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We will start the discussion on the topic in a slightly different manner. Instead of directly
jumping to the relevant provision, we will reach the destination by taking a route concerning some
other enactment i.e. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. This is what judicial precedents have to say.
1.1.
A three Judges bench of Honble Supreme Court in Som Nath Puri vs State of Rajasthan,
1.2.
Significantly, Section-409 IPC provides for life imprisonment and there is no death penalty
for the said offence. Despite that the aforesaid judicial pronouncement has chosen to settle that a
person convicted for such offences would not be entitled for the benefit of probation under Section4. A reading of the provision to the relevant extent may clarify the position.
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2.
Now, coming to the problem at hand. Magisterial Courts power to grant bail lies in
2.1.
Section-4 of Probation of Offenders Act and Section-437(1)(i) of CrPC both say that the
benefit will not be available for offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. We are
required to ascertain the meaning of expression death or imprisonment for life employed in
both the provisions.
3.
The simplest question is whether the aforesaid expression indicates only such offences in
which death and life are alternatively provided such as Section-302 IPC or any offence with either
of the punishment will fall within its ambit.
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In other words, the primary Question is whether the expression death or imprisonment for
life should be construed conjunctively or disjunctively?
3.1.
Since a three Judges bench of Honble Supreme Court has held that the life imprisonment
cases are barred by Section-4 Probation of Offenders Act, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the expression death or imprisonment for life means either of them and not in alternative.
Means, even if a provision provides only a life imprisonment without any reference to death, the
same would satisfy the requirement of the expression death or imprisonment for life. Virtually,
there is no reason as to why the ratio of Som Nath Puri (supra) should not be made applicable to
the expression death or imprisonment for life envisaged in Section-437 CrPC. Section-4 of PO
Act and Section-437 of CrPC both deal with the benefits of an accused person and both have
created an exception to the general beneficial rule of probation/bail so far as cases pertaining to
death or imprisonment for life are concerned.
4.
Once upon a time there was an enactment called Punjab Borstal Act Section-2(4) whereof
"an
offence
punishable
with
transportation
or
rigorous
imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code other than- (a) an offence
punishable with death;"
4.1.
In a given situation, a question was raised about giving benefit to a murder convict under
the said enactment and as we know the punishment provided for murder is death or imprisonment
for life. A three judges bench of Honble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand vs State of Haryana
(1988) 1 SCC 717 has held as under:
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4.2.
The above extract clearly shows that the three judges bench adopted a disjunctive route
while interpreting the expression death or imprisonment for life available in Section-302 IPC in
the context of exception provided in Punjab Borstal Act saying that it would not cover any offence
punishable with death.
5.
The three judges bench of Honble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand vs State of
Haryana (Supra) taken support for its view from several other decisions in following manner:
Support for such a view is available from several decisions of
different High Courts. Section 562(1)of the Code A of Criminal
Procedure of 1898 as amended in 1923 brought in the phrase:
"Punishable with death or transportation for life". In Emperor v. Mt.
Janki & Anr., AIR 1932 Nag. 130 that phrase was interpreted
disjunctively and women convicted of an offence for which
transportation for life was one of the punishments provided were
held ineligible for release on probation under section 562. It was
pointed out that the words 'death or transportation for life' must be
read as referring to offences the penalty for which provided by the
Penal Code contains either death or transportation for life as one of
the punishments awarded and not necessarily both. Reliance was
placed on a full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in King
Emperor v. Nga San Htwa & Ors., AIR 1927 Rangoon 205 which
was dealing with a similar phrase occurring in section 497 of the old
Code. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Chetti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 MP 241 also took the
same view. In Emperor v. Bahawati, AIR 1928 Lahore 920 it was
held that as one of the alternative punishments for that offence under
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6.
Interestingly, full bench decision of Rangoon High Court cited above was dealing
specifically with the Magisterial power of granting bail in a life imprisonment case and read the
relevant provision of the old CrPC in disjunctive manner accepting that even if death is not
provided, the life imprisonment cases are beyond the powers of magistrate in normal
circumstances. Though there is no specific sentence in the three judges bench decision in Subhash
(supra) saying that they were approving the ratio, since the three judges bench cited the decisions
and taken support from the same for their conclusion, it would be obvious that they have accepted
the particular ratio that if the offence falls within the category of either of the punishments provided
in the expression death or imprisonment for life, the offence shall be treated as falling within
exception so stated. Ratio of Rangoon case should therefore be treated as having subsumed in the
ratio of Subhash(supra) giving a binding effect throughout India that expression death or
imprisonment for life has to be interpreted in disjunctive manner.
6.1.
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6.2.
In Gursharan Singh vs Union of India dated 01.01.1989, Honble High Court of Delhi
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powers under Section 437 of the Code qua the offence not
punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for a lesser term
is not being concluded in this proceeding and as such it would not
be proper to express any final opinion in that field except indicating
that the line of reasoning regarding the construction of Section 437
of the Code as canvassed on behalf of the petitioners would certainly
require anxious consideration and the same cannot be lightly
brushed aside.
6.3.
However, Honble High Court of Delhi again had an occasion to deal with the situation in
the year 2011 when a case came up before it where a Ld. ASJ opining the situation to be falling
under later part of Section-307 IPC prescribing a life imprisonment set aside the bail granted by a
Magistrate holding that due to bar created in Section-437, the Magistrate was not competent to
grant bail. Honble High Court on a factual analysis found the circumstances to be falling under
first part instead of later part of Section-307 and held that since first part was providing a
punishment upto 10 years, the Magistrate was competent to grant bail. The case was titled as
Bhupender Singh vs State dated 07.12.2011. Following extract may be relevant:
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which would fall within the first part of Section 307 IPC and the
same being punishable with imprisonment upto 10 years was within
the competence of M.M. under Section 437(1)(i) CrPC.
6.4.
In Priyanka vs State dated 20.05.2015, Honble High Court of Delhi while dealing with
an offence of rape providing life imprisonment has finally taken a view that Magistrate has no
power to grant bail in life imprisonment cases.
7.
An example will further clarify the situation. Take for instance a case falling within
Section-303 IPC (prior to a date when the provision was declared ultra vires). The section provides
for a single punishment i.e. death, there is no alternative like Section-302 IPC. If we accept that
the expression death or imprisonment for life appearing in Section-437 CrPC should be
construed conjunctively means only such offences where death or imprisonment for life are
alternatively provided, naturally Section-303 IPC would be out of its scope and therefore, a
Magistrate would have power to grant bail for an offence under Section-303 IPC. This is clearly a
absurd situation in as much as Section-303 is graver than Section-302 for which a Magistrate does
not have power to grant bail. Similarly, Section-27(3) of Arms Act (prior to a date when the
provision was declared ultra vires) also provides for a single sentence of death. The same absurdity
will arise here.
7.1.
A further example may also be contemplated. Section-2(x) of CrPC defines a warrant case
as a case relating o an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
a term exceeding two years. Should we take that therein the legislature wanted only such offences
to be treated as warrant case where all of the three kinds of punishment are available for offence?
This would the height of absurdity. Similarly, 90 days prescription of Section-167 CrPC requires
an offence to be punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years. Does anyone going to say that an offence of 11 years without any reference to
death or life shall not fall under the 90 days prescription? Again an absurdity.
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8.
From meaning scribed to the word 'punishable' in several dictionaries, it can be said that it
8.1.
The phrase "not punishable with death or imprisonment for life" ought to be interpreted in
its ordinary disjunctive sense. Its scope cannot be permitted to be expanded by giving a strained
meaning, by reading it conjunctively. If that were permitted, the only offences to be excluded from
the benefit of the provision of Section-437 CrPC would be Sections 121, 302, 305, 307 (Part II)
and 396, while in all other grave and heinous offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the
section could be availed of by an accused. This cannot be the intention of legislature.
8.2.
The words used in Section 437(1)(i) are "the offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life". The word used between "death" and "imprisonment for life" is 'or' and not
'and'. So it cannot be said that this bar to power of the Magistrate to grant bail, shall be applicable
in those cases only where the offence is punishable with death as well as with life imprisonment
and that it shall not be applicable when the offence is punishable with life imprisonment only.
8.3.
Giving an interpretation to the aforesaid clause to this effect that the above bar on power
of Magistrate is applicable to those cases only where the offence is punishable with death as well
as with life imprisonment and not to those cases which are punishable with life imprisonment only
shall make the words 'punishable with life imprisonment redundant, because if intention of the
legislature was to impose the above bar in those cases only where the offence is punishable with
death as well as with life imprisonment, the above object could be achieved by using the words
"offences punishable with death sentence" and then all the offences punishable with death sentence
as well as the life sentence would have been excluded from the Magisterial jurisdiction to grant
bail, and as such use of the words "punishable with life imprisonment" shall become redundant
because in India every offence punishable with death sentence is punishable with life
Bail by Magistrate under Section-326 IPC: by Rakesh Kumar Singh
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imprisonment also in the alternative. There were apparently two exceptions only, Section 303
I.P.C. and Section-27(3) Arms Act but those sections have been declared to be unconstitutional by
the Hon'ble Apex Court. As such the bar to grant of bail in offences punishable with death sentence
as well as with life imprisonment could be achieved by using the words "death sentence only in
Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. and there could have been no requirement to use the words "punishable
with life imprisonment".
8.4.
The law of harmonious interpretation is that every word used in the law must be given its
natural and practical meaning and an interpretation which renders some provisions redundant
cannot be accepted, and the true import of the above words used in the Sub-section (i) of Section
437 is that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is barred in those cases also which are not punishable
with death but with life imprisonment.
The second part of discussion will focus on the dependency of bail powers on the manner
of trial. Does it depend on the classification of trial provided for the offence is the question? Does
a punishment loses its significance only because change of forum?
9.1.
In Prahalad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT of Delhi, AIR 2001 SC 1444, Honble Supreme Court
has observed:
Even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an
application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence
exclusively triable by a court of Sessions yet it would be proper and
appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused
person to approach the Court of Sessions for the purposes of getting
the relief of bail.
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9.2.
Clearly, therefore, though the Honble Supreme Court stated that in sessions triable case a
magistrate should direct the accused to approach a Sessions court, yet it has significantly provided
that there is no legal bar. This is very important. Power of bail therefore does not depend upon the
forum which would be capable of trying the offence.
9.3.
It is some other observation in the aforesaid judgment that gives rise to a seriously flawed
is
distinguishable
from
the
exercise
of
the
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9.4.
These portions are generally taken as a support for a proposition that if the offence is not
exclusively triable by sessions meaning that the offence is triable by magistrate, the situation will
not fall within the exception to Section-437 CrPC and the Magistrate will be empowered to grant
bail even for life imprisonment cases if the same is triable by a magistrate.
9.5.
The proposition however appears to be fallacious. CrPC nowhere discriminates on the basis
of forum so far as bail jurisdiction is concerned. In terms of Section-26 CrPC all offences under
IPC are triable by a Sessions court irrespective of the Schedule showing it to be triable by a
magistrate. Therefore, it is not as if the offence cannot be tried by a sessions if it is triable by a
magistrate. Further, Section-323 CrPC empowers a magistrate to send the case to the sessions for
trial even if the offence is not exclusively triable by sessions. Therefore, a forum of trial cannot be
the differentiating basis for exercising bail jurisdiction. As we know that a judgment is not to be
read like statute. Concept of exclusive jurisdiction of session for trial referred above cannot
therefore be treated as saying that if offence is magisterial trialable the magistrate will have the
power to grant bail. The bail jurisdiction remains dependent upon the punishment provided and
not on the forum for trial.
10.
However, some fertile mind may raise another contention which may superficially appear
to be a serious one i.e. a Magistrate cannot impose a term exceeding three years and any conviction
for three years has to give way for mandatory bail under Section-389(3) which will result in a
serious dichotomy that though in the initial period a magistrate could not have power to grant bail
for offence u/s-326 IPC but after conviction for the same, he has to grant bail for appeal as he
could not have imposed any punishment exceeding three years. Therefore, such fertile mind may
say that even for initial period a magistrate could have granted bail.
10.1.
The proposition may sound attractive but cannot stand a close scrutiny. First of all, there is
a fallacious presumption that Magistrate cannot impose a punishment exceeding three years. When
it is said that Section-326 IPC is triable by Magistrate, it nowhere indicates that the same will not
Bail by Magistrate under Section-326 IPC: by Rakesh Kumar Singh
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11.
Some High Courts however has taken a view that expression death or imprisonment for
life has to be read conjunctively and therefore a magistrate will have power to grant bail in life
imprisonment cases such as Section-326 IPC.
11.1.
In Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2010 ALL M.R. Cri.
2775 and Ishan Vasant Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 243, Ld.
Single judges of Honble High Court of Bombay taken a view that exception of death or
imprisonment for life is no applicable to singular life imprisonment cases. Both these judgments
were subsequently relied upon by a single judge of the same high court in Balasaheb Satbhai
Merchant vs the State dated 21.09.2011. However, in the year 2013, another Ld. Sinlge judge of
the same High Court doubting the correctness of those two judgments sent a reference to larger
bench in Jyoti Kaur Kohli vs State dated 28.10.2013 and the reference is still pending.
11.2.
Presently however we would be within the specifics if we say that these judgments of Ld.
Single judges are in direct conflict with the earlier division bench judgment of High Court of
Bombay in Naranji Premji (supra) and therefore cannot be followed.
11.3.
Apart from the above, both the aforesaid single judge decisions have relied upon the
judgments which could not have been relied upon. They primarily relied upon Mahammed Eusoof
v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Rang 51 and Tularam v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Nag 53. It would however be
Bail by Magistrate under Section-326 IPC: by Rakesh Kumar Singh
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interesting to note that Mahammed Eusoof decision was subsequently overruled by a full bench of
the same high court in Nga San Htwa (supra). Tularam (supra) was based on Mahammed Eusoof
and since Mahammed Eusoof has been overruled as indicated, Tularam (supra) should not be
treated as a good law. Apart from the same, later on the same High Court in Emperor vs Mst. Janki,
28 Nag LR 260 dissented specifically from Tularam in view of overruling of Mahammed Eusoof.
Needless further to say that the three judges bench of Honble Supreme Court in Subhash (supra)
has also cited Emperor vs Mst. Janki aforesaid for taking support.
11.4.
Single judges of Bombay High Court further relied upon Satyan Vs. State 1981 Cr.L.J.
1313 which is again a single judge bench decision based heavily on Tularam and Mahammed
Eusoof aforesaid. For the self same reason, Satyan(supra) should also not be treated as a good law.
11.5.
As a passing reference, it may also be noted that a division bench of Honble High Court
of Allahabad in Saroj Kumar Upadhyaya vs High Court dated 19.07.2007 has not accepted the
proposition of Satyan (supra) in following manner:
The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the above
bar to grant of bail is applicable in respect of those offences only
which are punishable with death as well as with life imprisonment
and it shall not be applicable in those cases which are punishable
with life imprisonment only. In support of this contention he cited
before us a ruling of Kerala High Court in the case of Satyam v.
State 1981 Cr.L.J. 1313 and of Andhra Pradhesh High Court in
Ashireddygari Narsimhareddy and Anr. v. State of A.P. 2001 Crl. LJ.
2010. We have carefully gone through these rulings which are of
Hon'ble Single Judges of Kerala High Court and Andhra Pradesh
High Court, but we are unable to agree with the above law laid down
in these rulings
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11.6.
And it would be very significant to note that the SLP preferred the aforesaid division bench
11.7.
In Chandra Pathak vs State of Bihar, a division bench of Hon'ble Patna High Court was
Moreover, since the case was under Section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code, the offence was punishable with life imprisonment. Except in
the cases of children, women and sick or infirm persons, the
discretion to grant bail by a Magistrate has been taken away by
Section 437(1) (i) of the Code in cases of non-bailable offences
punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
11.8.
Significantly, SLP filed against the aforesaid judgment has also been dismissed on
05.12.2014.
Conclusion:
12.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can safely be said that the expression death or
imprisonment for life has to be read in disjunctive manner and therefore will include within its
fold any offence singularly punishable with life imprisonment without referring to death and that
irrespective of forum of trial i.e. whether the offence is triable by Magistrate or exclusively by
Sessions, a Magistrate shall have no power to grant bail if he has reason to believe that an offence
punishable with life imprisonment such as Section-326 IPC has been committed by the accused
unless the case falls within any of the proviso appended to Section-437 CrPC.
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