IO FREE EUROPE a COMMUNIST AREA YUGOSLAVIA: Internal « Affairs 12 July 1966 YUGOSLAVIA: BEFORE AND APTER THE PURGE OF ew ALSKSANDAR RANKOVIC - PART IT mary: The July 1 purge of Tito's deputy Aleksandar Yankovic and the chief of the State Security Service, Svetislav Stefanovic, in general, has deep ideological aspects and, in particular, has special Yugoslav nationality aspects. Combined, these two aspects make the current developments in Yugoslavia very complex. The State Security Service [SSS] was long ago allotted the task of protecting the regime from outside dangers (notably against Stalin's followers in the country) and, at one and the same time, it provided a guarantee that the "withering away" of the state and the Party would not proceed too hastily. With outside dangers diminishing, the SSS con- centrated its activities against the liberalization, imbued with ever increasing tensions among the individual nationalities of the country. Thus the sabotage of the Vy liberal reforms actually was a reflection of the struggle between Communist leaders belonging to various nationalities. The liberals were not able to take measures against Rankovic and his group until they made possible the formation of a parliament and adoption of a liberal Constitution. This, in turn, made necessary the adoption of radical economic reforms whose implementation started the dogmatic group shaking in their boots. Only after having achieved all this were ihe liberals able to stage their biggest coup: the removal of Rankovic and his dogmatic group from‘ the Party apparatus and the State Security Service. This, however, does not mean that everything in the future will go smoothly. Many obstacles have yet to be overcome. Like the readers of an exciting detective story in which every new chapter offers unexpected turning points, observers both inside and outside Yugoslavia are waiting impatiently to find out who will be the next victim in the purging process begun on July 1 with the removal of Tito's deputy, Aleksandar Rankovic, and theoperational, chief of the State Security Service, Svetislav Stefanovic, It goes almost without saying that the secret police forces will suffer most of all from Tito's anger, Wo mercy will be shown them. This is clearly seen from thousands of meetings organized all over the country to explain to Party members the real meening of the Fourth Plenum held on the island of Brioni on July land 2. Two days after Rankovic and Stefanovic were purged, "a high functionary" of the State Security Service [SSS] took the floor at the July 3 evening Party meeting of the Beicrade branch of the State Security Service. He was one of the participants in the discussion initiated by Milos Minic, © member of the Yugoslav Central Committee from Serbia and Yugoslavie's chief Planner, who informed his listeners about the Fourth Plenun. After having listened to Minic'’s demand that_"all people who were responsible [for the mistakes committed] have to be purged from the Party and State Security Service,"2 the unnemee S88 "high functionary" agreed completely with the Fourth Flenum decisions and heppily stated that "the Coununists in the SSS will finally be able to start thinking freely and talking openly." After him, binic, took the floor agein and said: What I wanted to cay, comrades; is that we should €0 to the very end in clarifying matters. It will not be easy. Peware of hypocrites. They will soon try to agree with all decisions, in an effort to hushup their responsibility. You should stic to principles firmly ana be uncompromising in clarifying matters in your service. Perhaps I will be meicing a mistake if I let you lnow something for which T should bear the responsibility nyself. I wished the gomrede who just spoke had also acted in this manner in his service, or some 15 days ago, curing the work of the [Investigating] Commission, ‘He end his nistakes were discussed at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Jommittee. He should have told you all about this now, but he kept it from you. This is hypocrisy.3 The best of all is that Wilos Minic, too, has long been know as a dognatically-minded Commmist leader! He is now the accuser. For how long? "Withering Away" of the Farty in a Nulti-Netional State Even though all these and many other details about the current and forthcoming purges are of great importance, it would be wrong to make them the focal point of 211 considerations when discussing 1) See Pert I of Bacl After the Purge o. 2) K 3) Ibia. ound Informetion Yi ankovie, slavia, "Before and July 1966, by s.s. st, Belgrade, 7 July 1966.aS future developments in Communist Yugoslavia. For all these purges, for the present being chiefly carried out in the State Security Service, have both a long ideological background in general, and a Yugoslav national ty aspect in particular The latter has tre~ mendously confused the already complicated former aspect. Ideologi- cally speaking, the dilemma which has been faced by the Yugoslav Party for at least the past 10 years, has been reflected in the “fateful choice between the [Party] monopoly and the demonopolized [i.e., liberal] practice; this choice,: generally speaking, can be reduced to the choice between the rule of the Party and the rule of the system of the workers’ self-management."4 The problem in itself would have been difficult to solve even if the special Yugoslav nationality aspect of it did not exist Inner contradictions have accompanied the Communist Party in oe Yugoslavia from the day it assumed power and started enjoying the accompanying privileges. Belgrade professor Svetozar Stojanovic is therefore quite correct in claiming that no ruling Communist Party has been capable of solving the following ethical paradox: The [Party] organization has e totally privileged position in society, while it can fulfill its historical mission only if its members are not motivated by this [privileged] position, but rather by its Chess the Party's] historical aims and ideals." And since the above-mentioned "historical aims and ideals" in Yugoslavia have intermingled with the narrow-minded nationalistic feelings of individual nationalities, the Party and its ideology had not surprisingly turned into an instrument controlled by the State Security Service at whose head were the members chiefly of only one nationality. > w@ With the Party passing through a process of liberalization and "withering away," because of which it has not been capable of remaining (as in the war years) a unifying force relying on the ideas of proletarian internationalism, it became apparent that at least onc *Sraatzation, notably the State Security Service, was performing this unifying task effectively. Not only had the SSS protected the regime and state from outside dangers (Rankovic's role in the liquidation of Stalinist followers in Yugoslavia was enormous) but, what is more important, the State Security Service had become the main obstacle insuring that the state and the Party would not "wither away" for the foreseeable future. It wes precisely the State Security Service which was allotted the task of watching to 4) Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, "Norality of the Revolutionary Avant-Garde as a Historical Presupposition of Socialism,” Praxis, Zagreb, No. 1, January/February 1966, p. 72. 5) Ibid.see that liberal theories were not too hastily turned into practice.§ If today Rankovic and his State Security Service stand accused of "misusing this power," this means that they are accused ‘of something which they were expected to do, of course under Party control. Nankovic's position of the chief of Party cadres and head of the police, was once considered as the ideal combination for protecting the regime. He failed in this after havi created “our version of Stalinism...using conspiratorial methods"? in an effort to stop withering eway of the state and the Party. If the Party, as Professor Stojanovic asserts, has assumed "a highly privileged position" within society, the State Security Service and Rankovic assumed an even more privileged position within the Party, threatening to destroy the very revolution they were given the task of protecting. Here is how Professor Stojanovic explains this process: The armed socialist revolution is ethically based on the admission that, in a world of violence, sometimes nothing can help but violence. However, so long as it represents [a victory of] violence over violence, ethically everything is all right with an armed revolution...But subsequently a Pevolutionary has again and again to ask himself: Firstly, whether he is making efforte to use violence only to that extent to which it is really inescapable? Secondly, whether he is aware that, regardless of the fact’ of how carefully violence is being used and regardless of the fact that the use of violence is sometimes necessary for the Yealization of humanistic values, violence carries within itself the ethical enares of the revolution? And thirdly, against whom violence is used. Without this self-control, revolutionary violence can turn into egocentric and sadistic terrorism. Somebody has correctly written: "The transition from one stage of violence into a higher stage is imperceptible, and afterwards if is extremely difficult to make a step backwards. " 6) Nearly 10 years ago, on 18 December 1956, Moscow Pravda attacked Bavard Kardelj for his preaching of the "withering away of the state." Seid Pravda: "In passing, one may ask this question: Is Kardelj really as ardent a protagonist of the withering away of ‘the state and as strong an opponent of dictatorship as he proclaims himself to be? One has not heard so far that the army has withered away in Yugoslavie, or that tribunals and the Police have vanished!" 7) Stated by Politburo member and leader of the Slovenian Communists, lWiha Werinko, according to Borba of 9 July 1966. 8) Stojenovic, pp. 75-76.soem TT SS TT RL Only now is it clear that the Belgrade professor had Rankovic and his group in mind. Because of this he was attacked, even by Tito, at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee on February 25 of this year. Zdvard Kardelj, for his part, does not believe that various social deformations must necessarily lead to the defeat of socialism. unless "wrong historical positions" are adopted. In his recent study, entitled "Notes on Our Social Criticism," Kardelj gaid that "the battle is not lost" if people have surrendered for the moment "to the pressure from the prevailing conservative mentality. He then continued? Por, despite’ thé tortuous paths it follows, soctal progréss is not halted by various social ations or obétacles of 4 subjective natu battle fought from wro? historica (imphasis supplied] ule by Lew Renkevie's ouster came as alate quid pro quo for Djiles' purge 12 years ago. The question is whether a real balance hae been struck? Tor, although Tito decisively rejected any idea that he is becoming a liberal Communist orithat Djilas' ideas could ever win the upper hand in Yugoslavia, actually it is Djitesisw which hus defeated Renkovicism.. And Djilasism essentially. involves rule by law, constitutionality..-Rankovic and his group were able to slow down liberalization, not because of their ow real strength all over: Yugoslavia (they, obviously did not ‘sudceed in infiltrating the individual netional branches of the ‘State Security Service, ' especially in Croatia and Slovenia) but rather because of the support they were given by Tito and even by ‘the liberal leaders. This may sound contradictory, tut it is true. The fear nursed by Kardelj and Bakaric in 1961 and 1962 that their liberal ideas might bring about loss of control over the state (with no compensating control over the Party which was in the hands of Hankovic) prevented them from, as Tito put it, pursuing their views to the very end. What they first needed was a Parliament : which the deputies would not be puppets, but rather real repre— sentatives of the people (and to achieve this they needed a reformed electoral system); secondly, they needed a new constitution, approved by such a parliament; and thirdly they needed an economic reform based on economic Jews. Only after all this were accom plished. could they have made the attempt to seize control over the 9) Kardelj's study was published in the Yugoslay Central Committee monthly Socijalizem (the issues of September, October and December 1965). The vencdiuding part of Kerdeli's study was published in the Belgrade quarterly Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 21, January-March 1966. Kardelj's study was recently published in Warsaw in Polish (see Trybuna Ludu, 5 July 1966).Perty apparatus, too. Having gotten Tito on their side, and having split the Serbian Conmunist apperatus, on July lst they finally succeeded in bringing off their biggest coup: political decapitation of the head of the State Security Service apparatus while. themselves taking over the Party epparatus. What is to come now? First of all, the Party apparatus is far from having been completely taken out of the hands of Rankovic's followers. This is 2 long process. The liberals will need an extraordinary congress to implement their ideas and will need a new State Security Service to protect themselves from any surprise to come after Tito's death. This is why, in spite of Tito's promises that the current purges will be "humane"’in essence, the purges to come will be rather merciless. On the other hand, the liberals have to proceed gradually, especially because of the very sensitive nationality problem and Rankovic's following among the Serbs. This is true not because of his dogmatic ideas but simply because he is a Serb and one who presented himself es a "protector of Serbian national interests.” Actuelly he did not deserve such credit or at least not to the extent many Serbs have believed. The Croat and Slovenian liberal Conmunist leaders have, therefore, to insist on three main points: a) on complete respect for Yugoslavia's Constitution and law; b) on a confederative manner of government; and c) ona delegation of authority to individual organizations such as the Socialist Alliance, Trade Unions, ‘orkers' Councils, etc. will place the accent ever more on the Federal tiational Assembly in Belgrade, but still more on the republican assemblies, which will strengthen the confederalization of the country. In giving greater rights to the Socialist Alliance and Trade Unions, they will ibute much to a real "withering away" of the Party, whose role ie supposed finally to be reduced to that of an educational force, and to the de-profeesionalization of the Party apparatus which Rankovic tried to use for his own purposes. | | | In demanding full respect for the Constitution and law, they The process is seen as a long one, although the liberals have to do their utmost to achieve as much as possible while Tito | is still alive. Only with his support can they hope to swing | things in the direction they want. But this does not mean that the précess envisaged and begun by the liberals will be easy and without obstacles, Obstruction may come from outside (from the Soviet Union and fron its loyal allies) and from within from thei ye “okie very liberal group itself which has its own extreme right wing. This is why the purges will certainly be steered in this direction and may bring about unforeseeable difficulties in a society becoming relatively freer day by day and in a Party whose reorganization is going to teke place amidst increasing tensions among the individual nationalities composing the country. Thig ie why we are going to hear much more of Yugoslavia and ite leaders in the future. Much more will be heard, too, of far- Teaching changes which could not be stopped even if Tito should wish to do 90, and which eventually cannot but exert a major influence on other’ Communist countries. Slobodan Stankovic