Introduction:

The "great wall of sand" is the common name given to a series of land reclamation projects
undertaken by the Chinese government since 2014 in the South China Sea. The great wall
of sand is to strengthen Chinese territorial claims to the region demarcated by the "ninedash line".
They are created by dredging sand onto coral reefs to create artificial islands which are then
concreted to make permanent structures.
In the year 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue over 8.1 square kilometres of new land has been
created. In the June 2015, the land reclamation had reached 13.5 km and appeared
complete.

Strategic importance of Great wall of sand in respect to United States

a. Economically
b. Militarily
a.

Economically
The United States has many levers but so do the Chinese. While the USA often uses
economic tools of statecraft such as sanctions to try to affect the behavior of other countries,
it is not clear that they would be effective in dealing with China. China and the USA remain
each others second-largest trading partners, and China was only recently surpassed by
Japan as the largest holder of US. debt. American industry relies on burgeoning Chinese
markets, and is highly sensitive to U.S. policies that could lead China to restrict access to its
population. Any punitive U.S. economic policies could rapidly escalate out of control into a
trade war that could end up harming the United States just as much as, if not more than,
China. It would also likely harm U.S. friends and allies in the region, for whom China is the
single largest source of imports and one of the leading destinations for exports. This means
that the United States should not try to affect Chinese behavior in the South China Sea
primarily through economic measures.
a.
Militarily
The United States must move cautiously but deliberately to conduct freedom of
navigation operations in the internationally recognized waters of the South China Sea.
Freedom of navigation has been a bedrock principle of U.S. national security strategy for
decades, and at Shangri-La, Secretary Carter reaffirmed that the United States will fly, sail,
and operate wherever international law allows. Carter has reportedly asked his staff to
prepare military options for doing so, including sailing U.S. Navy ships within 12 nautical
miles of the artificial islands and flying surveillance aircraft over them as well. The U.S.
government should approve and routinely conduct such operations in order to ensure open
access throughout the South China Sea. These operations should be conducted
transparently (and often predictably) in order to minimize the chances of confrontation and
unexpected military brushes with Chinese naval ships and civilian vessels.
The Territorial Conflicts in the South China Sea in respect to (UNCLOS)
Competing claims of territorial sovereignty over islands and smaller features in the South
China Sea have been a longstanding source of tension and distrust in the region. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), concluded in 1982 and became force
in 1994. It has established a legal framework intended to balance the economic and security
interests of coastal states with those of seafaring nations. UNCLOS enshrines the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). A 200 nautical mile area that extends sole exploitation rights to
coastal nations over marine resources. The EEZ was never showed to serve as a security
zone. UNCLOS guaranteed huge passage rights for military aircraft and naval vessels
Neighbouring states such as Vietnam have also extended their bases on small islands and
reefs, but they have done so over many years and not within a few months. From September

2013 to June 2014 alone, more than ten million cubic metres of sand and cement were
taken to five reefs in the Spratly Islands area.

Legal issues of Great Wall of Sand

Unilateral declared sovereignty of great wall of sand.

Territorial waters of an artificial island on great wall of sand
Built of Artificial islands on a rock on great wall of sand

The Spratly Islands and the Great Wall of Sand

The Spratly Islands are a disputed group of 14 islands, islets and cays and more than 100
reefs, sometimes grouped in submerged old atolls, in the South China Sea. The Spratly
Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between Brunei, China , Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Regarding ownership of the Spratly Islands, a group of
islands & associated "maritime features which includes reefs, banks, cays and many others
located in the South China Sea. The dispute is own by diplomatic stalemate and the
employment of military pressure techniques in the advancement of national territorial claims.
All of them except Brunei own few of the maritime features.
China and Taiwan make similar claims to the entire island group, according to the Nine-Dash
Line. The archipelago is also claimed in its entirety by Vietnam. Brunei, Malaysia and the
Philippines each claim parts. With the exception of Brunei, all of these claimants have
already taken possession of islands or other fea-tures in the sea, erected buildings for
civilian and military use on many of the otherwise uninhabited islands, and taken steps to
reclaim land. In the 1980s, for instance, Malaysia built a runway on Swallow Island, and the
Philippines on Thitu Island. Between 2009 and 2014, Vietnam engaged in various activities
to reclaim land.

What is China salami-slicing tactics?

This Chinese salami-slicing small incremental actions too minor to be a casus belli. But,
which can gather over time into fundamental strategic change.. Now presents a infuriate
challenge to Chinas smaller neighbors.
The outposts continue to be disputed under international law. What is clear, however, is that
artificial islands do not expand a states territorial waters. Politically, Chinas land-reclamation
measures have flout both the spirit and the letter of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC).
Here are four ways countries in the region, supported by the United States, can resist
Chinas salami-slicing.
1.Increase the existence of non-Chinese fishing fleets in the East and South China Seas:
2. National government policies and budgets should support increased maritime law
enforcement and coast-guard capacity and presence.
3. The United States maritime services (civilian and military) and their equivalent in allied
and partner countries in the region may increase information sharing, officer exchanges &
multilateral training activities.
4. The USA along with allied and partner countries, may create a formal system. This system
should be used for sharing basic, real-time maritime intelligence:
The share of knowledge, operational experience, best practices and technical expertise are
normally low-cost ways of increasing maritime capacity that will capitulate large benefits to
all participants. In this regard all Countries in this partnership network should increase

regular programs for officer exchanges, staff meetings, school class appointments & training
exercises in order to attain the benefits of information sharing.
Chinas neighbors may attain more and quick capacity improvements by increasing funding
for white hull, nonmilitary maritime capacity compared to assigning that funding to naval
warships. Over the medium term, Chinas relative naval power compared to its neighbors will
inevitably widen. Chinas neighbors are almost certainly not in a position to compete
successfully against China in gray hull naval power.
The implications of the Chinese outposts
China and Vietnam hold the most competing and overlapping claims in the South China Sea.
The two countries have already fought twice over the disputed islands in 1974 and 1988.
This resulted in Chinas occupation of 10 the Paracel Islands and led many Vietnamese to
believe that China would not hesitate to use force again to resolve sovereignty disputes. The
history of these conflicts has raised the concerns and increased the political, nationalist and
emotional sensitivity of the issue in both countries. Hence, Vietnams forceful stance against
Beijing. The legacy of the disputes has led observers to construe that military confrontation
between the two countries cannot be ruled out as a possibility. However, so far, Vietnam has
proceeded with pragmatism. It has balanced its opposition to Chinas territorial claims with
its need to maintain substantial economic relations with its neighbour. Despite Vietnams
expanding economic ties with other countries including the US, Chinas economic influence
remains overpowering. Since the late 1980s, China has increasingly fashioned Vietnamese
economy through a carrot and stick approach, and is now becoming its largest overall
trading partner and main source of imports. It has invested through special loans and trade
contracts to boost Vietnams industrial and agricultural sectors and has successfully exerted
this economic leverage in the territorial disputes time and again. China is expected to
become Vietnam's top trading partner by 2030 after taking over the position of the US.
Politically, both China and Vietnam are communist countries and maintain substantive
communication through their ruling parties. For the Vietnamese Communist Party, this
connection is a double-edged sword. Direct link to Chinese party officials provides Vietnam
an invaluable edge over other claimant countries because it allows both sides to mend
relations even after serious clashes. It has also allowed the two countries to classify their
South China Sea disputes and to shield the overall bilateral relationship from them. Yet, both
the Vietnamese government and public are suspicious of Chinas intentions in the South
China Sea, in spite of relatively cordial party-to-party relations.