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Neglible
Slight
Moderate
Serious
Very serious
Environment: -
Operations: -
Severity
3
10
12
15
12
16
20
10
15
20
25
Low
High
Low
Extremely
Improbable
1
'
An accident could only
occur under freak conditions
Improbable
2
Possible
The accident may occur if an additional event
takes place.
Probability
Probable
4
High
Highly probable
5
This value is based on the "ease" of detection of a failure. The number of Levels is 5,
1 = easy detection / failure is obvious,
5 = unlikely to detect before operational use or fails in service without warning.
i.e. n = 1 to 5.
Certain
or Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very low
Failure of emergency/backup system during operation or failure apparent only when it causes other systems fail
(eg chamber flow fuse fails to operate after external pipework failure)
(eg scrubber
Use to the "Failure Detection Probability" value (n=1 to 5) calculate the Risk Priority Number "RPN" for an Item
A high RPN ranking will also be an strong indication that changes are required to the SOP, PMS and critical spares compliment on the system.
Severity Ratings:
Numerical Value:
Negligable
1
No absence from work
Environment: -
Operations: -
Short or no delay in
operations. Trivial asset
damage
Low
Probability Ratings:
Numerical Value:
Extremely Improbable
1
An accident could only
occur under freak
conditions
Failure Detection
'
Probability Rating:
Numerical Value:
Note:
'This is an
Ranking -
High
Certain
1
Obvious failure - visually
Risk Index
Information:
RI <= 2.250 is
OK.
Select value of nMax.
Suggest nMax. = 5 or 10
Reject Solution, Situation
Unacceptable / Do not
Operate
Do Not Use! / Suspend Pending
Review / Advise Management
Restrict Use, Operate with
Extreme Caution if it is
necessary to continue
operations.
Operate with Caution
OK to Operate!
Acceptable Solution
OK! Acceptable for
Operations:
RI = < 1.000 is not a valid resul
n = 1 to 5
RI Value as % of nmax.
5.000
100.00%
2.875
62.50%
2.625
57.50%
2.375
52.50%
2.250
50.00%
1.750
40.00%
0.750
20.00%
1.000
0.00%
Each element's score a, b and c is obtained from our understanding and expertise of the it
transformed in to the new synthetic evaluation index RI, which is a numerical value indicat
view point of control technology (and safety).
The Optimal RI
If we accept the optimal score of each element is 50% of the Max Score of n = 5, then the
exceed 2.5, the current control measures are considered to pass FMEA / FMECA assessmen
evaluation smoothly.
a=2.5, b=2.5, c=2.5 Which of course will provide an RI of 2.500 which in this evaluation w
Optimal RI value can be "tightened" up to a smaller number e.g. 2.000 or 2.250 if circumst
If operational requirements dictate a lower level of risk, the Optimal score can be recalcula
Optimum Risk Index value. If this is done and we are using a range of n = 1 to 5, any calc
between 2 and 5 requires further treatment, management or reengineering.
Changing the Optimal RI % of the applied range will (of course) require
The Necessity for Special Index and Formula to include "Detectability Probability
However, it is difficult for the case where the combination of a score is
a= 3, b= 3, c= 1 - Here we have 2 values which are relatively high and a low number, loo
result is 18 which again is looking high, however taking the cubed root of the product we h
Reducing our RI (Risk Index) back to a scale of n = 1 to 5 is considerably more manageable
expertise and knowledge in the 3 areas we are considering to produce a viable and reliable
The following formula will be obtained when this problem is dealt with using control techno
i.e. we are calculating the cube root of Probability x Severity x Detectio
formula is written as RI = POWER( (S * P * DP),1/3) e.g. using cell refe
You can substitute the element scores into this expression and get a synthetic evaluation s
The Reason for the Dimensional Return
The elements a, b, and c are one-dimensional values which show the necessity for measur
the necessity for measures, the three-dimensional value needs to be returned to a one-dim
(Probability x Severity x Detection Probability) as described above.
Discussion of the Reason for the one-dimensional value
The calculation of RI should not make an arithmetic average but a cubic average. This is be
Additionally, by performing this calculation (finding the cubed root of the product) the resu
and context as the original values. i.e. n = 1 to 5 in our case
Even if operational necessities dictated the requirement for n = 1 to 1
still remain in the context of n = 1 to 10 (if calculated as the cubed root of the product). A
score (5) as the Optimal RI value. (An RI of 4 could also be considered if circumstances dic
and need to be decided upon to fit the context in which they are being used, to create prac
outcomes while at the same time being represented in a simple and intuitive fashion so as
Severity
Low
Slight
Moderate
High
Serious
Very serious
Possible permanent
disability, possible fatality
Operation
delayed/Degraded.
Moderate asset damage.
Probability
Low
High
Improbable
Possible
Probable
Highly Probable
An accident may occur if an The accident could easily If work continues there wi
additional event takes
be caused by environmental almost certainly be an
place.
conditions, platform
accident
instability, vibration or
human carelessness.
Detectability
High
High
Medium
Low
Low
Very Low
Enter
Risk Index
Optimum as a %
below
Manual Entry !
where
"RI" = (Prob x Severity x Det. Prob.)1/3
45.0%
Range
< = 5.000 & >
Range 2.875
< = 2.875 & >
Range 2.625
Range
Range
FDP
2.5
OK to Operate!
Acceptable Solution
erstanding and expertise of the item of equipment or the process we are studying, these scores are
which is a numerical value indicating the degree of lack (i.e., additional need) of control measures f
the Max Score of n = 5, then the Optimal RI is 2.5. When each element obtains the score which do
to pass FMEA / FMECA assessment. For example, the failure mode that obtains the score shown bel
he Optimal score can be recalculated to 40% (for example) of the Max Score of "n MAX", this will lowe
ng a range of n = 1 to 5, any calculated RI between 1 and 2 will be considered to be acceptable an
nt or reengineering.
plied range will (of course) require recalculating of the "Risk Index Information" column as shown ab
atively high and a low number, looking at them makes subjective judgement difficult, multiplied toge
he cubed root of the product we have a result of 2.080 which is < 2.5 and there for an acceptable v
is considerably more manageable than working on a scale of n = 1 to 125 (5x5x5) and requires mu
ng to produce a viable and reliable answer.
ch show the necessity for measures. In order similarly for RI to serve as a one-dimensional value wh
needs to be returned to a one-dimensional value. We achieve this by taking the Cubed Root of the
ed above.
age but a cubic average. This is because each score a, b, and c have a mutually different meaning.
ubed root of the product) the resulting answer remains a meaningful and practical number in the sa
case
ated the requirement for n = 1 to 10 for probability, Severity & Detectability, the resultant RI value w
the cubed root of the product). Additionally, it would be practical to select the median value of eac
be considered if circumstances dictated tightening up the criteria, remember all these values are su
hey are being used, to create practical, efficient and economic solutions, which will produce optima
simple and intuitive fashion so as not to confuse management.)
ref. http://www.geocities.jp/takaro_u/fmea_eng.html#c6-5
Enter
Values
y serious
e or more fatalities
Selecte
d
w!
SH&S =
3
or uncontrolled release
ending beyond worksite.
ious pollution for > than
months
FDP
SE =
2.3
SO =
1
hly Probable
P=
y Low
ure of a system or an
ergency backup system
ng operation with the
ure apparent only when it
ses other systems fail
(e.g.
mber flow fuse fails to
rate after external
ework failure)
FDP =
x Det. Prob.)
1/3
where
"RI" = (Prob x Severity x Det. Prob.)1/3
RI
FDP
RI
2.466
2.621
olution
MAX
(the excel
ifferent meaning.
l number in the same range
g.html#c6-5
RI
2.621
Caution
General Guidance:
http://www.weibull.com/basics/fmea_fig1.htm
Abbreviations
ABS
ASME
AODC
BIBS
CO2
CO
DDC
RCL
DESIGN
ECU
FMEA
FMECA
FSW
HeO2
HP
H2S
HLB
ID
IMCA
IOGP
LARS
LSP
LR
LP
MSW
Nitrox
OD
O2
P & ID
PMS
Sat.
PVHO
RPN
SWL
SPF
SWR
SDC
TUP
TUPC