I.

VIII. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

A.
Definition: these are constructions placed upon statues at the time o
f, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature or judicial authoriti
es, as well as by those who, because of their involvement in the process of legi
slation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law.
B.
Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege
the contempo
rary construction is strongest in law.
C.
Contemporaneous construction is the construction placed upon the stat
ute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administ
er such statue.
D.
Executive and administrative officers are generally the very first of
ficial to interpret the law. These interpretations are in the form of:
1.
rules
2.
regulations
3.
circulars
4.
directives
5.
opinions and
6.
rulings.
E.
Types of executive interpretation:
1.
construction by an executive or administrative officer directly calle
d to implement the law which may be:
(a)
expressed (ex. Interpretation embodied in circulars, directive or reg
ulation)
(b)
implied. (a practice of enforcement of not applying the statute to ce
rtain situations)
2.
Construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief
legal adviser of the government in the form of opinions. In the absence of the
ruling of a president, the opinions of Sec. Of Justice is controlling among adm
inistrative and executive officials.
3.
Interpretation handed down in and adversary proceeding in the form of
a ruling by an executive office exercising quasi-judicial power.
Note: In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grav
e abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit o
f a legislative enactment creating or changing a governmental agency, the action
of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts.
E. Reason why contemporaneous construction is given much weight: it comes from
the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus const
rued these same people are the drafters of the law they interpret.
F.
When to disregard Contemporaneous construction
This contemporaneous construction is not binding upon the court. The court may
disregard it:
1.
where there is no ambiguity in the law
2.
where the construction is clearly erroneous
3.
where strong reason to the contrary exists
4.
where the court has previously given the statue a different interpret
ation
G.
If there is an error in implementation of the law, such error may be
corrected. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply.
H.
As a rule, erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no vested r
ight on the part of those who relied and followed such construction. But this r
ule is not absolute. There may be exeptions in the interest of justice and fair
play (ex. Tax cases)
I.
Legislative interpretation: the legislature may provide an interpre
tation or declaration clause in a statue by they cannot limit or restrict the po
wer granted to courts.

1.
While legislative interpretation is not controlling, courts may resor
t to it to clarify ambiguity in the language.
2.
such legislative interpretation is entitled of respect especially of
the executive department has similarly construed the statute.
J.
Legislative approval
the legislature, by action or inaction approve o
r ratify such contemporaneous construction. Such approval may manifest in many
ways such as:
1.
when it reenacts statute previously given a contemporaneous construct
ion
2.
when it amends a prior statute without providing anything which would
restrict, change, nullify the previous contemporaneous construction.
3.
appropriation of money for the officer designated to perform a task p
ursuant to an interpretation of a stature
4.
non-repudiation of the construction.
Note: Ratiohabitio Mandati aequiparatur legislative ratification is equivalent to
mandate.
K.
Stare decisis
1.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere one should follow past precedents a
nd should not disturb what has been settled.
Reason for such doctrine: the supreme court has a duty not only of interpreting
and applying the law but also in protecting the society from needless upheavals
. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium
interest of then state demands that
there be an end to litigation.
2.
A ruling in order to come within the doctrine of stare decision must
be categorically stated in the issue expressly raised by the parties; must be a
direct ruling.
3.
Rulings that are merely sub silencio are merely obiter dictum (an opi
nion of the court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decisi
on of the case before it; not binding)
4.
This doctrine is not absolute because Supreme Court may change or aba
ndon a precedent enunciated
1
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
VI. PARTS OF LAW
1. TITLE
1a. Single-subject Requirement. Article VI, Section 26 (1): Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the titl
e thereof.
1b. Purpose. [Philconsa v. Gimenez]:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or logrolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise of fraud upon the legislature;
3. To fairly apprise the people;
4. To serve as a guide in ascertaining the legislative intent - [Agpalo]
1c. Test of sufficiency. If all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed i
n its title but it need not be a complete index of the content.
1d. How to construe.
1. It must be reasonably construed.
2. It must be given a practical rather than technical construction
3. Title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject.
2. ENACTING CLAUSE
2a. Part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof which states t
he authority by which the act is enacted.
2b. Significance: Knowing the period of time that it was enacted. When the reaso
n of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
3. PREAMBLE

3a. A prefatory statement or explanation of a finding of facts, reciting the Pur

pose, Reason or Occasion for making the law to which it is prefix.
3b. [People v. Echavez] Preamble may restrict what appears to be broad scope of
law.
3c. [People v. Purisima] A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the min
ds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which
are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
3ca.While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when
the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted
to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
4. BODY OR PURVIEW
4a.That part of law which tells what the law is all about. The body should embra
ce only one subject matter.
4b. [People v. Carlos] The Constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a la
w relate to the subject expressed in its title.
4c. When there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between a proviso and the body of
a statute, the former prevails as latest expression of legislative intent.
5. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
5a.That part of law which states that if any provision of the act is declared nu
ll and void, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. Note: Not controlling
as the court may still invalidate the whole statute.
5b. Two views on the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law:
1. Orthodox view - An unconstitutional law is no law at all. It creates no offic
e, it creates no rights, it creates no obligation, it is not a source of protect
ion. It is stricken out of the statute books. It is treated as if it was never e
nacted at all.
2. Modern view (Operative Fact doctrine) - An unconstitutional law is not strick
en out of the statute books. It remains there but the court refuses to recognize
it. This is because, before it is declared unconstitutional, it enjoys the pres
umption of constitutionality. At that time, there may be parties who relied on t
he provisions of that law. As to them it remains to be valid. This is an operati
ve fact that cannot be denied. Because of this, the declaration of unconstitutio
nality is not given retroactive effect. It is always given prospective applicati
on.
2
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
5c. Indivisible Laws. When other provisions cannot stand on its own.
? SOME CLASSIFICATIONS
A. GENERAL , SPECIAL, LOCAL LAWS
1. A special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passag
e, and the special law is to be considered as remaining an exception to the gene
ral law as the same being the latest expression of the intention of the legislat
ure.
2. A special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
3. The rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case
is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and
application even if the terms of a general act are broad enough to include the
cases in the special law unless there is a manifest intent to repeal or alter th
e special law.
4. In case of conflict between the previous article and later article, the latte
r will prevail
5. Whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal t
heoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date must prev
ail being a later expression of the legislative will
6. Whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute the ordinance
must give way.
7. 12. Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular, the provision of the latter in case of conflict w
ill prevail

8. 13. Ordinance should not contravene with a statute, in case of a conflict bet
ween an ordinance and a statute the latter will prevail
9. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that the enactment of a later le
gislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law
10. It is elementary in statutory construction than an administrative circular c
annot abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an adminis
trative circular thus the latter cannot amend or repeal it
B. REMEDIAL, PENAL, CURATIVE LAWS
1. Procedural laws are retrospective
2. Curative statutes are validly accepted in this jurisdiction subject to the us
ual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
3. Curative statutes have retrospective effect.
4. It is a well-settled rule that a substantive law cannot be repealed by a proc
edural law
5. A general law cannot repeal a special law
6. In case of conflict between the general provision of a special law and a part
icular provision of a general law, the latter should prevail
C. PROSPECTIVE or RETROSPECTIVE
1. The question of whether a statute operates retrospectively or only prospectiv
ely depends on the legislative intent
2. As a rule, laws cannot be given retroactive effect the absence of a statutory
provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect
3. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unles
s the purpose and the intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used
4. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to gi
ve them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used.
3
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
VII. AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. TITLE
? [City of Baguio v. Marcos] Title of Act may be resorted in the ascertainment o
f Congressional will.
? Reason: For the reason that by specific constitutional precept about one-subje
ct title rule.
B. PREAMBLE
? [People v. Echavez] Preamble may restrict what appears to be broad scope of la
w.
? [People v. Purisima] A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds
of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which a
re to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
? While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when t
he statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted t
o, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
C. CONTEXT
? The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent in the statute
itself.
? [Aboitiz v City of Cebu] Legislative intent must be ascertained from a conside
ration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular pro
vision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in th
e abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may hav
e a limited application if viewed together with other provisions.
D. PUNCTUATION MARKS
? Aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of w
ritten words.
? Can be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the

words as thus punctuated.

? [US v Hart] If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reas
onable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an ad
ditional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute a
s thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusiv
e, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to
give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluou
s or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
E. WORDS AND PHRASES
? A statute is to be construed by the natural and obvious impart of its words, g
iving to it the ordinary grammatical construction.
? [Colgate v. Jimenez] General terms may be restricted by specific words, with t
he result that the general language will be limited by the specific language whi
ch indicates the statute's object and purpose. Applicable only to cases where, e
xcept for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall un
der one specific class.
F. HEADNOTES AND EPIGRAPHS
? It is a convenient index to the contents of the provisions of the statutes.
? [People v. Yabut] When the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and u
nambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preambl
e or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especiall
y where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference
aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.
G. INTENT AND POLICY
? It is the law itself. It is called the leading star and guiding light in the a
pplication and interpretation of the statute.
? What is within the spirit is within the law.
? Once the policy of the law is ascertained, it should be given effect by the ju
diciary.
? A statue of doubtful meaning must be given a construction that will promote pu
blic policy.
H. EXLANATORY NOTES
? A short exposition of explanation accompanying a proposed legislation by its a
uthor or proponent. It contains statements of the reason or purpose of the bill,
as well as arguments advanced by its author in urging its passage.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEBATES & DELIBERATIONS
? Where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning w
hich was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion
on the bill may be adopted.
J. PRESUMPTIONS
? Based on logic, common sense; eg. Presumption of constitutionality, completene
ss, prospective application, right and justice, etc.
? [Basco v. PAGCOR] A statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be
indulged in favor of its constitutionality.
K. IMPLICATIONS
? No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its app
lication. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which i
s expressed.
? [Chua v Civil Service] Every statute must be understood by implication.
? DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS. That which is plainly implied in the langu
age of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
? Every statute is understand by implication to contain all such provision as ma
y be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or to make effective rig
hts, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such coll
ateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from
the necessity of the law.
VIII. SOME WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIMS

A. Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be n
o departure. [Plain meaning rule]
o If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its l
iteral meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
o You get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal mea
ning or plain rule means interpretation of the law. All words in a statute shoul
d if possible, be given effect.
B. Ratio Legis Et Anima. What is within the spirit is within the law. The spirit
of the law controls the letter. The literal import must yield to intent.
C. Mens Legislatoris. Intent of the legislators.
D. Dura Lex Sed lex . The law maybe harsh, but is still the law.
E. Expressio unios est exclusio alterius. The expression of 1 person, thing or c
onsequence implies the exclusion of others or what is expressed puts an end to t
hat which is implied.
o EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly l
imited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be ext
ended to other matters.
o These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions
,
5
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
what is not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO
FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS, the express exception, exemption or savi
ngs excludes others.
Negative-Opposite Doctrine. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied is
known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.
F. Ejusdem Generis. The same kind or specie. This is to give effect to both the
particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the
class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, a
lthough not specifically named by the particular words.
o The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used
to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must giv
e way in favor of the legislative intent;
o Limitations of ejusdem generis requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by
a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is
not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases
a broader meaning.
G. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is no
t absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the
person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is cle
arly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the
intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language.
H. Pari Materia. Of the same subject or matter.
o Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enact
ing statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretation
s thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if tw
o statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irr
econcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends t
he earlier enacted statute.
o Reason: The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
I. Noscitur A Sociis. Associated words. When general and specific words are grou
ped, the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embr
ace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific wo
rds.
o If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its t

erms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be excepted.
J. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not dis
tinguish, do not distinguish.
K. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, t
he law itself ceases.
L. Salus populi est suprema lex. The safety/welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
o [Calalang v. William] o Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, n
or atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of s
ocial and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objec
tively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
6
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the compet
ent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitution
ally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutio
nally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all government
s on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
1
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
VI. PARTS OF LAW
1. TITLE
1a. Single-subject Requirement. Article VI, Section 26 (1): Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the titl
e thereof.
1b. Purpose. [Philconsa v. Gimenez]:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or logrolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise of fraud upon the legislature;
3. To fairly apprise the people;
4. To serve as a guide in ascertaining the legislative intent - [Agpalo]
1c. Test of sufficiency. If all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed i
n its title but it need not be a complete index of the content.
1d. How to construe.
1. It must be reasonably construed.
2. It must be given a practical rather than technical construction
3. Title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject.
2. ENACTING CLAUSE
2a. Part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof which states t
he authority by which the act is enacted.
2b. Significance: Knowing the period of time that it was enacted. When the reaso
n of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
3. PREAMBLE
3a. A prefatory statement or explanation of a finding of facts, reciting the Pur
pose, Reason or Occasion for making the law to which it is prefix.
3b. [People v. Echavez] Preamble may restrict what appears to be broad scope of
law.
3c. [People v. Purisima] A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the min
ds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which
are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
3ca.While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when
the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted
to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
4. BODY OR PURVIEW
4a.That part of law which tells what the law is all about. The body should embra
ce only one subject matter.
4b. [People v. Carlos] The Constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a la
w relate to the subject expressed in its title.

4c. When there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between a proviso and the body of
a statute, the former prevails as latest expression of legislative intent.
5. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
5a.That part of law which states that if any provision of the act is declared nu
ll and void, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. Note: Not controlling
as the court may still invalidate the whole statute.
5b. Two views on the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law:
1. Orthodox view - An unconstitutional law is no law at all. It creates no offic
e, it creates no rights, it creates no obligation, it is not a source of protect
ion. It is stricken out of the statute books. It is treated as if it was never e
nacted at all.
2. Modern view (Operative Fact doctrine) - An unconstitutional law is not strick
en out of the statute books. It remains there but the court refuses to recognize
it. This is because, before it is declared unconstitutional, it enjoys the pres
umption of constitutionality. At that time, there may be parties who relied on t
he provisions of that law. As to them it remains to be valid. This is an operati
ve fact that cannot be denied. Because of this, the declaration of unconstitutio
nality is not given retroactive effect. It is always given prospective applicati
on.
2
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
5c. Indivisible Laws. When other provisions cannot stand on its own.
? SOME CLASSIFICATIONS
A. GENERAL , SPECIAL, LOCAL LAWS
1. A special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passag
e, and the special law is to be considered as remaining an exception to the gene
ral law as the same being the latest expression of the intention of the legislat
ure.
2. A special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
3. The rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case
is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and
application even if the terms of a general act are broad enough to include the
cases in the special law unless there is a manifest intent to repeal or alter th
e special law.
4. In case of conflict between the previous article and later article, the latte
r will prevail
5. Whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal t
heoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date must prev
ail being a later expression of the legislative will
6. Whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute the ordinance
must give way.
7. 12. Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular, the provision of the latter in case of conflict w
ill prevail
8. 13. Ordinance should not contravene with a statute, in case of a conflict bet
ween an ordinance and a statute the latter will prevail
9. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that the enactment of a later le
gislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law
10. It is elementary in statutory construction than an administrative circular c
annot abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an adminis
trative circular thus the latter cannot amend or repeal it
B. REMEDIAL, PENAL, CURATIVE LAWS
1. Procedural laws are retrospective
2. Curative statutes are validly accepted in this jurisdiction subject to the us
ual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
3. Curative statutes have retrospective effect.
4. It is a well-settled rule that a substantive law cannot be repealed by a proc
edural law

5. A general law cannot repeal a special law

6. In case of conflict between the general provision of a special law and a part
icular provision of a general law, the latter should prevail
C. PROSPECTIVE or RETROSPECTIVE
1. The question of whether a statute operates retrospectively or only prospectiv
ely depends on the legislative intent
2. As a rule, laws cannot be given retroactive effect the absence of a statutory
provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect
3. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unles
s the purpose and the intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used
4. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to gi
ve them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used.
3
Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
VII. AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. TITLE
? [City of Baguio v. Marcos] Title of Act may be resorted in the ascertainment o
f Congressional will.
? Reason: For the reason that by specific constitutional precept about one-subje
ct title rule.
B. PREAMBLE
? [People v. Echavez] Preamble may restrict what appears to be broad scope of la
w.
? [People v. Purisima] A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds
of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which a
re to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
? While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when t
he statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted t
o, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
C. CONTEXT
? The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent in the statute
itself.
? [Aboitiz v City of Cebu] Legislative intent must be ascertained from a conside
ration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular pro
vision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in th
e abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may hav
e a limited application if viewed together with other provisions.
D. PUNCTUATION MARKS
? Aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of w
ritten words.
? Can be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words as thus punctuated.
? [US v Hart] If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reas
onable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an ad
ditional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute a
s thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusiv
e, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to
give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluou
s or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
E. WORDS AND PHRASES
? A statute is to be construed by the natural and obvious impart of its words, g
iving to it the ordinary grammatical construction.
? [Colgate v. Jimenez] General terms may be restricted by specific words, with t
he result that the general language will be limited by the specific language whi
ch indicates the statute's object and purpose. Applicable only to cases where, e
xcept for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall un

der one specific class.

F. HEADNOTES AND EPIGRAPHS
? It is a convenient index to the contents of the provisions of the statutes.
? [People v. Yabut] When the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and u
nambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preambl
e or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especiall
y where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference
aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.
G. INTENT AND POLICY
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Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
? It is the law itself. It is called the leading star and guiding light in the a
pplication and interpretation of the statute.
? What is within the spirit is within the law.
? Once the policy of the law is ascertained, it should be given effect by the ju
diciary.
? A statue of doubtful meaning must be given a construction that will promote pu
blic policy.
H. EXLANATORY NOTES
? A short exposition of explanation accompanying a proposed legislation by its a
uthor or proponent. It contains statements of the reason or purpose of the bill,
as well as arguments advanced by its author in urging its passage.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEBATES & DELIBERATIONS
? Where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning w
hich was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion
on the bill may be adopted.
J. PRESUMPTIONS
? Based on logic, common sense; eg. Presumption of constitutionality, completene
ss, prospective application, right and justice, etc.
? [Basco v. PAGCOR] A statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be
indulged in favor of its constitutionality.
K. IMPLICATIONS
? No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its app
lication. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which i
s expressed.
? [Chua v Civil Service] Every statute must be understood by implication.
? DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS. That which is plainly implied in the langu
age of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
? Every statute is understand by implication to contain all such provision as ma
y be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or to make effective rig
hts, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such coll
ateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from
the necessity of the law.
VIII. SOME WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIMS
A. Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be n
o departure. [Plain meaning rule]
o If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its l
iteral meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
o You get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal mea
ning or plain rule means interpretation of the law. All words in a statute shoul
d if possible, be given effect.
B. Ratio Legis Et Anima. What is within the spirit is within the law. The spirit
of the law controls the letter. The literal import must yield to intent.
C. Mens Legislatoris. Intent of the legislators.
D. Dura Lex Sed lex . The law maybe harsh, but is still the law.
E. Expressio unios est exclusio alterius. The expression of 1 person, thing or c
onsequence implies the exclusion of others or what is expressed puts an end to t
hat which is implied.
o EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly l

imited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be ext

ended to other matters.
o These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions
,
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Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
what is not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO
FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS, the express exception, exemption or savi
ngs excludes others.
Negative-Opposite Doctrine. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied is
known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.
F. Ejusdem Generis. The same kind or specie. This is to give effect to both the
particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the
class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, a
lthough not specifically named by the particular words.
o The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used
to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must giv
e way in favor of the legislative intent;
o Limitations of ejusdem generis requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by
a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is
not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases
a broader meaning.
G. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is no
t absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the
person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is cle
arly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the
intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language.
H. Pari Materia. Of the same subject or matter.
o Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enact
ing statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretation
s thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if tw
o statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irr
econcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends t
he earlier enacted statute.
o Reason: The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
I. Noscitur A Sociis. Associated words. When general and specific words are grou
ped, the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embr
ace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific wo
rds.
o If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its t
erms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be excepted.
J. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not dis
tinguish, do not distinguish.
K. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, t
he law itself ceases.
L. Salus populi est suprema lex. The safety/welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
o [Calalang v. William] o Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, n
or atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of s
ocial and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objec
tively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
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Notes on Atty. Clemente s Statutory Construction Syllabus [2015-2016]
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the compet

ent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitution
ally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutio
nally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all government
s on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
IX. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS

Central Capiz v. Ramirez Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter I
II, Page 79, Footnote No.8
FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 3
0 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as
an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate A
ct No. 2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public dom
ain, and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of t
he corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippi
ne Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural
land.
ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philipp
ine Islands which are privately owned.
HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and
is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in pri
vate ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whats
oever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: That no bill may be enacted into law shall embr
ace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of t
he bill.
Preamble:
People of the Philippines v. Purisima Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (Novembe
r 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16
FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defend
ant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree N
o. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which con
stitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential el
ement of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accu
sed of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion o
f, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organize
d lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No.
9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities an
d that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public pol
icy.

ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to sub
versive activities.
HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative m
easure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislat
ive intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what
acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spi
rit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or whereas
auses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

People v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)

Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people
for squatting which was punishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations w
ere raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. TheJudge dismissed the five informatio
ns before the accused could be arraigned. One of the Judge'sgrounds for the dism
issal was that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to th
ecultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be rec
onsidered.
Issues: Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies t
o agricultural lands.
Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands
because its preambleshows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban c
ommunities or more particularly to illegalconstructions in squatter areas made b
y well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involvespasture lands in r
ural areas.
other version:
People of the Philippines v. Echaves Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January
28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22
FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and simil
ar acts applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and rul
ed that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generi
s (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretar
y of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Sup
reme Court, thus bringing the case at hand.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands
HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring
that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. But the
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis be
cause the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that the rule of Ejusde
m Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when
the legislative is uncertain.

Context:
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March
31, 1965)
FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent shou
ld be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by

cl

collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers locat
ed in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to Responden
t, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu a
nd the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of
the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light o
f the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfa
ge. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
HELD: The term public refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, t
he power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. Th
e Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of th
e ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those dock
s that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court sta
tes th
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc. Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736
(January 15, 1992)
FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as prov
ided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a t
wo-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provide
d in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more
than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent c
ontends, on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final
Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the pres
criptive period and not the quarterly payment made.
ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax wa
s paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment)
.
HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme
Court said that, Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the ot
her provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent an
d to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdi
ty. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of t
he law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947) Ch
apter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60 FACTS: Petitioner, an alien, bought a resident
ial lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. In 1945, he sought to a
ccomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on
the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Petitioner brought
the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustai
ning the refusal of the register of deeds.
ISSUE: W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands
rticle XIII of the 1935 Constitution.

as stated in A

HELD: Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultu
ral lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be presumed that what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then p
revailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and pas
sed C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens
or to corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision is equivalent to
a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for un

der the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. In addition, the
interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim
that residential land is part of public agricultural lands . It is clear that the th
ree branches of the Government have always maintained that residential lots are in
cluded in agricultural lands . If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be co
nstrued as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the result would not b
e in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution.
Grammatical Aids

Mister Charmer011 <applicant.urgent@gmail.com>

Sep 28 (3 days ago)
to me
I.

VIII. CONTEMPOR

A. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single document.

? It is generally worded for it to be flexible. No technical meaning, except tec
hnical words which have well-understood meaning .
B. Penal Laws should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused.
? Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused
C. Tax Laws, in case of doubt, are to be construed strictly against the governme

nt and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to
be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares.
? A claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the tax
payer. However, where the law is clear and ambiguous, the law must be taken as i
t is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
? Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris again
st the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Exceptions: When
applicable to government, charitable, education and religious purposes; reason:
Constitution says so.
D. Labor Laws are liberally construed in favor of labor/worker.
? The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and th
e law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their fa
vor.
E. Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objecti
ve of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and pr
oceeding. Exceptions: Reglementary period, period of filing a revival, should be
mandatory applied.
F. Insurance laws/Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor
of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Reason: It is a contract of adh
esion, where the insured merely signs his agreement.
G. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favo
r of the government and against the applicant.
H. Expropriation laws shall be construed in favor of the National Government.
I. Elections laws shall be construed in a way not to defeat the will of the elec
torate.
J. Wills shall be construed in favor of the testamentary disposition.
A. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single document.
? It is generally worded for it to be flexible. No technical meaning, except tec
hnical words which have well-understood meaning .
B. Penal Laws should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused.
? Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused
C. Tax Laws, in case of doubt, are to be construed strictly against the governme
nt and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to
be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares.
? A claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the tax
payer. However, where the law is clear and ambiguous, the law must be taken as i
t is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
? Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris again
st the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Exceptions: When
applicable to government, charitable, education and religious purposes; reason:
Constitution says so.
D. Labor Laws are liberally construed in favor of labor/worker.
? The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and th
e law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their fa
vor.
E. Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objecti
ve of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and pr
oceeding. Exceptions: Reglementary period, period of filing a revival, should be
mandatory applied.
F. Insurance laws/Contracts