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Department of Economics
ECON 329 - Game Theory
Spring 2015
Homework #3
Lectures 8, 9 & 10
Return in Class on Tuesday Feb 26th
Name:
Player 1
L (q)
R (1-q)
T (r)
2,0
-1 , 2
B (1-r)
x,3
0,2
d) For which values of x there are no mixed strategy Nash equilibria (2 points).
2. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium using Theorems 2 and 4 (8 points). This question will test your
understanding of Theorems 2 and 4. Consider the following game.
Player 1
Player 2
L(q)
R ( 1q )
3,5
2,5
2,0
4 , -3
T (r)
B ( 1r )
b) Show that there is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player assigns positive probability to
each of her pure strategies. (3 points).
c) Check whether there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which player 1 plays pure strategy T and player
2 assigns positive probability to each of her pure strategies. If yes, find all the Nash equilibria (including mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium) satisfying these conditions. (3 points).