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Rabindranath S.

Polito
USC Law
Constitutional Law I
Case Digests: The 1987 Constitution
Lawyers League vs. Aquino (May 22, 1986)
FACTS
1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."
ISSUE
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
As early as April 10, 1986, the Court had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the
reasons to be stated below:
1. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and
73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by
extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All
the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ (October 24, 1986)
Facts
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the
provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: The six-year term of
the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992, refers to the
then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the
previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the
winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the
infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and
Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.

Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or
the previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of
Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his
allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge, and the people have made judgment.
It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon
of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election.
DE LEON vs ESGUERRA ( AUGUST 31, 1987)
Facts
This is an original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin
respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
On May 17, 1982, petitioners won the brgy. Election under the Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982 with Alfredo M. De Leon as the elected
Brgy Kap and the rest of the as Bgry Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Gov. Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government." The Petitioners maintain
that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.However, the respondents
contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision: Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986.

... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the
Provisional Constitution.

Issues
Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized?
Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the
actual plebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement.
Held
YES. The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has
been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus,
the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the
candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1987, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was
antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still
within the one year deadline, the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must
be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article 18 of the 1987 Constitution reading:
"Sec.27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By
that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section
2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners. ******* Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially
considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee
and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of
political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to
"general supervision" over local governments (Art 10, Sec. 4). Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of
the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years. Until
the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office
of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6)
years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be
considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article 18 of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution states "the act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that
"the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was
done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the
official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in
adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
Therefore, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of
the voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution.

In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno (June 29, 1992)


Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated
Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the
CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA
on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and
became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then
appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice
in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the
entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening
Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA.
However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that
the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres.
Aquino. The court en banc granted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later
filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that
the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been
appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that
would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.
Held:
NO. The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was
created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of
the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as
as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it
is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct
exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of
Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was
overthrown by the Aquino government. A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity.
Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where
the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a
reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to
locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution,
comprise the legal order of that constitutional state. It is assumed that the legal order
remains as a culture system of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point
may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is
no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials.
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the

Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials,
revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect,
had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members
of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made
by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

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