1. Navarro v.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the denial by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 150, in Civil Case No. 94-2913, of the petitioners appeal for non-payment of docket fees, as well as
the appellate courts March 29, 1999 Resolution which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
The petitioners received a copy of the Decision on February 10, 1998 and on February 18, 1998 filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision. On March 25, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the
said motion. The petitioners received their copy of the order on April 7, 1998.
On April 14, 1998, the last day of the reglementary period, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Notice of
Appeal from its January 16, 1998 Decision and March 25, 1998 Order. However, the petitioners failed to
pay the requisite docket and other lawful fees.
On April 21, 1998, the respondent MBTC filed a Motion to Deny Due Course to Notice of Appeal with Motion
for Execution on the ground that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Acting on the motion, the RTC,
while ruling in favor of the timeliness of the petitioners notice of appeal, nevertheless denied the appeal
for not being accompanied by the required docket fees. Hence, in its Order dated May 27, 1998, the RTC
granted the motion of the respondents for the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal.
Whether or not such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.
HELD:
The petitioners failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason to warrant a relaxation of the
mandatory rule on the payment of appellate docket and other lawful fees. The explanation given by the
petitioners counsel for the non-payment was that his secretary, who migrated to another country,
inadvertently failed to pay the docket and other fees when she filed the petitioners notice of appeal with
the court. The said counsel came to know of the inadvertence only when he received a copy of the RTCs
May 27, 1998 Order which denied due course to the appeal for failure to pay the required docket fees. The
explication deserves scant consideration. The Supreme Court reviewed the records and find that the
petitioners failed to show how and when their counsels secretary left the country. Neither did the
petitioners submit any explanation why their counsel failed to ascertain immediately after April 14, 1998 if
the said secretary before her departure had paid the requisite appellate docket and other lawful fees.
Thus, putting the blame on the counsels secretary for her failure to perfect the petitioners appeal to the
CA is unjustified. As aptly declared by the appellate court:
The reason given for movants failure to pay the docket fees, is that their counsels employee had left his
office has been debunked by the Supreme Court as a hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. (Lanting vs.
Guevarra, 27 SCRA 974) The Supreme Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks, which
adversely affect the case handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter. (Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 371.)
Indeed, the Supreme Court has admonished law offices to adopt a system of distributing and receiving
pleadings and notices, so that the lawyers will be promptly informed of the status of their cases. Hence,
the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding upon the latter.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

2. Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Q.C. Human Resources Management

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated
August 23, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65570 and the CA Resolution dated October
22, 2002, which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:

Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of chemical products in
Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the
name and style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of
chemical products in Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant.
Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various
establishments. It supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in
the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City.
On December 13, 2000, Rodolfo Capocyan (Capocyan), claiming to be the general counsel/national
president of the labor organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter), hereinafter referred
to as Obrero Filipino, sent a Notice of Strike to Universal.
On the same date, Resources informed the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment
that the officers and members of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal.
Five days later, or on December 19, 2000, Capocyon and 36 other union officers and members of Obrero
Pilipino, picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant
and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot,
which adjoined Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate.
On December 27, 2000, Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Antipolo City (RTC) for breach of contract and damages suffered due to the
disruption of their respective business operations.
On January 3, 2001, Universal forged an Agreement (To End Labor Dispute) with Obrero Pilipino.Thus, the
strike which affected the business operations of Universal and Marman ended. Universal and Tan then filed
a Notice of Dismissal as against the strikers.
On January 8, 2001, Resources filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint stated no cause
of action against it; that, assuming the existence of such cause of action, the same was lost upon dismissal
of the case against the individual defendants; and lack of jurisdiction.
In an Order dated February 2, 2001, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Resources filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 11, 2001.
On July 11, 2001, Resources filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. On August 23, 2002,
the CA rendered a Decision which set aside the Orders dated February 2, 2001 and May 11, 2001 of the
RTC and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Universal and Tan filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the CA in its Resolution dated October 22, 2002 denied it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint are true, for with a motion to dismiss complaint based on
lack of cause of action, the movant only hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint; that is, assuming arguendo that the facts alleged are true, those allegations are insufficient for
the court to render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
HELD:
The complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.

Anent Universal's claim for breach for contract and damages, the Court is convinced that the Complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a contract
of employment of temporary workers with Resources; and that Resources violated said contract by
supplying it with unfit, maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations.
Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction,
could have rendered judgment over the dispute.
However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court finds that she has no cause of action against
Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages
clearly springs from the strike effected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's

liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is
in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the
employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An
employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
employment. Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own,
beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the
strike staged by its employees.

3. Eusebio v. SOCIEDAD AGRICOLA DE BALARIN

This is a direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its Civil Case No.
3582, denying, after trial, the petition of the petitioner-appellant, Victor Eusebio, for certiorari and the
petition in intervention of the intervenors-appellants, against the respondents-appellees, Sociedad Agricola
de Balarin, Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the said lands officials'
resolutions in a land conflict over two (2) lots, Nos. 3837 and 3809, Cabanatuan Cadastre No. 51,
respectively, containing an area of 349 and 18 hectares, more or less.
FACTS:
The court a quo found the records bereft of any indications that the above-named respondents lands
officials committed grave abuse of discretion, or acted erroneously because of imposition, fraud or
mistake, or had denied the petitioner and the intervenors the due process of law, which are all factual in
nature; but the said petitioner and intervenors pursued their appeal directly to the Supreme Court, without
resorting to the Court of Appeals. They have thus waived their rights to question the trial court's findings of
fact, (Jacinto vs. Jacinto, et al., L-12313-14, 31 July 1959; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero,
L-11994, 25 July 1960), and the Court will entertain only the legal issues raised in the appeal, there being
no proper showing that the value of the interests of the parties in the disputed public lands, subject of the
controversy, exceeds P200,000 (Sec. 17, Judiciary Act, R.A. 296, as amended by R.A. 2613).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the successors of the old "Socieded Agricola" should be subrogated to its rights and
interests is a matter that lay exclusively within the discretion of the land authorities.
HELD:
The Court find no abuse in their having chosen to do so rather than declare the land open to new entry by
others, considering the improvements already introduced and the avowed intent of the heirs of the original
partners to proceed with the sales application of their predecessors-in-interest.
The intervenors-appellants charge that there is written instruments submitted in evidence to support the
finding that Bonifacio Gonzales sold, transferred or relinquished his rights under his homestead
application; and that the finding is contrary to the rule that no evidence is admissible to prove a sale of
realty other than by a written instrument.
This objection is untenable because the Statute of Frauds does not apply when the case is neither for a
violation of a contract nor for the performance thereof.
The intervenors-appellants also invoke the land for the landless policy of the government and contend that
the grant to the respondent Sociedad of such a big tract of land, more than 300 hectares in all, is a
violation of the policy. The land authorities, however, did not err because, as they held, the aforesaid policy
does not apply to lands already occupied and improved by other private persons, unless the latter are first
duly compensated.
The other issues are factual, hence, as hereinbefore stated, non-reviewable by this Court in view of the
appellants' direct appeal from the Court of First Instance to this Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. One-half () of the costs shall be
taxed against petitioner-appellant Victor Eusebio and the remaining half of the costs against the
intervenors-appellants.

4. Dagudag v Judge Paderanga

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conducts unbecoming judge filed by retired Lt. Gen.
Alfonso P. Dagudag, Head task of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City.
FACTS:
Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. was seized by the DENR. The items
were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the unknown

owner. Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products.
Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the act that an administrative case was already pending before
the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming judge.
HELD:
Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy.
He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and
thus cannot be the subject of replevin. Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and
of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of
judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance
their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves
abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. The rule that courts cannot
prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no
reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of
the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have
dismissed the replevin suit outright.

5. Cendana v. Avila
This is a petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution1 dated June 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89750, which dismissed the petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner.
FACTS:
Aggrieved, Avila filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222 a petition2 for quo
warranto with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC granted the injunctive
relief applied for.
Cendana filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court dismissed the said petition.
Undaunted, petitioner Cendana then filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari anchored on the
following grounds:
1.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BEFORE IT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT (1) PETITIONER DID NOT STATE THE "ACTUAL" ADDRESSES OF THE PARTIES; (2)
PETITIONER DID NOT MANIFEST HIS WILLINGNESS TO POST BOND IN HIS PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND (3) PETITIONER DID NOT FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE FILING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
2.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BEFORE IT IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE RULE THAT CASES SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE MERITS, NOT ON
TECHNICALITIES.
After a thorough consideration of submissions by the parties, the Court decides in agreement that the
petition is without merit.
Under Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari shall
contain the actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, thus:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the
relief prayed for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
HELD:

The requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual addresses of all the petitioners and
the respondents is mandatory. Petitioner's failure to comply with the said requirement is sufficient ground
for the dismissal of his petition. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari on
the ground that the parties' actual addresses were not indicated therein.
However, petitioner's failure to manifest willingness to post a bond, in his petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, is not a fatal
defect. This omission would, at the most, only result in the denial of his application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, not in the dismissal of his petition for certiorari. The Court
of Appeals' unqualified dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground that petitioner failed to
manifest willingness to post a bond is clearly inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that
petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned RTC Order. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration to give the court a quo a chance to correct itself is a jurisdictional and mandatory
requirement, which must be strictly complied with. Although there are exceptions to this general rule, the
instant case presents no valid and compelling reason to deviate from the said rule. Procedural rules
illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice. Hence, every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure proper dispensation of justice. The liberal
interpretation and application of the rules apply only in exceptional circumstances, none of which obtains
in the present case. The petition is denied for lack of merit.