRA1(1981),whichsoughtaninjunctiontoprohibittheCOMELEC
fromproceedingwiththeplebiscitefortheproposed1981amendments,andinMitravCOMELEC,104SCRA
59 (1981), which sought a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1973
Constitution,bothprayersbasedonthepremisethatthe1973Constitutionhadnotbeenratified,theSCheldthat
thefailureoftheCourtintheJavellanavExecutiveSecretarycasetomusterthevotesrequiredtodeclarethe
1973Constitutionasbeinginvalidlyratified,whichresultedinthedismissalofthesuitquestioningthevalidity
oftheratificationoftheConstitution,ineffectlegitimatedtheratification.InOccena,theCourtruledthat:
"TheSupremeCourtcancheckaswellaslegitimate.Inthelattercase,thereisanaffirmation
thatwhatwasdonecannotbestigmatizedasconstitutionallydeficient.Themeredismissalofasuitof
thischaractersuffices. ThatisthemeaningoftheconcludingstatementintheJavellanaresolution.
Sincethen,theCourthasinvariablyappliedthepresentConstitution."

3. Symbolic toeducatethebenchandbarastothecontrollingprinciplesandconceptsonmattersofgreat
publicimportance.
Symbolic Function of Supreme Court toGive Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and
Academic.
In SalongavCruzPano,134SCRA438(1985),thecaseagainstpetitionerforsubversionwhichwas
filed bythe fiscal onthe basis of flimsy testimonygiven by VictorLovely wasalready dismissed without
prejudicebythefiscal(uponanticipationofadverseruling).Andyet,theSCnotingthatasthefiscalsaidthe
dismissalofthechargeswaswithoutprejudicetothefilingofnewonesforthesameactsbecausethepetitioner
hasnotbeenarraignedanddoublejeopardydoesnotapply,thecaseisnotentirelymoot,decidedtoperformits
dutyto"formulateguidingandcontrollingconstitutionalprinciples,preceptsanddoctrines orrules"forthe
guidanceofthebarandbench.Itthus,wentontolectureaboutitsantiquatedunderstandingoftheincitingtest,
andhowitcouldnotbeprovedbyamerephotograph.
InJaviervCOMELEC,144SCRA194(1986),thecasewasalreadymootednotonlybythedeathof
EvelioJavier,butalsobytheabolitionofBatasan,theAntiqueseatwhichheandPacificadorwerecontesting
for.AndyettheSC,claimingtobe"notonlythehighestarbiteroflegalquestionsbutalsotheconscienceofthe
government,"decidedthecaseanyway"fortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture.Thecitizencomes
tousinquestoflawbutwemustalsogivehimjustice.The2arenotalwaysthesame.Therearetimeswhenwe
cannotgrantthelatterbec.theissuehasbeensettledandthedecisionisnolongerpossibleaccordingtothelaw.
Buttherearealsotimeswhenalthoughthedisputehasdisappeared,asinthiscase,itneverthelesscriesouttobe
resolved.Justicedemandsthatweactthen,notonlyforthevindicationoftheoutragedright,thoughgone,but

alsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture."
InDemeteriavAlba,148SCRA208,theSCstruckdownSec.44ofPD1177,authorizingthePresident
totransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,onthegroundthatitoverextendedtheprivilegegrantedunder
Art.VIII,sec.16(5)ofthe1973Constitution,evenifsuchprovisionwasalreadyabrogatedbytheFreedom
Constitution.Then,citingtheJaviercaseontheneed"notonlyforthevindicationofanoutragedright,though
gone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture,"itlecturedonhowthislawwouldopenthe
floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of
accountabilityforbudgetaryperformance,andentrenchmentoftheporkbarrelsystem,andonhowthiswould
createtemptationsformisappropriationandembezzlement.

Allcourtscanexercisejudicialreview
Art.VIII,Sec.5(2).TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:
xxx
(2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesof
Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:
(a)Allcasesinwhichtheconstitutionality orvalidity ofany treaty,internationalor executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b)Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment,ortoll,oranypenaltyimposed
inrelationthereto.
(c)Allcasesinwhichthejurisdictionofanylowercourtisinissue.
(d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.
(e)Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.

ThereviewpoweroftheSCimpliesthatithasappellatejurisdiction overfinaljudgments oflower

courtsoncaseswithconstitutionalissues. Ifso,inferiorcourtshaveoriginaljurisdictionoverconstitutional
casesalthoughtheydecidethecaseonlyatfirstinstance,theirdecisionbeingalwaysreviewablebytheSC.
Thus,forinstanceanRTCcanruleontheconstitutionalityoftheAntiSubversionLaw.
InJ.M.Tuason&Co.vCA,3SCRA696(1961),RA2616,whichprovidedfortheexpropriationofthe
TatalonEstate,wasclaimedtobeunconstitutional.ThisissuesaidtheSC,couldberesolvedbytheCFIinthe
ejectmentcasefiledbeforeitbytheevicteesoftheestate,sincethe1935Constitutioncontemplatedthatinferior
courtsshouldhavejurisdictionincasesinvolvingconstitutionalityissues,thatitspokeofappellatereviewof
"finaljudgmentofinferiorcourts"incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteof
theSCrequiredbySec.10ofArt.VIIrestrictedthedecisionsofthatCourtonlyintheexerciseofitsappellate
jurisdiction.
InYnotvIAC,148SCRA659,theSCreversedtheRTC'sholdingthatithadnoauthoritytoruleonthe
validityofEO626A,banningthetransportingofcarabaosfromoneprovincetoanother. TheCourtpointed
out,thatsinceithasjurisdictiontoreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsin

constitutionalcases,thenthelowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance.
TheSCthenstruckdownthelawforbeingarbitraryandforundulydelegatinglegislativepower.

C.EffectofaDeclarationofUnconstitutionality
CivilCode,Art.7.
Article7.xxx
WhenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitution,theformershallbevoid
andthelattershallgovern.
xxx
Theeffectofadeclarationthatalawisunconstitutionalistomakethelaweithervoidorvoidable.
Itisvoidifonitsface,itdoesnotenjoyanypresumptionofvalidity. Assuch,itproducesnoeffect
whatsoever,createsnorightoroffice,itimposesnoduty.Whateverpenaltywaspaidduringtheperiodofits
operationmustberemitted.
AnexampleisBP52inIgotvCOMELECcase,supra,providingthatanyonewhohasbeenchargedof
rebellion,etc.isprimafaciepresumedtobedisqualifiedfromrunningforalocalpost.Onitsface,itblatantly
goesagainsttheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.
Anotherexampleisalawimposingpriorrestraintwhichis,accordingtoSullivanvBantamBooks,and
USvNewYorkTimes,presumptivelyunconstitutional.
Butalawdeclaredunconstitutionalisonlyvoidableif,onitsface,itenjoysthepresumptionofvalidity.
In this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the
invalidationproducesnoretroactiveeffect,sinceitwouldbeunjusttoholdthatthelawdidnotproduceany
effectatallpriortoitsnullification.Fromthetimethelawwaspromulgatedtothetimeitwasdeclaredinvalid,
peoplewouldhaveenteredintovarioustransactionsandrelations,expectingandinfactcompelledtopresume
thatthelawisvalid.Thus,tonowholdthatthelawneverproducedanyeffectwouldpenalizethosewhoinfaith
believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the
Constitution.
AsthecourtputitinChicotCountyDistrictvBaxterStateBank,thepastcannotalwaysbeerased,so
thatstatementsofprincipleofabsoluteretroactivityisnotacceptableinallcases.Saidthecourt,
"[T]heactualexistenceofastatute,priortosuchdetermination,isanoperativefact,andmay
haveconsequenceswhichcannotjustlybeignored.Thepastcannotalwaysbeerasedbyanewjudicial
declaration. Theeffectofthesubsequentrulingastoinvaliditymayhavetobeconsideredinvarious
aspectswithrespecttoparticularrelations,individualandcorporate,andparticularconduct,privateand
official.xxx"

ThecaseofSerranodeAgbayanivPNB,38SCRA429(1971)isinpoint.
In1939,AgbayaniborrowedP450fromPNBsecuredbyarealtymortgage.In1944,theloanmatured
butPNBcouldnotcollectbecauseitwasatthistimeofthewar.In1945,Pres.OsmenaissuedtheDebtMorato
riumLaw(EO#32),suspendingthepaymentofloansforfouryearsduetotheravagesofwar.In1948,RA342
extendedtheDebtMoratoriumLawforanothereightyears(upto1956).In1953,however,theSCdeclaredRA
342asunconstitutionalinthecaseofRuttervEsteban.In1959,PNBfiledasuitforpaymentoftheloan.Has
theactionprescribed?
Ifwetaketheorthodoxview,theactionhasprescribed,sincethedeclarationof RA342asuncon
stitutionalretroactedto1945whenEO32wasfirstissued.Between1944whentheloanmaturedand1959,when
PNBcollectedtheloan,15yearshadelapsed.
[TheorthodoxviewwasannouncedbyMr.J.Field,inthecaseofNortonvs.ShelbyCountywherethe
courtheldthat:
"xxx.Anunconstitutionalactisnotalaw;itconfersnorights;itimposesnoduties;itaffordsno
protection;itcreatesnooffice;itis,inlegalcontemplation,inoperative,asifithadnotbeenpassed.]

Butifwetaketheunorthodoxview,astheSCdid,theactioncouldstillprosper.Theperiodfrom1945
whenthelawwaspromulgated,to1953whenitwasdeclaredunconstitutionalshouldnotbecountedforthe
purposeofprescriptionsincetheDebtMoratoriumLawwasoperativeduringthistime.Ineffect,only7years
hadelapsed(194445,195359).
Indeed,itwouldbeunjusttopunishthecreditorwhocouldnotcollectpriorto1953becausetheDebt
MoratoriumLawwaseffective,onlytobetoldlaterthathisrespectforanapparentlyvalidlawmadehimlose
hisrighttocollect.
Art.7oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthat,"Whenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththe
Constitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern."seemstobetheorthodoxviewonthematter.

CONSTITUTIONALLAW
________________
PARTONE

THEPHILIPPINESASASTATE

I.Statedefined.
CIRvCamposRueda,42SCRA23(1971). A State isapoliticallyorganizedsovereigncommunity,
independentofoutsidecontrol,boundbytiesofnationhood,legallysupremewithinitsterritory,andacting
throughgovernmentfunctioningunderaregimeoflaw.
Astateisacommunityofpersons,moreorlessnumerous,permanentlyoccupyingafixedterritoryand
possessedofanindependentgovernmentorganizedforpoliticalendstowhichthegreatbodyofinhabitants
renderhabitualobedience.(Prof.SamiloBarlongayquotingGarner,IntroductiontoPoliticalLaw,41.)
Theelementsofastateare:territory,people,sovereignty,government.
PeoplereferssimplytotheinhabitantsoftheState.
TerritoryisthefixedportionofthesurfaceoftheearthinhabitedbythepeopleoftheState.
GovernmentistheagencyorinstrumentalitythroughwhichthewilloftheStateisformulated,expressed
andrealized.
SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichthatStateisgoverned.

II.ComponentsofthePhilippineState
A.TerritoryTheArchipelagoConcept
Art.I.ThenationalterritorycomprisesthePhilippinearchipelago,withalltheislandsandwaters
embracedtherein,andallotherterritories overwhichthePhilippines hassovereigntyorjurisdiction,
consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvial,andaerialdomains,includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,
theinsularshelves,andothersubmarineareas.Thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislands
ofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthe
Philippines.
Inshort,thePhilippineterritoryconsistsof:(1)thePhilippinearchipelago,and(2)allterritoriesover
whichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction.
Ofalltheconstitutionsintheworld,probablyonlythePhilippineshasadefinitionofitsterritory.At
firstglance,thisisuselesssinceone'sterritoryunderInternationalLawisdefinednotbyone'sselfserving
claimsastowhatitcovers,butbyinternationaltreatiesandcustoms.Historically,however,thisdefinitionhada

validpurpose.
The1935ConstitutionneededtodefinePhilippineterritoryinordertopreventitsdismembermentby
theUS.Since,pursuanttotheTydingsMcDuffieAct,thedraftoftheConstitutionwastobesubmittedtotheUS
Presidentforapproval,definingthenationalterritorywasawayofmakingtheUSacknowledgeitsextentand
(to)respectitsintegrity.
The1973Constitutionneededadefinitionofnationalterritoryinordertolayclaimto
Sabah.TheclaimwasoriginallymadebyPresidentMacapagal.Sabahwasoneoftheterritoriesbelongingto
thePhilippines byhistoricrightandlegaltitle. President Marcos,in1977on theoccasion ofan ASEAN
MinisterialMeetinginSingaporeannouncedthatthePhilippineswaswillingtodropitsclaimsoverSabah;
nothingwasdone,howevertoamendtheConstitution.
The1987Constitutionchangedthephraseologyinto:"allotherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshas
sovereigntyorjurisdiction."Insochanging,therationalewastoremoveanyirritanttoourrelationswiththe
Malaysiabroughtaboutbythe1973formulationbutwithoutrenouncingtheclaimatthesametime.Anyway,if
the Philippines has theright over Sabah under International Law,itpossesses thatright with orwithout a
Constitution,theConstitutionbeingmerelyamunicipallawwhichdoesnotbindotherstates.
The 1987 Constitution, therefore, contains a definition of national territory so as not to give an
impressionthatthePhilippinesisabandoningitsclaimoverSabah.Removingsuchadefinitionwouldamount
todroppingtheclaimaltogether,afactnotfortheCommissionerstodecide.

1.ThePhilippineArchipelago
a.Treatylimits
1.TreatyofParisof10December1898.
Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and
seconds.Technicaldescriptionsaremadeofthescopeofthearchipelagoasthismaybefoundonthesurfaceof
theearth.

2.TreatyofWashingtonof7November1900betweentheUnitedStatesandSpain.
CedingCagayan,SibutoandSulu.

3.Treatyof2January1930betweentheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.

CedingtheTurtleandMangseeIslands.

b.Methodofdeterminingthebaselines
1.RA3046(17June1961)
DetermineappropriatepointsoftheoutermostIslandsofthearchipelago,thenconnectthembymeans
ofastraightlineuntilallislandsaresurroundedorenclosedbytheimaginarystraightlines.
"ThebaselinesfromwhichtheterritorialseaofthePhilippinesisdeterminedconsistofstraight
linesjoiningappropriatepointsoftheoutermostislandsofthearchipelago."(fifthwhereasclause.)

2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968). Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the
territorialseaofthePhilippineArchipelagoasprovidedinthisActiswithoutprejudicetothedelineationofthe
baselinesoftheterritorialseaaroundtheterritoryofSabah,situatedinNorthBorneo,overwhichtheRepublic
ofthePhilippineshasacquireddominionandsovereignty.
Usesofthebaseline:
a.Determinewhatisinternalwater(allwatersinsidethebaseline,whetherornotmorethan12miles
fromtheshore).
b.Determinethe200mileEEZ.
c.ArchipelagicDoctrine
Thebasicconceptofanarchipelagoisthatbodyofwaterstuddedwithislands,ortheislandssurrounded
withwater,isviewedasaunityofislands and waters togetherformingone unit. Thisisincontrasttoa
continentwhichisasinglemassofland.
Themainpurposeofthearchipelagicdoctrineistoprotecttheterritorialinterestsofanarchipelago.If
wefollowtheoldruleofinternationallaw,itispossiblethatbetweenislands,e.g.BoholandSiquijor,duetothe
morethan24miledistancebetweenthe2islands,theremaybehighseas.Thus,foreignvesselsmayjustenter
anytimeatwill,posingdangertothesecurityoftheState.Accordingtothedoctrine,eventhesebodiesofwater
withinthebaseline, regardlessofbreadth,formpartofthearchipelago andarethusconsidered asinternal
waters.
The archipelagic doctine has a twofold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security.
(Barlongay.)
Thearchipelagicdoctrineistheprinciplethatitisanintegratedunit;everythingwithinitcomprisesthe
archipelago.(ibid.)

TheConstitutionalprovisionsembodyingthisdoctrineare:
1."archipelago,withalltheislandandwatersembracedtherein"
Anarchipelagoisabodyofwater,studdedwithislands.
2."thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessofthebreadth
anddimensions,formpartofinternalwater"
Thefollowingprovisionsarereallysuperfluous:
1."terrestrial,fluvialandaerialdomains"
(becauseland,waterandairspacealreadyformpartofanarchipelago)
2."territorialsea,seabed,subsoil,insularshelves,othersubmarineareas"
"Territorialsea"meanswateroutsidethebaselineextendingupto12miles.
"Internalwater"referstowaterwithinthebaseline.
"Insularshelf"meansthelandwhichissubmergedunderwaterwhichmayextendbeyond12milesas
longasitisnotmorethan300ft.deep.Itisalsoknownasintercontinentalshelf.(Barlongay.)

2.OtherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction
PD1596(11June1978)
ClaimstheKalayaanGroupofIslandsaspartofPhilippineterritoryonthebasisofhistoricrightsand
legaltitle.
Theclaimwasmade"byreasonofhistory,indispensableneed,andeffectiveoccupationandcontrol
establishedinaccordancewithinternationallaw.xxx"

3.Theterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,theinsularshelvesandothersubmarineareas

4.ExclusiveEconomicZone
PD1599(11June1978). Thereisestablishedanexclusiveeconomiczoneextending"toadistanceof
twohundrednauticalmilesbeyondandfromthebaselinesfromwhichtheterritorialseaismeasured.Provided,

That,wheretheouterlimitsofthezoneasthusdeterminedoverlaptheexclusiveeconomiczoneofanadjacent
orneighboringstate,thecommonboundariesshallbedeterminedbyagreementwiththestateconcernedorin
accordancewithpertinentgenerallyrecognizedprinciplesorinternationallawondelimitation."(Sec.1thereof.)
Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and
overflight,thelayingofsubmarinecablesandpipelines,andotherinternationallylawfulusesofthesearelating
tonavigationandcommunications.(Sec.4thereof.)

Purposes:
1.Sovereignrightstoexplore,exploit,conserveandmanagethenaturalresources,livingornonliving,
renewableornonrenewableoftheseabed,subsoil,andsuperadjacentwaters.
Economicexploitationandexplorationoftheresourcesofthezonesuchastheproductionofenergy
fromthewater,currentsandwinds.
2.Exclusiverightsandjurisdictionwithrepecttotheestablishmentandutilizationofartificialislands,
offshore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the
preventionandcontrolofpollutionandscientificresearch.
3.Suchotherrightsasarerecognizedbyinternationallaw.
Otherstatesareprohibitedfromusingthezoneto:
1.Exploreorexploitanyresources;
2.Carryoutanysearch,excavationordrillingoperations;
3.Conductanyresearch;
4.Constructoroperateanyartificialisland,offshoreterminal,installation,orotherstructure;
5.Performanyactivitywhichiscontraryto,orinderogationof,thesovereignrightsandjurisdiction
hereinprovided.
Otherstatesareallowedtousethezonefor:
1.Navigationandoverflight;
2.Layingofsubmarinecableandpipelines;
3.Otherlawfulusesrelatedtonavigationandcommunication.

IncaseofoverlappingofEEZs,thecommonboundariesaretobedeteminedby(i)agreementand(ii)
internationalrulesondelimitations.

UNConventionontheLawoftheSea(30April1982.)

Theexclusiveeconomiczonewhichshallnotextendbeyond200nauticalmilesfrombaselinesfrom
whichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasured,isrecognizedintheUNCLOS,ofwhichthePhilippinesisa
signatory.Itsconceptisthatalthoughitisnotpartoftheterritory,exclusiveeconomicbenefitisreservedfor
thecountry.

B.People
1.Threemeaningsoftheword"People"
Theword"people"isusedinatleastthreesensesintheConstitution:
a."People"asInhabitants
Art.XIII,Section1.TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthat
protectandenhancetherightofallthe people tohumandignity,reducesocial,economic,andpolitical
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
commongood.

Art.II,Section15.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstill
healthconsciousnessamongthem.
Section16.TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthful
ecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature.
Art.III,Section2.Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects
againstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,
xxx
QuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1963), infra. Therightoftheanindividualtobe
secureinhispersonisguaranteedbytheConstitution.UnderourConstitution,thesameisdeclaredapopular
rightofthepeopleand,ofcourse,indisputablyappliestobothcitizensandforeignersinthiscountry.

b.PeopleasCitizens

Preamble.We,thesovereignFilipinopeopleimploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuilda
just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posteritythe blessings of independence anddemocracy under therule of lawanda regime of truth,
justice,freedom,love,equalityandpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.
Art.II,Sec.1.ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthe
peopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.
Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
GovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,all"citizens"may
berequiredtorenderpersonalmilitaryorcivilservice.
Art.III,Sec.7.Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecog
nized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertinenttoofficialacts,transactions,or
decisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeafforded
thecitizenssubjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.

c.PeopleasElectors
Art.VII,Sec.4. ThePresidentandVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthe people
xxx.
Art.XVI,Sec.2.TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem,
oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsof
thepeople.Suchlawshalltakeeffectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the
PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,
whenCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythe people inanationalreferendum
heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparty.
2.Citizenship
a.Whoarecitizens
Art.IV,Sec.1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
1)ThosewhoarecitizenofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheConstitution;
2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines;
3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipupon

reachingtheageofmajority;and
4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Thesecitizensareclassifiableinto(i)naturalborncitizens(covering#'s1,2,and3)and(ii)naturalized
citizens(covering#4).

b.ElectionofPhilippinecitizenship
Com.ActNo.625 (June7,1941.) ANACTPROVIDINGTHEMANNERINWHICHTHEOPTIONTO ELECT
PHILIPPINECITIZENSHIPSHALLBEDECLAREDBYAPERSONWHOSEMOTHERISAFILIPINOCITIZEN

Section1.TheoptiontoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithsubsection(4),section1,ArticleIV
[1935Constitution:ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,
electPhilippinecitizenship]shallbeexpressedinastatementtobesignedandsworntobythepartyconcerned
beforeanyofficerauthorizedtoadministeroaths,andshallbefiledwiththenearestcivilregistry.Thesaidparty
shallaccompanytheaforesaidstatementwiththeoathofallegiancetotheConstitutionandtheGovernmentofthe
Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States (now officials of Philippine Embassy or
Consulate)authorizedtoadministeroaths,andheshallforwardsuchstatementtogetherwithhisoathofallegiance,
totheCivilRegistryofManila.

Note:Therightofelectionpermittedunderthe1987ConstitutionisavailableonlytothoseborntoFilipino
mothersunderthe1935Constitutionwho,hadthatcharternotbeenchanged,wouldhavebeenabletoelect
Philippinecitizenshipuponattainingmajorityage.ThatrightisretainedforthemunderArticleIV,Section1
(3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present
constitutionasshewouldbeconsideredaFilipinocitizenatbirth.

Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,199SCRA692(1991)

F:
PetitionersBalingitandCoandprivaterespondentOngwereamongthecandidateswhoviedforthepositionof
representativeinthe2ndlegislativedistrictofNorthernSamarintheMay1987election.Ongwasproclaimedthewinner.
PetitionersfiledelectionprotestwiththeHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunalagainstOngontheground
thatOngisnotanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesandnotaresidentofthe2nddistrictofSamar.HRETruledinfavor
ofOng.

ISSUE:W/NOngisanaturalborncitizenastoentitlehimtorunascongressman.
RULING:YES,Ongisanaturalborncitizen.
Underthe1987Constitution:
"Sec.1.Theff.arecitizensofthePhil.:
xxx
3)Thosebornbefore17January1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipupon
reachingtheageofmajority;and
4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
Sec. 2. Natural borncitizens arethose who arecitizens of thePhil. from birth without having to
performanyacttoacquireorperfecttheircitizenship.ThosewhoelectPhil.citizenshipinaccordancewithpar.
3,Sec.1hereofshallbedeemednaturalborncitizens."
TheCourtinterpretsSec.1par.3asapplyingnotonlytothosewhoelectPhil.citizenship after2
February1987butalsothosewho,havingbeenbornofFilipinomothers,electedcitizenshipbeforethatdate,as
in the case of Ong. This ruling finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The
provisionwasframedtocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhereonebornofaFilipinofatherandanalienmother
wasautomaticallygrantedthestatusofanaturalborncitizenwhileonebornofaFilipinomotherandanalien
fatherwouldstillhavetoelectPhil.citizenship.Ifonesoelected,underearlierlaws,hewasnotconferredthe
statusofanaturalborncitizen.
ThereisnoquestionthatOng'smotherwasanaturalbornFilipinaatthetimeofhermarriagewithJose
OngChuan,aChinesewhofiledanapplicationfornaturalizationandwasgrantedone.Crucialtothiscaseis
whetherornotOngelectedorchosetobeaFilipinocitizeninordertocomewithinthepurviewoftheabove
quotedconstitutionalprovision.
ToexpectOngtohaveformallyorinwritingelectedcitizenshipwhenhecameofageistoaskforthe
unnaturalandunnecessaryforthecourtisoftheopinionthatOngwasalreadyacitizen.Notonlywashis
motheranaturalborncitizenbuthisfatherhadbeennaturalizedwhentherespondentwasonlynineyearsold.
Hecouldnothavedivinedwhenhecameofagethatin1973and1987,theConstitutionwouldbeamendedto
requirehimtohavefiledaswornstatementin1969electingcitizenshipinspiteofhisalreadyhavingbeena
citizensince1957.AnelectionofPhilippinecitizenshippresupposesthatthepersonelectingisanalienorhis
statusisdoubtfulbecauseheisanationaloftwocountries.ThereisnodoubtinthiscaseaboutOng'sFilipino
nationalitywhenheturned21.
Therearecaseswhichdefine"election"asbothaformalandaninformalprocess.InthecaseofInRe
Mallare,theCourtheldthattheexerciseoftherightofsuffrageandtheparticipation inelectionexercises
constituteapositiveactofelectionofPhil.citizenship.Inthiscase,Ongdidnotmerelyexercisehisrightof
suffrage.HehasestablishedhislifehereinthePhil.

OngwasbornintheruraltownofSamarwheretherearenoalienenclavesandnoracialdistinctions.

Theresp.haslivedthelifeofaFilipinosincebirth.Hisfatherappliedfornaturalizationwhenthechildwasstill
asmallboy.Onghasworkedinasensitivepositioninagovernmentagency. Hisprofession(CPA)requires
citizenship fortakingtheexaminations andgettingalicense.Hehasparticipated inpolitical exercises asa
FilipinoandhasalwaysconsideredhimselfaFilipino.Thereisnothingtoindicateanytingeofalienness.The
massofvotersofN.SamararefullyawareofOng'sparentage.Theyvotedbyoverwhelmingnumberstohave
himrepresenttheminCongress.Becauseofhisactssincechildhood,theyhaveconsideredhimaFilipino.
TheHREThadaninterestingviewastohowOngelectedcitizenship.Itobservedthat"whenOngwas
onlynineyearsold,hisfatherbecameanaturalizedFilipino.Sec.15oftheRevisedNaturalizationActsquarely
appliesitsbenefittohimforhewasthenaminorresidinginthecountry.Concededly,itwasthelawitselfthat
hadalreadyelectedPhil.citizenshipforOngbydeclaringhimassuch.
ThepetitionerscontendthatOng'sfatherwasnotvalidlynaturalizedbecauseofhisprematuretakingof
theoathofcitizenship.ThepetitionersquestionthecitizenshipofOng'sfatherthroughacollateralapproach.
Thiscannotbedone.Inourjurisdiction,anattackonaperson'scitizenshipmayonlybedonethroughadirect
actionforitsnullity.MRM.
xxxThefilingofaswornstatementorformaldeclarationisarequirementforthosewhostillhaveto
elect citizenship. FOR THOSE ALREADY FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberatechoicewhichcannotbelessbinding.AnyelectionofPhilippinecitizenshiponthepartofprivatere
spondentOngwouldnotonlyhavebeensuperfluousbutwouldalsohaveresultedinabsurdityconsideringthatit
wasthelawitselfthathadalreadyelectedPhilippinecitizenshipforhim.
Dissenting:
Ong is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, he having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinesecitizenshipofhisfatheratthetimeofhisbirth.Underthe1935Constitutionwhichwasinforceatthe
timeofOng'sbirth,onlythosewhosefatherswerecitizensofthePhilippineswereconsideredFilipinocitizens.
ThosewhosemotherswerecitizensofthePhilippineshadtoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheage
ofmajority,inordertobeconsideredFilipinocitizens.
c.Naturalborncitizens
Art.IV,Section2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirth
withouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship. Thosewhoelect
Philippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithparagraph(3),Section1hereofshallbedeemednaturalborn
citizens.

TheprovisiongrantingnaturalbornstatuseventothosewhowerebornofFilipinomothersbefore17
January1973butelectedPhilippinecitizenshipafterthatdateismeanttocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhere
onebornundersimilarcircumstancesbutmadetheelectionbefore17January1973isgrantedthestatusof
naturalborncitizenbythe1973Constitution.Simplybecausetherewasnodefinitionofanaturalborncitizen
underthe1935Constitution,thatonewhomadetheelectionaftertheeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionwas

notconferredsuchstatus.Thedefinitionofanaturalborncitizenunderthe1973Constitution,thereforemadea
childofFilipinomotherandalienfather'srightdependsonthefleetingaccidentoftime,andresultedintwo
kindsofcitizensmadeupofessentiallythesamemembers.
Atthesametime,however,thosewhoelectedpriorto17January1973couldnotbeplacedinthesame
footingasthosewhomadetheelectionafterthatdate,becausetheformeralreadyhada"vestedright"totheir
citizenshipwhichcouldnotbediminishedbythe1973Constitution.
Theremedyistoplacethelatterinthesamefootingastheformer.Thus,underthe1987Constitution,
thisaccidentalanomalynolongerexists.
Toillustrate: IfXwasbornandelectedbefore17January1973,hisstatusunderthe1973and1987
Constitutionsisthatofanaturalborncitizen,becausealthoughhehadtoperformanacttoperfecthisciti
zenship,hecouldnototherwisebeclassifiedsincetherewasnodefinitionofnaturalborncitizensinthe1935
Constitution.
IfXwasbornbeforeandelectedafter17January1973,whetherbeforeorafter2February1987,hewas
notanaturalborncitizenunderthe1973Constitution.Ifnotfortheprovisointhe1987Constitution,hewould
nothavebeendeemednaturalborncitizeneither.
Inturnthedefinitionof"naturalborncitizen"asonewhoissuchfrom(notat)birth(continuouslyupto
the time his citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et.al., under the 1935
Constitution.
Havingthestatusofanaturalborncitizenisimportantforthepurposeofcertainpoliticalandeconomic
rightsopenonlytosuchcitizens.
a)Political:Qualificationtorunforthefollowingposts:

Whomustbenaturalborncitizens:

(1)President
Art.VII,Sec.2
(2)VicePresident
Art.VII,Sec.3
(3)MembersofCongress
Art.VI,Secs.3and6
(4)JusticesoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourts
Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)
(5)Ombudsmanandhisdeputies
Art.XI,Sec.8
(6)ConstitutionalCommissions
Art.IX,B,Sec.1(1)
Art.IX,C,Sec.1(1)
Art.IX,D,Sec.1(1)
(7)MembersoftheCentralMonetaryAuthority
Art,XII,Sec.20
(8)MembersoftheCHR
Art.XIII,Sec.17(2)
(CommissiononHumanRights)

Formernaturalborncitizensastransfereesofprivatelands.
b)Economic
Art. XII, Sec. 8 xxx [A]naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenshipmaystillbeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.

Thefollowingarenaturalborncitizens:
1)Thosewhoarecitizens ofthePhilippines atthetime oftheadoption ofthisConstitution (asof2
February1987).
a)ThosewhoarecitizensundertheTreatyofParis
UnderArt.9oftheTreatyofParis,thecivilandpoliticalstatusoftheinhabitantsofthePhilippineswas
tobedeterminedbytheUSCongress.
Pursuanttothisprovisioninthetreaty,theUSCongresspassedthe PhilippineBillof1July1902,
Section4ofwhichdefinedwhothecitizensofthePhilippineswere:
"TheinhabitantsofthePhilippinesresidingthereinwhoweresubjectsofSpainon11April1899,and
continuingtoresidetherein,aswellastheirchildrenbornsubsequentthereto."
Thecutoffdateof11April1899wasthedateof"exchangeofinstrumentsofratification"betweenthe
USSenateandSpain,orthedateofratificationoftheTreatyofParis.
Thepeninsularesweregivenaperiodof18monthstoindicateiftheychooseFilipinoorSpanishcitizen
ship,byfilingtheirelectionwiththeCFI.
ThissameprovisionwasreembodiedintheJonesLawof29August1916.

b)Thosedeclaredcitizensbyjudicialdeclarationapplyingthejussoliprinciple,beforethe1957
caseofTioTiamvRepublic.
InRoavCommissionerofCustoms(1912),duringtheregimeofthePhilippineBillof1902,Roa,who
wasborninthePhilippinesin1889byaChinesefatherandFilipinomother,wasdeclaredbythecourttobea
citizenbyjussoli.
InPazChuavSecretaryofLabor(1939),duringtheregimeofthe1935Constitution,PazChuawhowas
borninTarlacin1914ofChinesefatherandFilipinomother,wasnotdeclaredacitizen.TheSCheld,without
alludingtotheRoacase,thatthejussoliwasneveradoptedinthePhilippines.

In TorresvTanChim(1940),Tan,whowasinthePhilippinesin1893ofChinesefatherandFilipino
mother,wasdeclaredacitizen.AccordingtoJ.Laurel,theprincipleofjussolistillapplied.The1934Concon
wasawareoftheRoarulinganddidnotintendtooverruleit.
InTanChongvSecretaryofLaborandLamSweeSangvSecretaryofLabor(1947),acasedecided
duringtheregimeoftheRepublicuponamotionforreconsiderationofaprewardecision,Tan,whowasborn
in1915,andLam,whowasbornin1900,bothinthePhilippines,ofChinesefatherandFilipinomother,were
notdeclaredcitizens. AccordingtoJ.Padilla,the1935Constitutionneveradoptedthe jussoli principle;the
merefactofbirthinthePhilippinesdoesnotconfercitizenshiponaperson.
In TalarocvUy (1950),consideringhisserviceduringthewarandhishavingbeenelectedmayorin
Misamis,wasdeclaredbytheSCacitizen"simplyduetobirth",withoutmentionofjussoliorjussanguinis.
Finally,in TioTamvRepublic (1957),theSCtriedtoresolvetheflipfloprulingsbystatingthatwe
followonlyjussanguinisbutthatthosewhowerejudiciallydeclaredcitizensonthebasisofjussolipriortothis
casewouldbeconsideredcitizens.Thisisthefinalwordonthematter.
Itwouldbeworthytonotethattheflipflopindecisioncanbeexplainedbythedateofbirthofthe
applicantineachcase.Thosebornbefore11April1899weretheonestowhomjussoliwasapplied,forthey
verywellwerecitizensundertheTreatyofParis.

c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine
Commission).

d)Thosewhowerecitizensunderthe1935Constitution.
1)ThosewhowerecitizensatthetimeofadoptionoftheConstitution(15November1935,thedateof
theinaugurationoftheCommonwealthgovernment).
2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesofforeignparent,whobeforetheadoptionoftheConstitutionhadbeen
electedtopublicofficeinthePhilippines.
This is the socalled "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention.Therulewasadoptedtoavoidtheabsurdityofthesituation.
Theruleonlyappliestoelectivepositions,notappointiveones.
In ChiongbianvdeLeon,theSCheldthatifoneisconsideredacitizenundertheCaramrule,his
childrenwouldalsobeconsideredcitizens,butunderthethirdcategory(thosewhosefathersarecitizens)
3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,upon,reachingtheageofmajority,elected
Philippinecitizenship.
Itwasonlybeginning17January1973whenchildrenofFilipinomothersbecamecitizenswithoutneed
ofelection. ChildrenbornbeforethisdateofFilipinomotherandalienfathershadan"inchoatecitizenship"
untiltheyelecteduponreaching21years.
5)Thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

e)Thosewhoarecitizensunderthe1973Constitution.
1)Thosewhoarecitizensasof17January1973,thedateofeffectivityofthe1973Constitution.
2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
Thatis,thosebornonorafter17January1973ofFilipinofatherorFilipinomother.
3)ThosewhoelectedPhilippinecitizenshippursuanttothe1935Constitution

Thatis,thosebornbefore17January1973ofFilipinomothersbutreachedtheageofmajorityand
electedPhilippinecitizenshiponorafter17January1973.
Notethatifonewasborn,reachedtheageofmajorityandelectedPhilippinecitizenship before17
January 1973, then he would be a citizen under e1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the 1973
Constitution).
Ontheotherhand,ifonewasborn,reached21years,butdidnotorfailedtoelectbefore17January
1973,thenhelosthiscitizenshipthen.
4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

2.)ThosebornofFilipinofathersorFilipinomothers(after17January1973).

3.)Thosebornbefore17January1973ofFilipinomotherswhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreaching
theageofmajority.
Thiscasearoseunderthe1935Constitution,childrenofFilipinomothersdidnotautomaticallybecome
citizens.Theyhadan"inchoatecitizenship"duringtheirminority,andbecamefullpledgedcitizensonlyupon
electionattheageofmajority.

Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became
citizens.Thisprovisionthencoversthosechildrenborn,beforetheeffectivityofthe1973Constitution.
ByJanuary17,1994,thisprovisionwouldhavenoapplicationanymore,sincethelastofthoseborn
before17January1973wouldhavereachedtheageofmajoritybythen.

CaseA:AFilipinowomanmarriedB,anAmericanin1961.ThemarriagemadeAanAmericancitizen
(whichunderCA63,strippedherofherPhilippinecitizenship,themarriagehavingbeencelebratedbefore17
January1973).AandBlivedintheUSsincethenandin1962,begotC,whowasautomaticallyanAmerican
citizenbyjussoliandjussanguinis.
In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in Cu v
Republic and VillahermosavCID,inordertoelectPhilippinecitizenship,atleastforelectionpurposes,itis
enoughthat(1)theperson'smotherwasaFilipinoatthetimeofhermarriagetothealienfather,evenifshe
subsequentlylosehercitizenshipbyvirtueofthemarriageand(2)thepersonbeachildofthatmarriage,forhim
toelectPhilippinecitizenship.
IfCwantstorunforCongress,isheconsideredanaturalbornFilipino?Underthe1973Constitution,
no.Butunderthe1987Constitution,yes.
Notethatifhewerebornafter17January1973,thechildwouldnotevenbeaFilipino.

d. NaturalizedCitizens,RevisedNaturalizationLaw(Com.ActNo.473,effective
June17,1939.)
4.)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.(namelyCA473,RevisedNaturalizationLaw)(Art.
IV,Sec.1(4))
Whoarequalifiedtobenaturalized
Qualifications(Sec.2,CA473)
A.Age
1)Hemustnotbelessthan21yearsoldatthedateofhearing.
Barlongay:Whenthelawusesthephase"ageofmajority,"use18yearsold,butnotwhenitusesthe
phrase"notlessthan21yearsold.
B.Residence

2)HemusthaveresidedinthePhilippinesforacontinuousperiodofnotlessthantenyears.

C.Character
3.) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution,andmusthaveconductedhimselfinanirreproachableconductduringtheentireperiodofhis
residenceinthePhilippinesinhisrelationwiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityin
whichheisliving.
D.Property
4.) HemustownrealestateinthePhilippinesworthnotlessthanP5,000ormusthavesomeknown
lucrativetrade,professionorlawfuloccupation.
(Test:Canhesupporthimselfandhisfamily?)
E.Education
5.)Mustbeabletospeakandwrite(notreadandwrite)FilipinoorEnglish,andaprincipaldialect(as
protantomodifiedbythe1987Constitution,sincethelawitselfspokeofEnglishorSpanish,andaprincipal
dialect).Thus,adeafandmuteisdisqualified,Orest

offvRepublic

Art.XIV,Sec.7. Forpurposesofcommunicationandinstruction,theofficiallanguagesofthe
PhilippinesareFilipinoand,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,English. Theregionallanguagesarethe
auxiliaryofficiallanguagesintheregionsandshallserveasauxiliarymediaofinstructiontherein.xxx
6.)Hemusthaveenrolledhisminorchildrenofschoolageinanyofthepublicschoolsorprivate
schoolsrecognizedbytheBureauofPrivateSchoolsofthePhilippines,wherePhilippinehistory,government
andcivicsaretaughtorprescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidencein
thePhilippinesrequiredofhimpriortothehearingofhispetitionfornaturalizationasPhilippinecitizen.

Whenisthetenyearresidencerequirementreducedtofive(5)years?
Com.ActNo.473,sec.3.
Sec.3.Specialqualifications.TheTenyearsofcontinuousresidencerequiredunderthesecondconditionof
thelastprecedingsectionshallbeunderstoodasreducedtofiveyearsforanypetitionerhavinganyofthefollowing
qualifications:
(1) HavinghonorablyheldofficeundertheGovernmentofthePhilippinesorunderthatofanyofthe
provinces,cities,municipalities,orpoliticalsubdivisions.(whichwasallowedbeforebythe1935Constitution,no
distinctionwhetherappointiveorelectiveposts.)
(2)HavingestablishedanewindustryorintroducedausefulinventioninthePhilippines..
(3)BeingmarriedtoaFilipinowoman

If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative
proceedingforthecancellationofherAlienCertificateofRegistration,uponproofofmarriageandaccordingto
theholdinginMoyYamLim,proofofnondisqualification.Thesearetheonlyrequirementsbecauseipsofacto,
shebecameaFilipinoherselfbymarriage.

(4) Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
establishedfortheexclusiveinstructionofchildrenofpersonsofaparticularnationalityorrace,inanyofthe
branchesofeducationorindustryforaperiodofnotlessthantwoyears.
(5)HavingbeenborninthePhilippines.

Whoaredisqualifiedtobenaturalized?
CA473,Sec.4
Theapplicantmustnotonlypossessthequalifications,hemustnothaveanyofthedisqualificationsset
bylaw.
Section4.Whoaredisqualified.ThefollowingcannotbenaturalizedasPhilippinecitizens:
(a)Personsopposedtoorganizedgovernmentoraffiliatedwithanyassociationorgroupofpersonswho
upholdandteachdoctrinesopposingallorganizedgovernments;
(b)Personsdefendingorteachingthenecessityorproprietyofviolence,personalassault,orassassination
forthesuccessandpredominanceoftheirideas;
(c)Polygamists,orbelieversinthepracticeofpolygamy;
(d)Personsconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude.

(Moralturpitudeinvolvesdishonesty,depravity. Apropensitytobreakthelaw,evenjusttrafficlaws,
constitutemoraldepravity.Whilemurderbeingacrimeofpassiondoesnotinvolvemoralturpitude,theftand
estafado.)
(e)Personssufferingfrommentalalienationorincurablecontagiousdisease;
(f) Personswho,duringtheperiodoftheirresidenceinthePhilippines,havenotmingledsociallywith
Filipinos,orwhohavenotevincedasinceredesiretolearnandembracethecustoms,traditions,andidealsofthe
Filipinos;
(g)CitizensorsubjectsofnationswithwhomthePhilippinesisatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwar;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.

DeclarationofIntention
Com.ActNo.473,sec.5.
Sec.5. Declarationofintention. OneyearpriortothefilingofhispetitionforadmissiontoPhilippine
citizenship,theapplicantforPhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththeOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,adeclaration
underoaththatitisbonafidehisintentiontobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines.Suchdeclarationshallsetforth

thename,age,occupation,personaldescription,placeofbirth,lastforeignresidenceandallegiance,thedateof
arrival,thenameofthevesseloraircraft,ifany,inwhichhecametothePhilippines,andtheplaceofresidencein
thePhilippinesatthetimeofmakingthedeclaration.Nodeclarationshallbevaliduntillawfulentryforpermanent
residencehasbeenestablishedandacertificateshowingthedate,place,andmannerofhisarrivalhasbeenissued.
Thedeclarantmustalsostatethathehasenrolledhisminorchildren,ifany,inanyofthepublicschoolsorprivate
schoolsrecognizedbytheBureauofPrivateSchoolsofthePhilippines,wherePhilippinehistory,governmentand
civicsaretaughtorprescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidenceinthe
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each
declarantmustfurnishtwophotographsforhimself.

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the
Philippinesandhavereceivedtheirprimaryandsecondaryeducationinpublicschoolsorthoserecognizedbythe
Governmentandnotlimitedtoanyraceornationality,andthosewhohaveresidedcontinuouslyinthePhilippines
foraperiodofthirtyyearsormorebeforefilingtheirapplication,maybenaturalizedwithouthavingtomakea
declarationofintentionuponcomplyingwiththeotherrequirementsofthisAct. Tosuchrequirementsshallbe
addedthatwhichestablishesthattheapplicanthasgivenprimaryandsecondaryeducationtoallhischildreninthe
publicschoolsorinprivateschoolsrecognizedbytheGovernmentandnotlimitedtoanyraceornationality.The
sameshallbeunderstoodapplicablewithrespecttothewidowandminorchildrenofanalienwhohasdeclaredhis
intentiontobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines,anddiesbeforeheisactuallynaturalized.

If one who is not exempted, fails to file, or files an invalid declaration of intention, he can be
denaturalizedanytimethroughdenaturalizationproceedings.

Procedure
Com.Act.No.473,Secs.712
Section7.Petitionforcitizenship.AnypersondesiringtoacquirePhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththe
competentcourt,apetitionintriplicate,accompaniedbytwophotographsofthepetitioner,settingforthhisname
andsurname;hispresentandformerplacesofresidence;hisoccupation;theplaceanddateofhisbirth;whether
singleormarriedandthefatherofchildren,thename,age,birthplaceandresidenceofthewifeandofeachofthe
children;theapproximatedateofhisorherarrivalinthePhilippines,thenameoftheportofdebarkation,and,if
heremembersit,thenameoftheshiponwhichhecame;adeclarationthathehasthequalificationsrequiredby
thisAct,specifyingthesame,andthatheisnotdisqualifiedfornaturalizationundertheprovisionsofthisAct;that
he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the
PhilippinesfromthedateofthefilingofthepetitionuptothetimeofhisadmissiontoPhilippinecitizenship.The
petitionmustbesignedbytheapplicantinhisownhandwritingandbesupportedbytheaffidavitofatleasttwo
crediblepersons,statingthattheyarecitizensofthePhilippinesandpersonallyknowthepetitionertobearesident
of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable,andthatsaidpetitionerhasintheiropinionallthequalificationsnecessarytobecomecitizenofthe
PhilippinesandisnotinanywaydisqualifiedundertheprovisionsofthisAct.Thepetitionshallalsosetforththe
namesandpostofficeaddressesofsuchwitnessesasthepetitionermaydesiretointroduceatthehearingofthe
case.Thecertificateofarrival,andthedeclarationofintentionmustbemadepartofthepetition.

Section.8. Competentcourt. TheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichthepetitionerhas

residedatleastoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthepetitionshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionto
hearthepetition.
Section9. Notificationandappearance.Immediatelyuponthefilingofapetition,itshallbethedutyof
theclerkofthecourttopublishthesameatpetitioner'sexpense,onceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeks,inthe
OfficialGazette,andinoneofthenewspapersofgeneralcirculationintheprovincewherethepetitionerresides,
andtohavecopiesofsaidpetitionandageneralnoticeofthehearingpostedinapublicandconspicuousplaceinhis
officeorinthebuildingwheresaidofficeislocated,settingforthinsuchnoticethename,birthplaceandresidence
ofthepetitioner,thedateandplaceofhisarrivalinthePhilippines,thenamesofthewitnesseswhomthepetitioner
proposestointroduceinsupportofhispetition,andthedateofthehearingofthepetition,whichhearingshallnot
beheldwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthelastpublicationofthenotice.Theclerkshall,assoonaspossible,
forwardcopiesofthepetition,thesentence,thenaturalizationcertificate,andotherpertinentdatatotheOfficeof
thePresident,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,theProvincialCommanderofthePhilippineNationalPoliceofthe
provinceandthemunicipaljudgeofthemunicipalitywhereinthepetitionerresides.
Section.10.Hearingofthepetition.Nopetitionshallbeheardwithinthethirty(30)daysprecedingany
election. The hearing shall bepublic,and theSolicitorGeneral,either himselforthrough his delegateorthe
provincialfiscalconcerned,shallappearonbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesatalltheproceedingsandat
thehearing. If,afterthehearing,thecourtbelieves,inviewoftheevidencetaken,thatthepetitionerhasallthe
qualificationsrequiredby,andnoneofthedisqualificationsspecifiedinthisActandhascompliedwithallrequisites
hereinestablished,itshallorderthepropernaturalizationcertificatetobeissuedandtheregistrationofthesaid
naturalizationcertificateinthepropercivilregistryasrequiredinsectiontenofActNumberedThereethousand
sevenhundredfiftythree.
Section11. Appeal.Thefinalsentencemay,attheinstanceofeitheroftheparties,beappealedtothe
SupremeCourt.
Section12. IssuanceoftheCertificateofNaturalization.If,afterthelapseofthirtydaysfromandafter
thedateonwhichthepartieswerenotifiedofthedecisionoftheCourt,noappealhasbeenfiled,orif,uponappeal,
thedecisionofthecourthasbeenconfirmedbytheSupremeCourt,andthesaiddecisionhasbecomefinal,the
clerkofthecourtwhichheardthepetitionshallissuetothepetitioneranaturalizationcertificatewhichshall,
among other things, state the following: The file number of the petition, the number of the naturalization
certificate,thesignatureofthepersonnaturalizedaffixedinthepresenceoftheclerkofthecourt,thepersonal
circumstancesofthepersonnaturalized,thedatesonwhichhisdeclarationofintentionandpetitionwerefiled,the
dateofthedecisiongrantingthepetition,andthenameofthejudgewhorenderedthedecision.Aphotographof
thepetitionerwiththedrysealaffixedtheretoofthecourtwhich grantedthepetition, must beaffixedtothe
certificate.
Beforethenaturalizationcertificateisissued,thepetitionershall,inopencourt,takethefollowingoath:
"I_________________________________, solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and particularly to the
___________________________ofwhichatthistimeIamasubjectorcitizen;thatIwillsupportanddefendthe
ConstitutionofthePhilippinesandthatIwillobeythelaws,legalordersanddecreespromulgatedbytheduly

constitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandthatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarily
withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
SohelpmeGod."

a.DeclarationofintentionfiledwiththeOSGoneyearbeforeactualapplication.
b.FilingofpetitionfornaturalizationwiththeRTCoftheprovinceinwhichtheapplicantisaresidentforat
leastoneyear.
c.Hearing,exceptwithin30daysbeforeanelection.TheStateisrepresentedbytheSolicitorGeneralorbythe
fiscalinhisbehalf.Twowitnessestotestifyonthecharacteroftheapplicantarepresented.
d.Decision.AppealofthedecisionoftheRTCmaybemadetoSC,pursuanttoRA530,amendingSec.17of
theJudiciaryActof1948.(UnderBP129,appealistotheCA).
e.Decisionbecomesfinalbutnotexecutory,thirty(30)daysafternoticeofthedecisionisreceivedbythe
parties.ThenoticeofthedecisionmustbereceivedbytheOSG;copyfurnishedtothefiscalisnotsufficientto
starttherunningofthe30dayperiod.
Afavorabledecisionbecomesexecutoryonlyafter2yearsfromthefinalityofthedecision.Itshallbecome
executoryonlyaftertheperiodof2yearsduringwhichthepetitionershallcontinuetobeunderprobation,asit
were,sothegovernmentcanbedoublysureheisentitledtobenaturalizedasacitizenofthePhilippines.
(RepublicAct530,Section1)
f.Summaryhearingaftertwoyears,whichisreallyacontinuationofthepreviousproceedings,toprovethat:
i)HedidnotleaveRPduringthe2yearperiodofprobation;
ii)Hedevotedhimselftolawfulcalling;
iii)Hewasnotconvictedofanyoffenseofviolationofgovernmentrules.
iv)Hedidnotcommitanactprejudicialtonationalinterestorinimicaltoagovernmentannounced
policy.
g.OathbeforetheRTC.
h.IssuanceofaCertificateofNaturalizationissuedbytheCourt. (Onlyacertificationisgivenbecausethe
decisiontwoyearsbeforehasgrantedhimhiscitizenship.)
i.CancellationofACRbeforetheCommissionerofImmigrationandDeportation.

"DerivativeNaturalization"(Sec.15)
"xxxAnywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthePhilippines,andwhomight

herselfbelawfullynaturalized,shallbedeemedacitizenofthePhilippines."

Note:Initslatestpronouncementonthisquestion,theSCheldthattheclause"whomightherselfbelawfully
naturalized"shouldbeinterpretedtomeanonlythatthealienwomanmustnotbelaboringunderanyofthe
disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim to Philippine citizenship in
administrativeproceedingsbeforetheimmigrationauthoritiesonlyandwillnothavetofileajudicialactionfor
thispurpose.Sheisnolongerrequiredtoprovethatshepossessesthequalificationsfornaturalization.
Whendecisionexecutory
RepublicActNo.530,sec.1
Sec.1.Theprovisionsofexistinglawsnotwithstanding,nopetitionforPhilippinecitizenshipshallbeheard
bythecourtsuntilaftersixmonthsfromthepublicationoftheapplicationrequiredbylaw,norshallanydecision
grantingtheapplication become executoryuntil aftertwoyearsfrom itspromulgation and after thecourt,on
properhearing,withtheattendanceoftheSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentative,issatisfied,andsofinds,that
duringtheinterveningtimetheapplicanthas(1)notleftthePhilippines,(2)hasdedicatedhimselfcontinuouslytoa
lawfulcallingorprofession,(3) hasnotbeenconvictedofanyoffenseorviolationofGovernmentpromulgated
rules,(4)orcommittedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthenationorcontrarytoanyGovernmentannounced
policies.

Effectonwifeandminorchildren
Com.ActNo.473,sec.15.
Section15.AnywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthePhilippines,andwho
mightherselfbelawfullynaturalizedshallbedeemedacitizenofthePhilippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
consideredcitizensthereof.
Aforeignbornminorchild,ifdwellinginthePhilippinesatthetimeofthenaturalizationoftheparent,
shallautomaticallybecomeaPhilippinecitizenandaforeignbornminorchild,whoisnotinthePhilippinesatthe
timetheparentisnaturalized,shallbedeemedaPhilippinecitizenonlyduringhisminority,unlesshebeginsto
residepermanentlyinthePhilippineswhenstillaminor,inwhichcase,hewillcontinuetobeaPhilippinecitizen
evenafterbecomingofage.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
PhilippinecitizenatthePhilippineConsulateofthecountrywhereheresides,andtotakethenecessaryoathof
allegiance.

EffectofNaturalizationontheWife
Ifthewifeis(i)legallymarriedtothenaturalizedhusband,and(ii)shedoesnotsufferfromanyofthe
disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well. What is required is only an
administrativeproceedingbeforetheCIDforthecancellationofherACRonthegroundthatherhusbandhas

beenrecentlynaturalized.
AccordingtoMoyaLimYao(41SCRA292)ruling,sheneednotprovethequalifications,butonlythat
sheisnotdisqualified.TheproceedingsmayevenbewiththeDepartmentofNaturalResourcesinrelationtoa
grantofconcessionrequiringcitizenship,wherethewifeprovesthatherhusbandhasbecomeaFilipino.

EffectofNaturalizationontheChildren
I.Ifthechildisofage,noeffect.
II.Ifthechildisaminor:
A.IfborninRPautomaticallybecomesacitizenuponthenaturalizationofthefather.
B.Ifbornabroad
1.Ifbeforethenaturalizationofthefather.
a.IfresidinginRPatthetimeofnaturalizationautomaticallybecomesacitizen.
b. If not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered citizen only during his
minority,unlesshetakespermanentresidenceinRPbeforereachingmajorityage.Inotherwords,hecontinues
tobeaFilipinoafterreaching18yearsoldonlyifhedecidestoresideherepermanentlybeforereachingthatage.
2.IfafterthenaturalizationofthefatherConsideredcitizenontheconditionthatuponreachingthe
ageofmajority,hetakesanoathofallegianceinthePhilippineconsulateoftheplacewherehemaybe.Ifhe
failstoregisterhisintenttocontinueasFilipinowithinone(1)yearuponreaching21years,heceasestobea
Filipinocitizen.
Denaturalization
Com.ActNo.473,Sec.18
Section18.Cancellationofnaturalizationcertificateissued.Uponmotionmadeintheproperproceedings
bytheSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentative,orbytheproperprovincialfiscal,thecompetentjudgemaycancelthe
naturalizationcertificateissuedanditsregistrationintheCivilRegistry:
(a)Ifitisshownthatsaidnaturalizationcertificatewasobtainedfraudulentlyorillegally;
(b)Ifthepersonnaturalizedshall,withinthefiveyearsnextfollowingtheissuanceofsaidnaturalization
certificate,returntohisnativecountryortosomeforeigncountryandestablishhispermanentresidencethere:
Provided,thatthefactofthepersonnaturalizedremainingformorethanoneyearinhisnativecountryorthe
countryofhisformernationality,ortwoyearsinanyotherforeigncountry,shallbeconsideredas primafacie
evidenceofhisintentionoftakinguppermanentresidenceinthesame;
(c)Ifthepetitionwasmadeonaninvaliddeclarationofintention;
(d) Ifitisshownthattheminorchildrenofthepersonnaturalizedfailedtograduatefromapublicor
private high schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history,

governmentandcivicsaretaughtaspartoftheschoolcurriculum throughthefaultoftheirparentseitherby
neglectingtosupportthemorbytransferringthemtoanotherschoolorschools. Acertifiedcopyofthedecree
cancellingthenaturalizationcertificateshallbeforwardedbytheclerkoftheCourttotheOfficeofthePresident
andtheSolicitorGeneral;

Notwhentheydroppedoutbecauseofscholasticperformance
(e)Ifitisshownthatthenaturalizedcitizenhasallowedhimselftobeusedasadummyinviolationofthe
ConstitutionalorlegalprovisionrequiringPhilippinecitizenship,asarequisitefortheexercise,useorenjoymentof
aright,franchiseorprivilege.

Procedure:
FiledbytheSolicitorGeneralbeforethesameRTCthatgrantedhisnaturalization,regardlessofwhere
hemayberesidingatthattime.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Republicvs.LiYao(214SCRA748)
F:

Fifteen(15)yearsafterLiYaowasconferredwithFilipinocitizenshipbynaturalization,theRepublicsoughtthe
cancellationthereofonthegroundsof:1)notbeingofgoodmoralcharacterbyhavingamorousrelationswithwomen;2)
nothavingconductedhimselfinanirreproachablemannerindealingwiththedulyconstitutedauthoritiesbyusingnames
otherthanthatauthorized,byresortingtotaxevasionandviolatingtheAntiDummyLaw.Thetrialcourtrelyingsolelyon
thegroundofevasionofthepaymentoflawfultaxesbyunderdeclarationofincomeasreflectedinhisincometaxreturn
for194651,cancelledhisnaturalization.Hencethisappeal.

ISSUE:W/nthecancellationofLiYao'snaturalizationwasvalid.
RULING:Yes.Acertificateofnaturalizationmaybecancelledifitissubsequentlydiscoveredthattheapplicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellationofacertificateofnaturalizationupongroundsorconditionswhicharisesubsequenttothegranting
ofthecertificateofnaturalization.Moreover,anaturalizationproceedingisnotajudicialadversaryproceeding,
thedecisionrenderedthereinnotconstituting resjudicata astoanymatterthatwouldsupportajudgement
cancellingacertificateofnaturalizationonthegroundofillegalorfraudulentprocurementthereof.
Theconcealmentofapplicant'sincometoevadepaymentoflawfultaxesshowsthathismoralcharacter
isnotirreproachable,thusdisqualifyinghimfornaturalization.
Ataxamnestyonlyrelieveshimfromanycivil,criminaloradministrativeliabilityinsofarashistax
caseisconcerned.Itdoesnothavetheeffectofobliteratinghislackofgoodmoralcharacterandirreproachable
conductwhicharegroundsfordenaturalization.MRM.

3.LossandReacquisitionofCitizenship
ArticleIV,Sec.3.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
(referringtoCA63.)
ArticleIV,Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unless
bytheiractoromissiontheyaredeemed,underthelaw(CA63)tohaverenouncedit.
CommmonwealthAct63
Section1.Howcitizenshipmaybelost.AFilipinocitizenmaylosehiscitizenshipinanyofthefollowingways
and/orevents:
(1)Bynaturalizationinaforeigncountry;
(2)Byexpressrenunciationofcitizenshiporexpatriation;
(3)BysubscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlawsofaforeigncountryupon
reachingtheageofmajority;Provided,however,ThataFilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipin
anymannerwhilethePhilippinesisatwarwithanycountry;
(4)Byrenderingservicetooracceptingcommissioninthearmedforcesofaforeigncountry:Provided,
Thattherenderingofserviceto,ortheacceptanceofsuchcommissionin,thearmedforcesofaforeigncountry,and
thetakingofanoathofallegianceincidentthereto,withtheconsentofthePhilippines,shallnotdivestaFilipinoof
hisPhilippinecitizenshipifeitheroftheff.circumstancesispresent:
(a)ThePhilippineshasadefensiveand/oroffensivepactofalliancewiththesaidforeign
country;or
(b)ThesaidforeigncountrymaintainsarmedforcesinthePhilippineterritorywiththe
consentofthePhilippines;ProvidedthattheFilipinocitizenconcerned,atthetimeofrendering
saidserviceoracceptanceofsaidcommission,andtakingtheoathofallegianceincidentthereto,
statesthathedoessoonlyinconnectionwithhisservicetosaidforeigncountry: Andprovided
finally,ThatanyFilipinocitizenwhoisrenderingserviceto,oriscommissionedin,thearmed
forcesofaforeigncountryunderanyofthecircumstancesmentionedinparagraph(a)or(b)shall
notbepermittedtoparticipatenorvoteinanyelectionofthePhilippinesduringtheperiodofhis
serviceto,orcommissionin,thearmedforcesofsaidforeigncountry.Uponhisdischargefromthe
serviceofthesaidforeigncountry,heshallbeautomaticallyentitledtothefullenjoymentofhis
civilandpoliticalrightsasaFilipinocitizen;
(5)Bycancellationofthecertificateofnaturalization;
(6)Byhavingbeendeclaredbycompetentauthority,adeserterofthePhilippinearmedforcesintimeof
war,unlesssubsequently,aplenarypardonoramnestyhasbeengranted;
(7)Incaseofawoman,uponhermarriage,toaforeignerif,byvirtueofthelawsinforceinherhusband's
country,sheacquireshisnationality.[ThisisnowqualifiedbyArt.IV,Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarry
aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renouncedit.]
Theprovisions ofthissectionnotwithstanding, theacquisitionofcitizenship byanaturalbornFilipino
citizenfromoneoftheIberianandanyfriendlydemocraticIberoAmericancountriesorfromtheUnitedKingdom

shallnotproducelossorforfeitureofhisPhilippinecitizenshipifthelawofthatcountrygrantsthesameprivilegeto
itscitizensandsuchhadbeenagreeduponbytreatybetweenthePhilippinesandtheforeigncountryfromwhich
citizenshipisacquired.

a.LossofCitizenship
Grounds:
(1)Naturalizationinaforeigncountry[CA63,Sec.1(1)]

FrivaldovCOMELEC(174SCRA245)(1989)
F:

FrivaldowaselectedasgovernorofSorsogon.TheLeagueofMunicipalitiesfiledapetitionfortheannulmentof
Frivaldo'selectionandproclamationonthegroundthathewasnotaFilipinocitizen,havingbeennaturalizedintheUSin
1983.HeadmittedsuchbutraisedasadefensethathedidsotoprotecthimselffromMarcosandthathisnaturalizationas
anAmericancitizenwasnotimpressedwithvoluntarinessbutwasobtainedonlyforreasonsofconvenience.TheLeague
arguedthatsinceFrivaldowasanaturalizedAmericancitizenandhadnotreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshiponthedayof
theelection,hewasnotqualifiedtorunforgovernor.Frivaldocounteredthathisoathinhiscertificateofcandidacythathe
wasanaturalborncitizenshouldbeasufficientactofrepatriation. Additionally,hisactiveparticipationinthe1987
electionshaddivestedhimofhisUScitizenshipunderthelawsoftheUS.

HELD:FrivaldoclaimshehasreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipbyvirtueofavalidrepatriation.Heclaimsthat
byactivelyparticipatingintheelections,heautomaticallyforfeitedAmericancitizenshipunderUSlaws.Such
lawsdonotconcernus.SuchforfeitureisbetweenhimandtheUSashisadoptedcountry.Itshouldbeobvious
thatevenifhedidlosehisnaturalizedAmer icancitizenship,suchforfeituredidnotandcouldnothavetheeffect
ofautomaticallyrestoringhiscitizenshipinthePhilippinesthathehadearlierrenounced.Atbest,whatmight
havehappenedasaresultofthelossofhisnaturalizedcitizenshipwasthathebecameastatelessindividual.
Merefilingofcertificateofcandidacyisnotasufficientactofrepatriation.Repatriationrequiresan
expressandequivocalact.Frivaldo'sclaimthathecouldnothaverepatriatedhimselfunderLOI270bec.the
SpecialCommitteeprovidedforthereinhadnotyetbeenconstitutedseemstosuggestthatthelackofthatbody
renderedhisrepatriationunnecessary. Thatisfarfetchedifnotspecious. Suchaconclusionwouldopenthe
floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their
abandonedcitizenshipw/oformallyrejectingtheiradoptedstateandreaffirmingtheirallegiancetothePhils.It
doesnotappearthatFrivaldohastakenthesecategoricalacts.Hecontendsthatbysimplyfilinghiscertificate
ofcandidacyhehad,w/omore,alreadyeffectivelyrecoveredPhil.citizenship. Butthatishardlytheformal
declarationthelawenvisionssurely,Phil.citizenshippreviouslydisownedisnotthatcheaplyrecovered.Ifthe
SpecialCommitteehadnotyetbeenconvened,whatitmeantsimplywasthatthepetitionerhadtowaituntilthis
wasdone,orseeknaturalizationbylegislativeorjudicialproceedings.Adapted.

LabovsCOMELEC(176SCRA1)

F:

RamonLabo,Jr.marriedanAustraliancitizeninthePhils.HewasgrantedAustraliancitizenship.Hetookan
oathofallegiancerenouncingallotherallegiance,etc.Thoughthemarriagewasdeclaredvoidforbeingbigamous,Labo
was,accordingtotherecordsstillanAustraliancitizen.Inthe1988localelections,LaboranformayorofBaguio.His
FilipinocitizenshipwasquestionedonthegroundthathehadacquiredAustraliancitizenshipthroughhismarriagetoan
Australian citizen andhis takingan oath of allegiance toAustralia where he renounced all other allegiance toother
countries.Laboclaimedthat(1)hismarriagedidnotautomaticallydivesthimofhisFilipinocitizenshipandthat(2)his
naturalizationinAustraliamadehimatworstonlyadualnationalanddidnotdivesthimofhisPhilippinecitizenship.

HELD:Labo'sfirstcontentionisirrelevant.HebecameanAustraliancitizenbyvirtueofnaturalizationandnot
bymarriage.
Thesecond argumentis specious w/c cannotstand againstthe clear provisions ofCANo. 63,w/c
enumeratesthemodesbyw/cPhil.citizenshipmaybelost,andamongthemare(1)naturalizationinaforeign
country;(2) expressrenunciationofcitizenship;and(3) subscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupportthe
Consti.orlawsofaforeigncountry,allofw/careapplicabletopetitioner.UnderArticleIV,Section5,"dual
allegianceofcitizenisinimicaltothenationalinterestandshallbedealtwithbylaw."
xxxEvenifitbeassumedthat,aspetitionerasserts,hisnaturalizationwasannulledafteritwasfound
thathismarriagewasbigamous,thatcircumstancealonedidnotautomaticallyrestorehisPhil.citizenship.His
divestitureofAustraliancitizenshipdoesnotconcernushere. Thatisamatterbetweenhimandhisadopted
country.WhatwemustconsideristhefactthathevoluntarilyandfreelyrejectedPhil.citizenshipandwillingly
andknowinglyembracedthecitizenshipofanothercountry.Thepossibilitythathemayhavebeensubsequently
rejectedbyAustraliadoesnotmeanthathehasbeenautomaticallyreinstatedasaPhil.citizen
Phil.citizenshipmaybereacquiredbydirectactofcongress,bynaturalizationorbyrepatriation.Itdoes
notappearthatpetitionerhasreacquiredPhil.citizenshipbyanyofthesemethods.Adapted.

Labov.COMELEC(211SCRA297,July1992)
F:

LaboranformayorofBaguiointheMay11,1992elections.Hisopponent,Ortega,questionedhiscitizenship
beforetheComelec,relyingonLabov.Comelec(179SCRA1,1989)whichdeclaredLabonotacitizenofthePhilippines.

HELD: 1. Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office.
Philippinecitizenshipisanindispensablerequirementforholdinganelectiveoffice.Thefactthathewaselected
bythemajorityoftheelectorateisofnomoment.
AsheldinFivaldovs.COMELEC,
"xxxThewillofthepeopleasexpressedthroughtheballotcannotcuretheviceofineligibility,
especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,thatthecandidatewasqualified.xxx"

xxx Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for
reacquisitionofPhil.citizenshipfiledbeforetheOfficeoftheSolGen.pursuanttoPD725andLOI270.To
date,however,theSpecialCommitteeonNaturalizationhadnotyetacteduponsaidapplication.Intheabsence
ofanyofficialactionorapprovalbyproperauthorities,amereapplicationforrepatriationdoesnot,andcannot,

amounttoanautomaticreacquistionoftheapplicant'sPhil.citizenship.
2.ThedisqualificationofLabodoesnotnecessarilyentitleOrtegaasthecandidatewiththenexthighestnumber
ofvotestoproclamationasmayor.Theineligibilityofacandidate receivingmajorityvotedoesnotentitletheeligible
candidatereceivingthenexthighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredelected.
3.Therulewouldhavebeendifferentiftheelectoratefullyawareinfact&inlawofacandidate'sdisqualification
soastobringsuchawarenesswithintherealmofnotorietywouldnonethelesscasttheirvotesinfavoroftheineligiblecan
didate.Insuchcase,theelectoratemaybesaidtohavewaivedthevalidityandefficacyoftheirvotesbynotoriously
misapplyingtheirfranchiseorthrowingawaytheirvotes,inwhichcase,theeligiblecandidateobtainingthenexthigher
numberofvotesmaybedeemedelected.Adapted.

(2)ExpressrenunciationorExpatriation[CA63,Sec1(2)]
ThisoverrulesHawvGovernment,wheretheSCheldthatrenunciationcouldbeimplied.
Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianvGovernment).Noonecanbecompelledtoremaina
Filipinoifhedoesnotwantto.

YuvDefensorSantiago(169SCRA364)
F:

Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the same period upon
presentmentbeforetheproperPortugueseconsularofficer.DespitehisnaturalizationasaPhilippinecitizenin1978,he
appliedforandwasissuedaPortuguesepassportin1981.WhilestillacitizenofthePhilippineswhohadrenounced,upon
hisnaturalization,"absolutelyandforeverallallegianceandfidelitytoanyforeignprince,potentate,stateorsovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercialdocumentshesigned.

HELD: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine
citizenship acquiredthroughnaturalization. In BoardofImmigrationCommissioner vsGoGallano,express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenshipuponnaturalizationasaPhilippinecitizenresumedorreacquiredhispriorstatusasaPortuguese
citizen,appliedforarenewalofhisPortuguesepassportandrepresentedhimselfassuchinofficialdocuments
evenafterhehadbecomeanaturalized Philippine citizen. SuchresumptionorreacquisitionofPortuguese
citizenshipisgrosslyinconsistentwithhismaintenanceofPhilippinecitizenship.
Dissenting: ThemereuseofaforeignpassportisnotipsofactoexpressrenunciationofFilipinocitizenship.
Whatevermaybethereasonsfordoingso,itmustbeascertainedinacourtoflawwhereafulltrialisconducted
insteadofanadministrativedeterminationofamostsummarynature(asinthiscase).Adapted.

AznarvOsmena,COMELEC,185SCRA703(May1990)
F:

EmelitoOsmenaranforGovernorofCebuintheJan.18,1988elections.AznarasCebuChairmanofLDPLaban
filedwithCOMELECapetitionforthedisqualificationofOsmenaonthegroundthatheisallegedlynotaFilipinocitizen,
beingaUScitizen,asevidencedbyOsmena'sapplicationforalien,hisaliencertificateofregistration,permittoreenter
thePhils,immigrationcertificateofclearanceetc.OsmenaontheotherhandmaintainedthatheisaFilcitizen,alleging
that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil passport, that he has been
continuouslyresidinginthePhilssincebirth&hasnotgoneoutofthecountryformorethan6monthsandthathehas
beenaregisteredvoterinthePhilssince1965.TheComelecdecidedforOsmena.

HELD:1.IntheproceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC,thepetfailedtopresentdirectproofthatprivateresphad
losthisFilipinocitizenshipbyanyofthemodesprovidedforunderCA#63.Amongothers,theseare:(1)by
naturalizationinaforeigncountry;(2)byexpressrenunciationofcitizenship;(3)bysubscribingtoanoathof
allegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlawsofaforeigncountry.Fromtheevidence,itisclearthatprivate
respondentOsmenadidnotlosehisPhilcitizenshipbyanyofthe3mentionedhereinaboveorbyanyothermode
oflosingPhilcitizenship.
2.ByvirtueofhisbeingthesonofaFilipinofather,thepresumptionthatprivaterespisaFilipino
remains.ItwasincumbentuponthepetitionertoprovethatprivresphadlosthisPhilcitizenship.PetAznar
failedtopositivelyestablishthisfact.OsmenaremainsaFilipino&thelossofhisPhilcitizenshipcannotbe
presumed.
3.ConsideringthefactthatadmittedlyOsmenawasbothaFilipino&anAmerican,themerefactthathe
hasaCertificatestatingheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino.InthecaseofOsmena,
theCertificationthatheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotSTILLaFilipino,possessedasheis,of
bothnationalitiesorcitizenship.ThereisnoexpressrenunciationhereofPhilcitizenship.Thereisevenno
impliedrenunciationofsaidcitizenship.WhenweconsiderthattherenunciationneededtolosePhilcitizenship
mustbeEXPRESS,itstandstoreasonthattherecanbenosuchlossofPhilcitizenshipWHENTHEREISNO
RENUNCIATION,EITHEREXPRESSORIMPLIED.
4.Thestatementinthe1987constitutionthat"dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenational
interest&shallbedealtwithbylaw"hasnoretroactiveeffect.Adapted.

(3)Takinganoathofallegiancetoanothercountryuponreachingtheageofmajority.
(4)Acceptingacommissionandservinginthearmedforcesofanothercountry,unless thereisan
offensiveordefensivepactwiththecountry,oritsmaintainsarmedforcesinRPwithRP'sconsent.
(5)Denaturalization.
(6)BeingfoundbyfinaljudgmenttobeadeserteroftheAFP.
(7)MarriagebyaFilipinowomantoanalien,ifbythelawsofherhusband'scountry,shebecomesa

citizenthereof.
Thisisdeemedrepealedbythe1973and1987Constitutions,whichmandatethatFilipinocitizenswho
marryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheir"act"or"omission",theyaredeemedunderthelawto
haverenouncedit.Atpresent,thelaw(CA63,Sec.1par.7)onlyprovidesforexpressrenunciation(i.e.,act),
andsothereisnolawatthemomenton"renunciationbyomission."ButCongressmayprovideforsuchlater.
But Sec.2ofthe1973Consti.(carried overasSec.4of the1987Consti.)onlyhasaprospective
application.Thus,CA63continuesformarriagescelebratedbefore17January1973.IfaFilipinomarrieda
Greekin1972andbecameaGreekcitizenherselfthereby,thenshelostherFilipinocitizenship. Astoher
children,however,itisenoughthatshewasaFilipinaatthetimeofmarriagetoqualifythemtoelectPhilippine
citizenshipwhentheyreachedtheageofmajority(Villahermosaruling). Butifthechildrenwerebornafter
1973,thenunderthe1987Constitution,thosechildrenarenowevennaturalborn.
Butif,in1961,aFilipinowomanmarriedanalienwhosecountrydidnotmakeheranautomaticcitizen,
andsoinordertoacquirehiscitizenship,sheappliedfornaturalization,andafterhernaturalizationshebegotC,
CcouldnolongerelectPhilippinecitizenship.TherulinginCuandVillahermosaappliesonlytomotherswho
losttheircitizenshipbyoperationoflawandnotbytheirownvoluntaryacts.
IfCwasbornaftertheapplicationbutbeforetheapprovalofthenaturalizationofhismother,hecould
stillelectPhilippinecitizenship.
Butforsimilarmarriagescelebratedafter17January1973,themerefactofmarriagealonedoesnotstrip
theFilipinowomanofherPhilippinecitizenship.Thus,ifaFilipinamarriesanalienin1974,evenifshegains
herhusband'scitizenship,livesabroad,doesnotpayhertaxes,neverreturnstoRP,sheisstillaFilipinaunder
the1973and1987Constitutions,solongasshedoesnotcategoricallyrenouncehercitizenship.Itfollowsthat
herchildrenarenaturalborncitizens,beingthechildrenofFilipinomothers,andthistimewithouttheneedof
election.

Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianvGovernment).NoonecanbecompelledtoremainaFilipino
ifhedoesnotwantto.
Exception:
Com.Act.No.63,Sec.1(3).

xxx[A]FilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipinanymannerwhiletheRepublicofthe
Philippinesisatwarwithanycountry.

Peoplevs.Manayao,74Phil.721(1947)
F:

ManayaowasoneoftheMakapiliswhotookpartinthekillingoftheresidentsinbarrioBanaban,municipalityof
Angat,Bulacan. Aftertheliberation,he,amongothers,waschargedw/treasonandw/multiplemurderinthePeople's

court.Inhisdefense,heargues,amongothers,hehaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwasthereforenotamenabletothe
Phil.lawontreason.

HELD:Appellant'scontentionisrepugnanttothemostfundamentalandelementaryprinciplesgoverningthe
dutiesofacitizentowardhiscountryundertheConsti.ThedefenseoftheStateisaprimedutyofgovernment
andinthefulfillmentofthisdutyallcitizensmayberequiredbylawtorenderpersonal,militaryorcivilservice.
Duringaperiodofstress,underaConstienshriningsuchtenets,thecitizencannotbeconsideredfreetocastoff
hisloyaltyandobligationstowardhisFatherland.
Itwouldshocktheconscienceofanyenlightenedcitizenrytosaythatthisappellant,bytheveryfactof
committingthetreasonousactschargedagainsthim,divestedhimselfofhisPhil.citizenshipandtherebyplaced
himselfbeyondthearmofourtreasonlaw.Forifthiswereso,hisverycrimewouldbetheshieldthatwould
protecthimfrompunishment.VV.

Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall
times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan
immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Caasivs.CourtofAppeals(191SCRA229)
F:

These2caseswereconsolidatedbec.theyhavethesameobjective: thedisqualificationunderSec.68ofthe
OmnibusElectionCodeoftheprivateresp.,MeritoMiguel,forthepositionofmunicipalmayorofBolinao,Pangasinan,to
w/chewaselectedinthelocalelectionsof1/18/88,onthegroundthatheisagreencardholder,hence,apermanent
residentoftheUS,notofBolinao.

HELD:Despitehisvigorousdisclaimer,Miguel'simmigrationtotheUSin1984constitutedanabandonmentof
hisdomicileandresidenceinthePhils.ForhedidnotgototheUSmerelytovisithischildrenorhisdoctor
there;he entered the USw/the intention tolive there permanently asevidenced by hisapplication for an
immigrant's(notavisitor'sortourist's)visa. Basedonhisapplication, hewasissued bytheUSGovtthe
requisitegreencardorauthoritytoresidetherepermanently.
xxxTobe"qualifiedtorunforelectiveoffice"inthePhils.,thelaw(Sec.68oftheOmnibusElection
Code)requiresthatthecandidatewhoisagreencardholdermusthave"waivedhisstatus asapermanent
residentorimmigrantofaforeigncountry."Therefore,hisactoffilingacertificateofcandidacyforelective
officeinthePhils.,didnotofitselfconstituteawaiverofhisstatusasapermanentresidentorimmigrantofthe
US.Thewaiverofhisgreencardshouldbemanifestedbysomeactofactsindependentofanddonepriorto
filinghiscandidacyforelectiveofficeinthiscountry.Withoutsuchpriorwaiver,hewas"disqualifiedtorunfor
anyelectiveoffice."
Residenceinthemunicipalitywhereheintendstorunforelectiveofficeforatleast1yearatthetimeof
thefilingofhiscert.ofcandidacy,isoneofthequalificationsthatacandidateforelectivepublicofficemust
possess.Migueldidnopossessthatqualificationbec.hewasapermanentresidentoftheUSandheresidedin
Bolinaoforaperiodofonly3mos.afterhisreturntothePhils.inNov.1987.RAM.

b.ReacquisitionofCitizenship

Secs.25,CommonwealthAct63
Sec.2.Howcitizenshipmaybereacquired.Citizenshipmaybereacquired:
(1) Bynaturalization: Provided,Thattheapplicantpossessnoneofthedisqualificationsprescribedin
sectiontwoofActNumberedTwentyninehundredtwentyseven(nowSec.4ofCA473.)
(2) ByrepatriationofdesertersoftheArmy,NavyorAirCorp: Provided,Thatawomanwholosther
citizenshipbyreasonofhermarriagetoanalienmayberepatriatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisAct
aftertheterminationofthemaritalstatus;and
(3)BydirectactoftheNationalAssembly(nowCongress.)
Sec. 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The procedure prescribed for
naturalization under Act Numbered Twentynine hundred twentyseven (now CA 473) shall apply to the
reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbynaturalizationprovidedforinthenextprecedingsection:Provided,That
thequalificationsandspecialqualificationsprescribedinsections3and4ofsaidActshallnotberequired: And
Provided,further,
(1)ThattheapplicantbeatleasttwentyoneyearsofageandshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesatleast
sixmonthsbeforeheappliesfornaturalization;
(2)Thatheshallhaveconductedhimselfinaproperandirreproachablemannerduringtheentireperiod
ofhisresidenceinthePhilippines,inhisrelationswiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityin
whichheisliving;and
(3)Thathesubscribestoanoathdeclaringhisintentiontorenounceabsolutelyandperpetuallyallfaith
andallegiancetotheforeignauthority,stateorsovereigntyofwhichhewasacitizenorsubject.
Sec.4.RepatriationshallbeeffectedbymerelytakingthenecessaryoathofallegiancetotheRepublicof
thePhilippinesandregistrationinthepropercivilregistry.
Sec.5.TheSecretaryofJusticeshallissuethenecessaryregulationsfortheproperenforcementofthisAct.
NaturalizationblanksandotherblanksrequiredforcarryingouttheprovisionsofthisActshallbepreparedand
furnishedbytheSolicitorGeneral,subjecttoapprovaloftheSecretaryofJustice.
xxx

(1)Naturalization(CA63andCA473)
Butthisisnowanabbreviatedprocess,withnoneedtowaitforthreeyears(oneyearfordeclarationofintent,
andtwoyearsforthejudgmenttobecomeexecutory).Anapplicantmustonlypossessthefollowing:
a.21yearsofage;
b.Residentfor6months;

c.Goodmoralcharacter;
d.Nodisqualification.
(2)Repatriation
(i)Womanwhobyhermarriagelosthercitizenship.
(Thisisnolongertrueunderthe1973and1987Constitutions,ifthelosswasdueonlytomarriage.)
In PeoplevAvengoza,119SCRA119(1982),itwasheldthatawomanwholosthercitizenshipby
reasonofhermarriagetoaChinesehusbandandhergaininghiscitizenship,mustfirstjudicially,provethatshe
wasFilipinocitizenpriortothemarriage,beforeshecanberepatriatedbyvirtueofthedeathofherhusband.
InJaovRepublic,121SCRA358(1983),itwasheldthatalthoughhercitizenshippriortohermarriage
toaChinesehusbandneededjudicialconfirmation,theprocessofrepatriationitself(i.e.,ofreacquiringthat
citizenship)involvesapurelyadministrativeproceeding.
Thus:Filipinocitizenshippriortoitslossbyvirtueofmarriagetoanalienandgaininghiscitizenship
needsjudicialdeclaration. Butreacquisitionofsuchcitizenship byrepatriation isapurelyadministrative
procedure.

Peoplev.Avengoza,119SCRA119(1982)
F:

GoCham,aChinese,hiswifeAnselmaAvengoza,andthelatter'smother,GavinaA.,wereaccusedofviolationof
CA108.ItwaschargedthatGoGamandAnselmaA.usedGavinaA.asdummyinordertoacquirelandsinCamarines
Surw/cthecouplewerenotqualifiedtoacquireunderthe1935Consti.Pendingtrial,GavinaA.andGoChamdied.On
hermotionthetrialcourtallowedAnselmaA.towithdrawherpreviouspleaofnotguiltyandtofileamotiontoquashw/c
thecourtlatergranted.ThetrialcourtruledthatAnselmahadreacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipuponthedeathofher
husband,GoCham,anduponcomplyingw/CA63,sec.4bytakinganoathofallegiancetotheRepublicandfilingthe
oathw/theCivilRegistrar.Theprosecutionappealed.

HELD: Def.Avengoza'ssoleevidenceonrecordtosupportherrepatriationisheroathofallegiancetothe
Republic.Def.AvengozabecameanalienbyreasonofherlawfulmarriagetoaChinesecitizen;howeverthis
doesnotnecessarilymeanthatshewasaFilipinocitizenprevioustosuchmarriage.Thus,sheshouldfirstprove
her citizenship previous toher marriage and as there is no conclusive proof of this matter on record, this
questionmustbejudiciallydeterminedbeforeshecanbelegallyrepatriated.VV.

Jaov.Republic,121SCRA358(1983)
F:

PetitionerfiledintheCFIDavaoapetitionforrepatriation.SheclaimedthatwhileherfatherwasaChineseand
hermotheraFilipinio,herparentswerenotlegallymarried,andthatalthoughshelostherPhil.citizenshipwhenshe
marriedaChinesenational,herhusbanddiedon9/6/62.Aftertrial,thecourtdeclaredthepetitionerjudiciallyrepatriated.
Thegovtappealed.

HELD:Theproceedingstakeninthetrialcourtareacompletenullity.Thereisnolawrequiringorauthorizing
thatrepatriationshouldbeeffectedbyajudicialproceeding.AllthatisrequiredforafemalecitizenofthePhils.
wholosthercitizenshiptoanalientoreacquireherPhil.citizenshipupontheterminationofhermaritalstatus
"isforhertotakethenecessaryoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhils.andtoregisterthesaidoathinthe
proper civil registry." Moreover, the petitioner's claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being
allegedlyanillegitimatechildofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomothermaynotbeestablishedinanaction
wheretheotherorherheirsarenotparties.ItisconsistentrulethatPhil.citizenshipmaynotbedeclaredina
nonadversarysuitwherethepersonswhoserightsareaffectedbysuchdeclarationarenotparties,suchasan
actionfordeclaratoryrelieforapetitionforjudicialrepatriationasanalien.VV.

(ii)ThosedeclaredbyauthoritiestobedesertersoftheArmedForces.(Onlythisisapplicabletothe
present.)
(3)LegislativeAct
Whichisbothamodeofacquiringandreacquiringcitizenship.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Republicvs.DelaRosa,232SCRA785
F:

Three(3)petitionsinvolvingthesameissuesandpartieswereconsolidated.Saidcasesquestionedthereadmission
ofJuanFrivaldoasaFilipinocitizenunderCA63ortheRevisedNaturalizationLawasamendedbyCA473.Frivaldo
becameaUScitizenallegedlyduetothepressurefromtheMarcosregime.Hecamebackhere, ranforGovernorof
Sorsogonandwon.

RULING:DISQUALIFIED.FrivaldomustvacatehisofficeandsurrenderthesametotheViceGovernor.
AformercitizenwhooptstoreacquirePhil.citizenshipthroughnaturalizationunderCA63is duty
boundtofollowtheprocedureprescribedbysaidlaw,anditisnotforhimtodecideandselecttherequirements
whichhebelievesareinconvenient.The lawdoesnotdistinguishbetweenanapplicantwhowasformerlya
Filipinocitizenandonewhowasneveracitizen.
(Barlongay:Thisstatementisinaccuratebecausethereareindeeddifferences.)
Failuretocomplywiththepublicationandpostingrequirementsunderthelawrenderednullandvoid
theproceedings conducted, thedecision rendered andtheoath ofallegiance taken.TheTCnever acquired
jurisdictiontohearthepetitionfornaturalizationofFrivaldo.Underthelaw,boththepetitionfornaturalization
andtheordersettingitforhearingmustbepublishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeksintheOGorina
newspaperofgeneralcirculation.Moreover,thepublicationandthepostingmustbeinitsfulltextfortheCourt
toacquirejurisdiction.
ThepetitionfornaturalizationlacksseveralallegationsunderSecs.2and6ofthelaw:(1)thatpetitioner
isofgoodmoralcharacter;(2)heresidedcontinuouslyinthePhil.foratleasttenyears;(3)thatheisableto
speakandwriteEnglishandanyoneoftheprincipaldialects;(4)hewillresidecontinuouslyinthePhil.from

dateoffilingofpetitionuntilhisadmissiontoPhilcitizenship;(5)thathehasfiledadeclarationofintentionor
ifheisexcusedfromsaidfiling,thejustificationtherefor.Theabsenceofsuchallegationsisfataltothepetition.
Adecisioninapetitionfornaturalizationbecomesfinalonlyafter30daysfrompromulgation,counted
fromthedateofreceiptbytheSol.Gen.ofhiscopyofthedecision.Sec.1ofRA530providesthatnodecision
grantingcitizenshipinnaturalizationproceedingsshallbeexecutoryuntilafter2yearsfromitspromulgationin
ordertobeabletoobserveiftheapplicanthas:(1)notleftthecountry;(2)dedicatedhimselfcontinuouslyto
lawfulcalling;(3)notbeenconvictedofanyoffenseorforviolationofgovernmentpromulgatedrules;(4)not
committedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthecountryorcontrarytogovernmentannouncedpolicies.
TheproceedingsintheTCweremarredbyirregularities.Thehearingwassetaheadofthescheduled
dateuponrequestofFrivaldosohecouldcatchupwiththelastdayforfilinghiscertificateofcandidacy,
withoutpublication;thepetitionwasheardwithin6monthsfromlastpublication;Frivaldowasallowedtotake
hisoathofallegianceevenbeforethefinalityofjudgmentandwithoutwaitingforthe2yearwaitingperiod.
MRM.

4.DualAllegiance
Art.IV,Sec.5Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenationalinterestandshallbedealtwith
bylaw.
Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall
times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan
immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

DualallegianceisnotcontradictorytothedoublenationalityofaFilipinawhomarriedanalien.Itis
notthebusinessofPhilippinelawtodetermineifitscitizenisalsoacitizenofanothercountrybyvirtueof
marriage.
WhatSec.5contemplatesisthecaseofalienswhoarenaturalizedasFilipinosbutremainloyaltotheir
countryoforigin(specificallyformerChinesenationalswhoevenraninthelegislativeYuanofChina),aswella
publicofficerswho,whileservingthegovernment,seekcitizenshipinanothercountry.
Note:UnderSec40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thosewithdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunning
foranyelectivelocalposition.

5.MixedMarriages
Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,1991ed.(hereinafterCruz):

1. ItwasprovidedundertheoldrulethataFilipinowomanwhomarriedanalienforfeitedherPhil.
citizenshipifunderthelawsofherhusband'sStateshewasrequiredtofollowhiscitizenship.Thisrulehasbeen
reversedbyArt.IV,Sec.4oftheConsti.w/cprovidesthat:
"CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheiractoromissiontheyare
deemed,underthelaw,tohaverenouncedit."

2.Butwhatofthereverseofthesituation?SupposeitisthealienwomanwhomarriesaFilipino?
Sec.15ofCA473providesthat"anywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthe
Phils.,andwhomightherselfbenaturalized,shallbedeemedacitizenofthePhils."
Initslatestpronouncementonthisquestion,theclause"whomightherselfbelawfullynaturalized"was
interpretedtomeanonlythatthealienwomanmustnotbelaboringunderanyofthedisqualificationsprescribed
bylawfornaturalizationinherownrightasaFilipinocitizen.Moreover,shecanestablishherclaimtoPhil.
citizenshipinadministrativeproceedings beforetheimmigrationauthoritiesonlyandwillnothavetofilea
judicialactionforthispurpose.
Recapitulating,J.BarredodeclaredinMoyaLimYaov.Comm.ofImmigration,41SCRA292:
xxxWenowholdxxxthatunderSec.15ofCA473,analienwomanmarryingaFilipino,native
bornornaturalized,becomesipsofactoaFilipinaprovidedsheisnotdisqualifiedtobeacitizenofthe
Phils.underSec.4ofthesamelaw.Likewise,analienwomanmarriedtoanalienwhoissubsequently
naturalizedherefollowsthePhil.citizenshipofherhusbandthemomenthetakeshisoathasFilipino
citizen,providedthatshedoesnotsufferfromanyofthedisqualificationsundersaidSec.4.

UPDATED11/24/95
RAM

C.Sovereignty
Sovereignty

"SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichtheStateisgoverned.
Therearetwokindsofsovereignty,towit, legal and political.Legalsovereigntyistheauthorityw/chasthe
powertoissuefinalcommandswhereaspoliticalsovereigntyisthepowerbehindthelegalsovereign,orthesum
totaloftheinfluencesthatoperateuponit.
Sovereigntymayalsobe internal or external. InternalsovereigntyreferstothepoweroftheStateto
controlitsdomesticaffairs.Externalsovereignty,w/cisthepoweroftheStatetodirectitsrelationsw/other
States,isalsoknownasindependence.xxx"(Cruz.)
"ThesupremepoweroftheStatetogovernpersonsandthingswithinitsterritory.

'TheoryofAutoLimitation'isthepropertyoftheStateforceduetowhichaStatehasexclusivelegal
competenceofselflimitationandselfrestriction(Jellinek).
InReaganvCIR,itwasheldthattheprovisioninthemilitarybasesagreementgivingtheUScriminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed even by Filipinos inside the bases is not a derogation of Philippine
sovereignty. ThePhilippineshasthepowertolimittheexerciseofitssovereignty. Whenitallowsaforeign
Statetousepartofitsterritoryandwaivesjurisdictionovercrimescommittedtherein,itdoesnotgiveuppartof
itssovereigntybutonlylimitstheexerciseofitssovereignty."(Mirasolnotes.)

1.DominiumandImperium
"ImperiumreferstotheState'sauthoritytogovern.Itcoverssuchactivitiesaspassinglawsgoverninga
territory,maintainingpeaceandorderoverit,anddefendingitagainstforeigninvasion.WhentheStateactin
thiscapacityjureimperii,itgenerallyenjoyssovereignimmunity.
Dominium referstothecapacityoftheStatetoownproperty. Itcoverssuchrightsastitletoland,
exploitationanduseofit,anddispositionorsaleofthesame.TheRegaliandoctrinewherebyalllandsofthe
publicdomainbelongtotheState,andanyoneclaimingtitlehastheburdentoshowownership,comeswithin
thisconcept.Inthiscapacityjuregestium,theStatedescendstothestatusofordinarypersonsandthusbecomes
liableassuch."(Mirasolnotes.)
Astateasajuridicalpersonmayactinthecapacityofsovereignaswellasowner.xxx"Asthereare
overtonesindicativeofskepticism,ifnotofoutrightrejection,ofthewellknowndistinctioninpubliclawbet.
thegovernmentalauthoritypossessedbythestatew/cisappropriatelyembracedintheconceptofsovereignty,
anditscapacitytoownoracquireprop.,itisnotinappropriatetopursuethematterfurther.Theformercomes
undertheheadingofimperiumandthelatterofdominium.Theuseofthistermisappropriatew/referenceto
landsheldbythestateinitsproprietarycharacter.Insuchcapacity,itmayprovidefortheexploitationanduse
oflandsandothernaturalresources,includingtheirdisposition,exceptaslimitedbytheConsti.DeanPounddid
speakoftheconfusionthatexistedduringthemedievalerabet.twosuchconcepts,butdidnotetheexistenceof
respublicaeasacorallarytodominium.xxx[T]herewasarecognitionbyJ.HomesinCarinov.InsularGov't,
that'SpaininitsearlierdecreesembodiedtheuniversaltheorythatalllandswereheldfromtheCrown***.'
Thatwasaconceptofjusregalia,w/cwasadoptedbythe1973Consti.,ownershiphoweverbeingvestedinthe
stateassuchratherthantheheadthereof.(Fernando56.)

2.Territorial,Personal,andExtraterritoralJurisdiction
Jurisdictionisthemanifestationofsovereignty.(Mirasolnotes.)
Thejurisdictionofthestateisunderstoodasbothitsauthorityandthesphereoftheexerciseofthat
authority.(Sinco26.)
a.TerritorialjurisdictionistheauthorityoftheStatetohaveallpersonsandthingswithinitsterritorial
limitstobecompletelysubjecttoitscontrolandprotection.(Mirasolnotes.)

Whenexercisedinreferencetopersonsorthingsfoundw/intheterritoryofthestate,itisknownas
territorial jurisdiction. All persons w/in that area, regardless of nationality, are subject to the territorial
jurisdictionofthestate.
Theterritorialjurisdictionofastateissovereigntyoperatingorappliedw/initsterritory.Itsscopeand
effectareexpressedinthisclassicstatementofChiefJusticeMarshallonthesubject:
"Thejurisdictionofthenationw/initsownterritoryisnecessarilyexclusiveandabsolute.Itis
susceptibleofnolimitationnotimposedbyitself. Anyrestrictionuponit,derivingvalidityfroman
external source,would implyadiminution ofits sovereignty to the extent ofthe restriction,andan
investmentofthatsovereigntytothesameextentinthatpowerw/cwouldimposesuchrestriction.All
exceptions,therefore,tothefullandcompletepowerofanationw/initsownterritories,mustbetraced
uptotheconsentofthenationitself.Theycanflowfromnootherlegitimatesource.Thisconsentmay
beeitherexpressorimplied."(Sinco2627.)

b.Personaljurisdictionistheauthorityofthestateoveritsnationals,theirpersons,property,andacts,
whetherwithinoroutsideitsterritory.TheCivilCodeprovisionthatprohibitoryandmandatorylawsfollow
citizenswherevertheygoisanexample.(Mirasolnotes.)
Whenjurisdictionisexercisedonthebasisofthestatusofthepersonsaffected,independentoftheir
presenceorabsenceintheterritoryofthestate,itisknownaspersonaljurisdiction.(Sinco26.)
Thepersonaljurisdictionofthestateisexercisedoverallitscitizensw/inorw/oitsterritory.Itaffects
theirperson,prop.,andevensomeoftheiractsperformedabroad.Theauthorityofthestatetow/ctheyowe
permanentallegiancefollowsthematalltimeswherevertheymightresideandaslongastheirmembershipof
thestatesubsists.(Sinco28.)
c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its
territoriallimitsbyreasonoftheireffectstoitsterritory. Art.2oftheRPC isaclassicexampleofthis.
(Mirasolnotes.)
Byagreementw/otherstates,astatemayestablishitslegalinstitutionsoutsideitsterritoriallimits.
Thus if a state does not have sufficient confidence in the administration of justice and the system of law
obtaininginaparticularcountry,itmayenterintoatreatyfortheestablishmentofitsowncourtsinthelatter
countrywhereitscitizensornationalsmaybetried.
xxx
Regardlessoftreatyoragreement,however,astatehasfullauthoritytoadoptrulesintendedtoapplyto
persons,whethercitizensoraliens,andthingsfoundintheterritoryofotherstatesoronthehighseasunder
certainconditions. Ofcourse,theactualenforcementofrulesintendedtohaveextraterritorialeffectmaybe
accomplishedonlywhenthepersonsconcernedarefoundw/intheterritorialjurisdictionofthestate.Toenforce
themintheterritoriallimitsofanotherstatewouldbetoviolatethesovereigntyofthelatter,unlessthisstate
givesitsconsentthereto.Thus,wehaveArt.2oftheRevisedPenalCode:
"Art. 2. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisionsofthisCodeshallbeenforcednotonlywithinthePhilippineArchipelago,includingits

atmosphere,itsinteriorwatersandmaritimezone,butalsooutsideofitsjurisdiction,againstthose
who:
1.ShouldcommitanoffensewhileonaPhilippineshiporairship.
2. Should forge or counterfeit anycoin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligationsandsecuritiesissuedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippines.
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligationsandsecuritiesmentionedintheprecedingnumber.
4.Whilebeingpublicofficersoremployees,shouldcommitanoffenseintheexerciseof
theirfunctions;or
5. Should commit anyof the crimes against national security and thelaw of nations,
definedinTitleOneofBookTwoofthisCode."

xxx.(Sinco2829.)

3.SovereignImmunity
(a)Basis
i.Constitutional
Art.XVI,Sec.3.TheStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.
ii.Jurisprudence
Positivisttheory:Therecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawsonwhichthe
rightdepends.(HolmesinKawananakoavPolyblank)
Sociologicaltheory:IftheStateisamenabletosuits,allitstimewouldbespentdefendingitselffrom
suitsandthiswouldpreventitfromperformingitsotherfunctions.(RepublicvVillasor,54SCRA83)(Mirasol
notes.)
ThedoctrineisalsoavailabletoforeignStatesinsofarastheyaresoughttobesuedinthecourtsofthe
localState.TheaddedbasisinthiscaseistheprincipleofthesovereignequalityofStates,underw/coneState
cannotassertjurisdictionoveranotherinviolationofthemaximparinparemnonhabetimperium.Todoso
would"undulyvexthepeaceofnations."(Cruz.)

Republicv.Villasor,54SCRA83(1973.)
F:

On7/3/61,adecisionwasrenderedinSPinfavorofresps.P.J.KienerCo.,Ltd,et.al.andagainstpetitionerherein,
confirmingthearbitrationawardintheamountof1.7M,subjectofSP.On6/24/69,resp.JudgeissuedanOrderdeclaring
theaforestateddecisionfinalandexecutory,directingtheSheriffsofRizalProvince,QCaswellasManilatoexecutethe
saiddecision.Acorrespondingaliaswritofexecutionwasthenissued.Onthestrengthofsaidwrit,thesheriffserved

noticesofgarnishmentw/severalbanks,speciallyonthe'moniesduetheAFPintheformofdeposits,sufficienttocover
theamountmentionedinthewrit;'thePhil.VeteransBankreceivedthesamenoticeofgarnishment.Hence,thisoriginal
actionforcertiorariandprohibitionw/theSC.

HELD:Itisafundamentalpostulateofconstitutionalismflowingfromthejuristicconceptofsovereigntythat
thestateaswellasitsgovtisimmunefromsuitunlessitgivesitsconsent.Itisreadilyunderstandablewhyit
mustbeso.Asovereignisexemptfromsuit,notbec.ofanyformalconceptionorobsoletetheory,butonthe
logicalandpracticalgroundthattherecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawonw/c
therightdepends.(J.Holmes,Kawananakoav.Polyblank,205US349.)Sociologicaljurisprudencesuppliesan
answernotdissimilar. [A]continuedadherencetothedoctrineofnonsuabilityisnottobedeploredforas
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacletotheperformanceofitsmultifariousfunctionsarefargreaterifsuchafundamentalprinciplewere
abandonedandtheavailabilityofjudicialremedywerenotthusrestricted.
TheStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.Acorollary,bothdictatedbylogicandsoundsensefrom
suchabasicconceptisthatpublicfundscannotbetheobjectofagarnishmentproceedingeveniftheconsentto
besuedhadbeenpreviouslygrantedandthestateliabilityadjudged.Thisisbasedonconsiderationsofpublic
policy.Disbursementsofpublicfundsmustbecoveredbythecorrespondingappropriationasrequiredbylaw.
ThefunctionsandpublicservicesrenderedbytheStatecannotbeallowedtobeparalyzedordisruptedbythe
diversionofpublicfundsfromtheirlegitimateandspecificobjects,asappropriatedbylaw.RAM.

(b)WhenasuitisagainsttheStateandwhenitisnot.
A suit is against the State, regardless of who is named as the defendant, if it produces adverse
consequencestothepublictreasuryintermsofdisbursementofpublicfundsandlossofgovernmentproperty.
WhenasuitisagainsttheState,itcannotprosperunlesstheStatehasgivenitsconsent.
Inthefollowingcases,however,thesuitisnotreallyagainsttheState.
1.Whenthepurposeofthesuitistocompelanofficerchargedwiththedutyofmakingpayments
pursuanttoanappropriationmadebylawinfavoroftheplaintifftomakesuchpayment.Forinthiscase,the
suit is not really against the State, the State having acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff through the
enactmentofanappropriationlaw.Rather,thesuitisintendedtocompelperformanceofaministerialduty.
(BegosovPVA,32SCRA466andDelMarvPVA,51SCRA340bothinvolvingtheWarWidowBenefitsLaw
duetheveterans.)
2.Whenfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint,itisclearthattherespondentisapublicofficersuedina
privatecapacity.
3.Whentheactionisnotinpersonamwiththegovernmentasthenameddefendant,butanaction in
remthatdoesnotnamethegovernmentinparticular.
InRepublicvFeliciano(148SCRA424),asuitagainstthegovernmentfortherecoveryofpossession
andownershipoflandbasedonapossessoryinformationwasdisallowedbytheSConthegroundthatasuitfor

therecoveryofpropertyisanaction"inpersonam"whichseekstobringtheStatetocourtjustlikeanyprivate
personwhoisclaimedtousurpapieceofproperty.
Whattheplaintiffshouldhavedone,theCourtcontinued,wastoapplyforajudicialconfirmationof
imperfecttitleunderSec.48(b)ofCA141,whichisan"action inrem",i.e.,onedirectedagainstthewhole
world,andnotthegovernmentinparticular.

Republicv.Feliciano,148SCRA424
F:

RespondentPabloFelicianofiledacomplaintintheCFIofCamarinesSuragainsttheRepublicofthePhilippines,
representedbythelandauthority,fortherecoveryofownershipandpossessionofaparceloflandinTinambac,Camarines
Sur. He alleged that the lot in questionshouldbe excluded from the NARRA settlement reservationprogram ofthe
governmentunderProc.No.90,sinceit'shisprivatepropertybeingcoveredbyapossessoryinformationtitleinthename
ofhispredecessorininterest.(Proc.No.90reservesforsettlementpurposes,undertheadministrationoftheNARRA,now
theLandAuthority,atractoflandsituatedintheMunicipalitiesofTinambacandSiruma,CamarinesSur.) Feliciano
prayedthathebedeclaredtherightfulownerofthepropertyinquestion.
Amotiontodismiss,principallyonthegroundthattheRPcannotbesuedwithoutitsconsentandhencetheaction
cannotprosper,wasfiledby86settlers(asintervenors)ofthelandinquestion.
TheCFIgrantedthemotiontodismiss,whichwasthenreversedbytheIAConappeal.Hencethispetitionbythe
RP.

ISSUES:1.WONthedoctrineofnonsuabilityofthestatecanbeinvokedinthiscase.(YES)

ThedoctrineofnonsuabilityoftheStatehasproperapplicationinthiscase.Theplaintiffhasimpleaded
theRPasdefendantinanactionforrecoveryofownershipandpossessionofaparcelofland,bringingtheState
tocourtjustlikeanyprivatepersonwhoisclaimedtobeusurpingapieceofproperty.Asuitfortherecoveryof
propertyisnotanactioninrem,butanactioninpersonam.
Byitscaptionanditsallegationandprayer,thecomplaintisclearlyasuitagainsttheState,whichunder
settledjurisprudenceisnotpermitted,exceptuponashowingthattheStatehasconsentedtobesued,either
expresslyorbyimplicationthroughtheuseofstatutorylanguagetooplaintobemisinterpreted.Thereisnosuch
showingofconsentintheinstantcase.Worse,thecomplaintitselffailstoallegetheexistenceofsuchconsent.
Thisisafataldefect,andonthisbasisalone,thecomplaintshouldhavebeendismissed.
Thefailureofthepetitionertoassertthedefenseofimmunityfromsuitwhenthecasewastriedbefore
thecourtaquo,asallegedbyprivaterespondent,isnotfatal.Itisnowsettledthatsuchdefense"maybeinvoked
bythecourtssuasponteatanystageoftheproceedings."
2.WONtheconsentoftheRPmaybereadfromProc.No.90itself.(NO)

Theexclusion of existing privaterights from the reservation established by Proc. no. 90 cannot be
construed asawaiver of theimmunity oftheState fromsuit.Waiverof immunity,being inderogation of
sovereignty,willnotbeinferredlightly,butmustbeconstruedinstrictissimijuris.Moreover,theProclamationis
notalegislativeact.TheconsentoftheStatetobesuedmustemanatefromstatutoryauthority.WaiverofState
Immunitycanonlybemadebyanactofthelegislativebody.Adapted.

Begosav.Chairman,PhilippineVeteransAdm.,32SCRA466(1970)
F:GaudencioBegosa,plaintiffappellee,wasan"enlistedmenofthePhil.CommonwealthArmy,inductedintheservice
oftheUSAFFE"havingtaken"activeparticipationinthebattleofBataan"aswellasthe"liberationdriveagainstthe
enemy"thereafterbecame"permanentlyincapacitatedfromworkduetoinjurieshesustainedinlineofdutyxxx."
Pltff.filedhisclaimfordisabilitypensionasfarbackas3/4/55;butitwaserroneouslydisapprovedon6/21/55,
bec.hisdishonorabledischargefromtheArmywasnotagoodorpropergroundforthesaiddisapproval,andthaton
reconsiderationaskedforbyhimon11/1/57,w/checontinuedtofollowup,theBoardofAdministrators,Phil.Veterans
Admin.,finallyapprovedhisclaimon9/2/64,attherateofP30/mo.JudgeSorianonotedthat:"haditnotbeenforthesaid
error,itappearsthattherewasnogoodgroundtodenythesaidclaim,sothelatterwasvalidandmeritoriousevenasofthe
dateofitsfilingon3/4/55,hencetomakethesameeffectiveonlyasofthedateofitsapprovalon9/2/64accordingto
def'sstandwouldbegreatlyunfairandprejudicialtopltff.
TheappealassignsasoneerrorwhatitconsiderstobethefailingoftheLCinnotholdingthatthecomplaintin
thiscaseisineffectasuitagainsttheStatew/chasnotgivenitsconsentthereto.

HELD:ItdoesnotadmitofdoubtthatifthesuitwereinfactagainsttheState,theLCshouldhavedismissed
thecomplaint.Norisittobedoubtedthatwhileostensiblyanactionmaybeagainstapublicofficial,thedef.
mayinreality bethe govt. Asaresult,itisequallywellsettledthatwherealitigationmay haveadverse
consequencesonthepublictreasury,whetherinthedisbursementoffundsorlossofprop.,thepublicofficial
proceededagainstnotbeingliableinhispersonalcapacity,thenthedoctrineofnonsuabilitymayappropriately
beinvoked.Ithasnoapplication,however,wherethesuitagainstsuchafunctionaryhadtobeinstitutedbec.of
hisfailuretocomplyw/thedutyimposedbystatute appropriating public fundsforthebenefitofpltff.or
petitioner.Suchisthepresentcase.
xxxHowever,wherethejudgementinsuchacasewouldresultnotonlyintherecoveryofpossessionof
theprop.infavorofsaidcitizenbutalsoinachargeagainstorfinancialliab.oftheGovt,thenthesuitshouldbe
regardedasoneagainstthegovtitself,andconsequently,itcannotprosperorbevalidlyentertainedbythecourts
exceptw/theconsentofsaidGovt.RAM.

DelMarv.PhilippineVeteransAdm(PVA),51SCRA340(1973)
F:

DelMaraverredthatheservedduringWWIIaschiefjudgeadvocateoftheCebuAreaCommand(aduly
recognizedguerrillaorg.)w/therankofmajor;thathesubsequentlyobtainedanhonorabledischargefromtheserviceon
10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and
adjudication,thePhil.VeteransBdgrantedhimamonthlylifepensionofP50effective1/28/47;thatin3/50,thesaidBd.
discontinuedpaymentofmonthlylifepensiononthegroundthathisreceiptofsimilarpensionfromtheUSGovt,thruthe
USVeteransAdmin.byreasonofmilitaryservicerenderedintheUSintheFarEastduringthewar,precludedhimfrom
receivinganyfurthermonthlylifepensionfromthePhil.Govt;thathewrotethesaidBd.twice,demandingthecontinued
paymentofhismonthlypensionbuthisdemandswentunheeded.Andpetitionformandamuswasfiledw/CFICebuw/c
renderedjudgmentupholdingDelMar'sclaim.
ThePVAarguesthatthecourtaquowasw/ojurisdictiontotrythecivilcasebec.itinvolvesamoneyclaim
againstPVAamereagencyoftheGovtperforminggovernmentalfunctionsw/nojuridicalpersonalityofitsownand,in
reality,partakesofanactionagainstthePhil.Govtw/cisimmunefromsuitw/oitsconsent.

HELD:Asageneralproposition,theruleontheimmunityoftheGovtfromsuitw/oitsconsentholdstrueinall

actionsresultingin"adverseconsequencesonthepublictreasury,whetherinthedisbursementsoffundsorloss
ofprop.Needlesstosay,insuchactions,w/c,ineffect,constitutesuitsagainsttheGovt,thecourthasnooption
buttodismissthem. Nonetheless,theruleadmitsofanexception. Itfindsnoapplicationwhereaclaimant
institutesanactionagainstafunctionarywhofailstocomplyw/hisstatutorydutytoreleasetheamountclaimed
fromthepublicfundsalreadyappropriatedbystatuteforthebenefitofthesaidclaimant.Asclearlydiscernible
fromthecircumstances,thecaseatbarfallsundertheexception.RAM.

ShaufvCA,191SCRA713(1990)
Doctrineofimmunityfromsuitwillnotapplyandmaynotbeinvokedwherethepublicofficialisbeingsuedin
hisprivateandpersonalcapacityasanordinarycitizen.
F:

ByreasonofhernonselectiontoapositionatClarkAirBase,Shauffiledanequalopportunitycomplaintagainst
officersofClarkAirBase,forallegeddiscriminationagainsttheformerbyreasonofhernationalityandsex.Shethenfiled
acomplaintfordamageswiththeRTC.RespondentsfiledaMTDonthegroundthatasofficersoftheUSArmedForces
performingofficialfunctionsinaccordancewiththepowersvestedinthem,theyareimmunefromsuit.
Shaufcontendsthattheofficersarebeingsuedintheirprivatecapacityfordiscriminatoryactsperformedbeyond
theirauthority,hencetheinstantactionisnotasuitagainsttheUSGovt.whichwouldrequireitsconsent.Accordingto
respondents,thecomplaintisbarredbytheimmunityoftheUSsincetheactssueduponaregovernmentalactivitiesofthe
US.

HELD:1.Thegeneralruleisthatastatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.Whilethedoctrineappearsto
prohibitonlysuitsagainstthestatewithoutitsconsent,itisalsoapplicabletocomplaintsfiledagainstofficials
ofthestateforactsallegedlyperformedbytheminthedischargeoftheirduties.Theruleisthatifthejudgment
againstsuchofficialswillrequirethestateitselftoperformanaffirmativeacttosatisfythesame,suchasthe
appropriationoftheamountneededtopaythedamagesawardedagainstthem,thesuitmustberegardedas
againstthestateitself,althoughithasnotbeenformallyimpleaded.
2.Itisadifferentmatterwherethepublicofficialismadetoaccountinhiscapacityassuchforacts
contrarytolawandinjurioustotherightsofplaintiff.InasmuchastheStateauthorizesonlylegalactsbyits
officers,unauthorizedactsofgovt.officialsorofficers arenotactsoftheState, and an action againstthe
officialsorofficersbyonewhoserightshavebeeninvadedorviolatedbysuchacts,fortheprotectionofhis
rights,isnotasuitagainsttheStatewithintheruleofimmunityoftheStatefromsuit.Thedoctrineofstate
immunitycannotbeusedasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjustice.
3.Thecloakofimmunityisremovedfromthemomentthepublicofficialissuedinhisindividual
capacitysuchaswhereheactswithoutauthorityorinexcessofthepowersvestedinhim.Apublicofficialmay
beliableinhispersonalcapacityforwhateverdamagehemayhavecausedbyhisactdonewithmaliceandin
badfaith,orbeyondthescopeofhisauthorityorjurisdiction.Inthiscase,theofficersareliablefordamages.
Adapted.

RepublicvSandoval,220SCRA124(1993)

Hereinpublicofficials,havingbeenfoundtohaveactedbeyondthescopeoftheirauthority,maybeheldliable
fordamages.
F:

Theheirsofthe12rallyistswhoperishedduringtheMendiolamassacrefiledanactionfordamages.Suchaction
wasfiledagainstthegovernment.ThiswasbyvirtueofarecommendationmadebytheCitizen'sMendiolaCommission
(createdforthepurposeofconductinganinvestigationofthedisorder,deathsandcasualtiesthattookplaceduringthe
Mendiolaincident.)thattheheirsandwoundedvictimsoftheincidentbecompensatedbytheGovt.Notwithstandingsuch
recommendation,noconcreteformofcompensationwasreceivedbythevictims.TheCayloGroup(thegroupofmarchers
inthesaidincident)filedaformalletterofdemandfromthegovt. Stillunheededforalmostayear,thegroupfiledan
actionagainstthegovt,togetherw/themilitaryofficersandpersonnelinvolvedintheincidentbeforethetrialcourt.Resp.
JudgedismissedthecomplaintasagainsttheRPonthegroundthattherewasnowaiverbytheSate.

HELD:1.Theprincipleofimmunityfromsuitisbasedontheveryessenceofsovereignty,andonthepractical
groundthattherecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawonwhichtherightdepends.It
alsorestsonreasonsofpublicpolicythatpublicservicewouldbehindered,andthepublicendangered,ifthe
sovereignauthoritycouldbesubjectedtolawsuitsattheinstanceofeverycitizenandconsequentlycontrolledin
theusesanddispositionsofthemeansrequiredfortheproperadministrationofthegovernment.
2.ThisisnotasuitagainsttheStatewithitsconsent.Firstly,therecommendationmadebytheMendiola
Commissionregardingindemnificationoftheheirsandthevictimsoftheincidentbythegovernmentdoesnot
inanywaymeanthatliabilityautomaticallyattachestotheState.TheCommissionwasmerelyafactfinding
bodyanditsrecommendationwasnotfinalandexecutory.Secondly,whateveractsorutterancesthatPresident
Aquinomayhavedoneorsaid,thesamearenottantamounttotheStatehavingwaiveditsimmunityfromsuit.
Althoughconsenttobesuedmaybegivenimpliedly,suchconsentwasnotgiveninthiscase.
3.SomeinstanceswhenasuitagainsttheStateisproperare:
(1)whentheRepublicissuedbyname;
(2)whenthesuitisagainstanunincorporatedgovt.agency;
(3)whenthesuitisonitsfaceagainstagovt.officerbutthecaseissuchthattheultimateliabilitywill
belongnottotheofficerbuttothegovt.
Inthiscase,whiletheRepublicissuedbyname,theultimateliabilitydoesnotpertaintothegovt.
Although the military officers were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalizeirresponsibilityandnonaccountabilitynorgrantaprivilegedstatusnotclaimedbyanyother
officialoftheRepublic.
Theprincipleofstateimmunityfromsuitdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,whenthereliefdemandedby
thesuitrequiresnoaffirmativeofficialactiononthepartoftheStatenortheaffirmativedischargeofany
obligationw/cbelongstotheStateinitspoliticalcapacity, eventhoughtheofficersoragentswhoaremade
defendantsclaimtoholdoractonlybyvirtueofatitleofthestateandasitsagentsandservants.
Theyarethereforeliablefordamages.Adapted.

(c)Consenttobesued
Howconsentisgiven
Theconsenttobesued,inordertobeeffective,mustcomefromtheState,actingthroughadulyenacted
statute.Waiverofstateimmunitycanonlybemadebyanactoflegislativebody.
InRepublicvPurissima,78SCRA470(1977),theSCheldthatacontractenteredintobytheRiceand
CornAdministrationstipulatingthatintheeventofbreach,actionmaybefiledbytheparties,cannotbethe
basisofamoneyclaimagainsttheRCA,agovernmententityundertheOfficeofthePresident,sincetheRCA
hadnoauthoritytobindthegovernmenttobesued.Onlyastatutecould.

Republicv.Purissima,78SCRA470(1977)
SuabilityoftheState.TheNeedforaStatuteGivingConsent
F:

TheRice&CornAdministration(RCA)enteredintoacontractw/theYellowBallFreightLinesinw/cthey
agreedthatintheeventofbreach,actionmaybefiledw/thecourtsofMla.In1972,Yellowfiledamoneyclaimagainst
RCA.Thecasewasassignedtoresp.Judge.,whodeniedamotiontodismissfiledbyRCArelyingonthestipulationinthe
contractoftheparties.

HELD:TheRCAispartofthegovt,beinginfactanofficeundertheOfficeofthePres.andthereforecannotbe
suedw/otheconsentoftheState.Theconsenttobeeffective....mustcomefromtheState,actingthruaduly
enactedstatute. Thus,whatevercounselfordef.RCAagreedtohadnobindingforceinthegovt. Thatwas
clearlybeyondthescopeofhisauthority.
InRepublicvFeliciano,148SCRa424,theSCheldthattheProclamationofthePresidentofthePhil
ippines(recognizingprivaterightstotheland)cannotbethesourceofconsent,sincetheProclamationisnota
legislativeact.VV.

RepublicvFeliciano,supra.

Expressconsent:
(1)Moneyclaimsarisingfromcontracts,expressorimplied.
ActNo.3083. AnActDefiningtheConditionsunderwhichtheGovernmentofthePhilippines
maybeSued.
Sec.1.SubjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct,theGovernmentofthePhilippinesherebyconsentsandsubmits

tobesueduponanymoneyedclaiminvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,whichcouldserve
asabasisofcivilactionbetweenprivateparties.
Sec.2.Apersondesiringtoavailhimselfoftheprivilegehereinconferredmustshowthathehaspresented
hisclaimtotheCommissiononAuditandthatthelatterdidnotdecidethesamewithintwomonthsfromthedateof
itspresentation.
Sec.3.OriginalactionsbroughtpursuanttotheauthorityconferredinthisActshallbeinstitutedinthe
RegionalTrialCourtoftheCityofManilaoroftheprovincewheretheclaimantresides,attheoptionofthelatter,
uponwhichcourtexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionisherebyconferredtohearanddeterminesuchactions.
Sec.4.Actionsinstitutedasaforesaidshallbegovernedbythesamerulesofprocedure,bothoriginaland
appellate,asifthelitigantswereprivateparties.
Sec.5.WhentheGovernmentofthePhilippinesisplaintiffinanactioninstitutedinanycourtoforiginal
jurisdiction,thedefendantshallhavetherighttoasserttherein,bywayofsetofforcounterclaiminasimilaraction
betweenprivateparties.
Sec.6. ProcessinactionsbroughtagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippinespursuanttotheauthority
grantedinthisActshallbeservedupontheSolicitorGeneralwhosedutyitshallbetoappearandmakedefense,
eitherhimselforthroughdelegates.
Sec.7.NoexecutionshallissueuponanyjudgmentrenderedbyanycourtagainsttheGovernmentofthe
PhilippinesundertheprovisionsofthisAct;butacopythereofdulycertifiedbytheclerkoftheCourtinwhich
judgmentisrenderedshallbetransmittedbysuchclerktothePresidentofthePhilippines,withinfivedaysafterthe
samebecomesfinal.
Sec.8.ThePresidentofthePhilippines,atthecommencementofeachregularsessionoftheLegislature,
shalltransmittothatbodyforappropriateactionalldecisionssoreceivedbyhim,andifsaidbodydeterminethat
paymentshouldbemade,itshallappropriatethesumwhichtheGovernmenthasbeensentencedtopay,including
thesameintheappropriationsfortheensuingyear.
Sec.9.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval.
Approved,March16,1923.

Com.Act327. AnActFixingtheTimewithinwhichtheAuditorGeneralshallRenderHisDecisionsand
PrescribingtheMannerofAppealTherefrom.
Sec.1.Inallcasesinvolvingthesettlementofaccountsorclaims,otherthanthoseofaccountableofficers,
theAuditorGeneralshallactanddecidethesamewithinsixtydays,exclusiveofSundaysandholidays,aftertheir
presentation.Ifsaidaccountsorclaimsneedreferencetootherpersons,officeoroffices,ortoapartyinterested,
theperiodaforesaidshallbecountedfromthetimethelastcommentnecessarytoaproperdecisionisreceivedby
him. Withrespecttotheaccountsofaccountableofficers,theAuditorGeneralshallactonthesamewithinone

hundreddaysaftertheirsubmission,Sundaysandholidaysexcepted.
IncaseofaccountsorclaimsalreadysubmittedtobutstillpendingdecisionbytheAuditorGeneralonor
beforetheapprovalofthisAct,theperiodsprovidedinthissectionshallcommencefromthedateofsuchapproval.
Sec.2.ThepartyaggrievedbythefinaldecisionoftheAuditorGeneralinthesettlementofanaccountor
claimmay,withinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthedecision,takeanappealinwriting:
(a)xxx
(b)TothePresidentofthePhilippines,or
(c)TotheSupremeCourtofthePhilippines,iftheappellantisaprivatepersonorentity.
Iftherearemorethanoneappellant,allappealsshallbetakentothesameauthorityresortedtobythefirst
appellant.
FromadecisionadverselyaffectingtheinterestsoftheGovernment,theappealmaybetakenbytheproper
headofthedepartmentorincaseoflocalgovernmentsbytheheadoftheofficeorbranchoftheGovernment
immediatelyconcerned.
TheappealshallspecificallysetforththeparticularactionoftheAuditorGeneraltowhichexceptionis
takenwiththereasonsandauthoritiesreliedonforreversingsuchdecision.
Sec.3.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval.
Approved,June18,1938.

Sec.2ofCA327hasbeenamendedbySec.50ofPD1445andbySec.35,Chapter5,SubtitleB,Title
I,BookV,AdministrativeCodeofthePhilippines,asfollows:
Sec.50.AppealfromdecisionsoftheCommission.Thepartyaggrievedbyanydecision,order,orrulingof
theCommissionmaywithinthirtydaysfromhisreceiptofacopythereofappealoncertioraritotheSupremeCourt
inthemannerprovidedbylawandtheRulesofCourt.Whenthedecision,order,orrulingadverselyaffectsthe
interestsofanygovernmentagency,theappealmaybetakenbytheproperheadofthatagency.(PD1445.)
Sec.35. AppealfromDecisionoftheCommission.Anydecision,orderorrulingoftheCommissionmay
bebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromhisreceiptofacopy
thereofinthemannerprovidedbylawandtheRulesofCourt.Whenthedecision,orderorrulingadverselyaffects
theinterestofanygovernmentagency,theappealmaybetakenbytheproperheadofthatagency.(SubtitleB,Title
I,BookV,AdministrativeCodeofthePhilippines.)

Beforethe1987Constitution,thelawinforcewasAct3038andCA327which,accordingtoSaysonv
Singson(asuittocompelpaymentofelectricalsuppliesdeliveredtoCAA),allowedsuitonlyformoneyclaims
arisingfromcontract,andprovidingaspecialprocedure.
Underthisprocedure,theclaimmustbefiledwiththeAuditorGeneral(now,COA).IftheAuditordid
notactwithin60days,thentheclaimantcouldfilehisclaimwiththeRTC. ButiftheAuditorrendereda
decision,thentheappealcouldbemadetotheSC,unlesstheclaimantwasapublicofficialinwhichcaseappeal
wastothePresident.

Art.IXofthe1987Constitutionnowgivesadifferentprocedure.Allmoneyclaimsaretobefiledwith
COA,whichhas60dayswithinwhichtoact. Ifitfailstosoact,theclaimantmustwaitanyway. Oncea
decisionhasbeenmade,hehas,within30daystoappealbycertioraritotheSC.

Saysonv.Singson,54SCRA282(1973)
F:

In1/67,theOfficeoftheDistrictEngr.requisitionedvarioussparepartsfortherepairofaD8Bulldozer. A
publicbiddingforthesaiditemswasconductedwhereintheawardscommitteeacceptedthewinningbidofP43,530given
bySingkierMotorServiceownedbyresp.Singson.SaidawardwasapprovedbytheSec.ofPublicWorksandComm.who
thendirectedtheimmediatedeliveryoftheparts.Induecourse,thevoucherw/ccoveredthetransactionreachedthehands
ofpetitionerHighwayAuditorSaysonwhothenmadeinquiriesaboutthereasonablenessoftheprice.Afterfindingthe
pricereasonable(aswasevidencedbytheindorsementsoftheDiv.Engr.andtheComm.ofPublicHighways,theapproval
of the Sec.of PW & C, andtheverificationofthe representativeofthe Bureau ofSupplyCoordination), petitioner
approvedandeffectedpaymentofthevoucherandwithheldthe20%equivalentofP8,706inordertosubmitthedocuments
coveringthetransactiontotheSupervisingAuditorforreview. Aftermakingacanvass,theGeneralAuditingOffice
determinedthetransactiontobeoverpricedbyatleastP40,000.Malversationchargeswerefailedagainstthedistrictengr.
andcivilengr.involved.Amandamussuitwasfiledbytheresp.w/csoughttocompelpetitionergovernmentauditorsto
approvethepaymentofthevouchercoveringthebalance.TheLCdecidedinfavorofresp.Singson.Hencethisappealby
certiorari.

HELD:Itisapparentthatresp.Singson'scauseofactionisamoneyclaimagainsttheGovt,forthepaymentof
theallegedbalanceofthecostofsparepartssuppliedbyhimtotheBureauofPublicHighways. Assuming
momentarilythevalidityofsuchclaim,mandamusisnottheremedytoenforcethecollectionofsuchclaim
againsttheState***,butanordinaryactionforspecificperformance***.Actually,thesuitdisguisedasonefor
mandamustocompeltheAuditorstoapprovethevouchersforpayment,isasuitagainsttheState,w/ccannot
prosperorbeentertainedbytheCourtexceptw/theconsentoftheState***.Inotherwords,theresp.should
havefiledhisclaimw/theGeneralAuditingOffice,undertheprovisionsofCA327***w/cprescribethe
conditionsunderw/cmoneyclaimagainstthegovernmentmaybefiled.
xxxItistruethatonceconsentissecured,anactionmaybefiled.ThereisnothingtopreventtheState,
however,insuchstatutorygrant,torequirethatcertainadministrativeproceedingsbehadandbeexhausted.
Also,intheproperforuminthejudicialhierarchycanbespecifiedifthereafteranappealwouldbetakenbythe
partyaggrieved.Here,therewasnorulingoftheAuditorGen.Evenhadtherebeensuch,thecourttow/cthe
mattershouldhavebeenelevatedisthisTribunal;theLCcouldnotlegallyactonthematter.Adapted.

(2)Quasidelictscommittedbyspecialagents
Art.2180.Theobligationimposedbyarticle2176isdemandablenotonlyforone'sownactsoromissions,
butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhomoneisresponsible.
xxx
TheStateisresponsibleinlikemannerwhenitactsthroughaspecialagent,butnotwhenthedamagehas
beencausedbytheofficialtowhomthetaskdoneproperlypertains,inwhichcasewhatisprovidedinArt.2176
shallbeapplicable.

xxx(CivilCode.)
Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,isobliged
topayforthedamagedone.Suchfaultornegligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractualrelationbetweenthe
parties,iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthisChapter.(ibid.)

Art.2180oftheCivilCodeallowsasuitagainstthegovernmentforquasidelictscommittedbythe
governmentwhenactingthroughspecialagents(thoseperformingnonregularfunctions)
Butifthetortiousactwascommittedbyaregularemployee,theinjuredpartycouldonlybringasuitfor
damagesagainsttheemployeeinhispersonalcapacity.
Itshouldbenotedinthisconnection,thatinMerrittvsGovt.ofthePhilippineIslands,34Phil311,the
SCsaidthatitisthereforeevidentthattheStateisonlyliableforactsofitsagents,officersandEEswhenthey
actasspecialagentswithinthemeaningofArt.1903(nowArt.2180)andthatthechauffeuroftheambulanceof
theGeneralHospitalwasnotsuchagent. Inthiscase,thePhilippine GeneralHospital(PGH),theagency
involved,didnotyethaveseparatelegalpersonalityfromthePhilippineGovt.Itshouldfurtherbenotedthatthe
plaintiffwasallowedtosuebyvirtueofaspeciallawbutwasunabletoholdthedefendantgovt.liablesincethe
injurieswerecausedbyaregulardriverofthegovt.andnotaspecialagent.

MerrittvGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,34Phil311
F:

Merritt,whileridinghismotorcyclewashitbyanambulanceownedbythePhilippineGeneralHospital.Itwas
drivenbyadriveremployedbythehospital. InorderforMerritttosuethePhilippinegovernment,ActNo.2457was
enactedbythePhilippineLegislatureauthorizingE.MerritttobringsuitagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands
andauthorizingtheAttorneyGeneralofsaidIslandstoappearinsaidsuit.AsuitwasthenfiledbeforetheCFIofManila
whichfixedtheresponsibilityforthecollisionsolelyontheambulancedriveranddeterminedtheamountofdamagestobe
awardedtoMerritt.Bothpartiesappealedfromthedecision,plaintiffMerrittastotheamountofdamagesanddefendant
inrenderingtheamountagainstthegovernment.

ISSUE:DidthedefendantinenactingActNo.2457simplywaiveitsimmunityfromsuitordiditalsoconcede
itsliabilitytotheplaintiff?
HELD:Byconsentingtobesued,astatesimplywaivesitsimmunityfromsuit.Itdoesnottherebyconcedeits
liability totheplaintiff,orcreateanycauseofaction inhisfavor,orextend its liability toanycausenot
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the
jurisdictionofthecourt,subjecttoitsrighttointerposeanylawfuldefense.
ActNo.2457authorizesE.Merritttobringsuitforthepurposeoffixingtheresponsibilityforthe
collisionanddeterminingtheamountofdamages,ifany,towhichE.Merrittisentitledonaccountofsaid
collision.ThegovernmentdidnotassumeanyliabilityundertheAct.

TheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsisonlyliable,fortheactsofitsagents,officersandemployees
whentheyactasspecialagentswithinthemeaningofparagraph5ofA1903,OCC(par.6,Art.2180,NCC).A
specialagentisonewhoreceivesadefiniteandfixedorderorcommission,foreigntotheexerciseoftheduties
ofhisofficeifheisaspecialofficial.Thespecialagentactsinrepresentationofthestateandexecutesthetrust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who onhis own responsibility performs the functions w/c are inherent in and naturally
pertaintohisofficeandw/careregulatedbylawandtheregulations.TheresponsibilityoftheStateislimited
tothatw/citcontractsthroughaspecialagent,dulyempoweredbyadefiniteorderorcommissiontoperform
someactorchargedw/somedefinitepurposew/cgivesrisetotheclaim,andnotweretheclaimisbasedonacts
oromissionsimputabletoapublicofficialchargedw/someadministrativeortechnicalofficewhocanbeheld
totheproperresponsibilityinthemannerlaiddownbythelawofcivilresponsibility. Thechauffeurofthe
ambulanceoftheGeneralHospitalwasnotsuchanagent.Adapted.

USv.Ceballos,182SCRA644
F:

Resp. was employed as barracks boy in Camp O'Donnel, and was arrested following a buybust operation
conductedbypetitioners,whoareofficersoftheUSAirForceandspecialagentsoftheAirForceOfficeofSpecial
Investigators.Petitionersfiledchargesagainstresp.forviolationofRA6425andtestifiedagainsthimatthetrial.Resp
wasdismissedfromemploymentasaresultofthefilingofthecharge. Resp.filedacomplaintfordamagesagainst
petitionersforhisremoval.Defendants(petitionersherein)filedtheaffirmativedefensethattheyhadonlydonetheirduty
intheenforcementofPhil.lawsinsidetheAmericanbasespursuanttotheRPUSMBA. Later,theircounselfileda
motiontowithdrawanswerandmovedforthedismissalofthecomplaintonthegroundthatdefendantswereactingintheir
officialcapacityandthatthecomplaintagainstthemwasineffectasuitagainsttheUSw/oitsconsent.

HELD: Petitionerscannotbedirectlyimpleadedforactsimputabletotheirprincipalw/chasnotgivenits
consenttobesued.Petitionerswereactingintheexerciseoftheirofficialfunctionswhentheyconductedthe
buybustoperation.
Pvt resp. invoke Art. 2180, NCCw/c holds the govt liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument,itwouldseem,ispremisedonthegroundthatsincetheofficersaredesignatedas"specialagents,"the
USgovtshouldbeliablefortheirtorts.
Suabilityv.Liability. Thereseemstobeafailuretodistinguishbet.suabilityandliability. Suability
dependsontheconsentofthestatetobesued,liabilityontheapplicablelawandtheestablishedfacts. The
circumstancethatastateissuabledoesnotnecessarilymeanthatitisliable;ontheotherhand,itcanneverbe
heldliableifitdoesnotfirstconsenttobesued.Liabilityisnotconcededbythemerefactthatthestatehas
alloweditselftobesued.Whenthestatedoeswaiveitssovereignimmunity,itisonlygivingthepltffthechance
toprove,itcan,thatthedef.isliable.
Thesaidart.establishesaruleofliability,notsuability.Thegovtmaybeheldliableunderthisart.only
ifitfirstallowsitselftobesuedthroughanyoftheacceptedformsofconsent.
Moreover,theagentperforminghisregularfunctionsisnotaspecialagentevenifheissodenominated,
asinthecaseatbar.Nolessimportant,thesaidprovisionappearstoregulateonlytherelationsofthelocalstate
w/itsinhabitantsand,hence,appliesonlytothePhil.govtandnottoforeigngovtsimpleadedinourcourts.
WerejecttheconclusionofthetrialcourtthattheanswerfiledbythespecialcounseloftheOfficeof
theSheriffJudgeAdvocateofClarkAirBasewasasubmissionbytheUSgovttoitsjurisdiction. Express

waiverofimmunitycannotbemadebyamerecounselofthegovtbutmustbeeffectedthroughadulyenacted
statute.Neitherdoessuchanswercomeundertheimpliedformsofconsent.
NOTESontheconsolidatedcasesUSv.Guinto,etal.:
1.Thedoctrineofstateimmunityissometimesderisivelycalledthe"royalprerogativeofdishonesty"
becauseoftheprivilegeitgrantsthestatetodefeatanylegitimateclaimagainstitbysimplyinvokingitsnon
suability.ThisimplieshoweverthattheStatemaybesuedwithitsconsent.
2.Theconsentofthestatetobesuedmaybemanifestedexpresslyorimpliedly.Expressconsentmaybe
embodiedinagenerallaworaspeciallaw. Expressconsentiseffectedonlybythewill ofthelegislature
throughthemediumofadulyenactedstatute.Consentisimpliedwhenthestateentersintoacontractorititself
commenceslitigation.Whenthegovt.entersintoacontract,itisdeemedtohavedescendedtothelevelofthe
othercontractingpartyanddivestedofitssovereignimmunityfromsuitwithitsimpliedconsent.However,dis
tinctionsmustbemadebetweensovereignandproprietaryacts.Thestatemayonlybeliableforproprietaryacts.
Asforthefilingofacomplaintbythegovt.,suabilitywillresultonlywherethegovt.isclaimingafffirmative
relieffromthedefendant.
3.ThereisnoquestionthattheUSwillbedeemedtohaveimpliedlywaiveditsnonsuabilityifithas
enteredintoacontractinitsproprietaryorprivatecapacity.Itisonlywhenthecontractinvolvesitssovereignor
governmentalcapacitythatnosuchwaivermaybeimplied.
4.Inthiscase,byenteringintoanemploymentcontract[aproprietaryfunction]withtherespondents,
the US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The state could therefore be sued since such
contractsarecommercialinnature.Adapted.

(3)Incorporationofgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorps.
Whenthegovernmentcreatesacorporation,itinvariablyprovidesthiscorporationaseparateentityand
with the capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit
encompassesanykindofaction,includingonefromtort.
In SSSvCA,120SCRA707(1983),thepropertyofoneSocorroCruzwasforeclosed duetothe
negligenceoftheregularemployeesofSSSinmistakingheraccount,whichwasupdated,withthatofanother
SocorroCruz,whichwasinarrears.TheSC,ingrantingnominaldamagestotheclaimant,seemedtobesaying
thatSSScouldhaveinvokedthedefenseofArt.2180,whichitdidnot. TheseparateopinionofMakasiar
enunciatedthis.[Note:Consenttobesuedincludesactionsbasedonquasidelicteventhoughcommittedby
regularagentsandnotbyspecialagents.]
Sotherule,itseems,isthatagovernmententitycanbesuedfortort,butifitis,itcaninvokethedefense
thatitactedthroughitsregularemployees,notspecialagents.

PNBvsCIR,81SCRA314(1978)
SincethePHHChadthecapacitytobesued,anyjudgmentagainstitcouldbeenforcedbyawritofexecution,

anditsfundscouldevenbegarnished.
F:

TheUnitedHomesiteEmployeesandLaborersAssociationofthePeople'sHomesiteandHousingCorporation
(PHHC)inacasefiledbeforetheCourtofIndustrialRelationsprevailedoverPHHC.Thefinalandexecutoryjudgment
wassoughttobeenforcedviaawritofgarnishmentagainstPHHC'sfundsdepositedwithPNB.PNBsoughttoquashthe
writallegingthatthefundswere"publicincharacter."Themotionwasdenied,hencethispetitionforcertiorarialleging
graveabuseofdiscretionindenyingthemotion.

HELD:PHHCwasagovernmentownedentity.Ithaspersonalitydistinctandseparatefromthegovernment.It
hasallthepowersofacorporationundertheCorporationLaw,accordinglyitmaysueandbesuedandmaybe
subjectedtocourtprocessesjustlikeanyothercorporation.Byengaginginbusinessthroughtheinstrumentality
ofacorp.,thegovtdivestsitselfofitssovereigncharacter,soastorenderthecorp.subjecttotherulesgoverning
privatecorporations.Garnishmentisaproperremedyforaprevailingpartytoproceedagainstthefundsofa
corporateentityevenifownedorcontrolledbythegovernment. Itiswellsettledthatwhenthegovernment
enters into commercial business, it abandons itssovereign capacity and istobe treated just like anyother
corporation.(ThecasewasbasedprimarilyonNASSCOvCIR,118Phil782.)VV.

RayovsCFIofBulacan,110SCRA456
F:

Petitioners are among the many victims of the flooding caused by the simultaneous opening of the three
floodgatesofAngatDamduringtheheightoftyphoon"Kading".ThecomplaintstheyfiledbeforetheCFIofBulacan
weredismissedforthereasonthattheNPCintheoperationoftheAngatDamis`performingapurelygovernmental
function,'thusit`cannotbesuedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheState.'RespondentCFIdeniedMRecon,hence,this
petition.

HELD:Thegovernmenthasorganizedaprivatecorporation,putmoneyinitandhasallowedittosueandbe
suedinanycourtunderitscharter[RA6395,Sec.3(d)].Asagovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporation,it
hasapersonalityofitsown,distinctandseparatefromthatoftheGovernment(NASSCOvCIR).Moreover,the
charterprovisionthattheNPCcan"sueandbesuedinanycourt"iswithoutqualificationonthecauseofaction
andaccordinglyitcanincludeatortclaimsuchastheoneinstitutedbypetitioners.Adapted.

SSSV.CA,120SCRA707(1983)
F:

TheSpousesDavidandSocorroCruzobtainedaloanfromSSSonthesecurityofalotlocatedinSto.Rosario,
Pateros,Rizal.Claimingthatthecouplehaddefaultedinthepaymentofthemonthlyamortizations,theSSSappliedfor
theforeclosureofthemortgage.Asaresultthesheriffscheduledthesaleoftheprop.mortgagedandnoticeofthesalewas
published.Itturnedoutthatwhilethecouplefailedtopaysomeoftheamortizationsontime,atthetimeoftheapplication
forforeclosure,theiraccountwasuptodate.TheSSSmistookthecouple'saccountforthatofanotheronebearingthe
samenameSocorroCruz,althoughw/differentmiddlename.ThespousessuedSSSfordamages.

HELD:(1)Havingacceptedthelatepaymentsofthemonthlyinstallments,theSSScouldnotsuddenlyandw/o
priornoticetothecoupleapplyfortheextrajudicialforeclosureoftheirmortgage.Therewasnegligenceonthe
partoftheSSSwhenitmistooktheloanaccountofSocorroJ.CruzforthatofSocorroC.Cruz.Itsattention

wascalledtotheerrorbutitrefusedtoacknowledgeitsmistake.SSSshould,thus,beheldliablefornominal
damages.
(2)Underitscharter[RA1161,sec.4(k)]theSSScansueandbesued.So,evenassumingthattheSSS
enjoysimmunityfromsuitasanentityperforminggovernmentalfunctionsbyvirtueoftheexplicitprovisionof
theenablinglaw,itcanbesued.Thegovernmentmustbedeemedtohavewaivedimmunityinrespectofthe
SSS,althoughitdoesnottherebyconcedeitsliability.
Makasiar,dissenting:
xxx. Theprovisionthatitcanbesuedandbesuedmerelyallowsaprivatecitizenaremedyforthe
enforcementofhisrightsbutalwayssubjecttothedefenseofthegovt.SinceunderArt.2180,NCCtheStateis
liablefortortonlywhenitactsthroughspecialagentsbutnotwhenitactsthroughofficialstowhomthetask
doneproperlypertainsandwhoaloneareliablefortheirtorts,theSSScannotbeheldliablefordamagesinthis
case.VV.

Impliedconsent:
(1)Whenthegovernmententersintobusinesscontracts
Whenthegovernmentisintheperformanceofgovernmentalfunction(jureimperii),evenifitenters
intoacontractwithprivatepersons,itcannotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.
ThusinUnitedStatesvRuiz,136SCRA487(1985).acontractfortherepairofwharvesandpiersatthe
navalbaseinSubicwasheldtobeinlinewiththegovernmentalfunctionoftheUSGovernmentandsothe
immunityexisted.
But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary
persons(juregestioni),itcanbesuedlikeanyotherperson.
In Malong vPNR,138SCRA63(1985),itwasheld thatwhen the stateorganized thePhilippine
NationalRailway,itdivesteditselfofitssovereigncapacity,andsobecameliablefordamagesthatarosefrom
thedeathofonewhofellfromanoverloadedtrain.

UnitedStatesofAmericav.Ruiz,136SCRA487(1985)
StateImmunityfromSuitsExtendstocontractsRelatingtoSovereignFunctions.
F:

In5/72,theUSadvertisedforbidprojectsinvolvingtherepairofwharvesandcertainworksontheshorelinesat
itsnavalbaseinSubic,Zambales.EligiodeGuzman&Co.,Inc.(EG&Co.)submittedproposalsinconnectionw/w/cit
received2telegramsfromtheUSgovtaskingittoconfirmitspriceproposalsandthenameofitsbondingco.However,in
6/82,EG&Co.wasinformedthatitsproposalshadbeenrejectedandtheprojectshadbeenawardedto3rdparties.EG&
Co.broughtsuitintheCFItocompeltheUSgovttoallowittoperformtheworkontheprojects.Italsoaskedforawritof
prel.inj.torestraintheUSgovtfromenteringintocontractw/3rdpartiesforworkontheprojects.TheUSgovtmovedto
dismissthecomplaint,butitsmotionwasdenied.Hencethepetitionforreview.

HELD: Ithasbeennecessarytodistinguishbet.sovereignandgovernmentalacts(jureimperii)andprivate,
commercialandproprietaryacts(juregestionis.)TheresultisthatStateimmunitynowextendsonlytoactsjure
imperii.However,theresp.Judgeheldthatbyenteringintoacontractfortherepairofwharvesorshorelinesthe
Statedidnotactinitsgovernmentalcapacity.
Astatemaybesaidtohavedescendedtothelevelofanindividualandcanthusbedeemedtohave
tacitlygivenitsconsenttobesuedonlywhenitentersintobusinesscontracts.Theruledoesnotapplywhere
thecontractrelatestotheexerciseofitssovereignfunctions.
Inthiscasetheprojectsareanintegralpartofthenavalbasew/cisdevotedtothedefenseofboththe
USandthePhils.,indisputablyafunctionofthegovtofthehighestorder;theyarenotutilizedfor,nordedicated
to,commercialorbusinesspurpose.VV.

MalongvPNR,138SCRA63(1985)
PNRnotImmunefromSuit
F:

ThepetitionerssuedthePhilippineNationalRailway(PNR)fordamagesforthedeathoftheirsonwhofellfrom
anoverloadedPNRtrainon10/30/77.However,thetrialcourtdismissedthesuitonthegroundthat,underitscharteras
amendedbyPD741,thePNRhadbeenmadeagovernmentinstrumentality,andthatassuchitisimmunefromsuit.

HELD: Thecorrectruleisthat"notallgovernmententities,whethercorporateornoncorporate,areimmune
fromsuits.Immunityfromsuitisdeterminedbythecharacteroftheobjectsforw/ctheentityisorganized."
Whenthegovtentersintoacommercialtransactionitabandonsitssovereigncapacityandistobetreatedlike
anyothercorp.Inthiscase,thestatedivesteditselfofitssovereigncapacitywhenitorganizedthePNR,w/cis
nodifferentfromitspredecessor,theManilaRailroadCo.VV.

(2)Whenitwouldbeinequitableforthestatetoinvokeitsimmunity,orwhenittakesprivateproperty
forpublicuseorpurpose.
InAmigablevCuenca,(43SCRA360),AlfonsovPasayandMinisteriovCFI,40SCRA464,theSC
allowedsuitfortherecoveryofpossessionoftitledlandspreviously(decades)takenoverbythegovernmentfor
expansionofroadswithoutjustcompensationandtheproperexpropriationproceedings.Insoholding,itsaid
thatitwouldbeunjustforthegovernmenttoinvokeimmunityafterithasitselfviolatedtherightsoftheparties
claimantbytakingoverthepossessionofthelands.
InSantiagovRepublic,87SCRA294(1978),theSCallowedtherevocationofadeedofdonationmade
totheBureauofPlantIndustryforitsfailuretocomplywiththeconditionthatitshouldinstallalightningand
watersystemonthepropertyandbuildanofficebuildingwithparkinglotbeforeacertaindate.Itwouldbe

unfair,saidthecourt,forthegovernmenttoinvokeitsimmunityaftergratuitouslyreceivingpropertyandnot
fulfillingitsconditions.
ThecaseofCommissionerofPublicHighwaysvsBurgos,96SCRA831,simplyimplementedtheruling
inAmigablevsCuenca,43SCRA360.Intheearliercase,thequestionraisedwastherightoftheplaintifftosue
thegovt.forrecoveryofthevalueofherpropertywhichhadbeenconvertedintopublicstreetswithoutpayment
toherofjustcompensation.AlthoughitwasshownthatshehadnotpreviouslyfiledherclaimwiththeAuditor
Generalasnormallyrequired,theSCdecidedinherfavor.TheSCheldthatthedoctrineofgovernmental
immunityfromsuitcannotserveasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjusticeonacitizen.Inthisinstantcase,
theSCfixedjustcompensationbasedonthemarketvalueofthelandatthetimeofthetaking.

Santiagov.Republic,87SCRA284(1978)
ConsenttobeSuedPresumedwhereAllowanceofImmunityWouldbeInequitable
F:

PetitionerfiledanactionintheCFIofZamboangaCityfortherevocationofadeedofdonationw/cheandhis
wifehadmadetotheBureauofPlantIndustry.Heclaimedthatthedoneefailedtocomplyw/theconditionofthedonation
thatthedoneeshouldinstallalightingandwatersystemontheprop.andbuildanofficebuildingw/parkinglotthereon
notlaterthan12/7/74.Thetrialcourtdismissedtheactiononthegroundofsovereignimmunity.

HELD:Ordinarily,asuitofthisnaturecannotprosper.Itwould,however,bemanifestlyunfairforthegovt,as
donee,w/cisallegedtohaveviolatedtheconditionunderw/citreceivedgratuitouslycertainprop.,toinvokeits
immunity.Sinceitwouldbeagainstequityandjusticetoallowsuchadefenseinthiscase,consenttobesued
couldbepresumed.VV.

CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvBurgos,96SCRA831(1980)
F:

Priv. respondent Victoria Amigable was the owner of a parcel of land in Cebu City; sometime in 1924 the
Governmenttookthislandforroadrightofwaypurpose.In1959,shefiledintheCFIofCebuacomplaintforrecoveryof
ownershipandpossessionplusdamages. Thiscomplaintwasdismissedonthegroundsofestoppelandthestatuteof
limitationsandalsoonthegroundofnonsuabilityoftheGovernment.TheSConappealreversedtheCFIandremanded
the case for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid Amigable, directing that to determine just
compensationfortheland,thebasisshouldbethepriceorvaluethereofatthetimeofthetaking.Respondentjudge,
howeverdidnotheedthedirectivebutinsteadtookintoaccountsuperveninginflationofthecurrencyandadjustedthe
valueinaccordancewiththeprevailingpesodollarexchangerate.HisbasiswasArticle1250oftheCivilCode.TheSol
Genappealedthedecision.

HELD:Art.1250appliesonlytocaseswhereacontractoragreementisinvolved.Itdoesnotapplywherethe
obligationtopayarisesfromlaw,independentofcontract.ThetakingofprivatepropertybytheGovernmentin
theexerciseofitspowerofeminentdomaindoesnotgiverisetoacontractualobligation. Thevalueofthe
propertyatthetimethegovttookpossessionofthelandinquestion,nottheincreasedvalueresultingfromthe

passageoftime,w/cinvariablybringsunearnedincrementtorealestate,representsthevaluetobepaidasjust
compensationfortheprop.taken.Adapted.

(3)IftheGovt.filesacomplaint,defendantmayfileacounterclaimagainstit
InFroilanvsOrientalPanShipping,GRL6060(Sept.30,1950),theSCheldthatwhentheStateitself
filesacomplaint,thedefendantisentitledtofileacounterclaimagainstit.Thisisbasedonequitablegrounds.
TheSCruledthatthegovt.impliedlyalloweditselftobesuedwhenitfiledacomplaintininterventionforthe
purposeofassertingaclaimforaffirmativereliefagainsttheplaintiff,towit,recoveryofavessel.

FroilanvsOrientalPanShipping,12SCRA276,GRL6060(Sept.30,1950)
F:FroilanpurchasedfromShippingCommissionavesselforP200,000payingP50Tdownpayment.ACMwasexecuted
tosecurethepaymentofthebalance.Forvariousreasonsincludingnonpaymentofinstallments,theCommissiontook
possessionofthevesselandconsideredthecontractofsalecancelled.TheCommissioncharteredanddeliveredsaidvessel
toPanOriental. FroilanappealedfromtheactionoftheCommissionandhewasrestoredtoalltherightsunderthe
originalcontract. However, PanOriental retained thepossessionofthevessel. Froilanfileda complaint torecover
possessionofthevessel.Awritofreplevinwasissued.TheGovtintervenedallegingthatFroilanfailedtopaythebalance
totheCommission;thattheintervenorwasentitledtothepossessionofsaidvesselunderthetermsoftheoriginalcontract
orinorderforittoeffecttheextrajudicialforeclosureofthemortgage.PanOrientalansweredthecomplaintinintervention
prayingthatifRPsucceededinobtainingthepossessionofthevessel,tocomplyw/itsobligationofdeliveringittoPan
Orientalpursuanttotheircontractofbareboatcharterw/optiontopurchase. Complaintininterventionwasdismissed
uponFroilan'spaymentofhisaccounttotheRP.RPfiledamotiontodismissthecounterclaimw/cPanOrientalhadfiled
againstitinviewofthecourt'sorderdismissingthecomplaintinintervention.CounterclaimofPanO.againstRPwas
dismissed.Hence,thisappeal.RPraised,amongothers,asgroundforthedismissalofPanO'scounterclaim,theState's
immunityfromsuit.

HELD: Byfilingitscomplaintinintervention, thegovtineffectwaiveditsrightofnonsuability. Stated

otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged
positionandcamedowntothelevelofthedef.Thelatterautomaticallyacquires,w/incertainlimits,therightto
setupwhateverclaimsandotherdefenseshemighthaveagainsttheState.Adapted.

(d)Scopeofconsent
(1)UnderActNo.3083
Sec.1.SubjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct,theGovernmentofthePhilippinesherebyconsentsandsubmits
tobesueduponanymoneyedclaiminvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,whichcouldserve
asabasisofcivilactionbetweenprivateparties.
xxx

Whenamoneyjudgmentisgivenagainstthegovernment,theordinaryruleforexecutionwouldnot
apply,fortheconsentofthegovernmenttobesuedisonlyuptothepointofjudgment.Ifitdoesnotpay,it
cannotbecompelledtopaybyattachmentorotherwise(howdoesoneattachtheQuezonbridge?)
TheprocedureisforonetofurnishtheOfficeofthePresidentwiththedecisionsoitcouldincludethe
amountinthebudgetforthenextyearasthebasisforappropriation(sincetherecanbenodisbursementof
publicfundsexceptinpursuanceoflaw).
Ifthejudgenonethelessissuesawritofexecutionagainstgovernmentfundsorproperty,noordinary
civilactioncanbefiledagainstthejudge,unlessthereisashowingofmalice.But,areinstatementofthefunds
togovernmentaccountsandrefundbytheprivatepartycanbeordered.(CommissionerofPublicHighwaysv
SanDiego,31SCRA616(1970),reiteratingthecaseofAlsuavJohnson.)

CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvSanDiego,31SCRA616(1970)
F:

On 11/20/40, the Govt filed a complaint for eminent domain (ED) in the CFI for the expropriation of land
belongingtoN.T.HashimneededtoconstructEDSA.On11/25/40,theGovttookpossessionoftheprop.upondepositw/
thecitytreasurerofthesumfixedbythecourtastheprovisionalvalueofallthelotsneededtoconstructtheroad.In1958,
theestateofHashim,throughitsJudicialAdministrator,TomasHashim,filedamoneyclaimw/theQCEngr'sOffice,w/c
wasallegedtobetheFMVoftheprop.inquestion.Nothinghavingcomeoutoftheclaim,theestatefiledacomplaintfor
therecoveryoftheFMVagainsttheBureauofPublicHighways(BPH.)Thepartiesenteredintoacompromiseagreement
w/cwasapprovedbytheCFI.Theestatefiledamotionfortheissuanceofawritofexecution,w/cthecourtgranted.A
noticeofgarnishment,togetherw/awritofexecutionwasservedonPNB,notifyingitthatlevywastherebymadeuponthe
fundsofpetitionerBureauandtheAuditorGeneralondeposit. Resp.Coruna,inhiscapacityasChief,Documentation
StaffofPNB'sLegalDept.,authorizedtheissuanceofacashier'scheckofthebankintheamountofthejudgment/
compromiseagreement. PetitionerscontendthatPNBactedprecipitatelyinhavingdeliveredtheamountw/oaffording
petitioner Bureau a reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment. It demands that the bank credit the
petitioner'saccountw/theamountgarnished.

HELD:Althoughthegovt,aspltff.inexpropriationproceedings,submitsitselftothejurisdictionoftheCourt
andtherebywaivesitsimmunityfromsuit,thejudgementthatisthusrenderedrequiringitspaymentofthe
awarddeterminedasjustcompensationforthecondemnedprop.asaconditionprecedenttothetransfertothe
titletheretoinitsfavor,cannotberealized upon execution. xxx [It] isincumbent uponthelegislatureto
appropriateanyadditionalamount,overandabovetheprovisionaldeposit,thatmaybenecessarytopaythe
awarddeterminedinthejudgment,sincetheGovtcannotkeepthelandanddishonorthejudgment.
xxx TheuniversalrulethatwheretheStategivesitsconsenttobesuedbyprivatepartieseitherby
generalorspeciallaw,itmaylimitclaimant'sclaim"onlyuptothecompletionofproceedingsanteriortothe
stageofexecution"andthatthepoweroftheCourtsendwhenthejudgmentisrendered,sincegovtfundsand
propertiesmaynotbeseizedunderwritsofexecutionorgarnishmenttosatisfysuchjudgments,isbasedon
obviousconsiderationsofpublicpolicy.Disbursementsofpublicfundsmustbecoveredbythecorresponding
appropriationsasrequiredbylaw.ThefunctionsandpublicservicesrenderedbytheStatecannotbeallowedto
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriatedbylaw.RAM.

(2)Underacharter
Whenconsenttobesuedisprovidedbythecharter,theconsentdoesnotstopwiththerendition,but
goesuptothesatisfactionofthejudgment.
InPNBvCIR,81SCRA314(1978),theSCheldthatsincethePHHChadthecapacitytobesued,any
judgmentagainstitcouldbeenforcedbyawritofexecution,anditsfundscouldevenbegarnished.
PNBvCIR,81SCRA314(1978),supra.
(notinV.V.Mendoza'srevisedoutline).
(e)Measureofrecovery
When property has been unlawfully taken by the government so that it is nowcompelled to make
payment,themeasureofrecoveryisthefairmarketvalueofthepropertyatthetimeoftaking(MinisteriovCFI,
40SCRA464).
Thevalueofthepesoinrelationtothedollaratthetimeoftakingcannotbeconsidered.ForArt1250
of the Civil Code concerning supervening inflation has no application in eminent domain cases, being
applicableonlytocontractualobligations[CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvBurgos,96SCRA831(1980)].
Ultimately,thefacevalueofthepesothenistheamounttobepaidnow.

D.Government
1.Governmentisthatinstitutionoraggregateofinstitutionsbywhichanindependentsocietymakesand
carriesoutthoserulesofactionwhicharenecessarytoenablementoliveinasocialstateorwhichareimposed
upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Governmentistheaggregateofauthoritieswhichruleasociety.(USvDorr,2Phil332,339).

U.S.vs.Dorr(2Phil332)
F:

Thedefendants wereconvicteduponacomplaint chargingthem withtheoffenseofwriting,publishing,and

circulatingascurrilouslibelagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesandtheInsularGovernmentofthePhilippine
Islands.ThecomplaintisbaseduponSec.8ofActNo.292oftheCommissionwhichpunishesanypersonwhoshall
"utterseditiouswordsorspeeches,write,publish,orcirculatescurrilouslibelsagainsttheU.S.GovernmentortheInsular
GovermentofthePhil.Islands,orwhichtendtodisturborobstructanylawfulofficerinexecutinghisoffice,orwhichtend
toinstigateotherstocabalormeettogetherforunlawfulpurposes,orwhichsuggestorinciterebelliousconspiraciesor
riots,orwhichtendtostirupthepeopleagainsttheunlawfulauthoritiesxxx".
Theallegedlibelwaspublishedasaneditorialintheissueofthe"ManilaFreedom".Thearticlementionedabout
the"foolishworkthattheCivilCommissionisdoingallovertheIslands"referringtotheappointmentbythelatterof
nativeswhichwerereferredtoas"insurgents"and"rogues"toimportantGovernmentpositions.

ISSUE:WhetherthepublicationconstitutesanoffenseunderSec.8ofACT.No.292
HELD:NO.Theterm"government"asemployedinACTNo.292oftheU.S.PhilippineCommissionisused
in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the
Government.ThearticleinquestioncontainsnoattackuponthegovernmentalsystemoftheU.S.,anditisquite
apparentthat,thoughgrosslyabusiveasrespectsboththeCommissionasabodyandsomeofitsindividual
members,itcontainsnoattackuponthegovernmentalsystembywhichtheauthorityoftheU.S.isenforcedin
theseislands.TheformofGovermentbyaCivilCommissionandaCivilGovernorisnotassailed.Itisthe
characterofthemenwhoareinstructedwiththeadministrationofthegovernmentthatthewriterisseekingto
bringintodisrepute.Adapted.
Noteonthecase:
Administration meanstheaggregateofthosepersonsinwhosehandsthereinsofthegovtareforthe
timebeing(entrusted.)
(notinVV'soutline)
a.Functions
Cruz:
Thegovtperformstwokindsoffunctions,towit,theconstituentandtheministrant.
Constituentfunctionsconstitutetheverybondsofsocietyandarethereforecompulsory.xxxMinistrant
functionsarethoseundertakentoadvancethegeneralinterestsofsociety,suchaspublicworks,publiccharity,
andregulationoftradeandindustry.Thesefunctionsaremerelyoptional.xxx
To our SC, however, the distinction bet. constituent and ministrant functions is not relevant in our
jurisdiction.InPVTAv.CIR,65SCRA416,itreiteratedtherulinginACCFAv.FederationofLaborUnions,
30SCRA649,thatsuchdistinctionhasbeenblurredbec.oftherepudiationofthe laissezfaire policyinthe
Consti.xxx

b.DoctrineofParensPatriae
Cruz:
OneoftheimportanttasksofthegovtistoactfortheStateasparenspatriae,orguardianoftherights
ofthepeople.xxx
ThisprerogativeofparenspatriaeisinherentinthesupremepowereveryState,whetherthatpoweris
lodgedinaroyalpersonorinthelegislature,andhasnoaffinitytothosearbitrarypowerswhicharesometimes
exertedbyirresponsiblemonarchstothegreatdetrimentofthepeopleandthedestructionoftheirliberties.

c.DeJureandDeFactoGovernments
Cruz:
Adejuregovthasrightfultitlebutnopowerorcontrol,eitherbec.thishasbeenwithdrawnfromitor
bec.ithasnotyetactuallyenteredintotheexercisethereof.Adefactogovt,ontheotherhand,isagovtoffact,
thatis,itactuallyexercisespowerorcontrolbutw/olegaltitle.
Thethreekindsofdefactogovtareasfollows:
(1)Thegovtthatgetspossessionandcontrolof,orusurps,byforceorbythevoiceofthemajority,the
rightfullegalgovtandmaintansitselfagainstthewillofthelatter.
(2) Thatestablishedasanindependentgovtbytheinhabitantsofacountrywhoriseininsurrection
againsttheparentstate.
(3)Thatwhichisestablishedandmaintainedbymilitaryforceswhoinvadeandoccupyaterritoryof
theenemeyinthecourseofwar,andw/cisdenominatedasagovtofparamountforce,liketheSecondRepublic
ofthePhils.establishedbytheJapanesebelligerent.
Thecharacteristicsofthiskindofdefactogovtare:
(a) Itsexistenceismaintainedbyactivemilitarypowerw/intheterritories,andagainsttherightful
authorityofanestablishedandlawfulgovt.
(b)Duringitsexistence,itmustnecessarilybeobeyedincivilmattersbyprivatecitizenswho,byacts
ofobediencerenderedinsubmissiontosuchforce,donotbecomeresponsible,aswrongdoers,forthoseacts,
thoughnotwarrantedbythelawsoftherightfulgovt.

2."GovernmentofthePhilippines"defined
GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesisdefinedas"thecorporategovernmentalentitythrough
whichthefunctionsofgovernmentareexercisedthroughoutthePhilippines,including,saveasthecontrary
appearsfromthecontext,thevariousarmsthroughwhichpoliticalauthorityismadeeffectiveinthePhilippines,
whetherpertainingtotheautonomousregions,theprovincial,city,municipalorbarangaysubdivisionsorother
formoflocalgovernment."[AdinistrativeCodeof1987,Sec.2(1).]

Case: NACOCOisagovernmententityorganizedtopromotethecoconutindustry. Inalitigation

concerningNACOCO,thegovernmentcounselappearedforitandobtainedatranscriptofstenographicnotes.
UndertheRulesofCourt,thegovernmentisexemptedfrompaymentofthetranscript.IsNACOCOpartofthe
government?
TheSCheldthatitisnotbecauseNACOCOwasorganizedtoperformministrantfunctions.
ButaccordingtoConfederationofGovernmentEmployeesvAgrarianReform,thedistinctionbetween
thetwofunctionsofthegovernmentconstituentandministrantnolongerholdsunderthe1935Constitution,
whichimposedagreaterroleonthegovernment.
III.PRINCIPLESANDPOLICIESOFTHEPHILIPPINEGOVERNMENT

(notinV.V.Mendoza'srevisedoutline)
Preamble
We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustand
humanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethe
commongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritythebless
ingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,
equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.

Whilethe1935Constitutionstartedwith"TheFilipinopeople...",the1973and1987Constitutions
beginthepreamblewith"We,thesovereignFilipinopeople..."Thechangefromthirdpersonpointofviewtoa
firstpersonpointofviewemphasizesthattheFilipinosthemselvesaretheonesestablishingtheConstitution.
ThethirdpersonpresupposessomeonetalkingabouttheFilipinopeople,andyetthatsomeoneishimselfa
Filipino.
Whilethe1935and1973ConstitutionsreferredtotheDivineProvidence,the1987Constitutionrefers
AlmightyGod,whichismorepersonal.
Apreamblehastwofunctions:(1)identifytheauthorsoftheConstitution,and(2)statethegeneral
principlesuponwhichtheConstitutionisfounded.(Setsthetoneforthesucceedingprovisions.)
A.Principles
It isa standard tobeobservedbecause itisrequiredbyjustice orfairnessorotherdimensions of
morality
1.SovereigntyofitsPeopleandRepublicanism
Art.II,Sec.1.ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthe
peopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.
Art.V.SUFFRAGE.
Sec.1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedby
law,whoareatleasteighteenyearsofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastone
yearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingthe
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed onthe exercise of
suffrage.
Sec.2.TheCongressshallprovideasystemforsecuringthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballotas
wellasasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.

TheCongressshallalsodesignaprocedureforthedisabledandtheilliteratestovotewithoutthe

assistanceofotherpersons.Untilthen,theyshallbeallowedtovoteunderexistinglawsandsuchrulesas
theCommissiononElectionsmaypromulgatetoprotectthesecrecyoftheballot.
(notinVV'soutline)
Art.VI,Sec.1.ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhichshall
consistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebyprovision
oninitiativeandreferendum.
Underthisprinciple, thePhilippines isademocratic state thatis,agovernment for,of,and bythe
people.Butitisnotapuredemocracy.Thus,whileitistruethatthepeoplearethepossessorsofsovereign
power,itisequallythecasethattheycannotexercisethepowersofgovernmentdirectly,butonlythroughthe
mediumoftheirdulyelectedrepresentatives.
Theirparticipationingovernmentconsistsof:
1)Suffrageelectingtheofficialstowhomtheydelegatetherightofgovernment.
2)Plebiscite
a)ratifyingtheConstitution
b)approvinganyamendmentthereto
c)withrespecttolocalmatters,approvinganychangesinboundaries,mergers,divisions,and
evenabolitionoflocaloffices
d)creatingmetropolitanauthorities,and
e)creatingautonomousregions

3)Initiativeandreferendumenactingorproposinglaws,localornational,inareferendum.
4)Recall(UndertheLocalGovernmentCode.)[asaddedbyProf.Barlongay.]
Barlongay:
FeaturesofRepublicanism:
1.Itisagovtoflawsandnotofmen;
2.Thereisperiodicholdingofelections;
3.Thereisobservanceofprincipleofseparationofpowersandofchecksandbalances;
4.Thereisobservanceoftherolethatthelegislaturecannotpassorenactirrepealablelaws.

2.AdherencetoInternationalLaw

Preamble
We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustand
humanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethe
commongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritythebless
ingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,
equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.
Art.II,Sec.2. ThePhilippines renounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,adoptthe
generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthelawoftheland,andadherestothepolicy
ofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.

"Adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" means the Philippines uses the
incorporation theory. Without need of statute, these principles of international law become part of the
Philippinebodyoflawsfromthemunicipalpointofview.
"Adherencetotheprinciplesofinternationallaw"wasadoptedfromtheKelloggBrianPact.

Art.II,Sec.7.TheStateshallpursueanindependentforeignpolicy.Initsrelationswithother
states,theparamountconsiderationshallbenationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest,
andtherighttoselfdetermination.
Art.II,Sec.8.ThePhilippines,consistentwiththenationalinterest,adoptsandpursuesapolicy
offreedomfromnuclearweaponsinitsterritory.

"Consistentwithnationalinterest"admitsoftwointerpretations.OneviewholdsthattheConstitution
itselfhasdecidedtohavenonuclearinterestasthepolicyoftheState.Theotherviewholdsthat,asshownby
thedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,thephraseshouldbereadas"subjecttonationalinterest"
whichmeansthattheissueofwhethertoallowthestockpilingofnuclearweaponsdependsonCongressional
policy.
ItistheintentandsenseoftheConstitutionalCommissionthatthephrase"consistentwithnational
interest"xxxalsomeans"subjecttothenationalinterest."(JoaquinBernas,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHE
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESACommentary,vol.II,1988ed.)

Art.XVIII,Sec.4.Allexistingtreatiesorinternationalagreementswhichhavenotbeenratified
shallnotberenewedorextendedwithouttheconcurrenceofatleast2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the
PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,
whentheCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofvotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum
heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparties.

Thereasonwhytheagreementmustberecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingstateissoitis
approvedbyitsownSenate,andnotjustbyitsPresident(executiveagreement),thus,committingitslegislature
tohonortheagreementandpreventingitfromrefusingappropriationstherefore.
3.SupremacyofCivilianAuthority
Art.II,Sec.3.Civilianauthorityisatalltimes,supremeoverthemilitary.TheArmedForcesof
thePhilippinesistheprotectorofthepeopleandtheState. Itsgoalistosecurethesovereigntyofthe
Stateandtheintegrityofthatnationalterritory.
Art.VII,Sec.18. ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe
Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress
lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace
thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof
martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita
reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta
majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,
whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress
may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe
Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.
TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor
suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency
ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe
extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorisetheconfermentofjurisdictionon
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or

offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.
Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe
judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.
Art.XVI,Sec.4.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbecomposedofacitizenarmedforce
whichshallundergomilitarytrainingandservice,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Itshallkeeparegularforce
necessaryforthesecurityoftheState.
Art.XVI,Sec.5. (1)AllmembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshalltakeanoathor
affirmationtoupholdanddefendtheConstitution.
(2)TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessofthemilitary,and
respectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty.
(3) Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and adequate remuneration and
benefitsofitsmembersshallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshall
beinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics.
Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity.
(4) NomembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesintheactiveserviceshall,atanytime,be
appointedordesignatedinanycapacitytoacivilianpositionintheGovernment,includinggovernment
ownedorcontrolledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries.
(5)Lawsonretirementofmilitaryofficersshallnotallowextensionoftheirservice.
(6)TheofficersandmenoftheregularforceoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbe
recruitedproportionatelyfromallprovincesandcitiesasfaraspracticable.
(7)ThetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallnotexceed
three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the
Presidentmayextendsuchtourofduty.
(notinVV'soutline)
Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenationalinscopeand
civilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.Theauthorityof
localexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

Thesupremacyofcivilianruleoverthemilitaryisensuredby,(i)theinstallationofthePresident,the
highestcivilianauthority,asthecommanderinchiefofthemilitary,(ii)therequirementthatmembersofthe
AFPsweartoupholdanddefendtheConstitution,whichisthefundamentallawofthecivilgovernment,(iii)the
professionalizationoftheserviceandthestrengtheningofthepatriotismandnationalism,andrespectforhuman
rights,ofthemilitary,(iv)insulationoftheAFPfrompartisanpolitics,(v)prohibitionagainsttheappointment
to a civil position, (vi) compulsory retirement of officers (no over staying of officers), so as to avoid
propagation ofpower), (vii) a3year limitation on thetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaff,whichalthough
extendibleincaseofemergencybythePresident,dependsonCongressionaldeclarationofemergency,(viii)re
quirementofprofessionalrecruitment,soastoavoidanyregionalcliquefromformingwithintheAFP,aswellas

(ix)theestablishmentofapoliceforcethatisnotonlyciviliancharacterbutalsounderthelocalexecutives.

4.GovernmentasProtectorofthePeopleandPeopleasDefendersoftheState
Art. II Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
GovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,allcitizensmay
berequiredunderconditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonal,militaryorcivilservice.
Art.II,Sec.5.Themaintenanceofpeaceandorder,theprotectionoflife,liberty,andproperty,
andthepromotionofthegeneralwelfare,areessentialfortheenjoymentbyallthepeopleoftheblessing
ofdemocracy.

Notetheemphasisonthegovernmentasservantofthepeople,ratherthanviceversa.
Notealsothatthepeoplemaybylawarerequiredtorender"personal"(notproxy)militaryorcivil
service.

5.SeparationofChurchandState
Art.II,Sec.6.TheseparationoftheChurchandStateshallbeinviolable.
Art.III,Sec.5.Nolawshallbemaderespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthe
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discriminationorpreference,shallforeverbeallowed.Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexercise
ofcivilorpoliticalrights.
Art.IX,C,Sec.2(5)xxxReligiousdenominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered(asapolitical
party,organization,orcoalitionbytheCOMELEC).
Art.VI,Sec.5(2) Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwenty percentum ofthetotal
numberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist. Forthreeconsecutivetermsafterthe
ratificationofthisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbe
filled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfromthelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenouscultural
communities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.

Exceptions:
Art.VI,Sec.28(3).Charitableinstitutions,churches,parsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,

mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.
Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitaryassuch,exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitary isassignedtotheArmed
ForcesofthePhilippines,oranypenalinstitution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium.
Art.XIV,Sec.3(3).Attheoptionexpressedinwritingbytheparentsorguardians,religionshall
beallowedtobe taught totheirchildren orwardsin public elementary andhigh schools within the
regularclasshoursbyinstructorsdesignatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligionto
whichthechildrenorwardsbelong,withoutadditionalcosttotheGovernment.
Sec.4(2).Educationalinstitutions,otherthanthoseestablishedbyreligiousgroupsandmission
boards,shallbeownedsolelybycitizensofthePhilippinesorcorporationsorassociationsatleast60%of
thecapitalofwhichisownedbysuchcitizens. TheCongressmay,however,requireincreasedFilipino
equityparticipationinalleducationalinstitutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the
Philippines.
Noeducationalinstitutionsshallbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliensandnogroupofaliensshall
comprisemorethan1/3oftheenrollmentinanyschool.Theprovisionsofthissubsectionshallnotapply
to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise
providedbylaw,forotherforeigntemporaryresidents.

TheclassiccaseinseparationofchurchandstateisPamilvTeleron,whichinvalidatedtheselectiontoa
localpostofFr.Gonzaga,(notehowever,thatecclesiasticsarenotprohibitedfromrunningforCongress).
ItisdifficulttodrawthelinebetweenseparationofChurchandState. In Elizalde v Victoriano,for
instance,alawexemptingmembersofIglesianiKristofromtherequirementthatallemployeesmustjoina
unionasconditionforcontinuedemployment,pursuanttoaclosedshopagreementintheCBA,ontheground
thatitisprohibitedbytheirreligion,washeldvalid.Foralthoughthelawamountedtoanestablishmentof
religion,itwaslikewisepromotingthefreeexercisethereof.
Thenonestablishment clauseisnotviolated,however,ifthebenefitderivedbyareligionfromthe
expenditureofpublicfundsismerelyincidentaltopublicpurpose.Thus,inAglipayvRuiz,theSCheldthat
thestampsprintedbythegovernmenttocommemoratethe33rdInternationalEucharisticCongressinManila
didnotviolatetheseparationofchurchandstate,becauseitsmainpurposewastopromoteManilaasseatofthe
congressandthustoattracttouriststoits(thestampshowedthemapofthePhilippines,notachalice). Not
havingbeeninspiredbyanysectarianfeelingtofavoradenominationnortobenefittheRomanCatholicChurch,
whateverreligiouscharacterthestamphadwasonlyincidentalanduncontemplated.

WhiletheConstitutionmandatesseparationofChurchandStatethrough(1)NonEstablishment,Free
ExerciseandNoReligiousTestclausesintheBillofRights,(ii)thedisallowanceofthereligioussectorfrom
beingregisteredasapoliticalpartyandfrombeingappointedassectoralrepresentativesofCongress,yetit
allowsexceptionstotherule.
(1)Theexemptionofreligious institutionsfromtaxationisarecognitionthattheChurchisnotall
separatefromState,foriftheywerereallyso,theChurchshouldbetaxedbyStatelikeanyotherentity.
(2)Publicfunds,whilegenerallyprohibitedfrombeingspentforreligiouspurposesasanaspectofthe
NonEstablishmentclause,maybeappliedtopriestrenderingreligiousservicetotheAFP,apenalinstitution,
oragovernmentorphanageorleprosarium.Thereasonistheexigencyoftheservice.IfmembersoftheAFP
hadtogooutofthebarrackstoattendtotheirspiritualneeds,nationalsecuritymightbeendangered;ifinmates
wereallowedtogooutofjailtohearmass,theymightneverreturn;andifleperswereallowedoutofthe
leprosarium,theymightcontaminateothers.
Thegeneralprohibition,however,doesnotapplytoapriestwho,forinstance,teachesMathematicsat
UP,forpaymentinthiscaseisnotforreligiousactivitiesbutforteachingofasecularsubject.
(3)Thepermissiontohaveoptimalreligiousinstructionduringregularclasshoursuponwrittenrequest
oftheparentorguardian,tobetaughtbyateacherapprovedbytheauthoritiesofthereligionofwhichthechild
isamember,provideditiswithoutcosttothegovernmentisanewprovisionintheConstitution.Undertheold
AdministrativeCode,theinstructioncouldnotbewithinregularclasshours.UnderA359oftheCivilCode,
religiousinstructionwouldevenbemadepartofthecurriculum(withgradesandfailingmarks),solongasthe
parentsaskforit.
(4)Withtheexceptionofsectarianschools,allschoolsmustbeownedbycitizensor60%Filipino
corporations.Thecontrolandadministrationofallschools,includingsectarianschools,mustbeinthehandsof
Filipinos.Furthermore,theycannotbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliens,andthealienpopulationintheschool
shouldnotexceed1/3.

B.Policies
A policy isastandardwhichsetsoutagoaltobereached,generallyanimprovementineconomic,
politicalorsocialfeatureofthecommunity

1.IndependentforeignpolicyandanuclearfreePhilippines
Art.II,Sec.7.TheStateshallpursueanindependentforeignpolicy.Initsrelationswithother
states,theparamountconsiderationshallbenationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest,

andtherighttoselfdetermination.
Art.II,Sec.8.ThePhilippines,consistentwiththenationalinterest,adoptsandpursuesapolicy
offreedomfromnuclearweaponsinitsterritory.
Art.XVIII,Sec.4.Allexistingtreatiesorinternationalagreementswhichhavenotbeenratified
shallnotberenewedorextendedwithouttheconcurrenceofatleast2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the
PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,
whentheCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofvotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum
heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparties.

2.AJustandDynamicSocialOrder
Preamble
...inordertobuildajustandhumanesocietyandestablishaGovernmentthatshallembodyour
idealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,preserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecureto
ourselvesandourposteritytheblessingsofindependenceanddemocracy...
Art. II, Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperityandindependenceofthenationandfreethepeoplefrompovertythroughpoliciesthatprovide
adequatesocialservices,promotefullemployment,arisingstandardofliving,andanimprovedqualityof
lifeforall.
Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities,income,wealth;asustainedincreaseintheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedbythe
nationforthebenefitofthepeople;andanexpandingproductivityasthekeytoraisingthequalityoflife
forall,especiallytheunderprivileged.
a.Promotionofsocialjustice
Barlongay:The1987Constitution,comparedtothe1935andthe1973Constitution,containsthemostexpanded
conceptofSocialJustice.
TheclassicdefinitionofSocialJusticeisfoundinCalalangvs.Williams,70P726,whereJusticeLaurel
declaredasfollows:
"Social Justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but the

humanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothatjusticeinits
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotionofthewelfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentofmeasurescalculatedto
insureeconomicstabilityofallthecomponentelementsofsociety,throughthemaintenanceofaproper
economicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsofthemembersofthecommunity,constitutionally,
throughtheadoptionofmeasureslegallyjustifiable,orextraconstitutionally, theexerciseofpowers
underlyingtheexistenceofallgovernmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleof saluspopuliestsuprema
lex."

Art.II,Sec.10.TheStateshallpromotesocialjusticeinallphasesofnationaldevelopment.
Art.XIII,Sec.1. TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactment ofmeasuresthat
protectandenhancetherightofallthepeopletohumandignity,reducesocial,economicandpolitical
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
commongood.
Tothisend,theStateshallregulatetheacquisition,ownership,use,anddispositionofproperty
anditsincrements.
Art.XIII,Sec.2.Thepromotionofsocialjusticeshallincludethecommitmenttocreateeconomic
opportunitiesbasedonfreedomofinitiativeandselfreliance.
Art.II,Sec.26. TheStateshallguaranteeequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice,and
prohibitpoliticaldynastiesasmaybedefinedbylaw.
Art.VII,Sec.13,par.2.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Member of the Constitutional
Commissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsof
bureausoroffices,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.
(notinVV'soutline)
Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficial shallbeeligibleforappointment ordesignation inany
capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.
Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshall
holdanyotheremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsorsubsidiaries.
ThePresidentcannotholdanyotherpostexceptthoseallowedbytheConstitution,viz.,(1)Chairmanof
NEDA,and(2)DepartmentSecretary(VV).
TheVicePresidentcanholdacabinetseatwithoutneedofconfirmation.

Members ofthecabinet(SecretariesandUndersecretaries): Some areoftheview thattheclause

"unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw"impliesthatwhenthereisalawallowingso,hemaybeappointedtoany
othergovernmentpost,evenifnotaffiliatedtohiscabinetposition.EO284limitsthenumberofgovernment
postsofcabinetmemberstonotmorethan2.However,EO284hasbeendeclaredunconstitutionalbytheSCin
thecaseofCivilLibertiesUnionvsExecutiveSecretary(194S317).Theprohibitionhoweverdoesnotinclude
positionsheldwithoutadditionalcompensationinexofficiocapacitiesasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbythe
primaryfunctionsoftheconcernedofficial'soffice.[Forfurtherdiscussion,seeExecutiveDept.:Prohibitions.]

b.Respectforhumandignityandhumanrights
Art.II,Sec.11.TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespect
forhumanrights.
(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
Art.XVI,Sec.5(2).TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessof
themilitary,andrespectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty.
Art.XIII,Sec.17
(1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissiononHumanRights.
(2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural
borncitizensofthePhilippines,andamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice
andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersshallbeprovidedbylaw.
(3)UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommissiononHumanRights
shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers.
(4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly
released.
Sec.18.TheCommissiononHumanRightsshallhavethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any party all forms of human rights violations
involvingcivilorpoliticalrights;
(2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedureandciteforcontemptforviolations
thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt;
(3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonwithinthe
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection;
(4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities;
(5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor
theprimacyofhumanrights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and provide for,
compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies;

(7)MonitortheGovernment'scompliancewithinternationaltreatyobligationsonhumanrights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
document or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conductedbyitorunderitsauthority;
(9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits
functions;
(10)Appointitsofficersandemployeesinaccordancewithlaw;and
(11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshouldfall
withintheauthorityoftheCommissiontakingintoaccountitsrecommendation.

c.Fundamentalequalityofwomenandmen
Art.II,Sec.14.TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurethe
fundamentalequalityofmenandwomenbeforethelaw.
(thefollowing2provisionsarenotinVV'srevisedoutline)
Art.IV,Sec.1(2)inrelationwithSec.4.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxx
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheir
actoromissiontheyaredeemedunderthelaw,tohaverenouncedit.
Art.XIII,Sec.14.TheStateshallprotectworkingwomenbyprovidingsafeandhealthfulworking
conditions,takingintoaccounttheirmaternalfunctions,andsuchfacilitiesandopportunitiesthatwill
enhancetheirwelfareandenablethemtorealizetheirfullpotentialintheserviceofthenation.
(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
Art.XIII,Sec.11. TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealth
developmentwhichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoall
thepeopleataffordablecost. Thereshallbepriorityfortheneedsoftheunderprivilegedsick,elderly,
disabled,women,andchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers.
(SeealsoCANo.1,theNationalDefenseAct)
One significant move to equalize men and women is in the area of citizenship. Under the 1935
Constitution,achildbornofaFilipinomotherbecameaFilipinoonlyuponelectionwhenhereachedtheageof
majority.The1973Constitutionremovedthisstigmaandmadesuchbornafter17January1973aFilipinowith
outtheneedofelection.The1987Constitutionimprovedthesituationevenmorebygrantingtothosechildren

bornbefore17January1973whoelectedcitizenship,whetherbornbeforeorafter17January1973,thestatusof
naturalborncitizens.
Atthesametime,Filipinowomenwhobyvirtueofmarriagetoanalienhusband,becamecitizensof
theirhusband'scountrynolongerlostherPhilippinecitizenshipbythatfactalone,beginning17January1973.
Intheareaoflaborithasbeenconsistentlyheld,beginningintheUSwithSandyvOregon(thecourt
requiringthecompanytoprovidestoolsforwomenworkersinthefactories),thatstatutes(Book3,TitleIII,
ChapterIoftheLaborCode)grantingwomenbettertreatmentbyvirtueoftheirmaternalfunctionwerevalid.

d.Promotionofhealth
Art.II,Sec.15.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstill
healthconsciousnessamongthem.
Sec.16.TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthful
ecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature.
Art.XIII,Sec.11. TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealth
developmentwhichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoall
thepeopleataffordablecost.Thereshallbepriorityfortheneedsoftheunderprivileged,sick,elderly,
disabled,womenandchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers.
Sec.12.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainaneffectivefoodanddrugregulatorysystemand
undertakeappropriatehealthmanpowerdevelopmentandresearch,responsivetothecountry'shealth
needsandproblems.
Sec.13.TheStateshallestablishaspecialagencyfordisabledpersonsfortheirrehabilitation,self
developmentandselfreliance,andtheirintegrationtothemainstreamofsociety.

e.Priorityofeducation,science,technology,arts,cultureandsports(ESTACS)
Art.II,Sec.17.TheStateshallgiveprioritytoeducation,science,etechnology,arts,cultureand
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social programs, and promote total human
liberationanddevelopment.

Art.XIV,Sec.1.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherightofallcitizenstoqualityeducation
atalllevelsandshalltakeappropriatestepstomakesucheducationaccessibletoall.

Students have the constitutional right not only to education but to a quality education, up to the
secondarylevel,forfree.Butthisissubjecttotherightoftheschooltoimposereasonableacademicstandards,
andtomakeeducationavailableonlyonthebasisofmerit.
InVillarvTechnologicalInstituteofthePhilippines,135SCRA706(1985),acaseinvolvingthedenial
ofenrollmentofstudentactivistswhotookpartindemonstrationsandmassactions,andwho,atthesametime
incurredscholasticdeficiencies.TheCourtheldthatparticipationinmassactionsperseisnotavalidground
fordismissal,butthatfailureinacademicsubjectspursuanttoschoolregulationswasavalidground.Forwhile
therighttoeducationisasocial,economicandculturalright,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit."
In Tagonan v Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 (1985), a case of a nursing student who was denied
readmissionaftershefailedasubjectduringherpreviousprovisionaladmission(andherinabilitytotakethis
subjectinanotherschoolaftershetriedtobribetheDeanofthatschool),theSCagainupheldtherightof
schoolsofhigherlearningtochoosethestudentswhichitthinkscouldbestachievetheirgoalofexcellenceand
truth,whileaffirmingtherightofstudentstoqualityeducation.

BARLONGAYCASE:
DepartmentofEducation,CultureandSportsv.SanDiego,180SCRA533(1989)
F:Theprivateresp.isagraduateofUEw/adegreeofBSZoology.ThepetitionerclaimsthathetooktheNMAT3times
andflunkeditasmanytimes.Whenheappliedtotakeitagain,thepetitionerrejectedhisapplicationonthebasisofthe
ruleallowingonly3chancesforastudenttotaketheNMAT.HethenwenttotheRTCValenzuelatocompelhisadmission
tothetest.
xxxByagreementoftheparties,pvt.resp.wasallowedtotaketheNMATon4/16/89subjecttotheoutcomeof
hispetition.xxx
Afterthehearing,theresp.judgerenderedadecisiondeclaringthechallengedorderinvalidandgrantingthe
petitiononthegroundthatthepetitionerhadbeendeprivedofherrighttopursueamedicaleducationthroughanarbitrary
exerciseofthepolicepower.

HELD:Wecannotsustaintheresp.judge.Herdecisionmustbereversed.
In Tablarinv.Gutierrez,152SCRA730,thisCourtupheldtheconstitutionality oftheNMATasa
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competenceandpreparationforamedicaleducation.
xxx
WeseenoreasonwhytherationaleintheTablarincasecannotapplytothecaseatbar.Theissueraised
inbothcasesistheacademicpreparationoftheapplicant.Thismaybegaugedatleastinitiallybytheadmission
testand,indeedw/morereliability,bythe3flunkrule.
ExerciseofPolicePower.Thepowerisvalidlyexercisedif(a)theinterestsofthepublicgenerally,as
distinguishedfromthoseofaparticularclass,requiretheinterferenceoftheState,and(b)themeansemployed

arereasonablynecessarytotheattainmentoftheobjectsoughttobeaccomplishedandnotundulyoppressive
uponindividuals.Inotherwords,theproperexerciseofthepolicepowerrequirestheconcurrenceofalawful
subjectandalawfulmethod.
Thesubjectofthechallengedregulationisw/intheambitofthepolicepower.Itistherightandindeed
theresponsibilityoftheStatetoinsurethatthemedicalprofessionisnotinfiltratedbyincompetents.xxx
Themethodemployedbytheregulationisnotirrelevanttothepurposeofthelawnorisitarbitraryor
oppressive.The3flunkruleisintendedtoinsulatethemedicalschoolsandultimatelythemedicalprofession
fromtheintrusionofthosenotqualifiedtobedoctors.
Therighttoqualityeducationisnotabsolute.TheConstitutionalsoprovidesthat"everycitizenhasthe
righttochooseaprofessionorcourseofstudy,subjecttofair,reasonableandequitableadmissionandacademic
requirements.
Thechallengedregulationdoesnotviolatetheequalprotectionclause.Alawdoesnothavetooperate
w/equalforceonallpersonsorthingstobeconformabletotheequalprotectionclause.
Therecanbenoquestionthatasubstantialdistinctionexistsbet.medicalstudentsandotherstudents
whoarenotsubjectedtotheNMATandthe3flunkrule.Themedicalprofessiondirectlyaffectstheverylives
ofthepeople,unlikeothercareersw/c,forthisreason,donotrequiremorevigilantregulation.
Therewouldbeunequalprotectionifsomeapplicantswhohavepassedthetestsareadmittedandothers
whohavealsoqualifiedaredeniedentrance. Inotherwords,whattheequalprotectionrequiresisequality
amongequals.RAM.

f.Urbanlandreformandhousing
Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith
theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens.
Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners.
Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except
inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner.
Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation
withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated.
ThelimitationstothepoweroftheStateinthisregard:
1.Respectfortherightsofpropertyowners.
2.Inthecaseofresettlement,saidprogrammustbewiththepermissionofthepersonstoberesettled,andthe
communitytowhichtheywouldberesettled.

g.Reforminagricultureandothernaturalresources
Art.II,Sec.21.TheStateshallpromotecomprehensiveruraldevelopmentandagrarianreform.
Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe
rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey
tillor,incaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof. Tothisend,theState
shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand
reasonableretentionlimitsasCongressmaypresecribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental,or
equityconsiderations,andsubjecttothepaymentofjustcompensation.Indeterminingretentionlimits,
the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntarylandsharing.
Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas
cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization,
and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculuture thourgh approrpriate
technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancial,production,marketing,andothersupportservices.
Sec.6.TheStateshallapplytheprinciplesofagragianreformorstewarship,wheneverapplicable
inaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,includinglandsofthep
ublicdomainunderleaseorconcessionsuitabletoagriculture,subjecttopriorrights,homesteadrightsof
smallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands.
TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich
shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw.
Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,expeciallyoflocalcommunities,
tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen
againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof
marineandfishingresources.
Sec.8. TheStateshallprovdeincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian
reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprisesoftheirchoice.

Thebasicphilosophybehindagrarianreformis"landtothetiller"ifoneisaregularfarmworkerand

"profitsharing"inothercases.But"justcompensation"anda"reasonableretentionlimit"areguaranteedthe
landowner.
Commonlimitationstolandreform(urbanoragrarian):
Itmustnotimpairtherightsofsmallagriculturallandowners,smallhomesteadsettlers,andsmall
propertyowners;
Theideaofreformistobenefitthepoorandotherpeasantsandthelandless.Itwouldtherefore,beself
defeatingfortheConstitutiontomakenoreservationinfavorofsmallpropertyownersandhomesteadsettlers.
Thebasicphilosophybehindothernaturalresourcesistheprincipleof"stewardship"anyonewhois
giventhechancetocultivatepubliclandmustuseintrustforthesucceedinggenerations,andsomustexercise
prudenceinitsuse.

h.Protectionoflabor
Art.II.Sec.18.TheStateaffirmslaborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce.Itshallprotectthe
rightsofworkersandpromotetheirwelfare.
Art.XIII,Sec.3.TheStateshallaffordfullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedand
unorganized,andpromotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations,andpeacefulconcertedactivities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.They
shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They shall also
participateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessaffectingtherightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovidedby
law.
TheStateshallpromotetheprincipleofsharedresponsibilitybetweenworkersandemployersand
thepreferentialuseofvoluntarymodesinsettlingdisputesincludingconciliation,andshallenforcetheir
mutualcompliancetherewithtofosterindustrialpeace.
TheStateshallregulatetherelationsbetweenworkersandemployers,recognizingtherightof
labortoitsjustshareinthefruitsofproductionandtherightofenterprisestoreasonablereturnson
investments,andtoexpansionandgrowth.

Thebasicphilosophybehindlaborissharedresponsibilityandthepreferentialuseofvoluntaryand
peacefulforthesettlementofdisputes.

Therightofgovernmentworkerstoformunions
Art.III,Sec.8.Therightofpeople,includingthoseemployedinthepublicandprivatesectors,to
formunions,associationsorsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbeabridged.

Art.IX,B,Sec.2(5).Therightofselforganizationshallnotbedeniedtogovernmentemployees.
(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
Sec.2(1).Thecivilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions,instrumentalities,andagenciesof
theGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharters.
TherightofgovernmentworkerstoformunionsisundisputedunderArtIII(8)oftheConstitution.(This
provisionisevenmisplacedsincetheBillofRightsonlycoverscivilandpoliticalrights.) Theproblemis
whethertheyhavetherighttostrike.
ThosewhoholdthenegativeviewsaythattherighttoselforganizationismentionedinArtIII(8)
separatelyfromtherighttostrikeinArtXIII(3).Ifitisincluded,therewouldbenoneedtoexplicatethetwo
anymore.
ButthosewhoholdtheaffirmativeviewsaythatalthoughtheConstitutiondoesnotexplicitlygrantit,
Congresscanalwaysgranttherighttogovernmentworkers.TheConstitutiondoesnotprohibititinArtIII(8)in
the phrase "for purposes not contrary to law". Besides the right to selforganization is rendered nugatory
withoutthecoercivetoolofstrike(whichistruebecausethestrikeatissueisonlytheeconomicstrike,notthe
ULPstrike).
ItmustbenotedthattheSCruledinAllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLabor,124SCRA
1, under the 1973 Constitution, that government workers cannot negotiate for terms and condition of
employment, fortheseareamatteroflaw. Theirremedyistoreporttotheirown headsand toconvince
Congresstoenactthedesiredlaw.
SaidtheCourt: Civilservantsareentitledtoformsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolaw. Butto
formanassociationisonething,andtousesuchassociationforthecoercivemeasureofgoingonstrikeand
bargainingwiththegovernmentsoastopressureitintocomplyingwiththeirdemands,isanother.
In NHA v Juco (134SCRA172),theSCheldthatthoseinthegovernmentservicecannotbargain
collectivelyasprivateworkersbecausetheyaregovernedbytheCivilServiceLaw.Italsoheldthatallgovt
ownedorcontrolledcorporationsregardlessoftheirmannerofcreation,werecoveredbytheCivilService.
Ininterpretingtherulingintheabovecases,wehavetodistinguishbetweentwokindsofgovernment
corporationsinaccordancewithArt.IX,B,Sec.2(1):a)thosewhichwereorganizedwithspecialcharters,in
casetheemployeesaregovernedbytheCivilServiceLawandarguablybytheSCrulinginAlliance,andb)
thosewhichwereorganizedpursuanttothegenerallaw(CorporationCode),inwhichcasetheiremployeescan
withoutdoubtbargaincollectivelyandgoonstrike.
The grant of the right to form unions is a social economic right included for the first time in the
Constitution.Previously,onlypoliticalandcivilrightswereguaranteedgovernmentemployees.
Question:Doestherighttoselforganizationgiventogovt.employeesincludetherighttostrike?

SSSEmployeesAssnvsCA,175SCRA686(1989)
F:SSSfiledw/theRTCQCacomplaintfordamagesw/aprayerforawritofprelinj.againstpetitionersSSSEA,alleging
thatthe officers and members of the latter staged anillegal strike andbarricaded the entrances to the SSS building
preventingnonstrikingemployeesfromreportingtoworkandSSSmembersfromtransactingbusinessw/SSS.ThePublic
SectorLaborManagementCouncilorderedthestrikerstoreturntoworkbutthestrikersrefusedtodoso. TheSSSEA
wentonstrikebec.SSSfailedtoactontheunion'sdemands.
Petitionersfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintforlackofjurisdiction,w/cmotionwasdenied.Therestraining
orderw/cwaspreviouslyissuedwasconvertedintoaninjunctionafterfindingthestrikeillegal.Petitionersappealedthe
casetotheCA.ThelatterheldthatsincetheemployeesofSSSaregovtemployees,theyarenotallowedtostrike.

HELD:EmployeesintheCivilServicemaynotresorttostrikes,walkoutsandothertemporaryworkstoppages,
likeworkersintheprivatesector,inordertopressuretheGovt.toaccedetotheirdemands.Asnowprovided
underSec.4,RuleIIIoftheRulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseoftheRightofGovt.EEstoSelf
Organizationwhichtookeffectaftertheinitialdisputearose,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentinthe
Govt,includinganypoliticalsubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereofandgovt.ownedandcontrolledcorporations
withoriginalcharters,aregovernedbylawandemployeesthereinshallnotstrikeforthepurposeofsecuring
changesthereof.
ThestatementofthecourtinAllianceofGovtWorkersv.MinisterofLaborandEmployment(124
SCRA1)isrelevantasitfurnishestherationalefordistinguishingbet.workersintheprivatesectorandgovt
employeesw/regardtotherighttostrike?
Sincethetermsandconditionsofgovt.employmentarefixedbylaw,govt.workerscannotuse
thesameweaponsemployedbyworkersintheprivatesectortosecureconcessionsfromtheiremployers.
Theprinciplebehindlaborunionisminprivateindustryisthatindustrialpeacecannotbesecuredthrough
compulsionoflaw.Relationsbet.privateemployersandtheiremployeesrestonanessentiallyvoluntary
basis. Subjecttotheminimumrequirementsofwagelawsandotherlaborandwelfarelegislation,the
termsandconditionsofemploymentintheunionizedprivatesectoraresettledthroughtheprocessof
collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegatedpower,theadministrativeheadsofgovtw/cfixthetermsandconditionsofemployment.And
thisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars,rules,andregulations,notthroughCBA's

EO180,w/c providesguidelines fortheexerciseoftherighttoorganizeofgovt employees, while

clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditionsofemploymentinvolvedarenotamongthosefixedbylaw.
Govtemployeesmay,therefore,throughtheirunionsorassociations,eitherpetitiontheCongressforthe
bettermentofthetermsandconditionsofemploymentwhicharew/intheambitoflegislationornegotiatew/the
appropriategovtagenciesfortheimprovementofthosew/arenotfixedbylaw. Iftherebeanyunresolved
grievances,thedisputemaybereferredtothePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilforappropriateaction.
RAM.

BARLONGAYCASE:
ManilaPublicSchoolTeachersAssociationv.Laguio,200SCRA323
F:

OnSeptember17,1990,Monday,atleast800publicschoolteachersproceededtothenationalofficeoftheDECS
andairedtheirgrievances.ThemassactioncontinuedintotheweekdespitetheDECSSecretary'sRETURNTOWORK
order.TheSecretaryfiledadministrativechargesagainsttheprotestingteachers.TheSecretaryrenderedthequestioned
decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two
separate petitions werefiledtoassailthevalidity ofthe returntoworkorder andhis decisions in the administrative
proceeding.

ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTTHEMASSACTIONSARECONSIDEREDASSTRIKES?
HELD: Yes.Themassactionsconstitutedaconcertedandunauthorizedstoppageof,orabsencefromwork,
whichitwastheteachers'dutytoperform,undertakenforessentiallyeconomicreasons.
ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTPUBLICSCHOOLTEACHERSCANSTRIKE?
HELD:No.Employeesofthepublicservicedonothavetherighttostrikealthoughtheyhavetherighttoself
organizationandnegotiatewithappropriategovernmentagenciesfortheimprovementofworkingconditions.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
HELD:Thiscourtisacourtoflastresort.Itresolvesquestionsoflawwherethereisnodisputeofthefactsor
thatthefactshavebeenalreadydeterminedbythelowertribunals.Itisnotatrieroffacts.Itcannotresolvethe
issuewhichrequirestheestablishmentofsomefacts.Theremedyisforthepetitionerstoparticipateinthe
administrativeproceedings. Iftheylost, they mayappealto theCivilServiceCommission. Ifpending said
administrativeproceedings,immediaterecoursetojudicialauthoritywasbelievednecessary,recourseiswiththe
RTCwheretherewouldbeopportunitytoproverelevantfacts.Adapted.

i.IndependentPeople'sOrganizations
Art. II, Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non governmental, communitybased, or sectoral
organizationsthatpromotethewelfareofthenation.
Art.XIII,Sec.15.TheStateshallrespecttheroleofindependentpeople'sorganizationstoenable
the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interestsandaspirationsthroughpeacefulandlawfulmeans.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to
promotethepublicinterestandwithidentifiableleadership,membershipandstructure.
Sec.16.Therightofthepeopleandtheirorganizationstoeffectiveandreasonableparticipation

atalllevelsofsocial,political,andeconomicdecisionmakingshallnotbeabridged.TheState,shallby
law,facilitatetheestablishmentofadequateconsultationmechanisms.
Thisisinrecognitionofpeople'spower,asidefromtheprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum.

3.FamilyasaBasicAutonomousSocialInstitution
Art.II,Sec.12.TheStaterecognizesthesanctityoffamilylifeandshallprotectandstrengthen
thefamilyasabasicautonomoussocialinstitution.Itshallequallyprotectthelifeofthemotherandthe
lifeoftheunbornfromconception.Thenaturalandprimaryrightanddutyofparentsintherearingof
theyouthforcivicefficiencyand thedevelopmentofmoralcharactershallreceivethesupportofthe
Government.
ThisprovisionseemstobethebasisofanargumentthatabortionisprohibitedbytheConstitution.It
might also be the basis of a stand against family planning. The root of the problem, of course, is the
determinationofwhenlifebegins.
TherightofparentstoreartheirchildrenistheonlynaturalrightrecognizedbytheConstitution.Thisis
adeclarationthattheStatedoesnotespousefascismwhichholdsthattheStateownsthelifeofeveryone.
Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly,itshallstrengthenitssolidarityandactivelypromoteitsdevelopment.
Sec.2.Marriage,asaninviolablesocialinstitution,isthefoundationofthefamilyandshallbe
protectedbytheState.
Somecitethisprovisionasthebasisofastandagainstdivorce. Andyetnotreally. Thephrase"
inviolablesocialinstitution,"wasliftedfromArt.52oftheCivilcode,andunderthatCode,divorcewaspartof
theproposeddraftsubmittedtoCongressbytheCodeCommissionandwasalmostapprovedifnotforreasons
otherthancompatibilitywithArt.52.
Sec.3.TheStateshalldefend:
(1)Therightofspousestofoundafamilyaccordingtotheirreligiousconvictionsandthedemands
ofresponsibleparenthood;
(2)Therightofchildrentoassistance,includingpropercareandnutrition,andspecialprotection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
(3)Therightofthefamilytoafamilylivingwageandincome;and
(4)Therightoffamiliesorfamilyassociationstoparticipateintheplanningandimplementation
ofpoliciesandprogramsthataffectthem.
Sec.4. ThefamilyhasthedutytocareforitselderlymembersbuttheStatemayalsodoso

throughjustprogramsofsocialsecurity.
Art.II,Sec.13.TheStaterecognizesthevitalroleofyouthinnationbuildingandshallpromote
andprotecttheirphysical,moral,spiritual,intellectualandsocialwellbeing. Itshallinculcateinthe
youthpatriotismandnationalism,andencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivilaffairs.
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequenceandincidentsaregovernedbylawandnotsubjecttostipulation,exceptthatthemarriage
settlementsmaybetoacertainextentfixthepropertyrelationsduringthemarriage.(CivilCode.)
Art.1.Marriageisaspecialcontractofpermanentunionbetweenamanandawomanentered
intoinaccordancewithlawfortheestablishmentofconjugalandfamilylife.Itisthefoundationofthe
familyandaninviolablesocialinstitutionwhosenature,consequences,andincidentsaregovernedbylaw
andnotsubjecttostipulation,exceptthatmarriagesettlementsmayfixthepropertyrelationsduringthe
marriagewithinthelimitsprovidedbythisCode.(FamilyCode.)

4.SelfReliantandIndependentEconomicOrder
Art. II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national economy
effectivelycontrolledbyFilipinos.
Sec. 20. TheStaterecognizes theindispensable role of the private sector,encouragesprivate
enterprise,andprovidesincentivestoneededinvestments.
Art. XII, Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contributetothecommongood.Individualsandprivategroups,includingcorporations,cooperativesand
similarcollectiveorganizations,shallhavetherighttoown,establishandoperateeconomicenterprises,
subjecttothedutyoftheStatetopromotedistributivejusticeandtointervenewhenthecommongoodso
demands.
These provisions revealthattheeconomic policy ofthePhilippines isone closer tosocialism than
capitalism.TheStateadoptsapolicyofbalancingtheprivatesector'spursuitforprofitandtheconcernofthe
Statetopromotedistributivejustice.
Theuseof"distributivejustice"isbasedontheAristoteliannotionofgivingeachonewhatisduehim
onthebasisofpersonalworthandvalue,andnotmerelywhathehascontractedfor.

GarciavsBOI(191SCRA288)
FACTS: TheBOIapprovedthetransferofthesiteofthepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandshiftof

feedstockforthatplantfromnaphthaonlytonaphthaand/orLPG. Thepetrochemicalplantwastobeajointventure
betweenthePNOCandtheBPCwhichisaTaiwanesegroup.AccordingtotheBOI,itistheinvestorwhichhasthefinal
sayastothesiteandthefeedstocktobeused.

HELD:EveryprovisionoftheConstitutiononthenationaleconomyandpatrimonyisinfusedwiththespiritof
nationalinterest.Thenonalienationofnaturalresources,theState'sfullcontroloverthedevt.andutilizationof
scarceresources,agreementswithforeignersbeingbasedonrealcontributionstotheeconomic growthand
generalwelfareofthecountryandtheregulationofforeigninvestmentsinaccordancewithnationalgoalsand
prioritiesaretooexplicitnottobenoticedandunderstood.
Apetrochemical industryisnotan ordinaryinvestment opportunity. Thepetrochemical industry is
essentialtothenationalinterst.TheBOIcommittedagraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitapprovedthetransferof
thepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandauthorizedthechangeoffeedstockfromnaphthaonlyto
naphthaand/orLPG.Nocogentadvantagetothegovt.hasbeenshownbythistransfer.Thisisarepudiationof
theindependentpolicyofthegovt.expressedinnumerouslawsandtheConstitutiontorunitsownaffairsthe
wayitdeemsbestforthenationalinterest.

5.CommunicationandInformationinNationBuilding
Art.II,Sec.24.TheStaterecognizesthevitalroleofcommunicationandinformationinnation
building.
Art.XVI,Sec.10.TheStateshalltheprovidethepolicyenvironmentforthefulldevelopmentof
Filipinocapabilityandtheemergenceofcommunicationstructuressuitabletotheneedsandaspirations
ofthenationandthebalancedflowofinformationinto,outof,andacrossthecountry,inaccordancewith
apolicythatrespectthefreedomofspeechandofthepress.
Sec.11(1). Theownership andmanagementofmassmediashallbelimited tocitizens ofthe
Philippines,ortocorporations,cooperativesorassociations,whollyownedandmanagedbysuchcitizens.
TheCongressshallregulateorprohibitmonopoliesincommercialmassmediawhenthepublic
interestsorequires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionthereinshallbeallowed.
(2)Theadvertisingindustryisimpressedwithpublicinterest,andshallberegulatedbylawforthe
protectionofconsumersandthepromotionofgeneralwelfare.
OnlyFilipinocitizensorcorporationsorassociationsatleastseventypercentofthecapitalof
whichisownedbysuchcitizensshallbeallowedtoengageintheadvertisingindustry.
Theparticipationofforeigninvestorsinthegoverningbodyofentitiesinsuchindustryshallbe
limitedtotheirproportionateshareinthecapitalthereof,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersof
suchentitiesmustbecitizensofthePhilippines.

Art.XVIII,Sec.23.Advertisingentitiesaffectedbyparagraph2,Section11ofArticleXVIofthis
Constitutionshallhavefiveyearsfromitsratificationtocomplyonagraduatedandproportionatebasis
withtheminimumFilipinoownershiprequirementtherein.

BothownershipandmanagementofmassmediamustbeinthehandsofFilipinos,100%.
Whilemonopoliesinmassmediamayberegulatedorprohibited,combinationsinrestraintofandunfair
competitionininformationmattersareabsolutelyprohibited.
Commercialadvertisingisnowdefinedasbeingvestedwithpublicinterest,andcanthusbeownedand
managedonlyby70%Filipinocorporations.

6.AutonomyofLocalGovernments
Art.II,Sec.25.TheStateshallensuretheautonomyoflocalgovernments.
Art.X.LocalGovernment.
GENERALPROVISIONS
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces,cities,municipalities,andbarangays.ThereshallbeautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanao
andtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided.
Sec.2.Theterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
elections,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,and
allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.
Sec.4.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.
Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcitiesandmunicipalitieswithrespect
tocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheir
prescribedpowersandfunctions.
Sec.5.Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenuesand
to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide,

consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy.Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrueexclusivelyto
thelocalgovernments.
Sec.6.Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenationaltaxes
whichshallbeautomaticallyreleasedtothem.
Sec.7.Localgovernmentsshallbeentitledtoanequitableshareintheproceedsoftheutilization
and developmentofthenationalwealthwithintheirrespectiveareas,inthemannerprovidedbylaw,
includingsharingthesamewiththeinhabitantsbywayofdirectbenefits.
Sec. 8. Theterm of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, whichshall be
determinedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected.
Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be
prescribedbylaw.
Sec.10.Noprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
governmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthepolitical
unitsdirectlyaffected.
Sec.11.TheCongressmay,bylaw,createspecialmetropolitanpoliticalsubdivisions,subjecttoa
plebisciteassetforthinSection10hereof. Thecomponentcitiesandmunicipalitiesshallretaintheir
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdictionofthemetropolitanauthoritythatwilltherebybecreatedshallbelimitedtobasicservices
requiringcoordination.
Sec. 12. Cities thatare highlyurbanized, asdetermined by law,andcomponent cities whose
chartersprohibit theirvotersfromvotingforprovincial electiveofficials,shallbe independent ofthe
province.Thevotersofcomponentcitieswithinaprovince,whosecharterscontainnosuchprohibition,
shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials.
Sec.13. Localgovernmentunitsmaygroupthemselves,consolidateorcoordinatetheirefforts,
services,andresourcesforpurposescommonlybeneficialtotheminaccordancewithlaw.
Sec.14. ThePresidentshallprovideforregionaldevelopmentcouncilsorothersimilarbodies
composedoflocalgovernmentofficials,regionalheadsofdepartmentsandothergovernmentoffices,and
representatives from nongovernmental organizations with the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralizationtostrengthentheautonomyoftheunitsthereinandtoacceleratetheeconomicandsocial

growthanddevelopmentoftheunitsintheregion.

AUTONOMOUSREGIONS
Sec.15.ThereshallbecreatedautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandintheCordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historicalandculturalheritage,economicandsocialstructures,andotherrelevantcharacteristicswhich
theframework ofthis Constitution andthe national sovereignty as well as territorialintegrity of the
RepublicofthePhilippines.
Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensurethat
lawsarefaithfullyexecuted.
Sec.17.Allpowers,functions,andresponsibilitiesnotgrantedbythisConstitutionorbylawto
theautonomousregionsshallbevestedintheNationalGovernment.
Sec.18.TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththeassistance
andparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesappointedbythe
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislativeassembly,
bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganicactsshall
likewiseprovideforspecialcourtswithpersonal,family,andpropertylawjurisdictionconsistentwiththe
provisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws.
Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes
castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and
geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.
Sec.19.ThefirstCongresselectedunderthisConstitutionshall,withineighteenmonthsfromthe
time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
MindanaoandtheCordilleras.
Sec.20. WithinitsterritorialjurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionand
nationallaws,theorganicactofautonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover:
(1)Administrativeorganizations;
(2)Creationofsourcesofrevenues;
(3)Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources;
(4)Personal,family,andpropertyrelations;
(5)Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment;
(6)Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment;
(7)Educationalpolicies;

(8)Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritage;and
(9)Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareof
thepeopleoftheregion.
Sec.21.Thepreservationofpeaceandorderwithintheregionshallbetheresponsibilityofthe
localpoliceagencieswhichshallbeorganized,maintained,supervised,andutilizedinaccordancewith
applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.

7.RecognitionoftheRightsofIndigenousCulturalCommunities

Art.II,Sec.22.TheStaterecognizesandpromotestherightsofindigenousculturalcommunities
withintheframeworkofnationalunityanddevelopment.

Art.VI,Sec.5(2) Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwenty percentum ofthetotal

numberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist. Forthreeconsecutivetermsafterthe
ratificationoftheConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbe
filled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfromthelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenouscultural
communities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.
Art.XII,Sec.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment
policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheirancestrallands
toensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.
TheCongressmayprovidefortheapplicabilityofcustomarylawsgoverningpropertyrightsor
relationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain.
Art.XIII,Sec.6.TheStateshallapplytheprinciplesofagrarianreformorstewardshipwhenever
applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including
lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands.
Art.XIV,Sec.17.TheStateshallrecognize,respectandprotecttherightsofindigenouscultural
communities topreserveanddeveloptheircultures,traditionsandinstitutions. Itshallconsiderthese
rightsintheformulationofnationalplansandpolicies.
Art.XVI,Sec.12.TheCongressmaycreateaconsultativebodytoadvisethePresidentonpolicies
affecting indigenousculturalcommunities,themajorityofthemembersofwhichshallcomefromsuch
communities.

8.HonestPublicServiceandFullPublicDisclosure

Art.II,Sec.27. TheStateshallmaintainhonestyandintegrityinthepublicserviceandtake
positiveandeffectivemeasuresagainstgraftandcorruption.
Sec.28. Subjecttoreasonableconditionsprescribedbylaw,theStateadoptsandimplementsa
policyoffullpublicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest.
Art.III,Sec.7. Therightofthepeopletoinformation onmattersofpublicconcernshallbe
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,
shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

HonestyofPublicOfficials
Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnet
worth. In thecaseofthePresident,Vice President,theMembers oftheCabinet,theCongress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemanner
providedbylaw.
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe
Houseconcernedofpotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofproposedlegislationof
whichtheyareauthors.
Sec.20.TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe
publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshall
publishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember.
Art.IX,D,Sec.4. TheCommission(onAudit)shallsubmittothePresidentandtheCongress,
withinthe timefixedbylaw,anannualreportcoveringthefinancial conditionandoperationofthe
Government,itssubdivisions,agencies,andinstrumentalities,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolled
corporations,andnongovernmentalentitiessubjecttoitsauditandrecommendmeasuresnecessaryto
improvetheireffectivenessandefficiency.
Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw.

Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the

OmbudsmantobeknownastheTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon,
VisayasandMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed.
Sec.6.TheofficialsandemployeesoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,otherthantheDeputies,shall
beappointedbytheOmbudsmanaccordingtotheCivilServiceLaw.
Sec.7.TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor.
Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,except
thoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.
Sec.8.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,andat
the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediatelypreceding election. TheOmbudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or
engagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.
Sec.9. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofat
leastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforevery
vacancythereafter.Suchappointmentshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithin
threemonthsaftertheyoccur.
Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe
decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.
Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding
theircessationfromoffice.
Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the govt., or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including govt. owned or controlled corporations and
shall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof.
Art.XI,Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions,duties:
(1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,
officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned

orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw,
ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties.
(3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliancetherewith.
(4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe
providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto
byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto
theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction.
(5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof
itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments.
(6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue
prudence.
(7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe
Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof
ethicsandefficiency.
(8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor
dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease.
Sec.15. TherightoftheStatetorecoverpropertiesunlawfullyacquiredbypublicofficialsor
employees,fromthemortheirnominees,ortransferees,shallnotbebarredbyprescription,laches,or
estoppel.
Sec.16.Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusinesspurpose
maybegranted,directlyorindirectlybyanygovt.ownedorcontrolledbankorfinancialinstitutiontothe
President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
ConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhavecontrolling
interest,duringtheirtenure.

ForeignLoans
Art.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublic
withthepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedby
law. TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysformtheendofeveryquarterofthecalendaryear,
submit to Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteedbythegovernmentorgovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationswhichwouldhavethe
effectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationof
themonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe
madeavailabletothepublic.

ExecutiveAgreementsonNaturalResources
Art.XII,Sec.2.
xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based
onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the
Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources.
ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis
provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.(pars.4and5thereof.)
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall upon
assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe
Houseconcernedofpotentialconflictofinterestthatmayariseformthefilingofproposedlegislationof
whichtheyareauthors.

HealthofthePresident
Art.VII,Sec.12. IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthe
stateofhishealth.TheMembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsand
theChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresidentduringsuch
illness.

Valmontev.Belmonte,170SCRA256(1989)
F:

Petitionersweremediapractitioners.TheyrequestedinformationfromrespondentGeneralManageroftheGSIS
regardingcleanloansgrantedbytheGSIScertainmembersofthedefunctBPontheguarantyofMrs.ImeldaMarcos
shortlybeforetheFeb.7,1986election.Theirrequestwasrefusedonthegroundofconfidentiality.Theybroughtthissuit
formandamus.

HELD:(1)Thecornerstoneoftherepublicansystemofgovtisthedelegationofpowerbythepeople.Inthis
system,governmentalagenciesandinstitutionsoperatew/inthelimitsoftheauthorityconferredbythepeople.
Deniedaccesstoinformationontheinnerworkingsofgovt,thecitizenrycanbecomepreytothewhimsand

capricesofthosetowhomthepowerhadbeendelegated. Thepostulateofpublicofficeasapublictrust,
institutionalizedintheConstitutiontoprotectthepeoplefromabuseofgovernmentalpower,wouldcertainlybe
merely empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribedbyimplementinglegislationadoptedpursuanttotheConstitution. Therighttoinformationisnot
merelyanadjunctofandthereforerestrictedinapplicationbytheexerciseofthefreedomofspeechandofthe
press. Farfromit. Therighttoinformationgoeshandinhandw/theconstitutionalpoliciesoffull public
disclosure andhonestyinthepublicservice. Itismeant toenhance thewidening roleofthecitizenry in
governmentaldecisionmakingaswellasincheckingabuseingovt.
(2)Therighttoinformationisnotabsolute.Itislimitedto"mattersofpublicconcern,"andisfurther
"subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw." (Legaspiv.CSC,150SCRA530.) Similarly,the
State'spolicyoffulldisclosureislimitedto"transactionsinvolvingpublicinterest,"andis"subjecttoreasonable
conditionsprescribedbylaw."TheGSISisatrusteeofcontributionsfromthegovtanditsemployeesandthe
administratorofvariousinsuranceprogramsforthebenefitofthelatter.Undeniably,itsfundsassumeapublic
character. xxx. Consideringthenatureofitsfunds,theGSISisexpectedtomanageitsresourcesw/utmost
prudenceandinstrictcompliancew/thepertinentlawsorrulesandregulations.Insum,thepublicnatureofthe
loanablefundsoftheGSISandthepublicofficeheldbytheallegedborrowersmaketheinformationsought
clearlyamatterofpublicinterestandconcern.
(3)TherighttoprivacycannotbeinvokedbyajuridicalentitylikeGSISbec.acorp.hasnorightor
privacyinitsnamesincetheentirebasisoftherighttoprivacyisaninjurytothefeelingsandsensibilitiesofthe
partyandacorp.wouldhavenosuchgroundforrelief.NeithercantheGSISinvoketherighttoprivacyofits
borrowers.Therightispurelypersonalinnature.Theconcernedborrowersthemselvesmaynotsucceedifthey
choosetoinvoketheirrighttoprivacy,consideringthepublicofficestheywereholdingatthetimetheloans
wereallegedtohavebeengranted.
(4)ThatGSIS,ingrantingloans,wasexercisingaproprietaryfunctionwouldnotjustifytheexclusion
ofthetransactionsfromthecoverageandscopeoftherighttoinformation.
(5) But,althoughcitizensareaffordedtherighttoinformation,and,pursuantthereto,areentitledto
"access toofficialrecords,"theConstitution doesnotaccordthemarighttocompel custodians ofofficial
recordstopreparelists,abstracts,summariesandthelikeintheirdesiretoacquireinformationonmattersof
publicconcern.VV.

UPDATED12/1/95
RAM

PARTTWO
STRUCTUREANDPOWERSOFTHENATIONALGOVERNMENT

I.THESEPARATIONOFPOWERS
Cruz: Purpose. Thedoctrineofseparationofpowersisintendedtopreventaconcentrationofauthorityin
onepersonorgroupofpersonsthatmightleadtoanirreversibleerrororabuseinitsexercisetothedetrimentof
ourrepublicaninstitutions.Morespecifically,accordingtoJ.Laurel,thedoctrineisintendedtosecureaction,
toforestalloveraction,topreventdepotismandtoobtainefficiency.xxx
BlendingofPowers.ThereareinstancesundertheConsti.whenpowersarenotconfinedexclusivelyw/inone
deptbutareinfactassignedtoorsharedbyseveraldepartments.Asaresultofthisblendingofpowers,thereis
somedifficultynowinclassifyingsomeofthemasdefinitelylegislative,executiveorjudicial.AsJ.Homesput
itvividlywhenheremarkedthat"thegreatordinancesoftheConstitutiondonotestablishanddividefieldsof
blackandwhite.Eventhemorespecificofthemarefoundtoterminateinapenumbrashadinggraduallyfrom
oneextremetoanother." Thepowersofgovtmaynotatalltimesbecontainedw/mathematicalprecisionin

watertightcompartmentsbec.oftheirambiguousnature,e.g.,thepowerofappointment,w/ccanrightfullybe
exercisedbyeachdeptoveritsownadministrativepersonnel.xxx

A.Congress
1.Composition,Qualifications,andTermofOffice
a.Senate
Art.VI,Secs.24
Art.VI.
Sec.2.TheSenateshallbecomposedoftwentyfourSenatorswhoshallbeelectedatlargebythe
qualifiedvotersofthePhilippines,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.
Sec.3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,and,on
thedayoftheelection,isatleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,aregisteredvoter,anda
residentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyearsimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
Sec.4.ThetermofofficeoftheSenatorsshallbesixyearsandshallcommence,unlessotherwise
providedbylaw,atnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelection.
NoSenatorshallserveformorethantwoconsecutiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheoffice
foranylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefull
termofwhichhewaselected.

COMPOSITION
24Senatorselectedatlargebyqualifiedvoters
QUALIFICATIONS
Citizenship:
Ageonthedayofelection:
Education:
Registeredvoter:
Residence:

TERMOFOFFICE

Naturalborncitizen
35
Abletoreadandwrite
InthePhilippines
2years(immediatelyprecedingthe
election)

Six(6)years
Tocommenceunlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,atnoononJune30nextfollowingtheelection.(Art.
VI,Sec.4)
ButunderSec.2oftheTransitoryprovisions,thesenatorselectedonthe2ndMondayofMay,1987
shallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.(Art.XVIII,Sec.2)
Ofthesenatorselectedintheelectionof1992,thefirst12obtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshall
servefor6yearsandtheremaining12for3years.Thereafter,12senatorswillbeelectedevery3years,toserve
atermof6years.(Art.XVIII,Sec.2)
No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms, and for this purpose, no voluntary
renunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallbeconsideredforthepurposeofinterruptingthecontinuity
ofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VI,Sec.4)
A)Regularcase:IfXrunsin1992,getsthe#12slot,andisreelectedin1998,hecannolongerrunin
thesenatorialelectionof2004,evenifintheyear2000heresignsfromoffice.Ingeneral,thelimitforregular
senators(thoseelectedafterthetransition,orafter1992)is12consecutiveyears.
ButifXrunsin1992,getsthe#13slot,doesnotrerunin1995,butrerunsin1998,hecanstillrerunin
2004.
B)Transition:IfMacedarerunsin1992andendsupin#15,whenhistermexpiresatnoonof30June
1995,hecannolongerrunforreelectionassenator,evenifhewillhaveservedforonly8years,sincethe
Constitutiontalksof2consecutiveterms.
IfXrunsin1992,endsup#13,thenrerunsin1995,hecannolongerrunforsenatorintheyear2001,
evenifhewillhaveservedforonly9years.
IfMacedadoesnotrerunin1992,thenrunsagainin1995,hecanstillrerunin2001.

b.HouseofRepresentatives
Art.VI,Secs.58
Art.VI.
Sec.5(1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallbecomposedofnotmorethantwohundredand
fiftymembers,unlessotherwisefixedbylaw,whoshallbeelectedfromlegislativedistrictsapportioned
amongtheprovinces,cities,andtheMetropolitanManilaareainaccordancewiththenumberoftheir
respectiveinhabitants,andonthebasisofauniformandprogressiveratio,andthosewho,asprovidedby
law,shallbeelectedthroughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesor
organizations.

(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number or
representativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist.Forthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationof
thisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtopartylistrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovidedby
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacentterritory.Eachcitywithapopulationofatleasttwohundredfiftythousand,oreachprovince,
shallhaveatleastonerepresentative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionmentoflegislativedistrictsbasedonthestandardprovidedinthisSection.
Sec.6.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanaturalborn
citizenofthePhilippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyearsofage,abletoread
andwrite,and,exceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbe
elected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthenoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayofthe
election.
Sec.7. TheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeelectedforatermofthreeyears
whichshallbegin,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,atnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowing
theirelection.
NoMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutiveterms.
Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptionin
thecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
Sec.8.Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandtheMembersof
theHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.

Art.IXC,Secs.68
ArtIXC.
Sec.6.Afreeandopenpartysystemshallbeallowedtoevolveaccordingtothefreechoiceofthe
people,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisArticle.
Sec.7.Novotescastinfavorofapoliticalparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbevalid,except
forthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution.
Sec.8.Politicalparties,ororganizationsorcoalitionsregisteredunderthepartylistsystem,shall
notberepresentedinthevoters'registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boardofcanvassers,or
othersimilarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledtoappointpollwatchersinaccordancewithlaw.

Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof
nomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentativesinparagraph(2),Section
5ofArticleVIofthisConstitution.

RepublicAct7941
ANACTPROVIDINGFORTHEELECTIONOFPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVESTHROUGHTHEPARTYLIST
SYSTEM,ANDAPPROPRIATINGFUNDSTHEREFOR.
BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesincongressassembled.
Sec.1.Title.ThisActshallbeknownasthe"PartyListSystemAct."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representativestotheHouseofRepresentativesthroughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regionalandsectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresentedsectors,organizations andparties, andwho lackwelldefined political constituenciesbut whocould
contributetotheformulationandenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole,tobecome
membersoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Towardsthisend,theStateshalldevelopandguaranteeafull,freeandopen
partysysteminordertoattainthebroadestpossiblerepresentationofparty,sectoralorgroupinterestintheHouseof
Representativesbyenhancingtheirchancestocompeteforandwinseatsinthelegislature,andshallprovidethesimplest
schemepossible.
Sec.3. DefinitionofTerms. (a) The partylistsystem isamechanismofproportionalrepresentationinthe
electionofrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesfromnational,regionalandsectoralpartiesororganizationsor
coalitions thereof registered withtheCommissiononElections (COMELEC). component partiesororganizations of
coalitionmayparticipateindependentlyprovidedthecoalitionofwhichtheyformpartdoesnotparticipateinthepartylist
system.
(b)Apartymeanseitherapoliticalpartyorasectoralpartyoracoalitionofparties.
(c)Apoliticalpartyreferstoanorganizedgroupofcitizensadvocatinganideologyorplatform,principlesand
policies for the general conduct of government and which,as the most immediate means ofsecuringtheir adoption,
regularlynominatesandsupportscertainofitsleadersandmembersascandidatesforpublicoffice.
Itisanationalpartywhenitsconstituencyisspreadoverthegeographicalterritoryofatleastamajorityofthe
regions.Itisaregionalpartywhenitsconstituencyisspreadoverthegeographicalterritoryofatleastamajorityofthe
citiesandprovincescomprisingtheregion.
(d)AsectoralpartyreferstoanorganizedgroupofcitizensbelongingtoanyofthesectorsenumeratedinSection
5hereofwhoseprincipaladvocacypertainstothespecialinterestandconcernsoftheirsector.
(e) A sectoralorganization referstoagroupofcitizensoracoalitionofgroupofcitizenswhosharesimilar
physicalattributesorcharacteristics,employment,interestsorconcerns.
(f)Acoalitionreferstoanaggrupationofdulyregisterednational,regional,sectoralpartiesororganizationsfor
politicaland/orelectionpurposes.
Sec.4. ManifestationtoParticipateinthePartyListSystem. Anyparty,organization,orcoalitionalready
registeredwiththeCommissionneednotregisteranew.However,suchparty,organization,orcoalitionshallfilewiththe
Commission,notlaterthanninety(90)daysbeforetheelection,amanifestationofitsdesiretoparticipateinthepartylist
system.

Sec.5. Registration. Anyorganizedgroupofpersonsmayregisterasaparty,organizationorcoalitionfor

purposesofthepartylistsystembyfilingwiththeCOMELECnotlaterthanninety(90)daysbeforetheelectionapetition
verifiedbyitspresidentorsecretarystatingitsdesiretoparticipateinthepartylistsystemasanational,regionalorsectoral
partyororganizationoracoalitionofsuchpartiesororganizations,attachingtheretoitsconstitution,bylaws,platformor
programofgovernment,listofofficers,coalitionagreementandotherrelevantinformationastheCOMELECmayrequire:
Provided,Thatthesectorshallincludelabor,peasant,fisherfolk,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,elderly,
handicapped,women,youth,veterans,overseasworkers,andprofessionals.
TheCOMELECshallpublishthepetitioninatleasttwo(2)nationalnewspapersofgeneralcirculation.
TheCOMELECshall,afterduenoticeandhearing,resolvethepetitionwithinfifteen(15)daysfromthedateit
wassubmittedfordecisionbutinnocasenotlaterthansixty(60)daysbeforetheelection.
Sec.6. Refusaland/orCancellationofRegistration. TheCOMELECmay, motuproprio, oruponverified
complaintofanyinterestedparty,refuseorcancel,afterduenoticeandhearing,theregistrationofanynational,regionalor
sectoralparty,organizationorcoalitiononanyofthefollowinggrounds:
(1)Itisareligioussectordenomination,organizationorassociationorganizedforreligiouspurposes;
(2)Itadvocatesviolenceorunlawfulmeanstoseekitsgoal;
(3)Itisaforeignpartyororganization;
(4)Itisreceivingsupportfromanyforeigngovernment,foreignpoliticalparty,foundation,organization,whether
directlyorthoughanyofitsofficersormemberorindirectlythoughthirdpartiesforpartisanelectionpurposes.
(5)Itviolatesorfailstocomplywithlaws,rulesorregulationsrelatingtoelections;
(6)Itdeclaresuntruthfulstatementsinitspetition;
(7)Ithasceasedtoexistforatleastone(1)year;or
(8)Itfailstoparticipateinthelasttwo(2)precedingelectionsorfailstoobtainatleasttwopercentum(2%)ofthe
votescastunderthepartylistsysteminthetwo(2)precedingelectionsfortheconstituencyinwhichithasregistered.
Sec.7.CertifiedListofRegisteredParties.TheCOMELECshall,notlaterthansixty(60)daysbeforeelection,
prepareacertifiedlistofnational,regional,orsectoralparties,organizationsorcoalitionswhichhaveappliedorwhohave
manifestedtheirdesiretoparticipateunderthepartylistsystemanddistributecopiesthereoftoallprecintsforpostingin
thepollingplacesonelectionday.Thenamesofthepartylistnomineesshallnotbeshownonthecertifiedlist.
Sec.8.NominationofPartyListRepresentatives.Eachregisteredparty,organization,orcoalitionshallsubmit
totheCOMELECnotlaterthanfortyfive(45)daysbeforetheelectionalistofnames,notlessthanfive(5),fromwhich
partylistrepresentativesshallbechosenincaseitobtainstherequirednumberofvotes.
Apersonmaybenominatedinone(1)listonly.Onlypersonswhohavegiventheirconsentinwritingmaybe
namedinthelist.Thelistshallnotincludeanycandidateforanyelectiveofficeorapersonwhohaslosthisbidforan
electiveofficeintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.Nochangeofnamesoralterationoftheorderofnomineesshallbe
allowedafterthesameshallhavebeensubmittedtotheCOMELECexceptincaseswherethenomineedies,orwithdraws
inwritinghisnomination,becomesincapacitatedinwhichcasethenameofthesubstitutenomineeshallbeplacedinthe
list.IncumbentsectoralrepresentativesintheHouseofRepresentativeswhoarenominatedinthepartylistsystemshall
notbeconsideredresigned.
Sec.9.QualificationsofPartyListNominees.Nopersonshallbenominatedaspartylistrepresentativeunless
heisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,aresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodofnotlessthan
one(1)yearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection,abletoreadandwrite,a bonafide memberofthepartyor
organizationwhichheseekstorepresentforatleastninety(90)daysprecedingthedayoftheelection,andisatleast
twentyfive(25)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection.
Incaseofanomineeoftheyouthsector,hemustbeatleastbetwentyfive(25)butnotmorethanthirty(30)years
ofageonthedayoftheelection.Anyyouthsectoralrepresentativewhoattainstheageofthirty(30)duringhistermshall

beallowedtocontinueinofficeuntiltheexpirationofhisterm.
Sec.10. MannerofVoting.Everyvotershallbeentitledtotwo(2)votes:thefirstisavoteforcandidatefor
memberoftheHouseofRepresentativesinhislegislativedistrict;andthesecond,avotefortheparty,organization,or
coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral
organization,orcoalitionnotentitledtobevotedforshallnotbecounted:Providedfinally,Thatthefirstelectionunderthe
partylistsystemshallbeheldinMay1998.
TheCOMELECshallundertakethenecessaryinformationcampaignforpurposesofeducatingtheelectorateon
thematterofthepartylistsystem.
Sec.11.NumberofPartyListRepresentatives.Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwentypercentum
(20%)ofthetotalnumberofthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representationintheHouseofRepresentativesatthestartoftheTenthCongressofthePhilippinesshallnotbeentitledto
participateinthepartylistsystem.
Indeterminingtheallocationofseatsforthesecondvote,thefollowingprocedureshallbeobserved:
(a)Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsshallberankedfromthehighesttothelowestbasedonthenumber
ofvotestheygarneredduringtheelections.
(b) Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsreceivingatleasttwopercent(2%)ofthetotalvotescastforthe
partylistsystemshallbeentitledtooneseateach:Provided,Thatthosegarneringmorethantwopercent(2%)ofthevotes
shallbeentitledtoadditionalseatsinproportiontotheirtotalnumberofvotes: Provided,finally,Thateachparty,
organization,orcoalitionshallbeentitledtonotmorethanthree(3)seats.
Sec.12.ProcedureinAllocatingSeatsforPartyListRepresentatives.TheCOMELECshalltallyallthevotes
fortheparties,organizations,orcoalitionsonanationwidebasis,rankthemaccordingtothenumberofvotesreceivedand
allocatepartylistrepresentativesproportionatelyaccordingtothepercentageofvotesobtainedbyeachparty,organization,
orcoalitionasagainstthetotalnationwidevotescastforthepartylistsystem.
Sec.13. How PartyListRepresentativesAreChosen. Partylistrepresentativesshallbeproclaimedbythe
COMELECbasedonthelistofnamessubmittedbytherespectiveparties,organizations,orcoalitionstotheCOMELEC
accordingtotheirrankinginsaidlist.
Sec.14.TermofOffice.Partylistrepresentativesshallbeelectedforatermofthree(3)yearswhichshallbegin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No partylist
representativesshallserveformorethanthree(3)consecutiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthof
timeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
Sec.15.ChangeofAffiliation;Effect.Anyelectedpartylistrepresentativewhochangeshispoliticalpartyor
sectoralaffiliationduringhistermofofficeshallforfeithisseat:Provided,Thatifhechangeshispoliticalpartyorsectoral
affiliationwithinsix(6)monthsbeforeanelection,heshallnotbeeligiblefornominationaspartylistrepresentativeunder
hisnewpartyororganization.
Sec.16. Vacancy.Incaseofvacancyintheseatsreservedforpartylistrepresentatives,thevacancyshallbe
automaticallyfilledbythenextrepresentativefromthelistofnomineesintheordersubmittedtotheCOMELECbythe
same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party,
organization,orcoalitionconcernedshallsubmitadditionalnominees.
Sec.17.RightsofPartyListRepresentatives.Partylistrepresentativesshallbeentitledtothesamesalariesand

emolumentsasregularmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives.
Sec.18. RulesandRegulations.TheCOMELECshallpromulgatethenecessaryrulesandregulationsasmay
benecessarytocarryoutthepurposesofthisAct.
Sec.19. Appropriations. TheamountnecessaryfortheimplementationofthisActshallbeprovidedinthe
regularappropriationsfortheCommissiononElectionsstartingfiscalyear1996undertheGeneralAppropriationsAct.
Starting1995,theCOMELECisherebyauthorizedtoutilizesavingsandotheravailablefundsforpurposesofits
informationcampaignonthepartylistsystem.
Sec.20. SeparabilityClause. IfanypartofthisActisheldinvalidorunconstitutional,theotherpartsor
provisionsthereofshallremainvalidandeffective.
Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealed.
Sec.22. Effectivity.ThisActshalltakeeffectfifteen(15)daysafteritspublicationinanewspaperofgeneral
circulation.
Approved,March3,1995.

COMPOSITION
Notmorethan250Members(*unlessotherwisefixedbylaw)electedfrom:
a)Legislativedistricts(80%oftheseatsshallbeallottedtodistrictrepresentatives.)
Thedistrictsaretobedeterminedaccordingtothefollowingrules:[200districtsor80%]
1.Thedistrictsaretobeapportionedamongtheprovinces,cities,andMetroManila.[Sec.5(1)]
2. The apportionment must be based on the number of inhabitants, using a uniform and progressive ratio.
Within3yearsfollowingthereturnofeverycensus,Congressshall makeareapportionmentoflegislative
districts,basedonthestandardshereinprovided(tomakeitrepresentativeandmoreresponsivetothepeople).
[Sec.5(4)]
3.Eachlegislativedistrictmustcompriseasfaraspracticable,contiguous,compact,andadjacentterritory(to
avoidgerrymandering,orputtingtogetherofareaswhereacandidateisstrong,evenifthesearenotcontiguous).
[Sec.5(3)]
4.Eachcitywithapopulationofatleast250,000musthaveatleastonerepresentative.[Sec.5(3)]
5.Eachprovince,regardlessofpopulationmusthaveatleastonerepresentative.[Sec.5(3)]
b)Partylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations.[Sec.5(2)]

Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitute20%ofthelowerhouse.
For3consecutivetermsaftertheratificationoftheConstitution(1987,1992,1995),1/2oftheseats
allocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbefilledbyselectionorelection,asprovidedbylaw,formthe(i)
labor,(ii)peasant,(iii)urbanpoor,(iv)indigenousculturalcommunities,(v)women,(vi)youth,and(vii)such
othersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.
Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmaysetuppostsbyappointmentfromalistofnomineesbythe
respectivesectors,theseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentatives(Art.XVIII,Sec.7).

QUALIFICATIONS
Citizenship:
Ageonthedayofelection:
Education:
Registeredvoter:
Residence:

Naturalborncitizen
25
Abletoreadandwrite
Inthedistrict,ifdistrict
representative
1yearinthedistrict
(immediatelyprecedingtheelection)

TERMOFOFFICE
3years
Tocommence(unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw)atnoonofJune30nextfollowingtheelection.(Art.
VI,Sec.7)
ButunderSec.2oftheTransitoryProvisions,themembersoftheHouseelectedonthesecondMonday
ofMay,1987shallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.
NoMemberoftheHouseshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms.Novoluntaryrenunciationof
theofficeforanylengthoftimeshallbeconsideredaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefull
termforwhichhewaselectedforthepurposeofcircumventingthis3termlimitation.(Art.VI,Sec.7)
Thus,Perezcanstillrerunin1992,and1995,butnolongerin1998. Ifheisreelectedin1992and
1995,andheresignsin1997,hecanstillnolongerrunin1998.Butifhedoesnotrunin1992orin1995,hecan
run for another 3 straight terms, because the continuity would be broken. Thus, one can be a lifetime
Congressmansolongashedoesnotrunonthethirdterm.

Dimaporovs.Mitra202SCRA779(Oct.15,1991)
F:

PetitionerMohammadAliDimaporowaselectedRepresentativeforthe2ndLegislativeDistrictofLanaodelSur
duringthe1987congressionalelections.
In Jan., 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
GovernoroftheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao.UponbeinginformedofsuchdevelopmentbytheCOMELEC,

respondentsSpeakerandSecretaryoftheHouseofReps.excludedpetitioner'snamefromtheRollofMembersofthe
HouseofReps.pursuanttoSec.67,ArticleIXoftheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.Blg.881)
Havinglostintheelections,petitionerthentriedbutfailedinhisbidtoregainhisseatinCongress.Hence,this
petition. HemaintainsthathedidnotlosehisseatascongressmanbecauseSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isnot
operativeunderthepresentConstitution,beingcontrarythereto,andthereforenotapplicabletothepresentmembersof
Congress.

ISSUE:WhetherSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isoperativeunderthepresentConstitution
HELD:YES.Sec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881reads:"Anyelectiveofficialwhethernationalorlocalrunning
foranyofficeotherthantheonewhichheisholdinginapermanentcapacityexceptforPresidentandVice
Presidentshallbeconsideredipsofactoresignedfromhisofficeuponthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy."
Petitionerfailedtodiscernthatratherthancutshortthetermofofficeofelectivepublicofficials,this
statutoryprovisionseekstoensurethatsuchofficialsserveouttheirentiretermofofficeandtherebycutting
shorttheirtenurebymakingitclearthatshouldtheyfailintheircandidacy,theycannotgobacktotheirformer
position. Thisisconsonant withtheconstitutionaledictthatallpublicofficialsmustservethepeoplewith
utmostloyaltyandnottriflewiththemandatewhichtheyhavereceivedfromtheirconstituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress,petitionerseemstoconfuse"term"with"tenure"ofoffice.
"ThetermofofficeprescribedbytheConstitutionmaynotbeextendedorshortenedbythelegislature,butthe
periodduringwhichanofficeractuallyholdstheoffice(tenure),maybeaffectedbycircumstanceswithinorbeyondthe
powerofsaidofficer.Thesesituationswillnotchangethedurationofthetermofoffice."

Underthequestionedprovision,whenanelectiveofficialcoveredtherebyfilesacert.ofcandidacyfor
anotheroffice,heisdeemedtohavevoluntarilycutshorthistenure,nothisterm.Thetermremainsandhis
successor,ifany,isallowedtoserveitsunexpiredportion.
ThefactthatthegroundcitedinSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isnotmentionedintheConstitution
itselfasamodeofshorteningthetenureofofficeofthemembersofCongressdoesnotprecludeitsapplication
topresentmembersofCongress.Sec.2,Art.IXoftheConstitutionprovidesthat"xxxAllotherpublicofficers
andemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment."Suchconstitutional
expressionclearlyrecognizesthatthe4groundsfoundinArt.VIoftheConstitutionbywhichthetenureofa
CongressmanmaybeshortenedareNOTexclusive.
Moreover, as the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automaticallythepermanentforfeitureoftheelectivepositionbeingpresentlyheld,itisnotnecessarythatthe
otherpositionbeactuallyheld.ThegroundforforfeitureinSec.13,Art.VIoftheConstitutionisdifferentfrom
theforfeituredecreedinSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881,whichisactuallyamodeofvoluntaryrenunciationof
officeunderSec.7,par.2ofArt.VIoftheConstitution.RAM.
Gutierrez,Jr.,J.:Dissentingopinion
Congresscannotaddbystatuteoradministrativeacttothecausesfordisqualificationorremovalof
constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining constitutional
officersotherthanthoseprovidedintheConstitution.

c.Synchronizedtermsofoffice
Art.XVIII,Secs.12
Art.XVIII,Sec.1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbe
heldonthesecondMondayofMay,1987.
ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybe
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
MembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.
Sec.2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelected
underthisConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.
OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberof
votesshallserveforsixyearsandtheremainingtwelveforthreeyears.

2.Election
a.Regularelection

ArtVI,Sec.8
Art.VI,Sec.8. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandthe

MembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.

Regular(Art.VI,Sec.8)
2ndMondayofmay,every3years,starting1992(unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw).Thetermofoffice
beginsonthefollowingJune30.
Forthetransitoryperiod,thefirstelectionwasheldonthe2ndMondayofMay,1987(Art.XVIII,Sec.
1.)
b.Specialelection
Art.VI,Sec.9
Art.VI,Sec.9. IncaseofvacancyintheSenateorintheHouseorRepresentatives,aspecial
electionmaybecalledtofillsuchvacancyinthemannerprescribedbylaw,buttheSenatororMemberof

theHouseofRepresentativesthuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredterm.
RepublicActNo.6645,Dec.28,1987

REPUBLICACTNO.6645

ANACTPRESCRIBINGTHEMANNEROFFILLINGAVACANCY
INTHECONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES.
Sec. 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representativesatleastone(1)yearbeforethenextregularelectionforMembersofCongress,theCommissionon
Elections,uponreceiptofaresolutionoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,certifying
totheexistenceofsuchvacancyandcallingforaspecialelection,shallholdaspecialelectiontofillsuchvacancy.If
Congressisinrecess,anofficialcommunicationontheexistenceofthevacancyandcallforaspecialelectionbythe
PresidentoftheSenateorbytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,shallbesufficientfor
such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpiredterm.
Sec.2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallfixthedateofthespecialelection,whichshallnotbeearlierthan
fortyfive(45)daysnorlaterthanninety (90)daysfromthedateofsuchresolution orcommunication,stating
amongotherthingstheofficeorofficestobevotedfor:Provided,however,Thatifwithinthesaidperiodageneral
electionisscheduledtobeheld,thespecialelectionshallbeheldsimultaneouslywithsuchgeneralelection.
Sec.3. The Commissionon Electionsshall sendcopiesoftheresolution,innumbersufficient fordue
distributionandpublication,totheProvincialorCityTreasurerofeachprovinceorcityconcerned,whointurn
shallpublishitintheirrespectivelocalitiesbypostingatleastthreecopiesthereofinasmanyconspicuousplacesin
eachoftheirelectionprecints,andacopyineachofthepollingplacesandpublicmarkets,andinthemunicipal
buildings.
Sec.4.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitspublicationintheOfficialGazetteorinatleasttwonewspapersof
generalcirculation.
Approved,December28,1987.

Art.IXC,Sec.11
Art.IXC,Sec.11. FundscertifiedbytheCommissionasnecessarytodefraytheexpensesfor
holdingregularandspecialelections,plebiscites,initiatives,referenda,andrecalls,shallbeprovidedin
the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon
certificationbytheChairmanoftheCommission.

IncaseofvacancyintheSenateortheHouse,aspecialelectionmaybecalledtofillupsuchvacancy
"inthemannerprescribedbylaw."
ThelawthatgovernsandlaysdownthedetailsconcerningthespecialcongressionalelectionsisRep.
ActNo.6645(December28,1987).Underthelaw,nospecialelectionwillbecalledifthevacancyoccurs(i)
lessthan18monthsbeforethenextregularelectioninthecaseoftheSenate,or(ii)lessthan1yearbeforethe
nextregularelectioninthecaseoftheHouse;inthesecases,wewilljusthavetowaitforthenextregular
election,forpracticalreasons.
Whenthevacancyoccursduringtheperiodwhenspecialelectionsareallowedtobeconducted(18or12
monthsormorebeforethenextregularelection),theparticularHouseofCongressmustpasseitheraresolution
bytheHouseconcerned,ifCongressisinsession,oracertificationbytheSenatePresidentortheSpeakerofthe
House,ifCongressisnotinsession,(a)declaringtheexistenceofthevacancyand(b)callingforaspecial
electiontobeheldwithin45to90daysfromthedateofcallingofthespecialelection(thatis,fromthedateof
theresolutionorcertification).
ButtheSenatororMemberoftheHousethuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredportionofthe
term.(Art.VI,Sec.9)
FundscertifiedbytheCOMELECasnecessarytodefraytheexpensesforholdingregularandspecial
elections,plebiscites,initiatives,referenda,andrecalls,shallbeprovidedintheregularorspecialappropriations
and,onceapproved,shallbereleasedautomaticallyuponcertificationbytheChairmanoftheCOMELEC.(Art.
IXC,Sec.11)
InLozadavsCOMELEC,120SCRA337,apetitiontocompeltheCOMELECtocallspecialelections
tofilltwelvevacancies intheinterim Batasang Pambansa wasdismissed ontheground interalia thatthe
petitionerswerenotproperpartiesastheyhadonlywhattheSupremeCourtcalleda"generalizedinterest"
sharedwiththerestofthepeople.

LozadavsCOMELEC,120SCRA337(1983)
F:

Thisisapet.formandamusfiledbyLozadaandIgotasrepresentativesuitforandinbehalfofthosewhowishto
participateintheelectionirrespectiveofpartyaffiliation,tocompeltheresp.COMELECtocallaspecialelectiontofillup
existingvacanciesnumbering12intheInterimBP.Thepet.isbasedonSec.5(2),Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti.w/creads:
"IncaseavacancyarisesintheBP18monthsormorebeforearegularelection,theCOMELECshallcalla
specialelectiontobeheldw/in60daysafterthevacancyoccurstoelecttheMembertoservetheunexpiredterm."
PetitionerLozadaclaimsthatheisaTPandabonafideelectorofCebuCityandatransientvoterofQC,MM,
whodesirestorunforthepositionintheBP;whilepetitionerIgotallegesthat,asTP,hehasstandingtopetitionby
mandamusthecallingofaspecialelectionasmandatedbythe1973Consti.

HELD:I.

a. Astaxypayers,petitionersmaynotfiletheinstantpetition,fornowherethereinisitalleged

thattaxmoneyisbeingillegallyspent.xxx
b. Asvoters,neitherhavepetitioners therequisiteinterestorpersonalitytoqualifythemto
maintainandprosecutethepresentpetition.Petitioners'standingtosuemaynotbepredicateduponaninterest
ofthekindallegedhere,w/cisheldincommonbyallmembersofthepublicbec.ofthenecessarilyabstract
natureoftheinjurysupposedlysharedbyallcitizens.
II.
a.TheSC'sjurisdictionovertheCOMELECisonlytoreviewbycertiorarithelatter'sdecision,
ordersorrulings.xxxThereisinthiscasenodecision,orderorrulingoftheCOMELECw/cissoughttobe
reviewedbythisCourtunderitscertiorarijurisdictionxxx.
b.Mandamusdoesnotlie.ThereistotalabsencethatCOMELEChasunlawfullyneglectedthe
performanceofaministerialdutyorhasrefusedonbeingdemanded, todischargesuchaduty. xxx[T]he
holdingofspecialelectionsinseveralregionaldistrictswherevacanciesexist,wouldentailhugeexpenditureof
money. OnlytheBPcanmakethenecessaryappropriationforthepurpose,andthispoweroftheBPmay
neitherbesubjecttomandamusbythecourtsmuchlessmayCOMELECcompelBPtoexerciseitspowerof
appropriation.
III.
Perhapsthe strongestreason whythesaidprovision isnotintended to applytotheInterim
National AssemblyisthefactthataspassedbytheConCon,theInterimNAwastobecomposedbythe
delegatestotheConCon,aswellasthethenincumbentPres.andVP,andthemembersoftheSenateandHouse
ofRep.ofCongressunderthe1935Consti.W/suchnumberofrepresentativesrepresentingeachcongressional
district,oraprovince,nottomentiontheSenators,therewasfeltabsolutelynoneedforfillingupvacancies
occurringintheInterimNA,consideringtheuncertaintyofthedurationofitsexistence.RAM.

Barlongay:
Q:Canappropriationofmoneythroughalawbecompelledbymandamus?
A:No.
Q:Istheruleabsolute?
A:No.Thereareexceptions(seePasaycase).LGUsmaybecompelledbymandamustoappropriatemoneyfor
obligationsalreadyincurredor(whenthereisalready)arighttow/caprivatepartyisentitled.

3.Salaries,PrivilegesandDisqualifications
a.Salaries
Art.VI,Sec.10.ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbe
determinedbylaw.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefull
termofalltheMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.

Art.XVIII,Sec.17.UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,thexxxPresidentoftheSenate,the
Speaker of the House of Representatives xxx (shall receive an annual salary of) two hundred forty
thousandpesoseach;theSenators,theMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,xxxtwohundredfour
thousandpesoseach;xxx

ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbedeterminedbylaw.
UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseshallreceive
anannualsalaryofP240,000;whiletheSenatorsandthemembersoftheHouseshallreceiveP204,000each.
(Art.XVIII,Sec.17.)
WhileitisCongress,throughasalarylaw,thatdeterminesthesalarytobereceivedbyitsmembers,the
Constitutionmandatesthatnoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefull
termofallthemembersofthetwohousesapprovingsuchincrease.

PhilconsavMathay,18SCRA300(1966)
F:

PHILCONSAhasfiledinthisCourtasuitagainsttheAuditorGeneralofthePhils.,andtheAuditorofthe
Congress,seekingtopermanentlyenjointheaforesaidofficialsfromauthorizingorpassinginauditthepaymentofthe
increasedsalariesauthorizedbyRA4134(approved6/10/64)totheSpeakerandmembersoftheHRepbefore12/30/69.
Sec.1,par.1ofRA4134provided,interalia,thattheannualsalaryoftheSenatePres.andoftheSpeakerofthe
HRepshallbeP40,000each;thatoftheSenatorsandmembersoftheHRep,P32,000each(therebyincreasingtheirpresent
compensationofP16TandP7,200paforthePresidingofficersandmembersrespectively.)
The19651966BudgetimplementedtheincreaseinsalaryoftheSpeakerandmembersoftheHRepsetbyRA
4134.
ThepetitionerscontendthatsuchimplementationisviolativeofArtVI,Sec.14ofthe1935Consti,w/cprovided
that:"xxxNoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofalltheMembers
oftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.xxx"
Thereasongivenbeingthatthetermofthe8senatorselectedin1963,andwhotookpartintheapprovalofRA
4134,willexpireonlyon12/30/69;whilethetermofthemembersoftheHousewhoparticipatedintheapprovalofthesaid
Actexpiredon12/30/65.

HELD: The Court agrees w/ petitioners that the increased compensation provided is not operative until
12/30/69,whenthefulltermofallmembersoftheSenateandHousethatapproveditwillhaveexpired.
Purposeoftheprovision.Thereasonforthethisrule,theCourtsaid,istoplacea"legalbartothe
legislatorsyieldingtothenaturaltemptationtoincreasetheirsalaries.Notthatthepowertoprovideforhigher
compensationislacking,butwiththelengthoftimethathastoelapsebeforeanincreasebecomeseffective,
thereisadeterrentfactortoanysuchmeasureunlesstheneedforitisclearlyfelt."
Significantly,inestablishingwhatmightbetermedawaitingperiod,theconstitutionalprovisionrefers
to"allmembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseorRep."inthesamesentence,asasingleunit,w/odistinctionor
separation bet. them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
"expirationofthefullterm"xxxusingthesingularform,andnottheplural,despitethedifferenceinthetermsof
office,xxxtherebyrenderingmoreevidenttheintenttoconsiderbothhousesforthepurposeasindivisible
componentsofonesingleLegislature. Theuseoftheword"term"inthesingular,whencombined w/the

followingphrase"allthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouse,"underscoresthatintheapplicationofsaid
provision, the fundamental consideration isthat thetermsof officeof all members ofthe Legislature that
enactedthemeasuremusthaveexpiredbeforetheincreaseincompensationcanbecomeoperative.
TermofallthemembersoftheCongress,insteadofallthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouse."
Thisisadistinctionw/oadifference,sincetheSenateandtheHousetogetherconstitutetheCongress.
The use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter
expression"oftheSenateandtheHouse"isgrammaticallycorrect.Tospeakof"membersoftheSenateandthe
House"wouldimplythatthemembersoftheSenatealsoheldmembershipintheHouse.RAM.

Illustration:Ifasalarylawispassedin1983increasingthesalaryofmembersofCongress,thesame
lawcanonlytakeeffectforthetermthatbeginsatnoonof30June1992;butifasalaryispassedin1988
decreasing the salary of members of Congress, the law can take effect right away, since the Constitution
prohibitsonlytheincrease. Ifanothersalarylawispassedin1993toincreasethesalary,thesamecantake
effectnotinthetermbeginningatnoonof30June1995;thetoptwelvesenatorselectedonthe2ndMondayof
May,1992wouldstillbeholdingofficethen.Itcanonlytakeeffectin1998.Effectively,therefore,suchlawcan
takeeffectonlyaftertheexpirationofthelongesttermofaSenator,whichissixyears,evenifthetermofthe
Representativewhovotedforthelawisonly3years.

LigotvMathay,56SCRA823(1974)
F:

PetitionerservedasamemberoftheHRepofCongressfor3consecutive4yrtermscoveringa12yrspanfrom
12/30/57to12/30/69.Duringhis2ndterminoffice,RA4134wasenactedintolaw.
Petitionerwasreelectedtoa3rdterm(12/30/65to12/30/69)butwasheldnotentitledtothesalaryincreaseof
P32,000duringsuchthirdtermbyvirtueofthisCourt'sunanimousdecisioninPhilconsav.Mathay.Petitionerlosthisbid
foraconsecutive4thterminthe1969electionsandhistermhavingexpiredon12/31/69,filedaclaimforretirementunder
CA186,Sec.12(c),asamended.
TheHRepthusissuedatreasurywarrantinpetitioner'sfavorashisretirementgratuity,usingtheincreasedsalary
ofP32,000p.a.Resp.CongressAuditordidnotsignthewarrantpendingresolutionbytheAuditorGen.ofasimilarclaim
filedbyCongSingson.WhentheAuditorGen.'sadversedecisiononSingson'sclaimcameout,respAuditorrequested
petitionertoreturnthewarrantforrecomputation.Petitioner'srequestforreconhavingbeendeniedbytheAuditorGen.he
filedthepresentpetitionforreview.

HELD: 1. [T]he"rateofpayasprovidedbylaw"formembersofCongressretiring on 12/30/69,suchas

petitioner,mustnecessarilybeP7,200p.a.,thecompensationtheyreceived"asprovidedbylaw"andtheConsti
duringtheirtermofoffice.
2.TograntretirementgratuitytomembersofCongresswhosetermsexpiredon12/30/69computedon
thebasisofanincreasedsalaryofP32,000p.a.wouldbetopaythemprohibitedemolumentsw/cineffect
increasethesalarybeyondthatw/ctheywerepermittedbytheConsti.toreceiveduringtheirincumbency.This
wouldbeasubtlewayofgoingaroundtheconstitutionalprohibitionandincreasingineffecttheircompensation
duringtheirtermofofficeandofdoingindirectlywhatcouldnotbedonedirectly.

3. Petitioners'contentionthatsincetheincreasedsalaryofP32Tp.a.wasalreadyoperativewhenhis
retirementtookeffecton12/30/69,hisretirementgratuityshouldbebasedonsuchincreasedsalarycannotbe
sustainedasfarasheandothermembersofCongresssimilarlysituatedareconcernedforthesimplereasonthat
aretirementorbenefitisaformofcompensationw/inthepurviewoftheConstitutionalprovisionlimitingtheir
compensationand"otheremoluments"totheirsalaryasprovidedbylaw.RAM.

b.Freedomfromarrest
Art.VI,Sec.11.ASenatororMemberoftheHouseshall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmore
than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged from arrest while Congress is in
session.xxx
Elementsoftheprivilege:
i.Congressmustbeinsession,whetherregular(sec.15)orspecial(supra).Itdoesnotmatterwherethe
memberofCongressmaybefound(attendingthesession,socializinginaprivateparty,orsleepingathome);so
longasCongressisinsession,freedomfromarrestholds;
ii.Thecrimeforwhichthememberistobearrestedispunishableby6yearsofimprisonmentorless.
"Punishable"referstothemaximumpossiblepenaltywhichapenalstatuteattachestotheoffense.Itfollowstoo
thatifthecrimeispunishableby6yearsand1dayofprisionmayorormore,themembercanbearrested,even
ifheissessioninthehallsofCongress.

Historyoftheprivilege
TheRevisedPenalCode(ActNO.3815),enactedin1932,indirectlygrantedparliamentaryimmunity,
wheninArt.145,itpunishedwithapenaltyofprisioncorrecional"anypublicofficeroremployeewhoshall,
whiletheAssemblyisinregularorspecialsession,arrestorsearchanymemberthereof,exceptincasesuch
memberhascommittedacrimepunishableunderthisCodebyapenaltyhigherthanprisionmayor."
Whenthe1935Constitutiontookeffect,itwasthoughtthatadirectgrantofparliamentaryimmunity
was given, since in Art. VI, Sec. 15, it was provided that: "The Senators and Members of the House of
Representativesshallinallcasesexcepttreason,felonyandbreachofthepeace,beprivilegedfromarrestduring
theirattendanceatthesessionoftheCongress,andingoingtoandreturningfromthesame."

MartinezvMorfe,44SCRA22(1972)
F:

Bothpetitionersarefacingcriminalprosecution,theinformationfiledagainstpetitionerMartinezforfalsification
ofapublicdocument(punishablebyprisionmayor)and2informationsagainstpetitionerBautista,Sr.forviolationofthe
RevisedElectionCode(penaltyimposableforeachoffensechargedisnothigherthan prisionmayor). Petitioners,as

delegatesoftheConCon(1973Consti.)wouldinvokewhattheyconsidertobetheprotectionoftheconstitution(granting
immunityfromarresttosenatorsandrepresentativesduringtheirattendanceatthesessionsofCongress)ifconsideredin
connectionw/Art145,RPCpenalizingapublicofficerwhoshall,duringthesessionsofCongress,"arrestorsearchany
memberthereof,exceptincasesuchmemberhascommittedacrimepunishableunder(such)codebyapenaltyhigherthan
prisionmayor."ForundertheConstitutionalConventionAct,delegatesareentitledtotheparliamentaryimmunitiesofa
senatororarepresentative.
Whatissoughtbypetitionersisthattherespectivewarrantsofarrestissuedagainstthembequashedontheclaim
thatbyvirtueoftheparliamentaryimmunitytheyenjoyasdelegates,xxxtheyareimmunefromarrest.

HELD: Certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants issued against petitioners. Their reliance on the
constitutionalprovisionw/cforthemshouldbesupplementedbywhatwasprovidedforintheRPCisfutile.
Thereisnojustificationforgrantingtheirrespectivepleas.
UnderArt.IV,Sec.15ofthe1935Consti.,theimmunityfromarrestdoesnotcoveranyprosecutionfor
treason,felonyandbreachofthepeace. Treason existswhentheaccusedlevieswaragainsttheRepublicor
adherestoitsenemiesgivingthemaidandcomfort.Afelonyisanactoromissionpunishablebylaw.Breachof
the peace covers anyoffense whether defined by the RPC or any special statute. xxx [F]rom the explicit
languageoftheConsti.,xxxpetitionerscannotjustifytheirclaimtoimmunity.NordoesArt.145,RPCcometo
theirrescue.Suchaprovisionthattookeffectin1932couldnotsurviveaftertheConsti.becameoperativeon
10/15/35.
xxx InthelanguageoftheConsti.thenthatportionofArt.145,RPCpenalizingapublicofficialor
employeewhoshallwhiletheCongressisinregularorspecialsessionarrestorsearchanymemberthereof
exceptincasehehascommittedacrimepunishableundertheRPCbyapenaltyhigherthanprisionmayoris
declaredinoperative.
TheaboveconclusionreachedbythisCourtisbolsteredandfortifiedbypolicyconsiderations.Thereis,
tobesure, a fullrecognition of thenecessity tohavemembers of Congress, and likewise delegates tothe
ConCon,entitledtotheutmostfreedomtoenablethemtodischargetheirvitalresponsibilities,bowingtono
otherforceexceptthedictatesoftheirconscience.xxxTheutmostlatitudeinfreespeechshouldbeaccorded
them.Whenitcomestofreedomfromarrest,however,itwouldamounttothecreationofaprivilegedclass,w/o
justificationinreason,ifnotwithstandingtheirliabilityforacriminaloffense,theywouldbeconsideredimmune
duringtheirattendanceinCongressandingoingtoandreturningfromthesame.Thereislikelynodissentfrom
thepropositionthatalegislatororadelegatecanperformhisfunctionsefficientlyandwell,w/otheneedforany
transgressionofthecriminallaw.RAM.
The exceptions under the 1935 Constitution (treason, felony and breach of the peace) were so
comprehensiveastoexcludefromtheoperationoftheprivilegeallcriminaloffensesandtolimittheimmunity
fromarrestorcivilprocessonlyduringthesessionofthatbody.Ultimately,Art.145oftheRPC,totheextent
thatitpenalizedpublicofficersfromarrestingmembersofCongressforcrimespunishablewithprisionmayor
orless,wasrendered"inoperative"uponthepassageofthe1935Constitution. Art.145,thenwasdeemed
strickenoutofthestatutebooksuponthisdeclarationbytheCourt;itwasdeclared"inoperative."Withoutthis
felony,therewasnowaytospeakofimmunityfromarrest.
The 1971 Concon, aware of this ruling (Martinez and Bautista were delegates), provided for real
immunityinthe1973Constitution,byincludingArt,VIII,Sec.9:"AMemberoftheNationalAssemblyshall,
inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestduringhisattend

anceatitssessions,andingoingtoandreturningfromthesame;buttheNationalAssemblyshallsurrenderthe
Memberinvolvedtothecustodyofthelawwithin24hoursafteritsadjournmentforarecessofitsnextsession,
otherwisesuchprivilegeshallceaseuponitsfailuretodoso."
The1987Constitutionseemstohavewidenedtheprivilegebysimplystatingthatsuchamember"shall,
inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedformarrestwhiletheCongress
isinsession." Unlikethe1973rule,now,arrestcanonlybemadewhenCongressisnotinsession. Ifthe
arrestingofficercannotacquirejurisdictionoverthepersonofthememberduringsuchperiod,hewillhaveto
waituntiltheendofhisterm.
Itwouldalsoseemthatupontheeffectivityofthe1973Constitution,Art.145,RPCwhichwasdeclared
inoperativebytheSC,wasdeemedrevived,butwithmodification(fromprisionmayortoprisioncorrecional).

c.SpeechandDebateClause
ArtVI,Sec.11.xxxNomembershallbequestionednorbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforany
speechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof.

Thisprivilegeprotectsthememberconcernedfromanylibelsuitthatmaybefiledagainsthimfora
speechmade"in"thehallsofCongressorinanyofitscommittees.Speechisnotconfinedtotraditionalspeech
buteventothecastingofvotes,themakingofreports,adebateordiscussion,evencommunicativeactions,and
anyotherformofexpression.
Thespeech,however,mustbemade"in"Congressinthedischargeoflegislativeduty.Thus,

JimenezvCabangbang,17SCRA876(1966)
F:
ThisisanordinarycivilactionfortherecoverybyplaintiffsJimenez,etal.,ofseveralsumsofmoney,
bywayofdamagesforthepublicationofanallegedlylibelousletterofdefendantBartolomeCabangbang.An
openletterofthePresident,publishedinseveralnewspapersofgeneralcirculationsayingthatcertainmembers
oftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines hadbeenpreparingforacoupandworkingforthecandidacyofthe
SecretaryofDefenseforthePresidency.
Uponbeingsummoned,theCabangbangmovedtodismissthecomplaintuponthegroundthattheletter
inquestionisnotlibelous,andthat,evenifitwere,saidletterisaprivilegedcommunication.
ISSUES: Whetherthepublicationinquestionisaprivilegedcommunication;and,ifnot,(2) whetheritis
libelousornot.
(1) Thedeterminationofthefirstissuedependsonw/nthepublicationfallsw/inthepurviewofthe
phrase"speechordebatetherein"thatistosay,inCongressusedinthisprovision.
ScopeofParliamentaryFreedomofSpeechandDebate."Saidexpressionreferstoutterancesmadeby

Congressmenintheperformanceoftheirofficialfunctions,suchasspeechesdelivered,statementsmade,or
votescastinthehallsofCongress,whilethesameisinsession,aswellasbillsintroducedinCongress,whether
thesameisinsessionornot,andotheractsperformedbyCongressmen,eitherinCongressoroutsidethe
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
CongressionalCommitteesdulyauthorizedtoperformitsfunctionsassuch,atthetimeoftheperformanceof
theactsinquestion."
Thepublicationinvolvedinthiscasedoes not belongtothiscategory. Accordingtothecomplaint
herein,itwasanopenlettertothePres.dated11/14/58,whenCongresspresumablywasnotinsession,anddef.
causedsaidlettertobepublishedinseveralnewspapersofgen.circ.inthePhils.,onoraboutsaiddate.Itis
obviousthat,inthuscausingthecommunicationtobesopublished,hewasnotperforminghisofficialduty,
eitherasamemberofCongressofasofficeroranyCommitteethereof.
(2) Letterwasnotlibelous. Theletterwasnotlibelousbec.itmentionsthathereinappellantsas
possibly"unwittingtoolsofaplanofwhichtheyhaveabsolutelynoknowledge." Inotherwords,thevery
document uponw/cpltffs'action isbasedexplicitlyindicatesthattheymightbe absolutelyunaware ofthe
allegedoperationplans,andthattheymaybeunwittingtoolsoftheplanners.Thestatementisnotderogatoryto
pltffs.tothepointofentitlingthemtorecoverdamages.RAM.

TheprovisionprotectstheMemberofCongressonlyfrombeingheldliableoutsideofCongress("inany
otherplace");itdoesnotprotecthimfromliability"inside"Congress,i.e.,frompossibledisciplinarymeasures
thathispeersmayimposeuponhim.Forasmentionedabove,hisspeechmayconstitutedisorderlybehavioras
in Osmena v Pendatun (109Phil863),andthismaybepenalized withcensure,suspensionfor60days,or
expulsion,thelattertwouponconcurrenceof2/3ofthemembership.
Itisimportanttonotethatthisprivilegeisnotabsolute.Theruleprovidesthatthelegislatormaynotbe
questioned"inanyotherplace,"whichmeansthathemaybecalledtoaccountforhisremarksbyhisown
colleagues inCongressitself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior. Thus, in the caseof
Osmena v Pendatun,thePresidenthimselfwhohadbeenvilifiedbythepetitionercouldnotfileanycivilor
criminalactionagainsthimbecauseofthisimmunity.Nonetheless,themajorityofthemembersoftheHouseof
Representativesinwhichthequestioned speechwasdeliveredwerenotprecluded fromdemonstrating their
loyaltytothechiefexecutivebydeclaringOsmenaguiltyofdisorderlybehaviorandsuspendinghiminthe
exerciseoftheirdisciplinarypower[nowArt.VI,Sec.16(3)].

OsmenavPendatun(109Phil863)
F:

In1960,Cong.OsmenadeliveredaprivilegespeechinCongressentitled"AMessagetoGarcia,"maliciously
denouncingandchargingtheadministrationofPres.Garcia.Asaresultofthis,theHRepthroughHouseResolutionNo.
59createdaspecialcommitteetoinvestigatetheveracityofthechargesandforhimtoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbe
punishedbytheHouseifhefailedtosubstantiatehischarges.
Onhisside,Osmenacontendedinhispetitionthat:
(1) theConsti.gavehimcompleteparliamentaryimmunity,andso,forwordsspokenintheHouse,heoughtnottobe
questioned;(2)thathisspeechconstitutednodisorderlybehaviorforw/checouldbepunished;(3)supposinghecouldbe

questionedanddisciplinedtherefor,theHousehadlostthepowertodosobec.ithadtakenupotherbusinessbefore
approvingHouseResolutionNo.59;(4)thattheHousehasnopower,undertheConsti.,tosuspendoneofitsmembers.
ResolutionNo.175foundOsmenaguiltyofseriousdisorderlybehavior.Hewassuspendedfor15months.

HELD: 1. Sec.15,Art.VIofthe1935Consti.providesthat"foranyspeechordebate"inCongress,the
SenatorsorMembersoftheHRep"shallnotbequestionedinanyotherplace."Observethat"theyshallnotbe
questionedinanyotherplace"thanCongress.Buttheymay,nevertheless,bequestionedinCongressitself.
Furthermore,theRulesoftheHousew/cpetitionerhimselfhasinvokedrecognizetheHouse'spowerto
holdamemberresponsible"forwordsspokenindebate."
The provision guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression w/o fear of being made
responsibleincriminalorcivilactionsbeforethecourtsoranyotherforumoutsideoftheCongressionalHall.
Butitdoesnotprotecthimfromresponsibilitybeforethelegislativebodyitselfwheneverhiswordsandconduct
areconsideredbythelatterdisorderlyorunbecomingamemberthereof.
Forunparliamentaryconduct,membersxxxofCongresshavebeen,orcouldbecensured,committedto
prison,suspended,evenexpelledbythevotesoftheircolleagues.
2.OnthethirdpointofpetitionerthattheHousemaynolongertakeactionagainsthim,bec.afterhis
speechandbeforeapprovingtheResolutionNo.59,ithadtakenupotherbusiness.
xxx [C]ourtshavedeclaredthat"therulesadoptedbydeliberativebodiesaresubjecttorevocation,
modificationorwaiveratthepleasureofthebodyappointingthem."Andithasbeensaidthat"Parliamentary
rulesaremerelyproceduralandw/theirobservance,thecourtshavenoconcern. Theymaybewaivedor
disregardedbythelegislativebody."

3.Onthequestionw/ndeliveryofspeechesattackingthePres.constitutesdisorderlyconductforw/c
Osmenamaybedisciplined,webelievethattheHouseisthejudgeofwhatconstitutesdisorderlybehavior,not
onlybec.theConsti.hasconferredjurisdiction uponit,butalsobec.thematterdependsmainlyonfactual
circumstancesofw/ctheHouseknowsbestbutw/ccannotbedepictedinblackandwhiteforpresentationto,
andadjudicationbytheCourts.RAM.
Illustration:IfCongressmanXmakesanoralabuseagainstCongressmanYinthehallsofCongress,he
cannotbearrestednorprosecutedforslanderbecauseofthespeechclause.Buthecanbepunishedbyhispeers
fordisorderlybehavior.
ButifCong.X,inthecourseofheateddebate,assaultsCong.Yandinflictsphysicalinjuries,hecanbe
criminallyprosecuted(fordirectassaultwithgraveorlessgravephysicalinjuries)becausealthoughaverbal
assaultisimmune,aphysicalisnotimmune.Butalthoughhecanbeprosecuted,hecannotbearrestedwhile
Congressisinsession,becausewhileheisnotimmunefromprosecution,heisimmunefromarrest,assuming
thepenaltydoesnotexceedprisioncorrectional.ThecourtmustthuswaitfortherecessofCongressbeforeit
canorderhisarrest.

d.Disqualifications
(1)IncompatibleOfficesandForbiddenOffices

Art.VI,Sec.13. NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyother
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries, duringhistermwithout
forfeitinghisseat.xxx
Anincompatibleofficeisapostwhichamembercannotacceptunlesshewaivesorforfeitshisseatin
Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the
incompatibilityarisesonlybecauseofhissimultaneousmembershipinboth.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Adazav.Pacana,Jr.,135SCRA431(1985)
F:

PetitionerHomobonoAdazawaselectedgovernorofMisamisOrientalinthe1/30/80elections.Electedvicegov.
forsaidprovinceinthesameelectionswasresp.FernandoPacana,Jr.Bothqualifiedandassumedtheirrespectiveoffices.
BothAdazaandPacanafiledtheircertificatesofcandidacyforthe5/14/84BPelections.Inthesaidelections,
petitionerwonwhilerespondentslost.
On7/23/84,resp.took his oathofofficeas gov.ofMis. Or. andstartedtoperform the dutiesofgovernor.
Claimingtobethelawfuloccupantofthegovernor'soffice,petitionerhasbroughtthispetitiontoexcluderesp.therefrom.
Hearguesthathewaselectedtosaidofficeforatermof6yrs.,thatheremainstobethegovernoroftheprovinceuntilhis
termexpireson3/23/86asprovidedbylaw,andthatw/inthecontextoftheparliamentarysystem,alocalelectiveofficial
canholdthepositiontow/chehadbeenelectedandsimultaneouslybeanelectedmemberofParliament.

HELD: 1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the BP from holding any other office of
employmentinthegovtduringhistenureisclearandunambiguous. Sec.10,Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti.
providesthat:
"Sec.10.AmemberoftheNationalAssemblyshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernment
xxxexceptthatofprimeministerormemberofthecabinet.xxx

xxxItisofnoavailtopetitionerthatthesystemofgovtinotherstatesallowsalocalelectiveofficialto
act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal
sovereignty lies is explicit. xxx [T]he incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the
constitutionitself.
2.Thesecondpropositionadvancedbypetitioneristhatresp.Pacana,asamereprivatecitizen,hadno
righttoassumethegovernorshipleftvacantbypetitioner'selectiontotheBP.Hemaintainsthatresp.shouldbe
consideredashavingabandonedorresignedfromthevicegovernorshipwhenhefiledhiscert.ofcandidacy.
ThepointpressedrunsafoulofBP697,Sec.13(2)ofw/cprovidesthatgovernors,mayors,membersofthe
varioussangguniangorbarangayofficialsshall,uponfilingacert.ofcandidacy,beconsideredonforcedleave
ofabsencefromoffice."Respfallsw/inthecoverageofthisprovisionconsideringthathewasamemberofthe
SangguniangPanlalawigan.RAM.

Art.VI,Sec.13.xxxNeithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedor
theemolumentsthereofincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.

ForbiddenOffice(VI,Sec.13)
Aforbiddenofficeisonetowhichamembercannotbeappointedevenifheiswillingtogiveuphisseat
in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his
disqualificationfortheforbiddenofficeneverthelessremains.Theprohibitionliesinthe"fiduciary"natureof
therelationshipinvolved.
Suchamembercannotresigninanticipationofthepassageofthelawcreatingsuchofficeorincreasing
itsemolumentasawayofcircumventingtheprohibition. However,theprohibitionisnotforever (asinthe
JonesLaw);itisforthetermforwhichhewaselected.

(2)Otherprohibitions
Art.VI,Sec.14.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmaypersonallyappearas
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other
administrativebodies. Neithershallhe,directlyorindirectly,beinterestedfinanciallyinanycontract
with,orinanyfranchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agency,or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentownedor controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
duringhistermofoffice.HeshallnotinterveneinanymatterbeforeanyofficeoftheGovernmentforhis
pecuniarybenefitorwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice.
(i)Personallyappearingascounselbeforeanycourtofjustice,theElectoralTribunal,quasijudicial
bodies,andotheradministrativebodies.
WhattheConstitutionprohibitsinthecaseofmembersofCongresswhoarealsomembersofthebaris
theirpersonalappearancebeforeanyofthesebodies.Thisisnotaprohibitionagainst,thepracticeoflawinany
court.Thus,amembermaystillsignandfilehispleadings,givelegaladvice,continueaspartner,andhavea
partnerorassociateappearforhimincourt.
Underthe1973Constitution,theprohibitionagainstpersonalappearancecoveredonlycourtsinferiorto
acourtofappellatejurisdiction(RTCdown),courtsinacivilcasewhereinthegovernmentistheadverseparty,
andadministrativebodies. Now,theprohibitionisagainst"any"court,thusincluding theSCandtheCA,
regardlessoftheaction.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Puyatv.DeGuzman,Jr.,113SCRA32(1982)

F:

On5/14/79,anelectionforthe11DirectorsoftheInternationalPipeIndustriesCorp.(IPI)washeld.Therewere
twogroups, the PuyatGroupand the AceroGroup. The Puyat Groupwould bein control oftheBoardand ofthe
managementofIPI.
On5/25/79,theAceroGroupinstitutedattheSECquowarrantoproc.questioningthe5/14/79election.Thesaid
groupclaimedthatthevoteswerenotproperlycounted.
May2531,1979,thePuyatGroupclaimsthatattheconferencesofthepartiesw/resp.SECCommissioner,
JusticeEstanislaoA.Fernandez,thenamemberoftheInterimBP,orallyenteredhisappearanceascounselforresp.Acero
tow/cthePuyatGroupobjectedonConstitutionalgrounds. Sec.11,Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti. providedthatno
Assemblymancould"appearascounselbeforexxxanyadministrativebody,"andSECwasanadministrativebody.
xxx
On7/17/79,theSECgrantedleavetointerveneonthebasisofAtty.Fernandez'ownershipoftenshares.Itisthis
OrderallowinginterventionthatprecipitatedtheinstantpetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionw/Prel.Inj.
xxx
On9/4/79,theCourtenbancissuedaTROenjoiningrespSECCommissionerfromallowingtheparticipationas
anintervenor,ofresp.FernandezattheproceedingsintheSECcase.

HELD: TheinterventionofAssemblymanFernandezintheSECcasefallsw/intheambitoftheprohibition
containedintheConsti.Therehasbeenanindirect"appearanceascounselbeforexxxanadministrativebody."
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion of Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearingascounsel.Ostensibly,heisnotappearingonbehalfofanother,althoughheisjoiningthecauseof
thepvtresps.Hisappearancecouldtheoreticallybefortheprotectionofhisownershipof10sharesofIPIin
respectofthematterinlitigation.
However,certainsalientcircumstancesmilitateagainsttheinterventionofAssemblymanF.intheSEC
case.HehadacquiredamereP200worthofstocksinIPI.Heacquiredthem"afterthefact,"thatis,on5/30/79,
afterthecontestedelectionofDirectorson5/14/79,afterthequowarrantosuithadbeenfiledon5/25/79before
SECandonedaybeforethescheduledhearingofthecasebeforetheSECon5/31/79.Andwhatismore,before
hemovedtointervene,hehadsignifiedhisintentiontoappearascounselforresp.Acero,butw/cwasobjected
tobypetitioners. Realizing,perhaps,thevalidityoftheobjection,hedecided,insteadto"intervene"onthe
groundoflegalinterestinthematterunderlitigation.RAM.

(ii)Beinginterestedfinanciallyinany(a)contractwith,or(b)franchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedby,
theGovernment,itssubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality,agovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporation,orits
subsidiary.Theprohibitionisforthedurationofhistermofoffice.
(iii)Interveninginanymatterbeforeanyofficeofthegovernmentforhispecuniarybenefit.
(iv)Interveninginanymatterwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice.
Itmaybenotedthatthelast3prohibitionsarethemselvespunishableactsundertheAntiGraftand
CorruptPracticesAct.

e.DutytoDisclose

Art.XI,17.Apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumptionofofficeandasoftenthereafter
asmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnetworth.Inthe
caseofthePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupremeCourt,
theConstitutionalCommissionsandotherconstitutionaloffices,andofficersofthearmedforceswith
generalorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe
Houseconcernedofapotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofaproposedlegislation
ofwhichtheyareauthors.
Sec.20.TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe
publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshall
publishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember.

Ingeneral,apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumingofficeandasoftenthereafterasmaybe,
requiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilitiesandnetworth. Butinthecaseof
membersofCongressandotherhighgovernmentofficials(asenumerated),thedisclosuremustbemadepublic
(Art. XI, Sec. 17). Furthermore, all members of Congress shall, upon assumption of office make a full
disclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests(Art.VI,Sec.12).
ThelawgoverningthisfinancialdisclosurebypublicofficersandemployeesisRA3019,otherwise
knownastheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct.Everypublicofficershallsubmitto(a)theOfficeofthe
DepartmentHead,or(b)theOfficeofthePresidentincaseofaheadofdepartmentorchiefofanindependent
office,thefollowing:
1.Atrue,detailed,andswornstatementofassetsandliability;
2.Astatementoftheamountsandsourcesofhisincome;
3.Theamountofpersonalandfamilyexpenses,and
4.Theamountofincometaxespaidthepreviousyear,onthefollowingoccasions:
(a)within30yearsafterassumingoffice
(b)onorbeforeApril15afterthecloseofthecalendar
year,and
(c)upontheexpirationoftheirtermofoffice,orupon
resignationorseparationfromoffice
WhenamemberofCongressauthorsaproposedlegislation,hemustnotifytheHouseconcernedofany

"potentialconflictofinterest"thatmayarisefromhisfilingofsuchbill(Art.VI,Sec.12.)
Furthermore,therecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe
publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAudit,whichshallpublish
annuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember(Art.VI,Sec.20.)
Thepurposeofpublicdisclosureofamember'sfinancialstatusandofficialexpensesistomakehim
visibletotherest,andthusgivehimadeterrentfromcommittinggraftandcorruption.Thepublichasarightto
knowhowmuchitisspendingforitsgovernment,

4.InternalGovernmentofCongress
a.Electionofofficers
Art.VI,Sec.16(1) TheSenateshallelectitsPresident andtheHouseofRepresentativesits
Speaker,byamajorityvoteofallitsrespectiveMembers.
EachHouseshallchoosesuchotherofficersasitmaydeemnecessary.

FirstorderofbusinesselectionbyeachhouseofthePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakerofthe
House,andsuchotherofficersthattherulesofeachhousemayprovide.
Amajorityvoteofalltherespectivemembersisrequiredtoelectthesetwoofficers.
UpontheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker,theConstitutiondeemstheHouses"organized."(VI,
19)
b.Quorum
Id.,Sec.16(2)AmajorityofeachHouseshallconstituteaquoromtodobusiness,butasmaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner,andundersuchpenalties,assuchHousemayprovide.
Thequorumrequiredtoconductbusinessisamajority(1/2+1)ofallthemembers.
Buttopassalaw,onlythevotesofthemajorityofthosepresentinthesession,therebeingaquorum,
arerequired.Thisisknownasthe"shiftingmajority".
Toillustrate:13membersoftheSenatearesufficienttoconstituteaquorum.Ifonly13membersare
present,avoteby7infavorofabillissufficienttopassit.Butasthenumberofthosepresentincreases,the
numberofvotesneededtopassabillwouldcorrespondinglyincrease,i.e.,shift.

When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the
attendanceoftheabsent(recalcitrant)membersbythemeansofarrestorsuchothermeasuresandpenaltiesas
theHousemayprovideinitsrules.

AvelinovCuenco,83Phil17(1949)
F:

Jose Avelino was Senate President in 1949. On 2/21/49, Senators Tanada and Sanidad filed a resolution
(Resolution68)againstAvelinocallingforaninvestigation.Duringthesession,Avelinoand6otherswalkedoutleaving12
senatorsbehind.The12senatorscontinuedthesessionandpassedresolutionno.67declaringtheSenatePres.seatvacate.
Sen.CuencowaseventuallyelectedastheactingPres.oftheSenate.
ByhispetitioninthisquowarrantoproceedingpetitioneraskstheCourttodeclarehimtherightfulPresidentof
thePhil.Senateandoustresp.,Sen.Cuenco.

ISSUES: a.DoestheCourthavejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter?
b.Itifhas,wereresolutionsNos.68and67validlyapproved?
c.Shouldthepetitionbegranted?
HELD:a.Tothefirstquestion,theanswerisinthenegative,inviewoftheseparationofpowers,thepolitical
natureofthecontroversyandtheconstitutionalgranttotheSenateofthepowertoelectitsownpres.,w/cpower
shouldnotbeinterferedw/,nortakenover,bythejudiciary.xxx
b.Thesecondquestiondependsuponthesesubquestions:(1)Wasthesessionofthesocalledrump
Senateacontinuationofthesessionvalidlyassembledw/22Senators(2wereabsent onewasabroad;the
otherwasconfinedinaManilahospital)inthemorningof2/21/49?(2)Wasthereaquorominthatsession?
(1)SupposingthattheCourthasjurisdiction,thereisunanimityintheviewthatthesessionunderSen.
Arranzwasacontinuationofthemorningsessionandthataminorityof10senatorsmaynot,byleavingthe
Hall,preventtheother12senatorsfrompassingaresolutionthatmetw/theirunanimousresolution.
(2) Iftherumpsession wasnotacontinuation ofthemorning session, wasitvalidlyconstituted?
JusticesParas,Feria,PabloandBengzonsaytherewasforthefollowingreasons:(i)theminutessayso,(ii)at
thebeginningofsuchsessiontherewereatleast14senatorsincludingSenatorsPendatunandLopez,and(iii)in
viewoftheabsencefromthecountryofSenatorConfessor,12senatorsconstituteamajorityoftheSenateof23
senators. WhentheConstitution declaresthatamajorityof"eachHouse"shallconstitute aquorom,"the
House"doesnotmean"all"themembers.Evenamajorityofallthemembersconstitutethe"House."Thereis
adifferencebet.amajorityof"allthemembersoftheHouse"andamajorityof"theHouse,"thelatterrequiring
lessnumberthanthefirst.Therefore,anabsolutemajority(12)ofallthemembersoftheSenatelessone(23)
constitutesconstitutionalmajorityoftheSenateforthepurposeofthequorom. J.Pablobelievesfurtherthat
evenifthe12didnotconstituteaquorom,theycouldhaveorderedthearrestofone,atleast,oftheabsent
membersxxx.RAM.
InAvelinovCuenco,supra.,therulingthenwas:ThequorumwascomputedonthenumberofSenators
overwhomtheSenatehasjurisdictionatthetimeofsession.

c.Rulesofproceedings
Id., Secs.16(3)EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings,punishitsMembersfor
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member.Apenaltyofsuspension,whenimposed,shallnotexceedsixtydays.
Sec.21. TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommittees may
conductinquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.Therights
ofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.

EachHouseoritscommitteesmaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings. Theserulesincludethe
proceduretobefollowedin"inquiriesinaidoflegislation."
TheHousemaysetasidetherulesitadoptedasitseesfit,becausetheserulesareonlyofatemporary
nature.
PacetevSecretaryoftheCommissiononAppointments,40SCRA58(1971)
TherulesoftheCommissiononAppointmentsconcerningitsinternalbusinesscouldbereviewedbytheCourts,
thatis,itisajusticiablematter,whenacertainconstructionofsuchruleswoulddefeattherightoftheindivid
ualtoapublicoffice.
F:

Inhissuitformandamusandprohibitionfiledw/thisCourt,petitionerF.Paceteallegedthathewasappointedby
thethenPres.ofthePhils.on8/31/64asMun.JudgeofPigcawan,Cotabato.Hethenassumedofficeanddischargedhis
duties.AshisappointmentwasmadeduringtherecessofCongress,itwassubmittedtotheCommissiononAppointments
(CA)atitsnextsessionin'65.On5/20/65,hewasunanimouslyconfirmed.Morethan9mos.aftersuchconfirmation,the
thenSec.ofJustice,throughtheJudicialSupt.,advisedpetitionertovacatehispositionasmun.judge,thegroundbeing
thathisappointmenthadbeenbypassed.Petitionerwastakenbysurpriseandsoughtclarificationfromtheprin.resp.He
wasinformedthatadayafterhisconfirmation,oneofthemembersoftheCA,Sen.Ganzon,wrotetoitsChairman,stating
thathewasfilingamotionfortherecon.oftheconfirmationoftheappointmentofpetitionerxxxinviewofderogatory
info.w/chehadreceived.Resp.Sec.ofCAthuswasledtonotifythethenSec.ofJusticeaccordingly,followingwhathe
consideredtobetheprevailingpracticeofsuchbodythatthemerepresentationofsuchletter"automaticallyvacatedthe
confirmationoftheappointmentinquestion***."Resp.thenadvisedpetitionerthatheshouldvacatehispositionashe
hadnotbeendulyconfirmed.

HELD:Petitionermustprevail.
1.R21oftheRevisedRulesoftheCAreads:
"ResolutionoftheCommissiononanyappointmentmaybeconsideredonmotionbyamemberpresentednot
morethanonedayaftertheirapproval.Ifamajorityofthememberspresentconcurtograntarecon.,theappointmentshall
bereopenedandsubmittedanewtotheCommission.Anymotiontoreconsiderthevoteonanyappointmentmaybelaid
onthetable,andthisshallbeafinaldispositionofsuchamotion."

"Respondent'stheorywouldgivetothemerefilingofmotionforrecon.theeffectw/citwouldhaveif
themotionwereapproved,and,hence,woulddispensew/thenecessityofsuchapproval,forw/theconcurrence
ofamajorityofthememberspresentisnecessary."(Altarejosv.Molo,25SCRA550.)xxxThatwouldbe
tantamounttoimpartingtoamoveofsinglememberofacollectivebodyadecisiveweight.Itisbadenoughif
theminorityweretoprevail.Aonemanruleisinfinitelyworse.

2.Adinterimappointmentstakeeffectatonce.Thetitleoftheappointeetotheofficeiscomplete.In
the language of the Consti., the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournmentoftheCongress."
Theconstitutionalrequirementisclear.TheremusteitherbearejectionbytheCAornonactiononits
part.Nosuchthinghappenedinthiscase.Petitionerhadinsteadinhisfavoraunanimousvoteofconfirmation.
Hecouldthusinvokeconstitutionalprotection.Forresps.toarguethatthemerefilingofaMFRdidsufficeto
setitaside,evenintheabsenceofanyfurtheractionistolosesightofwhatisprovidedintheConsti.
3.Thecourtsarecalledupontoseetoitthatprivaterightsarenotinvaded.Thusevenlegislativeacts
andexecutiveordersarenotbeyondthepaleofjudicialscrutiny.xxx[T]hereisnothingsacrosanctaboutarule
oftheCA,especiallyso,whenasinthiscase,aconstructionsoughttobefastenedonitwoulddefeattherightof
anindividualtoapublicoffice.RAM.
d.Disciplineofmembers
Art.VI,Sec.16(3)EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings,punishitsMembers
fordisorderlybehavior,andwiththeconcurrenceoftwothirdsofallitsMembers,suspendorexpela
Member.Apenaltyofsuspension,whenimposed,shallnotexceedsixtydays.

Eachhousemaypunishitmembersfor"disorderlybehavior."Whatconstitutes"disorderlybehavior"is
solelywithinthediscretionofthehouseconcerned.
Althoughamemberofeitherhousecannotbeheldaccountableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechhe
makeintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof,hecanbefoundguiltyofdisorderlybehaviorbyhisown
peers,soruledtheCourtinOsmenavPendatun.109Phil.863(1960).
The penalty may consist of (i) censure; or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, (ii)
suspension,notexceeding60days,or(iii)expulsion.
Thehistorybehindthe60daylimitationontheperiodofsuspensioncouldbetracedtotheearlycaseof
Alejandrino v Quezon, infra. Inadictum,theSCsaidthatitwasnotwithinthepowerofthelegislatureto
suspenditsmember,sincesuspensiondeprivedtheconstituentsofthemembersuspendedoftherighttobe
representedbyarepresentativethattheyreallyhad.Ineffect,suspensionpunishedtheconstituents.Inthecase
ofexpulsion,theconstituentscouldatleastelectsomeoneelsetosubstitutethememberrepresented.
Iftheonlydisciplinarymeasureswerelimitedtoexpulsionandcensure,however,theremightnotbea
penaltyappropriateenoughforadisorderlybehaviorthatmeritedsomethingmorethancensurebutlessthan
expulsion.Itwasthisdilemma,thattheCourtpreciselyfacedinOsmenavPendatun,whichmadeitupheldthe
suspensionof15monthsdespitetheAlejandrinoruling.
Thus,the1973Constitutiondevisedasystemofallowingsuspensionasapenaltybutlimiteditsperiod
to60days[Art.VII,Sec.7(3)].Thiswascarriedoverinthe1987Constitution.[Art.VI,Sec.16(3)]

Alejandrinov.Quezon,46P83(1924)
F:

Thepetitionerinthisorig.pet.formandamusandinjunctionisJoseAlejandrino,aSenatorappointedbytheGov
Gen.torepresentthe12thSenatorialDistrict.ThecasusbelliisaresolutionadoptedbythePhil.Senatecomposedofthe
resp.Senators,on2/5/24,deprivingAlejandrinoofalltheprerogatives,privileges,andemolumentsofhisofficeforthe
periodof1yrfrom1/24havingbeendeclaredguiltyofdisorderlyconductandflagrantviol.oftheprivilegesoftheSenate
forhavingtreacherouslyassaultedSen.deVeraontheoccasionofcertainphrasesbeingutteredbythelatterinthecourse
ofthedebateregardingthecredentialsofMr.Alejandrino.Theburdenofpetitioner'scomplaintisthattheresolutionis
unconstitutionalandentirelyofnoeffect.

HELD:1.Mandamus(M).Thegen.ruleisthatthewritwillnotliefromonebranchofthegovttoacoordinate
branch,fortheveryobviousreasonthatneitherisinferiortotheother. Mwillnotlieagainstthelegislative
body,itsmembers,oritsofficers,tocompeltheperformanceofdutiespurelylegislativeintheircharacterw/c
thereforepertainstotheirlegislativefunctionsandoverw/ctheyhaveexclusivecontrol.
2.Onthemeritsofthecontroversy,theOrganicActauthorizestheGovGen.toappoint2senatorsand
9representativestorepresentthenonChristianregionsintheLegislature.Thesesenatorsandrepresentatives
"holdofficeuntilremovedbytheGov.Gen."TheymaynotberemovedbytheLeg.However,totheSenateand
the HRep., respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, w/ the
concurrenceof2/3,expelanelectivemember."xxx.TheConsti.haspurposelywithheldfromthe2Housesof
the Leg. and the GovGen. alike the power to suspend an appointive member. The reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House w/o depriving the
constituency ofrepresentation;expulsion,whenpermissible,likewisevindicatesthehonorofthelegislative
bodywhilegivingtotheconstituencyanopportunitytoelectanew;butsuspensiondeprivestheelectoraldistrict
ofrepresentationw/othatdistrictbeingaffordedanymeansbyw/ctofillthevacancy.Bysuspension,theseat
remainsfilledbuttheoccupantissilenced.Suspensionfor1yr.isequivalenttoqualifiedexpulsionorremoval.
However,thewritprayedforcannotissue,forthereasonthattheSCdoesnotpossessthepowerof
coerciontomakethePhil.Senatetakeanyparticularaction.RAM.

Osmenav.Pendatun,109P863(1960)supra.(SpeechandDebateClause)
Comparedw/Alejandrinov.Quezon:ItistruethatinAlejandrinoanobiterdictumthat"suspensiondeprives
theelectoraldistrictofrepresentationw/othatdistrictbeingaffordedanymeansbyw/ctofillthatvacancy."
Buttheremarkshouldbeunderstoodtoreferparticularlytothe appointive senatorwhowasthentheaffected
partyandwhowasthentheaffectedpartyandwhowasbythesameJonesLawchargedw/thedutytorepresent
the12thDistrictxxx.
Itmustbeobserved,however,thatatthattimetheLegislaturehadonlythosepowersw/weregrantedto
itbytheJonesLaw;whereasnowtheCongresshasthefulllegislativepowersandprerogativesofasovereign
nation,exceptasrestrictedbytheConsti. xxx Now,theCongresshasthe inherentlegislativeprerogativeof
suspensionw/ctheConsti.didnotimpair.
"TheLegislativepowerofCongressisplenary,subject onlytosuchlimitations asarefoundinthe
Consti. Sothat any power deemed tobe legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the

Congress,unlesstheConsti.providesotherwise."(Verav.Avelino,77P192.)RAM.

ExpulsioncomparedwithexclusionunderArt.VI,Sec.17

ExpulsionunderArt.VI,Sec.16(3)shouldbedistinguishedfromexclusionunderArt.VI,Sec.17,
Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsof
theirrespectiveMembers.xxx
Underthelatter,ElectoralTribunalsoftheSenateandtheHouse,determineelectioncontests.They
shallbethesolejudgesoftheelections,returns,andqualificationsoftheirelectivemembers.EachElectoral
Tribunalisindependentoftheother;thisemphasizestheexclusivecharacterofthejurisdictionconferredupon
each House. However, each Tribunal cannot add to the qualifications or disqualifications found in the
Constitution. Thus,theElectoralTribunaliswithoutpowertoexcludeanymemberelectwhomeetsallthe
Constitution'srequirementsformembership.

e.JournalandCongressionalRecords
Art.VI,16(4)EachHouseshallkeepaJournalofitsproceedingsandfromtimetotimepublish
thesame,exceptingsuchpartsasmay,initsjudgment,affectnationalsecurity;andtheyeasandnayson
anyquestionshall,attherequestofonefifthoftheMemberspresent,beenteredintheJournal.
EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings.

ItisthefirsttimethattheConstitutionrequiresa"record"inadditiontoa"journal".Uptothe1973
Constitution,onlyajournalwasrequiredtobekept,althoughinpractice,thelegislaturehasalwayskepta
record.
Cruz:Thejournalisonlyaresumeofminutesofwhattranspiredduringalegislativesession.Therecordisthe
wordforwordtranscriptoftheproceedingstakenduringthesession.

(1)TheEnrolledBillTheory

Once a bill has been approved by both houses (the procedure will be discussed later), the bill is
engrossedorenrolled,andthis"EnrolledCopyoftheBill"bearsthecertificationofthePresidingOfficerofthe
house(eitherSenatePresidentorSpeakeroftheHouse)thatthisbillasenrolledistheversionpassedbyeach
house.Thepurposeofthecertificationistopreventattemptsatsmugglingin"riders".Theenrolledcopyis
thensenttothePresidentforhisaction.

Whathappensifthereisadiscrepancybetweentheenrolledcopyofthebill,andanyothercopyofthe
bill?Theenrolledbillprevails,saystheSCinthefollowingcases.

MabanagvLopezVito,78Phil.1(1947)
F:

Threeofthepltff.senatorsand8ofthepltff.representativeshadbeenproclaimedbyamajorityvoteofthe
COMELECashavingbeenelectedsenatorsandrepresentativesintheelectionsheldon4/23/46. The3senatorswere
suspended bythe Senate shortlyafter the openingof the first session following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularitiesintheirelection.The8representativessincetheirelectionhadnotbeenallowedtositinthelowerHouse,
excepttotakepartintheelectionofSpeaker,forthesamereason,althoughtheyhadnotbeenformallysuspended.xxx
Asaconsequence,these3senatorsand8reprs.didnottakepartinthepassageofthequestionedresolution,nor
wastheirmembershipreckonedinthecomputationofthenecessary3/4votew/cisrequiredinproposinganamendmentto
theConsti.(theParityRightsAmendment.) Ifthesemembershadbeencounted,theaffirmativevotesinfavorofthe
proposedamendmentwouldhavebeenshortofthenecessary3/4voteineitherbranchofCongress.

HELD: 1. Jurisdiction. Both notions of jurisdiction and conclusiveness of legislative enactment are
synonymousinthatbotharefoundedupontheregardw/cthejudiciaryaccordsacoequal,coordinate,and
independentbranchofGovt.Ifapoliticalquestionconclusivelybindsthejudgesoutofrespecttothepolitical
departments,adulycertifiedlaworresolutionalsobindsthejudgesunderthe"enrolledbillrule"bornofthat
respect.xxx
2. Enrolled Bill Theory. The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly
authenticatedbillorresolutionimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.xxx
Sec.313oftheoldCodeofCiv.Proc.,asamended,provides:
"Officialdocumentsmaybeprovedasfollows:***(2)theproceedingsofthexxxCongress,bythejournalsof
thosebodiesorofeitherhousethereof,orbypublishedstatutesorresolutions,orbycopiescertifiedbytheclerkor
secretary,orprintedbytheirorder;Provided,thatinthecaseofActsofxxxthePhil.Leg.,whenthereisanexistenceofa
copysignedbythepresidingofficersandsecretariesofsaidbodies,itshallbeconclusiveproofoftheprovisionsofsuch
Actsandofthedueenactmentthereof."

Reasonsinsupportofenrollment:
Sec.150.ReasonsforConclusiveness.xxx[T]heruleagainstgoingbehindtheenrolledbillisrequiredbythe
respectduetoacoequalandindependentdeptofgovt,anditwouldbeaninquisitionintotheconductofthemembersof
thelegislature,averydelicatepower,thefrequentexerciseofw/cmustleadtoendlessconfusionintheadmin.ofthelaw.
Theruleisalsooneofconvenience,bec.courtscouldnotrelyonthepublishedsessionlaws,butwouldberequiredtolook
beyondthesetothejournalsofthelegislatureandoftentoanyprintedbillsandamendmentsw/cmightbefoundafterthe
adjournmentofthelegislature.(Am.Jur.)

3.Comparedw/USv.Pons.TheCourtlookedintothejournalsinUSv.Ponsbec.,inallprobability,
thosewerethedocumentsofferedinevidence.ItdoesnotappearthatadulyauthenticatedcopyoftheActwas

inexistenceorwasplacedbef.theCourt;andithasnotbeenshownthatifthathadbeendone,thisCourtwould
nothaveheldthecopyconclusiveproofofthedueenactmentofthelaw.RAM.

CascoChemicalCo.vGimenez,7SCRA347(1963)
F:

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRA2609(ForExMarginFeeLaw),theCBissuedCircularNo.95,fixingauniform
marginfeeof25%onforextransactions.xxxSeveraltimesinNov.andDec.1959,petitionerCasco,w/cisengagedinthe
manufactureofsyntheticresingluesxxx,boughtforexfortheimportationofureaandformaldehydew/carethemain
RMintheproductionofsaidgluesandpaidthecorrespondingmarginfee.Petitionerhadsoughttherefundclaimingthat
theseparateimportationofureaandformaldehydeisexemptfromsaidfee.AlthoughtheCBissuedthevouchersforthe
refund,theAuditoroftheBankrefusedtopassinauditandapprovesaidvouchersuponthegroundthattheexemption
grantedbytheMBforpetitioner'sseparateimportationsofureaandformaldehydeisnotinaccordw/theprovisionsofsec.
2,par.XVIIIofRA2609.
Petitionermaintainsthattheterm"ureaformaldehyde"appearingintheprovisionshouldbeconstruedas"urea
and formaldehyde"andthattherespshereinhaveerredinholdingotherwise. xxx "Ureaformaldehyde"isafinished
product,w/cispatentlydistinctanddifferentfrom"urea"and"formaldehyde,"asseparatearticlesusedinthemanufacture
ofthesyntheticresinknownas"ureaformaldehyde."PetitionercontendsthatthebillapprovedinCongresscontainedthe
copulativeconjunction"and"bet.theterms"urea"and"formaldehyde"andthatthemembersofCongressintendedto
exempt"urea"and"formaldehyde"separatelyasessentialelementsinthemanufactureofthesyntheticresingluexxxciting
thestatementsmadeontheflooroftheSenate,duringtheconsiderationofthebillbef.theHousexxx.

HELD:SaidindividualstatementsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewoftheSenate.Muchlessdotheyindicate
theintentoftheHRep.Further,theenrolledbillw/cusestheterm"ureaformaldehyde"insteadof"ureaand
formaldehyde," isconclusiveuponthecourtsasregardsthetenorofthemeasurepassedbyCongressand
adoptedbythePres.Iftherehasbeenanymistakeintheprintingofthebillbef.itwascertifiedbytheofficers
ofCongressandapprovedbythePres.,theremedyisbyamendmentorcurativelegislation.RAM.

In Morales v Subido, infra., the SC, in upholding the enrolled bill, explained that its basis is the
separation of powers, so that the remedy of an aggrieved party is not a judicial decree but a legislative
amendmentorcurativelegislation.Inthiscase,thephrase,"whohasservedthepolicedepartmentofcityor"
wasomittedfromtheengrossedcopyofthePoliceActof1966,therebychangingthequalificationsrequiredby
thelawofachiefofacitypoliceagency.Itwasclearfromtherecordsandjournalthattheomissiontookplace
notanystageofthelegislativeproceedings,butonlyduringitsenrollment.Itwasfurtherclearthatthechange
wasmadenotbyCongress,butonlybyanemployee.AndyettheSCrefusedtogobehindtheenrolledActto
discoverwhatreallyhappened,becauseoftherespectduetheotherdepartments.
ThecasewasdifferentinAstorgavVillegas,infra.,becausehere,uponbeinginformedthattheenrolled
billdidnotcontaintheamendmentproposedbySenatorTolentino(regardingthepowersoftheViceMayorof
Manila)whenthehousebillwasraisedtotheSenate,theSenatePresident,withdrewhissignatureandnotified
thePresidentofthemistake,whothenlikewisewithdrewhissignature.Therewasnooccasion,then,toapply
theenrolledbilltheory.

(2)ProbativeValueoftheJournal
Thejournalisconclusiveonthecourtsastoitscontents,sotheSCruledinUSVPons,34Phil.729
(1916).Pons,inthiscasewasprosecutedunderacriminalstatute.Hecontended,however,thatthestatutewas
passedpastthemidnightafterFebruary28,1914,thelastdayofsessionofthelegislativebody,butthatthe
membersstoppedtheclockatmidnight,topassthelaw.TheSCrejectedthisclaim,rulingthattheprobative
valueofthejournalcouldnotbequestioned,otherwiseproofoflegislativeactionwouldbeuncertainandwould
nowhavetodependontheimperfectmemoryofmen.

USVPons,34Phil.729(1916)
F:

JuanPonswasaccusedofviolatingAct2381w/cprohibitstheillegalimportationofopium.Inhismotionforthe
reversalofhisconviction,counselcontentedthatthelastdayofthespecialsessionsoftheLeg.for1914was2/28;thatAct
2381,underw/cPonsmustbepunishediffoundguilty,wasnotpassedorapprovedon2/28buton3/1ofthatyr;andthat,
therefore,thesameisnullandvoid.ThevalidityoftheActisnototherwisedisputed.Asitisadmittedthatthelastdayof
thespecialsessionwas,undertheGovGen'sproclamation,2/28andthattheappellantischargedw/havingviolatedAct
2381,thevitalquestionisthedateoftheadjournmentoftheLeg.,andthisreducesitselfto2others,namely,(1)howthat
istobeproved,whetherbythelegislativejournalsorextraneousevidence,and(2) whetherthecourtcantakejudicial
noticeofthejournals.

HELD:A.Whiletherearenoadjudicatedcasesinthisjurisdictionupontheexactquestionw/nthecourtsmay
takejudicialnoticeofthelegislativejournals,itiswellsettledintheUSthatsuchjournalsmaybenoticedby
courtsindeterminingthequestionw/naparticularbillbecamealawornot. Andthesejournalsshow,w/
absolutecertainty,thattheLeg.adjournedsinedieat12o'clockon2/28/14.
B.Wewillinquirew/nthecourtsmaygobehindthelegislativejournalsforthepurposeofdetermining
thedateofadjournmentwhensuchjournalsareclearandexplicit.
Counselforappellant,inordertoestablishhiscontention,mustnecessarilydependuponthememoryor
recollectionofwitnesses,whilethelegislativejournalsaretheactsoftheGovtorthesovereignitself. From
theirverynatureandobjecttherecordsoftheLegareasimportantasthoseofthejudiciary,andtoinquireinto
theveracityofthejournalsoftheLeg.,whentheyareclearandexplicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterand
spirit of the organic laws by w/c the Phil. Govt was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independentdeptoftheGovt,andtointerferew/thelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLeg.xxxIfthe
clock,was,infactstopped,asheresuggested,"theresultantevilmightbeslightascomparedw/thatofaltering
theprobativeforceandcharacteroflegislativerecords,andmakingtheproofoflegislativeactiondependupon
uncertainoralevidence,liabletolossbydeathorabsence,andsoimperfectonaccountofthetreacheryof
memoryxxx.RAM.

(3)MattersRequiredtobeEnteredintheJournal
TheConstitutionrequiresthatthefollowingmattersbecontainedinthe
journal:
(a)Theyeasandnaysonthirdandfinalreadingofabill[Art.VI,Sec.
26(2)];
(b)VetomessageofthePresident(i.e.,hisobjectiontoabillwhenhe
vetoesit)[Art.VI,Sec.27(1)];
(c)TheyeasandnaysontherepassingofabillvetoedbythePresident
(Art.VI,Sec.27(1)];
(d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the
memberspresent[Art.VI,Sec.16(4)]
Inaddition,thejournalcontainsthesummaryoftheproceedings.
Arecord,ontheotherhand,containstheverbatimtranscriptofallproceedings ofthehouseorits
committees.TheConstitutionissilentastowhattherecordmustcontain.
However,inArt.XI,Sec.3(3),theConstitutionspeaksofthevoteofeachmemberoftheHouseeither
affirmingafavorableoroverridingitscontraryresolutionoftheimpeachmentcomplainttobe"recorded."

(4)JournalEntryRulevEnrolledBillTheory
IntheAstorgavVillegascase,theSC,bywayofobiter,indicatedthatthejournalmightreallyprevail
overtheenrolledbill,sinceajournalisrequired bytheConstitutionwhiletheenrollmentofabillisjusta
legislativepracticethatisnotevenmentionedintheConstitution. Further,enrollment doesnotaddtothe
validityofthebill,forwhatmakesitvalidarethevotesofthemembers.
Butthisviewismeredictum. ItcontradictstherulinginMoralesvSubidothattheenrolledcopy
prevailsoverthejournal.ItalsocontradictstheratioinMarshallField&Co.vClark,143US649(1891)that
thepartieswerenotcompetenttoshowfromthejournalthatthebillinthecustodyoftheSecretaryofStatewas
againstthecontentsofthejournal,becausejournalsarejustkeptbyclerkswhocouldbemistaken,whilethe
certifiedbillismadebythehighestofficerofthechamber.
Toreconcilethesetwoviews,itmaybesaidthat,astomattersrequiredbytheConstitutiontobeplaced
inthejournal,thejournalisconclusive.Butasidefromthese4matters,anyothermatterdoesnotenjoysuch
conclusiveness.
AstorgavVillegas,56SCRA714(1974)

F:

HouseBillNo.9266,w/cwasfiledintheHRep.,passedon3rdreadingw/oamendments. Itwassenttothe
Senateforconcurrence. ItwasreferredtotheappropriateSenateCommittee,w/crecommendedapprovalw/aminor
amendmentrecommendedbySen.Roxas.WhenthebillwasdiscussedontheSenatefloor,substantialamendmentstoSec.
1wereintroducedbySen.Tolentino,w/camendmentswereapprovedintotobytheSenate.xxxOn5/21/54,theSec.of
theSenatesentalettertoHRepthattheHousebillhadbeenpassedbytheSenatew/amendments. Attachedwasa
certificationoftheamendment,w/cwastheonerecommendedbySen.Roxas,andnottheTolentinoamendmentsw/cwere
theonesactuallyapprovedbytheSenate.TheHRepsignifiedapprovalassentbacktoit.Theprintedcopieswerethen
certifiedandattestedtobytheSecretariesoftheSenateandoftheHRep,theSpeakeroftheHRep,andtheSenatePres.
ItwaslatermadepublicbySen.TolentinothattheenrolledcopyofHousebillno.9266signedintolawbythe
Pres.wasawrongversionofthebillactuallypassedbytheSenateandapprovedontheSenatefloor.TheSenatePres.
admittedthismistakeinalettertothePres.Asaresult,thePres.sentamessagetothepresidingofficersofbothHouses
informingthemthatinviewofthecircumstanceshewasofficiallywithdrawinghissignatureonHouseBillno.9266.
Upontheforegoingfacts,theMayorofMla.issuedcircularsorderingthedisregardoftheprovisionsofRA4605.
Healsoissuedanorderrecalling5membersofthecitypoliceforcewhohadbeenassignedtotheViceMayorpresumably
underauthorityofRA4065.
Reactingtothesesteps,thethenVMayorAstorga,filedapet.w/thisCourtfor"Mandamus,Injunctionand/or
Prohibitionw/PrelMandatoryandProhibitoryInjunction"tocompelcompliancew/theprovisionsofRA4065.
Respondents'positionisthatRA4065neverbecamelawsinceitwasnotthebillactuallypassedbytheSenate,
andthattheentriesinthejournalofthatbodyandnottheenrolledbillitselfshouldbedecisiveintheresolutionofthe
issue.

HELD:1.Petitioner'sargumentthattheattestationofthepresidingofficersofCongressisconclusiveproofof
abill'sdueenactment,required,itissaid,bytherespectduetoacoequaldeptofthegovt,isneutralizedinthis
casebythefactthattheSenatePres.declaredhissignatureonthebilltobeinvalidandissuedasubsequent
clarificationthattheinvalidationofhissignaturemeantthatthebillhehadsignedhadneverbeenapprovedby
theSenate.Obviouslythisdeclarationshouldbeaccordedevengreaterrespectthantheattestationitinvalidated,
w/citdidforareasonthatisundisputedinfactandindisputableinlogic.
AsfarasCongressitselfisconcerned, thereisnothingsacrosanctinthecertification madebythe
presidingofficers.Itismerelyamodeofauthentification.ItistheapprovalbyCongressandnotthesignatures
ofthepresidingofficersthatisessential.
2.Petitioneragreesthattheattestationinthebillisnotmandatorybutarguesthatthedisclaimerthereof
bytheSenatePres.,grantingittohavebeenvalidlymade,wouldonlymeanthattherewasnoattestationatall,
butwouldnotaffectthevalidityofthestatute.xxxThisargumentsbegsthequestion.Itwouldlimitthecourt's
inquirytothepresenceorabsenceoftheattestationandtotheeffectofitsabsenceuponthevalidityofthe
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequentlytherebeingnoenrolledbilltospeakof,whatevidenceistheretodeterminew/nthebillhadbeen
dulyenacted?Insuchacase,theentryinthejournalshouldbeconsulted.RAM.

MarshallField&Co.vClark,143US649(1891)
ItisnotcompetentfortheappellanttoshowfromtheJournalsthattheenrolledbillcontainedasectionthat
doesnotappearintheenrolledActinthecustodyoftheStateDepartment.

F:

Inaccordancew/theTariffActofOct.1,1890,dutieswereassessedandcollectedonwoollendressgoods,
woollenwearingapparel,andsilkembroideriesimportedbyField&Co.;onsilkandcottonlacesimportedbySutton&
Co.;andoncoloredcottonclothsimportedbySternbach&Co.Theimportersseverallyprotestedagainsttheassessment
uponthegroundthattheActwasnotalawoftheUS.Itwascontended,amongothers,thattheTariffActwasanullity
bec."itisshownbycongressionalrecordsofproceedings,reportsofcommitteesofconference,andotherpapersprintedby
authorityofCongress,andhavingreferencetoHouseBill9416,thatasectionofthebillasitfinallypassed,wasnotinthe
billauthenticatedbythesignaturesofthepresidingofficersoftherespectivehousesofCongress,andapprovedbythe
Pres."

HELD:ThesigningbytheHouseSpeakerandbytheSenatePres.ofanenrolledbillisanofficialattestationby
thetwoHousesthatsuchbillistheonethathaspassedCongress.Itisadeclarationbythe2houses,through
theirpresidingofficers,tothePres.thatabill,thusattested,hasreceived,indueform,thesanctionofthe
legislativebranchofthegovt,andthatitisdeliveredtohiminobediencetotheconstitutionalrequirementthat
allbillsw/cpassCongressshallbepresentedtohim.AndwhenthebillthusattestedissignedbythePres.and
depositedinthearchives,itsauthenticationasabillthathaspassedCongressshouldbedeemedcompleteand
unimpeachable.RAM.

Moralesv.Subido,27SCRA131(1969.)
F:

Thepresentinsistenceofthepetitioneristhattheversionoftheprovision(Sec.10ofthePoliceActof1966),as
amendedatthebehestofSen.Rodrigo,wastheversionapprovedbytheSenateon3rdreading,andthatwhenthebill
emergedfromtheconferencecommittee,theonlychangemadeintheprovisionwastheinsertionofthephrase"orhas
servedaschiefofpolicew/exemplaryrecord."Insupportofthisassertion,thepetitionersubmittedcertifiedphotostatic
copiesofthedifferentdraftsofHouseBill6951showingthevariouschangesmade. Itisunmistakablethatthephrase
"whohasservedthepolicedeptofacityor,"wasstillpartoftheprovision,butaccordingtothepetitionertheHousebill
divisiondeletedtheentireprovisionandsubstitutedwhatisnowSec.10oftheActw/cdidnotcarrysuchphrase.
Itwouldthusappearthattheomissionofthephrase"whohasservedthepolicedeptofacityof",wasmadenotat
any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreadingthereof;thatthechangewasnotmadebyCongressbutonlybyanemployeethereofxxx.

HELD: Thepetitionerwhollymisconceivesthefunctionofthejudiciaryunderoursystemofgovt. [T]he

enrolledActintheofficeofthelegislativesecretaryofthePres.ofthePhils.showsthatsec.10isexactlyasitis
inthestatuteasofficiallypublishedinslipformbytheBureauofPrinting.Wecannotgobehindtheenrolled
Acttodiscoverwhatreallyhappened.TherespectduetotheotherbranchesofGovtdemandsthatweactupon
thefaithandcreditofwhattheofficersofthesaidbranchesattesttoastheofficialactsoftheirrespective
departments.Otherwise,wewouldbecastintheunenviableandunwantedroleofasleuthtryingtodetermine
what actually didhappeninthelabyrinthoflawmaking,w/consequentimpairmentoftheintegrityofthe
legislativeprocess. Theinvestigationw/cthepetitionerwouldlikethisCourttomakecanbebetterdonein
Congress.
[W]earenottobeunderstoodasholdingthatinallcasesthejournalsmustyieldtotheenrolledbill.To
besure,therearecertainmattersw/ctheConst.expresslyrequiresmustbeenteredonthejournalofeachhouse.
xxx[W]ithrespecttomattersnotexpresslyrequiredtobeenteredonthejournal,theenrolledbillprevailsinthe

eventofanydiscrepancy.RAM.

(5)CongressionalRecord
Art.VI,Sec.16(4)xxx
EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings.

UPDATED1/6/96
RAM

f.Sessions
(1)Regularsessions
Art.VI,Sec.15.TheCongressshallconveneonceeveryyearonthefourthMondayofJulyforits
regularsession,unlessadifferentdateisfixedbylaw,andshallcontinuetobeinsessionforsuchnumber
ofdaysasitmaydetermine,untilthirtydaysbeforetheopeningofitsnextregularsession,exclusiveof
Saturdays,Sundaysandlegalholidays.xxx
Sec.16(5)NeitherhouseduringthesessionoftheCongressshall,withouttheconsentoftheother
house,adjournformorethanthreedays,nortoanyotherplacethanthatinwhichthetwohousesshallbe
sitting.
Cruz:"[P]lace"ashereusedrefersnottothebuildingbuttothepoliticalunitwherethetwoHousesmaybe
sitting.
(2)Specialsessions
Art.VI,Sec.15.xxxThePresidentmaycallaspecialsessionatanytime.
Specialsessionsareheldinthefollowinginstances:
a)WhenthePresidentcallsforaspecialsessionatanytime(Art.VI,Sec.15)
b)TocallaspecialelectionduetoavacancyintheofficesofPresidentandVicePresident(Art.VII,
Sec.10)inw/cCongressshallconveneat10a.m.ofthethirddayafterthevacancy,withoutneedofacall.
c) To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his
assertionthatheisabletodisposehisdutiesandpowers.(ThistakesplacenotwhentheCabinetfirstsendsa
written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the President has disputed this initial
declaration.)(Art.VII,Sec.11.)
Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,within48hours,withoutneedofcall.
d)TorevokeorextendthePresidentialProclamationofMartialLaworsuspensionofthewritofhabeas

corpus(Art.VII,Sec.18).
Congress,ifnotinsession,shall,within24hoursfollowingsuchproclamationorsuspension,convene,
withoutneedofacall.
Inthelastthreecases,Congressconveneswithoutneedofacall.Theseareexceptionstothegeneral
ruleinthe1stcasethatwhenCongressisnotinsession,itcanonlymeetinspecialsessioncallbythePresident.
(3)Jointsession
Whenbothhousesmeetjointly,theygenerallyvoteseparately.Thereasonisobvious:thereareonly24
senators,whilethereare250representatives. ItwouldbebadpolicytogiveonevotetoaSenator,whowas
elected"atlarge",andthesameweightofvotetoarepresentative,whoiseitherelectedonlybyonelegislative
districtorapartylist.
Jointsessionandseparatevotingtakeplaceinthefollowinginstances:
(a)VotingSeparately
a)WhenCongress,whileactingasthecanvasserofvotesforthePresidentandVicePresident,hasto
breakthetiebetweentwoormorecandidatesforeitherpositionhavinganequalandthehighestnumberofvotes
(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5).
b)Whenitdecides(by2/3vote)onthequestionofthePresident'sinabilitytodischargethepowersand
dutiesofhisoffice(Art.VII,Sec.11,par.4).
c)WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVP,whenitconfirmsthenominationofaVPbythe
President from among the members of Congress; such person shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majorityvoteofallthemembersofbothHouses,votingseparately(Art.VII,Sec.9).
d)Whenitdeclares(by2/3vote)theexistenceofastateofwar[Art.VI,Sec,23(1)].
e)WhenitproposestoamendtheConstitution(3/4voteofthemembers)[Art.XVII,Sec.1(1)].

(b)VotingJointly
Butthereisoneexceptionalinstancewhenthetwohousesmeetandvotejointly:When,therehasbeena
proclamationofMartiallaworasuspensionofthewritbythePresident,andCongresshastodecidewhetherto
revokeortoextendsuchproclamationorsuspension(majorityvoteofallmembers,votingjointly)(VII,Sec.
18).
VV:Thereisanillogicalinconsistencyhere.Todeclareastateofwar,thevoteistakenseparately.But

todecideonaninternaldisorder(whichisshortofwar)whichspurredtheproclamationofMartialLawor
suspensionofthewrit,thevoteistakenjointly.Ifthevotingismade"joint"duetotheemergencycharacterof
thesituationbroughtaboutbytheinvasionorrebellion,thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotbesotodeclarethe
existenceofwar(whichamongothers,empowersthePresidenttoextendthetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaff),
thedangertonationalsecurityandtheemergencynaturebeingthesame,ifnotgraver.

5.ElectoralTribunals
Art.VI,Secs.17and19
Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsof
theirrespectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnineMembers,threeofwhom
shallbeJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremainingsixshall
beMembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenonthe
basisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandthepartiesororganizationsregistered
under the partylist represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Id.,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstituted
withinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththe
electionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhilethe
Congressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuch
powersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.

a.Composition
TheSenateandtheHouseshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunal,tobecomposedof9members,3shall
bejustices oftheSCtobe designated bytheChiefJustice, and theremaining 6shall bemembers ofthe
respectivehouseschoseonthebasisof"proportionalrepresentation"fromthepoliticalparties,andtheparties
ororganizationsregisteredunderthepartylistsystem.TheseniorjusticeshallbetheChairman.
Theuseofproportionalrepresentationtofillupthe6slotsreservedformembersoftheparticularhouse
isdifferentfromtheruleunderthe1935Constitution,whichreserved3seatsforthemajoritypartyandanother
3seatsfortheminorityparty.InTanadavCuenco,103Phil.1051(1957),theSCruledthattheslotreservedfor
theminoritypartyshouldnotbefilledupbythemajorityparty,eveniftherewasonlyonememberfromthe
minorityparty(inthepersonofTanada). Fortofillitupwouldoffset thebalanceofthetribunal,andthis
woulddefeatitsneutralitywhenactingasthesolejudgeofallelectioncontests.Thiscouldnotbedoneunder
the presentsetupofthelowerhousebecauseofthepartylistsystem,whichmakesafixedrepresentation
impossible.Ontheotherhand,bymakingthecompositionproportional,theverynatureoftheElectoralTribu
nalasaneutraljudgeofelectioncontestshasbeendestroyed.IntheSenate,forinstance,ifonlyonesenator

comesfromtheminorityparty,thereisnowaythathewouldberepresentedinthetribunal.Atleast,2senators
arerequiredofthe24membersoftheSenateinordertohaveonerepresentativeinthetribunal.Andevenif
thissinglerepresentativevotetogetherwiththe3justices,thereisnowayforthemoutvotethe5fromthe
majorityparty. Thecasethenisoneofamajoritypreservingitsadvantage. Underthesysteminthe1935
Constitution,solongasthereisoneminoritysenator,thereisalwaysaclausethathecouldoutvotethemajority,
andthatiswhenthe3justicesvotewithhim.
InAbbasvsSenateElectoralTribunal,166SCRA651,thepetitionerswhowereprotestantsinacontest
beforetherespondentbody,soughtthedisqualificationofallthelegislativemembersthereofonthegroundthat
theywereamongtheprotesteesinthesaidcontest,alongwiththeothermajoritymembersoftheSenate.(The
originaloppositionmember,SenatorEstrada,laterjoinedthemajorityandwasreplacedbySenatorEnrile,who
voluntarilyinhibitedhimself.)Indismissingthepetition,theSCsaid:
ItseemsclearthatinprovidingforaTribunaltobestaffedbybothJusticesoftheSupremeCourtand
membersoftheSenate,theConstitutionintendedthatboththosejudicialandlegislativecomponentscommonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators.SaidintentismoreclearlysignalledbythefactthattheproportionofSenatorstoJusticesis2to1
an unmistakable indication that the legislative and judicial components cannot be totally excluded from
participationintheresolutionofsenatorialelectioncontests.
WhereasituationiscreatedwhichprecludesthesubstitutionofanySenatorsittingintheTribunalby
anyofhisothercolleaguesintheSenatewithoutinvitingthesameobjectionstothesubstitute'scompetence,the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandonadutythatnoothercourtorbodycanperform,butwhichitcannotlawfullydischargeisshornofthe
participationofitsentiremembershipofSenators.
Theoverriding consideration should be thatthe Tribunal be notprevented from discharging a duty
whichitalonehasthepowertoperform,theperformanceofwhichisinthehighestinterestofthepeople.
ItshouldbenotedthattheframersoftheConstitutioncouldnothavebeenunawareofthepossibilityof
anelectioncontestthatwouldinvolveall24Senatorselect,someofwhomwouldinevitablyhavetositin
judgmentthereon.

b.NatureofFunction
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performanceandexecutionofthelimitedandspecificfunctionassignedtoitbytheConstitution.Thoughits
composition is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature, it is a body separate from and
independentofthelegislature.
ThegrantofpowertotheElectoralCommissiontojudgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsand
qualificationsofmembersofthelegislature,isintendedtobecompleteandunimpaired.(Angara vs Electoral
Commission,63Phil134)

RequestofJusticesMelencioHerrera,CruzandFelicianotoberelievedasmembersoftheHRET(Res.March
19,1991)
This resolution should be read in connection with Bondoc vs Pineda, which is discussed under
IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunals.
Insaidrequest,thethreejusticesaskedtoberelievedfrommembershipintheHRET. Accordingto
them,politicalfactorswhichhavenothingtodowiththemeritsofthecase,wereblockingtheaccomplishment
of their constitutionally mandated task. They therefore suggested that there should be a provision in the
ConstitutionthatupondesignationtomembershipintheElectoralTribunal,thosesodesignatedshoulddivest
themselvesofaffiliationwiththeirrespectivepoliticalparties,toinsuretheirindependenceandobjectivityas
theysitinTribunaldeliberations.
TheSCresolvedtodirectthemtoreturntotheirdutiesintheTribunal.Accordingtothecourt,inview
ofthesensitiveconstitutionalfunctionsoftheElectoralTribunalsasthe"solejudge"ofallcontestsrelatingto
theelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersofCongress,allmembersofthesebodiesshouldbe
guidedonlybepurelylegalconsiderationsinthedecisionofthecasesbeforethemandthatinthecontemplation
oftheConstitution,thememberslegislators,thereof,uponassumptionoftheirdutiestherein,sitintheTribunal
nolongerasrepresentativesoftheirrespectivepoliticalpartiesbutasimpartialjudges.Tofurtherbolsterthe
independenceoftheTribunals,thetermofofficeofeverymemberthereofshouldbeconsideredcoextensive
withthecorrespondinglegislativetermandmaynotbelegallyterminatedexceptonlybydeath,resignation,
permanentdisability,orremovalforvalidcause,notincludingpoliticaldisloyalty.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
Status
In Angara v Electoral Commission, supra,theSC held that thethenElectoral Commission wasan
independentbody,althoughattachedtoCongress,
InSuaresvChiefAccountant,theCommissiononAudit,(thenunderthe1935Constitution)asadjunct
ofCongress,wasruledtobeanindependentbody,althoughattachedtoCongress,andsothesalaryofitsstaffers
neednotbethesameasthoseoftheSenate.
Organization(Art.VI,Sec.19)
TheElectoralTribunalshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysafterthe2housesshallhavebeenorganized
withtheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.
Functions(id.,Sec.17)

TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbethe
sole judge of all contests relating to the (i) election, (ii) returns, and (iii) qualifications of their respective
members.
Under Vera v Avelino,supra,thehousemayconduct"exclusionproceedings," andbyavoteofthe
majoritydenyadmissiontoamemberelectpendingtheresolutionofcomplaintsconcerninghiselection.
EveniftheConstitutionvestsintheElectoralTribunalthepowertodecidetheelection,returnsand
qualificationsofmemberelect,theremaybenoelectoralcontest,andsonooccasionfortheElectoralTribunal
toexerciseitsjurisdiction.If,forinstance,Sistheonlycandidateandhesuffersfromadisqualification,e.g.,
citizenship,therewouldbenoelectioncontestsincetherewouldbenoprotestant,andsothejurisdictionofthe
tribunalcouldnotbeinvoked.Inthiscase,thehousecouldnotbedeniedthepowertopassonthismember
elect'squalifications.
Theoppositeisan"expulsionproceeding"whereasittingmemberisoustedfordisorderlybehaviorbya
voteof2/3pfallthemembersoftheparticularhouse.

c.IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunals
AlthoughtheElectoralTribunalsarepredominantlylegislativeinmembershipandtheprovisioncreating
themisfoundinArticleVIontheLegislativeDepartment,itisnotcorrecttosaythattheyaremereadjunctsof
theCongressofthePhilippines.Infact,inthedischargeoftheirconstitutionalduties,theyareindependentof
thelegislature,andalsooftheotherdepartmentsforthatmatter.
In the case Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, the question raised was whether the House of
Representativescould,attherequestofthedominantpoliticalpartytherein,changeitsrepresentativeinthe
HRET,presumablytothwartthepromulgationofadecisionfreelyreachedbytheTribunal.Whileacknowledg
ingtheindependenceoftheTribunalasthe"solejudge"ofelectioncontestsinvolvingthemembersoftheHouse
ofRepresentatives,theSCassumedjurisdiction,preciselytoprotectthatindependence.TheSCheldthatthe
independenceoftheHRETwouldbecomeamythanditsproceedingsafarceiftheHouseofRepresentativesof
the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
componentoftheHRET,toservetheinterestsofthepartyinpower.
TheresolutionoftheHouseofRepresentativesremovingCongressmanCamasurafromtheHRETfor
disloyaltytotheLDP,becausehecasthisvoteinfavoroftheNP'scandidate,Bondoc,isaclearimpairmentof
theconstitutionalprerogativeoftheHRETtobethesolejudgeoftheelectioncontestbetweenBondocand
Pineda.TosanctionsuchinterferencebytheHouseofRepresentativeintheworkoftheHRETwouldreduce
theTribunaltoameretoolfortheaggrandizementofthepartyinpowerwhichthethreeSCjusticesandthelone
minoritymemberwouldbepowerlesstostop.Aminoritypartycandidatemayaswellabandonallhopeatthe
thresholdoftheTribunal.
Asjudges,themembersoftheHRETmustbenonpartisan.Theymustdischargetheirfunctionswith

completedetachment,impartialityandindependenceevenindependencefromthepoliticalpartytowhichthey
belong.

Bondocv.Pineda(201SCRA792,Sept.1991)
F:

Pineda(LDP)andBondoc(NP)bothranascongressionalrepsforthe4thdistrictofPampanga.Pinedawonbut
BondocfiledaprotestintheHouseofRepsElectoralTribunal(HRET),whichiscomposedof9members,3ofwhomare
SCjustices,andtheremaining6aremembersoftheHousechosenonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthe
political parties & theparties ororganizations registeredunder thepartylistsystem representedtherein.The HRET
decidedinfavorofBondoc.Cong.Camasura,anLDP,votedinfavorofBondoc.BeforeBondoccouldbeproclaimed,the
LDPexpelledCamasuraasmemberoftheparty.The3justiceswhoalsovotedforBondocaskedtoberelievedfromtheir
assignmentintheHRETbecausethewithdrawalofCamasuraasHRETrepofLDPineffectwasawayofabortingthe
proclamationofBondoc(NP).[RequestofJusticesMelencioHerrera,CruzandFelicianotoberelievedasmembersofthe
HRET(Res.March19,1991)]

ISSUES:
1.MaytheHouseofRepsattherequestofthedominantpoliticalpartytherein,changethe
party'srepresentationintheHRETtothwartthepromulgationofadecisionfreelyreachedbythetribunalinan
electioncontestpendingtherein?
2.MaytheSupremeCourtreviewandannulthatactionoftheHouse?
HELD:(astoIssue#1):
1.No.Theuseoftheword"SOLE"inbothSec.17ofArt.VIofthe1987Consti&Sec.11ofArt.VIof
the1935ConstiunderscorestheEXCLUSIVEjurisdictionoftheHRETasjudgeofcontestsrelatingtothe
ELECTION, RETURNS & QUALIFICATIONS of the members of the House (Robles v. HRET, GR
88647,1990).ThetribunalwascreatedtofunctionasaNONPARTISANcourtalthough2/3ofitsmembersare
politicians.ItisaNONPOLITICALbodyinaseaofpoliticiansxxx.Tobeabletoexerciseexclusivejurisdic
tion,theHRETmustbeINDEPENDENT.Itsjurisdictiontohearanddecidecongressionalelectioncontestsis
notsharedbyitwiththeLegislaturenorwiththecourts.
2. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be NONPARTISAN. They must discharge their
functionswithcompletedetachment,impartiality,&independenceevenindependencefromthepoliticalparty
towhichtheybelong. Hence,DISLOYALTYTOPARTY&BREACHOFPARTYDISCIPLINEareNOT
VALIDgroundsfortheexpulsionofamemberofthetribunal.InexpellingCong.CamasurafromtheHRETfor
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination &
appreciationoftheballots&therecountofthevotesbythetribunal,thehousecommittedagraveabuseof
discretion,aninjustice,andaviolationoftheConstitution.ItsresolutionofexpulsionagainstCamasuraisnull
&void.
Astoissue#2:Yes.Thepower&dutyofthecourtstonullify,inappropriatecases,theactionsofthe
executive&legislativebranchesoftheGovt.,doesnotmeanthatthecourtsaresuperiortothePresident&the
legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk the "irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality&legalityoflegislativeorexecutiveactionwhenajusticiablecontroversyisbroughtbeforethe

courtsbysomeonewhohasbeenaggrievedorprejudicedbysuchaction,asinthiscase.Itis"aplainexerciseof
thejudicialpower,thatpowertohearanddisposeofacaseorcontroversuproperlybroguebeforethecourt,to
thedeterminationofwhichmustbebroughtthetest&measureofthelaw(Verav.Avelino, 77Phil192).
Adapted.

d.Powers
Intheearliercaseof Angara vs Electoral Commission (63Phil139),itwasheldthattherespondent
bodyhadtheexclusiverighttoprescribeitsownrulesofprocedure,asagainstthoseearlieradoptedbythe
legislature itself, in connection with the election contests under its jurisdiction. This ruling was recently
affirmedbytheSCinLazatinvsHouseElectoralTribunal,168SCRA391.TheSCheldthat:
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualificationsoftheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,topromulgaterulesandregulationsrelativeto
matterswithinitsjurisdiction,includingtheperiodforfilingelectionprotestsbeforeit,isbeyonddispute.Its
rulemakingpowernecessarilyflowsfromthegeneralpowergrantedtoitbytheConstitution.Thisistheimport
ofthecase Angara vs Electoral Commission. Insuch case, theSCheldthatthecreation oftheElectoral
Commissioncarriedwithit exnecesitaterei thepowerregulativeincharactertolimitthetimewithinwhich
protestsintrustedtoitscognizanceshouldbefiled.Whereageneralpowerisconferred,everyparticularpower
necessaryfortheexerciseoftheoneortheperformanceoftheotherisalsoconferred.Intheabsenceofany
furtherconstitutionalprovisionrelatingtotheproceduretobefollowedinfilingprotestsbeforetheElectoral
Commission,therefore,theincidentalpowertopromulgatesuchrulesnecessaryfortheproperexerciseofits
exclusivepowertojudgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersofthe
legislature,mustbedeemedbynecessaryimplicationtohavebeenlodgedalsointheElectoralCommission.

e.JudicialReviewofdecisionsofElectoralTribunals
Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives(199SCRA692,July,1991)
F:

Co,Balinquit&Ongranforrepresentativeofthe2ndlegislativedistrictofNorthernSamarintheMay11,1987
elections.Ongwonbutpets(Co&Balanquit)protestedOng'selectiononthegroundofnoncitizenship.TheHRETfound
forOng.

HELD:1.JudgmentsofelectoraltribunalarebeyondjudicialinterferencesaveonlyintheexerciseoftheCourt's
socalledextraordinaryjurisdiction,xxxuponadeterminationthatthetribunal'sdecisionorresolutionwas
renderedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionoruponaclearshowingof
sucharbitraryandimprovidentusebytheTribunalofitspowerasconstitutesadenialofdueprocessoflaw,or
uponademonstrationofaveryclearunmitigatedERROR,manifestlyconstitutingsuchgraveabuseofdiscretion
thattherehastobearemedyforsuchabuse.
2.IntheabsenceofashowingthattheHREThascommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackofjurisdiction,theCourtcannotexerciseitscorrectivepower.Adapted.

6.CommissiononAppointments
Art.VI,Sec.1819
Art.VI,Sec.18.ThereshallbeaCommissiononAppointmentsconsistingofthePresidentofthe
Senate,as exofficio Chairman,twelvesenators,andtwelveMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
electedbyeachHouseonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandpartiesor
organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submittedtoitwithinthirtysessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission.TheCommissionshall
rulebyamajorityvotesofalltheMembers.
Id.,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstituted
withinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththe
electionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhilethe
Congressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuch
powersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.
Compositionbyproportionalrepresentationhasalwaysbeentheruleevenunderthe1935Constitution.
And rightly so. For unlike the Electoral Tribunal which performs the essentially neutral function of
adjudication,theCommissiononAppointmentsperformstheessentiallypoliticalfunctionofappointment.The
distributionofpoliticalpartiesinthetwoHousesmustthusbereflectedproportionatelyintheCommission.
SincemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsisbasedonpartyaffiliation,thenadefection
fromonepartytoanotherchangestheproportionintherespectivehouses(which)isavalidgroundforthe
reorganizationofthecommission.
However,ameretemporaryalliance,anagreementbetweenandamongmemberscomingfromdifferent
partiestoactinaconcertedmanneronlyonsomeissues,butwithoutachangeinpartyaffiliation,doesnot
justifyacalltoreorganizethecommissiononthegroundthatthereisnolongerproportionalrepresentation.So
theSCruledinCunananvTan,115Phil7(1962).
In Daza vs Singson,180SCRA496,thepetitionerquestionedhisreplacementintheCommissionon
Appointments,insistingthathisdesignationtheretoasarepresentativeoftheLiberalPartywaspermanentand
couldnotbewithdrawn. Forhispart,therespondentcontendedthathecouldbevalidlybenamedinthe
petitioner'splaceinviewofthepoliticalrealignmentintheHousefollowingthereorganizationoftheLDPto
whichhebelonged. Bothinvokedtheearlier CunananvsTan case,wheretheSChadheldthatthepolitical
affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be reflected in their respective representations in the
CommissionofAppointments.ThepetitionerclaimedthattheformationoftheLDPwasmerelyatemporary
developmentwhereastherespondentclaimedthatithadpermanentlyalteredthepoliticalcompositionofthe
House. Rulinginfavoroftherespondent,theSCdeclaredthatpetitioner's argumentisbasedonthenon
registrationoftheLDP,whichheclaimshasnotprovidedthepermanentpoliticalrealignmenttojustifythe

questionedreorganization.However,theCOMELECthengrantedthepetitionoftheLDPforregistrationasa
politicalparty.Petitionerthenclaimsthatregistrationisnotsufficientandthatthepoliticalpartymustpassthe
testoftime. Underthistheory,aregisteredpartyobtainingthemajorityoftheseatswillnotbeentitledto
representationintheCommissiononAppointmentsaslongasitwasorganizedonlyrecentlyandhasnotyet
aged.Ifsuchargumentistobefollowed,onlytheLiberalPartyshallpasssuchtest.
TheHouseofRepresentativesthereforehastheauthoritytochangeitsrepresentationintheCommission
of Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership.Itisunderstoodthatsuchchangesmustbepermanentanddonotincludethetemporaryalliances
orfactionaldivisionsnotinvolvingseveranceofpoliticalloyaltiesorformaldisaffiliationandpermanentshifts
ofallegiancefromonepoliticalpartytoanother.

CosetengvsMitra(187SCRA377)
F:

Duringthe1987Congressionalelections,CosetengwastheonlycandidateelectedundertheKAIBAparty.Ofthe
12electedtotheCommissiononAppointments,RoqueAblanoftheKBL,representedtheCoalescedMinority.Whenthe
LDP was organized a year later, the House Committees including the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments had to be reorganized. Coseteng requested Mitra that she be appointed a member of the CA as a
representativeofKAIBA.Ablanwashoweverretainedasthe12thmemberrepresentingtheHouseminority.
CosetengfiledapetitiontodeclarenullandvoidtheappointmentofthemembersoftheCAonthetheorythat
theirelectiontotheCAviolatedtheconstitutionalmandateofproportionalrepresentation.

HELD:Thepetition should bedismissed notbecause itraises a political question,which itdoes not,but

because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the
politicalpartiestherein.
Theissueisjusticiable.Thelegality,andnotthewisdom,ofthemanneroffillingtheCA,isjusticiable.
Evenifitwereapoliticalquestion,suchwouldstillcomewithinjudicialreviewontheissueofwhetherthere
wasgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdiction.
Thecompositionwasbasedonproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalpartiestherein. Theother
minoritypartiesareboundbythemajority'schoices.EvenifKAIBAwereanoppositionparty,itslonemember
representsonly.4%oftheHouse,thussheisnotentitledtooneofthe12seats.Theotherrepresentativestothe
CAweredulyelectedbytheHouse(notbytheirparty)asprovidedinArt.VI,Sec.18.Thevalidityoftheir
electiontotheCAelevenfromtheCoalescedMajorityandonefromtheCoalescedMinorityisunassailable.
Adapted.

GuingonavsGonzales(214SCRA789)

F:

Asaresultofthe1992Senatorialelections,theLDPwasentitledto7.5seatsintheCA,theNPCto2.5,the
LAKASNUCDto1.5andtheLPPDPLABANto.5.Theproblemaroseastowhattowiththe1/2towhicheachofthe
partiesisentitled.TheLDPmajorityconvertedafractionalhalfmembershiptoawholemembership(7.5+.5)tobeable
toelectSenatorRomulo.Insodoing,oneotherparty'sfractionalrepresentationintheCAwasreduced.Thisisclearlya
violationofSec.18,Art.VIbecauseitisnolongerbasedonproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalparties.
Senator Tanada claimed that he has a right to be elected as member of the CA because of the physical
impossibilityofdividingaperson(needtoroundoff.5toonesenator)andbecauseasthesolerepresentativeofhisparty,
hispartyisentitledtorepresentation.

HELD:TheprovisionofSection18onproportionalrepresentationismandatoryincharacteranddoesnotleave
anydiscretiontothemajoritypartyintheSenatetodisobeyordisregardtheruleonproportionalrepresentation.
Nopartycanclaimmorethanwhatitisentitledtoundersuchrule.Section18alsoassuresrepresentationinthe
CAofanypoliticalpartywhosucceedsinelectingmemberstotheSenate,providedthatthenumberofsenators
soelectedenablesittoputarepresentativeintheCA.Therefore,intheSenate,apoliticalpartymustatleast
have2dulyelectedsenatorsforeveryseatintheCA.
TheSCdoesnotagreethatitismandatorytoelect12SenatorstotheCA. WhattheConstitution
requiresisthattherebeatleastamajorityoftheentiremembership. TheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethe
electionandpresenceof12senatorsand12membersoftheHouseinorderthattheCommissionmayfunction.
TheelectionofSenatorRomuloandTanadaasmembersoftheCAwasclearlyaviolationofArt.VI,
Sec.18.Adapted.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
Function(Art.VII,Sec.16)
TheCommissionshallconfirmorapprovenominationsmadebythePresidentofcertainpublicofficers
namedbytheConstitutionorbylaw:
1.headsoftheexecutivedepartments
2.ambassadors,otherpublicministers,andconsuls
3.officersoftheArmedForcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain
4.otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution
a.Chairmanandmembersof3ConstitutionalCommissions
b.regularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil
c.membersoftheRegionalConsultativecouncil
SessionsandProcedure(Secs.18&19)
TheCommission onAppointments shall meettodischargeitspowersandfunctions onlywhilethe
Congressisinsession.Themeetingmaybecalledby(a)theChairman,or(b)amajorityofallitsmembers.
TheChairmanoftheCommissiondoesnotvote,excepttobreakatie.TheCommissionshallactonall
appointmentssubmittedtoitwithin30sessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission.TheCommission
rulesbyamajorityvoteofallitsmembers.

Regularappointment
RegularappointmenttakesplacewhenthePresidentappointsanofficerwhoseappoinmentrequires
confirmationbytheCommission,whileCongressisinsession.Theofficersoappointedcannotassumeoffice
atonce. ThePresidentmustfirstnominatehimtotheCommission. Then,theCommissionshallactonall
appointmentssubmittedtoitwithin30sessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission(VI,18).Failureto
actwithintheperiodistantamounttodisapprovalofthenomination,sincetheConstitutionrequirespositive
actionbytheCommission(VV).IftheCongressortheCommissionitselfadjournswithouttakinganyaction
onthenomination,againitisdeemeddisapproved(orbypassed).IftheCommissionapprovesthenomination,
theOfficeofthePresidentmakesan"issuanceofcommission."Onlythencantheappointeeassumeoffice.
Recessappointment
Ontheotherhand,recessappointmenttakeswhenCongressisnotinsession.(Thisisalsoknownas
adinterim appointment, but the latter term is equivocal because it can be used in 2 senses: (i) midnight
appointment,whichhappenswhenthePresidentmakesanappointmentbeforehistermexpires,whetherornot
thisisconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments,and(ii)recessappointment,whichhappenswhenthe
PresidentmakesappointmentwhileCongressisinrecess,whetherornothistermisabouttoexpire.)Unlike
regularappointment,theadinterimappointmentmadebythePresidentiscompleteinitself,andthuseffective
atonce,evenwithoutconfirmation.Butthisappointmenthasonlytemporaryeffect.WhenCongressconvenes,
the Commission would have to act on the ad interim appointment by confirming it (in which case the
appointmentbecomespermanent)ordisapprovingitbymeansofapositivefailuretoactontheappointment(in
whichcasetheappointmentisimmediatelyterminated).
AccordingtotheConstitution,thePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentduringtherecess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointments(whichcanonlybedonewhenCongressisinsession(Art.VI,
Sec.19)oruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress(iftheCommissionfailstoactearlier).(Art.VII,Sec.16,
par.2).

7.LegislativePowerandProcessofCongress
a.Generalplenarypowers
Art.VI,Sec.1. ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippines,which
shallconsistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebythe
provisiononinitiativeandreferendum.

b.LimitationsontheLegislativePower

(1)Substantivelimitations
(a)Expresssubstantivelimitations
1)TheBillofRights
Art.III.BillofRights.
ThefreedomofindividualsareaddressedaslimitationstothepowerofCongresstolegislate.Thus,the
provisionsoftheBillofRightsbeginwiththephrase"Nolawshallbepassed".

2)AppropriationLaws
Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan
appropriationmadebylaw.
xxx
Art.VI,Sec.25. (1) TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationrecommendedbythe
PresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.Theform,content,andmanner
ofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.
(2) Noprovision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationstherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbe
limitedinitsoperationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies.
(4) Aspecialappropriationsbillshallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,andshallbe
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
correspondingrevenueproposaltherein.
(5)Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations;however,thePresident,the
PresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme
Court,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyitemin
thegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublic
purposestobesupportedbyappropriatevouchersandsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedby
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriationsbillfortheensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyear
shallbedeemedreenactedandshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillis
passedbytheCongress.

GeneralPrinciple
NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.[Art.
VI,Sec.29(1)].
Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,bills oflocal
application,andprivatebills,shalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouse,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcur
withamendments(Sec.24).(ThereasonisthattheHouseisthemorepopularchamberofCongress.)
GeneralAppropriation
ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongress,within30daysfromtheopeningofitsregularsession,asthe
basisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetof(a)expenditures,and(b)sourcesoffinancing,including
receiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.(Art.VII,Sec.22).
Theform,content,andmannerofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.[Art.VI,Sec.
25(1),2ndsentence].
TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationsrecommendedbythePresidentfortheoperationof
theGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.
No provision or enactment shall be embrace in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specificallytosomeparticularappropriationtherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbelimitedinits
operationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates.[Art.VI,Sec.25(2)]
The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approvingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies.
If,bytheendofthefiscalyear,theCongressshallhavefailedtopassthegeneralappropriationsbillfor
theensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyearshallbedeemedreenacted,
andshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillispassedbytheCongress.[Art.VI,Sec.
25(7)]
SpecialAppropriation
Aspecialappropriationsbillshall(a)specifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,and(b)supportedby
funds, actuallyavailable ascertified bytheNational Treasurer,or toberaised by acorresponding revenue
proposaltherein.[Art.VI,Sec.25(4)]
(Aspecialappropriationsbillmaybeproposedtosupplyalackormeetanewneed,likeaspecial
election.InthecaseofaspeciallawtoelectthePresidentandVicePresident,however,therequirementsofthe
sectionsarespecificallyexemptedbytheConstitutioninArt.VII,Sec.10.)

Transferoffundsalreadyappropriated
Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations.
However,thePresident,PresidentoftheSenate,SpeakeroftheHouse,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme
Court,andtheheadsoftheConstitutionalCommissionmay,bylaw,beauthorizedto"augment"anyiteminthe
general appropriations law for their respective offices, from "savings" in other items of their respective
appropriations.[Art.VI,Sec.25(5)]
Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublicpurposes,to
besupportedbyappropriatevouchers,andsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.[Art.VI,Sec.
25(6)]
InDemetria vAlba,supra,itwasheldthatSec.44oftheBudgetActof1977(BP1177)grantingthe
Presidenttheblanketauthoritytotransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,withorwithoutsavings,is
unconstitutional.

ProhibitedappropriationtoenforcetheSeparationofChurchandState
Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated(applied,paid,oremployed),directlyorindirectly,
fortheuse,benefit,orsupportofanyreligion(sect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,oranysystemof
religion)orofanypriest(preacher,minister,otherreligiousteacher,orreligiousdignitary).
Exception: When suchpriest,et.al.,isassigned to(a)theAFP; (b)anypenalinstitution; (c)any
governmentorphanage;or(d)anyleprosarium.[Art.VI,Sec.29(2)]
Appropriationslaws(thespendingpowersofCongress(id.,Sec.25))aretiedupwithTaxlaws(the
powertoraiserevenues(id.,Sec.28)). Theyaretwoindispensablesidesofacoin. Theyaretiedupbythe
principlethatnomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw
(id.,Sec.29(1)).

3)Taxlaws

Id.,Sec.28.(1)Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable.TheCongressshallevolvea
progressivesystemoftaxation.
Cruz:Uniformityintaxationmeansthatpersonsorthingsbelongingtothesameclassshallbetaxedatthesame
rate.Itisdistinguishedfromequalityintaxationinthatthelatterrequiresthetaximposedtobedeterminedon
thebasisofthevalueoftheproperty.ThepresentConsti.addsthattheruleoftaxationshallalsobeequitable,

w/cmeansthatthetaxburdenmustbeimposedaccordingtothetaxpayer'scapacitytopay.
Id.,Sec.28(2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,
andsubjecttosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
developmentprogramoftheGovernment.
(3)Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques,
nonprofitcemeteries,andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyused
forreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.
(4)Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofall
theMembersoftheCongress.

Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsused
actually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxesandduties.Upon
thedissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedof
inthemannerprovidedbylaw.
Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled
tosuchexemptionssubjecttothelimitationsprovidedbylawincludingrestrictionsondividendsand
provisionsforreinvestment.

Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan

appropriationmadebylaw.
(2) Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated,applied,paid,oremployed,directlyor
indirectly,forthe use,benefit,orsupportofanysect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,or
systemofreligion,orofanypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacher,ordignitaryassuch,
exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassignedtothearmedforces,ortoanypenal
institution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium.
(3)Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfund
andpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilled
orabandoned,thebalance,ifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.

4)JurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt
Art.VI,Sec.30. Nolawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellatejurisdiction oftheSupreme
CourtasprovidedinthisConstitutionwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence.
Cruz:ThepurposeistopreventfurtheradditionstothepresenttremendouscaseloadoftheSCw/cincludesthe
baclogofthepast2decades.

5)Titleofroyalty
Art.VI,Sec.31.Nolawgrantingatitleofroyaltyornobilityshallbeenacted.
Cruz: Thepurposeofthisprohibitionistopreservetherepublicananddemocraticnatureofoursocietyby
prohibitingthecreationofprivilegedclassesw/specialperquisitesnotavailabletotherestofthecitizenry.

(b)Impliedsubstantivelimitations

(i)Nondelegationoflegislativepowers
Asageneralrule,legislativepowerscannotbedelegated,whatcanbedelegatedistheexecutionofthe
laws under acceptable standards limiting discretion of the executive. The Constitution, however, provides
certainspecificexemptions.

A.DelegationtothePresident
1)Emergencypowers:
Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers
necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof
theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof..
2)Certaintaxingpowers[Art.VI,Sec.28(2)](seeDelegationofTaxPowers)
Art.VI,Sec.28.xxx
(2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubject
tosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand
wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof
theGovernment.

B.DelegationtoLocalGovernments
Taxpowers:

Art.X,Sec.5. Eachlocalgovernment unitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof

revenuesandtolevytaxes,feesandchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsastheCongressmay
provide,consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy. Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrue
exclusivelytothelocalgovernments.

PelaezvsAuditorGeneral15SCRA569
AtissueherewasthevalidityofSec.68oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeempoweringthePresident
ofthePhilippinestocreate,merge,divide,abolishorotherwisealtertheboundariesofmunicipalcorporations.
Pelaez contended that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power. The govt. argued that it was not,
invokingtheearliercaseof CardonavsBinangonan,36Phil547,wherethepowerofthegovernorgeneralto
transferterritoryfromonemunicipalitytoanotherwassustained. TheSCupheldPelaez. Itruledthatthe
completenesstestandthesufficientstandardtestmustbeappliedtogetherorconcurrently.TheSCdeclaredthat
theCardonacaseinvolvednotthecreationofanewmunicipalitybutmerelythetransferofterritoryfromone
municipalitytoanother.Thepowertofixsuchboundariesofexistingmunicipalitiesmaypartakeofanadminis
trativenaturebutthecreationofmunicipalcorporationsisstrictlylegislativeinnature.
AlthoughCongressmaydelegatetoanotherbranchoftheGovt.thepowertofilldetailsintheexecution,
enforcementoradministrationofalaw,itisessential,toforestallaviolationoftheprincipleofseparationof
powers,thatsaidlaw:(a)becompleteinitselfitmustsetforththereinthepolicytobeexecuted,carriedoutor
implementedbythedelegateand(b)tofixastandardthelimitsofwhicharesufficientlydeterminateor
determinabletowhichthedelegatemustconformintheperformanceofhisfunctions. Indeed,withouta
statutorydeclarationofpolicy,whichistheessenceofeverylaw,andwithouttheaforementionedstandard,there
wouldbenomeanstodetermine,withreasonablecertainty,whetherthedelegatehasactedwithinorbeyondthe
scopeofhisauthority.
Sec.68oftheRACdoesnotmeetthesewellsettledrequirementsforavaliddelegationofthepowerto
fixthedetailsintheenforcementofalaw.Itdoesnotenunciateanypolicytobecarriedoutorimplementedby
thePresident.Neitherdoesitgiveastandardsufficientlyprecisetoavoidtheevileffectsofunduedelegation.
Adapted.

C.DelegationtothePeople
Initiativeandreferendumpowers:
Art.VI,Sec.32.TheCongress,shall,asearlyaspossible,provideforasystemofinitiativeand
referendum,andtheexceptionstherefrom,wherebythepeoplecandirectlyproposeandenactlaws,or
approveorrejectanyactorlaworpartthereof,passedbytheCongressorlocallegislativebody,afterthe
registrationofapetitiontherefore,signedbyatleastten percentum ofthetotalnumberofregistered
voters with every legislative district represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.

(ii)Prohibitionagainstpassageofirrepealablelaws
Itisaxiomaticthatalllaws,eventheConstitutionitself,mayberepealedoramended.Noonecanbind
futuregenerationstoalaw.

(2)ProceduralLimits
Art.VI,Sec.26(1)EverybillpassedbyCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbe
expressedinthetitlethereof.
(2)Nobill passed byeither House shall become a law unlessit has passed threereadings on
separatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedays
beforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeet
apubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,
andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.
Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothe
President.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhis
objectionstotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournaland
proceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshall
agreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshall
likewisebeconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomea
law.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesofthe
MembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisveto
ofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof;otherwise,
itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.
(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,
revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.

c.QuestionHour
Art.VI,Sec.22.Theheadsofdepartmentsmayupontheirowninitiativewiththeconsentofthe
President,orupontherequestofeitherHouse,astherulesofeachHouseshallprovide,appearbeforeand
be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submittedtothePresidentoftheSenateortheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesatleastthreedays
beforetheirscheduledappearance. Interpellations shallnotbelimited towrittenquestions,butmay
covermattersrelatedthereto.WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequiresandthe
Presidentsostatesinwriting,theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.

The heads of department shall provide, appear before, and be heard, by any house, on any matter
pertainingtotheirdepartments:
(i)upontheirowninitiative,withtheconsentofthePresident;or
(ii)uponrequestofeitherhouse,astherulesofthathouseshallprovide.
(Thisisacarryoverofthe1973Constitution,afeatureofaparliamentarysystem.)
Writtenquestionsshallbesubmittedtothepresidingofficerofthehouseatleast3daysbeforethe
scheduledappearance.Thepurposeistoenablethecabinetmembertoprepare.
Interpellationsshallnotbelimitedtowrittenquestions,butmaycovermattersrelatedthereto.
ItissubmittedthatamemberoftheCabinetmaynotrefusetoappearbeforethehouse.Ifherefusesa
summons,hecanbecitedforcontempt.IfthePresidentforbidshisappearance,stillhemustappearifaskedby
Congress.Under1935,itwasanexcuseforthePresidenttocertifythattheinterestofpublicsecurityjustifies
therefusal;under1987,theremedyisanexecutivesessionnotrefusaltoappear.
WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequires,andthePresidentsostatesinwriting,
theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.(ItmustbenotedthenthatthePresidentcannotdisallow
theappearancebutcanonlyaskforacloseddoorsession).

d.LegislativeInvestigations
Art.VI,Sec.21.TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommittees
mayconductinquiriesinaidorlegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesorprocedure.The
rightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.
Eachhouseoranyofitscommitteesmayconduct"inquiriesinaidoflegislation"accordingtoitsduly
publishedrulesofprocedures.
Toenforcethisright,theSCupheldthepowerofCongresstoholdincontemptapersonrequiredto
appearbeforeCongressoritscommitteeandanswerquestionsrelevanttoamatteroflegislativeinterestinthe
Arnaultcases.
InArnaultvNazareno.87Phil29(1950).Arnaultwascitedforcontemptforpersistentlyrefusing,after
takingthestand,torevealthenameofthepersontowhomgavetheP440,000.Inconnectionwiththelegislative
investigationoftheBuenavistaandTambobongRealEstateswherebyacertainBertwasabletosellthelandto
thegovernmentandrealizedP1.5million. Thesecondcaseof Arnault v Balagtas,97Phil350(1955)arose
whenhepersistedinnotgivinginformation,thistimeaboutanaffidavitwhichpurportedlygavethedetailssur
roundingtheacquisitionsoftheestatesbyBertandthesupposedcircumstancesunderwhichhegavetheamount
toaJessSantos.TheCourtinbothcases,upheldtheauthorityoftheSenatetocitehimincontempt,andthus
dismissedthehabeascorpuspetitions.

Whensoheldincontempt,sincetheSenateisacontinuingbody,thecontemptseemstobeeffective
evenbeyondthesessionduringwhichthecontemptwasmade,heldtheSCinArnault,overrulingthecaseof
LopezvdelosReyes,55Phil170(1930),wheretheCourtheldthatthecontemptlastedonlyforthesessionand
couldnotberevivedinthenextsessionbyamerereapprovalofthepreviouscontempt.
However,therightsofthepersons(a)appearingin,or(b)affectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.
Notableamongtheserightsistherightagainst"selfincrimination".Usually,immunityisgrantedto
thosewhoarecompelledtoappear.

BengzonvsSenateBlueRibbonCommittee203SCRA767
Inthiscase,thepetitionerssoughttorestraintherespondentfrominvestigatingtheirparticipationinthe
alleged misuse of govt. funds and the illicit acquisition of properties being claimed by the PCGG for the
Republic of the Philippines. The SC granted the petition, holding that the petitioners are impleaded as
defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of
contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, and that no legislation was apparently being
contemplatedinconnectionwiththesaidinvestigation.
However,thedecisionfailedtoconsiderthattheproceedingbeforetheSandiganbayanwascriminalin
nature and that the purpose of the legislative investigation was to ascertain the disposition of funds and
propertiesclaimedtobepublicinnature.Itsfindingsonthismattercouldbethesubjectoflegislationalthough
itmaynothavebeenexpresslystatedthatsuchwasthepurposeoftheinquiry.Asobservedintheearliercaseof
ArnaultvsNazareno,87Phil29,theSCisboundtopresumethattheactionofthelegislativebodywaswitha
legitimateobjectifitwascapableofbeingsoconstrued,andithasnorighttoassumethatthecontrarywas
intended.

Mendoza,TheUseofLegislativePurposeasaLimitationontheCongressionalPowerofInvestigation,46PHIL
L.J.707(1971)
Adeterminationthattheinquiryisfora"legislativepurpose"isnottheend,butonlythebeginning,of
thecomplexity.
xxx
TheideathatCongresshasarighttobefullyinformedinorderthatitmaylegislatewiselyunderliesthe
exerciseofthepowertoinvestigate,w/coercivepowertocompeldisclosure.Atthesametimeconcernforthe
factthatunlesslimitedtoa"legislativepurpose"thepowertoinvestigatemaybeusedtoharassindividualsand
invadefundamentalrightsveryearlyledtheUSSCtoinsistonashowingthatinvestigationsbe"inaidof
legislation."
xxx
THEALTERNATIVEUSEOFTHEDOCTRINE

Throughtheyears,thedoctrineoflegislativepurpose,firstannouncedinKilbournvs.Thomposon,103
US168(1880),hassteadilydeclinedinvalueasalimitationonthecongressionalpowerofinvestigation,until
todayitisusedonlyasacounterweighttoindividualrights.xxx
Theuseofthedoctrineoflegislativepurposeissubjecttothefollowingobservations:
First.Tosaythatcongressionalinquiriesmayonlybejustifiedintermsoftheneedforlegislationisto
assumetwothings:(a)thatthepowersofgovtcanbeneatlydividedintolegislative,judicialandexecutive,and
(b)thatthefunctionofCongressisconfinedtostrictlylawmaking.Onlyadoctrinaireviewoftheprincipleof
separationofpowerscansupportthefirst.The2ndassumptionisbasedonanunreality.xxx
Second. [T]he doctrine of legislative purpose is difficult of enforcement. xxx It is said that
investigationscanonlybeundertakeninaidoflegislation.ButhowistheCourttoproveotherwiseifCongress
declaresthatitspurposeislegislation?TheCourtcannotprobeintothemotivesofthemembersofCongress.
Andlegislativeinvestigationneednotresultinlegislation.xxx
[W]hiletheCourtmaytrytoenforcethelegislativepurposedoctrinebyrequiringCongresstostatethe
aimsandpurposesofauthorizedinvestigations,thereisnothingitcandoifCongressrefusestocomplyw/its
demand. On what ground can the Court strike down vague authorizing resolutions? On the principle of
separationofpowers?
Fourth.Evengiventhefactthataninvestigationisforalegislativepurpose,thetaskoftheCourtisnot
atanend.xxxThelegislativepurposeservedbytheinquirywillstillhavetobeweighedagainsttherightofthe
witness. Legislative purpose serves not as a limitation on the power of investigation but rather as a
counterweighttotheinterestincivilliberties.
Fifth. xxx Topresumethatthepurposeislawmakingwherethepurposeisdifferentistoplacean
undueweightononesideofthescale.Againstthepresumptionoflegislativepurpose,individualrightswould
indeedappeartobemerepaperweights.xxx
xxxByrecognizingexposureasanormalpurposeofinvestigations,whileatthesametimestressingits
potentialdangertoindividualrights,theCourtcanbegintoactasarealbalancerofinterests,strikingdown
thoseinquirieswhichneedlesslydestroyconstitutional rights andupholdingthoseinw/cexposureofsome
dangerormisdeedsisessentialtosociety.
xxx
[T]heuseof"legislativepurposeasashorthandtermforwhatCongressmightundertaketendstolenda
conclusorymeaningwhenwhatisinvolvedisaprocessofreachingjudgment.xxx

NotesonLegislativeInquiriesbyRAM:
The power of Congress to conduct investigations exists for the primary purpose of enabling it to
dischargeitslegislativefunctionswiselyandeffectivelytoguideandaidCongressintheenactmentoflaws,

theiramendmentsandaswellastheirrepeal.1IntheseminalcaseofArnaultvs.Nazareno 2,theSupremeCourt
said:
Thepowerofinquirywithpowertoenforceitisanessentialandappropriateauxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absenceofinformationrespectingtheconditionswhichthelegislationisintendedtoaffector
change;andwherethelegislativebodydoesnotitselfpossessrequisiteinformationwhichis
notinfrequentlytruerecoursemustbehadtootherswhodopossesit.xxx.
Legislativeinvestigationsarecarriedoutinordertoascertain(a)whatnewlegislationis
needed (b) the existing law to be repealed and (c) whether a new legislation is effectively
accomplishingitspurposewithaviewofamendingit.3 Butinadditiontoobtainingfactsthat
maybeusefulinenactinglaws,thepowerofinquirymaybeutilizedbyCongressforthescrutiny
ofexecutiveactionaswellastheformationofpublicopinion. 4Congressionalinvestigationshave
thesalutaryeffectofkeepingthepublicinformedofwhatishappeningintheirgovernmentsince
congressionalinvestigationsaregivenwidepublicitybymedia.5
Congressional investigative function may be justified under certain provisions of the
Constitutionwhicharejudicialandexecutiveinnature.6Intheexerciseofthepowertoconfirm
appointments7,informationconcerningthequalificationsoftheappointeemaybeinvestigated.
TheSenatemayconductaninvestigationintoallmatterspertinenttothepossibleratificationofa
treaty.8Thepowertoinquireisalsoimpliedintheauthoritytoimpeachofficials. 9Investigatory
power is also available when Congress is considering constitutional amendments 10, or the
declarationoftheexistenceofastateofwar.11
ThegeneralpowerofCongressinconductinginvestigationsmayberoughlydividedinto
twoparts,onebeingitsinquisitorialpowerandtheotheritspunitivepower.12 Theinquisitorial
powersofCongress,ontheonehand,consistsofitsauthoritytosummonwitnesses,toextract
testimonyfromthem,andcompeltheproductionofpapers,documentsandotherinformation.13
ThepunitivepoweroftheLegislature,ontheotherhand,consistsofitsauthoritytodeal
directly,bywayofcontemptproceedings, with actswhichinherentlyobstructorpreventthe

1JoaquinR.Roces,ThePowerofCongressionalInvestigations,UELawJournal,vol.I,nos.14,19581959atpage262
263.
287Phil29,45(1950).
3JuanF.Rivera,TheCongressofthePhilippines,pp.5758.
4TanadaandFernando,TheConstitutionofthePhilippines,pp.771771.
5opcit.,loccit.
6JuanF.Rivera,TheCongressofthePhilippines,p.57.
7Art.VII,Sec.16,1987Constitution
8Art.VII,Sec.21,ibid.
9Art.XI,Sec.3,ibid.
10Art.XII,ibid
11Art.VI,Sec.23,ibid.
12supranoteno.2atp.264265.
13ibid,citingWilloughby,OntheConsitutionoftheUnitedStates,Vol.I,sec.344.

dischargeofitslegislativeduties.1 AsearlyasthecaseofLopezv.delosReyes,2theSupreme
CourthasruledthatthepowertopunishforcontemptisessentialtopermittheLegislatureto
performitsdutieswithoutimpediment. Thispronouncementhasbeenreaffirmedinthe1950
caseofArnaultv.Nazareno.3 Inthatcase,theSupremeCourthastakennoteofthefactthat
experience has shownthat mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and that
volunteeredinformationareoftenunreliable. Thecourts,thus,concludedthatsomemeansof
compulsionisessentialtoobtainwhatisneeded.
Thecorrelativepowertopunishaprevaricatingwitnessforcontemptrestsontherightof
thelegislaturetoselfpreservationandisfoundedon"therighttopreventactswhich,inandof
themselves,inherentlyobstructorpreventthedischargeoflegislativeduties,orrefusaltodothat
whichthereisaninherentlegislativepowertocompelinorderthatlegislativefunctionsmaybe
performed."4Thispunitivepower,however,terminateswhenthelegislativebodyceasestoexist
uponitsfinaladjournment.5 Thus,unliketheSenatewhichisacontinuingbody,thetermof
whosemembersexpireatdifferenttimes,6 thelifeof theHouseofRepresentativesterminates
uponitsfinaladjournment.7
TRACINGTHEROOTS
Thepracticeoflegislativeinquiriesdatesbacktothe1620swhenPilgrimslandedin
America.Beforethatevent,BritishParliamenthadexperimentedwithafactfindingcommittee
armedwiththepowertocompelattendanceofpersonsandtheproductionofdocumentswiththe
power to punish contumacious witnesses. This experiment on legislative inquest eventually
developedasanecessarypartofthelegislativeprocesswiththeestablishmentofthesupremacy
ofParliamentin1688.By1689,anumberofparliamentarycommitteesofinvestigationwerein
operation.8
TheUSCongressfirstexercisedthispowerinMarchof1792.TheformerCongresshad
approvedaresolutioncreatingacommitteetoinvestigatethecausesoffailureoftheexpedition
underMajorGeneralSt.ClairagainsttheIndiansatFortWayne,givingthiscommitteethepower
tocall forpapers andrecordsneed intheinvestigation. When thecommitteewascalled to
submitthenecessarypapersrelativetothecampaign,PresidentGeorgeWashingtonorderedhis
cabinettodeliveronlythosepapers,theexaminationofwhichwouldpromotepublicinterest,and
torefusethedeliveryofsuchpaperswhendisclosurewouldinjurepublicinterest.Nonetheless,
thedeterminationofwhatwouldenhancepublicinterestwasstillaPresidentialprerogative.In
1796,PresidentWashingtonagainrefusedtherequestoftheHouseforthedeliveryofcopyof
1ibid,atp.267
255Phil170.
3supranote6.
4supranote2atp.267citingMarshallv.Gordon,243US521.
5Bernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesACommentary,vol.II,p.134.
6Art.XVII,Sec.2,1987Constitution.
7supranote18.
8supranote7atp.56citingKeele,HaroldM.NotesonCongressionalInvestigations,AmericanBarAssociationJournal,
vol.40no.2,p.154,February1954.

instructionoftheUSMinisterwhonegotiatedatreatywithGreatBritaininvokingthedoctrineof
separation of powers. Subsequently, United States Presidents from Jefferson to Truman
effectivelywieldedthisdoctrineasashieldagainstinquiriesinitiatedbyCongress.1
ThefirstPhilippinecaseonthematteroflegislativeinvestigationsisthecaseofArnault
v.Nazareno.Inthatcase,SenateResolutionno.8createdaspecialcommitteetoinvestigatethe
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates purchase. The Committee called and examined various
witnesses, and among them was Jean Arnault. It sought to inquire into the necessity and
regularityofthepaymentofacertainBurtofonemillionfivehundredthousandpesos(P1,500,
000). Burt,forthedownpaymentoftwentythousandpesos(P20,000)hadsometimein1946
purchased from San Juan de Dios Hospital and from the Philippine Trust Company the
BuenavistaandTambobongEstates.TheCommitteesoughttodeterminewhowereresponsible
forandwhobenefitedfromthetransaction attheexpenseofthegovernment. JeanArnault
refusedtorevealthenameofthepersontowhomhegavetheamountofonehundredforty
thousandpesos(P140,000.00)aswellastoanyotherrelatedpertinentquestions.TheCommittee
thenorderedhiscommitmenttothecustodyoftheSergeantatarmsandimprisonmentinthe
NewBilibidPrison,MuntinglupauntildischargedbyfurtherorderoftheSenateorbytheSpecial
CommitteecreatedbySenateResolutionno.8.Apetitionforthereleaseofthepetitionerfrom
hisconfinementatMuntignlupawasdeniedbytheSupremeCourt,therebyupholdingtheright
ofCongresstoconductinvestigationsinaidoflegislation.
Philippinecourtshaveheldthatthecongressionalpowertoinvestigateiscoextensive
withlegislativepower.2ThisrulingfollowsthelaterdecisionshandeddownbytheUSSupreme
Court.NotethatearlierUSjurisprudencehasmaintainedthatcongressionalinvestigativepower
istobeusedtoimplementa"clearandpreciselegislativepurpose."3Later,USrulings,however,
haveexpandedthepowerto"atleastasgreatasthepowertolegislate."4

LIMITATIONS
ArticleVI,Sec.21ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommitteesmay
conductinquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.
Therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.

Inanattempttoprotecttherightsofwitnesses,theConstitutionimposesseverallimitationstothe
investigatorypowerofCongress.First.,theinvestigationmustbeinaidoflegislation.Congresscannot
conductaninvestigationmerelyforthepurposeofinvestigation.Noinquiryisanendinitself;itmustbe
relatedtoandinfurtheranceofalegitimatetaskofCongress.5 Investigationofpurelyprivateaffairsof
peoplecannotbemade,asCongresscannotlegislateonthem.HoweverCongresscaninquireintoprivate
1supranote2,atp.265266citingHistoryof(US)CongressionalInvestigations.
2Arnaultv.Nazareno,supra
3Kilbournv.Thompson,103US168(1881).
4supranoteno.2atp.60citingUSv.Johnson,333US837.
5Watkinsv.US,supra

affairsiftheyaffectmattersonwhichCongresscanlegislate. 1 Moreover,Congresscannotconductan
investigationtofindoutifsomeoneshouldbeprosecutedcriminally,ortodetermineifsomeoneisguilty
orinnocentofacrime,ortodecidewhataretherightsofpartiestoacontroversy.Congressisnotalaw
enforcementagencyoracourt.2
Unfortunately,however,thedeterminationofwhatis"inaidoflegislation"isnottheendbutonly
thebeginning ofthecomplexity.3 IfaclaimismadebyCongressthataninvestigation isinaidof
legislation,howwillthecourtproveotherwise?Moreoftenthannot,courtsarecompelledtotakethe
statementof"inaidoflegislation"atfacevalueandrenderitconclusiveuponthemselves.4
Itisdifficulttodefineanylimitsbywhichthesubjectmatterofitsinquirycanbecircumscribed.5
Itisnotnecessarythateveryquestionpropoundedtoawitnessmustbematerialtoaproposedlegislation.
Materialityofthequestionmustbedeterminedbyitsdirectrelationtothesubjectofinquiryandnotby
itsindirectrelationtoanyproposedorpossiblelegislation. 6Indeterminingtheproprietyofthequestion
propounded toawitness, thus, thefollowing matters aretobe considered7:(1)thedefinition ofthe
inquiryfoundintheauthorizingresolutionorstatute;(2)theopeningremarksofthecommitteechair;(3)
the nature of the proceedings; (4) the question itself; and (5) the response of the committee to a
pertinencyobjection.InthecaseofBengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,8theSupremeCourthas
heldthatthecontemplatedinquirybytherespondent Committee isnotreally"inaidoflegislation"
becauseitisnotrelatedtoapurposewithinthejurisdictionofCongress.Inthatcase,thepetitionersseek
toenjointheSenateBlueRibbonCommitteefromrequiringthemtotestifyandproduceevidenceatits
inquiryintotheallegedsaleoftheequityofBenjamin Romualdez toLopaGroupinthirtysix(36)
corporations.9TheCourtnotesthefactthatsincetheaimoftheinvestigationistofindoutwhetherornot
therelativesofthePresidentorMr.RicardoLopahasviolatedSection5ofRepublicAct3019,theAnti
GraftandCorruptPracticesAct,thematterappearsmorewithintheprovinceofcourtsratherthanthe
legislature.10 Inaddition,thecourtnotesthatforrespondentcommitteetoprobeandinquireintothe
samejusticiablecontroversy,whichisalreadybeforetheSandiganbayan,wouldbeanencroachmentinto
theexclusivedomainofjudicialjurisdictionthathasmuchearliersetin.11
Secondly, theinvestigationmust beinaccordancewith dulypublished rulesofprocedure of
Congress.TheserulesofprocedurearesubjecttochangeorevensuspensionbyCongressatanytime
exceptifitwillaffectthesubstantiverightsofthewitnessandotherpersonsinvolved.12

And thirdly, the Constitution further mandates that the rights of witnesses appearing in or
affectedbysuchinquiriesmustberespected.Likeallotherformsofgovernmentalactions,theBillof
Rightsisapplicabletocongressionalinvestigations.Witnessesatsuchinvestigations,hence,cannotbe
1JacintoJimenez,TheModernDaySpanishInquisition,AteneoLawJournal,volXXXIVp.71,citingNelsonv.Symaqn,
105A2d756,764.
2Ibid.
3VicenteV.Mendoza,TheUseofLegislativePurposeasaLimitaitononCongressionalPowertoInvestigate,46PLJ707.
4supra,note29atp.719.
5Arnaultv.Nazareno,supra.
6ibid.
7supranote23citingWatkinsv.US,354Us178,209214.
8203SCRA767.
9MiriamDefensorSantiago,CONSTITUTIONALLAW,p.141.
10Ibid,p.783.
11ibid,p.784.
12supranote19atp.133citingOsmenav.Pendatun,109Phil.863(1960)

compelled togiveevidenceagainstthemselves,theycannotbesubjected tounreasonablesearchand

seizure, and their freedoms of speech, press, religion and political belief and association cannot be
abridged.1
The right against selfincrimination applies to any witness in any proceeding, whether civil,
criminal,orinvestigative,whoisbeingcompelledtogivetestimonythatmaybeusedagainstthemina
subsequentcriminalcase.2Theprivilegeagainstselfincriminationnotonlyextendstoanswersthatwill,
inthemselvessupportaconvictionbutlikewise,embrace"thosewhichwouldfurnishalinkinthechain
of evidence to prosecute the claimant for a (crime)."3 The privilege, nevertheless, is operative and
availableonlywherethecompelledtestimonyorcommunicationpossessesapotentialforincrimination.
Forpotentialincriminationtoexist,theremustbeashowingthat(1)thereisathreatofcriminalliability;
(2)thatsuchthreatofcriminalliabilityconcernsthewitnesshimself;and(3)thatsuchthreatisrealand
appreciableandnotimaginaryandunsubstantial.4 Inalegislativeinvestigation,awitnesscannotclaim
hisrightagainstselfincriminationinrefusingtoanswerbeforeanyquestionispropoundedonhim.He
mustwaituntilheisaskedanincriminatoryquestion.5
Awitnesscanattempttoavoidansweringparticularquestionsbyclaiminganinfringementofhis
freedomofspeech,orfreedomofassociation,belief,orreligion.Tobemeaningful,freedomofspeech
and freedom of association must allow citizens to express ideas, even unpopular ones, and to join
associations, eveninfamousones,withoutfearofultimate sanctionfordoingso. Totheextentthat
testifying before a legislative committee forces one to publicly reveal beliefs and associations when
disclosure can lead to being blacklisted, socially ostracized, or losing one's job, compelling such
testimonyinfringesuponone'sconstitutionalrights.Alegislativeinvestigationmaycreatewhatiscalled
a"chillingeffect"ontheexerciseoftheserights.6
Awitnesscanremainsilentandultimatelyavoidpossiblesanctionforacontemptcitationifheor
she(1)makesaproperclaimtotheconstitutionalprotectionagainstselfincrimination,(2)validlyalleges
aninfringementoffreedomofreligion,speech,orofthepressandassociationand(3)validlyclaims
questionsaskedarenotpertinent.7However,itisapparentthatbutforalimitedandproperclaim,noneof
these options is freeof a substantial riskthat thewitness maybe wrongand have tosufferforthe
miscalculations.Indeed,thelegislativepowerofinquiryandtheauxiliarypowertocompeltestimonyare
limitedintheoryonly,butinvariablyunrestrictedinpractice.8
The1987,aswellasinthe1973Constitutiondirectlyconferredthepowerofinvestigationupon
congressional committees.9 This is a significant development since under the 1935 Constitution, the
investigatorypowersofthecommitteeswereconferredbythelegislature.Thereisaneedfordefining
1supranote2atp.66.
2ManualonGuarantyagainstSelfincrimination,PerfectoV.Fernandez,UPLawComplexInstituteofHumanRightsLaw
Center,p.11citingCounselmanv.Hitchcock,142US547,12SCt195,35LEd1110.
3Ibid,p.63citingHoffmanv.US,341US479,71SCt816,95LEd1118.
4Ibid,p.139citingHoffmanv.US,supra..
5JacintoJimenez,supranote27atp.90citingInrePetitionofGraham,104So2d16,18.
6PowertoInvestigate,theSupremeCourtandtheAllocationofConsitutionalPower,IntroductoryEssaysandSelected
Cases,OtisH.StephensandGregoryJ.Rathjen,p.146citingBarenblattv.US,360US109,79SCt1081,27USLaw
Week4366(1959).
7supranote33atp.148.
8Ibid.
9Bernas,supranote18atp.132.

with"sufficientparticularity"thejurisdictionandpurposeofinvestigatingcommittees(1)asawayof
insuringtheresponsibleexerciseofdelegatedpowerand(2)asabasisfordeterminingtherelevanceof
thequestionsasked.1Thescopeofthepowersofthecommitteemust,therefore,bedelimitedinorderto
enablethewitnesstoknowwhetherthesubjectofinvestigationisproper,and,ultimatelywhetherthe
questions asked are pertinent to the subject of inquiry.2 In delineating this powers, the following
propositions3havebeenmade:(1)theauthorityofaninvestigatingcommitteetoactmustbedetermined
fromtheruleorresolutioncreatingit;(2)avalidlegislativepurposeasdistinctfromapurposemerelyof
exposure,mustbeshown; and(3)thewitnessmustbeinformedastothepertinencyoftheparticular
questioninrelationtothelegislativepurpose.

AVAILABILITYOFJUDICIALREVIEW
Art.VIIISection1ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactual
controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceableand
todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityof
theGovernment.
Thecourtscanreviewwhetherornotthequestionspropoundedtoawitnessisrelevantto
the subject matter of legislative investigation. Whether the alleged immateriality of the
information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction,thecourtisindutyboundtopassuponthecontention.4
Whenaclaimtotheconstitutionalrightagainstselfincrimination,freedomofspeech,
press,religionandassociationisassertedtobargovernmentalinterrogation,theresolutionofthe
issuealwaysinvolvesabalancingbythecourtsofthecompetingprivateandpublicinterestsat
stakeintheparticularcircumstancesshown.5
Itcannotbesimplyassumed,however,thateverycongressionalinvestigationisjustified
byapublic need that overbalances anyprivaterights affected. Todoso istoabdicate the
responsibilityplacedbytheConstitution uponthejudiciarytoinsurethatCongressdoesnot
unjustifiablyencroachuponanindividual'srighttoprivacynorabridgehislibertyofspeech,
press,religionorassembly.6Thelegislativepurposeservedbytheinquirywillstillhavetobe
weighedagainsttherightofthewitness.Legislativepurposeservesbest,notasalimitationon
thepowerofinvestigationbutrather,asacounterweighttotheinterestincivilliberties.7 To
presumethatthepurposeislawmakingwhen,infact,itisnotistoplaceanundueweightonone
1supranote29atp.711citingWatkinsv.US,354US178.
2Ibid.
3supranote2atp.66citingBarenblattv.US,79Sct1081,27USLawWeek4366(1959).
4supranote6.
5supranote44.
6Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommitte,203SCRA767,785.
7supranote30atp.719.

sideofthescale.8RAM.

QuestionHour(Art.VI,Sec.22)andLegislativeInvestigation(id.,Sec.21)
a.Astopersonswhomayappear:
22:Onlyadepartmenthead
21:Anyperson
b.Astowhoconductstheinvestigation
22:Entirebody
21:Committees
c.Astosubjectmatter
22:Mattersrelatedtothedepartmentonly
21:Anymatterforthepurposeoflegislation.

e.ActasBoardofCanvassersforpresidentialandVicePresidentialelections
Art.VII,Sec.4,pars.4,etseq

.
Art.VII,Sec.4.xxx
ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof
canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe
Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty
daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof
theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the
certificatesofcanvass)thevotes.
Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor
moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe
voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.

RA7166:AnActProvidingforSynchronizedNationalandLocalElectionsandforElectoralReforms
8Ibid,p.720.

Sec.30. CongressastheNationalBoardofCanvassersfortheElectionofPresidentandVicePresident:
Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress shall determine the
authenticityanddueexecutionofthecertificatesofcanvassforPresidentandVicePresidentasaccomplishedand
transmittedtoitbythelocalboardsofcanvassers,onashowingthat:(1)eachcertificateofcanvasswasexecuted,
signedandthumbmarkedbythechairmanandmembersoftheboardofcanvassersandtransmittedorcausedtobe
transmittedtoCongressbythem;(2)eachcertificateofcanvasscontainsthenamesofallofthecandidatesfor
President and VicePresident and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists no
discrepancyinotherauthenticcopiesofthecertificateofcanvassordiscrepancyinthevotesofanycandidatein
wordsandfiguresinthesamecertificate.
Whenthecertificateofcanvass,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovince,cityordistrict,
appearstobeincomplete,theSenatePresidentshall requiretheboardofcanvassersconcernedtotransmitby
personaldelivery,theelectionreturnsfrompollingplacesthatwerenotincludedinthecertificateofcanvassand
supportingstatements. Saidelection returnsshallbesubmittedbypersonal deliverywithin two(2)daysfrom
receiptofnotice.
Whenitappearsthatanycertificateofcanvassorsupportingstatementofvotesbyprecinctbearserasures
oralterationswhichmaycastdoubtastotheveracityofthenumberofvotesstatedthereinandmayaffecttheresult
oftheelection,uponrequestofthePresidentialorVicePresidentialcandidateconcernedorhisparty,Congress
shall,forthesolepurposeofverifyingtheactualnumberofvotescastforPresidentandVicePresident,countthe
votesastheyappearinthecopiesoftheelectionreturnssubmittedtoit.

f. Call a special election in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice
President
Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe
vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules
withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident
andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof
suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,
ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.
Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe
exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening
oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe
calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

WhenavacancyoccursintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresident,morethan18monthsbefore
thedateofthenextregularpresidentialelection,theCongressshallconveneat10AMofthe3rddayafterthe
vacancy,inaccordancewithitsrules,withoutneedofcall.TheconveningofCongresscannotbesuspended.

Within7daysafteritconvenes,itshallenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentand
VicePresident,tobeheldbetween45to60daysfromthedayofsuchcall.Theholdingofthespecialelection
cannotbepostponed.
Notlaterthan30daysaftertheelection,CongressshallagainactasBoardofCanvassers(seeinfra),
sinceArt.VII,Sec.4par.atalksofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident.
Thus,thetimetableis:
Day0vacancyoccurs
Day3Congressconveneswithoutneedofcall
Day10Congresspassesthespecialelectionlaw,ifithasnotpassedbeforethisdate
Day55to70electionisheld
Day85to100asthecasemaybecanvassingbyCongress,ifithasnotdonesoearlier.
UndertheConstitutionthenavacancyisfilledbythe100thdayfromthevacancyatthelatest.
Thelawsopassedisexemptedfromthefollowing:
a)CertificationunderVI,26,par.2.Thus,thethreereadingscanbedoneallonthesameday.
b)ApprovalbythePresident(forobviousreasons).Thebillautomaticallybecomesalaw,then,uponits
approvalon3rdandfinalreading.
c)CertificationbytheNationalTreasureroftheavailabilityoffunds,orrevenueraisingmeasureunder
Art.VI,Sec.25(4).Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriations.

g.Revokeorextendsuspensionofprivilegeof

habeascorpus

ordeclarationofmartial

law
Art.VII,Sec. 18. ThePresident shallbetheCommanderinChief ofallarmed forcesofthe
Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress
lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace
thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof
martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita
reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta
majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,
whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress
may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe
Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.
TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor

suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency
ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe
extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictionon
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or
offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.
Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe
judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.

WhenthePresidentsuspendstheprivilegeofthewritorproclaimsmartiallaw(seediscussion,infra),
thenCongressshallconvenewithin24hoursformtheproclamationorsuspensioninaccordancewithitsrules,
withoutneedofacall,ifitisnotinsession.ThePresidentshallthensubmitareportinpersonorinwritingto
Congress,within48hoursfromtheproclamationorsuspension.
Byajointmajorityvoteofallthemembersofbothhousesinajointmeeting,theCongresshas2
possiblecoursesofaction:

1) To revoke (or disapprove) the proclamation or suspension, which revocation cannot be set aside
(vetoed)bythePresident,or
2)Toextendtheproclamationafter60days,foraperiodtobedeterminedbyCongress,ifthecauses
persist.
It must be noted that the Congress does not approve the proclamation or suspension, but either
disapprovesitorextendsit,becausetheproclamationorsuspensionisvalidinitselffor60daysalready,andso
doesnotrequiretheapprovalofCongressforitseffectivity.Whatitneedsistheextensionthatmaybegranted
byCongressbeyondthe60dayperiodwhenitexpires,whichextensionneednotbeforanother60daysonly.

h.ApprovePresidentialAmnesties
Art.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,
thePresident maygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,after
convictionbyfinaljudgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
MembersoftheCongress.
ThePresidenthasthepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofamajorityofallthemembersof
Congress.

i.Confirmcertainappointments
(1)Art.VII,Sec.9(ByCongress)
Art.VII,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduringtheterm
forwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongtheMembersofthe
SenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeswhoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteof
alltheMembersofbothHousesofCongress,votingseparately.
(2)Id.,Sec.16(BytheCommissiononAppointments)
Art.VII,Sec. 16. ThePresident shallnominateand, with the consentoftheCommission on
Appointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand
consuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Governmentwhoseappointments arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybe
authorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerin
rankin thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

ThefollowingofficersappointedbythePresidentrequireconfirmationbytheCA:
a.Headsofdepartments(VII,16)
b.Ambassadors,publicministers,andconsuls(VII,16)
c.OfficersoftheAFPfromtherankofcolonelandnavalcaptain(VII,16)
d.ChairmanandmembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions(IX,B,C,&D,1[2])
e.MembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil(VIII,8[2])
In Sarmiento vs Mison,156SCRA549,theCommissionerofCustomswasheldnottobesubjectto
confirmation,beingoftherankofthebureaudirector,whowaspurposelydeletedfromthelistingofthose
whoseappointmentshadtobeapprovedbytheCommissiononAppointments. Itwastheclearandexpress
intentoftheframersoftheConstitutiontoexcludepresidentialappointmentsfromconfirmationbytheCA,
exceptappointmentstoofficesexpresslymentionedinArt.VII,Sec.16.Thepowertoappointisalreadyvested

inthePresident,withoutneedofconfirmationbytheCA.
SarmientovsMison,156SCRA549
F:

Petitionersbroughtthissuitforprohibitionintheircapacityastaxpayers,membersoftheBarandlawprofessors,
toenjoinrespondentCommissionerofCustomsfromperforminghisfunctionsonthegroundthathisappointment,w/o
confirmationbytheCA,isunconstitutional.

HELD: Art.VII,Sec.16,asorginallyproposedbytheCommitteonExecutivePowerofthe1986ConCom
read:
Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentofaCommissiononAppointment,shallappointthe
headsofexecutivedepartmentsandbureaus,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmed
forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptainandallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenot
otherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmaybylawvestthe
appointmentofinferiorofficersinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments.

However,onmotionofComm.Foz,2changeswereapprovedinthetextoftheprovision.Thefirstwas
to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and
substitutethephrase"andall"w/thephrase"HESHALLALSOAPPOINTANY."Thefirstamendmentwas
intendedtoexempttheappointmentofbureaudirectorsfromtherequirementofconfirmationonthegroundthat
thispositionislowandtorequireconfirmationwouldsubjectbureaudirectorstopoliticalinfluence. Onthe
other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist
sentence,namely:
Theheadsoftheexec.depts,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersofthearmed
forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthe
Consti,i.e.,
(1)RegularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)]
(2)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCivilServiceCommission[Art.IXB,Sec.1(2)];
(3)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCOMELEC[Art.IXC,Sec.1(2)];
(4)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCOA[Art.IXD,Sec.1(2)];
(5)Membersoftheregionalconsultativecommission(Art.X,Sec.18.)
Therestoftheappointmentsmentionedinsec.16arenotsubjecttoconfirmation.Theseare:(1)all
otherofficersoftheGovtwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw;(2)thosewhomthePres.
maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint;and(3)officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongressmaybylaw
vestinthePres.alone.
xxx.VV.

j.ConcurinTreaties
Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate.

Thisistrue,althoughitisthePresidentwhoisthechiefspokesmaninforeignrelations. Executive
agreementsdonotneedconcurrence.

k.Declarationofwaranddelegationofemergencypowers
Art. VI, Sec.23. (1) TheCongress, by a vote oftwothirds ofboth Houses in joint sessions
assembled,votingseparately,shallhavethesolepowertodeclaretheexistenceofastateofwar.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers
necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof
theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.

TheCongress,byavoteof2/3ofbothhousesinjointsessionassembledbutvotingseparatelyshallhave
thesolepowertodeclaretheexistenceofastateofwar.[Art.VI,Sec.23(1)]
Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongressmayauthorizethePresident,foralimited
periodandsubjectsuchrestrictionsasthelawmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarry
outadeclarednationalpolicy.SuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress,unlesssooner
withdrawnbyitsresolution.[Art.VI,Sec.23(2).]
AlthoughthetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaffoftheAFPshouldnotexceed3years,thePresidentmay
extendsuchtourofdutyintimesofwarorothernationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress.[Art.XVI,Sec.
5(7).]

l.BejudgeofthePresident'sphysicalfitness
Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo
thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersand
duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.
Thereare3waysinwhichthePresidentmaybedeclaredunabletodischargehisfunctionsunderthis
article:
(1)Uponhisownwrittendeclaration
(2)UponthefirstwrittendeclarationbymajorityofhisCabinet
(3)UpondeterminationbyCongressby2/3voteofallitsmembersvotingseparately,actingonthe2nd
writtendeclarationbytheCabinet
WhenthePresidenthimselftransmitstotheSenatePresidentandSpeakeroftheHousehiswritten

declarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,thereisnoproblem.TheVice
PresidentshalldischargesuchpowersanddutiesasActingPresident,untilthePresidenttransmittotheSenate
PresidentandSpeakerawrittendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehispowersandduties.
TheproblemariseswhenamajorityofallmembersofCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentand
SpeakertheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice.Uponsuchtransmittal,the
VicePresidentshall"immediately"assumetheofficeasActingPresident.
The President can contest this by transmitting to the Senate President and Speaker his written
declarationthatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,heshallreassumehisoffice.
ButifthemajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinetreallybelieveotherwise,theycancontestthis
"declaration of non inability" by again sending a second written declaration to the Senate President and
Speaker,within5daysfromthetimethePresidenttransmittedhiswrittendeclarationofnoninability.
Itisthissecondcabinetwritten"declarationofinability"thatbringsintheCongressasjudgeofthe
President'sabilitytodischargehisoffice.
(TheVicePresidentinthissecondinstancedoesnotactasPresident:thePresidenthavingspokenas
againsthisCabinet,hisdeclarationentitleshimtostayuntilCongresssaysotherwise.ButiftheCabinetsubmits
thedeclarationmorethan5daysafterthePresidentreassumesoffice,thismaybeviewedasanewdeclaration,
andsotheVicePresidentcanimmediatelyactasPresident.)
Congressmustconvene(a)within10daysafterreceiptofthe2ndwrittendeclarationbytheCabinet,if
itisinsession,or(b)within12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespectivepresidingofficer,ifitisnot
insession.
Inajointsession,theCongressshalldecidethePresident'sability. Twothirdsvotebyeachhouse,
votingseparately,isrequiredtodeclarethePresident'sinability.Inotherwords,if2/3ofeachhousevotethat
thePresidentmuststepdown,theVicePresidentshallactasPresident.Butiflessthan2/3ofeachHousevote
thatthePresidentisunable,thePresidentshallcontinueinoffice.

m.PowerofImpeachment
(1)WhoaresubjecttoimpeachmentArt.XI,Sec.2
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand
corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe
removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

a.President
b.VicePresident
c.JusticesoftheSupremeCourt
d.MembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions
e.Ombudsman
(2)Groundsforimpeachment
Art.XI,Sec.2,supra.
a)CulpableviolationoftheConstitution
b)Treason(RPC)
c)Bribery(RA3019)
d)Graftandcorruption(RA3019)
e)Otherhighcrimes
f)Betrayalofpublictrust
Limitation:Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithina
periodofoneyear.[Art.XI,Sec.3(5)]
Forum:TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment.[Art.
XI,Sec.3(1)]
(3)Procedureforimpeachment
Art.XI,Sec.3(1)(6)
Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall
casesofimpeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe
includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin
threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,

shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten
sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.
(3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded.
(4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall
theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate
shallforthwithproceed.
(5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin
aperiodofoneyear.
(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting
forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.

A)Initiationstage
1)Ifinitiatedbylessthan1/3[Secs.3(2)(4)]
(a)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentisfiledwiththeHouseofRepresentativeby:(i)amemberof
theHouseofRepresentatives,or(ii)anycitizenuponaresolutionofendorsementbyanymemberoftheHouse.
(b) The complaint must be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days upon receipt
thereof.(thepurposeistoprohibitanydelay)
(c)Notlaterthan3sessiondaysafter,includingthecomplaintintheOrderofBusiness,itmustbe
referred(bytheSpeaker)tothepropercommittee(usually,theCommitteeonJusticeandOrder).
(d)TheCommitteehas60sessiondaysfromreceiptofthereferraltoconducthearings(toseeifthereis
probablecause),tovotebyanabsolutemajority,andtosubmitreportanditsresolutiontotheHouse.
(e)TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationandgeneraldiscussionbytheHousewithin10
sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.
(f)Afterthediscussion,avoteistaken,withthevoteofeachmemberrecorded.Avoteofatleast1/3of
allthemembersoftheHouseisneededto"affirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentofthe
Committee,ortooverrideitscontraryresolution."
IftheCommitteemadeafavorablerecommendation(i.e.,itrecommendedthatthecomplaintbesent
overtotheSenate),1/3ofallthemembersareneededtoapprovesuchrecommendation.

If the Committee made a contrary recommendation (i.e., it recommended the dismissal of the
complaint),1/3ofallthemembersareneededtodisapproveoroverridethisreport.
Inotherwords,solongas1/3ofthelowerhousevotestoproceedwiththetrial,thenthecasewouldbe
senttotheSenate,regardlessofthecommitteerecommendation,andregardlessofthenumberwhovote(which,
couldevenbeashighas66%oftheentireHouse),thatitshouldnotbesenttotheSenatefortrial.
Thereasonisthattheinitiationstagedoesnotdeterminetheguiltorinnocenceoftheofficerbeing
impeached.Itmerelydetermineswhetherthereisaprimafaciecaseagainsttheofficerthatmeritsafullblown
trialintheSenate.
Itissimilartoapreliminaryinvestigation.ItsanalogyinUSConstitutionalLawisthevoteof4justices
oftheUSSupremeCourtonwhethertogiveduecoursetoapetitionforcertiorari.Oncethe4justicesbelieve
thatthepetitionisonitsfacemeritorious,theCourtmustgiveduecoursetoit,evenif5believethatitshould
nothearthecase.Anyway,thegrantofduecoursedoesnotmeanafavorablejudgmentintheend.
ThecaseofRomulovYniguez,supra,servedastheprecursorofthepresentprovisiononimpeachment.
Underthe1973Constitution,theonlyprovisionontheinitiationstageofimpeachmentwas:"uponthefilingofa
verifiedcomplaint,theNationalAssemblymayinitiateimpeachmentbyavoteofatleast1/3ofallitsmembers."
ThesilenceoftheConstitutionontheproceduretobefollowedenabledtheBatasantoadoptarulethatwould
allowamerecommitteeoftheBatasantokillthecomplaintforimpeachmentbymerelyshelvingitintothe
archives.AndthedilemmainRomulovYniguezwasthepoliticalnatureofthedecisiontoshelvethecase.For
althoughthelegalityoftherulesofprocedureonimpeachmentisajusticiableorlegalquestion,andthussubject
tojudicialreview,toquestionthisincourt,andsatisfytherequirementsofjudicialreview(likeaninjury),one
mustresorttomandamustoretrievethecasefromthearchives.ButhowcanonemandamustheSpeaker?Thus,
evenifRomulowasraisingalegalquestion,thecourthadtoconsiderthequestionasapoliticalonebecauseit
couldnotordertheSpeaker,acoequal,toretrievethecasetheyshelved,adecisionmadebythelegislatureina
matterwithinitscompetence.
ThefactualsituationcouldnolongerariseunderthepresentConstitutionsincetheCommitteemust
reportthecasetothefloor,regardlessofitsrecommendation.Itcannotnow"kill"thebillonitsownvolition.
Andsincethereisaclearruleofprocedure,anyotherproceduresimilartothatadoptedbytheBatasanwould
nowbereviewablebytheCourtsagainstaconstitutionalstandard,inthesamewaylawspassedbyCongresscan
bemeasuredagainsttheconstitutionalnorm.
2)Ifinitiatedby1/3[Art.XI,Sec.3(4)]
Iftheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleast1/3ofallthemembersofthe
House,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed.
Thismeansthattheentireprocessiscutshort.ThereisnoneedforaCommitteereportanddiscussion
anymore,sincetheendresultisthat1/3ofthemembersoftheHousehavedecidedtosendthecasefortrial.
B)TrialStage

a)TheArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommitteeisforwardedtotheSenate,whichhasthesolepower
totryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment,fortrial.
b) When sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment case, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation.
c)Asageneralrule,thePresidentoftheSenatepresidesoveranimpeachmenttrial.Butwhenitisthe
PresidentofthePhilippineswhoisontrial, theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallbethepresiding
officer,butheshallnotvote.
d)Tocarryoutaconviction,thevoteof2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate(16Senators)isrequired.
Iflessthan2/3votethattheofficerisguilty,theeffectisacquittal.
e)ThejudgmentoftheSenate(likethejudgmentoftheHouseonwhethertoinitiate)isapolitical
questionthatcannotbereviewedbythecourt(RomulovYniguez).(Unlikealawthatcanbereviewedbythe
courts because of the existence of constitutional standards, this judgment cannot be reviewed, for the
Constitutionitselfhasgrantedthediscretiontothiscoequalbranchtoappreciatethecaseaspresented.)

(4)ConsequencesofImpeachment
Art.XI,Sec.3(7)Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfrom
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

Incaseofacquittal
ThePresidentcontinuesinoffice,becausependingtheimpeachmenttrial,heremainsinoffice.
Acquittaldoesnotonlymeanthedismissaloftheimpeachmentcase,butalsoabarfromanycriminal
actiononthesameoffensethatmaybefiledlateron.(VV)
Incaseofconviction[Art.XI,Sec.3(7)]
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than (i) removal from office and (ii)
disqualificationtoholdanyofficeunderRP.
Butapersonconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishment
accordingtolaw(RPC,AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,andotherpenallaws).
(Thecourtscannotreviewthejudgmentontheimpeachmentcase,andultimatelytheremovalfrom
officeandthedisqualification,becausethesearepoliticalquestions. Butitcanreviewthejudgmentinthe
criminalcase.)

(5)Mustimpeachmentprecedefilingofcriminalcase?
InLecarozvsSandiganbayan,128SCRA324,theSCsaidthatthebroadpoweroftheConstitutionvests
therespondentcourtwithjurisdictionoverpublicofficersandemployees,includingthoseinGOOCs.Thereare
exceptions,however,liketheconstitutionalofficers,particularlythosedeclaredtoberemovablebyimpeach
ment.Intheircase,theConstitutionproscribesremovalfromofficebyanyothermethod;otherwise,toallowa
publicofficerwhomayberemovedsolelybyimpeachmenttobechargedcriminallywhileholdinghisoffice
withanoffensethatcarriesthepenaltyofremovalfromoffice,wouldbeviolativeoftheclearmandateofthe
fundamental law. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and
disqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trustorprofitundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,buttheparty
convictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecutiontrial,andpunishment,inaccordancewithlaw.
Theeffectofimpeachmentislimitedtothelossofpositionanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trust
orprofitundertheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thepartythusconvictedmaybeproceededagainst,triedand
thereafterpunishedinaccordancewithlaw.Theclearimplicationis,the partyconvictedintheimpeachment
proceedingshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishmentaccordingtolaw;and
thatifthesamedoesnotresultinconvictionandtheofficialisnottherebyremoved,thefilingofacriminal
actioninaccordancewithlawmaynotprosper.
Constitutionalofficersarenotentitledtoimmunityfromliabilityforpossiblecriminalacts.Butthereis
a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced.Theymustfirstberemovedfromofficeviatheconstitutionalrouteofimpeachment(Art.XI,Secs.2
and3).Shouldtheybeimpeached,theymaythenbeheldtoanswereithercriminallyoradministrativelyforany
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against them in appropriate proceedings. Therefore a fiscal or
prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against constitutional
officers.Theremedyofapersonwithalegitimategrievanceistofileimpeachmentproceedings.

n.Powerwithregardtotheutilizationofnaturalresources
Art.XII,Sec.2. Alllandsofthepublicdomain,waters,minerals,coal,petroleum,andother
mineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andother
naturalresourcesareownedbytheState. Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernatural
resourcesshallnotbealienated.Theexploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshall
beunderthefullcontrolandsupervisionoftheState.TheStatemaydirectlyundertakesuchactivities,or
itmayenterintocoproduction,jointventure,orproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizensor
corporationsorassociationsatleastsixty percentum ofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens. Such
agreementmaybeforaperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmorethantwentyfive
years,andundersuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Incasesofwaterrights for
irrigation,watersupply,fisheries,orindustrialusesotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower,beneficial

usemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant.
TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and
exclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens.
TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,as
wellascooperativefishfarming,withprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes,
bays,andlagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based
onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the
Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources.
ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis
provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.

ThePresidentmayenterintoagreementswithforeignownedcorporationsinvolvingeithertechnicalor
financialassistanceforlargescaleexploration,development,andutilizationofminerals,petroleum,andother
mineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw...ThePresidentshallnotifythe
Congressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththisprovision,within30daysfromitsexecution.
(Art.XII,Sec.2,pars.4&5).

o.AmendmentoftheConstitution

Art.XVII,Sec.1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or
(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.
Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethrough
initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelve percentum ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotersofwhich
everylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvotestherein.
Noamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorisedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convetion,orbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsucha
convention.
Sec.4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionofthisConstitutionunderSection1hereofshallbevalid

whenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydays
norlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.

ConstituentPower(Art.XVII,Secs.1and2)
Theconstituentpower,orthepowertoamendorrevisetheConstitution,isdifferentfromthelaw
makingpowerofCongress,saidtheSCinGonzalesvComelec,infra.
AmendmentorrevisionoftheConstitutionmaybeproposedin3ways:
1.ByCongressactingasaconstituentbody(XVII,1)
Avoteof3/4ofallitsmembersisrequired.
2.Byaconstitutionalconvention(XVII,1)
a)CongresscallsaConConbyavoteof2/3ofallitsmembers,or
b)Congresssubmitstotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsuchconvention,byanabsolute
majorityvote.
3.Bythepeople(Art.XVII,Sec.2)
Through initiative upon petition by 12% of all registered voters, of whichever legislative district is
represented by at least3% of itsregistered voters. But thiscannot be resorted to (i)within 5 years from
February2,1987,nor(ii)moreoftenthanonceeveryfiveyears.
Anyamendmentorrevisionshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteto
beheldbetween6oto90daysfrom,theapprovaloftheamendmentorrevisioninthecaseofCongressorthe
ConCon,orthecertificationbyCOMELECofthesufficiencyofthepetitioninthecaseofthepeople.

Comparedwiththe1935Constitution:
1935Constitution,Art.XV
Art.XV,Sec.1. TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofallthe
MembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendments
tothisConstitutionorcallaconventionforthepurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsare

submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

8.LegislativeProcess
a.Requirementsastobills
(1)Astotitlesofbills
Art.VI,Sec.26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshall
beexpressedinthetitlethereof.

Titleofbills
Thepurposeistoprevent"logrolling"orthesmugglinginof"riders",thatis,itemsthatareunrelatedto
thebillitselfandwouldnothavebeenpassedhadtheynotbeensneakedintothebill.
Cruz: Thepurposesofthisruleare:
(1) Topreventhodgepodgeorlogrollinglegislation. Thisisdefinedas"anyactcontainingseveral
subjectsdealingwithunrelatedmattersrepresentingdiverseinterests,themainobjectofsuchcombinationbeing
tounitethemembersofthelegislaturewhofavoranyoneofthesubjectsinsupportofthewholeact."
(2)Topreventsurpriseorfrauduponthelegislature.
(3)Tofairlyapprisethepeople,throughsuchpublicationsofitsproceedingsasareusuallymade,ofthe
subjectsoflegislationthatarebeingconsideredinorderthattheymayhaveopportunityofbeingheardthereon,
bypetitionorotherwise,iftheyshouldsodesire.
xxx
Butthetitleneednotbeacompletecatalogueofabill.xxx
Inanycase,atitlemustnotbe"souncertainthattheaveragepersonreadingitwouldnotbeinformedof
thepurposeoftheenactmentorputoninquiryastoitscontents,orw/cismisleading,eitherinreferringtoor
indicatingonesubjectwhereanotherordifferentoneisreallyembracedintheact,orinomittinganyexpression
orindicationoftherealsubjectorscopeoftheact."
Thetitlecouldbespecific(AbilltocreatethemunicipalityofBagoda)orasbroad(CivilCode).
Whichshouldcontrol,thetitleorthetextofthestatute?
In Cruz v Paras, infra.theSCreferredtothetitleofthebilltofixthemeaningofthetextorthe
substantive portion of the bill. The title provided for the "regulation" of nightclubs and other places for
entertainment,whilethetext,asamended,gavelocalgovernmentstheauthorityto"prohibit"theseplacesalto
gether.TheCourtruledthatBocaue,couldnot,underthislaw,prohibittheseplacesbutonlyregulatethem,first
becausethe titlewascontrollingoverthetext (VV: theCourtstoodtheprincipleonitshead),andsecond,
becausethenightclubswerenotnuisancespersethatcouldbesummarilyevicted.Toconstruetheamendatory

actasgrantingmunicipalcorporationsthepowertoprohibittheoperationofnightclubswouldbetoconstrueit
inawaythatitviolatestheconstitutionalprovisionthat"everybillshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbe
expressedinthetitlethereof."

Cruzv.Paras,123SCRA569(1983)
F:

ThepetitionersareoperatorsornightclubsinBocaue,Bulacan.theyfiledprohibitionsuitstostoptheMun.of
Bocauefromenforcinganordinanceprohibitingtheoperationofnightclubs,cabarets,anddancehallsinthatmun.orthe
renewaloflicensestooperatethem.TheCFIupheldthevalidityoftheordinanceanddismissedthepetition.Hence,this
petitionforcertiorari.

HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not
preventedfromcarryingontheirbusiness.RA938,asorginallyenacted,grantedmunicipalitiesthepowerto
regulatetheestablishment,maintenance andoperationofnightclubs andthelike. WhileitistruethatOn
5/21/54,thelawwasamededbyRA979w/cpurportedtogivemunicipalitiesthepowernotonlytoregulatebut
likewisetoprohibittheoperationofnightclubs,thefactisthatthetitleofthelawremainedthesamesothatthe
powergrantedtomunicipalitiesremainsthatofregulation,notprohibition.Toconstruetheamendatoryactas
grantingmun.corporationsthepowertoprohibittheoperationofnightclubswouldbetoconstrueitinaway
that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressedinthetitlethereof."Moreover,therecentylyenactedLGC(BP337)speakssimplyofthepowerto
regulatetheestablishment,andoperationofbilliardpools,theatricalperformances,circusesandotherformsof
entertainment.Certiorarigranted.VV.

(2)Requirementsastocertainlaws
(a)Appropriationlaws
Art.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittotheCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopening
ofeveryregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresand
sourcesoffinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.

Art.VI,Secs.2425
Art.VI,Sec.24.Allappropriations,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublic
debt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,
buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.
Cruz:TheabovementionedbillsaresupposedtobeinitiatedbytheHouseorRepresentativesbec.itismore
numerousinmembership andthereforealsomorerepresentativeofthepeople. Moreover,itsmembersare

presumedtobemorefamiliarw/theneedsofthecountryinregardtotheenactmentofthelegislationinvolved.
xxx
Anappropriationbillisonetheprimaryandspecificpurposeofw/cistoauthorizethereleaseoffunds
fromthepublictreasury.
Arevenuebillisonethatleviestaxesandraisesfundsforthegovt,whileatariffbillspecifiestherates
ordutiestobeimposedonimportedarticles.
Abillincreasingthepublicdebtisillustratedbyonefloatingbondsforpublicsubscriptionredeemable
afteracertainperiod.
Abilloflocalapplicationisoneinvolvingpurelylocalormunicipalmatters,likeacharterofacity.
Privatebillsareillustratedbyabillgrantinghonorarycitizenshiptoadistinguishedforeigner.
Art.VI,Sec.25. (1) TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationrecommendedbythe
PresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.Theform,content,andmanner
ofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.
(2) Noprovision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationstherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbe
limitedinitsoperationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies.
(4) Aspecialappropriationsbillshallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,andshallbe
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
correspondingrevenueproposaltherein.
(5)Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations;however,thePresident,the
PresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme
Court,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyitemin
thegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublic
purposestobesupportedbyappropriatevouchersandsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedby
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriationsbillfortheensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyear
shallbedeemedreenactedandshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillis
passedbytheCongress.

Demetriav.Alba,148SCRA208(1987)
Budget Law, Authorizing the Transfer of Items Appropriated for One Government Office to Another is
Unconstitutional.
F:Petitioners,asconcernedcitizens,andmembersoftheBP,filedapetitionforprohibition,contestingthevalidityofPD

1177,Sec.44,authorizingthePresidentofthePhils."totransferanyfund,appropriatedforthedifferentdepartments,
bureaus,officesandagenciesoftheExecutiveDepartment...toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureau
oroffice...."

HELD:Par.1ofSec.44ofPD1177undulyextendstheprivilegegrantedunderArt.VIII,Sec.16(5)ofthe
1973Constitution. ItempowersthePres.toindiscriminatelytransferfundsfromonedept.bureau,officeor
agencyoftheExecutiveDept.toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydept.bureauorofficeincludedinthe
GeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment,w/oregardastow/nthefundstobetransferredare
actually savings in the item from w/c the same are to be taken, or w/n the transfer is for the purpose of
augmentingtheitemtow/csaidtransferistobemade.Itdoesnotcompletelydisregardthestandardssetinthe
fundamentallaw,therebyamountingtoanunduedelegationoflegislativepowers,butlikewisegoesbeyondthe
tenorthereof.Indeed,suchconstitutionalinfirmitiesrendertheprovisioninquestionnullandvoid.VV.

Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan

appropriationmadebylaw.
(2) Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated,applied,paid,oremployed,directlyor
indirectly,forthe use,benefit,orsupportofanysect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,or
systemofreligion,orofanypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacher,ordignitaryassuch,
exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassignedtothearmedforces,ortoanypenal
institution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium.
(3)Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfund
andpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilled
orabandoned,thebalance,ifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.

Guingonav.Garague,196SCRA221(1991)
F:

Petitionersquestiontheconstitutionalityoftheautomaticappropriationfordebtserviceinthe1990budget.

HELD:WhileitistruethatunderSec.5(5),ArticleXIVoftheConstitution,Congressismandatedtoassignthe
highestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation,itdoesnottherebyfollowthatthehandsofCongressaresohamstrung
astodepriveitthepowertorespondtotheimperativesofthenationalinterestandfortheattainmentofother
statepoliciesorobjectives.Inthiscase,thebudgetforeducationhastripledandthecompensationforteachers
hasdoubled.Thisisaclearcompliancewiththeconstitutionalmandategivinghighestprioritytoeducation.
Havingfaithfullycompliedtherewith,Congressiscertainlynotwithoutanypower,guidedonlybyits
goodjudgment,toprovideanappropriation,thatcanreasonablyserviceourenormousdebt. Itisnotonlya
matterofhonorandtoprotectthecreditstandingofourcountry. Moreespecially,theverysurvivalofour
economyisatstake.IfintheprocessCongressappropriatedanamountfordebtservicebiggerthantheshare
allocatedtoeducation,theSCfindsthatsuchappropriationisconstitutional.
ItwasalsoarguedthatthePresidentialDecreesauthorizingautomaticappropriationisviolativeofSec.

29(1):NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.They
assertthattheremustbedefiniteness,certainty,andexactnessinanappropriation,otherwiseitisanundue
delegationoflegislativepowertothePresidentwhodeterminesinadvancetheamountappropriatedforthedebt
service.TheSCwasnotpersuadedbysucharguments.Thetransitoryprovisionsprovidethatallexistinglaws
notinconsistentwiththeConstitutionshallremainoperativeuntilamended,repealedorrevoked.Inthiscase,
theautomaticappropriationprovidestheflexibilityfortheeffectiveexecutionofdebtmanagementpolicies.
ItwasarguedthatthePDsdidnotmeettherequirementthatallappropriationsauthorizingincreaseof
debt must be passed by Congress and approved by the President (VI, 24 and 27). This refers only to
appropriationmeasuresstilltobepassedbyCongress.Inthiscase,thePDshavebeenconsideredaspassed.
Astowhethertherewasunduedelegationoflegislativepower,theCourtfinds thatinthiscase,the
questionedlawsarecompleteinalltheiressentialtermsandconditionsandsufficientstandardsareindicated
therein.Inthiscase,thelegislativeintentionisclearandthatistheamountneededshouldbeautomaticallyset
asideinordertoenablethecountrytopaytheprincipal, interest,taxesandotherchargeswhen theyshall
becomeduewithouttheneedtoenactaseparatelawappropriatingfundsthereforastheneedarises.Although
the amounts are not stated specifically,such amounts are limited to the principal, interest, taxes and other
charges.
(b)Taxlaws
Art.VI,Sec.28. (1) Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable. TheCongressshall
evolveaprogressivesystemoftaxation.
(2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubject
tosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand
wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof
theGovernment.
(3)Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques,
nonprofitcemeteries,andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyused
forreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.
(4)Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofall
theMembersoftheCongress.

Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsused
actually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxesandduties.Upon
thedissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedof
inthemannerprovidedbylaw.
Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled
tosuchexemptionssubjecttothelimitationsprovidedbylawincludingrestrictionsondividendsand
provisionsforreinvestment.
(4)Subjecttoconditionsprescribedbylaw,allgrants,endowments,donations,orcontributions

usedactually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.

NormsofTaxation
Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable.TheCongressshallevolveaprogressivesystemof
taxation.[Art.VI.Sec.28(1)]
DelegationofTaxPowers
Asageneralrule,thepowertotax,beinganessentialaspectofsovereignty,isinherentlylegislativeand
thereforeisnondelegable,unlesstheConstitutionitselfallowsthedelegation. There are 2 sets of specific
exceptions:
1.TheCongress,may,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubjecttosuch
limitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,(i)tariffrates,(ii)importandexportquotas,(iii)tonnageand
wharfagedues,and(iv)otherdutiesandimposts,withintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof
theGovernment.[id.,Sec.28(2)]
2.Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenues,andtolevy
taxes,fees,andchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsastheCongressmayprovide,consistentwith
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.(Art.X,Sec.5)
ThetaxingpowermayalsobeexercisedbythePresidentasanincidentoftheemergencypowersthat
Congressmaygranttohim,underArt.VI,Sec.23(2).
BurdenofTaxation
Taxationbeingthesourceofrevenueofgovernmentanditsverylifeblood,"nolawgrantinganytax
exemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress." [id.,Sec.
28(4)]
According to jurisprudence, any question regarding the constitutionality of a tax measure must be
resolvedinfavorofitsvalidity.Butanydoubtregardingthetaxabilityofanypersonunderavalidtaxlawmust
beresolvedinfavorofthatpersonandagainstthetaxingpower.However,anydoubtastotheapplicabilityofa
taxexemptiongrantedtoapersonmustberesolvedagainsttheexemption.
Proceedsoftaxes
Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfundandpaid
outforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilledorabandoned,
thebalanceifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.[id.,Sec.29(3))

Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenationaltaxeswhichshallbe
automaticallyreleasedtothem.(Art.X,Sec.6).

Taxationofreligiousandcharitableinstitutions
Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques,nonprofit
cemeteries,and"alllands,buildingsandimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious,
charitable,oreducationalpurposes,shallbeexemptfromtaxation."(Art.VI,Sec.28(3)]
InAbravsHernando,107SCRA104(1981),theSCheldthatonewhoclaimsexemptionfromtaxeson
thegroundthatthepropertysoughttobetaxedbythegovernmentis"actually,directly,andexclusivelyusedfor
religiouspurposes"(mustproveit.)Thiscannotsimplybepresumedonthebasisofadeclarationtothateffect.
InYMCAvCollector,33Phil217(1916),thebuildingsandgroundsoftheYMCAdevotedtoreligious,
charitableandeducationalends,andnotfoundedandconductedforprofit,wereheldtobetaxexempt.(Asnow,
theexemptionisnotlimitedtoreligiousinstitutions.)
InBishopofNuevaSegoviavProvincialBoard,67Phil352(1927),theSCexemptedfromtaxation(1)
apieceoflandthatusedtobeacemeterybutwasnolongerusedforburialwherethefaithfulwouldcongregate
beforeandaftermass,and(2)atractgardenneartheconventwherevegetableswereplantedfortheuseofthe
priest. It is submitted that under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, this case would be overruled, and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Malcolm followed. For the former cemetery and the vegetable tract are not
"actuallyanddirectly"usedforreligiouspurposes.
Under the 1935Constitution, the provision read"exclusivelyfor religious, charitable or educational
purposes";in1973actually,directly,andexclusivelyforreligiousorcharitablepurposes";and,in1987,"actually,
directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitableoreducationalpurposes."
Atanyrate,theexemptionappliesonlytotaxes. Thus,a"specialassessment"(theamountassessed
resulting from the appreciation of value of realty due to public works constructed nearby) under the Real
PropertyTaxCode(ortherecentlyenactedLocalGovernmentCode),notbeingatax,doesnotfallunderthe
exemption. As in Apostolic Prefect v City Treasurer, 71 Phil 347 (1941), property owned by a religious
institutionandusedforreligiousandeducationalpurposesisliableforspecialassessments.

TaxationofEducationalInstitutions
All lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for ... educational
purposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)]
All revenues and assets of nonstock, nonprofit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties... Proprietary educational

institutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitledtosuchexemptions,subjecttothe
limitationsprovidedbylaw,includingrestrictionsondividendsandprovisionsforreinvestment.[Art.XIV,Sec.
4(3)].
Subjecttotheconditionsprescribedbylaw,allgrants,endowments,donationsorcontributionsactually,
directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.[Art.XIV,Sec.4(4)].
Undertheseprovisions,itisclearthat(1)sectarianschools[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)andArt.XIV,Sec.4(3)]
construedtogetheraswellas(2)nonstock,nonprofitsecularschools[Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)]areexemptfromthe
followingtaxes:a}allrealpropertytax("assets"andHodgesvMunicipalBoardofIloiloCity,19SCRA28
(1967), b} income tax [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)] for #2 and a fortiori for #1 for income actually,directly,and
exclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposesandevenc}estateandgifttax[Art.XIV,Sec.4(4)].
Proprietaryschoolsontheotherhand,aregrantedonlylimitedexemption.
b.Procedureforthepassageofbills
Art.VI,Sec.26.(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthree
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andthe
yeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.

ThreeReadings:
NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadings...[Art.VI,Sec.
26(2).]
On"firstreading,"thetitleofthebill,withouttheprovisions,isreadbeforethebody.Thepresiding
officerthenrefersthebilltothepropercommitteee.g.,"TotheCommitteeonLocalGovernments".(Congress
generallyworksthroughitscommittees,notasonebody.)
Afterconsiderationofthebillorresolution,theCommitteereturnsthesametothebodytogetherwith
itsamendments,objectionsorrecommendations.Wherethereportisfavorable,thebillisplacedontheproper
calendar.Ifthereportisunfavorable,themattershallbelaidonthetable,unlessthebodyonthewholedecides
otherwise.
On"secondreading",thebillorresolutionisreadinfullbeforethefloor,withsuchamendmentsasthe
committeemayhaveproposed. Then,itissubjectedtodebate,discussion andamendments. Whenthisis
through,amotiontoclosethegeneraldebateismade,thenavoteistakenbythemembershiponwhethertopass
thebillornotonthebasisoftheamendmentsordiscussions.

Thebillasamendedandapprovedisthe"printedinfinalform"anditscopiesare,asageneralrule,
distributedtothemembersatleast3daysbeforeitspassage.[Sec.26(2)][Thepurposeofthe3dayrequirement
istoenablethememberstocheckifthebillreflectsthetextandamendmentsapprovedonsecondreading,and
toseeifridershavebeenintroduced.]
As an exception, however, the Constitution allows the 3day and printed copy requirement to be
dispensedwithwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityoftheimmediateenactmentofthebilltomeeta
publiccalamityoremergency.[Sec.26(2).]Inthiscase,therefore,thethreereadingsmaybemadeinlessthan3
dayswithoutthebillbeingprinted.
Onthe"thirdandfinalreading",thebilliscalledbyitsnameortitle,thenavoteistakenrightaway,
withthe"yeas"and"nays"enteredintheJournal.Nomoreamendmentisallowed.
[Sec.26(2).]
Asageneralrule,thethreereadingsmustbeconductedonseparatedays,[Sec.26(2).]Theexceptionis
foundinArt.VII,Sec.10:WhenCongressconvenestocallaspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVice
President,"thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderpar.2,Sec.26,Art.VI",mean
ing,thethreereadingscanbedoneonthesameday.

ConferenceCommittee
Abillcanbepassedjointly(whenitisajointsession,supra),orseparately.Inthelattercase,itcanbe
passedsimultaneously(whenabillistakenupbybothhousesseparatelybutatthesametime,orsequentially
(whenabilloriginatesformonehouseandgoestotheotherhouse).Thereisnoproblemifthebillispassed
jointly.Butifitispassedseparately,thebillapprovedbyonehousegoestotheotherhouse,whichcanamend
suchbill.Oncetheotherhouseapprovesthebill,thisiscalledtheotherhouse'sversionofthebill.
AConferenceCommitteeisthenorganized,composedofequalnumberofmembersfromtheSenate
andtheHouse,tomakerecommendationstotherespectivechambersonhowtoreconcilethetwoversionsofthe
bill.Therespectivemembersareusuallygrantedblanketauthoritytonegotiateandreconcilethebills.Atthe
endoftheprocess,thecommitteecomesupwitha"ConferenceCommitteeReport",whichisthensubmittedto
therespectivechambersforapproval.

EngrossmentorEnrollmentoftheBill
Oncethebillisapprovedbybothhouses,thebillisengrossedorenrolled(seesupra).TheEnrolled
copyoftheBillbearsthecertificationbythepresidingofficers(SenatePresidentandSpeakeroftheHouse)that
thisenrolledcopyistheversionpassedbyeachhouse.(Theeffectsofthisenrolledbillarediscussedabove.)

ApprovalbythePresident

Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented
tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame
withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal
andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse
shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit
shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall
becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames
oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis
vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof,
otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.
(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,
revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
The bill as approved by Congress and certified by its presiding officers is then presented to the
President.
Generally,thereare3waysforthebilltobecomealaw:
1)WhenitisapprovedbythePresident;
2)WhenthevoteofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3voteofallthemembersofbothhouses;
3)UponfailureofthePresidenttovetothebillandtoreturnitwithhisobjections,totheHousewhereit
originated,within30daysafterthedateofreceipt.[Sec.27(1).]
Butthereare2caseswhenabillbecomesalawwithoutthesignatureofthePresident:
1)WhenthevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3voteofallthemembersofbothhouses;and
2)WhenthebillisonecallingaspecialelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentunderArt.VII,Sec.
10.Herethebillbecomeslawupon3rdandfinalreading.TheActingPresidentisnotrequiredtosign,forhe
mayhaveaninterestinthequestion.

c.ThePresident'svetopower
QualifiedversusAbsoluteVeto

VetoPowerofthePresident

Message Veto versus Pocket Veto. There is only one way for the President to veto a bill: By
disapproving it, and returning it to the house where the bill originated, together with his "veto message"

(explaininghisobjectionstothebill,whichmessageshallbeenteredintheJournalwithin30daysafterreceipt
[Sec.27(1)]
No"pocketveto"inthePhilippines.Inthisregard,thereisno"pocketveto"inthePhilippines.
Whatisapocketveto?
ComparewithArt.I,Sec.7ofUSConstitution:
Art.I,Sec.7.IfanybillshallnotbereturnedbythePresidentwithintendays(Sundaysexcepted)
afteritshallhavebeenpresentedtohim,thesameshallbealaw,inlikemannerasifhehadsignedit,
unlesstheCongressbytheiradjournmentpreventitsreturninwhichcaseitshallnotbealaw. (The
UnitedStatesConstitution.)

Apocketveto,asintheUSrequirestwoconcurringelements,(1)failuretoactonthebilland
(2)thereasonhedoesnotreturnthebilltoCongressisthatCongressisnotinsession.Thus,iftheUS
Congressisinsession,failurebythePresidenttoactwillnotresultinthevetoofthebill.
InthePhilippines,thereisnosuchprovision.InactionbythePresidentfor30daysneverproduceda
veto. IfCongressisnotinsession,thePresidentmuststillactinordertovetothebill. Onlyheneedsto
communicatethevetotoCongresswithoutneedofreturningthevetoedbillwithhisvetomessage.

Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented
tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame
withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal
andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse
shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit
shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall
becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames
oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis
vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof,
otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.
(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,
revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
Comparewith1935Constitution,Art.VI,Sec.20
Sec.20(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothe
President.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;butifnot,heshallreturnitwithhisobjectionstothe
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to

reconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreeto
passthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebe
considered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Inall
suchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembers
votingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.IfanybillshallnotbereturnedbythePresidentas
hereinprovidedwithintwentydays(Sundayexcepted),afteritshallhavebeenpresentedtohim,thesame
shallbecomealawinlikemannerasifhehadsignedit,unlesstheCongressbyadjournmentpreventsits
return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after
adjournment.
(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsofanyappropriation
bill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.Whenaprovisionofan
appropriationbillaffectsoneormoreitemsofthesame,thePresidentcannotvetotheprovisionwithout
atthesametimevetoingtheparticularitemoritemstowhichitrelates.Theitemoritemsobjectedto
shallnottakeeffectexceptinthemannerheretoforeprovidedastobillsreturnedtotheCongresswithout
theapprovalofthePresident. Ifthevetoreferstoabilloranyitemofanappropriation billwhich
appropriatesasuminexcessoftenpercentumofthetotalamountvotedintheappropriationbillforthe
generalexpensesoftheGovt.fortheprecedingyear,orifitshouldrefertoabillauthorizinganincrease
ofthepublicdebt,thesameshallnotbecomealawunlessapprovedbythreefourthsofalltheMembersof
eachHouse.(The1935Constitution.)

VetoMessage:WhenthePresidentvetoesameasure,heshouldreturnthemeasuretotheHouseof
origin,indicatinghisobjectionstheretoinwhatiscommonlyknownasa"vetomessage"sothatthesamecanbe
studiedbythemembersforpossibleoverridingofhisveto.
Is partial veto allowed under the Constitution? The general rule is that the President must approve
entirelyordisapproveintoto. Theexceptionappliestoappropriation,revenueandtariffbills,anyparticular
itemoritemsofwhichmaybedisapprovedwithoutaffectingtheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
Cruz: In Bolinao Electronics Corp. v Valencia, 11 SCRA 486, a public works bill contained an item
appropriatingacertainsumforassistancetotelevisionstations,subjecttotheconditionthattheamountwould
notbe available inplacees wherethere werecommercial television stations inoperation. Pres. Macapagal
approvedtheappropriationbutvetoedthecondition. WhenhisactwassubsequentlychallengedintheSC,it
washeldthatthevetowasineffectualandthattheapprovaloftheitemcarriedw/ittheapprovalofthecondition
attachedtoit.xxx
Inthiscase,theSCfurtherheldthatthevetopoweris"destructive"innature,notcreative,andsothe
Presidentislimitedtoapprovingordisapprovingthebill,intoto.Hecannotchooseonlythepartsthathelikes
andvetoestherest.Thus,inthiscase,thePresidentwasprohibitedfromvetoingonlythepartprohibitingthe
Philippine Broadcasting System from operating outside a certain radius, while approving the rest of the
appropriationforthisgovernmentradiostation.

Thus,whenthePresidentapprovesonepartandvetoesanother,thevetoisineffective:itisasthough
thereisnoveto.
Butinthecaseofappropriations,revenueortariffbills,thePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoany
particularitemoritems,withoutvetoingtheotheritemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
Thereasonis,theseitemsarereallyindependentofeachother,andsoeveryitemisdeemedabillin
itself.Butastoeachitem,hecannotapprovepartanddisapprovetheotherpart.

InGonzalesvsMacaraig,191SCRA452,thePresidentofthePhilippinesvetoedaprovisioninthe1989
GeneralAppropriationsBillandlaterasimilarprovisioninthe1990GeneralAppropriationsBill[providingfor
aprohibitionagainsttherestorationorincreaseofrecommendedappropriationsdisapprovedand/orreducedby
Congress]. Inhervetomessage,Pres.AquinosaidthatsuchprovisionviolatesArt.VISec.25(5)andthatit
nullifies her power and that of the Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions,toaugmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsin
other items of their respective appropriations, even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to
accelerate the implementation of essential public services. In rejecting the challenge to the veto, the SC
declaredthattherestrictiveinterpretationurgedbythepetitionersthatthePresidentmaynotvetoaprovision
withoutvetoingtheentirebillnotonlydisregardsthebasicprinciplethatadistinctandseverablepartofabill
maybesubjectofaseparatevetobutalsooverlookstheConstitutionalmandatethatanyprovisioninthegeneral
appropriationsbillshallrelatespecificallytosomeparticularappropriationthereinandthatanysuchprovision
shallbelimitedinitsoperatetotheappropriationtowhichitrelates[Art.VI,Sec.25(5).]Inotherwords,a
provisioninanappropriationbillislimitedinitsoperationtosomeparticularappropriationtowhichitrelates,
anddoesnotrelatetotheentirebill.
Inthiscase,thechallengedprovisionsdonotrelatetoanyparticularordistinctiveappropriation.They
apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Also, such
provisions aremoreofanexpressionofCongressional policy ratherthanabudgetary appropriation. They
shouldbetreatedasitemsforthepurposeofthePresident'svetopower.

BengzonvsDrilon208SCRA133(1992)
F:

Theissuehereistheconstitutionality ofthevetobythePresidentofcertainprovisionsin the1992General

AppropriationsActrelatingtothepaymentofadjustedpensionstoretiredjusticesoftheSCandtheCA.Accordingto
Pres.Aquino,thepaymentofsuchadjustedpensions(adjustedwithrespecttothepesopurchasingpower)woulderodethe
govt'scollectiveefforttoenforcethepolicyofstandardizationofcompensationandthatgovt.shouldnotgrantdistinct
privilegestoselectgroupsofofficialsoverthoseofthevastmajorityofcivilserviceservants.Theretiredjusticesasserted
thatsuchsubjectvetoisnotanitemveto.

HELD:ThevetopowerofthePresidentisnotabsolute.TheExecutivemustvetoabillinitsentiretyornotat
all.Howeverwhenitcomestoappropriation,revenueortariffbills,theAdministrationneedsthemoneytorun
themachineryofgovt.anditcannotvetotheentirebillevenifitmaycontainobjectionablefeatures.Thisisthe

reasonfortheitemvetopower.
TheConstitutionprovidesthatonlyaparticularitemoritemsmaybevetoed.Thepowertodisapprove
anyitemoritemsinanappropriatebilldoesnotgranttheauthoritytovetoapartofanitemandtoapprovethe
remainingportionofthesameitem.
Theterms"item"and"provision"aredifferent.Anitemreferstotheparticulars,thedetails,thedistinct
andseverablepartsofthebill. Itisanindivisiblesumofmoneydedicatedtoastatedpurpose. Anitem
obviouslymeansanitemwhichinitselfisaspecificappropriationofmoney,andnotsomegeneralprovisionof
law.
Inthiscase,thePresidentdidnotvetoanitem.ShevetoedthemethodsorsystemsplacedbyCongress
toinsurethatpermanentandcontinuingobligationstocertainofficialswillbepaidwhentheyfalldue.Inthis
case,thevetoedportionsarenotitemsbutareprovisions.Theaugmentationofspecificappropriationsfound
inadequatetopayretirementpayments,bytransferringsavingsfromotheritemsofappropriationsisaprovision
andnotanitem.ItgivestheSCChiefJusticethepowertotransferfundsfromoneitemtoanother.Thereisno
specificappropriationofmoneyinvolved.
Neithermaythevetopowerbeexercisedasameansofrepealingexistinglaws.Thisisarrogatingunto
thePresidencylegislativepowerswhicharebeyonditsauthority.Adapted.

OverridingtheVeto
UponconsiderationoftheobjectionsraisedbythePresidentinhisvetomessage,theHousefromwhich
thebilloriginatedshallreconsiderthebill.Ifaftersuchreconsideration,2/3ofallthemembersofsuchhouse
shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesenttogetherwiththeobjectionsofthePresident,totheotherhouseby
whichitshalllikewisebereconsidered.Ifapprovedby2/3ofallthemembersofthathouse,itshallbecomea
law.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachhouseshallbedeterminedby"yeas"or"nays",andthenamesofthe
membersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredintheJournal.[VI,27(1)]

d.Legislativevetoes

TheCongresscannotdeemadraftsubmittedbyanexecutiveagencypassedaslawbyitmereinaction
withinacertainperiod. Itmustgothroughthe3readingsandthesubmissionofthebilltothePresident,as
requiredbytheConstitution.InMillervMardo,2SCRA298(1961),theSCstruckdownasunconstitutional
Sec.6ofRA997,whichprovidedthatthereorganizationplandraftedbytheDepartmentofLaborandsubmitted
to President for approval shall be deemed as approved by Congress after its adjournment, unless in the
meantime,Congressbyresolutiondisapprovedtheplan.ItstruckdownaswelltheReorganizationPlandrafted
pursuanttothislaw.
Insoholding,theCourtruledthattheapprovalofabillcannotbemadebyCongressbymeresilence,
adjournmentorconcurrentresolution. TheConstitutionrequiresthetwohousestoholdseparatesessionfor

deliberation,andtosubmitthedeterminationofonetotheseparatedeterminationoftheother,unlessajoint
sessionisprovidedfor.ThismethodofpassingalawamountstoanabdicationbyCongressofitslegislative
prerogativestotheExecutive.

e.EffectivityofLaws
Art.2.Lawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationinthe
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Whenabillbecomesalawthroughanyofthe3meansmentionedabove,thelawdoesnotbecome
effectiveatonce.Accordingtotherulinguponreconsiderationin Tanada v Tuvera, 136SCRA27(1985),in
additiontothedatefixedeitherbytheeffectivityclauseofthestatute,or,initsabsence,byArt.2oftheCivil
(15daysafteritspublication),theremustfirstbeapublicationofthelaweitherintheOfficialGazetteorina
newspaperofgeneralcirculation[EO200].Otherwise,thereisaviolationofdueprocess.
This requirement for publication applies to any kind of law, even laws which are not of general
application,privatelaws(e.g.lawgrantingcitizenshiptoX),lawsoflocalapplication,andrulesandregulations
ofsubstantivecharacter.
In People v Que Po Lay, 94Phil640(1956),aCBcirculargoverningtheremittanceofdollarswith
correspondingforfeitureincaseofviolation,washeldtorequirepublication,sinceithadthenatureofapenal
rule.

Tanadav.Tuvera,136S27(1985)
F:

Invokingthepeople'srighttobeinformedonmattersofpublicconcern,arightrecognizedintheConstitution,as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated,petitioners seekawrit ofmandamus tocompel respondent public officials topublish,and/orcause the
publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrativeorders.Respondentscontend,amongothersthatpublicationintheOGisnotasinequanonrequirementfor
theeffectivityoflawswherethelawsthemselvesprovidefortheirowneffectivitydates.Itisthussubmittedthatsincethe
presidentialissuancesinquestioncontainspecialprovisionsastothedatetheyaretotakeeffect,publicationintheOGis
indispensablefortheireffectivity.ThepointstressedisanchoredonArt.2ofNCC.

HELD:Theinterpretationgivenbyrespondentisinaccordw/thisCourt'sconstructionofsaidarticle.Inalong
lineofdecisions,thisCourthasruledthatpublicationintheOGisnecessaryinthosecaseswherethelegislation
itselfdoesnotprovideforitseffectivitydateforthenthedateofpublicationismaterialfordeterminingits
dateofeffectivity,w/cisthe15thdayfollowingitspublicationbutnotwhenthelawitselfprovidesforthe
datewhenitgoesintoeffect.
Respondent'sargument,however,islogicallycorrectonlyinsofarasitequatestheeffectivityoflawsw/

thefactofpublication.Consideredinthelightofotherstatutesapplicabletotheissueathand,theconclusionis
easilyreachedthatsaidArt.2doesnotprecludetherequirementofpublicationintheOG,evenifthelawitself
providesforthedateofitseffectivity.
xxx Thepublicationofallpresidentialissuances"ofapublicnature"or"ofgeneralapplicability"is
mandatedbylaw.Theclearobjectofthelawistogivethegeneralpublicadequatenoticeofthevariouslaws
w/caretoregulatetheiractionsandconductascitizens.W/osuchnoticeandpublication,therewouldbeno
basisfortheapplicationofthemaximignorantialegisnonexcusat.Itwouldbetheheightofinjusticetopunish
orotherwiseburdenacitizenforthetransgressionofalawofw/chehadnonoticewhatsoever,notevena
constructiveone.Itisneedlesstosaythatthepublicationofpresidentialissuances"ofapublicnature"or"of
generalapplicability"isarequirementofdueprocess.Itisaruleoflawthatbeforeapersonmaybeboundby
law,hemustfirstbeofficiallyandspecificallyinformedofitscontents.RAM.

Tanadav.Tuvera, 146S446(1986). Motionforreconsideration. xxx[T]heclause"unlessitisotherwise

provided"referstothedateofeffectivityandnottotherequirementofpublicationitself,w/ccannotinanyevent
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval,oronanyotherdate,w/oitspreviouspublication.
Publicationisindispensableineverycase,butthelegislaturemayinitsdiscretionprovidethattheusual
15dayperiodshallbeshortenedorextended.
Itisnotcorrecttosaythatunderthedisputedclausepublicationmaybedispensedw/altogether.The
reasonisthatsuchomissionwouldoffenddueprocessinsofarasitwoulddenythepublicknowledgeofthelaws
thataresupposedtogovernit.
Conclusivepresumptionofknowledgeofthelaw.Theconclusivepresumptionthateverypersonknows
thelawpresupposesthatthelawhasbeenpublishedifthepresumptionistohaveanylegaljustificationatall.
Thetermlawsshouldrefertoalllawsandnotonlytothoseofgeneralapplication,forstrictlyspeaking
alllawsrelatetothepeopleingeneralalbeittherearesomethatdonotapplytothemdirectly.
RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
conditionfortheireffectivity,w/cshallbegin15daysafterpublicationunlessadifferenteffectivitydateisfixed
bythelegislature.
Coverage.CoveredbythisrulearePDsandEOspromulgatedbythePres.intheexerciseoflegislative
powers.Administrativerulesandregulationsmustalsobepublishediftheirpurposeistoenforceorimplement
existinglawpursuanttoavaliddelegation.
Interpretativeregulationsandthosemerelyinternalinnature,i.e.,regulatingonlythepersonnelofthe
administrativeagencyandnotthepublic,neednotbepublished.Neitherispublicationrequiredofthesocalled
lettersofinstructionsissuedbyadministrativesuperiorsconcerningtherulesorguidelinestobefollowedby
theirsubordinatesintheperformanceoftheirduties.
Publicationmustbeinfulloritisnopublicationatallsinceitspurposeistoinformthepublicofthe
contentsofthelaws.ThemerementionofthenumberofthePD,thetitleofsuchdecree,itswhereabouts,the
supposeddateofeffectivity,andinameresupplementoftheOGcannotsatisfythepublicationrequirement.
Thisisnotevensubstantialcompliance.RAM.

ExecutiveOrderNo.200,June18,1987

Art.2.Lawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationeither
intheOfficialGazetteorinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines,unlessitisotherwise
provided.(asamendedbyEO200.)

9.InitiativeandReferendum,
Initiativeisthepowerofthepeopletoproposebillsandlaws,andtoenactorrejectthematthepolls,
independentofthelegislativeassembly.Itistherightofagroupofcitizenstointroduceamatterforlegislation
eithertothelegislatureordirectlytothevoters.
Referendum istherightreservedtothepeopletoadoptorrejectanyactormeasurewhichhasbeen
passedbyalegislativebodyandwhichinmostcaseswouldwithoutactiononthepartoftheelectorsbecomea
law. It is a method of submitting an impt. legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people, the
submissionofalawpassedbythelegislaturefortheirapprovalorrejection.

Rep.ActNo.6735,Aug.4,1989

UPDATED1/22/96
/RAM

B.ExecutiveDepartment
1.ThePresident

a.Qualifications,election,termandoath
Art.VII,Secs.2,4and5
Art.VII,Sec.2. NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,
andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.
QualificationsofPresident
1)NaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines
2)Registeredvoter
3)Abletoreadandwrite
4)40yearsofageonthedayofelection
5)ResidentofthePhilippinesforatleast10yearsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection

Art.VII,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeople
foratermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayofthe
electionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligiblefor
anyreelection. NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfour
yearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime.
NoVicePresidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationofthe
officeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheservicefor
thefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbe
heldonthesecondMondayofMay.
ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof
canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe
Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty
daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof
theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the
certificatesofcanvass)thevotes.
Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor
moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe
voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.
TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

ElectionandTermofPresident
RegularElectionandTerm
ThePresidentandVicePresident(whoshallbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident)
shallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermof6years,whichshallbeginonthenoonofJune30next
followingthedayofelection.TheregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbeheldonthe2nd
MondayofMay.(Art.VII,Sec.4pars.1&3).
Thesixyeartermfortheincumbent President andVice President elected intheFebruary 7,1986
electionis,forpurposesofsynchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.Thefirst
regularelectionsforthePresidentandVicePresidentunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthe2ndMondayof
May,1992.(Art.XVIII,Sec.5.)
In In re Saturnino Bermudez,145SCRA160,theSCheldthatthe"incumbentPresidentandVice
President"referredtoabovearePres.CorazonAquinoandVicePresidentSalvadorLaurel(eveniftheywerenot
theonesdeclaredbytheBatasangPambansaasthewinnersoftheFebruary7,1986SnapElection).
SpecialElectionandTerm
IfavacancyoccursintheofficesofPresidentandVicePresidentmorethan18monthsbeforethedate
ofthenextregularpresidentialelection,aspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVicePresidentshallbe
calledbyCongress,pursuanttoVII,10.(SeediscussionunderOtherPowersofCongress,supraandSuccession,
infra.)
AconditionalresignationbytheincumbentPresidentisnotarealresignationthatcreatesavacancyfor
thepurposeofcallingaspecialelection.ButinthePhilippineBarAssociation,Inc.vCOMELEC,140SCRA
455,thefailureoftheSCtoissueaninjunctionontimeisalreadyadecisioninitselfinfavorofthevalidityof
thelawcallingforSnapElectionsdespitetheabsenceofvacancy;only,itisadecisionthatisnotsupportedbya
ratiodecidendi. Indeed, amidtermelectioninapresidential systemofgovernment inresponsetopopular
clamorforit,isalegalanomaly.
PBAV.COMELEC,140SCRA455(1985).Validityof"Snap"ElectionforPresidentandVicePresident.
SuitsquestioningthevalidityofBP883,callingaspecialelectionforPres.andVicePres.onFeb.7,
1986.ThelawwasenactedfollowingtheletterofPres.MarcostotheBPthathewas"irrevocablyvacatingthe
positionofPres.effectiveonlywhentheelectionisheldandafterthewinnerisproclaimedandqualifiedas
Pres.bytakinghisoathofofficetendaysafterhisproclamation."Theprincipalgroundforthechallengetothe
validityofthestatutewasthattheconditionalresignationofthePres.didnotcreateavacancyrequiredbyArt.
VII,Sec.9(nowArt.VII,Sec.8)w/cauthorizedthecallingofaspecialelection.
Afterdeliberating,7JusticesvotedtoDISMISS.Ontheotherhand,5JusticesvotedtoDECLAREthe
statuteunconstitutional.Inaccordancew/Javellanav.ExecutiveSec.,50SCRA141(1973),J.Teehankeewasof
theviewthatastherewerelessthantenvotesfordeclaringBP883unconstitutional,thepetitionsshouldbe
dismissed.

Noopinionwasdelivered.VV.

TheConstitutionissilentastowhetherthepersonselectedinthespecialelectionshallserveonlyfor
theunexpiredportionoftheterm,andwhetherthenewPresidentcanrunforreelectionifhehasnotserved
morethan4years,whichdependsontheconstructionofthephrase"hassucceededasthePresident,"discussed
inthenextsection.VV:Onlyunexpiredportion.
Reelection
ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.Furthermore,nopersonwhohas"succeeded"as
Presidentandhasservedassuchformorethan4years,shallbequalifiedforanyelectiontothesameoffice(the
Presidency)atanytime.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.1)
ThepersonwhosucceedsasPresidentandnotjustinanactingcapacity,couldeitherbe(i)theVice
President,or(ii)onewhowaselectedPresidentinaspecialelection.Inbothcases,ifhehasservedformore
than4years,heisineligibleforreelectionasPresident.
Ifheservedfor4yearsorless,hecanrunforreelection,itissubmitted,since(a)theterm"succeeded"
encompasses election and (b) the general rule prohibiting the President to run for reelection refers to the
Presidentelectedduringtheregularelection.Furthermore,itissubmittedthatthispersonmayresignonthe4th
yearsoastobequalifiedtorunforPresident,sincethereisnothingintheConstitutionthatprohibitsthis.
InviewofthewordingofArt.XVII,Sec.5,however,PresidentAquinocanrunforthe1992electionas
PresidentwithoutviolatingtheruleagainstreelectionsincetheFebruary7,1987electionwasnotconducted
underthepresentConstitution,the1992Presidentialelectionbeingthe"firstregularelections"tobeheldunder
thisConstitution.Furthermore,althoughshemayhaveservedformorethan4yearsasPresidentbythen,she
willhavedonesonotassuccessortothePresidency.IfVicePresidentLaurelistheonewhoservesasPresident
formorethan4years,thenhecannotrunforthePresidencyin1992.
TheVicePresidentontheotherhand,shallnotserveformorethan2successiveterms.Andforthis
purpose,avoluntary(butnotinvoluntary)renunciationofofficeforanylengthoftime,shallnotbeconsidered
aninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermsforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.
2). Thisisapplicable,however,beginning1992,becauseoftheTransitoryProvisions. (Thisprohibitionis
similartothatapplicabletoSenators.)
CanvassingofElectionReturns
AsalreadynotedintheOtherPowersoftheLegislature,supra,itistheCongressthatactsasBoardof
CanvassersofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident.Theprovisionreads:
"ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentdulycertifiedbythe
BoardofCanvassersofeachprovinceorcity,shallbesubmittedtotheCongress,directedtothe
PresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenate
shall,notlaterthan30daysafterthedateoftheelection,openallthecertificatesinthepresence
oftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesinajointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upon

determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof, in the manner provided by law,
canvassthevotes.
Thepersonhavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincase
2ormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes,oneofthemshallforthwithbechosen
bythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersoftheCongress,votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates."(Art.
VII,Sec.4,pars.46).
ElectoralTribunalfortheElectionofthePresidentandVicePresident
TheSupreme Court,sitting enbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelating totheelection,
returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthatpurpose.
(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.)
Note that while election controversies in the Congress are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their
respectiveElectoralTribunals,thoseintheExecutiveareundertheSupremeCourtitself.

OathofOffice
Art. VII, Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice
PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation:
"Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmy
dutiesasPresident(orVicePresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveand
defenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyself
totheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewill
beomitted.)

b.Privilegeandsalary
Art.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentand
VicePresidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreasein
saidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhich
suchincreasewasapproved.Theyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromthe
Governmentoranyothersource.

Thesalariesof thePresident and VicePresident shall be determined by law. Unless theCongress

providesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP300,000andtheVicePresident,thesalary
ofP240,000.

c.Prohibitions

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies
orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly
avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

ProhibitionagainstthePresident,VicePresident,membersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistants
(a)Theyshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure,unlessotherwiseprovided
bythisConstitution
InCivilLibertiesUnionvsExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317,thepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo.
284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesandasst.secretariesandotherappointive
officialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit, subjectofthelimitations
imposedtherein.Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewasviolativeofArt.
VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointiveofficialif
allowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions.
IndeclaringtheEOunconstitutional,theSCheldthatbyostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthat
Cabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretariesmayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmore
than2positionsinthegovt.andGOOCs,EO284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremployment
indirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateofArt.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessother
wiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.
Ifmaximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedto
attendtohisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment.

CivilLibertiesUnion(CLU)vExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317(1991)

F:

thepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesand
asst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit,
subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein. Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewas
violativeofArt.VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointive
officialifallowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions.

HELD:Byostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretaries
mayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOOCs,EO284
actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateof
Art.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.If
maximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedtoattendto
hisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment.
xxx
ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascompared
totheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofofthe
intentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employmentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheir
positions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedby
theConsti.itself.xxx
However,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13
mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oaddition
compensationinan exofficio capacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaid
official'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationofthe
constitutional prohibition butareproperlyan imposition ofadditional duties andfunction on saidofficials.
Adapted.

(b)Theyshallnotpracticeanyotherprofession.
(c)Theyshallnotparticipateinanybusiness.
(d)Theyshallnotbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorspecialprivilege
granted.

CompareProhibitionsagainstotherofficials

Art.VI,Sec.13.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyotheroffice
or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghis
seat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereof

increasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.
Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany
otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive
managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,
norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor
privilegegrantedbytheGovernment, anyofits subdivisions,agencies, orinstrumentalities, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinany
capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.
Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VIII,Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylaw
shallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.

Exceptionstoruleprohibitingexecutiveofficialsfromholdingadditionalpositions:
a.President
(1)The President can assume a Cabinetpost, (because thedepartments are mere extensions of his
personality,accordingtotheDoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,sonoobjectioncanbevalidlyraisedbased
onArt.VII,Sec.13.)
(2)ThePresidentistheChairmanofNEDA.(Art.XII,Sec.9)
b.VicePresident
Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx
TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno
confirmation.
c.Cabinet
(1)TheSecretaryofJusticeshallbeanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.(Art.VIII,
Sec.8[1])

2)Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,appointiveofficialsshall
not hold anyother office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.(Art.IX,B,7,par.2)
Art.VII,Sec.13talksof"unless otherwiseprovidedbytheConstitution." In thecaseofCabinet
members,thisreferstoArt.IX,B,7,par.2.Thus,theConstitutionallowsaCabinetmembertoholdanother
officeprovidedeither(1)suchisnecessitatedbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition(e.g.SecretaryofTrade
andIndustryasChairmanofNDC,SecretaryofAgrarianReformasChairmanoftheLandBank),or(ii)is
allowedbylaw.ThevalidityofEO284allowingmembersoftheCabinetandtheirUnderSecretariestohold2
additionalofficeswasdecidedinthecaseofCLUvsExec.Secretary.

d.Succession
(1)Atthebeginningofterm

Art. VII, Sec. 7. The Presidentelect and the VicePresident elect shall assume office at the
beginningoftheirterms.
xxx

ThisprovisionreferstothePresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheregularelection,andsotheterm
referred to begins on June 30 next following the election on the 2nd Monday of 1992, and every 6 years
thereafter.

VacancyinthePresidency
Therearetwosetsofrulesonsuccession,dependingonwhetherthevacancytookplacebeforethe
beginningofthetermonJune30,orduringthependencyofthetermsthatcommencesonJune30.(Thecutoff
pointisunsettled.OneviewisthatthecutoffisnoonofJune30,asexpressedinArt.VII,Sec.4,par.1.The
otherviewisthatthecutoffismidnightofJune29whenJune30begins.)
A.TemporaryorpermanentvacancyinthePresidencybeforetheterm

1.IfthePresidentelect cannotassume hispostatthebeginning ofhistermbecause i)he hasnot

qualifiedasyet(e.g.hehadanoperationandsohecouldnottakehisoathofofficeonJune30),ii)ora
Presidenthasnotbeen"chosen"andqualifiedasyet(e.g.thereisatieandCongresshasnotyetbrokenthetie),
thentheVicePresidentshallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentelectshallhavequalified,orshallhavebeen
"chosen:andqualified,asthecasemaybe.(Art.VII,Sec.7,pars.2&3).

Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx
If the Presidentelect fails to qualify, the VicePresidentelect shall act as President until a
Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.
IfaPresidentshallnothavebeenchosen,theVicePresidentelectshallactasPresidentuntila
Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.
xxx

2.IfthePresidentelecti)dies,orii)becomespermanentlydisabled"atthebeginningofthetermofthe
President"(i.e.,beforetheterm),thentheVicePresidentelectshallbecomethePresident.(Id.,par.4)
Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx
xxx
xxx
IfatthebeginningofthetermofthePresident,thePresidentelectshallhavediedorshallhave
becomepermanentlydisabled,theVicePresidentelectshallbecomePresident.
3.IfbothPresidentandVicePresident(i)havenotbeen"chosen"or(ii)havenotqualified,or(iii)die,
or(iv)becomepermanentlydisabled,thenthePresidentoftheSenate,orincaseofhisinability,theSpeakerof
theHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVicePresidentshallhavebeen"chosen"andqualified.
(par.5)
Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx
WherenoPresidentandVicePresidentshallhavebeenchosenorshallhavequalified,orwhere
both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice
Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.(par.5thereof.)

IncaseboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseareunabletoactasPresident,then
Congressshallbylaw,provideforthe"mannerofselecting"theonewhowillactasPresidentuntilaPresident
ofVicePresidentshallhave(beeneither"chosen"or"elected"pursuanttothespecialelectionreferredtoinVII,
10,andqualified.
Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx
TheCongressshall,bylaw,provideforthemannerinwhichonewhoistoactasPresidentshallbe
selecteduntilaPresidentoraVicePresidentshallhavequalified,incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,
orinabilityoftheofficialsmentionedinthenextprecedingparagraph.(par.6thereof.)

Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe

vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules
withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident
andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof
suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,
ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.
Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe
exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening
oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe
calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

(2)Duringterm
Art.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthe
President,theVicePresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,
permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVicePresident,the
PresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthen
actasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified.
TheCongressshall,bylaw,provide whoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanent
disability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVicePresident
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualificationsastheActingPresident.

B.PermanentVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm
1.IncaseofthePresident's(i)death(ii)permanentdisability,(iii)removalfromoffice(theonlywayis
byimpeachment),or(iv)resignation,theVicePresidentshallbecomePresidentfortheunexpiredportionofthe
term.(par.1)
2.IncaseofboththePresident'sandVicePresident'sdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice
(byimpeachment),orresignation,thentheSenatePresidentor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse,
shallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecial
electioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.(par.1.)
When the Acting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Speaker of the House) dies, becomes
permanentlydisabled,orresigns(butisnotremoved,becausethereisnoneedtoimpeachhim,hisstaybeing
temporary),thentheCongressshallbylaw,provide"who"shallbeActingPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice
Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified. This

ActingPresidentshallbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualifications.(par.2)

Comparisonsanddistinctionsbetweenthetwovacancies:
a)TheincumbentPresidentneverholdsoverthePresidencyinanycase.
b)ThevacancymustoccurintheofficesofboththePresidentandVicePresidentinorderfortheSenate
President,ortheSpeaker,or,intheirinability,theoneprovidedtosucceedaccordingtotheLawofSuccession
passedbytheCongress,tosucceedasActingPresidentuntilthequalificationofthePresident.
c)TheLawonSuccessionmustbepassedbytheCongressinbothcasesintheeventthatthePresident,
VicePresident,SenatePresidentandtheSpeakerareallunabletoactasPresident.Butinthecaseofavacancy
occurringbeforetheterm,thelawprovidesonlyforthe"mannerofselecting"theActingPresident,whileinthe
caseofavacancyoccurringduringtheterm,itprovidesfor"theperson"whoshallactasPresident. Inboth
cases,thestintoftheActingPresidentistemporary.
d)Whenthevacancycomesbeforetheterm,theConstitutiontalksofthesuccessoractingasPresident
untilaPresidenthasbeen"chosen"and"qualified";whenitcomesduring,ittalksof"elected"andqualified.
Thereasonisthatbeforetheterm,thevacancyinthePresidencyneednotbefilledupbyelection,sinceitmay
befilledupbyavoteofCongressincaseofatie(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5);butduringtheterm,theonlywayto
fillupthevacancyisbyspecialelection.
e)Aspecialelectioninbothcasesisheld,pursuanttoArt.VII,Sec.10,onlywhenbothofficesof
President and VicePresident arevacant. However, if thevacancy occurs beforethe term, thegrounds are
limitedto2(deathandpermanentdisabilityorboth),whileifthevacancyoccursduringtheterm,thegrounds
are4(death,permanentdisability,removal,andresignation).
f)Thevacancythatoccursbeforethetermofofficemaybetemporaryorpermanent;thevacancythat
occursduringthetermofofficecanonlybeapermanentone. Thus,adifferentsetofrulesapplies,tobe
discussednextfollowing,incaseofthetemporaryinabilityofthePresidentduringthetermofoffice.

Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe
vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules
withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident
andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof
suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,
ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.
Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe
exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening
oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe
calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

(3)Incaseoftemporarydisability
Art.VII,Secs.1112
Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowers
anddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowers
anddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVicePresidentasActingPresident.
WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenate
andtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunable
todischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowers
anddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident.
Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakerofthe
HouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersand
dutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfive
daystothePresident oftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten
declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshall
decidetheissue. Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinfortyeight
hours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall.
IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,
withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwothirdsvoteofbothHouses,voting
separately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresident
shallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresident shallcontinueexercising thepowersanddutiesofhis
office.

C.TemporaryVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm(Art.VI,Sec.11,supra)
AvacancyinthePresidencyarisingfromhisdisabilitycanoccurinanyofthefollowingways:
1.AwrittendeclarationbythePresident
2.WrittendeclarationbytheCabinet
3.FindingbyCongressby2/3votethatthePresidentisdisabled.
Inallthesecases,theVicePresidenttemporarilyactsasthePresident.
VoluntarydeclarationofinabilitybyPresident

a.WhenthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerhiswrittendeclarationthatheis
unabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice
PresidentasActingPresident.
b.TheVicePresidentshallsoactuntilthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakera
writtendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehisoffice.
ContestedinabilityofthePresident
a.WhenmajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentandSpeakertheir
writtendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice,thentheVicePresidentshallimmediately
assumethePresidencyinanactingcapacity.
b.ThePresidentcancontestthisbysendinghisownwrittendeclarationtotheSenatePresidentand
Speaker,thatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,thePresidentshallautomaticallyassumehisoffice.
c.ShouldthemajorityoftheCabinetinsistontheiroriginalstandbytransmittingasecondwritten
declarationofthePresident'sinabilitywithin5daysfromresumptionofofficeofthePresident,thenCongress
shallstepin.
d.UponreceiptofthisseconddeclarationbytheCabinet,Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,
within48hours,withoutneedofcall,inaccordancewithitsrules.(Ifitisalreadyinsession,itmustmeetright
away,asglimpsedfromthefactthattheyonlyhave10daystodecide,whereasifitisnotinsession,itmust
convenein2daysanddecidebeforethe12thday.)
e.CongressshalldeterminethePresident'sinabilitywithin10daysafterreceiptofthesecondwritten
declarationbytheCabinetifitisinsession,orwithin12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespective
presidingofficerifitisnotinsession.
f.IfthePresident,bya2/3voteofbothhousesvotingseparately,determinedtobe"unable"todischarge
hisoffice,thentheVicePresidentshallactasPresident. Iflessthan2/3findhimunable,thenthePresident
shallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.

SeriousIllnessofthePresident
Art.VII,Sec.12. IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthe
stateofhishealth.ThemembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsand
theChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresident
duringsuchillness.

e.Removal

Art.XI,Secs.23
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand
corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe
removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall

casesofimpeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe
includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin
threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten
sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.
(3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded.
(4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall
theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate
shallforthwithproceed.
(5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin
aperiodofoneyear.
(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting
forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.
(7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand
disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall
neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

[A more detailed discussion on this topic can be found above under Other Powers of Congress:
Impeachment.]
InitiationStageattheHouseofRepresentatives

a.FilingofverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentofthePresidentorVicePresident,onthegroundof
culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalof
publictrust.
b.InclusionofthecomplaintintheOrderofBusinesswithin10sessiondays.
c.ReferralofcomplainttotheCommitteeonJusticewithin3sessiondaysfromitsinclusion.
d.Hearing,voting,andsubmissionofreportbytheCommitteewithin60daysfromreferral.
e.PlacingoncalendaroftheCommitteeresolutionwithin10daysfromsubmission.
f.Discussiononthefloorofthereport,thenavotebythemembershipoftheHouseofRepresentatives.
g.If1/3votetoaffirmafavorableresolutionoroverrideacontraryresolution,thecaseisforwardedto
theSenatefortrial.
TrialStageattheSenate
a.TheSenatorstakeanoathoraffirmation.TheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtpresidesoverthe
trial,butdoesnotvote.
b.Aftertrial,theSenatorsvotetoconvictoracquit.Avoteof16(2/3ofallthemembers)isrequiredto
convictthePresidentorVicePresident.
Posttrial
a.IfthePresidentisacquittedbytheSenate,heshallcontinueinoffice.Noimpeachmentproceeding
canagainbeinitiatedagainsthimwithinaperiodofoneyear.
b.IfthePresidentisimpeached,heshallberemovedfromofficeatonce,andshallbedisqualifiedto
holdanyofficeintheRepublic.HiscriminalliabilityunderArt.XI,Sec.3(7)maybesubjecttohimimmunity
fromsuit.

f.PowersandFunctionsofthePresident
(1)ExecutivePower
Art.VII,Secs.1and17
Art.VII,Sec.1.TheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentofthePhilippines.

Id., Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.

Theexecutivefunctionisessentiallythedutytoimplementthelawswithinthestandardsimposedbythe
legislature.UndertheConstitution,thispowerisexercisedbythePresident.Thus,whentheCabinetandother
branchesoftheExecutiveDepartmentimplementthelaw,theyareactingunderthecontrolofthePresident.

MarcosvsManglapus177SCRA668,178SCRA760
F:

ThisisapetitionformandamusaskingtheCourttoordertherespondentstoissuetraveldocumentstoMr.Marcos
andhisimmediatefamilyandtoenjointheimplementationofthePresident'sdecisiontobartheirreturntothePhilippines.
Theissueiswhetherornot,intheexerciseofexecutivepower,thePresidentmayprohibittheMarcosesfromreturningto
thePhilippines.
TheConstitutionprovidesthattheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresident(Art.VII,Sec.1).However,it
doesnotdefinewhatismeantby"executivepower"althoughinthesamearticleittouchesontheexerciseofcertainpowers
bythePresident,i.e.thepowerofcontroloverallexecutivedepts.,bureausandoffices,thepowertoexecutethelaws,the
appointingpower,thepowersunderthecommanderinchiefclause,thepowertograntreprieves,commutations,pardons,
thepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofCongress,thepowertocontractorguaranteeforeignloans,thepower
toenterintotreatiesorinternationalagreements,thepowertosubmitthebudgettocongressandthepowertoaddress
Congress.(VII,Sec.1423)

TheinevitablequestioniswhetherbyenumeratingcertainpowersofthePresident,didtheframersof
theConstitutionintendthatthePresidentshallexercisethosespecificpowersandnoother?
AccordingtotheSC,thatalthoughthe1987Constitutionimposeslimitationsontheexerciseofspecific
powersofthePresident,itmaintainsintactwhatistraditionallyconsideredaswithinthescopeofexecutive
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power
enumeratedintheConstitution. Inotherwords,executivepowerismorethanthesumofspecificpowersso
enumerated.
Inthiscase,thePresidenthasthepowertobartheMarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.Shehas
theobligationtoprotectthepeople,promotetheirwelfareandadvancethenationalinterest.Shehastobalance
thegeneralwelfareandthecommon goodagainsttheexerciseofrights ofcertainindividuals. Thepower
involvedisthePresident'sresidualpowertoprotectthegeneralwelfareofthepeople.Itisfoundedontheduty
ofthePresident,asstewardofthepeople.
ResolutiononMotionforReconsideration:
ItcannotbedeniedthatthePresident,uponwhomexecutivepowerisvested,has unstatedresidual
powerswhichareimpliedfromthegrantofexecutivepowerandwhicharenecessaryforhertocomplywithher
dutiesundertheConstitution.ThepowersofthePresidentarenotlimitedtowhatareexpresslyenumeratedin
thearticleontheExecutiveDepartmentandinscatteredprovisionsoftheConstitution.Adapted.

(2)Controlofexecutivedepartments
Art.VII,Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,and
offices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.

"Control"isthepowertosubstituteone'sownjudgmentinthatofasubordinate.
Underthequalifiedpoliticalagencydoctrine,thedifferentexecutivedepartmentsaremereadjunctsof
the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he
designated toassist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the
Presidentintheparticularfieldinwhichtheyact. Theiractsarepresumptivelyactsofthe"President,until
countermandedorreprobatedbyhim".ThePresidentcansubstitutehiswilloverthoseofthesecretaries,and
theycannotcomplain. Furthermore,theyholdtheirofficesubjecttothediscretionofthePresident,whocan
replacethemanytimeonceheloseshisconfidenceinthem.
Thus,inPlanasvGil,sincetheCivilServiceCommissioner,thennotanindependentbody,wasthealter
ego of the President, and the President could investigate local officials, the Commissioner could likewise
investigatethem.
InVillenavSecretaryoftheInterior,theinvestigationoftheMayorofMakatibytheSecretaryofthe
InteriorwasdeemedaninvestigationconductedbythePresidenthimself.
The doctrine on the power of control remained unchanged in the jurisprudence under the 1973
Constitution. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had occasion to
reemphasizeitscontinuingvalidity.Here,thepowergiventotheMinisterofLabortoassumejurisdictionovera
labordisputeaffectingthenationalinterestortocertifyitforcompulsoryarbitrationwaschallengedasanundue
delegationofapowerwhichproperlybelongedtothePresident.Allthatwasneededtosettlethecasewasto
hark back to the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the President. Under the
presidentialsystem,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsareadjunctsoftheExecutiveDepartment,the
headsofthevariousexecutivedepartmentsareassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExecutiveand,exceptincases
wheretheChiefExecutiveisrequiredbytheConstitutionorthelawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthe
situationdemandthatheactpersonally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChief
Executive are performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobatedbytheChiefExecutive,presumptivelytheactsoftheChiefExecutive.Eachheadofadepartmentis,
andmustbe,thePresident'salteregointhemattersofthatdepartmentwherethePresidentisrequiredbylawto
exerciseauthority.ThePresidenthastheconstitutionalpowerofcontrolanddirectionoversuchdept.headsand
cabinetsecretaries.

(3)Generalsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousregions

Art.X,Sec.4.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.xxx

Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

"Generalsupervision"meansthemereoverseeingofasubordinatetomakesurethattheydotheirduties
underthelaw.Butthisdoesnotincludethepowertooverruletheiracts,iftheseactsarewithintheirdiscretion.
Thegrantofmeresupervisorypoweroverlocalgovernmentsandautonomousregionsisinlinewiththe
policyoftheStatetopromotetheautonomyoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousregions.Therecanbenoreal
localautonomywhiletheNationalGovernmentcontrolsthelocalgovernments.
GanzonvsCA200SCRA271
ThepetitionersquestionthepowerofthePresident,actingthroughtheSecretaryofLocalGovernment,
tosuspendand/orremovelocalofficials.
ItistheconsideredopinionoftheCourtthatnotwithstandingthechangeintheconstitution,thecharter
didnotintendtodivestthelegislatureofitsrightorthePresidentofherprerogativeasconferredbyexisting
legislationtoprovideadministrativesanctionsagainstlocalofficials.Theomissionof"asmaybeprovidedby
law"(Sec.4,Art.X)signifiesnothingmorethantounderscorelocalgovernments'autonomyfromCongressand
tobreakCongress'"control"overlocalgovt.affairs.TheConstitutiondidnot,however,intendforthesakeof
localautonomy,todeprivethelegislatureofallauthorityovermunicipalcorporations,inparticular,concerning
discipline.
Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers,whichsupposedlyexcludesthepowerofinvestigation,anddeniedhercontrol,whichallegedlyembraces
disciplinaryauthority. Thisisamistakenimpressionbecauselegally"supervision"isnotincompatiblewith
disciplinaryauthority. "Control"hasbeendefinedasthepowerofanofficertoalter,modifyornullifyorset
asidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentofthe
formerforthatofthelatter."Supervision"ontheotherhandmeansoverseeingorthepowerorauthorityofan
officertoseethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Adapted.

(4)Powerofappointment
Cruz:Appointmentmaybedefinedastheselection,bytheauthorityvestedw/thepower,ofanindividualwho
istoexercisethefunctionsofagivenoffice.
The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v Paredes, the most eminently
executivepower,becauseitisthroughhisappointeesthatthePresidentcanexecutelaws.

ThepowerofappointmentbythePresidentunderthe1987Constitutionhasbeensignificantlycurbed.It
canbeclassifiedasfollows:

WiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments
MembersoftheRegionalConsultativeCouncilinArt.X,Sec.18areaccordingtoSarmientovMison,
156 SCRA 547, supra.also subject toconfirmation by the CA, because their appointment is vested in the
President by the Constitution. But J. Mendoza disagrees. For unlike the Chairman and members of the
ConstitutionalCommissionsandtheregularmembersoftheJBC,theConstitutioninArt.X,Sec.18doesnot
saythattheappointmentissubjecttoconfirmation.Also,thepatternintheConstitutionshowsthatwherethe
nomineesarealreadyscreenedeitherbyJBC(forjusticesandjudges)orthemultisectoralbodies(Regional
ConsultativeCouncil),thenthereisnoneedforCAconfirmationtopreventanoverkill.Itisenoughthatthe
Presidentmadetheappointmentonthebasisofnominations.Otherwise,itwouldbetoorigid,consideringthat
thedutyoftheRCCisonlytoadviseCongressontheautonomousacttobeenacted.
Dobureaudirectorsneedconfirmation?InSarmientovMison(Dec.1987),theSCheldthatno
theydidnotneedtobeconfirmed.ThedeliberationsoftheConConshowedthatadraftsimilarto
VII,10ofthe1935Constitution,whichincludedbureauheadsinthelistofappointeesrequiring
confirmation,wasintroduced,butuponmotion,bureaudirectorswereomittedexpresslyfromthe
draftbecausetheywereconsideredoflowrank,andsowerethoughttobebettershieldedfrom
partisanpolitics.
ButtheSCaddedthatofthe4categoriesofpublicofficersrequiringconfirmation,the4thmustbe
givenarestrictiveconstructionbecauseconfirmationderogatestheappointingpowerofthePresident.Indeed,it
said,onlyasmallclassofofficersneededconfirmation.
Insayingso,however,itdidnottrytoexplaincertainanomaliesthatmayarisefromsuchrestrictive
interpretation:(a)Ifacolonelneededconfirmation,whynottheUndersecretaryofNationalDefensewhohasa
higherrankaslineofficer?(b)Ifanambassadorneededconfirmation,whynottheUndersecretaryofForeign
Affairswhohasahigherrank?(c)WhynottheCBgovernorwhoissopowerfulastoplungethecountryinto
bankruptcy?

BautistavsSalonga172SCRA160
F:

PetitionerwasappointedChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightson12/17/88.Shetookheroathofoffice
on12/22andthereafterenteredintothedischargeofherfunctionsandduties.However,on1/9/89,shewasaskedbythe
Commission on Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of her
appointment.Sherefusedtodosoonthegroundthatherappointmentwasnotsubjecttoconfirmation.On1/14/89,the
Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the
jurisdictionoftheCA,theCAdisapprovedherappointmenton1/25.Petitioner,anticipatingtheactionoftheCA,fileda
petitionforcertiorariw/theSC.

ISSUE:WhetherornottheappointmentbythePresidentoftheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights
(CHR)istobemadewithorwithoutCAconfirmation.
HELD:(1)OnlythoseappointmentsexpresslymentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIaretobe
reviewedbytheCA,namely,"theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand
consuls,otherofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose
appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution."AllotherappointmentsbythePres.aretobemadew/othe
participationoftheCA." SincethepositionofChairmanoftheCHR,anindependentofficecreatedbythe
Constitution,isnotamongthepositionsmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,appointmentsto
whicharetobemadewiththeconfirmationoftheCA,itfollowsthattheappointmentbythePresidentofthe
ChairmanoftheCHRistobemadewithouttherevieworparticipationoftheCA.Theyareamongtheofficers
ofthegovt"whomhe(thePres.)maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."AndSec.2(c)ofEO163,May5,1987,
authorizesthePres.toappointtheChairmanandMembersoftheCHR.
xxx.VV.

QuintosDelesvs.CommissiononAppointments177SCRA259
F:

Petitionerand3otherswereappointedSectoralRepresentativesbythePresidentpursuanttoArticleVII,Section
16,par.2andArticleXVIII,Section7oftheConstitution.However,petitionerandthe3othersectoralrepresentatives
appointeeswerenotabletotaketheiroathsanddischargetheirdutiesasmembersofCongressduetotheoppositionof
somecongressmenmembersoftheCommissiononAppointments(CA),whoinsistedthatsectoralrepresentativesmust
first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires confirmation by the CA in the appointment of sectoral
representativestotheHouseofRepresentatives.
HELD:YES.Section16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionprovidesthat:"Thepresidentshallnominateand,with
theconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,
otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,and
otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitutionxxx".
InSARMIENTOVS.MISON(1987),theSCconstruedSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitutiontomean
that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Art. VII require
confirmationbytheCA.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in par. 2, Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointmentbythePresidentbyexpressprovisionofSec.7,Art.XVIIIoftheConstitution,itisindubitablethat
sectoralrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesareamongthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsare
vested in the President in this Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose
appointmentsaresubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.(SARMIENTOVS.MISON)
Implicitintheinvocationofpar.2,Section16,Art.VIIasauthorityfortheappointmentofpetitioneris,
therecognitionbythePresidentasappointingauthoritythatpetitioner'sappointmentrequiresconfirmationby
theCA.UnderPar.2,Sec.16,ArtVII,appointmentsmadebythePresidentpursuantthereto"shallbeeffective

onlyuntildisapprovalbytheCAoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress."Ifindeedappointmentsof
sectoralrepresentativesneednoconfirmation,thePresidentneednotmakeanyreferencetotheconstitutional
provisionsabovequotedinappointingthepetitioner.Asamatteroffact,thePresidenthadexpresslysubmitted
petitioner'sappointmentforconfirmationbytheCA. ConsideringthatCongresshadadjournedwithoutresp.
CAhavingactedonpetitioner's appointment, saidappointment/nominationhadbecomemootandacademic
pursuanttoSec.23oftheRulesofresp.CAand"unless resubmitted shallnotagainbeconsideredbythe
Commission."Adapted.

Calderonv.Carale(208SCRA254)
F:

InMarch1989,RA6715(HerreraVelosoLaw),amendingtheLaborCode,wasapproved.ItprovidesinSec.13
thereofasfollows:
"xxx
TheChairman,theDivisionPresidingCommissionersandotherCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresident,
subjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.xxx"
Pursuanttosaidlaw,PresidentAquinoappointedtheChairman(B.CARALE)andCommissionersoftheNLRC.
Theappointmentsstatedthattheappointeesmayqualifyandenterupontheperformancesofthedutiesoftheoffice.
Thepresentpetitionforprohibitionquestionstheconstitutionalityandlegalityofthepermanentappointments
extendedbythePresidenttotherespondentsChairmanandMembersoftheNLRC,withoutsubmittingthesametothe
CommissiononAppointmentsforconfirmationpursuanttoArt.215oftheLaborCodeasamendedbyRA6715.
Petitionersinsistsonamandatorycompliancew/RA6715whichhasinitsfavorthepresumptionofvalidity.RA
6715isnot,accordingtothepetitioner,anencroachmentontheappointingpoweroftheexecutivecontainedinSec.16of
Art.VIIoftheConstitution.
TheSolicitorGeneralcontends,ontheotherhand,thatRA6715transgressesSec.16,Art.VIIbyexpandingthe
confirmationpowersoftheCommissiononAppointmentswithoutconstitutionalbasis.

ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointmentsextendedbythePresidenttogovernmentofficersadditionaltothoseexpresslymentionedinthe
firstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitution.(NO)
HELD:ThecontroversyinthecaseisfocusedonSec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitutionw/cprovides:
"Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,
appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficers
ofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevested
inhiminthisConstitution.HeshallalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsare
nototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,
bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheads
ofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards."xxx

TherearefourgroupsofofficerswhomthePresidentshallappoint.Thesefourgroupsare:
First,theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officers
ofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevested

inhiminthisConstitution;
Second,allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforlaw;
Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint;
Fourth,officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentstheCongressmaybylawvestinthePresidentalone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylawandthosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawto
appoint.
Indubitably,theNLRCChairmanandCommissionersfallwithinthesecondsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,
morespecificallyunder"thosewhomhe(thePresident)maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."Undeniably,the
ChairmanandMembersoftheNLRCarenotamongtheofficersmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16
whoseappointmentsrequiresconfirmationbytheCA.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents
ChairmanandMembersoftheNLRC,itisunconstitutionalbecause:
1.itamendsbylegislation,thefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitutionbyaddingthereto
appointmentsrequiringconfirmationbytheCA;and
2.itamendsbylegislation,thesecondsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,byimposingtheconfirmationoftheCA
onappointmentsw/careotherwiseentrustedonlywiththePresident.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a
judicialfunction.
SupremeCourtdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingtheConstitutionshallformpartofthelegalsystemof
thePhilippines.NodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbytheCourtinadecisionrendered enbanc orin
divisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbytheCourtsittingenbanc.Adapted.

Notes: Fromtherulingsin SarmientoIIIv.Mison,156S549), Bautistav.Salonga,172S160,and Delesv.

ConstitutionalCommission,177S259,thesedoctrinesarededucible:
1.ConfirmationbytheCAisrequiredonlyforpresidentialappointeesasmentionedinthefirstsentence
ofSec.16,Art.VII,including,thoseofficerswhoseappointmentsareexpresslyvestedbytheConstitutionitself
inthepresident(likesectoralrepresentativestoCongressandmembersoftheconstitutionalcommissionsof
Audit,CivilServiceandElection).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaworthoseofficerswhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawto
appoint(liketheChairmanandMembersoftheCom.onHumanRights).Also,asobservedin Sarmientov.
Mison,whenCongresscreatesinferiorofficesbutomitstoprovideforappointmentthereto,orprovidesinan
unconstitutionalmannerforsuchappointments,theofficersareconsideredasamongthosewhoseappointments

arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw.

(2)W/NlegislationcanexpandaconstitutionalprovisionaftertheSupremeCourthasinterpretedit.
InEndenciaandJugov.David,93Phil.699,theCourtheld:
"WehavealreadysaidthattheLegislatureunderourformofgovernmentisassignedthetaskandthe
powertomakeandenactlaws,butnottointerpretthem.Thisismoretruewithregardtotheinterpretationofthe
Constitution,whichisnotwithinthesphereoftheLegislativeDepartment.IftheLegislaturemaydeclarewhata
lawmeans,orwhataspecificportionoftheConstitutionmeans,especiallyafterthecourtshaveinactualcase
ascertaineditsmeaningbyinterpretationandapplieditinadecision,thiswouldsurelycauseconfusionand
instabilityinjudicialprocessesandcourtdecisions.Undersuchasystem,afinalcourtdeterminationofacase
basedonjudicialinterpretationofthelaworoftheConstitutionmaybeunderminedorevenannulledbya
subsequentanddifferentinterpretationofthelaworoftheConstitutionbytheLegislativeDepartment.That
would neither be wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our
constitutionalsystemofgovernment,particularlythosegoverningtheseparationofpowers."
ThefunctionoftheCourtinpassinguponanactofCongressisto"laythearticleoftheConstitution
whichisinvokedbesidethestatutewhichischallengedandtodecidewhetherthelattersquareswiththeformer"
andtoannounceitsconsideredjudgmentuponthequestion."
ItcannotbeoverlookedthatSec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitutionwasdeliberatelyintendedbythe
framerstobeadeparturefromthesystemembodiedinthe1935ConstitutionwheretheCAexercisedthepower
ofconfirmationoveralmostallpresidentialappointments,leadingtomanycasesofabuseofsuchpowerof
confirmation.Adapted.

Ramosv.Alvarez(97PHIL.844)[ComparewithCalderoncase]
F:

BeforeservinghisfulltermaselectedmemberoftheProvincialBoardofNegrosOcc.,JesusAritao(LP)resigned
hisofficewhenhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacyforcongressman.
Tofillsuchvacancy,thenPresidentQuirino,actingontheauthorityofSec.21(b)oftheRevisedElectioncode
(REC)appointed Agustin Ramos (LP), whoassumed office thereafter.Induetime,Ramos' interim appointment was
submittedtotheCommissiononAppointments(CA)forconfirmation.Butbeforeitcouldbeconfirmed,thenewPresident
of the Phil., Hon. R. Magsaysay, nominated Rafael Alvarez for the same office. The nomination was unanimously
confirmedbytheCAafterithasrejectedRamos'appointment.
AlvarezassumedofficeasmemberoftheProv'lBoardofNegrosOcc.despitevigorousoppositionfromRamos,
whothereafterfiledthepresentpetitiontohavehimselfdeclaredlegallyentitledtotheofficeandtohaveAlvarezousted
therefrom.
Petitionercontends,amongothers,thatheisstilllegallyentitledtotheofficebecausehisappointmentwasnot
subjecttotheconsentordisapprovaloftheCA.Respondentonhispartcontendsotherwise.

ISSUE:W/NanappointmentmadebythePresidentunderSec.21(b)oftheRECissubjecttotheconsentofthe
CA.(YES)

Sec.21(b)oftheREC,underw/cthepetitionerwasappointed,provides:
Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death,
resignation,removalorcessationoftheincumbent,thePresidentshallappointtheretoasuitable
person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the
recommendation ofsaidparty,saveinthecaseofmayor,whichshallbefilledbythevice
mayor."
UnderPar.3,ofSec.10,Art.VIIofthe1935Constitution,therearefourgroups
ofofficersthatthePresidentshallappoint,namely:
First,theheadsofexecutivedepartmentsandbureaus,officersoftheArmyfromtherankofcolonel,of
theNavyandairforcesfromtherankofcaptainorcommander;
Second,allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforinthe
Constitution;
Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint;and
Fourth,inferiorofficerswhoseappointmentstheCongresshasbylawvestedinthePresidentalone.
TheConstitutionisexplicitthatforofficersofthefirst,secondandthirdgroups,theappointmentmade
bythePresidentshallbewiththeconsentoftheCA.Itisonlyinthecaseofthefourthgroup,thatis,ofinferior
officerswhoseappointmentisbylawvested"inthePresidentalone"thatsuchconsentisnotrequired.
Ontheotherhand,examiningtheprovisionofSec.21(b)oftheREC,wefindthatwhileitsaysthatthe
Presidentshallmaketheappointment,itdoesnotsaythattheappointmentisnottobesubjecttotheconsentof
theCAthatis,thatitistobemadebythePresidentalone.Suchbeingthecase,thePresident'sappointmentmust
bedeemedsubjecttothegeneralrequirementthatthesameistobewiththeconsentoftheCA.Itwouldfallthen
underthethirdgroupofofficersmentionedinpar.3ofSec.10,Art.VIIofthe1935Constitution.Thus,inthe
UnitedStates,underaconstitutionalprovisionsimilartoours,thegeneralruleisthat"whenastatutedoesnot
specifyhowanofficeristobeappointed,itmustbebythePresidentandwiththeconsentoftheSenate."
Inviewoftheforegoing,petitioner'sappointmentasmemberoftheProvincialBoardwassubjecttothe
consentoftheCA,sothathisrighttotheofficeceasedwhenhisappointmentwasrejectedbytheCommission.
Adapted.
(TakenoteofthecaseofCalderonv.Carale,208SCRA254)

(a)Headsoftheexecutivedepartments
Art.VII,Sec. 16. ThePresident shallnominateand, with the consentoftheCommission on

Appointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand
consuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Governmentwhoseappointments arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybe
authorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerin
rankin thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

(b)Ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls(Id.)

(c)OfficersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippineswiththerankofcolonelor
navalcaptain(becausetheseareofficersofasizeablecommandenoughtostageacoup)
(Id.)
(d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the
Constitution:
(i)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheConstitutionalCommissions
Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners(oftheCivilServiceCommission)shallbe
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissioner
forfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears,
withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshall
beonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. Innocase
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporaryoractingcapacity.
Id.,C,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononElections)shall
beappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofseven
yearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,threeMembersshallholdofficeforsevenyears,
twoMembersforfiveyears,andthelastMembersforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointment
toanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. InnocaseshallanyMemberbe

appointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.
Id.,D,Sec.1(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononAudit)shallbe
appointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyears
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. Innocaseshallany
Memberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.

(ii)Regularmembers oftheJudicialandBarCouncil(composedoftheIBP
representative,professoroflaw,retiredSCjustice,andrepresentativeoftheprivatesector.Notetheexofficio
members:ChiefJustice,SecretaryofJustice,andrepresentativeofCongress)Art.
VII,Sec.8.(2)Theregularmembersofthe(JudicialandBar)Councilshallappointedbythe
PresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.OftheMembers
firstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawfor
threeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.

(iii)Sectoralrepresentatives
Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof
nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2) of
Section5ofArticleVIofthisConstitution.

(iv)RegionalConsultativeCommission

Art.X,Sec.18. TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththe
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefine
thebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislative
assembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws.
Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes
castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and
geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.

UponrecommendationoftheJudicialandBarCouncil

(a)MembersoftheSupremeCourtandallothercourts
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil
foreveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submissionofthelist.
(b)Ombudsmanandhis5deputies(forLuzon,Visayas,Mindanao,generaland
military)

Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist
ofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesfor
everyvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilled
withinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur.

AppointmentofVicePresidentasMemberoftheCabinet
Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx
TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno
confirmation
AppointmentssolelybythePresident
Art.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallxxxalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhose
appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawto
appoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident
alone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

1.ThosevestedbytheConstitutiononthePresidentalone(e.g.appointmentofVicePresidenttothe
Cabinet)[Art.VII,Sec.3(2)]
2.Thosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw.

3.Thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.
4.ThoseotherofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentisvestedbylawinthePresident(alone).
Thephraseologyismuddled.
Themeaningof#4wastoucheduponinSarmientovMison.Inarguingthatevenbureauchiefsneeded
confirmationeveniftheyareofinferiorrank,theargumentwasthephrase,"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vestin
theappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone"meantthatuntilalawispassedgiving
suchappointingpowertothePresidentalone,thensuchappointmenthastobeconfirmed.Onlyaftersuchlawis
passeddoesthenecessityforconfirmationnolongerhold.TheSCdismissedthisviewhowever,sayingthatthe
inclusionoftheword"alone"wasanoversight.Thus,theConstitutionshouldread"TheCongressmay,bylaw,
vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident."

(5)LimitationsonappointingpowerofthePresident
Art.VII,Secs.13and15
`Art.VII,Sec.13.xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Id.,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendof
histerm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentsto
executivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublic
safety.

a.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivildegreeofthePresidentshall
not,duringhis"tenure".beappointedas(i)membersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,(ii)memberofthe
OfficeofOmbudsman,(iii)Secretaries,(iv)Undersecretaries,(v)Chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.
b.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelections(2ndMondayofMarch),anduptothe
endofhis"term"(June30),aPresident(orActingPresident)shallnotmakeappointments.
Exception:Temporaryappointments,toexecutivepositions,whencontinuedvacanciesthereinwill(1)
prejudicepublicservice(e.g.Postmaster)or(ii)endangerpublicsafety(e.g.ChiefofStaff).

This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the validity of
"midnightappointments".
(Adinterimappointmentscouldeitherbe"midnight",ifmadebythePresidentbeforehestepsdownfromoffice
orrecess,ifmadebythePresidentwhenCongressisnotinsession.)
InAytonavCastillo,4SCRA1(1962),theSCruledthatwhile"midnightappointments"arenotillegal,
theyshouldbemadeinthecapacityofa"caretaker"doublycarefulandprudentinmakingtheselection,soas
nottodefeatthepoliciesoftheincomingadministration.Saidthecourt:
AftertheproclamationofanincomingPresident,theoutgoingPresidentisnomorethana"caretaker"
administratordutyboundtopreparefortheorderlytransitiontothenewPresident,andheshouldnotdoactsthat
wouldobstructthepoliciesofhissuccessor.
Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantposts,iffew,andsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdelib
erateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandtheappointeesqualifications,maybe
undoubtedlypermitted.
Buttheissuanceof350appointmentsinonenight,andtheplannedinductionofalmostallofthemafew
hoursbeforetheinaugurationofthenewPresidentmayberegardedasabuseofpresidentialprerogatives.
Where the President makes adinterim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be
"prudent"toinsureapprovalofhisselection,eitherbypreviousconsultationwiththeCAorby
explaininghisreasonthereafter.WheretheCAthatwillconsidertheappointeesisdifferentfrom
thatexistingatthetimeofappointment,andwherethenamesaretobesubmittedbyhissuccessor
who may not wholly approve of his selections, the President should be "doubly careful in
extendingsuchappointment.

InJorgevMayer,10SCRA331(1964),theCourtemphasizedtheruleinAytonathataprudentlymade
midnightappointmentsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationofthe
needfortheappointmentandtheappointees'qualifications isnotprohibitedbylaw. Thecircumstancesof
Jorge'sappointmentasDirectorofLandsinthiscase,basedonhis38yearsoffaithfulserviceandconfirmedby
theCAbeforeitsadjournment,werefoundtobejudicious.

InQuisumbingvTajanglangit,10SCRA446(1964),theSCemphasizedthattheAytonarulingdoesnot
declareallmidnightappointmentsasinvalid,andthattheadinterimappointmentofthepetitionerchiefofpolice
here,whosequalificationandregularitywerenotdisputed,exceptforthefactthatitwasmadeduringthelast
fewdaysoftheoldadministration,isthusnotinvalid.

Interimorrecessappointments

Art VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constitutedwithinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganized
withtheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker. TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonly
whiletheCongressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischarge
suchpowersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.

Art.VII,Sec.16.xxx
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

Regularandrecess(adinterim)appointments
The procedure for confirmation has been discussed above under Constitutional Congressional
Committees.Tosketch:
Appointmentsrequiringconfirmationareoftwokinds,(i)regular,iftheCA,thatis,Congress,isin
session,or(ii)duringtherecessofCongress(becausetheCommissionshallmeetonlywhileCongressisin
session[Art.VI,Sec.19]).
Regular appointments require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The President
nominates,CongressreceivesthenominationandforwardsthistotheCAforconfirmation,thentheOfficeof
thePresidentissuesaCommission,atwhichpointtheappointeecanassumehisoffice.
Recessappointments,ontheotherhand,neednoconfirmationtobeeffective,albeittemporarily.The
appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, or until the next
adjournmentofCongress(unlessmeantime,itisconfirmedbytheCommission)(Art.VII,Sec.16,par.2)
TemporaryDesignations:
AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIIISec.17
ThePresidentmaydesignateanofficeralreadyinthegovt.serviceoranyothercompetentpersonto
performthefunctionsofanyofficeintheexecutivebranch,appointmenttowhichisvestedinhimbylaw,when:
(a)Theofficerregularlyappointedtotheofficeisunabletoperformhisdutiesbyreasonofillness,
absenceoranyothercause;or
(b)Thereexistsavacancy;
Innocaseshallatemporarydesignationexceedone(1)year.

(6)LimitationsontheappointingpoweroftheActingPresident

Art.VII,Secs.1416
Art.VII,Sec.14. AppointmentsextendedbyanActingPresidentshallremaineffectiveunless
revokedbytheelectedPresidentwithinninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice.
Art.VII,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheend
ofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointments
toexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublic
safety.

Art.VII,Sec.16.xxx
ThePresident shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbythe
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

UPDATED1/23/96
/RAM

(7)Executiveclemencies
Art.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,
thePresident maygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,after
convictionbyfinaljudgment.
It shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
MembersoftheCongress.

ThePresident maygrant (i)reprieves,(ii) commutations, and (iii) pardons, and (iv) remit fines and
forfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment,except:
(a)Incasesofimpeachment,and
(b)AsotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,viz.

Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,paroleorsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelection
laws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationby
theCommission(onElections.)

Definitions
Reprieveisatemporaryrelieffromorpostponementofexecutionofcriminalpenaltyorsentenceora
stayofexecution.Itdoesnotmorethanstaytheexecutionofasentenceextendedtoaprisonertoaffordhiman
opportunitytoprocuresomeameliorationofthesentenceimposed.(Black.)Itisthewithholdingofasentence
foranintervaloftime,apostponementofexecution,atemporarysuspensionofexecution. (Peoplevs.Vera,
infra.)
Commutation isareduction ofsentence. (Black.) Itisaremission ofapartof thepunishment;a
substitutionofalesspenaltyfortheoneoriginallyimposed.(Peoplevs.Vera,infra.)
Pardonisapermanentcancellationofsentence.(Black)Itisanactofgraceproceedingfromthepower
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment thelawinflictsforthecrimehehascommitted.Itisaremissionofguilt,aforgivenessofthe
offense.(PeoplevVera,infra.)

Cruz: KindsofPardon. Pardonmaybeclassifiedintoabsoluteorconditionalandplenaryorpartial.An

absolutepardonisoneextendedw/oanystringsattached,sotospeak,whereasaconditionalpardonisoneunder
w/ctheconvictisrequiredtocomplyw/certainrequirements.Aplenarypardonextinguishesallthepenalties
imposedupontheoffender,includingaccessorydisabilities,whereaspartialpardondoesnot.
Wherethepardonisconditional,theoffenderhastherighttorejectthesamesincehemayfeelthatthe
conditionimposedismoreonerousthanthepenaltysoughttoberemitted. Butinthecaseofanabsolute
pardon,thepardoneehasnooptionatallandmustacceptitwhetherhelikesitornot.Inthissense,anabsolute
pardonissimilartocommutation,w/cisalsonotsubjecttoacceptancebytheoffender.
Amnesty isasovereignactofoblivionforpastacts,grantedbygovernmentgenerallytoaclassof
personswhohavebeenguiltyusuallyofpoliticaloffenses(treason,sedition,rebellion),andwhoaresubjectto
trialbuthavenotyetbeenconvicted,andoftenconditionedupontheirreturntoobedienceanddutywithina
prescribedtime.(Black;BrownvWalker,161US602).
Probationisadispositionunderwhichadefendantafterconvictionandsentenceisreleasedsubjectto
conditionsimposedbythecourtandtothesupervisionofaprobationofficer.[Sec.3(a),PD968.]
Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the
minimumtermoftheindeterminatesentencepenalty,withoutgrantingapardon,prescribingthetermsupon
whichthesentenceshallbesuspended.

(a)Pardondistinguishedfromprobation
Peoplevs.Vera,65P56(1937)
Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and
differentfromeachother,bothinoriginandnature. Inprobation,theprobationerisinnotruesense,asin
pardon,afreeman.Heisnotfinallyandcompletelyexonerated.Heisnotexemptfromtheentirepunishment
w/cthelawinflicts.UndertheProbationAct,theprobationer'scaseisnotterminatedbythemerefactthatheis
placedonprobation.Theprobationer,duringtheperiodofprobation,remainsinlegalcustodysubjecttothe
controloftheprobationofficerandofthecourt,hemayberearresteduponthenonfulfillmentoftheconditions
ofprobationand,whenrearrested,maybecommittedtoprisontoservethesentenceoriginallyimposedupon
him.

Notes:
Inbothcases,theremustbeafinaljudgmentofconviction,andtheconvictmustbeexemptedfrom
serviceofsentence.ButpardonisgrantedbytheChiefExecutiveforanycrime,whileprobationisgrantedby
thecourtafterinvestigationbyaprobationofficeronlyforcaseswherethepenaltyimposeddoesnotexceed6
yearsand1day(prisionmayor),wherethecrimeisnotagainstthesecurityoftheState,wheretherewasno
previousconvictionforanoffensepunishedby arrestomayor,andwheretherewasnopreviousavailmentof
probation.
Inabsolutepardon,thesentenceanditseffects,includingtheaccessorypenalties,areabolisheduponthe
grantofpardon.Inprobation,therestorationoftheprobationertohiscivilrightstakesplacesonlyafterhisfinal
dischargeaftertheperiodofhisprobation.(Secs.14&16)

(b)PardondistinguishedfromParole
PardonmaybegrantedbytheChiefExecutiveundertheConstitutionandformerlytheAdministrative
Code,atanytimeafterfinaljudgmentofconviction,evenbeforeservice;whileparoleisgrantedbytheBoardof
PardonsandParoleundertheIndeterminateSentenceLawonlyaftertheconvicthasservedtheminimumterm
ofhissentence.
Inpardon,theconvictbecomesafreeman;inparole,heisnotreallyfreebecausealthoughhehis
releasedfromthecustodyofthelaw,hemustsubmittoperiodicexaminationbytheBoardofParole.
InTesorovDirectorofPrisons,68Phil154(1939),theSCdismissedthecontentionthatbecauseparole
isnotmentionedintheConstitution,thenthepowertograntparoleisalsodeemedrepealed.TheCourtsaidthat
paroleispartofthepardoningpowerofthePresident. JusticeFernandopointsout,however,thatthisisnot
accurate.IfeverthePresidenthasthepowertograntparole,itisbecausethelawgrantshimthatpower,andnot
becauseparoleispartofpardon.

Tesorovs.DirectorofPrisons,68Phil154

F:
OnOct.10,1934,petitionerTesorowasconvictedintheCFIManilaofthecrimeoffalsificationofapublic
documentandwassentenced.HispenaltywastoexpireonOct.28,1937.
OnNov.14,1935,theGov.Gen.grantedthepetitioneraparole,whichthelatteraccepted,subjecttocertain
conditions.Oneoftheconditionswasthathewillnotcommitanyothercrimeandwillconducthimselfinanorderly
manner.
Dec.3,1937,thepetrwaschargedwiththecrimeofadultery.However,thecasewasdismissedfornonappearance
ofthecomplainant,JoseNagar.
Feb. 1938, Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts
supportingthecrim.action,chargedpetitionerwithviolationoftheconditionsofhisparole.
Later,byvirtueofanorderfromthePresident,thepetrwasarrestedandrecommittedtothecustodyoftheDir.of
Prisons.
Petr.contendsthatsec.64(i)oftheRev.Adm.Code,insofarasitconfersupontheChiefExecutivethepowerto
grantandrevokeparoles,hasbeenimpliedlyrepealedbyPar.6,sec.11,Art.VIIoftheConstitution,asthelatteromittedto
specifysuchpowerinconnectionwiththepowersgrantedthereintothePresidentofthePhilippines.
Sec.64(1)givestheGov.Gentheff.powersandduties:
"Togranttoconvictedpersonsreprievesorpardons,eitherplenaryorpartial,conditionalor
unconditional;tosuspendsentenceswithoutpardon,remitfines,andorderthedischargeofanyconvicted
personuponparole,subjecttosuchconditionsashemayimpose;andtoauthorizethearrestandre
incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions,ofhispardon,parole,orsuspensionofsentence."
TheaforementionedConstitutionalprovisionprovides:
"ThePresidentshallhavethepowertograntreprieves,commutations,andpardons,and
remitfinesandforfeitures,afterconviction,foralloffenses,exceptincasesofimpeachment,uponsuch
conditionsandwithsuchrestrictionsandlimitationsashemaydeempropertoimpose.Heshallhavethe
powertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceoftheNationalAssembly."

ISSUENO.1:W/Ntherehasbeenarepeal.
HELD:NONE.ThepowertopardongiventhePresidentbytheConstitution,"uponsuchconditionsandwith
suchrestrictionsandlimitationsashemaydeempropertoimpose,"includesthepowertograntandrevoke
paroles.IftheomissionofthepowerofparoleintheConstitutionistobeconstruedasadenialthereoftothe
President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the
Constitution,havebeenreleasedconditionallybytheChiefExecutive.

ISSUENO.2:W/NtheBoardhaslegalauthoritytoinvestigatetheconductofthepetitioner.
HELD:YES.Bythetermsofhisparole,petitioneragreedtoreporttotheexecutivesecretaryoftheBoardonce
amonthduringthefirstyearofhisparole,andthereafter,onceevery3months.Byhisconsenttothiscondition,
petitionerhasplacedhimselfunderthesupervisionoftheBoard.Thedutytoreportonthepartofthepetitioner

implies acorrespondingpoweronthepartoftheBoardtoinquireintohisconductand afortiori tomake

recommendationstothePresidentbywhoseauthorityitwasacting.Thepowertorevokeparolesnecessarily
carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of
revocationistoberationalandintelligent.Intheexerciseofthisincidentalpower,thePresidentisnotprecluded
bylaworbytheConstitutionfrommakinguseofanyagencyofthegovt,orevenofanyindividual,tosecurethe
necessaryassistance.
ISSUENO.3:W/Njudicialpronouncementtotheeffectthathehascommittedacrimeisnecessarybeforehe
canbeproperlyadjudgedashavingviolatedhisconditionalparole.
HELD:NO.Asoneoftheconditionsofhisparole,petitioneragreedthathewillnotcommitanyothercrimeand
willconducthimselfinanorderlymanner.Thus,themerecommission,nothisconvictionbycourt,ofanyother
crime,thatwasnecessaryinorderthatpetitionermaybedeemedtohaveviolatedhisparole.AndunderSec.64
(i),theChiefExecutiveisauthorizedtoorder"thearrestandreincarcerationofanysuchpersonwho,in his
judgment,shallfailtocomplywiththecondition/sofhispardon,parole,orsuspensionofsentence.
ISSUENO.4:W/NthecourtscanreviewthefindingsofthePres.regardingtheviolationoftheconditional
parole.
HELD:NO.Wherethedeterminationoftheviolationoftheconditionalparolerestsexclusivelyinthesound
judgmentoftheChiefExecutive,thecourtswillnotinterfere,bywayofreview,withanyofhisfindings.
ISSUENO.5:W/Nupontheexpirationofhismaximumtermofimprisonment,hisconditionalparolealso
expires.

HELD:NO.Whenaconditionalpardonisviolated,theprisonerisplacedinthesamestateinw/chewasatthe
timethepardonwasgranted.Hemayberearrestedandrecommittedtoprison.xxxTheruleiswellsettledthat,
inrequiringtheconvicttoundergosomuchofthepunishmentimposedbyhisoriginalsentenceashehadnot
sufferedatthetimeofhisrelease,thecourtshouldnotconsiderthetimeduringwhichtheconvictwasatlarge
byvirtueofthepardonastimeservedontheoriginalsentence.(Pp.v.Tapel)Thisruleappliesbyanalogyto
conditionalparole.Adapted.

Torresv.Gonzales152SCRA272
F:

Before1979,Torreswasconvictedofthecrimeofestafa(2counts)andwassentencedtoimprisonmentandtopay
anindemnity.ThemaximumsentencewouldexpireonNov.2,2000.

OnApril18,1979,aconditionalpardonwasgrantedthepetitionerbythePresidentonconditionthatpetitioner
would"notagainviolateanyofthepenallawsofthePhil.Shouldthisconditionbeviolated,hewillbeproceededagainst
inthemannerprescribedbylaw.Petitioneracceptedtheconditionalpardonandwasreleased.
OnSept.8,1986,thePresidentcancelledtheconditionalpardonofthepetitioneruponrecommendationofthe
BoardofPardons.TherecordbeforetheBoardshowedthatpetitionerhadbeenchargedwith20countsofestafa,convicted

ofseditionw/cisthesubjectofanappeal,andaletterreportfromtheNBIshowingalonglistofchargesbroughtagainst
thepetitioner.ThepetitionerwassubsequentlyarrestedandconfinedinMuntinlupatoservetheunexpiredportionofhis
sentence.
Petitionerclaimshedidnotviolatehisconditionalpardonsincehehasnotbeenconvictedbyfinaljudgmentofthe
20countsofestafanorofthecrimeofsedition.Healsocontendsthathewasnotgivenanopportunitytobeheardbefore
hewasarrestedandrecommittedtoprisonandthusdeprivedofdueprocess.

ISSUE:W/Nconvictionofacrimebyfinaljudgmentofacourtisnecessarybeforethepetitionercanbevalidly
rearrestedandrecommittedforviolationofthetermsofhisconditionalpardonandaccordinglytoservethe
balanceofhisoriginalsentence.
HELD:NO.TheCourtcited3cases:Espuelasv.Prov'lWardenofBohol;Tesorov.Dir.ofPrisonsandSalesv.
Dir.ofPrisons.
Thegrantofpardonandthedetermination ofthetermsandconditions ofaconditional pardonare
purelyexecutiveactswhicharenotsubjecttojudicialscrutiny.
Thedeterminationoftheoccurrenceofabreachofaconditionofapardon,andtheproperconsequences
ofsuchbreach,maybeeitherapurelyexecutiveact,notsubjecttojudicialscrutinyunderSec.64(i)oftheRev.
Adm.Code;oritmaybeajudicialactconsistingoftrialforandconvictionofviolationofaconditionalpardon
under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial
pronouncementofguiltofasubsequentcrimeisnecessary,muchlessconvictionthereforbyfinaljudgmentofa
court,inorderthataconvictmayberecommendedfortheviolationofhisconditionalpardon.

Becausedueprocessisnotsemperetubiquejudicialprocess,andbecausetheconditionallypardoned
convicthadalreadybeenaccordedjudicialdueprocessinhistrialandconvictionfortheoffenseforw/chewas
conditionallypardoned,sec.64(i),RAC,isnotafflictedwithaconstitutionalvice.
Inshort,inproceedingagainstaconvictwhohasbeenconditionallypardonedandwhoisallegedto
havebreachedtheconditionsofhispardon,theExecutiveDept.has2options:(i)toproceedagainsthimunder
Sec.64(i),RAC;or(ii)toproceedagainsthimunderArt.159,RPCwhichimposesthepenaltyof prision
correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive,shallviolateanyoftheconditionsofsuchpardon.Here,thePresidenthaschosentoproceedagainst
thepetitionerundertheRAC.Thatchoiceisanexerciseoftheexecutiveprerogativeandnotsubjecttojudicial
scrutiny.Adapted.

(c)PardondistinguishedfromAmnesty
1.Pardonisusuallygrantedforcommoncrimes;amnesty,forpoliticalcrimes.
2.Pardonisgrantedtoindividuals;amnesty,toagroup,class,orcommunitygenerally.

3.Pardoncanonlybegrantedafterconviction;amnestymaybegrantedevenbeforetrial.
4.Pardonlooksforwardandrelievestheoffenderfromtheconsequencesofanoffenseofwhichhehas
beenconvicted,thatis,itabolishesorforgivesthepunishment;amnestylooksbackwardandabolishesandputs
intoobliviontheoffenseitself,thatis,itoverlooksandobliteratestheoffensewithwhichtheconvictischarged
thatthepersonreleasedstandspreciselyasthoughhehadcommittednooffense.(Barrioquinto vFernandez,
infra.)
5.PardonisaprivateactofthePresidentw/cmustbepleadedandprovedbythepersonbec.thecourts
donottakejudicialnoticeofit;amnestyisapublicactofw/cthecourtstakejudicialnotice.(Cruz,Philippine
PoliticalLaw,1991ed.)
6.PardondoesnotrequiretheconcurrenceoftheCongress;amnestyrequiressuchconcurrence.(id.)

Barrioquintoetalv.Fernandez82Phil642
F:

PetitionersJimenezandBarrioquintowerechargedwithmurder.Jimenezwassentencedtolifeimprisonment.
Beforetheperiodforperfectinganappealhadexpired,JimenezbecameawareofProcl.No.8whichgrantsamnestyin
favorofallpersonswhomaybechargedwithanactpenalizedundertheRPCinfurtheranceofresistancetotheenemyor
againstpersonsaidinginthewareffortsoftheenemy,andcommittedduringtheperiodDec.8,1941tothedatewheneach
particularareaofthePhil.wheretheoffensewasactuallycommittedwasliberatedfromenemycontrolandoccupation.
ThepetitionerssubmittedtheircasestotheGuerrillaAmnestyCommission(GAC).
TheGACreturnedtheircasestotheCFIZamboangaw/odecidingwhetherornottheyareentitledtothebenefits
oftheAmnestyProclamation,onthegroundthatinasmuchasneitherofthepetitionershaveadmittedtocommittingthe
offense,theycannotinvokethebenefitsoftheamnesty.

HELD: Pardon isgrantedbytheChiefExecutiveandassuchitisaprivateactwhichmustbepleadedand

provedbythepersonpardoned,becausethecourtstakenonoticethereof;whileAmnestyisbyProclamationof
theChiefExecutivewiththeconcurrenceofCongress,anditisapublicactofwhichthecourtsshouldtake
judicialnotice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communitieswhomaybeguiltyofpoliticaloffenses,generallybeforeoraftertheinstitutionofthecriminal
prosecutionandsometimesafterconviction.
Pardonlooksforwardandrelievestheoffenderfromtheconsequencesofanoffenseofwhichhehas
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the
restorationoftherightstoholdpublicoffice,ortherightofsuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbeexpresslyrestoredby
thetermsofthepardon,"andit"innocaseexemptstheculpritfromthepaymentofthecivilindemnityimposed
uponhimbythesentence"(Art36RPC).WhileAmnestylooksbackwardandabolishesandputsintooblivion
theoffenseitself,itsooverlooksandobliteratestheoffensewithwhichheischargedthatthepersonreleasedby
amnestystandsbeforethelawpreciselyasthoughhehadcommittednooffense.

ISSUE:W/NinordertoentitleapersontothebenefitsoftheAmnestyProcl.ofSept.7,1946,itisnecessaryas
aconditionprecedentthatheshouldadmithavingcommittedthecriminalactwithw/cheischargedandallege
theamnestyasadefense.
HELD:NO.Itissufficientthattheevidence,eitherofthecomplainantoroftheaccused,showsthattheoffense
committedcomesw/nthetermsofsaidAmnestyProcl.

Itisnotcorrecttosaythat"invocationofthebenefitsoftheamnesty isinthenatureofapleaof
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declaredbythecourtsortheAmnestyCommissionsentitledtothebenefitsoftheamnesty.For,w/nheadmits
or confesseshaving committed the offense w/ w/c he ischarged, theCommissions should, if necessary or
requestedbytheinterestedparty,conductsummaryhearingofthewitnessesbothforthecomplainantsandthe
accused,onwhetherhehascommittedtheoffenseinfurtheranceoftheresistancetotheenemy,oragainst
personsaidinginthewareffortsoftheenemy,anddecidewhetherheisentitledtothebenefitsofamnestyand
tobe"regardedasapatriotorherowhohasrenderedinvaluableservicestothenation,"ornot,inaccordance
withthetermsoftheAmnestyProclamation.
ISSUE:W/Nthebenefitsofamnestymaybewaived.
HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the
prosecutionorthedefense,cannotbewaived,becauseitisofpublicinterestthatapersonwhoisregardedbythe
AmnestyProclamation,whichhastheforceoflaw,notonlyasinnocent,forhestandsintheeyesofthelawasif
hehadnevercommittedanypunishableoffensebecauseoftheamnesty,butasapatriotorhero,cannotbe
punishedasacriminal.

DissentingOpinion:
Amnestypresupposesthecommissionofacrime.Whenanaccusedsaysthathehasnotcommitteda
crime,hecannothaveanyuseforamnesty.ItisalsoselfevidentthatwheretheAmnestyProclamationimposes
certainconditions,asinthiscase,itisincumbentupontheaccusedtoprovetheexistenceofthoseconditions.A
petitionforamnestyisinthenatureofapleaofconfessionandavoidance.Thepleaderhastoconfessthe
allegationsagainsthimbeforeheisallowedtosetoutsuchfactsas,iftrue,woulddefeattheaction.
o
The4thdistinction(pardonisforwardlookingwhileamnestyisbackwardlooking)isnotaccurateon
thebasisofdecidedcases.
Itcanbeseenfromseveralcases,thereforethattheeffectofpardonretroactstothedayofthecrime.It
isnotsimplyforwardlooking.
Pardonisstilluseful,then,eveniftheconvicthasalreadyservedhisfullsentence,becausetheremaybe

accessorypenaltiesthatareperpetualinextent.Adapted.

Notes:
Thefifthdistinctionbet.pardonandamnestyisthatpardonisaprivateactofthePresident,andsomust
beimpleadedincourt;amnestyisapublicactbythePresidentandCongress,andsothecourtisenjoinedtotake
judicialnoticeofit.(supra)
The5thdistinction(pardonisaprivateactwhileamnestyisapublicact)isnottrueinPhilippinelaw.
Thecaseholdsthatpardonmustberaisedasadefense,otherwisethecourtcannottakejudicialnoticeofsuch
pardon. But under Art. 89 of the RPC, absolute pardon extinguishes criminal liability. And under the
Constitution,pardoncanonlybegrantedafterfinalconviction.Ifso,once,aconvicthasbeengrantedpardon,
thisimpliesthathehasalreadybeenconvicted,andthatpreciselyhehasbeenexemptedfromthepenaltyarising
fromconviction.Whywouldhestillhavetoinvokeit?Thisseemstocontemplateasituationwhereheisbeing
chargedagainofthesamecrime,andthatheneedstoinvokethepardonasadefense,whichisimpossible
becauseofdoublejeopardy.
TheerrorintheBarrioquintorulingisthatitborrowedthisdistinctionfromAmericanlaw,whichallows
thePresidentthepowertograntpardonevenbeforeconviction(thus,FordwasabletopardonNixoneven
withoutatrial.)
SuchwasourlawundertheJonesLawof1916.Butunderthe1935Constitution,thisrulewaschanged:
pardoncouldonlybegrantedafterconviction,In1973,itwasmadestricter:pardoncouldbegrantedonlyafter
"final"conviction.Then,in1981,thephrase"afterfinalconviction"wasdropped,thusgoingbacktotherule
undertheJonesLawandthePresidentcouldgrantpardonanytime.In1987,thephrasereads:"afterconviction
byfinaljudgment."
Asidefromextinguishingcriminalliability,pardonalsoworkstoremitfinesandforfeiturespaidinfavor
oftheGovernment.
Butitdoesnotautomaticallyrestorethepublicofficeforfeited,norrelievethepardoneeofcivilliability
andotherclaimspertainingtotheprivateoffendedparty.

(d)EffectsofPardon
InCristobalvLabrador,71Phil34(1940),thevoterwhoserighttovotewaschallengedinanexclusion
proceedingbecausehehadbeenconvictedofestafawhichcarriedtheaccessorypenaltyofdisqualificationfrom
therightofsuffrage,andinPellobellovPalatino,72Phil441(1941),themayorelectwhowasnotallowedto
takehisoathbecauseofapreviousconviction,forfalsificationofaprivatedocumentwhichlikewisecarriedthe
accessorypenaltyofdisqualification,werebothallowedtoexercisetheirpoliticalrightinviewofthesubsequent
pardongrantedthem.[Therewouldbenoproblemiftheywerepardonedbeforehand,forthentheywouldbe
restoredtotheirpoliticalright(s)rightaway.]

CristobalvLabrador,71Phil34(1940)
F:

On3/15/30,TeofiloSantoswasfoundguiltyofestafaandsentencedto6monthsofarrestomayor.Uponappeal,
hisconvictionwasaffirmed.Hewasconfinedinjailfrom3/14/9/32to8/18/32.Notwithstandinghisconviction,Santos
continuedtobearegisteredelectorinMalabon,Rizalandwasmunicipalpres.from 1934to1937. Subsequently,The
ElectionCodewasapproved.Sec.94,par.(b)ofsaidlawdisqualifiestheresp.fromvotingforhavingbeendeclaredby
finaljudgmentguiltyofanycrimeagainstprop."Bec.ofthisprovision,SantospetitionedtheChiefExecutiveforabsolute
pardon.ThePres.grantedhispetitionrestoringhimtohis"fullcivilandpoliticalrights,exceptthatwithrespecttothe
righttoholdpublicofficeoremployment,hewillbeappointedforappointmentsonlytopositionsw/careclericalor
manualinnatureandinvolvingnomoneyorprop.responsibility.On11/40,Cristobalfiledapetitionfortheexclusionof
Santos'nameinfromthelistofvotersinMalabononthegroundthatthelatterisdisqualifiedunderpar.(b),Sec.94ofCA
357.LCdeniedCristobal'spetitionholdingthatSantos'pardonhadtheeffectofexcludinghimfromthedisqualification
createdbypar.(b)ofSec.94.Hence,thispetitionforceritorari.

HELD:Thereare2limitationsupontheexerciseoftheconstitutionalprerogativeofthePres.tograntpardon:
(1)thatthepowerbeexercisedafterconviction;(2)thatsuchpowerdoesnotextendtocasesofimpeachment.
xxxAnabsolutepardonnotonlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutitalsoremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfrom
conviction.Inthepresentcase,thedisabilityistheresultofconvictionw/ow/ctherewouldbenobasisforthe
disqualificationfromvoting.
xxx
Inthepresentcase,whilethepardonextendedisconditionalinthesensethat"hewillbeeligiblefor
appointmentonlytopositionsw/careclericalormanualinnatureinvolvingnomoneyorprop.resp.,"itis
absoluteinsofarasit"restorestheresp.tofullcivilandpoliticalrights."Adapted.
Pelobellov.Palatino72Phil441
F:

PelobelloallegesthatPalatinoisdisqualifiedfromvotingandbeingvotedupon.ItappearsthatPalatinowascon
victedbyfinaljudgmentin1912ofatentadocontralaautoridadysusagentesandsentencedtoimprisonment.Hewaslater
electedmayorofTorrijos,Marinduquein1940.ItisadmittedthatPalatinowasgrantedbytheGov.Gen.aconditional
pardonin1915.ItisalsoproventhatonDec.25,1940,thePresidentgrantedhimabsolutepardonandrestoredhimtothe
enjoymentoffullcivilandpoliticalrights.

ISSUE:W/Ntheabsolutepardonhadtheeffectofremovingthedisqualificationincidenttocriminalconviction
underthethenElectionCode,thepardonhavingbeengrantedaftertheelectionbutbeforethedatefixedbylaw
forassumingoffice.
HELD:YES.TheSCadoptsthebroadviewinCristobalv.Labradorthatsubjecttothelimitationsimposedby
theConstitution,thepardoningpowercannotberestrictedorcontrolledbylegislation;anabsolutepardonnot
onlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromtheconviction;andthatwhen
grantedafterthetermofimprisonmenthasexpired,absolutepardonremovesallthatisleftoftheconsequences
ofconviction.ThusthebetterviewisnottounnecessarilyrestrictorimpairthepoweroftheChiefExecutive
who,afterinquiryintotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityoflawtotheextentof
relievingcompletelythepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessory andresultantdisabilitiesofcriminal

conviction.
Underthecircumstancesofthecase,itisevidentthatthepurposeingrantinghimabsolutepardonwas
toenablehimtoassumethepositionindeferencetothepopularwill;andthepardonwasthusextendedafterthe
electionbutbeforethedatefixedbytheElectionCodeforassumingoffice.Adapted.

InLacunavAbes,24SCRA780,thepetitionerwasconvictedofcounterfeiting,andsowasdisqualified
fromtherightofsuffrage.Asaresult,hewasnotallowedtofilehiscandidacy,evenifhewasalreadygranted
pardon,becauseoneoftherequirementsfortheofficewasthatthecandidatebeaqualifiedvoter.TheSC,after
pointingoutthatthelawdidnotrequirethathebearegisteredvoterbutonlyaqualifiedvoteratthedayof
election,pointedoutthat,grantingarguendo,pardonretroactedtothedayofthecrime.Thus,onthedayofthe
election,"itisasthoughhewasaregisteredvoterevenifonthatday,hewasnotyetpardoned."

Lacunav.Abes24SCRA780
F:

MayorelectAbeshadbeenconvictedofthecrimeofcounterfeitingtreasurywarrantsandsentencedto prision
mayorandafine.Afterhehadpartiallyservedhissentence,hewasreleasedonApril7,1959byvirtueofaconditional
pardongrantedbythePresident,remittingonlytheunexpiredportionoftheprisontermandfine.Withoutthepardon,his
maximumsentencewouldhavebeenservedonOct.13,1961.
Withtheapproachofthe1967elections,Abesappliedforregistrationasavoterbutsaidapplicationwasdenied.
Despitethis,Abesfiledhiscertificateofcandidacyfortheofficeofmayorandlaterwon.OnNov.16,1967,hewas
proclaimedthefullyelectedmayor.Lacunaplacedsecond.
Lacunafiledhispetitionforquowarrantowithprelim.injunctioninCFINuevaEcija.Onthesamedaythatthe
hearingwasheldontheapplicationforprelim.injunction,thePresidentgrantedAbesanabsoluteandunconditionalpardon
andrestoredtohimfullcivilandpoliticalrights.
CFIdismissedthepetition,declaringAbes'eligibilitytothepositionofmayor.
LacunacontendsthattherestorationofAbes'civilandpol.rightsdidnotretroacttoremovethedisqualification
existinganteriortothegrantofthepardon.

ISSUE:W/Naplenarypardon,grantedafterelectionbutbeforethedatefixedbylawforassumingoffice,had
theeffectofremovingthedisqualificationsprescribedbyboththecriminalandelectoralcodes.
HELD: YES. The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be
unnecessarilylimitedasitwouldleadtotheimpairmentofthepardoningpower,whichwasnotcontemplatedin
theConstitution(Cristobalv.Labrador;Pelobellov.Palatino;Mijaresv.Custorio).
Aslaiddowninthe Pelobello case,"xxxsubjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution,the
pardoningpowercannotberestrictedorcontrolledbylegislativeaction;thatanabsolutepardonnotonlyblots
outthecrimecommittedbutremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromconviction;andthatwhengrantedafterthe
termofimprisonmenthasexpired,absolutepardon removesallthatisleftoftheconsequencesofconviction.
ThusthebetterviewisnottounnecessarilyrestrictorimpairthepoweroftheChiefExecutivewho,afterinquiry
intotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityoflawtotheextentofrelievingcompletely
thepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessoryandresultantdisabilitiesofcriminalconviction.Adapted.

In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through
falsificationofpublicdocumentswasgrantedanabsolutepardon,andthereafterclaimedshewasentitledasa
consequencetoreinstatementasassistantcitytreasurer,theSCheldthatapardoncannotmasktheactsconsti
tutingthecrime.Theseare"historicalfacts"which,despitethepublicmanifestationofmercyandforgiveness
implicitinpardon,"ordinary,prudentmenwilltakeintoaccountintheirsubsequentdealingswiththeactor."
Pardongrantedafterconvictionfreestheindividualfromallpenaltiesandlegaldisabilitiesandrestoreshimto
allhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence,itcannotbringbacklostreputation
forhonesty,integrityandfairdealing. Thismustbeconstantlykeptinmind,lestwelosetrackofthetrue
characterandpurposeoftheprivilege. Thus,pardondoesnot ipsofacto restoreaconvictedfelontopublic
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly
restoreshiseligibilityforappointmenttothatoffice.

MonsantovsFactoran,170SCRA190
APardonedConvictisnotEntitledtoReinstatementtoaPublicOffice.
F:

Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru
falsificationofpublicdocumentsandsentencedto4yrs.,2mos.and1dayofprisioncorrecional,asminimum,to10yrs.
and1dayofprisionmayor,asmaximum;topayfine(P3,500)andtoindemnifythegovt(P4,892.50)inadecisionofthe
SB.WhilehercasewaspendingappealintheSC,shewasgrantedabsolutepardonand"restoredtofullcivilandpolitical
rights"bythenPres.Marcos.TheMinistryofFinanceagreedtoreinstateherw/onecessityofanewappointmentprovided
thiswasdonenotearlierthanthedateofherpardon.However,on4/15/86,thenewadministrationheldthatshewasnot
entitledtoautomaticreinstatementonthebasisofthepardongrantedher.AsherMFRwasdenied,petitionerbroughtthis
actiontotheSC.Petitioner'stheoryisthatthegen.ruleonpardondoesnotapplytoherbec.shewasextendedclemency
whilehercasewasstillpendingintheSC.Shecontendedthatw/ofinaljudgmentonconviction,theaccessorypenaltyof
forfeitureofofficedidnotattach.

HELD:(1)Petitionerwasgrantedpardonunderthe1973Consti.,asamended,w/c,bydeletingtherequirement
that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before
conviction.The1987Consti.revertedtotheformerrule,requiringfinalconvictionasaconditionforthegrant
bythePres.ofpardon.However,itisimmaterialwhenthepardonwasgranted,fortheresultwouldbethesame.
Byacceptingthepardon,thepetitionerisdeemedtohaveabondonedherappeal,w/theresultthatthejudgment
of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office)
becamefinal.
(2)ThemoderntrendofauthoritiesrejecttheundulybroadlanguageofExParteGarland,4Wall.333
(1867)totheeffectthatintheeyesofthelaw,theoffenderwhoispardonedisasinnocentasifhehadnever
committedtheoffense.Whilewearepreparedtoconcedethatpardonmayremitallthepenalconsequencesofa
criminalindictmentifonlytogivemeaningtothefiatthatapardon,beingapresidentialprerogative,shouldnot
becircumscribedbylegislativeaction,wedonotsubscribetotheviewthatpardonblotsouttheguiltofan

individualandthatonceheisabsolved,heshouldbetreatedasifhewereinnocent.Forwhatevermayhavebeen
thejudicialdictainthepast,wecannotperceivehowpardoncanproducesuch"moralchanges"astoequatea
pardonedconvictincharacterandconductw/onewhohasconstantlymaintainedthemarkofagood,law
abidingcitizen.Accordingly,pardondoesnotipsofactorestorehimtopublicofficemayhavebeenforfeitedby
reasonoftheconviction,althoughsuchpardonundoubtedlyrestoreshiseligibilityforappointmenttothatoffice.
Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her
convictionshouldbetakenintoaccounttodeterminewhethershecanagainbeentrustedw/publicfunds.
(3)Norcanpetitionerbeexemptedfromthepaymentofthecivilindemnity.Itsubsistsnotwithstanding
serviceofsentence,ifforanyreasonthesentenceisnotservedbypardon,amnestyorcommutationofsentence.
VV.
Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilitiesandrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence(w/c
israre),itcannotbringbacklostreputationforhonesty,integrityandfairdealing.Thismustbeconstantlykept
inmindlestwelosetrackofthetruecharacterandpurposeoftheprivilege.xxx"

(e)Sanctionsforviolationsofconditionalpardon
TorresvsGonzales152SCRA272
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breachedtheconditionsofhispardon,theExecutiveDept.has2options:(i)toproceedagainsthimunderSec.
64(i),RAC;or(ii)toproceedagainsthimunderArt.159,RPCwhichimposesthepenaltyof prisioncorrec
cional minimumperiod,uponaconvictwhohavingbeengrantedconditionalpardonbytheChiefExecutive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitionerundertheRAC.Thatchoiceisanexerciseoftheexecutiveprerogativeandnotsubjecttojudicial
scrutiny.

(f)Doespardoningpowerapplytoadministrativecases?

LlamasvsExecutiveSecretary,202SCRA844(1991)
"Conviction"maybeusedineitheracriminalcaseorinanadministrativecase.
F:
Pet.LlamaswasViceGov.ofTarlacwhoassumedthepositionofgov.whenGov.Ocampowasfound
guiltybyDILGofaviol.ofRA3019andmetedapenaltyof90dayssuspension.Administrativeconvictionwas
basedoncomplaintfiledbypetitionersandotherschargingOcampow/executingloanagreementw/Lingkod
Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a nonstock and nonprofit org. headed by the gov. as
chairman and his brotherinlaw as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be
disadvantageoustothegovt. MFRbyOcampowasdeniedbyDILG. On3/19/91,Ocampoissued"admin.

order"whereinhesignifiedintentiontocontinueinofficeathisresidenceinthebeliefthatpendencyofappeal
totheExec.Sec.precludedfinalityasexecutoryoftheDILGorder. W/orulingontheMFR,theExec.Sec.
issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that executive
clemencycouldonlybegrantedbythePres.incrim.cases,notinadmin.cases.
HELD: Accordingtopetitioner,"afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment"appliessolelytocrim.cases." But,he
himselfdescribesthegovernorasone"convictedinanadmin.case"andthusactuallyconcedesthat"conviction"
maybeusedeitherinacrim.oradmin.case.TheConst.doesnotdistinguishbet.w/ccasesexecutiveclemency
maybeexercisedbythePres.,w/thesoleexclusionofimpeachmentcases.
If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminalcases,withmuchmorereasoncanshegrantexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecases,whichare
clearlylessseriousthancriminaloffenses.However,thepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemencyin
administrative casesrefersonly toadministrative casesin theExecutive branchand not intheJudicial or
Legislativebranchesofthegovt.
UnderthedoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,thedifferentExecutivedepartmentsaremereadjuncts
ofthePresident.TheiractsarepresumptivelytheactsofthePresidentuntilcountermandedorreprobatedby
her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive
departments, may substitute herdecision forthatof hersubordinate. Itis clearly within thepowerof the
Presidentnotonlytogrant"executiveclemency"butalsotoreverseormodifyarulingissuedbyasubordinate
againstanerringpublicofficial,whereareconsiderationofthefactsallegedwouldsupportthesame.Itisin
thissensethattheallegedexecutiveclemencywasgranted.Adapted.

Sec.53,Chapter7,SubtitleA,TitleI,BookV,AdministrativeCodeof1987
Sec. 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities. In meritorious cases and upon
recommendationofthe(CivilService)Commission,thePresidentmaycommuteorremoveadministrative
penaltiesordisabilitiesimposeduponofficersoremployeesindisciplinarycases,subjecttosuchterms
andconditionsashemayimposeintheinterestoftheservice

(g)Whomayavailofamnesty?
TolentinovsCatoy82Phil300(1948)
F:

PetitionerwasaHukbalahapwhowasfoundguiltyofillegalassemblyinfurtheranceoftheHukbalahapdesigns.
Afterthejudgmentwaspromulgated,thePresidentissuedProc.No.76grantingamnestytoleadersandmembersofthe
Hukbalahap.Petitionerwhowasalreadyservinghissentence,sentapetitiontothePresidentforhisreleaseunderthe
provisionsoftheproclamation.Noactionwastakenonhispetition.Hethenwenttocourtandfiledanapplicationfora
writofhabeascorpus.

HELD:ThoughsomemembersoftheCourtquestiontheapplicabilityofAmnestyProclamationNo.76to
Hukbalahapsalreadyundergoingsentenceuponthedateofitspromulgation,themajorityoftheCourtbelieve

thatbyitscontextandpervadingspirittheproclamationextendstoallmembersoftheHukbalahap.Itmakesno
exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of the
associations knownastheHukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ngMagbubukid (PKM). Nocompelling
reasonisapparentforexcludingHukbalahapsofanyclassorconditionfromitsobjectwhichis"toforgiveand
foregotheprosecutionofthecrimes ofrebellion,sedition,etc."Iftotalpunishment isforegoneinfavorof
Hukbalahapswhosucceededinevadingarrest,itstandstoreasonthatthosewhofellintotheclutchesofthelaw
haveabetterclaimtoclemencyfortheremainingportionofapunishmentfixedforthesameoffense.
The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the
constitutedauthoritiesandencourageresumptionoflawfulpursuitsandoccupation.Thisobjectivecannotbe
expectedtomeetwithfullsuccesswithoutthegoodwillandcooperationoftheHukbalahapswhohavebecome
moreembitteredbytheircapture,prosecutionandincarceration.
Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon includes
amnesty.Pardonandamnestyarebothconstruedmoststrictlyagainstthestate.Adapted.

MacagaanvsPeople152SCRA430
Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documentsbytheSandiganbayan.TheyclaimedthattheyhadbeengrantedamnestybyPresidentMarcos.The
SandiganbayanclaimedthatthebenefitsofamnestywereneveravailabletopetitionersunderPD1182.TheSC
agreedwiththeSandiganbayanthatinfactthepetitionerswereexpresslydisqualifiedfromamnesty.Theactsfor
which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting only of
diversionofpublicfundstoprivateprofit.Theamnestyproclamationcoveredonlyactsinthefurtheranceof
resistancetodulyconstitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublic.

BARLONGAYCASE:
Veravs.People,7SCRA152(1963)
Amnestycannotbeinvoked,wheretheaccusedactuallydeniesthecommissionoftheoffensecharged.
F:

IntheCFIQuezon,petitionersVera,amongothers,werechargedw/thecomplexcrimeofkidnappingw/murder
ofAmadeoLozanes.Uponpetitioners'motion,invokingthebenefitsofAmnestyProcl.ofthePres,s.of1946,thecase
wasreferredtotheEightGuerrillaAmnestyCommission,w/cactuallytriedit.Duringthehearing,noneofthepetitioners
admittedhavingcommittedthecrimecharged.Infact,Vera,theonlydef.whotookthewitnessstand,insteadofadmitting
thekillingofthedeceasedLozanes,categoricallydeniedit.Hence,theCommission,initsdecisionheldthatitcouldnot
takecognizanceofthecase,onthegroundthatthebenefitsoftheAmnestyProcl.,couldbeinvokedonlybydefs.ina
criminalcasewho,admittingthecommissionofthecrime,pleadthatsaidcommissionwasinpursuanceoftheresistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the
Commissionorderedthatthecaseberemandedtothecourtoforiginfortrial.AMFRwasfiledbypetitionersbutwas
denied.FromthisorderoftheCommission,petitionersappealedtotheCAw/ccertifiedtheappealtous,inviewofthe
legalissueinvolved.

ISSUE:W/npersonsinvokingthebenefitofamnestyshouldfirstadmithavingcommittedthecrimeofw/cthey

areaccused.
PetitionerscontendthattobeentitledtothebenefitsofAmnestyProcl.No.8,itisnotnecessaryfor
themtoadmitthecommissionofthecrimecharged,citinginsupportoftheirsubmission,amongothers,the
caseofBarrioquinto,et.alvs.Fernandez,et,al.(82P642.)totheeffectthat"inordertoentitleapersontothe
benefitsofAmnestyProcl.,itisnotnecessarythatheshould,asaconditionprecedent,admithavingcommitted
thecriminalactoroffensew/w/cheischarged,andallegetheamnestyasadefense;itissufficientthatthe
evidence,eitherofthecomplainantortheaccused,showsthattheoffensecommittedcomesw/inthetermsof
saidAmnestyProcl.
HELD: ButsaidcaseshavebeensupersededanddeemedoverruledbythesubsequentcasesofPeo.vs.Llanita,
et.al.(86P219),etc.whereinweheldthat
"Itisrankinconsistencyforappellanttojustifyanactorseekforgivenessforanact,accordingto
him,hehasnotcommitted. Amnestypresupposesthecommissionofacrime,andwhenanaccused
maintainsthathehasnotcommittedacrime,hecannothaveanyuseforamnesty. Whereanamnesty
procl.imposescertainconditions,asinthiscase,itisincumbentupontheaccusedtoprovetheexistence
ofsuchconditions. Theinvocationofamnestyisinthenatureofapleaofconfessionandavoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on
accountofinterveningfactswhich,ifproved,wouldbringthecrimechargedwithinthescopeofthe
amnestyproclamation."(italicssupplied.)

Atanyrate,thefactsestablished bef.theCommissiondonotbringthecasew/inthetermsofthe
AmnestyProcl.xxxAsfoundbytheCommission,thekillingofthedeceased(Lozanes)wasnotinfurtherance
oftheresistancemovement,butduetotherivalrybet.theHunter'sGuerrilla,tow/chebelonged,andtheVera's
Guerrillaofpetitioners.RAM.

(8)Powersascommanderinchief
Art.VII,Sec.18. ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe
Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress
lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace
thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof
martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita
reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta
majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,
whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress
may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe
Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.
TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor
suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.

TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency
ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe
extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictionon
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or
offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.
Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe
judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.

Art.III,Sec.13.Allpersons,exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishablebyreclusionperpetua
whentheevidence ofguildisstrong,shall,beforeconviction, be bailable bysufficient sureties, orbe
releasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhen
theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.
Art.VIII,Sec.1.xxx
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

AsCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines,thePresidenthasthefollowingpowers:
a.Hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.
b.Hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,or
c.HemayproclaimmartiallawovertheentirePhilippinesoranypartthereof.
Subjectto:Art.VIII,Sec.1par.2.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactual
controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornot
therehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranch
orinstrumentalityoftheGovt.
CallouttheAFPtopreventlawlessviolence
Thisismerelyapolicemeasuremeanttoquelldisorder.Assuch,theConstitutiondoesnotregulateits

exerciseradically

Suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus
A"writofhabeascorpus"isanorderfromthecourtcommandingadetainingofficertoinformthecourt
(i)ifhehasthepersonincustody,and(ii)whathisbasisindetainingthatperson.
The"privilegeofthewrit"isthatportionofthewritrequiringthedetainingofficertoshowcausewhy
heshouldnotbetested.Notethatitistheprivilegethatissuspended,notthewrititself.
Requisites:
1.Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and
2.Thepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspension.
Effectsofthesuspensionoftheprivilege
1.Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritappliesonlytopersons"judiciallycharged"forrebellionor
offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5).Suchpersonssuspectedofthe
abovecrimescanbearrestedanddetainedwithoutawarrantofarrest.
"Judiciallycharged"asusedintheConstitutionisimprecise.Forifonewerealreadyjudiciallycharged,
hisdetentionwouldbelegalandsohecouldnolongerpetitionfor habeascorpus. Habeascorpus precisely
contemplatesasituationinwhichapersonisbeingdetainedwithoutbeingchargedincourt.Thus,theprovision
shouldread"onewhoissuspectedofcomplicityin"thetwocrimesabove.
Asageneralrule,nopersoncouldbearrestedwithoutawarrantofarrest(validlyissuedupon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesses,(cf.Art.III,Sec.2),unless(i)thearrestwas
madeinconnectionwithacrimecommittedinthepresenceofthedetainingofficer,or(ii)the
privilegeofthewritwassuspended. Ifthepublicofficerarrestshimwithoutawarrant,the
officerbecomesliablefor"arbitrarydetention"underArt.124oftheRPC,andapetitionfor
habeascorpuscanbefiledtoseekhisrelease.
Thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotmakethearrestwithoutwarrantlegal.Butthemilitaryis,in
effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy
available against suchunlawful arrest(arbitrary detention). The arrestwithout warrant is justified by the
emergencysituationandthedifficultyinapplyingforawarrantconsideringthetimeandthenumberofpersons
tobearrested.
Butthecrimeforwhichheisarrestedmustbeonerelatedtorebellionortheinvasion. Astoother

crimes,thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotapply.
2. Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe
judiciallychargedwithin3days,orotherwiseheshallbereleased.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.6).
Inotherwords,thepublicofficercandetainapersonwithoutwarrantofarrest,buthecanonlydosofor
72hours.Beforethelapseof72hours,aninformationmusthavebeenfiledinthepropercourtcharginghimof
the offense for which he was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a
preliminaryinvestigationtobefirstconductedbythefiscal,hemustsignawaiveroftheeffectsofArt.125.
(delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons)
Theeffectofthesuspensionoftheprivilege,therefore,isonlytoextendtheperiodsduringwhichhecan
bedetainedwithoutawarrant.UnderArt.125,asamendedbyEO272,thepublicofficercanonlydetainhim
for12,18or36hoursdependingonthegravityoftheoffenseofwhichheischarged;withinthistime,hemust
bejudiciallycharged,otherwise,hemustbereleased.Whentheprivilegeissuspended,theperiodisextendedto
72hours.
Whathappensifheisnotjudiciallychargednorreleasedafter72hours?Thepublicofficerbecomes
liableunderArt.125for"delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons."Astothedetainee,itissubmittedthatheor
someoneelseinhisbehalfcanfileapetitionforhabeascorpus.Forevenifthesuspensionhasalifetimeof60
daysingeneral,astothatperson,thesuspensiononlyhasaneffectivityof72hours,sothatafterthistime,the
suspensionisliftedastohim.
3. Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusis
suspended.(Art.III,Sec.13)
Art.III,Sec.13.xxxTherighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofHCis
suspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.
ThisnewprovisionabrogatestherulinginMoralesvPonceEnrilewhichheldthecontrary.
ProclaimMartialLaw
Requisites:
1.Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and
2.PublicsafetyrequirestheproclamationofmartiallawalloverthePhilippinesoranypartthereof.

Effectsoftheproclamationofmartiallaw
ThePresidentcan:
1.Legislate

2.Orderthearrestofpeoplewhoobstructthewareffort.
Butthefollowingcannotbedone(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.4)
1.SuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution.
2.Supplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsandthelegislativeassemblies.
Theprincipleisthatmartiallawisproclaimedonlybecausethecourtsandothercivilinstitutionslike
Congresshavebeenshutdown.Itshouldnothappenthatmartiallawisdeclaredinordertoshutdownthecivil
institutions.
3.Conferjurisdictionuponmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilians,wherecivilcourtsareunableto
function.
Thisisthe"opencourt"doctrinewhichholdsthatcivilianscannotbetriedbymilitarycourtsifthecivil
courtsareopenandfunctioning.Butifthecivilcourtsarenotfunctioning,thencivilianscanbetriedbythe
militarycourts. Martiallawsusuallycontemplatesacasewherethecourtsarealreadyclosedandthecivil
institutionshavealreadycrumbled,thatisa"theaterofwar."Ifthecourtsarestillopen,thePresidentcanjust
suspendtheprivilegeandachievethesameeffect.
4.Automaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.
Thisoverrulestheholdingin Aquino v PonceEnrile,59SCRA183(1974),thatwhenthePresident
proclaimsmartiallaw,healsoimpliedlysuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit.
Underthepresentrule,thePresidentcanstillsuspendtheprivilegeevenasheproclaimmartiallaw,but
hemustsosuspendexpressly.
TheRoleofCongress
a.WhenthePresidentproclaimsmartiallaworsuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit,suchproclamationor
suspensionshallbeeffectiveforaperiodof60days,unlesssoonerrevokedbytheCongress.
b.Uponsuchproclamationorsuspension,Congressshallconveneatonce.Ifitisnotinsession,itshall
convene inaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall within24hoursfollowingtheproclamation or
suspension.
c.Within48hoursfromtheproclamationorthesuspension,thePresidentshallsubmitareport,in
personorinwriting,totheCongress(meetinginjointsessionoftheactionhehastaken).
d.TheCongressshallthenvotejointly,byanabsolutemajority.Ithastwooptions:
(i)Torevokesuchproclamationorsuspension.

Whenitsorevokes,thePresidentcannotsetaside(orveto)therevocationashenormallywoulddoin
thecaseofbills.IfCongressdoesnotdoanything,themeasurewillexpireanywayin60days.Sotherevoca
tionmustbemadebeforethelapseof60daysfromthedatethemeasurewastaken.
(ii)Toextenditbeyondthe60dayperiodofitsvalidity.
CongresscanonlysoextendtheproclamationorsuspensionupontheinitiativeofthePresident.
Theperiodneednotbe60days;itcouldbemore,asCongresswoulddetermine,basedonthe
persistenceoftheemergency.IfCongressfailstoactbeforethemeasureexpires,itcannolonger
extendituntilthePresidentagainredeclaresthemeasure,forhowdooneextendsomethingthat
hasalreadylapsed?
NotethatCongresscannot"validate"theproclamationorsuspension,becauseitisalreadyvalid.
Itisthusrestrictedtothe2measuresabove.
IfCongressextendsthemeasure,butbeforetheperiodofextensionlapses,therequirementsforthe
proclamationorsuspensionnolongerexist,Congresscanlifttheextension,sincethepowertoconferimpliesthe
powertotakeback.IfCongressdoesnotrevieworlifttheorder,thiscanbereviewedbytheSupremeCourt
pursuanttothenextsection.

TheRoleoftheSupremeCourt
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfilledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthe
factualbasisof(a)theproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,or(b)the
extensionthereof.Itmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithin30daysfromitsfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18par.
3)
Thisisbecausejudicialpowerincludesthedutytodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagrave
abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthe
Government.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2)
ThejurisdictionoftheSCmaybeinvokedinapropercase.Apetitionforhabeascorpusisonesuch
case.Whenapersonisarrestedwithoutawarrantforcomplicityintherebellionorinvasion,heorsomeoneelse
inhisbehalfhasthestandingtoquestionthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension.ButbeforetheSCcan
decideonthelegalityofhisdetention,itmustfirstpassuponthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension.
ThetesttobeusedbytheSupremeCourtinsoreviewingtheactofthePresidentinproclaimingor
suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the
sufficiencyofthefactualbasisofthemeasure. ThequestionisnotwhetherthePresidentorCongressacted
correctly,butwhetherheactedarbitrarilyinthattheactionhadnobasisinfact.
Decidingonwhethertheactwasarbitraryamountstoadeterminationofwhetherornottherewasgrave
abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,whichisnowmadepartofjudicialpowerbyArt.

VIII,Sec.1,par.2.Thiscurbsradicallytheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.
ThistestwastakenfromthecaseofLansangvGarcia,42SCRA446(1971).Theissuethereraisedwas
whetherinsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritin1971,Marcoshadabasisfordoingso.TheSC,inconsidering
thefactthatthePresidentbasedhisdecisionon(a)theSenatereportontheconditioninCentralLuzonand(b)a
closeddoorbriefingbythemilitaryshowingtheextentofsubversion,concludedthatthePresidentdidnotact
arbitrarily.Onemaydisagreewithhisappreciationofthefacts,butonecannotsaythatitiswithoutbasis.
[InthiscaseofLansangvs.Garcia,theSCheldunanimouslythatithastheauthoritytoinquireintothe
existenceofthefactualbasisinordertodeterminetheconstitutionalsufficiencythereof.ThisholdingoftheSC
isnowfoundinArt.VII,Sec.18,par.3.]
Withthistestandthenewprovisionsinthe1987Constitution,thecaseofGarciaPadillavPonceEnrile,
121SCRA 472(1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the
President'sproclamationofmartiallawisbeyondjudicialreview,andthatthecitizencanonlytrustthatthe
Presidentactsingoodfaith.ThecasesofBarcelonvBakerandMontenegrovCastaneda,whichruledthatthe
validityofthesuspensionoftheprivilegewasapoliticalquestion,arelikewiseburiedinthegraveofjudicial
history.

Thereare4ways,then,fortheproclamationorsuspensiontobelifted:
1)LiftingbythePresidenthimself
2)RevocationbyCongress
3)NullificationbytheSupremeCourt
4)Operationoflawafter60days
MilitaryTrialofCiviliansVoidEvenUnderMartialLaw,IfCivilCourtsAreOpen.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5.).
InAquinovsMilitaryCommission No.2,63SCRA546,theSCupheldthepowerofthePresidentto
createmilitarytribunalsauthorizedtotrynotonlymilitarypersonnelbutalsociviliansevenifatthattimecivil
courtswereopenandfunctioning,thusrejectingthe"opencourt"theory. TheSCthereheld: "Martiallaw
createsanexceptiontothegeneralruleofexclusivesubjectiontotheciviljurisdiction,andrendersoffenses
againstthelawsofwar,aswellasthoseofacivilcharacter,triablebymilitarytribunals.Publicdangerwarrants
thesubstitutionofexecutiveprocessforjudicialprocess.Theimmunityofciviliansfrommilitaryjurisdiction,
must,however,givewayinareasgovernedbymartiallaw.xxx
In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military
Commission No.2decision wasreversed. AccordingtotheSC,civilians whoareplacedontrialforcivil
offensesundergenerallawareentitledtotrialbyjudicialprocess.Sincewearenotenemyoccupiedterritory
norareweunderamilitarygovt.andevenonthepremisethatmartiallawcontinuesinforce,themilitary
tribunals cannottryandexercisejurisdictionovercivilians forciviloffensescommitted bythemwhichare
properlycognizable bythecivilcourtsthathaveremained openandhavebeenregularlyfunctioning. The
assertionofmilitaryauthorityovercivilianscannotrestonthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChieforon
anytheoryofmartiallaw.Aslongascivilcourtsremainopenandareregularlyfunctioning,militarytribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly

cognizablebycivilcourts.Toholdotherwiseisaviolationoftherighttodueprocess.
"Thepresidingofficeratacourtmartialisnotajudgewhoseobjectivityandindependenceareprotected
bytenureandundiminshedsalaryandnurturedbythejudicialtradition,butisamilitaryofficer.Substantially
differentrulesofevidenceandprocedureapplyinmilitarytrials.Apartfromthesedifferences,thesuggestionof
the possibility of influence on the actions of the courtmartial by the officer who convenes it, selects its
membersandthecounselonbothsides,andwhousuallyhasdirectcommandandauthorityoveritsmembersis
apervasiveoneinmilitarylaws,despitestrenuouseffortstoeliminatethedanger.

(9)Emergencypowers
Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the
President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers
necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof
theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.

ThisgrantofemergencypowertothePresidentisdifferentfromtheCommanderinChiefclause.When
thePresidentactsundertheCommanderinChiefclause,heactsunderaconstitutionalgrantofmilitarypower,
whichmayincludethelawmakingpower. ButwhenthePresidentactsundertheemergencypower,heacts
underaCongressionaldelegationoflawmakingpower.
Thescopeofthegrantissuch"powersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy."
Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the
declaredpolicy. The1987Constitution,itissubmitted,doesnotchangethescope. "Powernecessaryand
proper"shouldmeanlegislativepower,becauseCongressisonlyallowedtodelegatelegislativepower,beingits
onlyinherentpower.ItsotherpowersareonlygrantedtoitbytheConstitution,andsoitcannotdelegatewhat
hasonlybeendelegatedtoit.
Thispoweris(1)foralimitedperiod,and(2)subjecttosuchrestrictionsasCongressmayprovide.The
power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such
resolution,(b)uponthenext(voluntary)adjournmentofCongress.ForthefactthatCongressisabletomeetin
sessionuninterruptedlyandadjournofitsownwillprovesthattheemergencynolongerexistsistojustifythe
delegation.
Thisruleortheterminationofthegrantofemergencypowersisbasedondecidedcases,whichinturn
becameArt.VII,Sec.15ofthe1973Constitution.

InAranetavDinglasan,84Phil368(1949),theCongressgrantedthePresidentemergencypowersto
fixrentalsofhouses.Afterthewar,Congressheldaspecialsession.TheSCheldthattheemergencypower
lastedonlyuntilCongresshelditsregularsession.ThefactthatCongresscouldnowmeetmeantthattherewas

noemergencyanymorethatwouldjustifythedelegation.
InthecasesofRodriguezvTreasurero,involvingthelawmadebyPres.Quirinoappropriatingthesum
ofmoneyfortheoperationofthegovernment; Barredo v COMELEC,involvinganotherlawmadebyPres.
Quirinoappropriatinganamounttodefraytheexpensesforanelection,andGuevarravCollectorofCustoms,
involvingaregulationofexport,theSCheldthattheemergencypowerthatenabledthePresidenttolegislate
ceasedthemomentCongresscouldmeetinregularsession.
Attheveryleast,saidtheSCin Rodriguez v Gella,92Phil603(1953),itshouldceaseuponthe
approvalofaresolutionbyCongressterminatingsuchgrant.Inthiscase,theCongressenactedabillprecisely
terminatingthegrantofemergencypower,butthiswasvetoedbythePresident.TheSCruledthatthevetoed
billshouldbedeemedaresolutionthatterminatesthegrant.

AranetavDinglasan,84Phil368(1949)
F:

ThepetitionschallengethevalidityofEOsofthePres.avowedlyissuedinvirtueofCA671.Theyresttheircase
chieflyonthepropositionthattheEmergencyPowersAct(CA671)hasceasedtohaveanyforceandeffect.

HELD:CA671becameinoperativewhenCongressmetinregularsessionon5/25/46,andtheEOswereissued
w/oauthorityoflaw.
CA671doesnotintermfixthedurationofitseffectiveness.TheintentionoftheActhastobesought
forinitsnature,theobjecttobeaccomplished,thepurposetobesubserved,anditsrelationtotheConsti.
Art.VIofthe1935Consti.providesthatanylawpassedbyvirtuethereofshouldbe"foralimited
period."Thewords"limitedperiod"arebeyondquestionintendedtomeanrestrictiveinduration.Emergency,
inordertojustify thedelegationofemergencypowers, "mustbe temporaryoritcan notbesaid tobean
emergency."
ItistobepresumedthatCA671wasapprovedw/thislimitationinview.Theoppositetheorywould
makethelawrepugnanttotheConsti.,andiscontrarytotheprinciplethatthelegislatureisdeemedtohavefull
knowledgeoftheconstitutionalscopeofitspowers.Theassertionthatnewlegislationisneededtorepealthe
actwouldnotbeinharmonyw/theConsti.either.Ifanewanddifferentlawwerenecessarytoterminatethe
delegation,theperiodforthedelegationwouldbeunlimited,indefinite,negativeanduncertain;"thatw/cwas
intendedtomeetatemporaryemergencymaybecomepermanentlaw,"forCongressmightnotenacttherepeal,
andevenifitwould,therepealmightnotmeetw/theapprovalofthePres.,andtheCongressmightnotbeable
tooverridetheveto.Further,thiswouldcreatetheanomalythat,whileCongressmightdelegateitspowersby
simplemajority,itmightnotbeabletorecallthemexceptbya2/3vote.xxx.RAM.

RodriguezvGella,92Phil603(1953)
F:

On12/16/41,CA671wasapproveddeclaringastateoftotalemergencyasaresultofwarinvolvingthePhils.and
authorizingthePres.topromulgaterulesandregulationstomeetsuchemergency." In1949,theSCdecidedthatsaid
emergencypowersceasedasearlyas1945.Here,theissueagainisw/nCA671isstilleffective.Itappearsthatin1952,

thePres.issuedEOs545and546(forappropriationoffundsforpublicworksandforreliefintheprovincesandcities
visitedbytyphoons,floods,etc.)
TheCongresspassedHouseBill727declaringthat"washaslongended"andthatthe"needforthegrantofsuch
unusualpowerstothePres.hasdisappeared,"andforthatreason,CongressrepealedalltheEmergencyPowersActsofthe
Pres.However,thiswasvetoedbythePres.
PetitionersseektoinvalidatesaidEOs.

HELD:AlthoughHouseBill727,hasbeenvetoedbythePres.anddidnottherebybecomearegularstatute,it
mayatleastbeconsideredasaconcurrentresolutionoftheCongressformallydeclaringtheterminationofthe
emergencypowers.TocontendthattheBillneededpresidentialacquiescencetoproduceeffect,wouldleadto
theanomalous,ifnotabsurdsituationthat,"whileCongresswhiledelegateitspowersbyasimplemajority,it
mightnotbeabletorecallthemexceptby2/3vote.xxxAdapted.
Barlongay:Noticetheapparentinconsistencybet.theConstitutionandthecases.TheConsti.[Art.VI,Sec.23
(2)] states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner
withdrawnbyresolutionofCongresswhereasthecasestellusthattheemergencypowersshallcease upon
resumptionofsession.Toreconcilethetwo,IbelievethatitwouldnotbeenoughforCongresstojustresume
sessioninorderthattheemergencypowersshallcease.Ithastopassaresolutionwithdrawingsuchemergency
powers,otherwisesuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress.

(10)Contractingandguaranteeingforeignloans
Art.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublic
ofthePhilippineswiththepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsas
maybeprovidedbylaw.TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheendofeveryquarterof
thecalendaryear,submittoCongressacompletereportofitsdecisionsonapplicationsforloanstobe
contractedorguaranteedbytheGovernment,orgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,which
wouldhavetheeffectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersprovidedbylaw.

Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationof
themonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe
madeavailabletothepublic.

RepublicAct4860

ANACTAUTHORIZINGTHEPRESIDENTOFTHEPHILIPPINESTOOBTAINSUCHFOREIGNLOANS
ANDCREDITS,ORTOINCURSUCHFOREIGNINDEBTEDNESS,ASMAYBENECESSARYTOFINANCE
APPROVEDECONOMICDEVELOPMENTPURPOSESORPROJECTS,ANDTOGUARANTEE,INBEHALF
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY

CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE
LENDINGTOTHEPRIVATESECTOR,APPROPRIATINGTHENECESSARYFUNDSTHEREFORE,AND
FOROTHERPURPOSES.
BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesinCongressassembled:
Sec.1.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesisherebyauthorizedinbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesto
contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such
foreigngovernments,foreignfinancialinstitutions,orotherinternationalorganizations,withwhom,orbelongingto
countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as maybe necessary and upon such terms and
conditionsasmaybeagreedupon,toenabletheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinestofinance,either
directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any governmentowned or controlled
corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law:
Provided,Thatatleastseventyfivepercentshallbespentforpurposesofprojectswhicharerevenueproducing
and selfliquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing,
constructionandimprovementofhighwaysandbridges,airports,portsandharbors,schoolbuildings,waterworks
andartesianwells,airnavigationfacilities,developmentoffishingindustry,andother:Provided,Thatsuchforeign
loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said
developmentprojectstocoverthecostofequipment,relatedtechnicalservicesandsupplies,wherethesamearenot
obtainablewithinthePhilippinesatcompetitivepricesaswellaspartofthepesocosts,otherthanworkingcapital
andoperationalexpensesnotexceedingtwentypercentoftheloan:Provided,further,Thatinthecaseofroads,
bridges,irrigation,portworks,rivercontrols,airportsandpower,theamountshallnotexceedseventypercentof
theloan.
TheauthorityofthePresidentofthePhilippinesashereinprovidedshallincludethepowertoissue,forthe
purposeshereinbeforestated,bondsforsaleintheinternationalmarketstheincomefromwhichshallbefullytax
exemptinthePhilippines.
Sec.2.Thetotalamountofloans,creditsandindebtedness,excludinginterests,whichthePresidentofthe
PhilippinesisauthorizedtoincurunderthisActshallnotexceedonebillionUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentin
otherforeigncurrenciesattheexchangerateprevailingatthetimetheloans,creditsandindebtednessareincurred:
Provided,however,That thetotal loans, creditsand indebtednessincurredunderthisActshall notexceedtwo
hundredfiftymillioninthefiscalyearoftheapprovalofthisAct,andtwohundredfiftymillioneveryfiscalyear
thereafter,allinUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentinothercurrencies.
All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular
projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such
projectsshallhavebeenpreparedbytheofficesoragenciesconcerned,recommendedbytheNationalEconomic
CouncilandtheMonetaryBoardoftheCentralBankofthePhilippines,andapprovedbythePresidentofthe
Philippines.
Sec.3. ThePresidentofthePhilippinesis,likewise,herebyauthorized,inbehalfoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines,toguarantee,uponsuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeagreedupon,foreignloansextendeddirectly
to,orbondsforsaleininternationalmarketsissuedby,corporationsownedorcontrolledbytheGovernmentofthe
Philippinesforindustrial,agriculturalorothereconomicdevelopmentpurposesorprojectsauthorizedbylaw,such

asthosementionedinSectiononeofthisAct,includingtherehabilitationandmodernizationofthePhilippine
NationalRailways,thecashcapitalrequirementsoftheLandBank,electrification,irrigation,rivercontroland
drainage,telecommunication,housing,constructionand/orimprovementofhighways,housing,constructionand/or
improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and artesian wells, air
navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others:
Provided,Thatatleastseventyfivepercentshallbespentforpurposesorprojectswhicharerevenueproducing
andselfliquidating. Theloans/orbondedindebtednessofgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswhich
maybeguaranteedbythePresidentunderthisActshallincludethoseincurredbygovernmentownedorcontrolled
financialinstitutionsforthepurposeofrelendingtotheprivatesectorandthetotalamountthereofshallnotbe
morethanfivehundredmillionUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentinotherforeigncurrenciesattheexchange
rateprevailingatthetimetheguaranteeismade: Provided,Thatthegovernmentownedorcontrolledfinancial
institutionsshallrelendtheproceedsofsuchloansand/orbondedindebtednesstoFilipinosortoFilipinoownedor
controlledcorporationsandpartnerships,atleastsixtysixandtwothirdspercentumoftheoutstandingandpaid
upcapitalofwhichisheldbyFilipinosatthetimetheloanisincurred,suchproportiontobemaintaineduntilsuch
time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains
outstanding,failuretomeetwiththecapitalownershiprequirementshallmaketheentireloanimmediatelydueand
demandable,togetherwithallpenaltiesandinterests,plusanadditionalspecialpenaltyoftwo percentum onthe
totalamountdue.
Sec.4. TheimplementationofthisActshallbesubjectto,andgovernedby,theprovisionsofExecutive
Order236,datedFebruary13,1957,prescribingproceduresfortheplanningofdevelopmentfinances,theissuance
ofgovernmentsecurities,andthedisbursementofproceedsandcreatingtheFiscalPolicyCouncilandtheTechnical
CommitteeonDevelopmentFinance,asamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.236,datedMay26,1966,notinconsistent
withthisAct,whichareherebyadoptedbyreferenceandmadeanintegralpartofthisAct.
Sec.5.ItshallbethedutyofthePresident,withinthirtydaysaftertheopeningofeveryregularsession,to
reporttotheCongresstheamountofloans,creditsandindebtednesscontracted,aswellastheguaranteesextended,
andthepurposesandprojectsforwhichtheloans,creditsandindebtednesswereincurred,andtheguarantees
extended,aswellassuchloanswhichmaybereloanedtoFilipinoownedorcontrolledcorporationsandsimilar
purposes.
Sec.6. TheCongressshallappropriatethenecessaryamountofanyfundsintheNationalTreasurynot
otherwiseappropriated,tocoverthepaymentoftheprincipalandinterestonsuchloans,creditsorindebtednessas
andwhentheyshallbecomedue.
Sec.7.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval.
Approved,September8,1966.

DoesCongresshavetobeconsultedbythePresidentwhenhecontractsorguaranteesforeignloansthat
increasetheforeigndebtofthecountry?
TheaffirmativeviewcitesArt.VI,Sec.24whichholdsthatallbillsauthorizingincreaseofthepublic
debtmustoriginateexclusivelyfromtheHouseofRepresentatives,althoughtheSenatemayproposeorconcur

withamendments.
Thenegative,andstrongerview,isthatthePresidentdoesnotneedpriorapprovalbyCongressbecause
theConstitutionplacesthepowertocheckthePresident'spowerontheMonetaryBoardandnotonCongress.
Congressmay,ofcourse,provideguidelinesforcontractingorguaranteeingforeignloans,andhavetheserules
enforcedthroughtheMonetaryBoard.ButthatCongresshaspriorapprovalisatotallydifferentissue.
Atanyrate,thepresentpower,whichwasfirstintroducedinthe1973Constitution,wasbasedonRA
4860ortheForeignLoanAct.Whatusedtobeastatutorygrantofpowerisnowaconstitutionalgrantwhich
Congresscannottakeaway,butonlyregulate.

(11)Powersoverforeignaffairs
(a)Treatymakingpower
Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate.

ByreasonofthePresident'suniquepositionasheadofstate,heisthelogicalchoiceasthenation's
spokesmaninforeignrelations.TheSenate,ontheotherhand,isgrantedtherighttoshareinthetreatymaking
powerofthePresidentbyconcurringwithhimwiththerighttoamend.

Treatydistinguishedfromexecutiveagreements
ExecutiveagreementsenteredintobythePresidentneednoconcurrence.Thereasonisthatalthough
executiveagreementsareakindofinternationalagreements,whentheConstitutionintendstoincludeexecutive
agreements,itsayssospecifically,asinArt.VIII,Sec.5,par.2,whenitspeaksofthepoweroftheSCtoreview
finaljudgmentsoflowercourtsincasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,internationalor
executiveagreement,isinquestion.
InholdingthattreatiesareformaldocumentswhichrequireratificationwithapprovaloftheSenate,
whileexecutiveagreementsbecomebindingthroughexecutiveactionwithoutneedofavotebytheSenate,the
SCinCommissionerofCustomsvEasternSeaTrading,3SCRA351(1961),saidthatthedifferencebetweena
treatyandanexecutiveagreementisthata treaty isaninternationalagreementinvolvingpoliticalissuesor
changesofnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalarrangementsofapermanentcharacter,whilean
executiveagreementisaninternationalagreementembodyingadjustmentsofdetailcarryingoutwellestablished
nationalpoliciesandtraditions,andthoseinvolvingarrangementsofamoreorlesstemporarynature.
Examplesoftreatiesareanagreementontax,extradition,alliance.Examplesofexecutiveagreements
areagreementsrelatingtopostalconventions,tariffrates,copyright,mostfavorednationclause.

CommissionerofCustomsvs.EasternSeaTrading,3SCRA351
F: Resp.Easternwastheconsigneeofseveralshipmentofonionandgarlicw/carrivedattheportofMla.from8/5to
9/7/54.SomeshipmentscamefromJapanandothersfromHK.Inasmuchasnoneoftheshipmentshadthecertificate
requiredbyCBCircularsNos.44and45forthereleasethereof,thegoodsthusimportedwereseizedandsubjectedto
forfeitureproceedingsforallegedviolationsofSec.1363(f)oftheRev.Adm.Code,inrelationtothesaidcirculars.Said
goodswerethendeclaredforfeitedinfavorofthegovtbytheCommissionerofCustomsthegoodshavingbeen,inthe
meantime,releasedtotheconsigneesonsuretybonds.Onreview,theCourtofTaxAppealsreversedtheCommissionerof
Customsandorderedtheaforementionedbondstobecancelledandwithdrawn.AccordingtotheCTA,theseizureand
forfeitureofthegoodsimportedfromJapancannotbejustifiedunderEO238,notonlybec.thesameseekstoimplement
anExecutiveAgreementextendingtheeffectivityofourTradeandFinancialAgreementsw/Japanw/cagreement,is
ofdubiousvalidityxxxowingtothefactthatourSenatehadnotconcurredinthemakingofsaidExecutiveAgreement.

HELD:TheconcurrenceofsaidHouseofCongressisrequiredbytheConsti.inthemakingof"treaties",w/c
are,however,distinctanddifferentfrom"executiveagreements,"whichmaybevalidlyenteredintow/osuch
concurrence.
[Thecourtwentontodistinguishatreatyfromanexecutiveagreement.]
The agreement in question, being merely an executive agreement, there is no requirement of
concurrence.RAM.

USAFFEVeteransAssn.vsTreasurer105Phil1030
F:

ThecentralissueinthiscaseconcernsthevalidityoftheRomuloSnyderAgreement(1950)wherebythePhil.
Govt.undertooktoreturntotheUSGovt.intenannualinstallments,atotalof$35MdollarsadvancedbytheUSto,but
unexpendedby,theNationalDefenseForcesofthePhilippines.TheUSAFFEVeteranscontendedthatthemoneydelivered
bytheUSwerestraightpaymentsformilitaryservicesandthatthereforetherewasnothingtoreturntotheUSandnothing
toconsiderasaloan. TheyalsocontendedthattheRomuloSynderAgreementwasvoidforlackofauthorityofthe
officerswhoconcludedthesame.

HELD:Thefundsinvolvedhavebeenconsistentlyregardedasfundsadvancedandtobesubsequentlyaccounted
for.Sucharrangementthereforeincludestheobligationtoreturntheunexpendedamounts.
Inthiscase,Pres.Quirinoapprovedthenegotiations. HehadpowertocontractloansunderRA213
amendingRA16.AstothecontentionthattheagreementlacksratificationbytheSenate,itwasheldthatthe
yearlyappropriationsbyCongressoffundsascompliancewiththeagreementconstitutedratification.Buteven
iftherewasnoratification,theagreementwouldstillbevalid.Theagreementisnota"treaty"asthetermis
usedintheConstitution.TheagreementwasneversubmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence.Itmustbenoted
thatatreatyisnottheonlyformthataninternationalagreementmayassume.Forthegrantoftreatymaking
powertotheExecutiveandtheSenatedoesnotexhaustthepowerofthegovt.overinternationalrelations.
Consequently,executiveagreementsmaybeenteredintowithotherstatesandareeffectiveevenwithoutthe
concurrenceoftheSenate.Fromthepointofviewofinternationallaw,thereisnodifferencebetweentreaties
andexecutiveagreementsintheirbindingeffectuponstatesconcernedaslongasthenegotiatingfunctionaries

haveremainedwithintheirpowers. Thedistinctionbetweenanexecutiveagreementandatreatyispurelya
constitutionaloneandhasnointernationallegalsignificance.
In the case of Altman vs US, it was held that an international compact negotiated between the
representativesoftwosovereignnationsandmadeinthenameandorbehalfofthecontractingpartiesand
dealingwithimportantcommercialrelationsbetweenthetwocountries,isatreatyinternationallyalthoughasan
executiveagreement,itisnottechnicallyatreatyrequiringtheadviceandconsentoftheSenate.
NatureofExecutiveAgreements:Thereare2classes:(1)agreementsmadepurelyasexecutiveacts
affectingexternalrelationsandindependentoforwithoutlegislativeauthorization,whichmaybetermedas
presidentialagreements,and(2)agreementsenteredintoinpursuanceofactsofCongress,orCongressional
ExecutiveAgreements.TheRomuloSnyderAgreementmayfallunderanyofthesetwoclasses,forpreciselyon
Sept.18,1946,CongressspecificallyauthorizedthePresidenttoobtainsuchindebtednessw/theGovtofthe
US,itsagenciesorinstrumentalities.Evenassuming,arguendo,thattherewasnolegislativeauthorization,itis
herebymaintainedthattheRomuloSnyderAgreementwaslegallyandvalidlyenteredintotoconformtothe
secondcategory.This2ndcategoryusuallyincludesmoneyagreementsrelatingtothesettlementofpecuniary
claimsofcitizens.Adapted.

CIRvsGotamco148SCRA36
F:

TheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)isaninternationalorganizationwhichhasaregionalofficeinManila.It
enjoysprivilegesandimmunitieswhicharedefinedintheHostAgreemententeredintobetweenthePhilippinesandthe
saidorganization.OneoftheprovisionsisthatWHOshallbeexemptfromalldirectandindirecttaxes.Whenitdecidedto
constructabuildingtohouseitsownoffices,itenteredintoafurtheragreementwiththegovt.exemptingitfrompaying
dutiesonanyimportationofmaterialsandfixturesrequiredfortheconstruction.WHOinformedthebiddersthatitwas
exemptfromthepaymentofallfees,licensesandtaxesandthattheirbidsshouldnotincludesuchitems.However,the
CIRdemandedfromitscontractor,Gotamco,thepaymentof3%contractor'stax.TheCIRquestionstheentitlementofthe
WHOtotaxexemption,contendingthattheHostAgreementisnullandvoid,nothavingbeenratifiedbythePhilippine
Senate.

HELD:WhiletreatiesarerequiredtoberatifiedbytheSenate,lessformaltypesofinternationalagreements
maybeenteredintobytheChiefExecutiveandbecomebindingwithouttheconcurrenceofthelegislativebody.
TheHostAgreementcomeswithinthelattercategory. Itisavalidandbindinginternationalagreementeven
withouttheconcurrenceofthePhilippineSenate.Adapted.

(b)Deportationofundesirablealiens
InQuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1959),theSCdeclaredthatwhiletheDeportation
Boardhasnopowertoissueawarrantofarrestissueduponthefilingofformalchargesagainstcertainalienfor
thepurposeoftakinghimincustodytoanswerthosecharges,ithasthepowerdelegatedbythePresident,to
issueawarranttocarryoutafinalorderbasedonafindingofguilt.

InGoTekvDeportationBoard,79SCRA17(1976),theSCupheldthePresident'spowertoorderthe
deportationofanalienunderSec.69oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode.Heneednotwaitforthependingcase
toendinconviction. Hemay,evenduringthependencyofthecase,orderthedeportationifhethinksheis
undesirabletonationalinterest.Thisdecisiontodeport,saidtheCourt,isanactofState.

QuaCheeGanvs.DeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1963)
F:

On5/12/52,SpPros.Galangchargedpetitionersbef.theDeportationBoardw/havingpurchaseddollarsinthe
totalsumof$130,000,w/ohavingthenecessarylicensefromtheCB,andofhavingclandestinelyremittedthesametoHK;
andpetitionersw/havingattemptedtobribeofficersofthePhil.andUSGovernmentsinordertoevadeprosecutionfor
saidunauthorizedpurchaseofUSdollars.Followingthefilingofsaiddeportationcharges,awarrantforthearrestofsaid
alienswasissuedbythepresidingofficersoftheDeportationBd.xxx
PetitionerscontestthepowerofthePres.todeportaliensand,consequently,thedelegationtotheDeportationBd.
oftheancillarypowertoinvestigate,onthegroundthatsuchpowerisvestedintheLegislature.Itisclaimedthatforthe
powertodeportaliensbeexercised,theremustbealegislationauthorizingthesame.

HELD:UnderCA613,theCommissionerofImmigrationwasempoweredtoeffectthearrestandexpulsionof
an alien, after previous determination by the Bd. of the existence of ground or grounds therefor. W/ the
enactmentofthislaw,however,thelegislaturedidnotintendtodelimitorconcentratetheexerciseofthepower
todeportontheImmigrationCommissioneralone.WhileitmayreallybecontendedthatSec.52ofCA613did
not expressly confer on the Pres. the authority todeport undesirable aliens, xxx but merely lays downthe
proceduretobeobservedshouldtherebedeportationproceedings,thefactthatsuchaprocedurewasprovided
forbef.thePres.candeportanalienw/cprovisionwasexpresslydeclaredexemptedfromtherepealingeffect
ofImmigrationActof1940 isaclearindicationoftherecognition,andinferentiallyaratification,bythe
legislatureoftheexistenceofsuchpowerintheExecutive.
Underthepresentandexistinglaws,therefore,deportationofanundesirablealienmaybeeffectedin2
ways: (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the
CommissionerofImmigration,uponrecommendationoftheBd.ofCommissioners,underSec.37ofCA613.
President'spowerofinvestigationmaybedelegatedtotheDeportationBoard.ThePresident'spower
ofinvestigationmaybedelegated.ThisisclearfromareadingofSec.69oftheRACw/cprovidesfor"aprior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent xxx the Deportation Board has been
conductingtheinvestigationastheauthorizedagentofthePres.xxx
Powertoarrestaliens. Sec.69oftheRACdoesnotprovidefortheexerciseofthepowertoarrest.
Thecontentionxxxthatthearrestofaforeignerisnecessarytocarryintoeffectthepowerofdeportationisvalid
onlywhenthereisalreadyanorderofdeportation.Tocarryouttheorderofdeportation,thePres.obviouslyhas
thepowertoorderthearrestofthedeportee.But,certainly,duringtheinvestigation,itisnotindispensablethat
thealienbearrested.
PowertoorderarrestofalienmaynotbedelegatedtoDeportationBoardbyPresident. Conceding
w/odecidingthatthePres.canpersonallyorderthearrestofalien,yetsuchpowercannotbedelegatedbyhimto
theDeportationBoard.Theexerciseofthepowertoorderthearrestofanindividualdemandstheexerciseof

discretionbytheoneissuingthesame,todeterminewhetherunderspecificcircumstances,thecurtailmentofthe
libertyofsuchpersoniswarranted.xxxAndauthoritiesaretotheeffectthatwhileministerialdutiesmaybe
delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement may not be so delegated.
RAM.

GoTekvs.DeportationBoard,79SCRA17(1977)
F:

PetitionerwasarrestedforpossessionoffakedollarsandprosecutedunderArt.168RPC. Atthesametime,
deportationproceedingswerebroughtagainsthim. HefiledapetitionforprohibitionagainsttheDeportationBoard,
contending that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c
possessionoffakedollarsisnot)andonlyafterconviction.TheCFIMlasustainedhiscontention.

HELD:ThePresident'spowertodeportaliensderivesfromSec.69oftheRev.Adm.Codew/cdoesnotspecify
thegroundsfordeportationofaliensbutonlyprovidesthatitbeorderedafterdueinvestigation.Theintentionis
to give the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so
undesirableastoaffectorinurethesecurity,welfare,orinterestoftheState.TheChiefExecutiveisthesoleand
exclusivejudgeoftheexistenceoffactsw/cwarrantthedeportationofaliensasdisclosedinaninvestigation.
VV.

(12)Poweroverlegislation
(a)MessagetoCongress
Art.VII,Sec.23.ThePresidentshalladdresstheCongressattheopeningofitsregularsession.
Hemayalsoappearbeforeitatanyothertime.

Every4thMondayofJuly,thePresidentdeliverstheStateoftheNationAddress,whichcontainshis
proposalsforlegislation.Throughthisspeech,hecaninfluencethecourseoflegislationthatCongresscantake
duringtheregularsession.

(b)Prepareandsubmitthebudget
Art.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopeningof
everyregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresandsources
offinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.

The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b) sources of
financing, and (c) receipts from revenueraising measures. This budget is the upper limit of the

appropriationsbilltobepassedbyCongress.Throughthebudget,therefore,thePresidentrevealsthe
prioritiesofthegovernment.

(c)Vetopower
Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented
tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame
withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal
andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse
shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit
shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall
becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames
oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis
vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof,
otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.
(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,
revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
Asageneralrule,allbillsmustbeapprovedbythePresidentbeforetheybecomelaw,exceptwhen(i)
thevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3vote,and(ii)thebillpassedisthespeciallawtoelectthePresident
andVicePresident.ThisgivesthePresidentanactualhandinlegislation.However,hiscourseofactionisonly
toapproveitorvetoitasawhole.(SeeLegislativePowerofCongress)

(d)EmergencyPower
Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the
President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers
necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof
theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.
(SeePreviousNotes)

(e)Fixingoftariffrates
Art.VI,Sec.28.xxx
TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofixwithinspecifiedlimits,andsubjectto
suchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand
wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof

theGovernment.

Thereasonforthedelegationisthehighlytechnicalnatureofinternationalcommerce,andtheneedto
constantlyandwithrelativeeaseadapttheratestoprevailingcommercialstandards.

(13)Immunityfromsuit

TheSChasaffirmedtimeandagainthedoctrineofthePresident'simmunityfromsuit.Inaresolution
inCarillovMarcos,(April1981)andinthelatestcaseofInreBermudez(October1986),theCourtsaidthatit
is"elementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitorfrombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiod
oftheirincumbencyandtenure."

ArelateddoctrineisthePresident's"immunityfromliability".IntheUScaseofNixonvFitzgerald,an
employeeoftheAirForcewaslaidoffduetoanadversedecision ofaSenateCommitteemadeuponthe
insistenceofPres.Nixon,butwhichdecisionwaslaterfoundtobebaseless,theSCruledthatthePresident,
whetherinofficeornot,isabsolutelyimmunefromliabilityforhisofficialacts.TheCourtgavethreereasons
forsuchimmunity:
1.ThesingularimportanceofthePresidencyandhishighvisibility.
2. The distraction that suits would bring to such an important official laden with enormous
responsibility.
3.TheconsequencethatthePresidentmighthesitateatthemomentofgreatestperiltothenationifhe
knowsthathewouldbeheldliablelateron.
InHarlowvFitzgerald,however,theSCruledthatCabinetmembersandsenioraidessuedforthesame
actasinNixonvFitzgeraldonlyenjoy"qualifiedimmunity." Thisimmunityislessthanabsolute,andyetit
wouldenablethemtodefeatunsubstantiatedclaimswithoutresortingtotrial.Theyareallowedtoshowina
preliminarymannerthattheclaimisunsubstantial.

Barlongay:
Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendtohisalteregos?
A:No.

Carillovs.Marcos,Res.ofApril4,1981

ThePresidentassuchcannotbesued,enjoyingashedoesimmunityfromsuit,butthevalidityofhis
actscanbetestedbyanactionagainsttheotherexecutiveofficialsorsuchindependentconstitutionalagenciesas
theCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit.VV.

Inre:SaturninoV.Bermudez,145SCRA160
F:

Inapetitionfordeclaratoryreliefimpleadingnorespondents,petitioner,asalawyer,quotesthefirstpar.ofSec.5
ofArt.VIIIoftheproposed1986Consti.,w/cprovides:
"Sec.5.ThesixyeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheFebruary7,1986election,
isforpurposesofsynchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.
xxx"
Claimingthatthesaidprovisionisnotclearastowhomitrefers,hethenaskstheCourt"todeclareandanswerthe
questionoftheconstructionanddefinitenessastowho,amongthepresentincumbentPres.AquinoandVicePres.Laurel
andelectedPres.MarcosandVicePres.Tolentinobeingreferredtounderthesaidprovision.

HELD:Thispetitionisdismissedoutrightforlackofjurisdictionandlackofcauseofaction.
Prescindingfromthepetitioner'slackofcapacitytosue,itiselementarythatthisCourtassumesno
jurisdictionoverpetitionsfordeclaratoryrelief.Moreimportantly,thepetitionamountsineffecttoasuitagainst
theincumbentPres.AquinoanditisequallyelementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitor
frombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiodoftheirincumbencyandtenure.RAM.

SolivenvsMakasiar;BeltranvsMakasiar167SCRA393
F:

ThisisthelibelcaseinvolvingBeltran'sallegationsthatPresidentAquinowashidingunderherbed.Oneofthe
issueswaswhetherthePresidentmayinitiatecriminalproceedingsagainstthepetitionersthroughthefilingofacomplaint
affidavit. According to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disabilitytofilesuit.HecontendedthatifcriminalproceedingsensuebyvirtueofthePresident'sfilingofhercomplaint
affidavit,shemaysubsequentlyhavetobeawitnessfortheprosecution,bringingherundertheTC'sjurisdiction. This
wouldbeanindirectwayofdefeatingherprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,sincebytestifyingonthewitnessstand,she
wouldbeexposingherselftopossiblecontemptofcourtorperjury.

HELD: Therationale forthegranttothePresident oftheprivilegeofimmunity fromsuitistoassurethe

exerciseofPresidentialdutiesandfunctionsfreefromanyhindranceordistraction,consideringthatbeingthe
Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
Butthisprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,pertainstothePresidentbyvirtueoftheofficeandmaybe
invokedonlybytheholderoftheoffice;notbyanyotherpersoninthePresident'sbehalf.Thus,anaccusedina
criminalcasewherethePresidentisacomplainantcannotraisethepresidentialprivilegeasadefensetoprevent
thecasefromproceedingagainsttheaccused.
Moreover,thereisnothinginourlawsthatwouldpreventthePresidentfromwaivingtheprivilege.The
Presidentmayshedtheprotectionaffordedbytheprivilegeandsubmittothecourt'sjurisdiction.Thechoiceof

whethertoexercisetheprivilegeortowaiveitissolelythePresident'sprerogative.Itisadecisionthatcannotbe
assumedandimposedbyanotherperson.RAM.

Barlongay:
Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendevenbeyondhisterm?
A:Yes.Solongastheactwasdoneduringhisterm.

(14)ExecutivePrivilege
Inthecaseof US vs Nixon,PresidentNixonrefusedtoreleaseinformationconcerningtheWatergate
scandal,claimingwhathecalled"executiveprivilege."TheUSSCheldhisrefusalinvalid,declaringthatneither
thedoctrineofseparationofpowers,northeneedforconfidentiality ofhighlevelcommunications,without
more,cansustainanabsolute,unqualifiedPresidentialprivilegeofimmunityfromjudicialprocessunderall
circumstances.ThePresident'sneedforcompletecandorandobjectivityfromadviserscallsforgreatdeference
fromthecourts. However,whentheprivilegedependssolelyonthebroad,undifferentiatedclaimofpublic
interestintheconfidentialityofsuchconversations,aconfrontationwithothervaluesarise.Absentaclaimof
needtoprotectmilitary,diplomaticorsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets,itisdifficulttoaccepttheargument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminishedbyproductionofsuchmaterialforinspectionwithalltheprotectionthatthecourtwillbeobligedto
provide.

2.VicePresident
a.Qualifications,election,termandoath
Art.VII,Sec.3.ThereshallbeaVicePresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandterm
ofofficeandbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident.Hemayberemovedfromofficein
thesamemannerasthePresident.
TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno
confirmation.

Id.,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeoplefora
termofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayofthe
electionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligiblefor
anyreelection. NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfour
yearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime.
NoVicePresidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationofthe
officeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheservicefor

thefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbe
heldonthesecondMondayofMay.
ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof
canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe
Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty
daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof
theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the
certificatesofcanvass)thevotes.
Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor
moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe
voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.
TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

Id.,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVicePresidentor
theActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation:
"Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmy
dutiesasPresident(orVicePresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveand
defenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyself
totheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewill
beomitted.)

b.Privilegeandsalary
Art.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentand
VicePresidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreasein
saidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhich
suchincreasedwasapproved.Theyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromthe
Governmentoranyothersource.

c.Prohibitions

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies
orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly
avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx
TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno
confirmation.

d.Succession

Art.VI,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduringtheterm
forwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongthemembersofthe
SenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,whoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteof
allthemembersofbothhouses,votingseparately.

NotethatincasethevacancyoccursinboththeofficesofPresidentandVicePresident,thereisno
ActingVicePresidentspokenof.ThereasonisthattheVicePresidentdoesnothaverealfunctionswhenthe
Presidentisaround.
When a vacancy occurs in both offices, the VicePresident is elected in a special election. If the
vacancyoccursonlyintheVicePresidency,thesuccessorisnotelectedanymore,butmerelychosenfromthe
Congress.

e.Removal
Art.XI,Secs.23
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the

Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand
corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe
removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall

casesofimpeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe
includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin
threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten
sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.
(3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded.
(4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall
theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate
shallforthwithproceed.
(5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin
aperiodofoneyear.
(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting
forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.
(7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand
disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall
neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

f.Functions
(1)Rightofsuccession

Art.VII,Secs.8and11
Art.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthe
President,theVicePresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,

permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVicePresident,the
PresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthen
actasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified.
TheCongressshall,bylaw,provide whoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanent
disability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVicePresident
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualificationsastheActingPresident.

Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowers
anddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowers
anddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVicePresidentasActingPresident.
WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenate
andtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunable
todischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowers
anddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident.
Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakerofthe
HouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersand
dutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfive
daystothePresident oftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten
declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshall
decidetheissue. Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinfortyeight
hours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall.
IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,
withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwothirdsvoteofbothHouses,voting
separately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresident
shallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresident shallcontinueexercising thepowersanddutiesofhis
office.

(2)MembershipinCabinet
Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx
TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno
confirmation.

UPDATED1/24/96
RAM

C.TheJudicialDepartment

Barlongay: Of the three departments of government, two departments (Executive and Legislative) are
consideredasactive.Ontheotherhand,theJudiciaryisconsideredaspassive.Itispassiveinthesensethatit
hastowaitforacasetobefiledbeforeitcanact.
Cruz: Tomaintaintheindependence oftheJudiciary,thefollowingsafeguardshavebeenembodied inthe
Consti:
(1)TheSCisaconstitutionalbody.Itcannotbeabolishednormayitsmembershiporthemannerofits
meetingsbechangedbymerelegislation.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(1)]
(2)ThemembersofthejudiciaryarenotsubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.
(3)ThemembersoftheSCmaynotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.(Art.IX,Sec.2.)
(4)TheSCmaynotbedeprivedofitsminimumoriginalandappellatejurisdictionasprescribedinArt.
X,Sec.5oftheConsti.(Art.VIII,Sec.2.)
(5)TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSCmaynotbeincreasedbylaww/oitsadviceandconcurrence.
(Art.VI,Sec.30.)
(6)TheSCnowhasadministrativesupervisionoveralllowercourtsandtheirpersonnel.(Art.VIII,
Sec.6.)
(7)TheSChasexclusivepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.11.)
(8)ThemembersoftheSCandalllowercourtshavesecurityoftenure,w/ccannotbeunderminedbya
lawreorganizingthejudiciary.(Id.)
(9) Theyshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.
(Art.VIII,Sec.12.)
(10)Thesalariesofjudgesmaynotbereducedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.)
(11)Thejudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.(Art.VIII,Sec.3.)

(12)TheSCalonemayinitiaterulesofcourt.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5).]
(13)OnlytheSCmayorderthetemporarydetailofjudges.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(3)]
(14)TheSCcanappointallofficialsandemployeesofthejudiciary.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(6)]
1.TheSupremeCourt
a.Composition
Art.VIII,Sec.4. (1) TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedof aChiefJusticeandfourteen
AssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Any
vacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.
(2) Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,or
law,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
otherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytook
partinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.
(3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofa
majorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvoted
thereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequired
numberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecided enbanc: Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleor
principleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedor
reversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.

Creation
ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablished
bylaw.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.1.)
TheSupremeCourtisaconstitutionalbody. AssuchitcannotbeabolishedbytheCongressforthe
powertodestroyonlyresidesintheonewhohasthepowertocreate.
Thelowercourts(CourtofAppeals,RegionalTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,MetropolitanTrial
Courts,MunicipalCircuitTrialCourts),ontheotherhand,areestablishedbylaw,andsocouldbeabolishedby
law,providedthesecurityoftenureisnotundermined.
Composition

TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeand14AssociateJustices.[Art.VIII,Sec.
4(1)]
Underthe1935Constitution,theSupremeCourtwascomposedofeleven(11)justicesinall;in1973,

fifteen(15)Justices.

ModeofSitting
Itmaysitenbanc,orinitsdiscretion,indivisionsof3,5or7members(or5,3or2divisions).[Art.
VIII,Sec.4(1)]
In1935,therulewasthattheSCmaysitenbancorin2divisions,"unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw."
CongressdecidedagainstallowingtheSCtositin2divisionsonthetheorythatthereisonlyoneSupreme
Court.Andso,itprovidedintheJudiciaryActof1948therulethattheSCmayonlysitenbanc.Butthereality
wasthat thedockets were crowded. This prompted the framers toeliminate one phrase "unless otherwise
providedbylaw"in1956,andineffectleavethedecisiontotheSConwhethertositenbancorin2divisions,if
itsatondivisions.
In1987,notonlywasthediscretionretained,butalsothedivisionswereincreased.Theremaybe5,3or
2divisionsmadeupof3,5or7members,respectively.Atpresent,theSCsitseitherenbancorin3divisions.

OneSupremeCourt
When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme Court" because,
according the United States v Limsiongco, 41 Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its
authority,becausealthoughitsitsindivisions,itremainsandcofunctionsasonebody.
This"oneSupremeCourt"doctrineisstrengthenedbytheprovisionthat"whentherequirednumber(in
adivision)isnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaid
downbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourt
sittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]

StrictComposition
InVargasvRilloraza,80Phil297(1948),theSCheldthatthetemporarydesignationofjudgesofthe
CFIandtheCourtofAppealsintheSupremeCourttoconstituteaquorumduetodisqualificationofsomeofthe
justices,isunconstitutional.ThereisbutoneSupremeCourtwhosemembershipappointmentsarepermanent.

VargasvRilloraza,80Phil297(1948)
F:Pet.VargasfiledamotionassailingtheconstitutionalityofPeople'sCourtActw/cprovidesthatanyjusticeoftheSC
whoheldanyofficeorpositionunderthePhilExec.CommissionorunderthegovtcalledPhil.Republic,maynotsitand
voteinanycasebroughttothatcourtundersec.13hereofinw/ctheaccusedisapersonwhoheldanyofficeorposition
undereitherboththePhil.Exec.CommissionandthePhil.Republicoranybranch,instrumentalityoragencythereof.If

onaccountofsuchdisqualification,orbec.ofanyofthegroundsofdisqualificationofjudges,inR126,sec.1oftheROC,
oronaccountofillness,absenceoftemporarydisability,therequisitenumberofjusticesnecessarytoconstituteaquorom
inanycaseisnotpresent,thePres.maydesignatesuchno.ofjudgesoftheCFI,judgesatlargeofCFI,cadastraljudges,
havingnoneofthedisqualificationsetforthintheabovelaw,asmaybenecessarytosittemporarilyasjusticeoftheSCin
ordertoformaquorom.

HELD:(1)Congressdoesnothavethepowertoaddtotheexistinggroundsfordisqualificationofajusticeof
theSC.Todisqualifyanyoftheseconstitutionalcomponentmemberofthecourtespeciallyasinthiscase,a
majorityoftheminatreasoncase,isnothingshortofdeprivingthecourtitselfofitsjurisdictionasestablished
bythefundamentallaw.Disqualificationofajudgeisadeprivationofhisjudicialpower.Itwouldseemevident
thatifCongresscoulddisqualifymembersofSCintakingpartinthehearinganddeterminationofcertain
"collaboration"cases,itcouldextendthedisqualificationtoothercases.
(2)Thedesignationprovided(aCFIjudgetositasaSCjusticeiftheSCdoesnothavetherequired
quorum)isrepugnanttotheconstitutionalrequirementthatmembersbeappointedbythePres.w/theconsentof
the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments.)Itwillresultinasituationwherein6memberssittingwillnotbeappointedandconfirmedin
accordancew/theConsti.
(3) Howeverbriefortemporarymaybetheactionorparticipationofajudgedesignated,thereisno
escapingthefactthathewouldbeparticipatinginthedeliberationsandactsoftheSCandifallowedtodoso,
hisvotewouldcountasmuchasanyregularjustice.xxxAdapted.

b.Appointmentandqualifications
Art.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylower
collegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourt
mustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourt
orengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.

JudicialandBarCouncil
Id.,Sec.8.(5)The(JudicialandBar)Councilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommending
appointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmay
assigntoit.

Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedby
thePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforevery
vacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submissionofthelist.

Qualifications

(1)Naturalborncitizen[Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)]
(2)Atleast40yearsofage(id.)
(3)Atleast15yearsofexperienceasajudgeoflowercourt,orpracticeoflawinthePhilippines(id.)
(4)Ofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]
c.Salary
Art.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupreme
courtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalary
shallnotbedecreased.

UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,theCJshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP240,000andthe
AssociateJusticesshallreceiveP204,000each.(Art.XVIII,Sec.17.)
ThesalaryoflowercourtjudgesisnotinitiallyfixedbytheConstitutionbutbythelaw.
Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.)
Butitmaybeincreasedbylaw,totakeeffectatonce. Reasonsare:[one]theConstitutiondoesnot
prohibitit;[two]theJudiciaryplaysnopartinthepassageofthelawincreasingtheirsalaryunliketheCongress
andtheExecutive,andsotherecanbenoconflictofinterest;and[three]thiswillpromotetheindependenceof
theJudiciary.
IstheimpositionofincometaxonthesalaryoftheJusticesandJudgesadiminutionoftheirsalaryas
prohibitedbytheConstitution?
Underthe1935Constitution(Art.VIII,Sec.9),itwasprovidedthatthemembersoftheJudiciary"shall
receivesuchcompensationasmaybefixedbylaw,whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuancein
office."
InPerfectovMeer,85Phil552(1950),theSCruledthatsalariesofjudgeswerenotsubjecttoincome
tax,forsuchwouldbeadiminutionoftheirsalary,incontraventionoftheConstitution. Thishappenedafter
JusticePerfectorefusedtopaytheassessmentofincometaxmadeuponhimbytheCollector.

Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the
diminutionofsalariesofmembersofthejudiciaryshouldnotbeinterpretedtomeananexemptionfromincome
tax.(Sec.13,RA590.)
ButtheCourtstruckthisstatutedownasunconstitutionalwhenasinthepreviouscase,JudgeEndencia
refusedtopayhistaxes;therebygivingtheSCanopportunity tomakethepronouncement inthecaseof
EndenciavDavid,93Phil696(1953).TheSCrulinginvalidatingthestatutewasbasedonthereasonthatthe
legislaturehadnopowertointerprettheConstitution,suchpowerbeinglodgedinthejudicialbranch,andso
whenitdid,itviolatedtheseparationofpowersundertheConstitution.

Comparethe1973Constitution,Art.XV,Sec.6
Awareofthisruling,theframersofthe1973ConstitutionclearlyprovidedinArt.XV,Sec.6that:
Art.,Sec.6. Nosalary oranyformofemolumentofanypublicofficeroremployee,including
constitutionalofficers,shallbeexemptfromthepaymentofincometax.
therebyavoidingaSCcontrary,selfdefensiveruling.
Thisprovisioninthe1973Constitution,however,isnotfoundinthe1987Constitution,promptingsome
judgesincludingNitafan,tocontendthattheoldrulinginPerfectoandEndenciaistherebydeemedrevived.But
theSCthistimedidnotupholdtheoldruling.
Notexemptfromincometax
In Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987
Constitution,thesalariesofmembersoftheJudiciaryarenotexemptfromtaxes.Itanchoreditsdecisiononthe
deliberationoftheConstitutionalCommission,thatis,onthelegislativehistoryofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10.
AdraftofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10whenoriginallypresentedtothebody,expresslyexemptedthe
salaryofjudgesfromtaxation.Butwhenthisdraftwasdiscussedonsecondreading,thesentimentwasagainst
theexemption,thereasonbeingthatlikeanyothercitizen,judgesandjusticesmustpaytheirshareintheburden
ofmaintainingthegovernment. SothisexpressexemptionwasdeletedfromArt.VIII,Sec.10andsoitwas
whenthedraftwasadoptedbythebody.
TherewasaplantoinsertasimilarprovisionasthatfoundinArt.XV,Sec.6of1973,butthrough
oversight,theconstitutionalcommissionfailedtoinsertone.Yet,theintentwascleartohaveone,andsoitmust
bereadintotheConstitution,theSCconcluded.

d.Securityof

Tenure
Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold

office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges
oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin
thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Id.,Sec.2.xxx
NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits
Members.
Reorganization
ItishighlydoubtfulifthisprovisionappliestotheSC.Thepowertoreorganizeinvolvesthepowerto
createanddestroy.SincetheSCisacreationoftheConstitutionandnotofCongress,itmaynotbecreatednor
destroyed,andultimatelyreorganizedbyCongress.

DelaLallanavs.Alba,112SCRA294(1982)
F:

Sec.144ofBP129replacedtheexistingcourtsystem,w/theexceptionoftheSCandtheSB,w/anewoneand
providedthatuponthecompletionofthereorganizationbythePres.,thecourtsaffected"shallbedeemedautomatically
abolishedandtheincumbentsthereofshallceasetoholdoffice." Petitioner,judgeofthecitycourtofOlangapo,and7
membersoftheBarquestionedthevalidityoftheActinanactionforprohibition,onthegroundthatitcontravenedthe
securityoftenureofjudges.TheysoughttobolstertheirclaimbyimputinglackofGFintheenactmentoftheActandby
characterizing it as an undue delegation of legislative power bec. of Sec. 41, w/c authorizes the Pres. to fix the
compensationofthosewhowouldbeappointedunderit"alongtheguidelinessetforthinLOINo.93,pursuanttoPD985,
asamendedbyPD1597."

HELD: TheimputationoflackofGFdisregardsthefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyand
deliberationnotonlybytheBPbutalsobyaPresidentialstudycommittee(composedoftheChiefJusticeand
MinisterofJusticeascochairmen,w/membersdrawnfromtheSCandMinistryofJustice.)Thestudygroup
calledattentiontothecloggeddocketsofthecourtsandthepossibleworseningofthesituationasaresultof
populationgrowthandrisingexpectations,andtheadverseeffectofthisonthedevelopmentalprogramsofthe
govt.Itwasthisproblemw/ctheActseekstosolve.xxx[T]heabolitionofanofficeisw/inthecompetenceof
alegislativebodyifdoneinGF.ThetestiswhethertheabolitionisinGF.Asthatelementispresentinthe
enactmentofBP129,thelackofmeritofthepetitionbecomesapparent.
(2)However,whiletherecanbenoclaimtosecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,intheir
effectthereisnodifferencebet.removalandtheabolitionofoffice.Ineithercase,theeffectontheincumbent
isoneofseparation.Accordingly,intheimplementationofthelawitwouldbeinkeepingw/thespiritofthe
Consti.that,asfarasincumbentjusticesandjudgesareconcerned,theSCbeconsultedandthatitsviewbe
accordedfullestconsideration.Thisisnotrenderingadvisoryopinionbec.thereisnoquestionoflawinvolved.
Neitheristhereintrusionintotheappointingprocessbec.onlyincumbentsareinvolved.
(3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the
compensationofthosewhowillbeappointedtothenewcourts"alongtheguidelinessetforthinLOINo.93,

pursuanttoPD985,asamendedbyPD1597"constitutesasufficientground.VV.

e.Removal
Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges
oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin
thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Art.XI,Sec.2. ThexxxMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxmayberemovedfromoffice,on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand
corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe
removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

SeeprocedureforimpeachmentunderOtherPowersofCongress.
MembersoftheSCcannotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.Thus,aSCjusticecannotbechargedin
acriminalcaseoradisbarmentproceeding,becausetheultimateeffectofeitheristoremovehimfromoffice,
andthuscircumventtheprovisiononimpeachment.

f.FiscalAutonomy
Art.VIII,Sec.3. TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy. AppropriationsfortheJudiciary
maynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,after
approval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

g.Jurisdiction
(1)ThePowerofJudicialReview
Art.VIII,Sec.5.xxx
(2) Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealor certiorari asthelawortheRulesof
Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:
(a) Allcases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or

regulationisinquestion.

ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablished
bylaw.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.1.)
ScopeoftheJudicialPower
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto:(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2)
1.Settleactualcontroversies,involvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable;and
Thisistheclassicaldefinitionofjudicialpowerthatcontemplatesacasewherethepartyplaintiffhasa
causeofactionagainstthepartydefendant,thatis,theplaintiffhasarightcorrespondingtothedefendant's
obligation,whichrightwasviolatedbythedefendant,therebyresultingininjury.
2.Determinewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.

AsearlyasAngaravElectoralTribunal,theSCheldthatwhenitperformshischeckingfunctionofthe
coequalbranches,itismerelyperformingadutyimposeduponitbytheConstitution;thatitactsasthemecha
nism that implements the "supremacy of theConstitution." Theextent towhich it exercises this function,
however,hasbeenlimitedbythepoliticalquestiondoctrine.
(1)PowerofJudicialReview

AngaravElectoralCommission,63Phil139(1936).
F:

In1935,theNationalAssemblyadoptedaresolutionthat"allmemberselect,withnoelectionprotestfiledonor
before3December1935aredeemedelected."TheElectoralCommission,aconstitutionalbody,ontheotherhandsetthe9
December1935asthedeadlineforthefilingofelectionprotest.
Ynsua,wholosttoAngara,filedamotionofprotest(complaint)on8December1935.Thiswasentertainedby
theElectoralCommission. AngaracontendedthatthedeadlinesetbytheNationalAssemblywascontrolling. Who
prevailed?

HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral
Commission,inviewoftheconstitutionalprovisiongrantingtheelectoralCommissionjurisdictionoverelection
protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated
constitutionalboundaries,itneitherassertssupremacy,norannulstheactsofthelegislature.Itsimplycarries
outthesolemnandsacredobligationsimposeduponitbytheconstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsandto
establishforthepartiestherightswhichtheconstitutiongrantstothem.Thisisintruthallthatisinvolvedin

whatistermed"judicialsupremacy"whichproperlyisthepowerofjudicialreviewundertheConstitution.
Eventhen,thispowerofjudicialreviewislimitedtoactualcasesandcontroversiestobeexercisedafter
fullopportunityofargumentbytheparties,andlimitedfurthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedorthevery
lismota presented.Anyattemptatabstractioncouldonlyleadtodialecticsandbarrenlegalquestionsandto
sterileconclusionsunrelatedtoactualities. Narrowedasitsfunctionisinthismanner,thejudiciarydoesnot
passuponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation.xxxAdapted.
a.ConditionsfortheExerciseofJudicialReview

InPeople vVera,66Phil56(1937),J.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybe
exercisedinanactualcaseandcontroversy.
This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a
constitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime,and(4)aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylis
motaofthecase,i.e.anunavoidablequestion.

PoliticalQuestions
In PBA v COMELEC,140SCRA455,weseeareversalofjudicialreview. Thecasewasclearlya
justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election,
proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorized the
BatasantopassaSnapElectionLaw?TheCourtcouldhavevalidlyissuedaninjunctiontostoptheCOMELEC
fromproceedingwiththepreparationsfortheelection.Butitdidnot,citingitsdelayindecidingthecaseand
thesentimentsofthepeoplethatdevelopedinthemeantimeasreasonforitsinaction.Accordingtothecourt,
whatatfirstwasalegalquestionbecameapoliticalquestionbecauseitwasovertakenbyevents.[Inthiscase,
no7Justicesvotedtodismissthepetitions,and5Justicesvotedtodeclarethestatuteunconstitutional. In
accordancew/Javellanavs.Exec.Sec.,J.Teehankeewasoftheviewthatastherewerelessthantenvotesfor
declaringBP883unconstitutional,thepetitionsshouldbedismissed.)
VV:ACourtwhichdoesnotissueaninjunctiontoenjoinanofficialactwhenitcouldhaveissuedone
isactuallydecidingthecaseinfavorofthevalidityoftheact. Failuretoissueaninjunctionisasmuchan
exerciseofjudicialreview.
InRomulovYniguez,infra,weseeanothertrendofjudicialreview.Whatseemslikealegalquestion
when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelve a complaint for
impeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroader
context(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofacoequalbranchtocompelhimbymandamusto
recallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionofthe
Batasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.)
SaidtheSC: BydenyingMitra'smotiontorecalltheresolutionofimpeachment,theBPineffect
confirmedtheactionofitscommitteedismissingtheresolution.Thisplacesthematterbeyondreviewbythis
Court.WhilethepetitionisdirectedattheCommitteeonJustice,HumanRightsandGoodGovt.,itisactually
directedattheBPbec.thecommittee'saction,dismissingtheresolutionofimpeachment,wasapprovedbythe

BP.Indeed,aninterferencebythejudicialdept.w/theworkofalegislativecommitteewouldbetantamountto
anintereferencew/theworkofthelegislatureitself.
Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerase
doubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.

DumlaovCOMELEC(95SCRA392)
F:

Section4ofBP52providedthatanyretiredelectivelocalofficialwhohadreceivedretirementpaytowhichhe
wasentitledunderthelawandwhohavebeen65yearsoldatthecommencementofthetermofofficetowhichhesought
tobeelected,wasnotqualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehadretired.
Dumlaofiledforprohibitiontoenjointheenforcementofthelaw,claimingthatthiswasdirectedathimasformer
governorofNuevaVizcaya.

HELD:TheSCheldthat(a)hehadnostanding,sincehehadnotbeeninjuredbytheoperationofthelaw,no
petitionforhisdisqualificationhavingbeenfiledand(b)theactionwasarequestforadvisoryopinion.Andyet,
theSCupheldthevalidity"becauseofparamountpublicinterest",declaringthatthelegislativepurposeof
infusingyoungerbloodinlocalgovernmentwasvalid.Adapted.

Barlongay:
Q:Whatarethetwoaspectsofpoliticalquestions?
A:(1)thosequestionsthatarelefttothepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity
(2)mattersw/carelodgedintheotherbranchesofgovt.
Q:Whatistheeffectoftheexpandedjurisdictiononthepoliticalquestiondoctrine?
A:Thedoctrinestillexistsbuthasbeenreducedinscope.

b.Allcourtscanexercisejudicialreview
ThereviewpoweroftheSCimpliesthatithasappellatejurisdiction overfinaljudgments oflower
courtsoncaseswithconstitutionalissues. Ifso,inferiorcourtshaveoriginaljurisdictionoverconstitutional
casesalthoughtheydecidethecaseonlyatfirstinstance,theirdecisionbeingalwaysreviewablebytheSC.
Thus,forinstanceanRTCcanruleontheconstitutionalityoftheAntiSubversionLaw.
InJ.M.Tuason&Co.vCA,3SCRA696(1961),RA2616,whichprovidedfortheexpropriationofthe
TatalonEstate,wasclaimedtobeunconstitutional.ThisissuesaidtheSC,couldberesolvedbytheCFIinthe
ejectmentcasefiledbeforeitbytheevicteesoftheestate,sincethe1935Constitutioncontemplatedthatinferior
courtsshouldhavejurisdictionincasesinvolvingconstitutionalityissues,thatitspokeofappellatereviewof
"finaljudgmentofinferiorcourts"incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteof
theSCrequiredbySec.10ofArt.VIIrestrictedthedecisionsofthatCourtonlyintheexerciseofitsappellate

jurisdiction.
Said the court: The Consti. contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involvingtheconstitutionalityofanytreatyorlaw,foritspeaksofappellatereviewofthefinaljudgmentof
inferiorcourts,incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteoftheSC,requiredby
Sec.10,Art.VIII,ofthe1935Consti.,conditionsonlydecisionsofthatcourtintheexerciseofitsappellate
jurisdiction.
InYnotvIAC148SCRA659,theSCreversedtheRTC'sholdingthatithadnoauthoritytoruleonthe
validityofEO626A,banningthetransportingofcarabaosfromoneprovincetoanother. TheCourtpointed
out,thatsinceithasjurisdictiontoreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsin
constitutionalcases,thenthelowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance.
TheSCthenstruckdownthelawforbeingarbitraryandforundulydelegatinglegislativepower.

Ynotvs.IAC,148SCRA659(1987)
F:

Petitioners'6carabaos wereconfiscatedbythepolice forhavingbeen transported from Masbate toIloilo in

violationofEO626A. Hebroughtanactionforreplevin,challengingtheconsitutionalityoftheEO. Thetrialcourt
sustainedtheconfiscationoftheanimalsanddeclinedtoruleonthevalidityofthelawonthegroundthatitlacked
authoritytodoso.ItsdecisionwasaffirmedbytheIAC.Hencethispetitionforreview.

HELD:(1) UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdictionto"review,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmon
appealor certiorari,asthelaworrulesofcourtmayprovidefinaljudgmentsoflowercourts"inallcases
involvingtheconstitutionalityofcertainmeasures,lowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirst
instance.
(2)Thereisnodoubtthatbybanningtheslaughteroftheseanimals(exceptwherethereatleast7yrs.
oldifmaleand11yrsoldiffemaleupontheissuanceofthenecessarypermit)theEOwillbeconservingthose
stillfitforfarmworkorbreedingandpreventingtheirimprovidentdepletion.Wedonotsee,however,howthe
prohibitionoftheinterprovincialtransportofcarabaoscanpreventtheirindiscriminateslaughter,considering
thattheycanbekilledanywhere,w/nolessdifficultyinonprovincethaninanother.Obviously,retainingthe
carabaoinoneprovincewillnotpreventtheirslaughterthere,anymorethanmovingthemtoanotherprovince
willmakeiteasiertokillthemthere.Asforthecarabeef,theprohibitionismadetoapplytoitasotherwise,so
saystheEO,itcouldbeeasilycircumsbcribedbysimplykilling theanimal. Perhapsso. However,ifthe
movementoftheliveanimalsforthepurposeofpreventingtheirslaughtercannotbeprohibited,itshouldfollow
thatthereisnoreasoneithertoprohibittheirtransferas,nottobeflippant,deadmeat.
(3)Intheinstantcase,thecarabaoswerearbitrarilyconfiscatedbythepolicestationcommander,were
returnedtothepetitioneronlyafterhehadfiledacomplaintforrecoveryandgivenasupersedeasbondw/cwas
orderedconfiscateduponhisfailuretoproducethecarabaoswhenorderedbythetrialcourt.TheEOdefined
theprohibition,convictedthepetitionerandimmediatelyimposedpunishment,w/cwascarriedoutforthright.
Themeasuresstruckhimatonceandpounceduponthepetitionerw/ogivinghimachancetobeheard,thus
denyinghimelementaryfairplay.xxxVV.

(2)JudicialReviewandpoliticalquestions.
Art.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas

maybeestablishedbylaw.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political question doctrine. As
enunciated in Tanada v Cuenco, a political question is one tobe decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity,oneinrespecttowhichfulldiscretionarycapacityisgiventotheotherbranchesofthegovernment.
Itdoesnotmean,however,thatthepoliticalquestiondoctrinehasbeencompletelyabrogatedbythe
Constitution,suchthatifthosecaseswheretheSCinvokedthedoctrineweredecidednowitwouldhaveto
decidethecaseonitsmerits.ItissubmittedthatwhattheConstitutionoverrulesisonlytherulinginGarcia
PadillavPonceEnrile,supra,wheretheSCheldthatthequestiononthevalidityoftheproclamationofmartial
lawisbeyondjudicialreview,sothatwhenthePresidentsaysthatthereisaneedforsuchproclamation,his
wordsarebindingontheCourts,andallthatthecitizencandoistrustinthegoodfaithofthePresident.
Indeed,asalreadynotedintheCommanderinChiefpowerofthePresidentabove,Art.VII,Sec.18
authorizestheSCtoreview,inanappropriateproceeding(likeahabeascorpuspetition),filedbyacitizen(who,
undertheRulesofCourt,couldbethedetaineehimself,oranyoneelseinhisbehalf),thesufficiencyofthe
factualbasisoftheproclamationorsuspension.
Beyondthis,thepoliticalquestiondoctrineisnotadeadissue.Infact,theSupremeCourtcontinuesto
invokeitasinLawyers'LeagueforaBetterPhilippinesvAquino,InreBermudezandMarcosvsManglapus.

GarciavsBOI,191SCRA288
Inthiscase,thecourtruledthatithasaconstitutionaldutytostepintothecontroversyanddetermine
theparamountissue.Saidthecourt,"[t]hereisbeforeusanactualcontroversywhetherthepetrochemicalplant
shouldremaininBataanorshouldbetransferredtoBatangas,andwhetheritsfeedstockoriginallyofnaphtha
onlyshouldbechangedtonaphthaand/orliquifiedpetroleumgasastheapprovedamendedapplicationofthe
BPC,nowLuzonPetrochemicalCorp.(LPC),shows.AndinthelightofthecategoricaladmissionoftheBOI
thatitistheinvestorwhohasthefinalchoiceofthesiteandthedecisiononthefeedstock,whetherornotit
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding.
TheSupremeCourtheldthattheBOIcommittedagraveabuseofdiscretioninapprovingthetransferof
thepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandauthorizingthechangeoffeedstockfromnaphthaonlyto
naphthaand/orLPGforthemain reasonthatthefinalsayisintheinvestorallothercircumstancestothe
contrarynotwithstanding.Nocogentadvantagetothegovernmenthasbeenshownbythistransfer.Thisisa
repudiationoftheindependentpolicyofthegovernmentexpressedinnumerouslawsandtheConstitutiontorun

itsownaffairsandthewayitdeemsbestforthenationalinterest.
Dissenting:ThedecisionoftheBOImaybeextremelyunwiseandinadvisable,buttheSCmaynot,forthat
reasonannultheBOI'sactionorprohibititfromactingonthemannerthatlieswithinitsparticularsphereof
competence,fortheCourtisnotajudgeofthewisdomandsoundnessoftheactionsofthetwoothercoequal
branchesoftheGovernment,butonlyoftheirlegalityandconstitutionality.Adapted.

(3)Jurisdictionovercriminalcaseswherepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetua
Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:
xxx
(2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealor certiorari asthelawortheRulesof
Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:
(d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.

InPeoplevDaniel,86SCRA511(1978)andasaffirmedinPeoplevRamos,88SCRA466(1979),both
beingrapecaseswherethetrialcourtimposedlesserpenaltiesbecauseofmisappreciationoftheaggravating
andqualifyingcircumstancesandonappealthepenaltywasincreased.Themajorityopinionheldthat"hence
forth,shouldtheCAbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetuashouldbeimposedinany
criminalcaseappealedtoitwherethepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourtislessthanreclusionperpetua,thesaid
Court,withcomprehensivewrittenanalysisoftheevidenceanddiscussionofthelawinvolved(should)render
judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the
circumstanceswarrant,refrainfromenteringjudgment,andforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentire
recordtheretotothisCourtforreview."ChiefJusticeCastro,forthemajority,explained:Art.X,Sec.5(2)(d)
[nowArt.VIII,Sec.5(2)(d)]providesthattheSCshallhaveappellatejurisdictionover"finaljudgementsand
decreesofinferiorcourts"incriminalinw/cthe"penaltyimposedisdeathorlifeimprisonment."Unlessthe
CArendersjudgmentandimposesthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetua,therewouldbenojudgmentfor
SCtoreview.Indeed,Section34oftheJudiciaryActof1948andthepresentRule124,Sec.13providethat,
whenevertheCAshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorlifeimprisonmentshouldbeimposed,
"thesaidcourtshallrefrainfromenteringjudgmentthereon,andshallforthwithcertifythecasebroughtbefore
itonappeal,"whichthatitisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgment.Inotherwords,theCAisnotprohibited
fromrenderingjudgmentbutfrom"enteringjudgment."Thedistinctionbet.thetwoiswellestablished.
The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated w/ an "entry of judgment" as the latter is
understoodinR36inrelationtoSec.8,R121andSec.16,R124,ROC."Entryofjudgment"presupposesa
finaljudgment finalinthesensethatnoappealwastakenfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtorappellate
courtw/inthereglamentaryperiod.Ajudgmentinacrim.casebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodfor
perfecting anappeal, orwhenthesentence hasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthedef.has
expresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.Itisonlythenthatthereisajudgmentw/cistobeenteredor
recordedinthebookofentriesofjudgments.

Rule124,Sec.13.xxx
WhenevertheCourtofAppealsshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaor
highershouldbeimposedinacase,theCourtafterdiscussionoftheevidenceandthelawinvolved,shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances warrant,
refrainfromenteringjudgmentandforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentirerecordthereoftothe
SupremeCourtforreview.

(4)ArticleVII,Sec.18,par.3
Art.VII,Sec.18.xxx
xxx
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency
ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe
extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.

(5)ArticleVII,Sec.4,par.7
Art.VII,Sec.4.xxx
xxx
TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,VicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsruleforthepurpose.

Lopezvs.Roxas,17SCRA756(1966)
F:

In1965,the2HousesofCongressinjointsessionproclaimedpetitionerFernandoLopezelectedtotheOfficeof
theVicePresidentofthePhilippines.Hisclosestopponent,resp.GerardoRoxas,thenfiledwiththePresidentialElectoral
Tribunal(PET)anelectionprotestcontestingtheelectionofpetitionerhereinasVPuponthegroundthatitwasnothe,but
saidresp.,whohadobtainedthelargestnumberofvotesforsaidoffice. PetitionerLopeztheninstitutedthisOriginal
ActiontopreventthePETfromhearinganddecidingtheaforementionedelectioncontest,uponthegroundthatR.A.No.
1793,creatingsaidTribunal,is"unconstitutional"andthat,"allproceedingstakenbyitareanullity".

ISSUE:WhetherR.A.1793isunconstitutional
HELD:NO.Section1,Art.VIIIoftheConstitutionvestsinthejudicialbranchofthegovernment,notmerely
somespecifiedorlimitedjudicialpower,buttheentiretyor"all"ofsaidpower,except,only,somuchasthe
Constitutionconfersuponsomeotheragency,suchasthepowerto"judgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returnsandqualifications'ofmembersoftheSenateandthoseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisvested
bytheConstitutionsolelyintheSenateElectoralTribunalandtheHouseElectoralTribunal,respectively.
R.A1793,creatingthePET,hastheeffectofgivingadefeatedcandidate thelegalrighttocontest

judiciallytheelectionofthePresidentelectortheVPelect.ByprovidingthatthePET"shallbecomposedof
theChiefJusticeandtheother10MembersoftheSC",R.A.1793hasconferreduponsuchcourtanadditional
exclusiveoriginaljurisdiction.Ithasnotcreatedanewandseparatecourt.IthasmerelyconferredupontheSC
thefunctionsofaPET. ThePETisnotinferiortotheSCsinceitisthesamecourt,althoughthefunctions
peculiartosaidTribunalaremorelimitedinscopethanthoseoftheSCintheexerciseofitsordinaryfunctions.
TheauthorityofthePETtodeclarewhohasthebetterrighttoofficedoesnotabridgeconstitutionaltenure.
Iftheevidenceintroducedintheelectionprotestshowsthatthepersonreallyelectedistheprotestant,notthe
persondeclaredelectedbyCongress,thenthelatterhadlegallynoconstitutionaltenurewhatsoever,and,hence,
hecanclaimnoabridgmentthereof.Moreover,intheimpositionofnewdutiesupontheSC,theCongresshas
not,throughR.A.1793,encroachedupontheappointing poweroftheExecutive. Itconstitutesneitherthe
creationofanoffice,northeappointmentofanofficer.Saidlawisconstitutional.Adapted.

(6)ArticleIX,A,Sec.7
Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A
caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or
memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise
providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
totheSupremeCourton certiorari bytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthecopy
thereof.

h.CongressionalPoweroverJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt
Art.VIII,Sec.2. TheCongressshallhavethepowerthedefine,prescribeandapportionthe
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumeratedinSection5hereof.
xxx
Butwhilethejurisdictionofcourtsisamatteroflegislativeapportionment,theConstitutionsetscertain
limitationsonthisprerogative:
1.ItcannotdecreasetheconstitutionallysetjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.
(ItmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof.)
2.ItcannotincreasetheconstitutionallysetappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.

Art.VI,Sec.30. Nolawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellatejurisdiction oftheSupreme

CourtasprovidedinthisConstitutionwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence.

3.ItcanincreasetheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSC(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).
4.ItcanmakethejurisdictionoftheSCconcurrentwithlowercourts(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).
Thus,undertheRulesofCourt,theoriginaljurisdictionoftheSCisconcurrentwiththeRTCandinthe
caseofthespecialcivilactions,withtheCA.
5. Itcannotpassalawreorganizingthejudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits
members.(Art.VI,Sec.2,par.2)

MantrusteSystems,Inc.vsCA
F:

Mantruste(MSI)enteredintoaninterimleaseagreementw/DBP,ownerofBayviewPlazaHotelwhereinthe
formerwouldoperatethehotelforaminimumof3mos.oruntilsuchtimethatthesaidpropertiesaresoldtoMSIorother
thirdpartiesbyDBP.Subsequently,thePres.issuedProcl.50w/csoughttotheexpeditiousprivatizationofgovernment
assets. TheBayviewHotelproperties wereamongthegovt assets identifiedforprivatization andwereconsequently
transferredfromDBPtotheAssetPrivatizationTrust(APT)fordisposition. xxx. Thepropertiesweresubsequently
awardedtotheMakatiAgroTradingandLaFilipinaCorp.MSIfiledacomplaintfortheissuanceofarestrainingorder
enjoiningAPTfromapprovingthewinningbidandawardingtheBayviewpropertytoprivatepetitionersandfromejecting
MSIfromthepropertyorfromterminatingthecontractoflease. TheCAnullifiedthelowercourt'sdecisionforbeing
violativeofSec.31ofProcl.50A.

HELD: Section31ofProclamationNo.5Aprohibitedcourtsandadministrativeagencies fromissuing any

restrainingorderorinjunctionagainsttheAssetPrivatizationTrustinconnectionwiththeacquisition,saleor
dispositionofassetstransferredtoit,noragainstanypurchaserofassetssoldbytheTrusttopreventsuch
purchaserfromtakingpossessionofanyassetspurchasedbyhim.SaidSectiondoesnotinfringeanyprovision
oftheConstitution.Itdoesnotimpairtheinherentpowerofthecourts"tosettleactualcontroversieswhichare
legallydemandableandenforceableandtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretion
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovt." The
President,intheexerciseofherlegislativepowerundertheFreedomConstitution,issuedsaidProclamationto
preventcourtsfrominterferinginthedischargeoftheExecutiveDepartmentofitstaskofcarryingoutthe
expeditiousdispositionandprivatizationofcertaingovt.corporationsand/ortheassetsthereof,absentanygrave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistentwiththeConstitutionandnothavingbeenrepealedorrevokedbyCongress,hasremainedoperative.
Whilethejudicialpowermayappeartobepervasive,thetruthisthatunderthesystemofseparationor
powers,thepowersofthecourtsovertheotherbranchesandinstrumentalitiesofgovernmentislimitedtothe
determination ofwhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof
jurisdictionintheexerciseoftheirauthorityandintheperformanceoftheirassignedtasks. Courtsmaynot
substitutetheirjudgmentforthatoftheAPT,norblock,byaninjunction,thedischargeofitsfunctionsandthe
implementationofitsdecisionsinconnectionwiththeacquisition,sale,ordispositionofassetstransferredtoit.
Adapted.

TheSupremeCourt'sJurisdiction
A)Originaljurisdiction[Art.VIII,Sec.5(1)]
(1)Casesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls.
(2)Petitionsforcertiorari,prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoandhabeascorpus.
(3)SufficiencyoffactualbasisofproclamationofmartiallawandsuspensionofprivilegeofwritofHC
NotethattheSCdoesnothavejurisdictionoverdeclaratoryreliefcases,whichmustbefiledwiththe
RTC(InReBermudezsaidsotoo,andyetgaveduecoursetothepetition.)
Thefirstcase(ambassadors,etc.)ismadeconcurrentwithRTCsbylaw(JudiciaryActof1948).The
secondcase(specialcivilactions)isconcurrentwiththeCAandtheRTC,withrespecttoinferiorbodies.
B)AppellateJurisdiction
TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertoreview,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmon(i)ordinary
appeal,or(ii)petitionforreviewoncertiorari,asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentand
ordersoflowercourtsinthefollowingcases:
(1)Casesquestioningtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofany(a)treaty,(b)internationalandexecutive
agreement,(c)laworstatute,(d)presidentialdecree,(e)proclamation,(f)order,(g)instruction,(h)ordinance,or
(i)regulation.
(2)Casesquestioningthelegalityofan(a)tax,(b)impost,(c)assessment,or(d)toll,or(e)anypenalty
imposedinrelationthereto.
(3)Casesinwhichthejurisdictionoflowercourtsisinissue.
(4)Criminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.
(5)Casesinw/conlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.
(6)OrdersoftheConstitutionalCommissions.

Appellatejurisdictionmaybeexercisedintwoways:
1.Ordinaryappeal
Thisisobligatoryonthecourts,sotheappellantpossessesthis"asamatterofright".Underthismode,
theSCcanpassonbothquestionsoffactandlaw.

OrdinaryappealtotheSCisallowedbylawincriminalcaseswherethepenaltyimposedisreclusion
perpetuaorhigher,includingthoseinvolvingotheroffenseswhich,althoughnotsopunished,aroseoutofthe
sameoccurrenceorwhichmayhavebeencommittedbytheaccusedonthesameoccasion(toensureuniformity
ofdecision).(Sec.17,JudiciaryActof1948).
TheothercaseistheautomaticreviewbytheSCofcriminalcaseswherethedeathpenaltyisimposed.
Thisisunliketheordinaryappealtakenwherethepenaltyisreclusionperpetuaorhigher,forinthiscase,the
reviewisautomatic.Thereasonwhyitisnotautomaticinthefirstcase(reclusionperpetua)isthatonappeal,
theappellatecourtmayincreasethepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourt(todeath)sothattheconvictmustfirst
waivehisrightagainstdoublejeopardy,preciselybyvoluntarilymakingtheappeal,beforetheSCcanreopenthe
case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on
automaticappealisthatthejudgmentisaffirmed.
NaturalizationanddenaturalizationcasesundertheJudiciaryActof1948(Sec.17)usedtobedirectly
appealabletotheSC.ButthisisdeemedtohavebeenamendedbytheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980
(BP129)which,inSec.5(3),makesallcasesdecidedbytheRTC,appealabletotheCA,exceptthosemade
directlyappealabletotheSCby(i)theConstitution,(ii)BP129and(iii)Sec.17[3(i)]andSec.17[4(4)]ofthe
JudiciaryActof1948.Naturalizationanddenaturalizationcasesdonotfallunderanyoftheexceptions.
2.Petitionforreviewoncertiorari
ThisisnotdiscretionaryontheSC. Ithastheauthoritynottogiveduecoursetothepetition,ifthe
petitionshowsnomeritonitsface.Thus,modeprovidedforinRule45,islimitedtopurequestionsoflaw.All
othercasescanbeappealedtotheSCusingthismode.
TheConstitutionnowprovidesthat"nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionof
thecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor."(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par.
2)
The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax,
jurisdictionandpurequestionsoflaw),areappealabletotheSCbypetitionforreviewoncertiorari.However,
incasesinvolvingconstitutionality,tax,orjurisdiction,whentheresolutionofthemainissuedependsona
controvertedquestionoffact,thecasemustbeappealedtotheCAonboth,questionsoffactandlaw,andthe
decisionoftheCAisthenraisedtotheSCbypetitionforreviewoncertiorarionpurequestionsoflaw.(Sec.17
oftheJudiciaryActof1948)
Certiorari
Thecertiorarireferredtoin5(1)(whentheSCexercisesoriginaljurisdiction)isthespecialcivilaction
of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of
jurisdiction,(b)excessofjurisdiction,or(c)graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction.
The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an
ordinarymodeofappeal,wheretheissueraisedis"errorofjudgment"orerroroflaw.

i.Administrativepowers

(1)Supervisionoflowercourts
Art.VIII,Sec.6.TheSupremeCourtshallhaveadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsandthe
personnelthereof.

InNoblejasvTeehankee,theSCheldthatalthoughtheCommissionerofLandRegistrationisgiventhe
rankofjudgeoftheCFI,heisstillanadministrativeofficial,henceoutsidethejurisdictionoftheSCandcannot
beinvestigatedbyitasifhewerealowercourtjudge.Otherwise,theSCwouldbeperforminganonjudicial
work.
(2)Temporarilyassignjudgestootherstationsinthepublicinterest
Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to)
xxx
(3) Assigntemporarilyjudgesoflowercourtstootherstationsaspublicinterestmayrequire.
Suchtemporaryassignmentshallnotexceedsixmonthswithouttheconsentofthejudgeconcerned.
(3)Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidmiscarriageofjustice[Art.
VIII,Sec.5(4)]

(4)Disciplineoflowercourtjudges
Art.VIII,Sec.11.xxx TheSupremeCourt enbanc shallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesof
lowercourts,orordertheirdismissal,byavoteofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthe
deliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

(5)Appointmentofofficialsandemployeesofentirejudiciary
Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to)
xxx
(6)AppointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw.

j.Rulemaking
Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:

xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,theadmissiontothepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshall
notdiminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights. Rightsofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi
judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt.

PowerofCongresstorepealRulesofCourt
ArticleXVIII,Sec.10.AllcourtsexistingatthetimeoftheratificationofthisConstitutionshall
continuetoexercisetheirjurisdiction,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw. Theprovisionsoftheexisting
RulesofCourt,judiciaryacts,andprocedurallawsnotinconsistentwiththisConstitutionshallremain
operativeunlessamendedorrepealedbytheSupremeCourtortheCongress.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline)
CoJudicialpowers
AsidefromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtmentionedabovethefollowingareitsotherpowers
relatedto,thoughnotexactlyconstituting,itsjudicialfunction:
1.Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrial,inordertoavoidamiscarriageofjustice.Art.VIII,Sec.
5(4)]
2. Rule making Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights,(b)pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,(c)theadministrationtothepracticeoflaw,(d)the
IntegratedBar,and(e)legalassistancetotheunderprivileged.
Limitationstothispower: Suchrulesshall(i)providesimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedure,forthe
speedydispositionofcases,(ii)beuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,and(iii)notdiminish,increaseor
modifysubstantiverights.
Rulesofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapproved
bytheSC.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5)]
Itisonthebasisofthispower,thattheRulesofCourt,theBar,IBP,LegalAidOfficewereadopted.

In1935,asaffirmedinthecaseofInreCunanan,theCongresswasgiventhepowertoalter,supplement
ormodifytheRulesofCourt.Thus,iftheSCsetthepassinggradeinthebarat75%,Congresscouldloweritto
70%,providedthishasnoretroactiveeffect.
Thisisnolongertruein1987.Rulemakingpowerandthecorollarypowerofamendingtherulesare
nowlodgedexclusivelyontheSC.

PracticeofProfessions
Art.XII,Sec.14.xxx
ThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincases
prescribedbylaw.
MartialLaw
Art.VII,Sec.18. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyany
citizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofMartialLaworthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydays
formitsfiling.(par.3thereof.)

k.Noquasijudicialandadministrativeworkofjudges
Generally:Nononjudicialworkforjudges;Noquasijudicialandadministrativeworkforjudges.
Asageneralrule,membersofthejudiciaryshallonlyhavejudicialfunctions,inlinewiththeseparation
ofpowersprincipleoftheConstitution.Thus:
Art.VIII,Sec.12. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylaw
shallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunction.

Thus,inMeralcovPasayTransportationCo.,57Phil600(1932),theSCheldthatjusticesoftheSC
couldnotbeconstitutedintoaBoardofArbitrationtodeterminereasonablecompensationfortheuseofa
bridge,forthisisanonjudicialwork.

MeralcovPasayTransportationCo.,57Phil600(1932)
Theissue concerns the legal rightof the members ofthe SC,sitting as aboard of arbitrators, the
decisionofamajorityofwhomshallbefinal,toactinthatcapacity.

HELD:TheSCanditsmembersshouldnotandcannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrust
ortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoorconnectedw/theadministeringofjudicialfunctions.RAM.

InGarciavMacaraig,39SCRA106(1971),theSCsaidthatitdidnotlookwithfavoratthepracticeof
longstandingofjudgesbeingdetailedwiththeDepartmentofJusticetoassisttheSecretary,evenifitwereonly
inconnectionwithhisworkofexercisingadministrativeauthorityovercourts. Thebasisofthisruleisthe
separationofpowers.Inthiscase,resp.MacaraigwasappointedtooneofthenewlycreatedCFIbranchesw/
stationatCalambaLaguna.Atthetimeofhisappointment,resp.wasthechiefofTechnicalStaffoftheDOJ
andconcurrentlymemberoftheBoardofPardonsandParole.xxx

InRe:RodolfoManzano166SCRA246
F:

EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees,particularlythoseinvolvingthepoorandindigentones,thusalleviatingjailcongestionandimprovinglocaljail
conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden,fiscalorjudgewhomaybefoundtohavecommittedabusesinthedischargeofhisdutiesandreferthesameto
properauthorityforproperaction,torecommendrevisionofanylaworregulationwhichisbelievedprejudicialtothe
properadministrationofcriminaljustice.
JudgeManzano,ExecutiveJudgeOfIlocosNortewasappointedasmemberofsaidCommittee.Beforeaccepting
theappointment,itsoughttheopinionoftheSCastotheproprietyofsuchappointment.

HELD: Suchcommitteeperformsadministrativefunctions. Administrativefunctionsarethosewhichinvolve

theregulationandcontrolovertheconductandaffairsofindividualsfortheirownwelfareandthepromulgation
ofrules and regulations tobettercarryoutthepolicy ofthelegislatureorsuchasaredevolvedupon the
administrativeagencybytheorganiclawofitsexistence.
UndertheConstitution,themembersofthecourtsshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperforming
quasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.ConsideringthatmembershipofJudgeManzanoinsuchcommittee,
willviolatetheConstitution,theSupremeCourtisconstrainedtodenyhisrequestthathebeallowedtoserve
therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said
committee,butonlywhensuchassistancemaybereasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofhisjudicialduties.
Adapted.
Exceptions:ConstitutionallyappointednonjudicialfunctionsoftheSupremeCourt
a.ActasPresidentialElectoralTribunal
WhileCongressactsastheNationalBoardofCanvassersforthePresidentialelection,theSupreme
CourtactsastheElectoralTribunalforsuchelection.TheConstitutionprovides:"TheSupremeCourt,sitting
enbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtoelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentor
VicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose."(Art.Art.VII,Sec.4,lastpar.)

ThismeansthatbeforetheproclamationbytheCongressofthewinner,Congressisthejudgeofany
electoralissue,buttheproclamation,whenthereisanelectoralcontestalready,thentheSCbecomesthesole
judge.
The1935Constitutiondidnotprovidethispower. AndsoRA1793gavetheSCthepowertoactas
judgeinpresidentialelectoralcontests.ItwaschallengedinthecaseofLopezvRoxas,17SCRA756(1966),
buttheSCupheldthelaw,reasoningthatitdidnotconstitutetheSCasaseparatebodybutonlyaddedtoits
powersthepowertobethejudgeofelectioncontests.
WiththeexpressprovisioninArt.VII,Sec.4,par.7,thisisnolongeraproblem.
b.ChiefJusticeaspresidingofficerinimpeachmenttrialofthePresident.[Art.XI,Sec.3(6)]
c.ChiefJusticeasChairmanoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.

l.Reportonthejudiciary
Art.VIII,Sec.16.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeachregular
sessionoftheCongress,submittothePresidentandtheCongressanannualreportontheoperationsand
activitiesoftheJudiciary.

m.Mannerofsittingandvotesrequired
Art.VIII,Sec.4. (1) TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedof aChiefJusticeandfourteen
AssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Any
vacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.
(2) Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,or
law,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
otherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytook
partinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.
(3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofa
majorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvoted
thereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequired
numberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecided enbanc: Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleor
principleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedor
reversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.

TheSupremeCourtmaysitenbancorinitsdiscretion,indivisionsof3,5,or7members.[Art.VIII,

Sec.4(1)]
ThefollowingcasesshallbeheardbytheSCenbanc:
1.Casesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreementorlaw.[Id.,Sec.
4(2)]
2.Cases involving the(a) constitutionality, (b) application, or(c)operation ofpresidential decrees,
proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinancesandotherregulations.[Id.,Sec.4(2)]
3.AllothercaseswhichundertheRulesofCourtarerequiredtobeheardbytheSCenbanc.[Id.,Sec.
4(2)]
4. Casesormattersheardbyadivisionwheretherequirednumberofvotestodecideorresolve(the
majorityofthosewhotookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase
lessthan3members)isnotmet.[Id.,Sec.4(3)]
5.Tomodifyorreverseadoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrendereden
bancorindivision.[Id.,Sec.4(3)]
6.Administrativedisciplinarycasesinvolvingjudgesoflowercourts.(Id.,Sec.11.)
7.Actionsinstitutedbycitizentotestthevalidityofaproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewrit.(Art.VII,Sec.18.)
8.ThecourtsittingasPresidentialElectoralTribunal.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.)

Rule56,Sec.11
Sec.11. Procedureifopinionisequallydivided.Wherethecourt enbancisequallydividedin
opinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbereheard,andifonrehearingno
decisionisreached,theactionshallbedismissediforiginallycommencedinthecourt;inappealedcases,
thejudgementororderappealedfromshallstandaffirmed;andonallincidentalmatters,thepetitionor
motionshallbedenied.
Rule125,Sec.3
Sec.3.Decisionifopinionisequallydivided. When the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbereheard,andifonrehearingno
decision is reached, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused
acquitted.

n.Requirementastodecisions
Art.VIII,Secs.1314
Deliberations
Art.VIII,Sec.13.TheconclusionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasesubmittedtoitfordecision
enbanc orindivisionshallbereachedinconsultationbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberforthe
writingoftheopinionoftheCourt.AcertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeshallbeissued
andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseandservedupontheparties.AnyMemberwhotook
nopart,ordissented,orabstainedfromadecisionorresolutionmuststatethereasontherefor.Thesame
requirementsshallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.

Thereasonfortherequirementthatthedecisionmustbereached"inconsulta"(i.e.,afterdeliberations
bythegroup)istoemphasizethattheSCisonebody,albeitcollegiate,sothatthedecisionofthecaseisbythe
courtitselfandnottheponente.Thewriteroftheopinionismerelythespokesmanofthebody.

ConsingVCA177SCRA14(1989)
ISSUE:W/NabsenceofcertificationbytheCourtofAppealsrendersthatdecisioninvalid.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the
implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate
courts,suchastheCA,SandiganbayanandCTA,arereachedafterconsultationwiththemembersofthecourt
sittingenbancorinadivisionbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberthereoffordecisionwriting.
Theabsencewouldnotnecessarilymeanthatthecasesubmittedfordecisionhadnotbeenreachedin
consultationbeforebeingassignedtoonememberforthewritingoftheopinionofthecourtsincetheregular
performanceofofficialdutyispresumed.Thelackofcertificationservesasanevidenceoffailuretoobserve
thecertificationrequirementbutitwouldnothavetheeffectofinvalidatingthedecision.

Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly
anddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.
Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue
courseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.

Voting

Votesrequiredto"renderadecisionorresolution"
A)Enbanc
Concurrenceofa majorityofthemembers who(i) actually tookpartinthedeliberations (i.e., the
consultation)ontheissuesinthecase,and(ii)votedthereon.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(2)andSec.11.]
a.Thelowestpossiblevotesneededtorenderadecisionis5,sincequorumof15is8,andmajorityof8
is5.Thisnumbermayincreaseasthenumberofjusticespresentincrease;
b.Onewhoabstainedisdeemedtohavevotedforthepurposeofcomputingthemajorityvoteneeded.
Foranabstentionisreallyaformofcastingavotewithitsownrepercussionsontheoutcomeofthecase.
c.Onewhowaspresentbutkeptsilentduringthedeliberationsanddidnotvoteisstillincludedinthe
countingforthepurposeofdeterminingthemajority.Foritmayhappenthathehasalreadymadeuphismind
onhowtodecideandinfluencetheoutcomeofthecase.
d.Butonewhoexpresslyinhibitedorisdisqualifiedfromtakingpart(forinstancebecauseofconflictof
interest)isnotincluded.
e.Theremustbeaquorumbeforeavaliddecisioncanbemade. Withoutaquorum,therecanbeno
validbusinesstobeginwith.
f.Incase,thenecessarymajoritycannotbemustered,thenthereisnodecisionrendered.(Seeeffectof
failuretoreachamajoritybelow.)
Thisprovisionthus,overrulestherequirementof(a)10votes(2/3)todeclarealawunconstitutional
under1973(aconstitutionalrequirement),and(b)10votestoimposeoraffirmthedeathpenalty(byinternal
rulesoftheSC,althoughconstitutionally8voteswereenough).Thepresumptionofconstitutionalityoflaws
undertheJudiciaryActof1948,however,remainsvalid.
B)Indivisions
Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolved(a)withtheconcurrenceofamajority
ofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,and(b)in
nocasewithouttheconcurrenceofatleast3ofsuchmembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,the
caseshallbedecidedenbanc.Nodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaidbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbanc
orindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]
a.Inadivisionof7members,themajorityifallarepresentis4.Ifonly6arepresent,4.Ifonly5or4,
3.Ifonly3,noquorum.
b.Inadivisionof5members,3votesareneededregardlessofwhether5,4,or3arepresent.

c.Indivisionof3members,3votesareneeded.
d.Inanyofthesecases,whenthevotescannotbemustered,thecasemustberaisedtothecourtenbanc.

Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority:
Ifthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseisagainreheard.Ifuponrehearing,nomajorityisstill
had,thefollowingaretheeffects:
a.Ifacaseisonappeal,thejudgmentappealedfromisdeemedaffirmedexcept:
(i)Criminalcaseswherethejudgmentisthatofconviction:theconvictionisreversed,andthe
accusedisacquitted.
(ii)Caseswherethelowercourtdeclaredalaw,etc.unconstitutional:thejudgmentisreversed,
andthevalidityofthelawisdeemedsustained,pursuanttothepresumptionofconstitutionalityunderSec.9of
theJudiciaryActof1948.(Ifthelowercourtdeclaredthelawasnotunconstitutional,thisjudgmentisdeemed
affirmedpursuanttothegeneralruleabove.)
(Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity, and 3
abstained,thereisnodecisionandsothelawremainsvalid.)
b.Ifthecaseisanoriginalpetition,thenthecaseisdeemeddismissed.
Writingofthedecision
Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsand
thelawonwhichitisbased.(Art.VIII,Sec.14.)
InthecaseoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourt,thisruleisaddressedtotheonetowhomthewritingof
the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is
addressedtothejudge.
Decisionsonthemerit.
Therulerequiringstatementoftherelevantfacts,theissues,theruling,andthereasonedopinionin
supportoftheruling,appliesonlytodecisionsonthemeritbyacourtofrecord,basedonthefollowingrulings
oftheSC:
a.InValladolidvInciong,121SCRA205(1983),itwasheldthattheOrderoftheDeputyMinisterof
Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional
requirementbecauseitisnotadecisionofacourtofrecord,theMinistryofLaborbeinganadministrative

agencywithquasijudicialfunctions,withrulesofproceduremandatedtobenonlitigious,summaryandnon
technical.
Section14,Chapter3,BookVII,AdministrativeCodeof1987
Section14. Decision. Everydecision renderedbytheagencyinacontestedcaseshallbein
writingandshallstateclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.xxx

AirManilavs.Balatbat,38SCRA489(1971)

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedureprinciples,suchasthedue process requirements ininvestigations andtrials. Administrative due
processincludes:
(a)Therighttonotice,beitactualorconstructive,oftheinstitutionoftheproceedingsthatmayaffecta
person'slegalrights;
(b)Reasonableopportunitytoappearanddefendhisrights,introducewitnessesandrelevantevidence
inhisfavor;
(c)Atribunalsoconstitutedastogivehimreasonableassuranceofhonestyandimpartiality,andoneof
competentjurisdiction;and
(d)Afindingordecisionbythattribunalsupportedbysubstantialevidencepresentedatthehearing,or
atleastcontainedintherecordsordisclosedtothepartiesaffected.

b.InBacolodMurciaMillingCo.vHenares,107Phil.560(1960),theSCruledthatordersofacourton
anincidentalmatter(inthiscase,theorderimposingthepaymentofattorney'sfees)neednotstatethelegalbasis
oftheruling.

MinuteResolution
Cruz: Injustifyingthesocalledminuteresolution,theSCsaidinBorromeov.CA,186SCRA1:
"TheSCdisposesofthebulkofitscasesbyminuteresolutionsanddecreesthemasfinalandexecutory,aswhere
acaseispatentlyw/omerit,wheretheissuesraisedarefactualinnature,wherethedecisionappealedfromissupportedby
substantialevidenceandisinaccordw/thefactsofthecaseandtheapplicablelaws,whereitisclearfromtherecordsthat
thepetitionswerefiledmerelytoforsetalltheearlyexecutionofjudgmentandfornoncompliancew/therules. The
resolutiondenyingduecourseordismissingapetitionalwaysgivesthelegalbasis.
xxxx
TheCourtisnotdutyboundtorendersigneddecisionsallthetime.Ithasamplediscretiontoformulatedecisions
and/orminuteresolutions,providedalegalbasisisgiven,dependingonitsevaluationofacase."

AndneitherdoestheruleapplytoadministrativecasesdecidedbytheSCitself,asitheldinPrudential
Bankv.Castro,158SCRA646,thus:
"No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration'forlackofmerit,theissuesraisedthereinhavingbeenpreviouslydulyconsideredandpassed
upon.Inanadministrativecase,theconstitutionalmandatethat'no***motionforreconsiderationofadecision
ofthecourtshallbe***deniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasisthereforisinapplicable.Andevenifitwere,said
resolutionstatedthelegalbasisforthedenial,and,therefore,adheredfaithfullytotheconstitutionalrequirement.
'Lackofmerit,'asagroundfordenialislegalbasis.

Petitionsforreviewandmotionsforreconsideration
Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue
courseordenied,withoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par.2.)
Thisruleappliestoadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofa"decisiononthemerits",saidtheSC
in Mendoza v CFI,51SCRA369(1973). Itdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,toadismissalofamotionfor
reconsiderationofapreviousdismissalofapetitionforhabeascorpus.(Thedismissalofthepetitionforhabeas
corpusisnotadecisiononthemerits,butissimilartoadismissalofapetitionforreview,whichisadecision
nottogiveduecoursetothepetition.)
Thepastpracticeusedtobethatwhentheappellatecourtdeniedapetitionforreview,ordeniedaMFR,
itsimplydidsoinaMinuteResolution,statingthatthecasewasdismissedforlackofbasis.Thisaggrieved
manyalawyer,speciallythosewhowouldspenddayspreparingpagesofbriefs,onlytofindoutthatalltheir
effortwasansweredbyaoneliner"Dismissedforlackofbasis".
Thispromptedtheframersofthe1987ConstitutiontoforcetheCourttoatleastwritedownthelegal
basisforthedenial.Thismeansthatwhileafullydetaileddecisionisnotrequired,neitherisaskimpyoneliner
isallowed.Thelegalreasonforthedismissalmustbewritten.
DissentersandAbstainers
Inthecaseofadecisiononthemerits,ifamember(a)tooknopart,or(b)dissented,or(c)abstained
fromadecisionorresolution,hemuststatehisreasontherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.13.)

Before,onlythosewhodissentedwererequiredtowriteanopinion.Now,eventhosewhotooknopart
inthedeliberationsbutwerepresent,andthosewhoabstainedarerequiredtowritetheirreasonsfortheseare
reallyformsofcastingtheirvote.Thosewhoinhibitedthemselvesare,ofcourse,notrequiredtovote,sincethey
didnotreallyparticipate.
Procedurally,thepurposeistoenablethepartytofindoutthereasonfortheactiontaken.Forcourts
lowerthantheSC,andeventheSCitself,thisisimportantforappealormotionforreconsiderationpurposes,as

thebasisfortheassignmentoferror.
Theoretically,sincetheSCisnotanelectivebranchitmustexplainthereasonbeingitsultimatesource
ofauthority.Congressneednotexplainitsactionsinceithasbeendelegatedthelegislativepowerbythepeople.
o.Mandatoryperiodfordecidingcases
Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbe
decidedorresolvedwithintwentyfourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,
unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsfor
allotherlowercourts.
(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthe
lastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.
(3) Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbythe
ChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordof
thecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolution
hasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.
(4) Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudiceto
suchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseor
mattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.

Art.VII,Sec.18.xxx
xxx
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency
ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe
extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
xxx(par.3thereof.)

Art.XVIII,Secs.1214
Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this
Constitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingin
theSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbe
adoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies.
Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the
applicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythe
courts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.

Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
ConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whenthe
applicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.
A)CasesfiledafterFebruary2,1987
AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedwithintwentyfour
monthscountedfromthedateofsubmission."[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)]
Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief
ormemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(2)]
MandatoryperiodintheSupremeCourt:24months[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)]
Except:Apropercasequestioningthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaw
orsuspensionoftheprivilegewhichmustbedecided30daysfromfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.1.)

Butwhathappensifthejudgeorcourtfailstomeetthedeadlineanyway?TheConstitutionprovides:
Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJustice
orthepresidingJudgeshallforthwithbeissued,andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,
andservedupontheparties. Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasbeenrenderedor
issuedwithinsaidperiod.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(3)]
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility(administrativedisciplinaryactionagainstthejudgeorjustices)shalldecideorresolvethecaseor
mattersubmittedtheretofordeterminationwithoutfurtherdelay.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(4)]
Inotherwords,failuretodecidethecase[forreasonsotherthantheinabilitytoreachthenecessary
majority]hasnoconsequenceonthecase.Thus,acertificationisrequiredthattheperiodhaslapsedwithoutany
decisionbeingmade,statingthereasonforsuchinaction.Thenthecourtmustdecidewithoutanyfurtherdelay.
Theconsequencesareonthejudge:(a)hecouldnotdrawouthissalary,sincehewouldnotbeabletocertify
thathehasresolvedallcasessubmittedtohimin90daysand(b)heissubjecttoadministrativesanctions.
B)CasesfiledbeforeFebruary2,1987butexpireafterthisdate
TheprovisionsofArt.VIII,Sec,15(3)(4)shallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationof
thisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.(Art.XVIII,Sec.14)
Inotherwords,itisasifthesecaseswerefiledafterFebruary2,1987.
C)CasesthatexpiredbeforeFebruary2,1987

Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthe
decisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbythe
SCassoonaspracticable.(Art.XVIII,Sec.13.)
TheSupremeCourtshall,within1yearfromFebruary2,1987adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethe
decisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSCorlowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthis
Constitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies.(Art.XVIII,Sec.
12.)

2.Lowercourts
a.Qualificationsandappointment
Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)(2)
Art.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylower
collegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourt
mustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourt
orengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
(2)theCongressshallprescribethequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybe
appointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippineBar.

Id.,Sec.8.(5)The(JudicialandBar)Councilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommending
appointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmay
assigntoit.
Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedby
thePresidentfromalistofatlistthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforevery
vacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the
submissionofthelist.

Composition
Thecompositionoflowercourtsshallbeprovidedbylaw.ThelawsaretheJudiciaryActof1948and
BP129.
Qualifications

LowerCollegiateCourt(CourtofAppeals)
(1)Nopersonshallbeappointedmemberofanylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizen.[Art.
VIII,Sec.7(1)]andamemberofPhilippineBar.
(2)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)]
(3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependence.
[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]
LowerCourts
(1)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudge
thereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippinebar.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)]
(2)Hemustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]

b.Salary
Art.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupreme
courtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalary
shallnotbedecreased.
.
c.Congressionalpowertoreorganizeandsecurityoftenure
Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges
oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin
thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Id.,Sec.2.xxx
NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits
Members.

ThepowerofCongresstoreorganizelowercourtshasbeenupheldbytheSCpriorto1987.
InOcampovSecretaryofJustice,51OG147(1955),theSCbyfailingtomusterthe2/3vote

requiredthentodeclarealawunconstitutionalineffectsustainedthevalidityofthelawpassedbyCongress
abolishingtheofficesof"judgesatlarge"and"cadastraljudges"andtheconsequentremovalofjudgesoccu
pyingtheseposts. Notingthatthepurposeofthelawwastopromotetheindependenceofthejudiciary(by
avoidingforumshopping),itheldthatanabolitionofanofficemadeingoodfaithdoesnotviolatesecurityof
tenure.Securityoftenurepresupposesthecontinuedexistenceoftheofficefromwhichonewasremovednot
removalfromanofficethathasbeenabolishedingoodfaithandnotmerelypartisanpoliticalreasons.
InDeLaLlanavAlba,112SCRA294(1982),theSCagainupheldtheReorganizationActof
1980(BP129),onthegroundthattheabolitionofanoffice,iswithinthecompetenceofthelegislatureifdone
ingoodfaith.ThattherewasgoodfaithwasshownbythefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyand
deliberationbytheBatasanandthePresidentialstudycommittee,themembershipofwhichincludesSCjustices,
andwasthemeanstoupgradetheadministrationofjusticeinthePhilippines.TheSCreiteratedthattherecan
benoclaimforsecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,andthattheabolitionofofficeisnot
removal,althoughtheireffectsmaybethesame.
Itisdoubtfulwhethertheserulingsremainvalidintotoinviewofthenewexpressprovisionprohibiting
areorganizationlawthatunderminesthesecurityoftenureoftheJudiciary.
OnecompromiseviewisthatCongresshasthepowertopassareorganizationlawconcerningthelower
courts,butitcanonlytakeeffectuntiltheposthasbeenvacatedbytheincumbentjudge.

d.Removal
Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges
oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin
thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.
Cruz:"Judgesoflowercourt,"ashereused,includesjusticesoftheSandiganbayan.Thisrulecastsmuchdoubt
onthelegalityofthepresidentialdecreemakingthemremovableonlybythelegislaturethroughtheprocessof
impeachment.

e.Jurisdiction
Art.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas
maybeestablishedbylaw.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

Asruledin J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA andin Ynot v IAC, supra,thereisineffecta"constitutional

confermentoforiginaljurisdiction onthelowercourtsinthosefivecasesforwhichtheSupreme Courtis
grantedappellatejurisdictionin5(2)."
UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdiction"toreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmonappeal
orcertiorariasthelaworRulesofCourtmayprovide,judgmentsoflowercourts,"lowercourtscanpassupon
thevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance.

f.Requirementsastopreparationofdecisions
Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly
anddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.
Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue
courseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.

Mannerofsitting
TheCourtofAppealssitsindivisionswhenithearscases;theonlytimeitconvenesasonebodyisto
takeupmattersofadministration.
Thetrialandinferiorcourts,ofcourse,donothavethisproblemsincethereisonlyonejudge.

Deliberations
Thesamerequirements(forconsulta)shallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.
13)
Forobviousreasons,thisrequirementdoesnotapplytothetrialandinferiorcourts.

Voting
Forcollegiatecourts,liketheCourtofAppeals,thelawprovidesthatitsitsonlyindivisionswhen
decidingcases.
Fortrialandinferiorcourts,noproblemarisessinceonlyonejudgeisinvolved.

Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority

CourtofAppeals.Thesamerulesapply,exceptthatthedecisioncannowbeappealedtotheSC.
InferiorCourts.Failuretodecidehasnoconsequenceonthedecisionofthecourt.TheCourtisnot
oustedofitsjurisdiction,butthejudgesuffersadministrativeconsequences.

g.Mandatoryperiodfordeciding

Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbe
decidedorresolvedwithintwentyfourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,
unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsfor
allotherlowercourts.
(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthe
lastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.
(3) Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbythe
ChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordof
thecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolution
hasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.
(4) Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudiceto
suchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseor
mattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.
Art.XVIII,Secs.1214

Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this
Constitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingin
theSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbe
adoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies.
Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the
applicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythe
courts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.
Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
ConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whenthe
applicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.

MandatoryPeriod

Lowercollegiatecourts:12months,unlessreducedbytheSC
Otherlowercourts:3months,unlessreducedbytheSC

Overruled:
TheConstitutionnowexplicitlyprovidesinSec.15(1)thattheperiodsaremandatory,asidefromusing
theword"must"(not"shall"asin1973)inSec.15(1).ThecaseofMarcelinovCruz,121SCRA51(1983),
whichheldthattheperiodsinthe1973Constitutionwereonlydirectory,isthusnow,overruled.
Cruz:Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughdecisionwithinthemaximumperiodisnowmandatory,failuretoarrive
atthesamewillnotdivestthecourtofjurisdiction,withoutprejudicetoanyresponsibilitythatmayattachtothe
judge.Thecourtmuststillresolvethecasew/ofurtherdelay,unliketheoldrulewhenthedecisionappealed
wasdeemedautomaticallyaffirmedandthepetitionwasdeemedautomaticallydismissedasaresultofthe
inactionofthecourt.
xxx

Marcelinovs.Cruz,121SCRA51
F:

Judgementinacriminalcasewasrenderedbeforetheclerkofcourtwithin85daysafterthecasewasconcluded.
Butjudgementwaspromulgatedafterlapseof90daysfromthedaythecasewassubmittedfordecision.

ISSUE: W/Ntrialcourtlostjurisdiction overthecaseforfailuretodecidethesamewithin90daysfrom

submissionthereof.
W/Nconstitutionalprovisionismandatory.
HELD:Notoboth.Theconstitutionalprovisionreferstorenditionofjudgementwhichreferstothefilingof
thesigneddecisionwiththeclerkofcourt.
Bythephrase"unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,"itisevidentthattheperiodprescribedissubject
tomodificationbytheSCunderitsprerogativepowertopromulgaterulesconcerningprocedureinallcourts.
Constitutionalprovisionsaredirectory,wheretheyrefertomattersmerelyprocedural.Butfailuretodecidea
casewithin90daysconstituteagroundforadministrativesanctionagainstthedefaultingjudge.Adapted.

DeRomavsCA152SCRA205
The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said
provision in the Constitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the
correspondingcourtsofjurisdictionorrendertheirdecisionsinvalid.

3.TheJudicialandBarCouncil
Art.VIII,Sec.8. AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionofthe
SupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJusticeas exofficio Chairman,theSecretaryofJustice,anda
representativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessor
oflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector.
(2) TheregularmembersoftheCouncilshallbeappointedbythePresidentforatermoffour
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,the
retiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.
(3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeep
arecordofitsproceedings.
(4)TheregularMembersoftheCouncilshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedby
theSupremeCourt. TheSupremeCourtshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsforthe
Council.
(5)TheCouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.It
mayexercisesuchotherfunctionanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.

Exofficiomembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)]
(1)ChiefJusticeasexofficioChairman
(2)SecretaryofJustice
(3)RepresentativeofCongress
Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)]
(4)RepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar
(5)ProfessorofLaw
(6)RetiredmemberoftheSC
(7)Representativeofprivatesector
Secretaryexofficio[Art.VIII,Sec.8(3)]
ClerkoftheSC,whoshallkeeparecordofitsproceedings

Appointment,Tenure,Salary
Exofficiomembers

ForobviousreasonsthisdoesnotapplysincethepositionintheCouncilisgoodonlywhilethepersonis
theoccupantoftheoffice.
Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)]
The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
Thetermoftheregularmembersis4years.
But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create
continuityinthecouncil:
IBPrepresentative4years
Lawprofessor3years
Retiredjustice2years
Privatesector1year
RegularmembersshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSC.TheSCshallprovide
initsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.[Art.VIII,Sec.8(4)]

Functions
1.RecommendappointeestotheJudiciary[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)]
2.RecommendappointeestotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandhis5deputies.(Art.XI,Sec.9)
3.SuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSCmayassign[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)]

4.Automaticreleaseofappropriationforthejudiciary
Art.VIII,Sec.3. TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy. AppropriationsfortheJudiciary
maynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,after
approval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

UPDATED1/27/96
REVISED4/13/96
RAM