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The new class war

Excluding the working class in 21st-century Britain
Is Britains working class already lost to a vicious cycle of political disengagement and
exclusion? Geoffrey Evans and James Tilley outline the terms of a new class war
against the working class, based on its shrinking share of the population, low political
participation rates and the decreasing return it provides to electoral vote-chasers.
The mid-20th century saw the rise of the working class. Whether you were
an angry young man of the 1950s literary scene, or a working-class hero
of 60s pop culture, it was good to be working class. People were proud of
their working-class status and working-class background.
But times have changed. Today, the politics and social norms of 21stcentury Britain are about working-class marginalisation rather than workingclass pride. The factors that have underpinned this change have led to
political disillusion and non-participation. They have also, though to a lesser
degree, boosted support for non-mainstream parties like Ukip among the
working class, as they have increasingly been deserted by mainstream
politicians. How and why has this happened?

Relatively worse off: a new picture of class by

comparison
Class has held the central position in studies of British politics since early
research into voting behaviour conducted in the 1960s. Most academics
since then have focussed on the descriptive question of whether class
voting has declined and the implications for politics of this decline. The
main argument made is that class no longer matters, that the distinctions
between the working and middle classes have blurred, and that
individualisation is the key attribute of modern, post-industrial societies.
As a result, parties no longer need to connect with differences in interests
between classes. The blurring of social divisions has produced a blurring
of political divisions.
However, these claims do not fit well with the facts. The most significant
feature of the post-industrial class structure is not its disappearance, but
the changing sizes of its classes. Inequalities have not only survived but
have in some respects increased. Although attention has been focussed
on the growth of a socially microscopic but financially bloated super-rich
group, the more substantial political change has been in the relative size
of the working class.

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Using data from the British Election Study, figure 1 shows the numbers
of people in different occupational social classes over time. It is quite
clear that whereas the main point of division in the past was between
a large and fairly homogenous working class and a small middle class,
now it is between a larger group of heterogeneous middle classes and
a smaller working class. There are now more people in the new middle
class (essentially professional workers, many in the public sector) than
in the working class. The transition from a majority working-class society
to a minority working-class society has multiple implications: some
psychological, some political.
Figure 1
fdd

The changing shape of the occupational

class structure in Britain

60%
Working class
Old middle class
New middle class

40%

20%

0%
1955

1975

1995

2015

Source: British Election Survey

Note: The working class are people in manual jobs (including foremen). The old middle class comprises small
employers, managers and self-employed professionals. The new middle class is made up of professional
employees. Not shown are people with routine non-manual jobs (a relatively constant 20 per cent of the population), self-employed people without employees (about 5 per cent of the population) and personal service
workers (about 5 per cent of the population). People are classified by their current job, or previous job if they
are not in work. Those who have never worked are classified by their spouses occupation if that is possible.

One key idea here is relative group size. The concept of relative
deprivation was used by Gary Runciman to interpret why people
accepted class inequalities in the big working class Britain of the
1960s, but has until now not been used to understand new class
divisions. Gauging relative deprivation requires a reference group against

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which social comparisons can be made. In the mid-20th century, when

the working class was the numerically dominant group in society in the
1950s manual workers made up nearly 60 per cent of the population
the presence of a small elite was not a major source of negative social
comparison. To be working class is not problematic when most people
are in the same situation. However, as the class structure has changed
shape, leaving a smaller group at the bottom of the hierarchy, it has
become difficult to avoid more unfavourable comparisons.
This process parallels that identified in Samuel Stouffers classic studies
of the US military. When about half of US air force personnel were
promoted, those who were not responded negatively, because they
felt left behind. By comparison, only one in 10 of the military police
were promoted, so for those who missed out it was less of a problem
to have failed. To extend this analogy: people of the working class
previously accepted their situation on the basis of comparison with the
majority of the population, when the majority of the population lived in
similar circumstances. That is no longer the case. To be working class
nowadays is to be, in effect, a loser in a more unequal and socially
differentiated society.
This does not refer only to the obvious lack of resources: it has a
psychological component as well. We know that people typically make
social comparisons that enhance their self-esteem. The majority of the
population now has an identifiable minority group typically referred
to as the white working class that can be legitimately looked down
upon. This is especially so in a society where interracial or interfaith
disparagement is at best discouraged and at worst illegal.

To be working
class is not
problematic
when most
people are in the
same situation.
However, as the
class structure
has changed
shape, leaving a
smaller group at
the bottom of the
hierarchy, it has
become difficult
to avoid more
unfavourable
comparisons.

The twist in the tale is that, psychologically, it is less costly for those in
disadvantaged situations to see such outcomes as just. In consequence,
it is often the disadvantaged themselves who are most critical of others
who are disadvantaged, adding a further source of negative appraisal.
So although the working class in Britain has not (yet) been self-defined in
the white trash vernacular that many in the US seem to have accepted,
we do find, for example, that the harshest critics of people on welfare
are often those who are by dint of their class position most vulnerable
to having to claim it themselves. Whereas 40 per cent of people with
working-class occupations agree that many people on welfare benefits
should not be helped, this is only true of 20 per cent of those in
professional occupations.
This kind of punitive, or at least unreceptive, perspective is not
restricted to welfare. Changing attitudes to social issues that are badges
of progress for many on the progressive left are anathema to many in the
working class. As the bulk of the educated middle-class population have
become more liberal, the views of the working class have become more
distinctively divorced from mainstream opinion, especially with regards
to the issues of immigration and EU integration. At the same time, class
divisions around economic issues remain robust. Peoples views on the
market economy are still consistently related to class, with the working
class wanting more interventionist and redistributive policies.

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To put it bluntly, poor people want the state to be redistributive and

protectionist, and rich people dont.

on The centre-ground: Towards a Classless

politics?
Overall, the changing size of Britains social classes has either not affected
the distinctiveness of those classes in terms of their political views, or it
has exacerbated those differences. Rather, it is the changing distribution
of voters that has produced a shift of focus towards the political centre
by those who seek votes. The Labour party found it could no longer
base its electoral success primarily on working-class support, and the
Conservative party responded, eventually, in part by targeting this same
centre-ground. In some respects, then, we have seen a compression
of the range of views represented in Westminster. This is not a new
conclusion, but many of its implications have remained unexamined.
In the 1990s, both left and right claimed Britain was witnessing the end
of class politics. John Major, shortly after taking over leadership of the
Conservative party in 1990, declared he wanted to produce a genuinely
classless society, and by 1997 John Prescott, as deputy leader of the
Labour party, claimed that in essence this aim had been met, as were all
middle class now. While pronouncements by politicians are not always
known for their sagacity, mainstream British electoral politics has indeed
edged towards classlessness.
Traditionally, politics has been seen as a clash between the economic left
that favours redistribution and public ownership and one broadly on the
right that favours the free market and a greater acceptance of income
inequalities. In this world, Labour attracted working-class voters and the
Conservatives middle-class voters this is something of a caricature, to
be sure, but even in 1992 it was still a broadly accurate description of
electoral behaviour.
Figure 2, however, shows how support for Labour changed between the
early 1980s and the last election in 2010, by class and income. Up to
1992, less than a quarter of professional and managerial workers (the
salariat) supported Labour, compared to over 50 per cent of manual
workers (the working class). By 1997 this had all changed, and has
remained so ever since. Tony Blair famously said he wanted to take class
out of British politics, and he did. When his government was re-elected
in 2001 with another sweeping victory, the gap between the salariat and
working class, which was about 30 per cent in 1992, had fallen to less
than 10 per cent, a level at which it has essentially remained.
The key point is that differences between classes have not changed
over time, but the connections between class and party choice have
weakened markedly and swiftly, most dramatically in the 199497 period
when the main parties converged on policy. And its timing suggests that
this decline of class-based voting was driven by Labours shift to the
political centre-ground.

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The key point is

that differences
between classes
have not changed
over time, but
the connections
between class
and party choice
have weakened
markedly and
swiftly, most
dramatically
in the 199497
period when the
main parties
converged on
policy.

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Figure 2
fdd

Closing the class gap

Voter support for the Labour party, by occupational class and income quintile, 19832010

60%

Labour party support

40%

20%
Working class
Salariat
Difference

0%

10

20

00

20

90

19

80

19

-20%

-40%

60%

Labour party support

40%

20%
Bottom income quintile
Top income quintile
Difference

0%

10

20

00

20

90

19

80

19

-20%

-40%

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey

Note: These figures are based on a combined measure of party identification and vote intention. The
working class are people with manual jobs. The salariat comprises managers and professionals. People
are classified by their current job, or previous job if they are not in work. Those who have never worked are
classified by their spouses occupation if that is possible. Income refers to household income.

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The process of political convergence has in part been facilitated by

extensive use of techniques for assessing public opinion that enable a
precise strategic focus on the median voter. However, it also derives from
the increasing domination of the higher ranks of political parties and most
importantly, in this context, of the Labour party of professional politicians
with middle-class backgrounds, a university education (archetypally of the
Oxbridge variety), and the values associated with such milieu. Increasingly,
politicians are socially alien to working-class voters and, of course, vice
versa: those politicians are likely to neither understand nor approve of
many of the preferences of working-class voters. The modern left and its
activists are particularly unreceptive to unfashionable views criticising
multiculturalism and mass immigration. It is not only former Labour prime
ministers, per Gordon Browns infamous aside, who view the working
(wo)man as a bigot; the professional left have never really wanted to believe
that the group they champion can hold such unenlightened positions.

A vicious circle of exclusion: is it too late?

Thus, we have seen a perfect storm, whereby ideological strategy and
social selection have resulted in the exclusion of the presence and
preferences of working-class people from the political mainstream. This
lack of representation has consequences. As the major parties have
become more similar, we have seen increasing electoral volatility and
increasing support for minor parties. We have also seen decreasing turnout,
concentrated among exactly those whose views are now most poorly
represented by the traditional parties: the working class, the poor and the
less well educated. Poorer people have always been less likely than richer
people to vote, but historically this difference has been very small. Yet in
2010 nearly 45 per cent of the poorest fifth of the population did not vote at
the general election, compared to only 20 per cent of the richest fifth.
This rise in non-voting among the disadvantaged reinforces their lack of
representation. Since parties seek to win elections, they are less likely to
care about chasing the votes of groups that dont turn up to the polling
booth on election day. This vicious circle depends on whether those who
have stopped voting can be persuaded to return, or if once participation
stops it is difficult to rekindle. The failure of the disadvantaged to reverse
the fall in electoral participation that occurred during the Blair years which
echoes the pattern that still holds in the US after the Democrats deserted
their own white, working-class constituency points rather depressingly to
this latter outcome.

We have seen a
perfect storm,
whereby
ideological
strategy and
social selection
have resulted
in the exclusion
of the presence
and preferences
of working-class
people from
the political
mainstream.

Alternatively, perhaps the entry of protest parties with appeal for workingclass voters into the election equation could provide a stimulus for the
left to resurrect its appeal to the working class. Labour could choose
to differentiate itself on more traditional class lines, and thus renew the
working-class basis for their support. However, if we use the latest data
from the British Election Survey to look closely at the support for Ukip we
can see that they are attracting voters from both the working class, where
support runs at around 2025 per cent, and also from more Thatcherite
small employers and the self-employed, who display identical levels

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of support. This certainly does not look like a simple case of the white
working class supporting Ukip. Indeed, much of their support comes
from Conservative heartlands. Most crucially, however, the arrival of Ukip
does not appear to have encouraged non-voters to return to politics.
Instead, the partys support overwhelmingly is taken from other parties
and primarily from the Conservatives (44 per cent in the latest British
Election Survey pre-election poll). The pressure on Labour to compete for
left behind voters is not there.
The processes we have described here are strikingly different from those
assumed by many academics who have commented on the evolving
nature of class politics. Many have simply asserted the disappearance
of class divisions on the evidence of declining levels of class voting. But
the shape of Britains classes is the real driver. People reference their lives
against those immediately around them when their group is large, so they
do not feel deprived or socially inferior. That belief is harder to maintain
when they are a low-status minority in a more differentiated society. At the
same time, those above them now have a target group to look down on.
Most importantly of all, this differentiation is reflected and reinforced in a
cycle of political non-participation and exclusion, as those who represent
them become socially distant and seek their winning voter coalitions
elsewhere. In that sense, the new class war is not being waged by the
working class but against them.

Differentiation
is reflected and
reinforced in a
cycle of political
non-participation
and exclusion,
as those who
represent the
working class
become socially
distant and seek
their winning
voter coalitions
elsewhere.

Geoffrey Evans is professor of the sociology of politics at the University of

Oxford, and an official fellow in politics, Nuffield College, Oxford. He is a
co-director of the 2015 British Election Study. His recent publications include
Political Choice Matters: Explaining the strength of class and religious
cleavages in cross-national context (OUP, 2013).
James Tilley is a university lecturer in the department of politics and
international relations at the University of Oxford and a fellow of Jesus College,
Oxford. His recent publications include Blaming Europe: Responsibility without
accountability (OUP, 2014).
The research reported here will appear in the authors forthcoming book,
TheNew Class War: The political and social marginalization of the British
working class, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2016.

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