Supreme Court Reviews Probation Application for Bank Fraud Conviction

1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
TodayisFriday,January08,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L45685November16,1937
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDSandHONGKONG&SHANGHAIBANKINGCORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSEO.VERA,Judge.oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,andMARIANOCUUNJIENG,respondents.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralTuasonandCityFiscalDiazfortheGovernment.
DeWitt,PerkinsandPonceEnrilefortheHongkongandShanghaiBankingCorporation.
VicenteJ.Francisco,FeriaandLaO,OrenseandBelmonte,andGibbsandMcDonoughforrespondentCu
Unjieng.
NoappearanceforrespondentJudge.
LAUREL,J.:
ThisisanoriginalactioninstitutedinthiscourtonAugust19,1937,fortheissuanceofthewritofcertiorariandof
prohibitiontotheCourtofFirstInstanceofManilasothatthiscourtmayreviewtheactuationsoftheaforesaidCourt
ofFirstInstanceincriminalcaseNo.42649entitled"ThePeopleofthePhilippineIslandsvs.MarianoCuUnjieng,et
al.",moreparticularlytheapplicationofthedefendantMarianoCuUnjiengthereinforprobationundertheprovisions
ofActNo.4221,andthereafterprohibitthesaidCourtofFirstInstancefromtakinganyfurtheractionorentertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be
forthwithcommittedtoprisoninaccordancewiththefinaljudgmentofconvictionrenderedbythiscourtinsaidcase
(G.R.No.41200).1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.",
criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent
herein,Hon.JoseO.Vera,istheJudgeadinterimoftheseventhbranchoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,
whoheardtheapplicationofthedefendantMarianoCuUnjiengforprobationintheaforesaidcriminalcase.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15,
1931,petitionerhereinHongkongandShanghaiBankingCorporationinterveninginthecaseasprivateprosecutor.
AfteraprotractedtrialunparalleledintheannalsofPhilippinejurisprudencebothinthelengthoftimespentbythe
courtaswellasinthevolumeinthetestimonyandthebulkoftheexhibitspresented,theCourtofFirstInstanceof
Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai
BankingCorporation.Uponappeal,thecourt,onMarch26,1935,modifiedthesentencetoanindeterminatepenalty
of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twentyseven days of
prisionmayor,butaffirmedthejudgmentinallotherrespects.MarianoCuUnjiengfiledamotionforreconsideration
and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November,1936.Thiscourt,onNovember24,1936,deniedthepetitionsubsequentlyfiledbythedefendant
forleavetofileasecondalternativemotionforreconsiderationornewtrialandthereafterremandedthecasetothe
courtoforiginforexecutionofthejudgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu
UnjiengonNovember27,1936,beforethetrialcourt,undertheprovisionsofActNo.4221ofthedefunct
PhilippineLegislature.HereinrespondentMarianoCuUnjiengstatesinhispetition,interalia,thatheisinnocentof
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/nov1937/gr_l45685_1937.html
1/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
thecrimeofwhichhewasconvicted,thathehasnocriminalrecordandthathewouldobservegoodconductinthe
future.TheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,JudgePedroTuasonpresiding,referredtheapplicationforprobationof
theInsularProbationOfficewhichrecommendeddenialofthesameJune18,1937.Thereafter,theCourtofFirst
InstanceofManila,seventhbranch,JudgeJoseO.Verapresiding,setthepetitionforhearingonApril5,1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein
respondentMarianoCuUnjieng.TheprivateprosecutionalsofiledanoppositiononApril5,1937,alleging,among
otherthings,thatActNo.4221,assumingthatithasnotbeenrepealedbysection2ofArticleXVoftheConstitution,
isneverthelessviolativeofsection1,subsection(1),ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionguaranteeingequalprotectionof
thelawsforthereasonthatitsapplicabilityisnotuniformthroughouttheIslandsandbecausesection11ofthesaid
Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwiseintheirrespectiveprovinces.TheprivateprosecutionalsofiledasupplementaryoppositiononApril19,
1937,elaboratingontheallegedunconstitutionalityonActNo.4221,asanunduedelegationoflegislativepowerto
theprovincialboardsofseveralprovinces(sec.1,Art.VI,Constitution).TheCityFiscalconcurredintheopposition
of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No.
4221.
OnJune28,1937,hereinrespondentJudgeJoseO.Verapromulgatedaresolutionwithafindingthat"laspruebas
nohanestablecidodeunamaneraconcluyentelaculpabilidaddelpeticionarioyquetodosloshechosprobadosno
soninconsistentesoincongrentesconsuinocencia"andconcludesthatthehereinrespondentMarianoCuUnjieng
"es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but
denyingthelatter'spetitionforprobationforthereasonthat:
...SiesteJuzgadoconcedieralapoblacionsolicitadaporlascircunstanciasylahistoriasocialquesehan
expuestoenelcuerpodeestaresolucion,quehacenalpeticionarioacreedordelamisma,unapartedela
opinionpublica,atizadaporlosrecelosylassuspicacias,podrialevantarseindignadacontraunsistemade
probacionquepermiteatisbarenlosprocedimientosordinariosdeunacausacriminalperturbandolaquietud
ylaeficaciadelasdecisionesyarecaidasaltraeralasuperficieconclusionesenteramentedifferentes,en
menoscabodelinterespublicoquedemandaelrespetodelasleyesydelveredictojudicial.
OnJuly3,1937,counselforthehereinrespondentMarianoCuUnjiengfiledanexceptiontotheresolutiondenying
probationandanoticeofintentiontofileamotionforreconsideration.Analternativemotionforreconsiderationor
newtrialwasfiledbycounselonJuly13,1937.Thiswassupplementedbyanadditionalmotionforreconsideration
submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was
postponedatthepetitionofcounselfortherespondentMarianoCuUnjiengbecauseamotionforleavetointervene
in the case as amici curiae signed by thirtythree (thirtyfour) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
AttorneyEulalioChaveswhosesignatureappearsintheaforesaidmotionsubsequentlyfiledapetitionforleaveto
withdrawhisappearanceasamicuscuriaeonthegroundthatthemotionforleavetointerveneasamicicuriaewas
circulatedatabanquetgivenbycounselforMarianoCuUnjiengontheeveningofJuly30,1937,andthathesigned
thesame"withoutmaturedeliberationandpurelyasamatterofcourtesytothepersonwhoinvitedme(him)."
OnAugust6,1937,theFiscaloftheCityofManilafiledamotionwiththetrialcourtfortheissuanceofanorderof
execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjiengtojailinobediencetosaidjudgment.
OnAugust7,1937,theprivateprosecutionfileditsoppositiontothemotionforleavetointerveneasamicicuriae
aforementioned,askingthatadatebesetforahearingofthesameandthat,atallevents,saidmotionshouldbe
denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several
counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order
requiringallpartiesincludingthemovantsforinterventionasamicicuriaetoappearbeforethecourtonAugust14,
1937.Onthelastmentioneddate,theFiscaloftheCityofManilamovedforthehearingofhismotionforexecution
of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amicicuriae but, upon objection of counsel for
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge
thereuponsetthehearingofthemotionforexecutiononAugust21,1937,butproceededtoconsiderthemotionfor
leavetointerveneasamicicuriaeasinorder.Evidenceastothecircumstancesunderwhichsaidmotionforleave
tointerveneasamicicuriaewassignedandsubmittedtocourtwastohavebeenheardonAugust19,1937.Butat
thisjuncture,hereinpetitionerscametothiscourtonextraordinarylegalprocesstoputanendtowhattheyalleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the
defendantMarianoCuUnjiengfordelayintheexecutionofthesentenceimposedbythisHonorableCourtonhim,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make
effectiveafinaljudgmentofthiscourtimposedonthedefendantMarianoCuUnjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restrainingorderbythiscourtonAugust21,1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners
allegethattherespondentjudgehasactedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofhisjurisdiction:
2/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probationforthefollowingreason:
(1)Undersection11ofActNo.4221,thesaidofthePhilippineLegislatureismadetoapplyonly
totheprovincesofthePhilippinesitnowherestatesthatitistobemadeapplicabletochartered
citiesliketheCityofManila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manilaforthepurposeofgivingeffecttolawsofgeneralapplication,itisalsotruethatActNo.
4221isnotalawofgeneralapplicationbecauseitismadetoapplyonlytothoseprovincesin
whichtherespectiveprovincialboardsshallhaveprovidedforthesalaryofaprobationofficer.
(3)EveniftheCityofManilawereconsideredtobeaprovince,still,ActNo.4221wouldnotbe
applicabletoitbecauseithasprovidedforthesalaryofaprobationofficerasrequiredbysection
11thereofitbeingimmaterialthatthereisanInsularProbationOfficerwillingtoactfortheCity
ofManila,saidProbationOfficerprovidedforinsection10ofActNo.4221beingdifferentand
distinctfromtheProbationOfficerprovidedforinsection11ofthesameAct.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit
Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
MarianoCuUnjieng'sapplicationforprobation,forthereasonthat:
(1)HisjurisdictionandpowerinprobationproceedingsislimitedbyActNo.4221tothegranting
ordenyingofapplicationsforprobation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June
28,1937,itbecamefinalandexecutoryatthemomentofitsrendition.
(3)Norightonappealexistsinsuchcases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
changethesame.
III.BecausetherespondentjudgemadeafindingthatMarianoCuUnjiengisinnocentofthecrimefor
which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but
withoutfoundationinfactandinlaw,andisfurthermoreincontemptofthiscourtandaviolationofthe
respondent'soathofofficeasadinterimjudgeoffirstinstance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperativewhenheissuedhisorderofJune28,1937,denyingtheapplicationforprobation,tocommit
hiscorespondenttojail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
courseoflaw.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a
system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutionalbecauseitisviolativeofsection1,subsection(1),ArticleIII,oftheConstitutionofthe
Philippinesguaranteeingequalprotectionofthelawsbecauseitconfersupontheprovincialboardofits
provincetheabsolutediscretiontomakesaidlawoperativeorotherwiseintheirrespectiveprovinces,
because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several
provincesofthelegislativepowerlodgedbytheJonesLaw(section8)inthePhilippineLegislatureand
bytheConstitution(section1,Art.VI)intheNationalAssemblyandforthefurtherreasonthatitgives
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law
(section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces
withoutuniformity.InanothersupplementarypetitiondatedSeptember14,1937,theFiscaloftheCity
ofManila,inbehalfofoneofthepetitioners,thePeopleofthePhilippineIslands,concursforthefirst
timewiththeissuesraisedbyotherpetitionerregardingtheconstitutionalityofActNo.4221,andon
theoralargumentheldonOctober6,1937,furtherelaboratedonthetheorythatprobationisaformof
reprieveandthereforeAct.No.4221isanencroachmentontheexclusivepoweroftheChiefExecutive
tograntpardonsandreprieves.OnOctober7,1937,theCityFiscalfiledtwomemorandumsinwhich
hecontendedthatActNo.4221notonlyencroachesuponthepardoningpowertotheexecutive,but
alsoconstituteanunwarranteddelegationoflegislativepowerandadenialoftheequalprotectionof
3/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
thelaws.OnOctober9,1937,twomemorandums,signedjointlybytheCityFiscalandtheSolicitor
General,actinginbehalfofthePeopleofthePhilippineIslands,andbycounselforthepetitioner,the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the
validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same
persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it
deniestheequalprotectionofthelawsandconstitutesanunlawfuldelegationoflegislativepowerand,
further,thatthewholeActisvoid:thattheCommonwealthisnotestoppedfromquestioningthevalidity
of its laws that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the
probation law as unconstitutional and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in
prohibitionproceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums,challengeeachandeveryoneoftheforegoingpropositionraisedbythepetitioners.
Asspecialdefenses,respondentsallege:
(1)Thatthepresentpetitiondoesnotstatefactssufficientinlawtowarranttheissuanceofthe
writofcertiorariorofprohibition.
(2)Thattheaforesaidpetitionisprematurebecausetheremedysoughtbythepetitionersisthe
very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution
beforethetrialcourtwhenthepresentpetitionwasfiledwiththiscourt.
(3)Thatthepetitionershavingthemselvesraisedthequestionastotheexecutionofjudgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same
underthetheorythatitsresolutiondenyingprobationisunappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instancetodecidethequestionastowhetherornottheexecutionwilllie,thiscourtnevertheless
cannotexercisesaidjurisdictionwhiletheCourtofFirstInstancehasassumedjurisdictionover
thesameuponmotionofhereinpetitionersthemselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be
toleratedbecauseitimpairstheauthorityanddignityofthetrialcourtwhichcourtwhilesittingin
theprobationcasesis"acourtoflimitedjurisdictionbutofgreatdignity."
(6)Thatunderthesuppositionthatthiscourthasjurisdictiontoresolvethequestionsubmittedto
andpendingresolutionbythetrialcourt,thepresentactionwouldnotliebecausetheresolution
of the trial court denying probation is appealable for although the Probation Law does not
specificallyprovidethatanapplicantforprobationmayappealfromaresolutionoftheCourtof
First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order,
resolutionordecisionofaninferiorcourtisappealabletothesuperiorcourt.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjiengbeingappealable,thesamehadnotbecomefinalandexecutoryforthereasonthatthe
said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the
requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the
restrainingorderimprovidentlyanderroneouslyissuedbythiscourt.
lawphi1.net
(8)ThattheFiscaloftheCityofManilahadbyimplicationadmittedthattheresolutionofthetrial
court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the
motionforreconsiderationandagreedtothepostponementofthehearingofthesaidmotion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of
certiorariwithmandamus,itappearingthatthetrialcourt,althoughitbelievedthattheaccused
was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the
accusedisarichmanandthat,beforeapetitionforcertiorarigroundedonanirregularexercise
of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsiderationspecifyingtheerrorcommittedsothatthetrialcourtcouldhaveanopportunityto
correctorcurethesame.
(10)Thatonhypothesisthattheresolutionofthiscourtisnotappealable,thetrialcourtretains
itsjurisdictionwithinareasonabletimetocorrectormodifyitinaccordancewithlawandjustice
that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be
4/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case
takingtheformofamotionforreconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege,saidcourtcannotorderexecutionofthesamewhileitisonappeal,forthentheappeal
would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the
accusedcommencestoservehissentence(ActNo.4221,sec.1U.S.vs.Cook,19Fed.[2d],
827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is
constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislativepower,doesnotinfringetheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitution,anddoesnotencroachuponthe
pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the
respondentsreiteratetheviewthatsection11ofActNo.4221isfreefromconstitutionalobjectionsandcontend,in
addition,thattheprivateprosecutionmaynotinterveneinprobationproceedings,muchlessquestionthevalidityof
ActNo.4221thatboththeCityFiscalandtheSolicitorGeneralareestoppedfromquestioningthevalidityofthe
ActthatthevalidityofActcannotbeattackedforthefirsttimebeforethiscourtthatprobationinunavailableand
that,inanyevent,section11oftheActNo.4221isseparablefromtherestoftheAct.Thelastmemorandumforthe
respondentMarianoCuUnjiengwasdeniedforhavingbeenfiledoutoftimebutwasadmittedbyresolutionofthis
courtandfiledanewonNovember5,1937.Thismemorandumelaboratesonsomeofthepointsraisedby
therespondentsandrefutesthosebroughtupbythepetitioners.
Inthescrutinyofthepleadingsandexaminationofthevariousaspectsofthepresentcase,wenotedthatthecourt
below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said
applicationassumedthetasknotonlyofconsideringthemeritsoftheapplication,butofpassingupontheculpability
oftheapplicant,notwithstandingthefinalpronouncementofguiltbythiscourt.(G.R.No.41200.)Probationimplies
guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the
offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly,
especiallywherefromitsownadmissionreliancewasmerelyhadontheprintedbriefs,averments,andpleadingsof
the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequentcases,"ifeachandeveryCourtofFirstInstancecouldenjoytheprivilegeofoverrulingdecisionsofthe
SupremeCourt,therewouldbenoendtolitigation,andjudicialchaoswouldresult."Abecomingmodestyofinferior
courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
intergratedjudicialsystemofthenation.
Afterthreshingcarefullythemultifariousissuesraisedbybothcounselforthepetitionersandtherespondents,this
court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1)
whetherornottheconstitutionalityofActNo.4221hasbeenproperlyraisedintheseproceedingsand(2)inthe
affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of
certainincidentalquestionsraisedbytheparties.
Toarriveatacorrectconclusiononthefirstquestion,resorttocertainguidingprinciplesisnecessary.Itisawell
settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that
questionisproperlyraisedandpresentedinappropriatecasesandisnecessarytoadeterminationofthecasei.e.,
theissueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismotapresented.(McGirrvs.HamiltonandAbreu[1915],30Phil.,
563,5686R.C.L.,pp.76,7712C.J.,pp.780782,783.)
Thequestionoftheconstitutionalityofanactofthelegislatureisfrequentlyraisedinordinaryactions.Nevertheless,
resortmaybemadetoextraordinarylegalremedies,particularlywheretheremediesintheordinarycourseoflaw
evenifavailable,arenotplain,speedyandadequate.Thus,inCuUnjiengvs.Patstone([1922]),42Phil.,818),this
court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings(see,also,12C.J.,p.783)andinGovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Springer([1927],50Phil.,
259[affirmedinSpringervs.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands(1928),277U.S.,18972Law.ed.,845]),this
court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in
habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783 Bailey on HabeasCorpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory,see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234) and even on an application for preliminary injunction
wherethedeterminationoftheconstitutionalquestionisnecessarytoadecisionofthecase.(12C.J.,p.783.)The
samemaybesaidasregardsprohibitionandcertiorari.(YuCongEngvs.Trinidad[1925],47Phil.,385[1926],271
U.S.,50070Law.ed.,1059Bellvs.FirstJudicialDistrictCourt[1905],28Nev.,28081Pac.,875113A.S.R.,
854 6 Ann. Cas., 982 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra,
decidedbythiscourttwelveyearsagowas,likethepresentone,anoriginalactionforcertiorariandprohibition.The
constitutionalityofActNo.2972,popularlyknownastheChineseBookkeepingLaw,wastherechallengedbythe
petitioners,andtheconstitutionalissuewasnotmetsquarelybytherespondentinademurrer.Apointwasraised
"relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This
5/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was
constitutional.ThecasewaselevatedonwritofcertioraritotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateswhichreversed
thejudgmentofthiscourtandheldthattheActwasinvalid.(271U.S.,50070Law.ed.,1059.)Onthequestionof
jurisdiction,however,theFederalSupremeCourt,thoughitsChiefJustice,said:
BytheCodeofCivilProcedureofthePhilippineIslands,section516,thePhilippinesupremecourtisgranted
concurrentjurisdictioninprohibitionwithcourtsoffirstinstanceoverinferiortribunalsorpersons,andoriginal
jurisdictionovercourtsoffirstinstance,whensuchcourtsareexercisingfunctionswithoutorinexcessoftheir
jurisdiction.Ithasbeenheldbythatcourtthatthequestionofthevalidityofthecriminalstatutemustusually
be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
(CadwalladerGibsonLumberCo.vs.DelRosario,26Phil.,192).Butinthiscasewhereanewactseriously
affectednumerouspersonsandextensivepropertyrights,andwaslikelytocauseamultiplicityofactions,the
SupremeCourtexerciseditsdiscretiontobringtheissuetotheact'svaliditypromptlybeforeitanddecidein
the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Exparte
Young (209 U. S., 12352 Law ed., 714 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441 14 Ann. Ca., 764
Trauxvs.Raich,239U.S.,3360Law.ed.,131L.R.A.1916D,54536Sup.Ct.Rep.,7Ann.Cas.,1917B,
283andWilsonvs.New,243U.S.,33261Law.ed.,755L.R.A.1917E,93837Sup.Ct.Rep.,298Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now
disclaimedonbehalfoftherespondents,andbothpartiesaskadecisiononthemerits.Inviewofthebroad
powersinprohibitiongrantedtothatcourtundertheIslandCode,weacquiesceinthedesireoftheparties.
Thewritofprohibitionisanextraordinaryjudicialwritissuingoutofacourtofsuperiorjurisdictionanddirectedtoan
inferiorcourt,forthepurposeofpreventingtheinferiortribunalfromusurpingajurisdictionwithwhichitisnotlegally
vested.(High,ExtraordinaryLegalRemedies,p.705.)Thegeneralrule,althoughthereisaconflictinthecases,is
that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the
complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But
where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
preventedbythewritofprohibitionfromenforcingthatstatute.(50C.J.,670ExparteRoundtree[1874,51Ala.,
42 In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365 Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384 84 A., 799 Pennington vs.
Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13 State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54 46 S. E., 185 Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5
Dana,1930Am.Dec.,669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which
prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has
becomefinalandbeforetheyhaveservedtheirsentence.Itistruethatatcommonlawtheauthorityofthecourtsto
suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts,
including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealthvs.Dowdican'sBail[1874],115Mass.,133Peoplevs.Stickel[1909],156Mich.,557121N.W.,
497Peopleexrel.Forsythvs.CourtofSession[1894],141N.Y.,288Webervs.State[1898],58OhioSt.,616).
But,intheleadingcaseofExparteUnitedStates([1916],242U.S.,2761Law.ed.,129L.R.A.,1917E,117837
Sup.Ct.Rep.,72Ann.Cas.1917B,355),theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesexpressedtheopinionthatunder
thecommonlawthepowerofthecourtwaslimitedtotemporarysuspension,andbrushedasidethecontentionas
toinherentjudicialpowersaying,throughChiefJusticeWhite:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon
conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in
exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise
reasonable,thatis,judicial,discretiontoenablethemtowiselyexerttheirauthority.Buttheseconcessions
affordnogroundforthecontentionastopowerheremade,sinceitmustrestuponthepropositionthatthe
power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the
propositionurgeduponthedistributionofpowersmadebytheConstitutionwillbecomeapparentwhenitis
observedthatindisputablealsoisitthattheauthoritytodefineandfixthepunishmentforcrimeislegislative
andincludestherightinadvancetobringwithinjudicialdiscretion,forthepurposeofexecutingthestatute,
elementsofconsiderationwhichwouldbeotherwisebeyondthescopeofjudicialauthority,andthattheright
torelievefromthepunishment,fixedbylawandascertainedaccordingtothemethodsbyitprovidedbelongs
totheexecutivedepartment.
JusticeCarson,inhisilluminatingconcurringopinioninthecaseofDirectorofPrisonsvs.JudgeofFirstInstanceof
Cavite(29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the
executionofsentencespronouncedincriminalcasesisnotinherentinthejudicialfunction."Allareagreed",hesaid,
"thatintheabsenceofstatutoryauthority,itdoesnotliewithinthepowerofthecourtstograntsuchsuspensions."
(atp.278.)Bothpetitionerandrespondentsarecorrect,therefore,whentheyarguethataCourtofFirstInstance
sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred
exclusivelybyActNo.4221ofthePhilippineLegislature.
6/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
Itis,ofcourse,truethattheconstitutionalityofastatutewillnotbeconsideredonapplicationforprohibitionwhere
thequestionhasnotbeenproperlybroughttotheattentionofthecourtbyobjectionofsomekind(Hillvs.Tarver
[1901],130Ala.,59230S.,499Stateexrel.Kellyvs.Kirby[1914],260Mo.,120168S.W.,746).Inthecaseat
bar,itisunquestionablethattheconstitutionalissuehasbeensquarelypresentednotonlybeforethiscourtbythe
petitionersbutalsobeforethetrialcourtbytheprivateprosecution.Therespondent,Hon.JoseOVera,however,
actingasjudgeofthecourtbelow,declinedtopassuponthequestiononthegroundthattheprivateprosecutor,not
being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex
County([1916],225Mass.,59113N.E.,742,743),asauthorityforthepropositionthatacourtwillnotconsider
anyattackmadeontheconstitutionalityofastatutebyonewhohasnointerestindefeatingitbecausehisrightsare
not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the
constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
whichthejudge,consciousofthefallibilityofthehumanjudgment,willshrinkfromexercisinginanycasewherehe
can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional
Limitations,8thed.,Vol.I,p.332),proceededontheassumptionthatActNo.4221isconstitutional.Whiletherefore,
thecourtaquoadmitsthattheconstitutionalquestionwasraisedbeforeit,itrefusedtoconsiderthequestionsolely
because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced
thattheprivateprosecutionhasnopersonalitytoappearinthehearingoftheapplicationforprobationofdefendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionalitywasnotproperlyraisedinthelowercourt.Although,asageneralrule,onlythosewhoarepartiesto
asuitmayquestiontheconstitutionalityofastatuteinvolvedinajudicialdecision,ithasbeenheldthatsincethe
decreepronouncedbyacourtwithoutjurisdictionisvoid,wherethejurisdictionofthecourtdependsonthevalidity
ofthestatuteinquestion,theissueoftheconstitutionalitywillbeconsideredonitsbeingbroughttotheattentionof
thecourtbypersonsinterestedintheeffecttobegiventhestatute.(12C.J.,sec.184,p.766.)And,evenifwewere
toconcedethattheissuewasnotproperlyraisedinthecourtbelowbytheproperparty,itdoesnotfollowthatthe
issuemaynotbehereraisedinanoriginalactionofcertiorariandprohibitions.Itistruethat,asageneralrule,the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings,
ordinarilyitmaynotberaisedatthetrial,andifnotraisedinthetrialcourt,itwillnotconsideredonappeal.(12C.J.,
p.786.See,also,CadwalladerGibsonLumberCo.vs.DelRosario,26Phil.,192,193195.)Butwemuststatethat
thegeneralruleadmitsofexceptions.Courts,intheexerciseofsoundsdiscretion,maydeterminethetimewhena
questionaffectingtheconstitutionalityofastatuteshouldbepresented.(InreWoolsey[1884],95N.Y.,135,144.)
Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be
raisedforthefirsttimeatanystageoftheproceedings,eitherinthetrialcourtoronappeal.(12C.J.,p.786.)Even
incivilcases,ithasbeenheldthatitisthedutyofacourttopassontheconstitutionalquestion,thoughraisedfor
the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case.
(McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674 124 S. W., 892 Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
CordageCo.[1908],214Mo.,685113S.W.1108Carmodyvs.St.LouisTransitCo.,[1905],188Mo.,57287S.
W.,913.)Andithasbeenheldthataconstitutionalquestionwillbeconsideredbyanappellatecourtatanytime,
where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561 57 S., 870.) As to the
power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings,weturnagainandpointwithemphasistothecaseofYuCongEngvs.Trinidad,supra. And on the
hypothesesthattheHongkong&ShanghaiBankingCorporation,representedbytheprivateprosecution,isnotthe
proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the
opinionthatthePeopleofthePhilippines,representedbytheSolicitorGeneralandtheFiscaloftheCityofManila,
issuchaproperpartyinthepresentproceedings.Theunchallengedruleisthatthepersonwhoimpugnsthevalidity
ofastatutemusthaveapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustained,
directinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement.ItgoeswithoutsayingthatifActNo.4221reallyviolatestheconstitution,
thePeopleofthePhilippines,inwhosenamethepresentactionisbrought,hasasubstantialinterestinhavingitset
aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50
Phil.,259(affirmedinSpringervs.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands[1928],277U.S.,18972Law.ed.,845),
thiscourtdeclaredanactofthelegislatureunconstitutionalinanactioninstitutedinbehalfoftheGovernmentofthe
Philippines.InAttorneyGeneralvs.Perkins([1889],73Mich.,303,311,31241N.W.426,428,429),theStateof
Michigan,throughitsAttorneyGeneral,institutedquowarrantoproceedingstotesttherightoftherespondentsto
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutionalbecauseitimpairedtheobligationofcontracts.Thecapacityofthechieflawofficerofthestateto
questiontheconstitutionalityofthestatutewasthough,asageneralrule,onlythosewhoarepartiestoasuitmay
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronouncedbyacourtwithoutjurisdictioninvoid,wherethejurisdictionofthecourtdependsonthevalidityofthe
statuteinquestion,theissueofconstitutionalitywillbeconsideredonitsbeingbroughttotheattentionofthecourt
bypersonsinterestedintheeffecttobeginthestatute.(12C.J.,sec.184,p.766.)And,evenifweweretoconcede
thattheissuewasnotproperlyraisedinthecourtbelowbytheproperparty,itdoesnotfollowthattheissuemaynot
be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionalitymustberaisedattheearliestopportunity,sothatifnotraisedbythepleadings,ordinarilyitmaynot
beraisedathetrial,andifnotraisedinthetrialcourt,itwillnotbeconsideredonappeal.(12C.J.,p.786.See,also,
7/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
CadwalladerGibsonLumberCo.vs.DelRosario,26Phil.,192,193195.)Butwemuststatethatthegeneralrule
admitsofexceptions.Courts,intheexerciseofsounddiscretion,maydeterminethetimewhenaquestionaffecting
theconstitutionalityofastatuteshouldbepresented.(InreWoolsey[19884],95N.Y.,135,144.)Thus,incriminal
cases,althoughthereisaverysharpconflictofauthorities,itissaidthatthequestionmayberaisedforthefirsttime
atanystateoftheproceedings,eitherinthetrialcourtoronappeal.(12C.J.,p.786.)Evenincivilcases,ithas
beenheldthatitisthedutyofacourttopassontheconstitutionalquestion,thoughraisedforfirsttimeonappeal,if
it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs.
Maysville&B.S.R.Co.[1910],136Ky.,674124S.W.,892Lohmeyervs.St.Louis,CordageCo.[1908],214Mo.
685113S.W.,1108Carmodyvs.St.LouisTransitCo.[1905],188Mo.,57287S.W.,913.)Andithasbeenheld
thataconstitutionalquestionwillbeconsideredbyanappellatecourtatanytime,whereitinvolvesthejurisdictionof
the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutionalquestionraisedforthefirsttimebeforethiscourtintheseproceedings,weturnagainandpointwith
emphasistothecaseofYuCongEng.vs.Trinidad,supra.AndonthehypothesisthattheHongkong&Shanghai
Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
questionhereapointwedonotnowhavetodecideweareoftheopinionthatthePeopleofthePhilippines,
represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings.Theunchallengedruleisthatthepersonwhoimpugnsthevalidityofastatutemusthaveapersonal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the
Philippines,inwhosenamethepresentactionisbrought,hasasubstantialinterestinhavingitsetaside.Ofgreater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamentallawbytheenforcementofaninvalidstatute.Hence,thewellsettledrulethatthestatecanchallenge
thevalidityofitsownlaws.InGovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Springer([1927]),50Phil.,259(affirmedin
Springervs.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands[1928],277U.S.,18972Law.ed.,845),thiscourtdeclaredan
act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In
Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan,
through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a
mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional
because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionalityofthestatutewasitselfquestioned.SaidtheSupremeCourtofMichigan,throughChamplin,J.:
...Theideaseemstobethatthepeopleareestoppedfromquestioningthevalidityofalawenactedbytheir
representatives that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute
enactedbythepeopleofMichiganisanadequateanswer.Thelastpropositionistrue,but,ifthestatuterelied
oninjustificationisunconstitutional,itisstatuteonlyinform,andlackstheforceoflaw,andisofnomore
savingeffecttojustifyactionunderitthanifithadneverbeenenacted.Theconstitutionisthesupremelaw,
and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the
respondentsarenottheonlypartiesininterestuponsuchconstitutionalquestions.AswasremarkedbyMr.
JusticeStory,inspeakingofanacquiescencebyapartyaffectedbyanunconstitutionalactofthelegislature:
"Thepeoplehaveadeepandvestedinterestinmaintainingalltheconstitutionallimitationsupontheexercise
oflegislativepowers."(Allenvs.Mckeen,1Sum.,314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the
AttorneyGeneralofKansastotesttheconstitutionalityofastatuteofthestate.Indisposingofthequestionwhether
ornotthestatemaybringtheaction,theSupremeCourtofKansassaid:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always
interestedwheretheintegrityofitsConstitutionorstatutesisinvolved.
"IthasaninterestinseeingthatthewilloftheLegislatureisnotdisregarded,andneednot,as
anindividualplaintiffmust,showgroundsoffearingmorespecificinjury.(Statevs.KansasCity
60Kan.,518[57Pac.,118])."(Statevs.Lawrence,80Kan.,707103Pac.,839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its AttorneyGeneral, or county
attorney,mayexercisehisbetjudgmentastowhatsortofactionhewillbringtohavethematterdetermined,
eitherbyquowarrantotochallengeitsvalidity(Statevs.Johnson,61Kan.,80360Pac.,106849L.R.A.,
662),bymandamustocompelobediencetoitsterms(Statevs.Dolley,82Kan.,533108Pac.,846),orby
injunctiontorestrainproceedingsunderitsquestionableprovisions(Stateexrel.vs.CityofNeodesha,3Kan.
App.,31945Pac.,122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006
Statevs.S.H.Kress&Co.[1934],155S.,823Statevs.Walmsley[1935],181La.,597160S.,91Statevs.Board
ofCountyComr's[1934],39Pac.[2d],286FirstConst.Co.ofBrooklynvs.State[1917],211N.Y.,295116N.E.,
1020Bushvs.State{1918],187Ind.,339119N.E.,417Statevs.Watkins[1933],176La.,837147S.,8,10,11).
Inthecaselastcited,theSupremeCourtofLuisianasaid:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of
8/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three
decisionsarecited,viz.:Stateexrel.Hall,DistrictAttorney,vs.JudgeofTenthJudicialDistrict(33La.Ann.,
1222)Stateexrel.Nicholls,Governorvs.Shakespeare,MayorofNewOrleans(41Ann.,1566So.,592)
and State exrel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679 18 So., 746 47 L. R. A., 512).
These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in
conflictwithonewhichitishisdutytoenforce.InStateexrel.Hall,DistrictAttorney,vs.Judge,etc.,theruling
was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the
districtattorneytofileabillofinformationchargingapersonwithaviolationofthestatute.Inotherwords,a
judgeshouldnotjudiciallydeclareastatuteunconstitutionaluntilthequestionofconstitutionalityistendered
for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel.
Nicholls,Governor,etc.,isauthorityforthepropositionmerelythatanofficeronwhomastatuteimposesthe
duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be
unconstitutional.Stateexrel.BankingCo.,etc.,isauthorityforthepropositionmerelythatexecutiveofficers,
e.g.,thestateauditorandstatetreasurer,shouldnotdeclinetoperformministerialdutiesimposeduponthem
byastatute,onthegroundthattheybelievethestatuteisunconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the
Constitutionofthestate.If,intheperformanceofhisdutyhefindstwostatutesinconflictwitheachother,or
onewhichrepealsanother,andif,inhisjudgment,oneofthetwostatutesisunconstitutional,itishisdutyto
enforcetheotherand,inordertodoso,heiscompelledtosubmittothecourt,bywayofaplea,thatoneof
thestatutesisunconstitutional.Ifitwerenotso,thepoweroftheLegislaturewouldbefreefromconstitutional
limitationsintheenactmentofcriminallaws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may
impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact,
theyappeartohaveproceededontheassumptionthattheruleasstatedissoundbutthatithasnoapplicationin
the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the
petitionersherein,theprincipalreasonsbeingthatthevaliditybeforethiscourt,thattheCityFiscalisestoppedfrom
attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said
city.(Additionalmemorandumofrespondents,October23,1937,pp.8,.10,17and23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional,isnoreasonforconsideringthePeopleofthePhilippinesestoppedfromnorassailingitsvalidity.For
courtswillpassuponaconstitutionalquestionsonlywhenpresentedbeforeitinbonafidecasesfordetermination,
andthefactthatthequestionhasnotbeenraisedbeforeisnotavalidreasonforrefusingtoallowittoberaised
later.Thefiscalandallothersarejustifiedinrelyinguponthestatuteandtreatingitasvaliduntilitisheldvoidbythe
courtsinpropercases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the
resolutionoftheinstantcase.For,"...whilethecourtwillmeetthequestionwithfirmness,whereitsdecisionis
indispensable,itisthepartofwisdom,andjustrespectforthelegislature,rendersitproper,towaiveit,ifthecasein
whichitarises,canbedecidedonotherpoints."(ExparteRandolph[1833],20F.Cas.No.11,5582Brock.,447.
Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional
questionisnecessarywheneveritisessentialtothedecisionofthecase(12C.J.,p.782,citingLongSaultDev.
Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849 Ann. Cas.
1915D,56andappdism242U.S.,272]Hessevs.Ledesma,7PortoRicoFed.,520Cowanvs.Doddridge,22
Gratt[63Va.],458UnionLineCo.,vs.WisconsinR.Commn.,146Wis.,523129N.W.,605),aswheretherightof
apartyisfoundedsolelyonastatutethevalidityofwhichisattacked.(12C.J.,p.782,citingCentralGlassCo.vs.
NiagraraF.Ins.Co.,131La.,51359S.,972Cheneyvs.Beverly,188Mass.,8174N.E.,306).Thereisnodoubt
thattherespondentCuUnjiengdrawshisprivilegetoprobationsolelyfromActNo.4221nowbeingassailed.
Apartfromtheforegoingconsiderations,thatcourtwillalsotakecognizanceofthefactthattheProbationActisa
new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts that may
persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation that some of them are
already on probation that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future and that the
respondentMarianoCuUnjienghasbeenatlargeforaperiodofaboutfouryearssincehisfirstconviction.Allwait
the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionalityofActNo.4221benowresolved.(YuCongEngvs.Trinidad[1925],47Phil.,385[1926],271U.S.,
50070Law.ed.,1059.See6R.C.L.,pp.77,78Peoplevs.Kennedy[1913],207N.Y.,533101N.E.,442,444
Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616 Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327 133 N.W., 209, 211 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489
Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous
situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchantsareaffectedbytheseproceedings,andinasmuchasActNo.2972isanewlawnotyetinterpretedbythe
9/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
courts,intheinterestofthepublicwelfareandfortheadvancementofpublicpolicy,wehavedeterminedtooverrule
the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary
situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme
CourtoftheUnitedStates.Amorebindingauthorityinsupportoftheviewwehavetakencannotbefound.
WehavereachedtheconclusionthatthequestionoftheconstitutionalityofActNo.4221hasbeenproperlyraised.
Nowforthemaininquiry:IstheActunconstitutional?
UnderadoctrinepeculiarlyAmerican,itistheofficeanddutyofthejudiciarytoenforcetheConstitution.Thiscourt,
byclearimplicationfromtheprovisionsofsection2,subsection1,andsection10,ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,
may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk
fromitssworndutytoenforcetheConstitution.And,inclearcases,itwillnothesitatetogiveeffecttothesupreme
lawbysettingasideastatuteinconflicttherewith.Thisisoftheessenceofjudicialduty.
Thiscourtisnotunmindfulofthefundamentalcriteriaincasesofthisnaturethatallreasonabledoubtsshouldbe
resolvedinfavoroftheconstitutionalityofastatute.Anactofthelegislatureapprovedbytheexecutive,ispresumed
tobewithinconstitutionallimitations.TheresponsibilityofupholdingtheConstitutionrestsnotonthecourtsalone
but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
departmentofthegovernmentitself."(U.S.vs.TenYu[1912],24Phil.,1,10Casevs.BoardofHealthandHeiser
[1913],24Phil.,250,276U.S.vs.Joson[1913],26Phil.,1.)Andastatutefinallycomesbeforethecourtssustained
by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to
support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioningaparticularlawtheydidnotintendtoviolatetheConstitution.Thecourtscannotbutcautiouslyexercise
itspowertooverturnthesolemndeclarationsoftwoofthethreegranddepartmentsofthegovernments.(6R.C.L.,
p.101.)Then,thereisthatpeculiarpoliticalphilosophywhichbidsthejudiciarytoreflectthewisdomofthepeople
asexpressedthroughanelectiveLegislatureandanelectiveChiefExecutive.Itfollows,therefore,thatthecourts
will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to
requireacitationofauthorities.
Oneofthecounselforrespondents,inthecourseofhisimpassionedargument,calledattentiontothefactthatthe
President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act,
adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however,
reiteratedhisconfidenceintheintegrityandindependenceofthiscourt.WetakenoticeofthefactthatthePresident
in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the
Probation Act (No. 4221) that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly
repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned but that said bill was vetoed by the
President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the
Commonwealthalaw...unfairandverylikelyunconstitutional."Itissufficienttoobserveinthisconnectionthat,in
vetoingthebillreferredto,thePresidentexercisedhisconstitutionalprerogative.Hemayexpressthereasonswhich
hemaydeemproperfortakingsuchastep,buthisreasonsarenotbindinguponusinthedeterminationofactual
controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner
insinuatehisopiniononamatterencompassedwithinhisbroadconstitutionalpowerofvetobutwhichhappensto
beatthesametimependingdeterminationinthiscourtisaquestionofproprietyforhimexclusivelytodecideor
determine.Whateveropinionisexpressedbyhimunderthesecircumstances,however,cannotswayourjudgment
onwayoranotherandpreventusfromtakingwhatinouropinionisthepropercourseofactiontotakeinagiven
case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political
history,itisthatweareindependentoftheExecutivenolessthanoftheLegislativedepartmentofourgovernment
independentintheperformanceofourfunctions,undeterredbyanyconsideration,freefrompolitics,indifferentto
popularity,andunafraidofcriticismintheaccomplishmentofoursworndutyasweseeitandasweunderstandit.
TheconstitutionalityofActNo.4221ischallengedonthreeprincipalgrounds:(1)ThatsaidActencroachesupon
thepardoningpoweroftheExecutive(2)thatitsconstitutesanunduedelegationoflegislativepowerand(3)thatit
deniestheequalprotectionofthelaws.
1.Section21oftheActofCongressofAugust29,1916,commonlyknownastheJonesLaw,inforceatthetimeof
the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the GovernorGeneral of the
Philippines"theexclusivepowertograntpardonsandreprievesandremitfinesandforfeitures".Thispowerisnow
vestedinthePresidentofthePhilippines.(Art.VII,sec.11,subsec.6.)TheprovisionsoftheJonesLawandthe
Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution.UndertheJonesLaw,asatcommonlaw,pardoncouldbegrantedanytimeafterthecommissionof
the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2 In re Lontok
[1922], 43 Phil., 293). The GovernorGeneral of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the
United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our
Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning
powercanonlybeexercised"afterconviction".So,too,underthenewConstitution,thepardoningpowerdoesnot
extendto"casesofimpeachment".ThisisalsotherulegenerallyfollowedintheUnitedStates(VideConstitutionof
10/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
theUnitedStates,Art.II,sec.2).TheruleinEnglandisdifferent.There,aroyalpardoncannotbepleadedinbarof
animpeachment"but,"saysBlackstone,"aftertheimpeachmenthasbeensolemnlyheardanddetermined,itisnot
understoodthattheking'sroyalgraceisfurtherrestrainedorabridged."(Vide,ExparteWells[1856],18How.,307
15Law.ed.,421Com.vs.Lockwood[1872],109Mass.,32312Am.Rep.,699Sterlingvs.Drake[1876],29Ohio
St.,45723am.Rep.,762.)Thereasonforthedistinctionisobvious.InEngland,Judgmentonimpeachmentisnot
confinedtomere"removalfromofficeanddisqualificationtoholdandenjoyanyofficeofhonor,trust,orprofitunder
theGovernment"(Art.IX,sec.4,ConstitutionofthePhilippines)butextendstothewholepunishmentattachedby
lawtotheoffensecommitted.TheHouseofLords,onaconvictionmay,byitssentence,inflictcapitalpunishment,
perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense
committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our
Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the
pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be
grantedbythePresidentundertheConstitutionbutonlywiththeconcurrenceoftheNationalAssembly.Weneed
notdwellatlengthonthesignificanceofthesefundamentalchanges.Itissufficientforourpurposestostatethatthe
pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief
ExecutiveundertheJonesLawbeenimpairedbytheProbationAct?
Asalreadystated,theJonesLawveststhepardoningpowerexclusivelyintheChiefExecutive.Theexerciseofthe
powermaynot,therefore,bevestedinanyoneelse.
"...Thebenignprerogativeofmercyreposedintheexecutivecannotbetakenawaynorfetteredbyanylegislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate
departmentsofgovernmenthavenothingtodowiththepardoningpower,sincenopersonproperlybelongingtoone
ofthedepartmentscanexerciseanypowersappertainingtoeitheroftheothersexceptincasesexpresslyprovided
for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the
executivewithoutexpressorimpliedlimitations,thegrantisexclusive,andthelegislaturecanneitherexercisesuch
power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp.
838,839,andcasescited.)IfActNo.4221,then,confersanypardoningpoweruponthecourtsitisforthatreason
unconstitutionalandvoid.Butdoesit?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Exparte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27 61
Law. ed., 129 L.R.A. 1917E, 1178 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an
exhaustivereviewoftheauthorities,expressedtheopinionofthecourtthatunderthecommonlawthepowerofthe
courtwaslimitedtotemporarysuspensionandthattherighttosuspendsentencedabsolutelyandpermanentlywas
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is
concerned,thatis,thecausingoftheimpositionofpenaltiesasfixedtobesubject,byprobationlegislationorsuch
othermeansasthelegislativemindmaydevise,tosuchjudicialdiscretionasmaybeadequatetoenablecourtsto
meetbytheexerciseofanenlargedbutwisediscretiontheinfinitevariationswhichmaybepresentedtothemfor
judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things
adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National
ProbationAssociationandotherstoagitatefortheenactmentbyCongressofafederalprobationlaw.Suchaction
wasfinallytakenonMarch4,1925(chap.521,43Stat.L.159,U.S.C.title18,sec.724).Thiswasfollowedbyan
appropriationtodefraythesalariesandexpensesofacertainnumberofprobationofficerschosenbycivilservice.
(Johnson,ProbationforJuvenilesandAdults,p.14.)
InUnitedStatesvs.Murray([1925],275U.S.,34748Sup.Ct.Rep.,14672Law.ed.,309),theSupremeCourtof
theUnitedStates,throughChiefJusticeTaft,heldthatwhenapersonsentencedtoimprisonmentbyadistrictcourt
hasbeguntoservehissentence,thatcourthasnopowerundertheProbationActofMarch4,1925togranthim
probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionalityoftheprobationActwasnotconsideredbutwasassumed.ThecourttracedthehistoryoftheAct
and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives
(ReportNo.1377,68thCongress,2Session)thefollowingstatement:
Prior to the socalled Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of
probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or
volunteers.Inthiscase,however(ExparteUnitedStates,242U.S.,2761L.Ed.,129L.R.A.,1917E,1178
37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to
suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the
courtsweretoexerciseprobationpowersinthefuture...
Sincethisdecisionwasrendered,twoattemptshavebeenmadetoenactprobationlegislation.In1917,abill
wasfavorablyreportedbytheJudiciaryCommitteeandpassedtheHouse.In1920,thejudiciaryCommittee
againfavorablyreportedaprobationbilltotheHouse,butitwasneverreachedfordefiniteaction.
Ifthisbillisenactedintolaw,itwillbringthepolicyoftheFederalgovernmentwithreferencetoitstreatment
11/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the
presenttimeeverystatehasaprobationlaw,andinallbuttwelvestatesthelawappliesbothtoadultand
juvenileoffenders.(see,also,Johnson,ProbationforJuvenilesandAdults[1928],Chap.I.)
Theconstitutionalityofthefederalprobationlawhasbeensustainedbyinferiorfederalcourts.InRiggsvs.United
Statessupra,theCircuitCourtofAppealsoftheFourthCircuitsaid:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been
reviewedbytheCircuitCourtofAppealsoftheNinthCircuit(7F.[2d],590),andtheconstitutionalityofthe
actfullysustained,andthesameheldinnomannertoencroachuponthepardoningpowerofthePresident.
This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose
undertheactwehavetoconsider,andtoitandtheauthoritiescitedthereinspecialreferenceismade(Nix
vs.James,7F.[2d],590,594),asisalsotoadecisionoftheCircuitCourtofAppealsoftheSeventhCircuit
(Kriebelvs.U.S.,10F.[2d],762),likewiseconstruingtheProbationAct.
Wehaveseenthatin1916theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinplainandunequivocallanguage,pointedto
Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually
enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United
Statesin1928andconsistentlysustainedbytheinferiorfederalcourtsinanumberofearliercases.
WearefullyconvincedthatthePhilippineLegislature,liketheCongressoftheUnitedStates,maylegallyenacta
probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is
supportedbyotherauthorities.InExparte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542 L.R.A. 1916A, 1285 151 Pac., 698, the
courtsaid:"ItisclearlywithintheprovinceoftheLegislaturetodenominateanddefineallclassesofcrime,andto
prescribeforeachaminimumandmaximumpunishment."AndinStatevs.Abbott([1910],87S.C.,46633L.R.A.
[N.S.],11270S.E.,6Ann.Cas.1912B,1189),thecourtsaid:"Thelegislativepowertosetpunishmentforcrime
isverybroad,andintheexerciseofthispowerthegeneralassemblymayconferontrialjudges,ifitseesfit,the
largestdiscretionastothesentencetobeimposed,astothebeginningandendofthepunishmentandwhetherit
shouldbecertainorindeterminateorconditional."(QuotedinStatevs.Teal[1918],108S.C.,45595S.E.,69.)
Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the
legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in
imposingthepenaltieswhichthelawprescribesinparticularcases.Itisbelievedthatjusticecanbestbeservedby
vestingthispowerinthecourts,theybeinginapositiontobestdeterminethepenaltieswhichanindividualconvict,
peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence
merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty
providedbylawisclearlyexcessive,thecourtsbeingallowedinsuchcasetosubmittotheChiefExecutive,through
theDepartmentofJustice,suchstatementasitmaydeemproper(seeart.5,RevisedPenalCode),incaseswhere
bothmitigatingandaggravatingcircumstancesareattendantinthecommissionofacrimeandthelawprovidesfor
apenaltycomposedoftwoindivisiblepenalties,thecourtsmayallowsuchcircumstancestooffsetoneanotherin
consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation.(Art.63,rule4,RevisedPenalCodeU.S.vs.RegueraandAsuategui[1921],41Phil.,506.)Again,
article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each
periods,incasethepenaltyprescribedbylawcontainsthreeperiods,theextentoftheevilproducedbythecrime.In
theimpositionoffines,thecourtsareallowedtofixanyamountwithinthelimitsestablishedbylaw,consideringnot
onlythemitigatingandaggravatingcircumstances,butmoreparticularlythewealthormeansoftheculprit.(Art.66,
Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but
alwayslowerbytwodegreesatleastthanthatprescribedbylawforthecrimewhichhehascommitted.Article69of
the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete selfdefense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly
excusablebyreasonofthelackofsomeoftheconditionsrequiredtojustifythesameortoexemptfromcriminal
liabilityintheseveralcasesmentionedinarticle11and12oftheCode,"thecourtsshallimposethepenaltyinthe
periodwhichmaybedeemedproper,inviewofthenumberandnatureoftheconditionsofexemptionpresentor
lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the
socialdangerandthedegreeofcriminalityshownbytheoffender,"shallimposeuponhimeitherarrestomayorora
finerangingfrom200to500pesos.(Art.59,RevisedPenalCode.)
UnderourRevisedPenalCode,also,onehalfoftheperiodofpreventiveimprisonmentisdeductedformtheentire
termofimprisonment,exceptincertaincasesexpresslymentioned(art.29)thedeathpenaltyisnotimposedwhen
theguiltypersonismorethanseventyyearsofage,orwhereuponappealorrevisionofthecasebytheSupreme
Court,allthemembersthereofarenotunanimousintheirvotingastotheproprietyoftheimpositionofthedeath
penalty(art.47,seealso,sec.133,RevisedAdministrativeCode,asamendedbyCommonwealthActNo.3)the
deathsentenceisnottobeinflicteduponawomanwithinthethreeyearsnextfollowingthedateofthesentenceor
whilesheispregnant,oruponanypersonoverseventyyearsofage(art.83)andwhenaconvictshallbecome
insaneoranimbecileafterfinalsentencehasbeenpronounced,orwhileheisservinghissentenced,theexecution
of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or
imbecility(art.79).
12/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
Butthedesireofthelegislaturetorelaxwhatmightresultintheundueharshnessofthepenallawsismoreclearly
demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law
enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole
(secs.5to100andgrantingthecourtslargediscretioninimposingthepenaltiesofthelaw.Section1ofthelawas
amendedprovides"hereafter,inimposingaprisonsentenceforanoffensespunishedbytheRevisedPenalCode,
oritsamendments,thecourtshallsentencetheaccusedtoanindeterminatesentencethemaximumtermofwhich
shallbethatwhich,inviewoftheattendingcircumstances,couldbeproperlyimposedundertherulesofthesaid
Code,andtoaminimumwhichshallbewithintherangeofthepenaltynextlowertothatprescribedbytheCodefor
the offense and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile
DelinquencyLaw(ActNo.3203)whichwassubsequentlyamendedbyActNo.3559.Section7oftheoriginalAct
andsection1oftheamendatoryActhavebecomearticle80oftheRevisedPenalCode,amendedbyActNo.4117
ofthePhilippineLegislatureandrecentlyreamendedbyCommonwealthActNo.99oftheNationalAssembly.Inthis
Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the
modificationinparticularcasesofthepenaltiesprescribedbylawbypermittingthesuspensionoftheexecutionof
the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular
circumstancesoftheoffenses,thecriminalrecord,ifany,oftheconvict,andhissocialhistory.TheLegislaturehas
inrealitydecreedthatincertaincasesnopunishmentatallshallbesufferedbytheconvictaslongastheconditions
ofprobationarefaithfullyobserved.Itthisbeso,then,itcannotbesaidthattheProbationActcomesinconflictwith
the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme
CourtofNewMexico,"theelementofpunishmentorthepenaltyforthecommissionofawrong,whiletobedeclared
by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns
solelytheprocedureandconductofcriminalcauses,withwhichtheexecutivecanhavenothingtodo."(Exparte
Bates,supra.)InWilliamsvs.State([1926],162Ga.,327133S.E.,843),thecourtupheldtheconstitutionalityof
theGeorgiaprobationstatuteagainstthecontentionthatitattemptedtodelegatetothecourtsthepardoningpower
lodgedbytheconstitutioninthegovernoraloneisvestedwiththepowertopardonafterfinalsentencehasbeen
imposedbythecourts,thepowerofthecourtstoimposedanypenaltywhichmaybefromtimetotimeprescribed
bylawandinsuchmannerasmaybedefinedcannotbequestioned."
Werealize,ofcourse,theconflictwhichtheAmericancasesdisclose.Somecasesholditunlawfulforthelegislature
to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so
wouldencroachuponthepardoningpoweroftheexecutive.(InreWebb[1895],89Wis.,35427L.R.A.,35646
Am.St.Rep.,84662N.W.,1779Am.Crim.,Rep.,702Stateexrel.Summerfieldvs.Moran[1919],43Nev.,150
182Pac.,927Exparte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041 132
Am.St.Rep.,62897Pac.,650Peoplevs.Barrett[1903],202Ill,28767N.E.,2363L.R.A.,8295Am.St.Rep.,
230Snodgrassvs.State[1912],67Tex.Crim.Rep.,61541L.R.A.[N.S.],1144150S.W.,162ExparteShelor
[1910],33Nev.,361111Pac.,291Nealvs.State[1898],104Ga.,50942L.R.A.,19069Am.St.Rep.,17530
S.E.858Stateexrel.Paynevs.Anderson[1921],43S.D.,630181N.W.,839Peoplevs.Brown,54Mich.,15
19N.W.,571Statesvs.Dalton[1903],109Tenn.,54472S.W.,456.)
Othercases,however,holdcontra.(Nixvs.James[1925C.C.A.,9th],7F.[2d],590Archervs.Snook[1926D.
C.],10F.[2d],567Riggs.vs.UnitedStates[1926C.C.A.4th],14])[2d],5Murphyvs.States[1926],171Ark.,
620286S.W.,87148A.L.R.,1189ReGiannini[1912],18Cal.App.,166122Pac.,831ReNachnaber[1928],
89Cal.App.,530265Pac.,392ExparteDeVoe[1931],114Cal.App.,730300Pac.,874Peoplevs.Patrick
[1897],118Cal.,33250Pac.,425Martinvs.People[1917],69Colo.,60168Pac.,1171Beldenvs.Hugo[1914],
88Conn.,5091A.,369,370,371Williamsvs.State[1926],162Ga.,327133S.E.,843Peoplevs.Heise[1913],
257Ill.,443100N.E.,1000Parkervs.State[1893],135Ind.,53435N.E.,17923L.R.A.,859St.Hillarie,
Petitioner[1906],101Me.,52264Atl.,882Peoplevs.Stickle[1909],156Mich.,557121N.W.,497Statevs.
Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529 State exrel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541 237 Pac., 525
Statevs.Everitt[1913],164N.C.,39979S.E.,27447L.R.A.[N.S.],848Stateexrel.Buckleyvs.Drew[1909],
75N.H.,40274Atl.,875Statevs.Osborne[1911],79N.J.Eq.,43082Atl.424ExparteBates[1915],20N.M.,
542L.R.A.,1916A.1285151Pac.,698Peoplevs.exrel.Forsythvs.CourtofSession[1894],141N.Y.,288
23L.R.A.,85636N.E.,38615Am.Crim.Rep.,675Peopleexrel.Sullivanvs.Flynn[1907],55Misc.,639106
N.Y.Supp.,928Peoplevs.Goodrich[1914],149N.Y.Supp.,406Moorevs.Thorn[1935],245App.Div.,180
281N.Y.Supp.,49ReHart[1914],29N.D.,38L.R.A.,1915C,1169149N.W.,568ExparteEaton[1925],29
Okla.,Crim.Rep.,275233P.,781Statevs.Teal[1918],108S.C.,45595S.E.,69Statevs.Abbot[1910],87S.
C.,46633L.R.A.,[N.S.],11270S.E.,6Ann.Cas.,1912B,1189Fultsvs.States[1854],34Tenn.,232Woods
vs.State[1814],130Tenn.,100169S.W.,558Bakervs.State[1814],130Tenn.,100169S.W.,558Bakervs.
State[1913],70Tex.,Crim.Rep.,618158S.W.,998Cookvs.State[1914],73Tex.Crim.Rep.,548165S.W.,
573Kingvs.State[1914],72Tex.Crim.Rep.,394162S.W.,890Clarevs.State[1932],122Tex.Crim.Rep.,
394162S.W.,890Clarevs.State[1932],122Tex.Crim.Rep.,21154S.W.[2d],127ReHall[1927],100Vt.,
197 136 A., 24 Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802 109 S.E., 460 State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash.,
287118Pac.,42Stateexrel.Tingstandvs.Starwich[1922],119Wash.,561206Pac.,2926A.L.R.,393396.)
Weelecttofollowthislongcatenaofauthoritiesholdingthatthecourtsmaybelegallyauthorizedbythelegislature
13/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
tosuspendsentencebytheestablishmentofasystemofprobationhowevercharacterized.Stateexrel.Tingstand
vs.Starwich([1922],119Wash.,561206Pac.,2926A.L.R.,393),deservedparticularmention.Inthatcase,a
statuteenactedin1921whichprovidedforthesuspensionoftheexecutionofasentenceuntilotherwiseorderedby
thecourt,andrequiredthattheconvictedpersonbeplacedunderthechargeofaparoleorpeaceofficerduringthe
termofsuchsuspension,onsuchtermsasthecourtmaydetermine,washeldconstitutionalandasnotgivingthe
court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the
state.(Vide,also,ReGiannini[1912],18CalApp.,166122Pac.,831.)
Probationandpardonarenotcoterminousnoraretheythesame.Theyareactuallydistrictanddifferentfromeach
other,bothinoriginandinnature.InPeopleexrel.Forsythvs.CourtofSessions([1894],141N.Y.,288,29436N.
E.,386,38823L.R.A.,85615Am.Crim.Rep.,675),theCourtofAppealsofNewYorksaid:
...Thepowertosuspendsentenceandthepowertograntreprievesandpardons,asunderstoodwhenthe
constitutionwasadopted,aretotallydistinctanddifferentintheirnature.Theformerwasalwaysapartofthe
judicial power the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
postponesthejudgmentofthecourttemporarilyorindefinitely,buttheconvictionandliabilityfollowingit,and
the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the
punishmentprescribedfortheoffenseandtheguiltoftheoffender.Itreleasesthepunishment,andblotsout
ofexistencetheguilt,sothatintheeyeofthelaw,theoffenderisasinnocentasifhehadnevercommitted
theoffense.Itremovesthepenaltiesanddisabilities,andrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrights.Itmakeshim,asit
were,anewman,andgiveshimanewcreditandcapacity.(ExparteGarland,71U.S.,4Wall.,33318Law.
ed.,366U.S.vs.Klein,80U.S.,13Wall.,12820Law.ed.,519Knotevs.U.S.,95U.S.,14924Law.
ed.,442.)
Theframersofthefederalandthestateconstitutionswereperfectlyfamiliarwiththeprinciplesgoverningthe
powertograntpardons,anditwasconferredbytheseinstrumentsupontheexecutivewithfullknowledgeof
the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly
exercisedbytheEnglishcrown,orbyitsrepresentativesinthecolonies.(ExparteWells,59U.S.,18How.,
30715Law.ed.,421.)Asthispowerwasunderstood,itdidnotcomprehendanypartofthejudicialfunctions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should
abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal
courtshassolongmaintained.Thetwopowers,sodistinctanddifferentintheirnatureandcharacter,were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial
department.Wethereforeconcludethatastatutewhich,interms,authorizescourtsofcriminaljurisdictionto
suspendsentenceincertaincasesafterconviction,apowerinherentinsuchcourtsatcommonlaw,which
wasunderstoodwhentheconstitutionwasadoptedtobeanordinaryjudicialfunction,andwhich,eversince
itsadoption,hasbeenexercisedoflegislativepowerundertheconstitution.Itdoesnotencroach,inanyjust
sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest
times.(QuotedwithapprovalinDirectorsofPrisonsvs.JudgeofFirstInstanceofCavite[1915],29Phil.,265,
Carson,J.,concurring,atpp.294,295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the
probationer'scaseisnotterminatedbythemerefactthatheisplacedonprobation.Section4oftheActprovides
thattheprobationmaybedefinitelyterminatedandtheprobationerfinallydischargedfromsupervisiononlyafterthe
periodofprobationshallhavebeenterminatedandtheprobationofficershallhavesubmittedareport,andthecourt
shallhavefoundthattheprobationerhascompliedwiththeconditionsofprobation.Theprobationer,then,during
theperiodofprobation,remainsinlegalcustodysubjecttothecontroloftheprobationofficerandofthecourt
and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committedtoprisontoservethesentenceoriginallyimposeduponhim.(Secs.2,3,5and6,ActNo.4221.)
Theprobationdescribedintheactisnotpardon.Itisnotcompleteliberty,andmaybefarfromit.Itisreallya
newmodeofpunishment,tobeappliedbythejudgeinapropercase,insubstitutionoftheimprisonmentand
find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other
sentencecarryingoutthelawdeemedapplicabletotheoffense.Theexecutiveactofpardon,onthecontrary,
isagainstthecriminallaw,whichbindsanddirectsthejudges,orratherisoutsideofandaboveit.Thereis
thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this
cause.(Archervs.Snook[1926],10F.[2d],567,569.)
Probationshouldalsobedistinguishedfromreprieveandfromcommutationofthesentence.Snodgrassvs.State
([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 61541 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the
petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been
vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the
courtsbymeansofprobationlawauthorizingtheindefinitejudicialsuspensionofsentence.Wehaveexaminedthat
caseandfoundthatalthoughtheCourtofCriminalAppealsofTexasheldthattheprobationstatuteofthestatein
termsconferredonthedistrictcourtsthepowertograntpardonstopersonsconvictedofcrime,italsodistinguished
14/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
betweensuspensionssentenceontheonehand,andreprieveandcommutationofsentenceontheother.Saidthe
court,throughHarper,J.:
ThatthepowertosuspendthesentencedoesnotconflictwiththepoweroftheGovernortograntreprievesis
settled by the decisions of the various courts it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a
suspensionofsentenceisthatareprievepostponestheexecutionofthesentencetoadaycertain,whereas
asuspensionisforanindefinitetime.(Carnalvs.People,1Parker,Cr.R.,262InreBuchanan,146N.Y.,
264 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in
conflictwiththepowerconfidingintheGovernortograntcommutationsofpunishment,foracommutationsis
notbuttochangethepunishmentassessedtoalesspunishment.
InStateexrel.Bottomnlyvs.DistrictCourt([1925],73Mont.,541237Pac.,525),theSupremeCourtofMontana
hadunderconsiderationthevalidityoftheadultprobationlawofthestateenactedin1913,nowfoundinsections
1207812086,RevisedCodesof1921.Thecourtheldthelawvalidasnotimpinginguponthepardoningpowerof
theexecutive.InaunanimousdecisionpennedbyJusticeHolloway,thecourtsaid:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our
Constitutionwasadopted,andnooneofthemwasintendedtocomprehendthesuspensionoftheexecution
of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 1207812086. A "pardon" is an act of grace,
proceedingfromthepowerintrustedwiththeexecutionofthelawswhichexemptstheindividualonwhomitis
bestowedfromthepunishmentthelawinflictsforacrimehehascommitted(UnitedStatesvs.Wilson,7Pet.,
1508Law.ed.,640)Itisaremissionofguilt(Statevs.Lewis,111La.,69335So.,816),aforgivenessof
theoffense(Cookvs.MiddlesexCounty,26N.J.Law,326ExpartePowell,73Ala.,51749Am.Rep.,71).
"Commutation"isaremissionofapartofthepunishmentasubstitutionofalesspenaltyfortheoneoriginally
imposed(Leevs.Murphy,22Grat.[Va.]78912Am.Rep.,563Richvs.Chamberlain,107Mich.,38165N.
W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's
Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a
temporarysuspensionofexecution(Butlervs.State,97Ind.,373).
Fewadjudicatedcasesaretobefoundinwhichthevalidityofastatutesimilartooursection12078hasbeen
determinedbutthesameobjectionshavebeenurgedagainstparolestatuteswhichvestthepowertoparole
inpersonsotherthanthosetowhomthepowerofpardonisgranted,andthesestatuteshavebeenupheld
quiteuniformly,asareferencetothenumerouscasescitedinthenotestoWoodsvs.State(130Tenn.,100
169S.W.,558,reportedinL.R.A.,1915F,531),willdisclose.(See,also,20R.C.L.,524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Lawhadneverbeenenacted.ThePresidentmayyetpardontheprobationerandthusplaceitbeyondthepowerof
thecourttoorderhisrearrestandimprisonment.(Riggsvs.UnitedStates[1926],
14F.[2d],5,7.)
2.But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that
reasonvoid,doessection11thereofconstitute,ascontended,anunduedelegationoflegislativepower?
Undertheconstitutionalsystem,thepowersofgovernmentaredistributedamongthreecoordinateandsubstantially
independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government
derivesitsauthorityfromtheConstitutionwhich,inturn,isthehighestexpressionofpopularwill.Eachhasexclusive
cognizanceofthematterswithinitsjurisdiction,andissupremewithinitsownsphere.
ThepowertomakelawsthelegislativepowerisvestedinabicameralLegislaturebytheJonesLaw(sec.12)
and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
powertoanyotherbodyorauthority.Anyattempttoabdicatethepowerisunconstitutionalandvoid,ontheprinciple
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was
establishedbyLordCokeintheEnglishpubliclawindecisionsforbiddingthedelegationofjudicialpower,andfound
itswayintoAmericaasanenlightenedprincipleoffreegovernment.Ithassincebecomeanacceptedcorollaryof
theprincipleofseparationofpowers.(5Encyc.oftheSocialSciences,p.66.)Theclassicstatementoftheruleis
thatofLocke,namely:"Thelegislativeneithermustnorcantransferthepowerofmakinglawstoanybodyelse,or
placeitanywherebutwherethepeoplehave."(LockeonCivilGovernment,sec.142.)JudgeCooleyenunciatesthe
doctrine in the following oftquoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferreduponthelegislaturetomakelawscannotbedelegatedbythatdepartmenttoanyotherbodyorauthority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain and by the constitutional
agencyalonethelawsmustbemadeuntiltheConstitutionitselfischarged.Thepowertowhosejudgment,wisdom,
andpatriotismthishighprerogativehasbeenintrustedcannotrelieveitselfoftheresponsibilitiesbychoosingother
agenciesuponwhichthepowershallbedevolved,norcanitsubstitutethejudgment,wisdom,andpatriotismofany
other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on
15/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
ConstitutionalLimitations,8thed.,Vol.I,p.224.QuotedwithapprovalinU.S.vs.Barrias[1908],11Phil.,327.)This
courtpositsthedoctrine"ontheethicalprinciplethatsuchadelegatedpowerconstitutesnotonlyarightbutaduty
tobeperformedbythedelegatebytheinstrumentalityofhisownjudgmentactingimmediatelyuponthematterof
legislationandnotthroughtheinterveningmindofanother.(U.S.vs.Barrias,supra,atp.330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislativepowerstolocalauthorities.(Rubivs.ProvincialBoardofMindoro[1919],39Phil.,660U.S.vs.Salaveria
[1918],39Phil.,102Stoutenburghvs.Hennick[1889],129U.S.,14132Law.ed.,6379Sup.Ct.Rep.,256State
vs.Noyes[1855],30N.H.,279.)"Itisacardinalprincipleofoursystemofgovernment,thatlocalaffairsshallbe
managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities and hence while the rule is also
fundamentalthatthepowertomakelawscannotbedelegated,thecreationofthemunicipalitiesexercisinglocalself
governmenthasneverbeenheldtotrenchuponthatrule.Suchlegislationisnotregardedasatransferofgeneral
legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial
practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick,
supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territoriesoftheUnitedStatesasitmayselect.AterritorystandsinthesamerelationtoCongressasamunicipality
orcitytothestategovernment.(UnitedStatesvs.Heinszen[1907],206U.S.,37027Sup.Ct.Rep.,74251L.ed.,
109811Ann.Cas.,688Dorrvs.UnitedStates[1904],195U.S.,13824Sup.Ct.Rep.,80849Law.ed.,1281
Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authoritiesmaintainthatthismaynotbedone(12C.J.,pp.841,8426R.C.L.,p.164,citingPeoplevs.Kennedy
[1913],207N.Y.,533101N.E.,442Ann.Cas.,1914C,616).However,thequestionofwhetherornotastatehas
ceasedtoberepublicaninformbecauseofitsadoptionoftheinitiativeandreferendumhasbeenheldnottobea
judicialbutapoliticalquestion(PacificStatesTel.&Tel.Co.vs.Oregon[1912],223U.S.,11856Law.ed.,37732
Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressivecourts,thestingofthedecisionsofthemoreconservativecourtshasbeenprettywelldrawn.(Opinions
oftheJustices[1894],160Mass.,58636N.E.,48823L.R.A.,113Kiernanvs.Portland[1910],57Ore.,454
111Pac.,3791132Pac.,40237L.R.A.[N.S.],332PacificStatesTel.&Tel.Co.vs.Oregon,supra.)Doubtless,
also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the
ConstitutionofthePhilippinesprovidesthat"TheNationalAssemblymaybylawauthorizethePresident,subjectto
suchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tofixwithinspecifiedlimits,tariffrates,importorexportquotas,
andtonnageandwharfagedues."Andsection16ofthesamearticleoftheConstitutionprovidesthat"Intimesof
warorothernationalemergency,theNationalAssemblymaybylawauthorizethePresident,foralimitedperiodand
subjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribed,topromulgaterulesandregulationstocarryoutadeclarednational
policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing
constitutionalprovisions,thePresidentcouldbeauthorizedtoexercisethepowerstherebyvestedinhim.Uponthe
otherhand,whateverdoubtmayhaveexistedhasbeenremovedbytheConstitutionitself.
Thecasebeforeusdoesnotfallunderanyoftheexceptionshereinabovementioned.
ThechallengedsectionofActNo.4221insection11whichreadsasfollows:
ThisActshallapplyonlyinthoseprovincesinwhichtherespectiveprovincialboardshaveprovidedforthe
salaryofaprobationofficeratratesnotlowerthanthosenowprovidedforprovincialfiscals.Saidprobation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office.(Emphasisours.)
Intestingwhetherastatuteconstituteanunduedelegationoflegislativepowerornot,itisusualtoinquirewhether
thestatutewascompleteinallitstermsandprovisionswhenitleftthehandsofthelegislaturesothatnothingwas
lefttothejudgmentofanyotherappointeeordelegateofthelegislature.(6R.C.L.,p.165.)IntheUnitedStatesvs.
AngTangHo([1922],43Phil.,1),thiscourtadheredtotheforegoingrulewhenitheldanactofthelegislaturevoid
insofarasitundertooktoauthorizetheGovernorGeneral,inhisdiscretion,toissueaproclamationfixingtheprice
of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compaia General de
Tabacosvs.BoardofPublicUtilityCommissioners[1916],34Phil.,136.)Thegeneralrule,however,islimitedby
anotherrulethattoacertainextentmattersofdetailmaybelefttobefilledinbyrulesandregulationstobeadopted
orpromulgatedbyexecutiveofficersandadministrativeboards.(6R.C.L.,pp.177179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with
powertodeterminewhentheActshouldtakeeffectintheirrespectiveprovinces.Theyaretheagentsordelegates
ofthelegislatureinthisrespect.Therulesgoverningdelegationoflegislativepowertoadministrativeandexecutive
officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a
varietyofcasesondelegationofpowertoadministrativebodieswillshowthattheratiodecidendiisatvariancebut,
itcanbebroadlyassertedthattherationalerevolvesaroundthepresenceorabsenceofastandardorruleofaction
orthesufficiencythereofinthestatute,toaidthedelegateinexercisingthegranteddiscretion.Insomecases,
itisheldthatthestandardissufficientinothersthatisinsufficientandinstillothersthatitisentirelylacking.Asa
rule,anactofthelegislatureisincompleteandhenceinvalidifitdoesnotlaydownanyruleordefinitestandardby
16/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
whichtheadministrativeofficerorboardmaybeguidedintheexerciseofthediscretionarypowersdelegatedtoit.
(See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495 79 L. ed., 1570 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837 97 A.L.R., 947
Peopleexrel.Ricevs.WilsonOilCo.[1936],364Ill.,4064N.E.[2d],847107A.L.R.,1500andcasescited.See
alsoR.C.L.,title"ConstitutionalLaw",sec174.)Inthecaseatbar,whatrulesaretoguidetheprovincialboardsin
theexerciseoftheirdiscretionarypowertodeterminewhetherornottheProbationActshallapplyintheirrespective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents.TheprobationActdoesnot,bytheforceofanyofitsprovisions,fixandimposeupontheprovincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the
language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the
provincialboardstoexercisearbitrarydiscretion.Bysection11iftheAct,thelegislaturedoesnotseeminglyonits
ownauthorityextendthebenefitsoftheProbationActtotheprovincesbutinrealityleavestheentirematterforthe
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability
andapplicationoftheProbationActareentirelyplacedinthehandsoftheprovincialboards.Iftheprovincialboard
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation.This,toourminds,isavirtualsurrenderoflegislativepowertotheprovincialboards.
"Thetruedistinction",saysJudgeRanney,"isbetweenthedelegationofpowertomakethelaw,whichnecessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercisedunderandinpursuanceofthelaw.Thefirstcannotbedonetothelatternovalidobjectioncanbemade."
(Cincinnati,W.&Z.R.Co.vs.ClintonCountyComrs.[1852]1OhioSt.,77,88.Seealso,SutherlandonStatutory
Construction,sec68.)TothesameeffectarethedecisionofthiscourtinMunicipalityofCardonavs.Municipalityof
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547) Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs.
Youngberg([1931],56Phil.,234).Inthefirstofthesecases,thiscourtsustainedthevalidityofthelawconferring
upontheGovernorGeneralauthoritytoadjustprovincialandmunicipalboundaries.Inthesecondcase,thiscourt
helditlawfulforthelegislaturetodirectnonChristianinhabitantstotakeuptheirhabitationonunoccupiedlandsto
beselectedbytheprovincialgovernorandapprovedbytheprovincialboard.Inthethirdcase,itwasheldproperfor
thelegislaturetovestintheGovernorGeneralauthoritytosuspendornot,athisdiscretion,theprohibitionofthe
importationoftheforeigncattle,suchprohibitiontoberaised"iftheconditionsofthecountrymakethisadvisableor
ifdeceasedamongforeigncattlehasceasedtobeamenacetotheagricultureandlivestockofthelands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of
executionorthepromulgationbyexecutiveoradministrativeofficialsofrulesandregulationstocarryintoeffectthe
provisionsofalaw.Ifwewere,recurrencetoourowndecisionswouldbesufficient.(U.S.vs.Barrias[1908],11
Phil.,327U.S.vs.Molina[1914],29Phil.,119Alegrevs.CollectorofCustoms[1929],53Phil.,394CebuAutobus
Co.vs.DeJesus[1931],56Phil.,446U.S.vs.Gomez[1915],31Phil.,218Rubivs.ProvincialBoardofMindoro
[1919],39Phil.,660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature.Itistruethatlawsmaybemadeeffectiveoncertaincontingencies,asbyproclamationoftheexecutive
ortheadoptionbythepeopleofaparticularcommunity(6R.C.L.,116,170172Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations,
8thed.,Vol.I,p.227).InWaymanvs.Southard([1825],10Wheat.16Law.ed.,253),theSupremeCourtofthe
United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63 65 N. W., 738 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to
ascertainfactsissuchapowerwhichmaybedelegated.Thereisnothingessentiallylegislativeinascertainingthe
existenceoffactsorconditionsasthebasisofthetakingintoeffectofalaw.Thatisamentalprocesscommontoall
branchesofthegovernment.(Dowlingvs.LancashireIns.Co.,supraInreVillageofNorthMilwaukee[1896],93
Wis., 616 97 N.W., 1033 33 L.R.A., 938 Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120 108 N.W., 210 Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U.S., 649 12 Sup. Ct., 495 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to
relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX Laski, "The
Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569579 Beard, "SquirtGun Politics", in
Harper'sMonthlyMagazine,July,1930,Vol.CLXI,pp.147,152),theorthodoxpronouncementofJudgeCooleyin
his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the
UnitedStatesinthefollowinglanguagespeakingofdeclarationoflegislativepowertoadministrativeagencies:
"The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this
authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature.Inotherwords,thelegislature,asititsdutytodo,determinesthat,undergivencircumstances,certain
executiveoradministrativeactionistobetaken,andthat,underothercircumstances,differentofnoactionatallis
tobetaken.Whatisthuslefttotheadministrativeofficialisnotthelegislativedeterminationofwhatpublicpolicy
demands,butsimplytheascertainmentofwhatthefactsofthecaserequiretobedoneaccordingtothetermsof
thelawbywhichheisgoverned."(WilloughbyontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,2nded.,Vol.II,p.1637.)In
Millervs.Mayer,etc.,ofNewYork[1883],109U.S.,3Sup.Ct.Rep.,22827Law.ed.,971,974),itwassaid:"The
efficiencyofanActasadeclarationoflegislativewillmust,ofcourse,comefromCongress,buttheascertainmentof
17/18
1/8/2016
G.R.No.L45685
thecontingencyuponwhichtheActshalltakeeffectmaybelefttosuchagenciesasitmaydesignate."(See,also,
12C.J.,p.864Statevs.Parker[1854],26Vt.,357Blandingvs.Burr[1859],13Cal.,343,258.)Thelegislature,
then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the
specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
ProhibitionActcontingentuponspecifiedfactsorconditionstobeascertainedbytheprovincialboard.Itleaves,as
we have already said, the entire operation or nonoperation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion
vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find
anyfact,orawaitthehappeningofanyspecifiedcontingency.Itisboundbynorule,limitedbynoprincipleof
expendiencyannouncedbythelegislature.Itmaytakeintoconsiderationcertainfactsorconditionsand,again,it
maynot.Itmayhaveanypurposeornopurposeatall.Itneednotgiveanyreasonwhatsoeverforrefusingorfailing
toappropriateanyfundsforthesalaryofaprobationofficer.Thisisamatterwhichrestentirelyatitspleasure.The
factthatatsomefuturetimewecannotsaywhentheprovincialboardsmayappropriatefundsforthesalaries
ofprobationofficersandthusputthelawintooperationinthevariousprovinceswillnotsavethestatute.Thetimeof
itstakingintoeffect,wereiterate,wouldyetbebasedsolelyuponthewilloftheprovincialboardsandnotuponthe
happeningofacertainspecifiedcontingency,orupontheascertainmentofcertainfactsorconditionsbyapersonor
bodyotherthanlegislatureitself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the
ProbationLawintheirrespectiveprovinces.Insomejurisdiction,constitutionsprovidedthatlawsmaybesuspended
onlybythelegislatureorbyitsauthority.Thus,section28,articleIoftheConstitutionofTexasprovidesthat"No
powerofsuspendinglawsinthisstateshallbeexercisedexceptbythelegislature"andsection26,articleIofthe
ConstitutionofIndianaprovides"Thattheoperationofthelawsshallneverbesuspended,exceptbyauthorityofthe
General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the
legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a
law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs.
James([1814],11Mass.,3966Am.Dec.,174,177,178),itwassaid:
Bythetwentietharticleofthedeclarationofrightsintheconstitutionofthiscommonwealth,itisdeclaredthat
the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the
legislature,orbyauthorityderivedfromit,tobeexercisedinsuchparticularcasesonlyasthelegislatureshall
expresslyprovidefor.ManyofthearticlesinthatdeclarationofrightswereadoptedfromtheMagnaChartaof
England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an
enumerationoftheoppressiveactsofJamesII,tendingtosubvertandextirpatetheprotestantreligion,and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of
dispensingwithandsuspendingthelaws,andtheexecutionofthelawswithoutconsentofparliament.The
firstarticleintheclaimordeclarationofrightscontainedinthestatuteis,thattheexerciseofsuchpower,by
legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further
declaredandenacted,that"Nodispensationbynonobstanteofortoanystatute,orpartthereof,shouldbe
allowed but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute."Thereisanimpliedreservationofauthorityintheparliamenttoexercisethepowerherementioned
because,accordingtothetheoryoftheEnglishConstitution,"thatabsolutedespoticpower,whichmustinall
governmentsresidesomewhere,"isintrustedtotheparliament:1Bl.Com.,160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute
powerresidesinthepeopleandthelegislaturecanonlyexercisewhatisdelegatedtothemaccordingtothe
constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the
subject,andsubversiveofhisrighttoprotection,"accordingtostandinglaws,"whetherexercisedbyoneman
orbyanumberofmen.Itcannotbesupposedthatthepeoplewhenadoptingthisgeneralprinciplefromthe
Englishbillofrightsandinsertingitinourconstitution,intendedtobestowbyimplicationonthegeneralcourt
oneofthemostodiousandoppressiveprerogativesoftheancientkingsofEngland.Itismanifestlycontrary
tothefirstprinciplesofcivillibertyandnaturaljustice,andtothespiritofourconstitutionandlaws,thatany
onecitizenshouldenjoyprivilegesandadvantageswhicharedeniedtoallothersunderlikecircumstances
or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstancesareexempted.
Toillustratetheprinciple:Asectionofastatuterelativetodogsmadetheownerofanydogliabletotheownerof
domestica
18/18

Supreme Court Reviews Probation Application for Bank Fraud Conviction

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Supreme Court Reviews Probation Application for Bank Fraud Conviction

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1/8/2016

You might also like