10.14 United States v.

Nixon
Facts: In June 1972, five men armed with bugging equipment were arrested inside
Democratic National Committees offices in Washington, D.C. Police discovered that the
burglars worked, directly/indirectly for the Committee to Re-elect the President Nixon. A
special prosecutor appointed to probe the Watergate scandal; subpoenaed the tapes. Nixon
refused to released them, claiming they were protected under privilege. Another special
prosecutor asked the US Supreme Court to compel Nixon to release all of the tapes in their
entirety.
Issue: WON, separation of powers allow for the settlement of this dispute to be settled by
the Judicial Branch.
Ruling: The Court ruled unanimously that President Richard Nixon had to surrender the
tapes. Main Point: Supreme Court of the US had to balance the executive privilege against
the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial.
10.15 Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001); MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
Facts:EDSA 2 commenced with the PNP and AFP joining the crowd. In the succeeding days,
a chain of resignations from the military, the police, and the cabinet ensued. On January 20,
Supreme Court declared the seat for presidency as vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. At noon, Chief Justice, whose authority was later
unanimously confirmed by SC, administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.
Issue: WON the assumption of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the office of the
President is justifiable?
Ruling: The supreme Court held that Estrada had resigned thereby leaving the office
vacant.The judgement that Estrada had resigned was based on two statements of Estrada
just before he left Malacaang and on the diary of Angara published in the inquirer. Main
point: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,

10.16 Arroyo v De Venecia (1997)

Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House
of Representatives involving tax on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Passed
and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the second reading, petitioner moved for
adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally needed to conduct business.
Petitioners motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by
Pres. Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not the law passed on violation on the constitutional
Held: There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by nominal
voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the
third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in passing a bill
over the veto of the President.
Main Point: The court cannot declare an act of legislature void on account of noncompliance with the rules made by itself.
10.17 Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139
Facts: COMELEC approved Resolution No. 6074 which awarded Phase II of the Modernization
Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC,) an entity that had not
participated in the bidding, for the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots
in the 2004 elections,

The poll body signed the actual automation Contract with Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., a
company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.
Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: Yes. There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Main point: Comelec approved the
assailed Resolution and awarded the subject Contract not only in clear violation of law and
jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.

10.18 MATTEL, INC. vs. EMMA FRANCISCO

Facts: Petitioner alleged that private respondent Uy's "Barbie" trademark as the latter was
confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, accessories, and toys. Mattel argues that its
products are items related to Uy's products; hence, identical trademarks. Uy submits that
the case has become moot and academic since the records of the IPO will show that no
Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) was fi led on or before December 1, 2001; thus,
he is deemed to have abandoned his trademark application for failure to comply with the
mandatory filing of the DAU.
Issue: Whether or not the judiciary resolve moot cases.
RULING: A moot case is one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by the virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally the courts decline
jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. MAIN POINT: The courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if first, there has been a grave violation of the Constitution, and public
interest is involved.
10.19 Villarosa v. HRET, GR No. 144129, September 14, 2000
Facts:Petitioner (Villarosa) and private respondent (Quintos) were the only candidates for
the office ofRepresentative of the lone legislative district of Occidental Mindoro in the
synchronized national and local elections of 1998. The provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate. Private respondent filed an election protest
against the petitioner contestingthe results in all of the precincts of the province1.
Petitioner is the wife of a previous representative of the district and in his certificate
for candidacy on the 1995 elections, he wroteas his nickname/stage name: JOE-JTV.
Issue: whether JTV votes should be counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of
Villarosas husband, who is the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro.
HELD: Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the
election process. Main point: HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the only issue for its determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be
counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.
10.20 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS (comfort women), a non-stock,
non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid
to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during World War II. ;
Officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitionersclaims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.

RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against
Japan. MAINPOINT: The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitionersclaims against Japan.
10.21 Garcia v. Board of Investments, GR No. 92024, November 9, 1990
Facts: The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign corporation, was attracted to situate
its petrochemical plant in Bataan by initial inducements and other circumstances
Subsequently, however, it asked the Board of Investments to be allowed to move to
Batangas on the ground that it has the right of final choice of plant site. On that basis, the
BOI yielded.
Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of discretion when it yield to the wishes
of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
Ruling: Yes. The clear advantages manifest in the plants remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near absolute discretion given
by the BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first
choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least. Main point: The BOI capitulation is
adverse to Philippine interest contrary to the thrust of the Constitution. (grave abuse)
10.22 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999
FACTS: In 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. ;
ISSUE: WON the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of
the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. Main Point: The powers of the Executive, the legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right of life. To contend that only the Executive can protect
the right of life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of three branches of our government. (Bernas)
*additional : The crime of raping his ten-year old either daughter/step daughter having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as
the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect.
10.23 Torrecampo v. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482
Facts: Torrecampo filed the petition for injunction pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A 8975 onJuly
1, 2009, a day after DPWH entered aportion of Barangay Matandang Balara toimplement
the C-5 Road Extension Project. Torrecampo insists that the RI-PADA area isa better
alternative to subject lots for theproject.
Issue:WON
respondents
should
be
enjoined rom commencing with and
implementingthe C-5 Road Extension Project along Tandang Sora Road, affecting
MWSSproperties
Held:The court rules that Torrecampo is notentitled to an injunction for judicial reviewdoes
not apply to matters concerning the Executive branch, main point: . The court issued that
Torrecampo is notentitled to an injunction, the denied. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies (C5 road)

10.24 Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a decision which ruled
that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from
being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a
private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such. The
Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of
the PNRC statute.
HELD: Yes, it has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise
judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of
the case.
MAIN POINT: Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows: WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of
the Phil. Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
10.25 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Facts: The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute was established with
"the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. On
May 9, 2003, the Philippines entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement with United States of
America (USA) which aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and
US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.
Issue: WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the nonsurrender agreement, and the International Criminal Court.
Ruling:Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine,
nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute.The State has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute its own nationals in its custody who may have committed the
grave international crimes specified in the Rome Statute.
Main point: Under the premise of complementarity, the primary jurisdiction for any case
lies first with the states national judicial systems.
10.26 Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
FACTS: Professor Merlin M. Magallona, in her capacity, assailed the constitutionality of RA
9522 an act to amend certain provisions of the RA no. 3046, as amended by RA no. 5446, to
define the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines and raised a petition against Hon.
Eduardo Ermita; on two principal grounds: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine Maritime Territory,
and the reach of Philippine states sovereign power violating the Article I (2) RA 9522
opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security.
ISSUE: WON, RA 9522 is conflicting with current provisions on National Territory in
converting internal waters into archipelagic waters.
RULING: Petition is Dismissed. The Court finds RA 9522 constitutional and is
consistent with the Philippines national interest, beside the fact that it is a vital step in
safeguarding the countrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zone and continental
shelf. Main point: Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters
will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III an
archipelagic state has sovereign power .

10.27 Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR No. 171101, November 22, 2011

THE FACTS On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of
the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
RULING:The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE. Main point: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies
11.1 Sana v. CESB, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011
Facts:Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing Executive Order
No. 883, series of 2010 (EO 883), which granted Career Executive Service Officer (CESO)
rank to eligible lawyers in the executive branch, and a related administrative
issuance,Career Executive Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870, for violating Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution
Issue:Does the petition assailing executive order no. 883, series of 2010 present a
justiciable controversy?
Ruling:No. The factors are not obtained here. The question whether an appointment to a
CESO rank of an executive official amounts to appointment for purposes of the constitutional
ban on midnight appointment while potentially recurring, main point: holds no certainty of
evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban
period under
11.2 Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690
FACTS This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific
Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a
Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the
(PLDT). The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale
of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned
by PTIC to First Pacific.
ISSUE : Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII refer to the total common shares
only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting
preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
RULING: the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to
vote in the election of directors. Main point: In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
Section 2. Role of Congress

11.3 Mantruste Systems v. CA, 179 SCRA 136 (1989)

Facts: The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC, pet),
requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms
upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of
the MEC and the compensation to be paid to the MEC by such transportation companies.Act
NO. 1446, Section 11 relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition.
Issue: WON Court may exercise administrative or quasi-judicial functions as provided
by ActNo. 1446
Held: Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final; the decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through
the regular court system (Trial Courts Court of Appeals SC). They will be reviewed by
the lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. Main point: The SC
cannot sit as members of the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their
jurisdiction to decide on cases on purely contractual situations.
11.4 Malaga v. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516 (1992)
FACT: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC (Prequalifications, Bids and Awards Committee ) of The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF)
for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list
of pre-qualified bidders. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the
ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D.
1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of
PD 1818?
HELD: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
11.5 Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
Facts: Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions to Examines," to
all who will take the licensure examinations in accountancy. No examinee shall attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or
similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Issue: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation
Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter.
Ruling: The SC ruled that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and
enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. This is because from Presidential
Decree No. 223, the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the
President for general direction and coordination.
Main Point: Where the statutes designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of
general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority. But where
there is silence, the general rule applies.
Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy
11.6 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 SCRA 429 (1950)

Facts: A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought and installed in the
second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court.The
Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President) disapproved of
the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market
purchases. Petitioners also contend that judicial functions do not include purchase of
property. Radio wealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved
however, the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment
Issue: Whether or not the Auditor General, as part of the Executive Department, was correct
in his decision to deny the payment of the equipment that the Supreme Court bought from
Radiowealth.
Ruling: No, the Auditor General made a mistake in his decision. According to Section 3 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy which means
that the appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced and shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Main point: Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary
to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the
administration of justice.

11.7 Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

FACTS:On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and
the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution
by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed
bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court,
and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUES:Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
RULING:The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of
the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. The petition is granted and the questioned
veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid.MAIN POINT:Fiscal
autonomy is granted to the Supreme Court to strengthen its independence. Thus, any
appropriations for Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year, and after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
Section 4. Composition; En Banc and Division Cases
11.8 Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)
Facts:On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution
which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its
March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after
the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
ISSUE:Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and
prerogatives?
HELD: No.The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it
impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be
referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While there is
nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed
by law, rule or regulation. Main point: The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it

being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

11.9 People v. Dy, GR 115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003

Facts: Antecedent facts are as follows: On or about 12 January 1994, in Baguio, and within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually aiding one
another, did then and there willfully and taking advantage of the unconscious state of the
complainant who was then under the influence of drugs, have carnal knowledge of Gina
Marie Mobley against her will and consent. Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and
Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts
decision which affirmed the judgment of Baguio RTC, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape
and acts of lasciviousness.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Courts decision was only recommendatory.
Held: Under Section 4(1), Article 8 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc
or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made
up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered
as separate and distinct courts. Main point:The divisions are not to be considered as
separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court

11.10 People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004

FACTS: Gerry Ebio was a convicted rapist who abused his own daughter, Dory Ebio. On April
2000, Dory Ebio was preparing to sleep in the sala, then Gerry who was at that time drunk,
Armed with a six inch blade-like instrument, Gerry ordered her to undress and threatened to
kill her if she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and panty. Gerry
also took off his shorts, mounted her and had carnal knowledge of her. She was silent during
the sexual assault because of the threat to her life. After the assault she put on her panty
and shorts lay down and continued crying inside the room. On 14 October 2002, Gerry Ebio
was convicted by the Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer death
penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seven concurring justices constituted a quorum of a 14- member
court?
RULING: Yes. (The constitution does not expressly state the number of justices required to
present to constitute a quorum of the court en banc) BUT in case of doubt in a criminal case,
especially where the punishment imposed is death penalty, THE DOUBT SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the
Court en banc.; MAIN POINT: Since it was a capital criminal case, the court ruled that there
should beeight justices (not 7 or merely half of the 14 justices).
11.11 Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000
Facts: The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering forestland.
X wanted to intervene believing that if Ds title would be annulled and after declassification
of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the property would become
valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of Ds title would allegedly pave
the way for his free patent application.
Issue: Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.
Held: No. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character
and not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct
operation of the judgment. Main point: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc