RAJESH UPRETY

Presenting
Author Photo

Present Affiliation

OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE

Academic Qualification

B.TECH (MECHANICAL), PGDBM (Specialization in

Marketing)

Area of Specialization

PIPE AND COATING

Achievements / Awards

INSTRUMENTAL IN INTRODUCING DUAL FBE

COATING IN INDIA

Authors

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

PIGGABLE & NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES

FOR

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

OBJECTIVES OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE:
TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINES.
AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY,
PROTECT ENVIRONMENT AND
ENSURE CONTINUOUS AVAILABILITY OF PIPELINE FOR TRANSPORTATION
WITHOUT INTERRUPTIONS, THEREBY MINIMIZING THE BUSINESS RISKS AND
THROUGHPUT LOSS.

PIPE TRIANGLE

PIPE

PLEASURE

PAIN
3

TOTAL PIPELINE NETWORK IN INDIA

PIGGABLE PIPELINE

: 40,000 KM

NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINE : 5000 KM

(EXCLUDING GAS/ OIL FLOW LINES)

SUB-SEA SPM LINES (SINGLE LINES)

4

Onsite Incidents Trend last three years

Number of Onsite Incidents

2011-12
80

2012-13

70

2013-14
2014-15 (till date)

60
50
40
30
20
2014-15 (till date)

10

2013-14
0

2012-13

Ref &
GPP

PL

MO

2011-12

E& P

Total

Fatalities in Onsite Incidents - Trend

2011-12
45

2012-13

Number of Fatalities

40
35

2013-14

30

2014-15 (till date)

25
20
15
10

2014-15 (till
2013-14

2012-13

Ref & GPP

PL

2011-12

MO

E& P

* Ref & GPPs : 28 Fatalities in a single Incident in 2013-14

** Marketing Operations (MO): 05 Fatalities in a single incident in 2012-13

*** E&P: three children drowned at well site in 2013-14

PIPELINE INTEGRITY
EXAMPLE :
TWO CASES OF SEAM FAILURE IN A
CRUDE PL WITHIN 18 YEARS OF SERVICE
(SURGE ANALYSIS, HYDRAULICS, LDS,
VALVES, WT)
EXAMPLE :
FLASH FIRE DURING
GRINDING OPERN AT
NIGHT IN A TANK FARM
(MISSING BOUNDARY
PILLARS/TP/TLP,
SOP, ESD, CP
MONITORING,
COATING SUEVEY)

EXAMPLE :
FIRE & EXPLOSION IN A
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
LEADING TO MULTIPLE
FATALTIES (PIGGING,
COATING)

CATAGORIES OF PIGGABLE/ NONPIGGABLE LINES

FROM PIGGING POINT OF VIEW THERE ARE FOUR CATAGORIES
OF PIPELINES :
1. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH REGULAR CLEANING PIGGING
IS CARRIED OUT.
2. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH CLEANING PIGGING IS NOT
CARRIED OUT.
3. NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES SUCH AS WELL FLOW LINES/
JETTY LINES.
4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP.

BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE

PIPELINES(PIGGING DONE REGULARLY)
1. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH REGULAR CLEANING PIGGING
IS CARRIED OUT.

PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS IS NOT CARRIED OUT REGULARLY.

PROPER STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IS NOT CARRIED OUT TO

ESTABLISH TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION.

BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE

PIPELINES(PIGGING NOT DONE REGULARLY)
2. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH CLEANING PIGGING IS NOT
CARRIED OUT.

BASIC DETAILS ABOUT THE HEALTH OF THE PIPELINE

ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

PRIODICITY FOR MAINTENANCE IS NOT FOLLOWED OR

IGNORED.

SINCE COMMISSIONING PROPER CLEANING PIGGING HAS

NOT BEEN DONE. HIGH APPREHENSION OF CONDENSATE
AND WAX DEPOSITION CANNOT BE OVER RULED.

BASIC CONCERN FOR NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES

3. NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES SUCH AS FLOW LINES/ JETTY
LINES.

THERE IS NO FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON THESE PIPELINES.

THERE IS NO CATHODIC PROTECTION

PIPELINES.

MONITIORING SYSTEM NOT IN PLACE IN LINE WITH OISD-GDN-233.

IN SOME PIPELINES IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT EVEN CORROSION

PROBES/ COUPONS ARE NOT USED.

FOR SOME UNDERGROUND

CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL

CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES
4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP.

FIT FOR PURPOSE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS CONDITIONS IS

NOT A SOLUTION.

AWARENESS ABOUT VARIOUS TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE

FOR ASSESSING INTERNAL CORROSION SUCH AS DIRECT
ASSESSMENT.

EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF PIGGING THE LINE BY USING

MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING THE LINE TO A

PIGGABLE LINE.

CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL

CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES
THREATS IN LACK OF PIGGING

IT MAY RESULT IN HEAVY DEPOSITION OF WAX IN CASE

OF CRUDE PIPELINES.

IT MAY RESULT IN DEPOSITION OF CONDENSATE IN CASE

OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, WHICH MAY SPEED UP
INTERNAL CORROSION RATE.

OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233
a) INSPECTION
PROCEDURE
FOR
CROSS-COUNTRY
PIPELINES :
i. INTERNAL INSPECTION
ii. PRESSURE TESTING SUCH AS HYDROTESTING
iii. COMBINATION OF i) & ii)

b) INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES

:
i. EXTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT
(ECDA)
ii. INTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT
(ICDA)
iii.STRESS CORROSION CRACKING DIRECT ASSESSMENT
(SCCDA)

OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233

c) INTERNAL CORROSION :
a) EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CORROSION
MITIGATION
MEASURES SHOULD BE CHECKED ONCE IN SIX
MONTHS BY ANALYSING CORROSION COUPON.
b) ER PROBES/ ECN PROBES/ LPR (LINEAR POLARISATION
TECHNIQUE) PROBES SHOULD BE INSTALLED.
c) IF RATE OF INTERNAL CORROSION IS > 1 mpy,
CORROSION INHIBITOR SHALL BE USED.
d) WHENEVER REPLACEMENT OF PIPELINE IS CARRIED
OUT, INTERNAL VISUAL INSPECTION SHALL BE
CARRIED OUT.

OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233
d)

STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (SCC) :

a) PRESENCE OF H2S CAN LEAD TO SERIOUS SULPHIDE
STRESS CRACKING OF STEELS, WHICH CAUSES
STEPWISE CRACKING IN STEEL. ITS MITIGATION CAN
BE DONE IN TWO WAYS BY INJECTING CHEMICAL
INHIBITORS & BY TREATING STEEL WITH CERTAIN
ALLOYING
ELEMENTS
&
CONTROLLING
ITS
HARDNESS.
B) SCC IS A SELECTIVE EXTERNAL CORROSION ATTACK
RESULTING FROM A COMBINATION OF DISBONDED
COATING,
TENSILE
STRESS,
AND
CERTAIN
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.

OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233
e)

PIPELINE DATA REQUIRED FOR DIRECT ASSESSMENT :

a) HISTORICAL DATA
b) PIPELINE MAPS & GEO DETAILS (DEPTH, LAND
PROFILE ETC.,)
c) BASIC TECHNICAL DATA SUCH AS PIPE DIA,
WT,GRADE, FLOW RATE, DESIGN PRESSURE, COATING
TYPE, CP PARAMETERS ETC.,
d) PRESENCE OF LIQUID WATER
e) PRESENCE OF H2S, CO2 OR O2.
f) CORROSION MONITORING DATA INCLUDING TYPE OF
MONITORING (E.G., COUPONS, ELECTRIC RESISTANCE
ETC.,)
g) PIPELINE SURVEY DATA : SOIL RESISTIVITY DATA,
COATING SURVEY DATA

OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233

f) DIRECT ASSESSMENT (DA) METHOD

g) INSPECTION
PROCEDURE
FOR
PIPELINE
HAVING
EXTERNAL
COATING
BUT
WITHOUT
CATHODIC
PROTECTION SYSTEM (IMPRESSED CURRENT BASED OR
SACRIFICIAL CURRENT BASED).
h) INSPECTION
PROCEDURE
FOR
PIPELINE
HAVING
EXTERNAL COATING BUT WITH CATHODIC PROTECTION
SYSTEM (IMPRESSED CURRENT BASED OR SACRIFICIAL
CURRENT BASED).

i) HYDROTESTING

FEW CASE STUDIES

(1) CASE-I :

THE LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 1999 AND IPS WAS

CARRIED OUT IN THE YEAR 2013. THE IPS REPORT WAS
NOT MADE AVAILABLE AS IT WAS INFORMED THAT THE
SAME IS UNDER REVIEW BY TPI. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS
SHOWED IRON CONTENT AS HIGH AS 49%. THERE WAS
NO ACTION TAKEN BY THE OPERATOR.

FEW CASE STUDIES

(2) CASE-II :
SUB-SEA LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 2006, HOWEVER, PIGGING
OPERATION NOT YET CARRIED OUT AS THERE WAS NO SCRAPPER
LAUNCHING BARREL OR SCRAPPER RECEIVER BARREL.
(3) CASE-III :
IN ONE OF THE JETTY LINE, THERE WAS NO CATHODIC PROTECTION
IN THE UNDERGROUND PIPELINE EVEN THOUGH EXTERNAL COATING
WAS IN PLACE.

FEW CASE STUDIES

(4) CASE-IV :

OFF-SHORE CRUDE LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 2005,

HOWEVER, PIGGING OPERATION NOT YET CARRIED OUT.

OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS

MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED IN

RECENT PAST

LOCATION MAP NARMADA SITE

SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE NARMADA RIVER SITE

TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVER

S.No.

Pipeline Operator

Pipe Size

Remarks

(1)

Reliance (RGTIL)
Natural Gas

48 OD x 1.000 WT (25.4 mm),

API 5L X70 Gr.

Line is intact

(2)

GAIL India
Natural Gas

30 OD x 19.1/11.9 mm WT, API

5L X 70 Gr.

Snapped & burst

(3)

Reliance Industries Limited (RIL)

Ch. 29.150 KM (NG)

26 OD x 0.500 WT, API 5L X 60 Snapped & burst. Pipe has got

Gr.
stuck in the nearby electrical
tower

Natural Gas

(4)

Reliance Industries
(RIL)(NG)
Ch. 29.150 KM

Limited 24 OD x 0.500 WT API 5L X 60 Snapped & burst.

Gr.

TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVER

S.No.

Pipeline Operator

Pipe Size

Remarks

(5)

Gujarat State Petronet Ltd., (GSPL 24 OD x 0.688 (17.5 mm) WT, API About 100 m pipeline is
exposed.
NG)
5L X 60 Gr.
Ch. 17.000 KM

(6)

ONGC (Ch. 14.200 KM) CRUDE OIL 8.625 OD x 0.375 (9.53 mm) WT, Leakage in line
API 5L X 46 Gr.

(7)

IOCL (Amod Hazira Pipeline)

12.75 OD x 0.219 WT, API 5L X 60 Line is intact

Gr.

(8)

ONGC (OPAL)
Naptha

12.75 OD x 0.25 WT, API 5L X 46 Under construction

Gr.

ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT

S.No

CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT

(1)

IT WAS A NATURAL CALAMITY. UNPRECEDENTED SUDDEN FLOODS DUE TO HEAVY

RAINS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM.

(2)

THE RIVER BANK (SOUTH SIDE) WAS NOT REINFORCED, WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY SOIL
EROSION.

(3)

REMOVAL OF PLANTS AND VEGETATION DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTRICAL

TRANSMISSION TOWER OF TORRENT POWER CLOSE TO THE RIVER BANK, WHICH HAS
RESULTED IN LOOSENING OF THE PARENT SOIL.

(4)

IRRIGATION DEPT. DID NOT PROVIDE ANY PRIOR WARNING BEFORE RELEASE OF
ABRUPT WATER DISCHARGE IN SUCH A LARGE QUANTITY.

(5)

SOIL EROSION IS A GRADUAL PROCESS, WHICH TAKES NUMBER OF YEARS. PIPELINE

OPERATORS SHOULD CLOSELY MONITOR SUCH BEHAVIOR OF THE RIVER COURSE AND
THE ADJOINING BANKS ON A REGULAR BASIS.

ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT

S.No

CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT

(6)

IT WAS A NATURAL CALAMITY. UNPRECEDENTED SUDDEN FLOODS

DUE TO HEAVY RAINS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF DISCHARGE OF
WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM.

(7)

BECAUSE OF THE EROSION OF THE SOIL FROM THE RIVER BANK,

PIPE LINE, WHICH WAS BURIED IN THE GROUND BECAME EXPOSED
AND PIPE LINE IN THE ERODED PORTION BECAME UNSUPPORTED.
DUE TO THE FORCE OF WATER ON THIS EXPOSED PORTION OF PIPE
LINE, IT STARTED OSCILLATING AND FINALLY ONE OF THE PIPELINES
GOT SNAPPED DUE TO HEAVY OSCILLATION EFFECT IN HANGING
PIPE LINE SECTION. THE VELOCITY OF WATER AND TURBULENCE IN
THE RIVER WAS EXTREMELY HIGH AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.

NATURAL GAS PIPELINE

Leak/Burst site

Date/Time of incident

27th June 2014 at about

0545 hours

No. of fatalities

22

Operating pressure

42 to 45 Kg/cm2

Design pressure

72 Kg/cm2

Pipeline size and grade

18 OD API 5L X60 Grade

RIVER

BRIDGE

SV-1

SV-2

18" (API 5L X-60)

ORIGINATING
STATION

SV-5

SV-4/ I P

HIGHWAY X-ING

SV-3

(PIGGING STATION)
(CANAL)

POWER PLANT
RIVER X-ING
SV-6

SV-7

SV-8

12

ANALYSIS / OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT

CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINE SUPPLYING NATURAL GAS TO POWER

PLANT
THE PIPELINE WAS BEING OPERATED AT A LOWER FLOW RATE AND
LOWER PRESSURE W.R.T. THE DESIGN PARAMETERS.
PIPELINE WAS TRANSPORTING WET GAS WHILE IT WAS ORIGINALLY
DESIGNED FOR TRANSPORTING DRY NATURAL GAS.
THE GAS CONTAINED CO2 AND SOME TRACES OF SULPHUR.
LEAKAGE TOOK PLACE AT THE LOWEST POINT WHERE THE PIPELINE
WAS CROSSING A CANAL AT 6 OCLOCK POSITION.
34

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT

IT WAS RAINING ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, SO IT IS INFERRED THAT

VAPOUR CLOUD FORMED DUE TO HEAVY WEATHER.
A TEA STALL OWNER. WHO TURNED ON THE STOVE IN THE MORNING,
POSSIBLY PROVIDED THE SOURCE OF IGNITION.
THERE HAS BEEN A HISTORY OF PREVIOUS LEAKS NEAR THE PLACE OF
ACCIDENT.

35

ROOT CAUSE OF THE FIRE INCIDENT

LEAK DUE TO INTERNAL CORROSION PRESENCE OF CO2 LED TO FORMATION
OF H2CO3.

DURING EARLIER REPAIRS EXTERNAL COATING GOT DAMAGED RESULTING IN

EXTERNAL CORROSION.
IMPROPER PIGGING FOAM PIG USED INSTEAD OF SCRAPPER PIGS.
PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS NOT CARRIED OUT.
IPS CARRIED OUT IN 2010 - MAXIMUM METAL LOSS REPORTED IN IPS IS
EQUIVALENT OF 50% OF WALL THICKNESS.
USE OF WET NATURAL GAS INSTEAD OF DRY NATURAL GAS.

NOT USING CORROSION INHIBITOR.

36

RECOMMENDATIONS
PROPER CLEANING PIGGING TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY FOLLOWED BY
PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS.
INSTRUMENTED PIG SURVEY TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY AND THE
ANOMALY RECTIFICATION TO BE CARRIED OUT AS PER THE
RECOMMENDATIONS .
PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE MADE FOR REPAIR OF PIPELINE.

ANY CHANGE FROM THE INITIAL CHANGE SHOULD BE ROUTED THROUGH A

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCEDURE AFTER PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS.
CORROSION INHIBITOR TO BE USED IN THE LINE AS PER REQUIREMENT.
IN ADDITION TO OFC COMMUNICATION THERE SHOULD ALSO BE ANOTHER
37
STAND BY MODE OF COMMUNICATION.

MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE

INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTS
CHANGING DESIGN SERVICE WITHOUT PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OR
WITHOUT PROPER MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCESS.
NOT LEARNING FROM PAST FAILURES & NOT CARRYING OUT PROPER ROOT
CAUSE ANALYSIS.
NOT CARRYING OUT PROPER CLEANING PIGGING & INTELLIGENT PIGGING
SURVEY; NOT IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF IPS SURVEY IN TIME.

HIGH DEPENDENCY ON THIRD PARTY AGENCIES WITHOUT PROPER CONTROL.

INADEQUATE LINE-PATROLLING.

MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE

INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTS
LACK OF S.O.P. FOR MAJOR ACTIVITIES LIKE REPAIR OF PIPELINE, COLD CUTTING,
MUD PLUGGING, PIGGING, HOT-TAPPING ETC.,

NOT USING CORROSION-COUPONS/ CORROSION INHIBITORS.

NON-AVAILABILITY OF A PROPER LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM.
MANUAL OPERATION OF SECTIONALIZING VALVES.
DIRECT CURRENT VOLTAGE GRADIENT (DCVG) SURVEY / CURRENT ATTENUATION
TEST (CAT) SURVEY/ CP SURVEY NOT CARRIED OUT REGULARLY FOR ASSESSING
CONDITION OF COATING.

ELEMENT OPERATIONS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

RIGOROUS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROVIDES FRAMEWORK
FOR :
(1) MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP,
COMMITMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

(6) OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE

(7) MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

(2) RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

(8)

(3) FACILITIES DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION

SPECS, CODES, STANDARDS

(9) INCIDENT
ANALYSIS

INVESTIGATION

&

(4) INFORMATION / DOCUMENTATION

(10) COMMUNITY AWARENESS

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

&

(5) PERSONNEL & TRAINING

THIRD PARTY SERVICES

(11) OPERATIONS
INTEGRITY
ASSESSMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

EFFECTIVE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF AN ASSET COMPRISES OF :
1. DESIGN INTEGRITY (ASSURANCE THAT FACILITIES ARE DESIGNED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNING STANDARDS AND MEET SPECIFIED
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS),

2. TECHNICAL

INTEGRITY

(APPROPRIATE WORK PROCESSES FOR

INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS AND DATA MANAGEMENT TO
KEEP THE OPERATIONS AVAILABLE) AND

3. OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY (APPROPRIATE KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE,

SOPS, COMPETENCE AND DECISION MAKING TO OPERATE THE PLANT AS
INTENDED THROUGHOUT ITS LIFECYCLE.)

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DESIGN INTEGRITY :
DESIGN OF A CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PLANT PIPING SINCE IT
IS NOT CONFINED TO A LIMITED AND PROTECTED AREA AND MAY PASS THROUGH DIFFERENT TYPES
OF TERRAIN OVER WHICH THE OPERATOR HAS NO CONTROL.
THEREFORE, ITS DESIGN HAS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION BOTH NATURAL PHENOMENON AS
WELL AS HUMAN ACTIVITIES ALONG THE ROUTE AND PROVIDE A SYSTEM ENSURING ITS LONG LIFE,
OPERATABILITY AND EASE OF MAINTENANCE.
WHILE CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW PIPELINE PROJECT MORE TIME SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO FREEZING
DETAILED DESIGN AND ENGINEERING.
STRESS ANALYSIS, SURGE RELIEF ANALYSIS, HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS, NETWORK ANALYSIS ETC.,
SHOULD BE DONE IN THE INITIAL STAGES AND NECESSARY DESIGN CHANGES TO BE CARRIED OUT
REGARDING SELECTION OF PIPE, PIPE FITTINGS, VALVES, LAYOUT, P&ID ETC.,

DESIGN INTEGRITY
SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN IS ACHIEVED BY :
APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE CODES AND SYSTEM HARDWARE COMPONENTS (ASME STANDARD
& OISD STANDARDS).
SELECTION OF PIPE MATERIAL AND ITS WALL THICKNESS, MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION FOR VALVES
AND OTHER PIPE FITTINGS.
CONSIDERING THE LOADS & STRESSES IMPOSED ON THE PIPELINE BY PHYSICAL PRESSURES AND
FORCES, SUCH AS INTERNAL PRESSURE, STATIC LOADINGS AND WEIGHT EFFECTS.
CONSIDER DYNAMIC LOADING, WHERE APPLICABLE, WIND, WAVES, EARTHQUAKE ETC.,
IDENTIFYING HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS & LOCATION CLASS.
SPECIAL PROTECTIONS AT CROSSING LIKE RIVER/CANAL, RAIL, ROAD ETC.,

DESIGN INTEGRITY
SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVED BY:
(A) PIPE THICKNESS :
THE NOMINAL WALL THICKNESS T FOR THE STEEL PIPE, SHALL BE CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ASME B 31.4 - CONSIDERS LONGITUDINAL JOINT FACTOR FOR TYPE OF PIPELINE MANUFACTURING,
FACTORS FOR RAIL, ROADS, RIVER CROSSINGS, PIPES ON BRIDGES, LOCATION CLASS ETC.
CORROSION ALLOWANCE ADDED TO THE CALCULATED THICKNESS.
(B) ALL PIPING JOINTS ARE WELDED
(C)THE HAZOP AND RISK ANALYSIS
(D) LOCATING SECTIONALIZING VALVES AT IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS FOR ISOLATIONS EASILY APPROACHABLE.
SECTIONALIZING VALVES SHALL BE REMOTE OPERATED.

DESIGN INTEGRITY
SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVED BY:
(E) SURGE ANALYSIS TO PREVENT OVER-PRESSURIZATION ON CLOSURE.
(F) FEATURE OF DE-PRESSURIZATION, SHUTDOWN & ISOLATION LOGIC AT PUMP STATIONS.
(G) METERING STATIONS AND SCADA SYSTEMS PROVIDE CONTINUOUS MONITORING
PIPELINE OPERATIONS.

OVERSIGHT OF

(H) LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM WITH PROVISION FOR IDENTIFICATION / LOCATION OF LEAK AND ISOLATION OF
AFFECTED SECTION.
(I) EXTERNAL COATING & CATHODIC PROTECTION FOR EXTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL.
(J) INHIBITOR INJECTION FOR INTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL CASE.

TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING
PIPELINE PIGGING - PIGS ARE INSERTED INTO THE PIPELINE WHILE IT IS
OPERATIONAL AND ARE CARRIED ALONG BY THE FLUID BEING PUMPED.

CLEANING PIGS

TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING
THEIR BASIC PURPOSE OF PIGGING IS THREEFOLD:
(1) CLEANING PIG - PROVIDE A WAY TO CLEAN DEBRIS AND SCALE FROM
THE INSIDE OF THE PIPE,
(2) INTELLIGENT PIG - INSPECT OR MONITOR THE CONDITION OF THE
PIPE,
(3) OR ACT AS A PLUG OR SEAL TO SEPARATE PRODUCTS IN MULTIPRODUCT COMMERCIAL PIPELINES OR TO ISOLATE A SEGMENT FOR
REPAIR WITHOUT DEPRESSURIZING THE REMAINDER OF THE
PIPELINE.
(4) PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY TO MONITOR
THE TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION RATE.

TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING :
INTELLIGENT PIG
PIGS THAT MONITOR THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE ARE IN-LINE INSPECTION TOOLS.
MONITORING PIGS, ALSO CALLED INSTRUMENT PIGS OR SMART PIGS.
GEOMETRY PIGS : CHECKS DEFORMATION, MISALIGNMENTS, BENDS, ELEVATION
CHANGES AND DIRECTIONAL CHANGES TO THE PIPE.
MAGNETIC FLUX LEAKAGE AND ULTRASONIC TECHNOLOGIES : FOR CRACKS DETECTION
AND THICKNESS MEASUREMENT, CORROSION DETECTION, LEAK DETECTION.

TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
EXTERNAL HEALTH
PROTECTION:

MONITORING

PIPELINE

COATING

&

CATHODIC

PROTECTIVE COATING : TO PREVENT DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE PIPE & THE
ENVIRONMENT & TO PREVENT ITS PARTICIPATION IN ELECTROCHEMICAL REACTIONS
PROPERTIES REQUIRED
(A) ELECTRICAL INSULATING PROPERTIES,
RESISTANCE TO MOISTURE
(B) MECHANICAL- ADHESION, ABRASION RESISTANCE,
FLEXIBILITY, IMPACT RESISTANCE
(C) STABILITY AGAINST TEMP CHANGE
3 LAYER POLYETHYLENE / POLYPROPYLENE OR FUSION BONDED EPOXY COATING IS
PROVIDED

TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
FOLLOWING COATING SURVEYS ARE DONE ON UNDERGROUND PIPELINES ONE MONTH
AFTER THE COMMISSIONING OF IMPRESSED CURRENT SYSTEM:
a. CLOSE INTERVAL COMPUTERIZED [ON & OFF] POTENTIAL LOGGING (CIPL) @
EVERY 1M OF PIPELINE ROW.
b. PEARSON SURVEY ALONG PIPELINE ROW.

c.

CAT (CURRENT ATTENUATION TEST) SURVEY @ EVERY 50M OF PIPELINE ROW.

d. DCVG ( DIRECT CURRENT VOLTAGE GRADIENT) SURVEY AT DEFECT LOCATIONS

INDICATED BY PEARSON, CIPL, CAT SURVEYS
e. COATING CONDUCTANCE SURVEY AT AND MIDWAY BETWEEN CP STATIONS.
f.

CASING & CARRIER SHORT SURVEYS.

OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
ALL THE PIPELINE OPERATORS MUST HAVE A CORPORATE POLICY TO IMPROVE PIPELINE AND
FACILITY INTEGRITY TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS
EMPLOYEES.INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT GOALS SHALL INCLUDE :
PROMOTE THE LONG TERM INTEGRITY OF THE PIPELINE SYSTEM
CONDUCT BUSINESS IN A SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE MANNER
COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
DEMONSTRATE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT THROUGH THE MONITORING
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THROUGH ANNUAL RISK ASSESSMENTS

OF

ONLY ADEQUATELY TRAINED, SKILLED AND COMPETENT MANPOWER SHALL BE DEPLOYED

FOR PIPELINE OPERATIONS.
COMPLY WITH ALL THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)

OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
PRESSURE SET POINTS SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY DEFINED AND BUILT IN THE
OPERATION PHILOSOPHY.
ESD LOGIC (CAUSE AND EFFECT DIAGRAM) SHOULD BE PROPERLY DEFINED.
CLEANING PIGGING HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT AS PER OISD GUIDELINES AND PIGRESIDUE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY. THE RESULTS OF THE
PIG-RESIDUE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE ANALYSED WITH THE HELP OF STATISTICAL
TECHNIQUES TO WORK OUT THE TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION RATE.
NO SAFETY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BY-PASSED.

OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
ROU INSPECTION
INSPECTIONS CAN INVOLVE INDIVIDUALS WALKING THE ROU AND ALSO AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE.
A) NO DWELLING OR PERMANENT STRUCTURE IN ANY FORM SHALL BE PERMITTED
WITHIN THE RIGHT OF USER
B) CONTROLLING VEGETATION GROWTH IN THE FORM OF TREES,
C) PREVENTING ENCROACHMENT FROM ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND STRUCTURES,
D) MAINTAINING VISIBILITY OF PIPELINE MARKERS
PATROLLING ( GROUND / AERIAL ) OF ROW / ROU
TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY (URBAN AREAS AND NON-URBAN AREAS)
OBSERVE
SURFACE
CONDITIONS,
LEAKAGE,
CONSTRUCTION
ACTIVITY,
ENCROACHMENTS, WASHOUTS AND ANY OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE SAFETY AND
OPERATION OF THE PIPELINE.

OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
MONITORING & REVIEW OF
OPERATING BARRIERS.

OPERATING PARAMETERS TO WORK WITHIN THE

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) INCLUDING EMERGENCY ISOLATIONS.

SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM MONITORING & PROOF TESTS OF ESD SYSTEMS.
INTERPRETATION OF CATHODIC MONITORING RESULTS.
INTERPRETATION OF PIGGING RESULTS & ACTIONS THERE OF.
COATING HEALTH SURVEY & CORRECTIVE MEASURE.

CLASS LOCATION
A CLASS LOCATION CAN CHANGE AS POPULATION GROWS AND MORE PEOPLE LIVE OR
WORK NEAR THE PIPELINE.

WHEN A CLASS LOCATION CHANGES, PIPELINE OPERATORS :

MUST EITHER REDUCE THE PIPE'S OPERATING PRESSURE TO REDUCE STRESS LEVELS
IN THE PIPE;
REPLACE THE EXISTING PIPE WITH PIPE THAT HAS THICKER WALLS OR HIGHER YIELD
STRENGTH TO YIELD A LOWER OPERATING STRESS AT THE SAME OPERATING
PRESSURE;
WHERE THE CLASS IS CHANGING ONLY ONE CLASS RATING, SUCH AS FROM A CLASS 1
TO CLASS 2 LOCATION, CONDUCT A PRESSURE TEST AT A HIGHER PRESSURE

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
ARE :
THE INLINE INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING
HEALTH INTEGRITY OF PIPELINES,
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES,
THE CONTROL FOR MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE INCLUDING THE PROCESS
SAFETY ASPECTS

CONCLUSION
PIPES LAID UNDERGROUND CANNOT SPEAK, IT IS OUR DUTY TO CARE FOR THE PIPE
& GIVE EITHER PAIN OR PLEASURE. NEED OF THE HOUR TO IS TO HAVE A
SENSITIVITY TOWARDS PIPE.
PIPELINE INTEGRITY MUST CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION &
OPERATION PHASES.
PIPELINE INTEGRITY REQUIRES ADOPTING A FAILURES ARE PREVENTABLE
MINDSET.
ADOPTION OF CORROSION MANAGEMENT BEST PRACTICES CAN IMPROVE
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF PIPELINE OPERATIONS.