Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Aranas vs. Mercado, Gr. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 Facts
Aranas vs. Mercado, Gr. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 Facts
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this
case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and
the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties
mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the
mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the
title of the mortgagor.
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an
aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
that transpired.
xxx
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
2. The Stringent Standard for a Declaration of Presumptive Death has not been fully
substantiated.
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred
from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients
directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search
for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for
him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her
husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of
the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the
aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouses bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouses
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries
were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that
she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she
had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and
the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
January 9, 2013
union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a
spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations
and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established
for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure,
the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores
further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a
good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court cannot support.
Affinity may also be defined as the relation which one spouse because of marriage has
to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage
between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of
affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one.
The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wifes blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa. Indeed, there is no affinity between the blood relatives of
one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his
wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes brother. There is no affinity between the
husbands brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis.
2. In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity
in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of
Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a
relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to
the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not
related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the
aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas
aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not
disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
Whether, based on the compromise agreement entered into by the parents (Beckett and Eltesa)
which was confirmed by the court, constitutes res judicata in a judgment involving custody of a
minor child.
Held: No.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr., in favor of his
mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the
legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the
child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential
command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of
custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, is not permanent and unalterable [and] an
always be re-examined and adjusted. And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v.
Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as permanent and unbending, the
simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that
sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real
sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and
effect of res judicata.
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents evidence (the
testimonial evidence of the owner of apartment, the Baptismal Certificate, the Birth Certificate
which however does not contain the necessary signature of petitioner) sufficiently proved that
her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Held: Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit A-1) of Christian Paulo Salas
in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly,
it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she
claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it
has
no
probative
value
to
establish
filiation
to
the
alleged
father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as
the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect
to
the
childs
paternity.
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters,
hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment
unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits E and F showing petitioner and respondent inside the
rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account (Exhibit C)
from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the
payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondents
child
as
an
act
of
charity.
As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten
instrument
signed
by
the
parent
concerned.
The trial court ruled that the public documents presented by petitioner, i.e. Marriage Certificate
between him and respondent; Marriage Certificate between respondent and Raymond
Arambulo; Death Certificate of Raymond Arambulo; and Certification from the NSO stating that
respondent indeed contracted two marriages while the first one was still subsisting, were not
competent proofs to establish the nullity of the second marriage as the NSO Officer did not
physically appear before the court to make her testimony. A motion for reconsideration was
denied through an Order.
Issue: whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.
Held: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the
sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they
deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither
the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage,16 which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of
the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely
establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted
a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there
was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the
time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said
date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved;
and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and
void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
Gr. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
Joyce Ardiente, Petitioner vs. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de
Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., Respondents
Facts:
Petitioner Ardiente and Spouses Pastorfide entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
wherein the latter undertakes to pay the amount of Php 70,000.00 as consideration of a unit
held by the former at Emily Homes Balulang, Cagayan De Oro City. It was also stipulated in the
MOA that electric and water bills will now be transferred on the account of Pastorfide. However,
the conflict aroused when petitioner, without informing respondents, requested that the water
line of the latter be cut off by Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD). COWD on its part,
without due notice, acceded to petitioners request. When Ma. Theresa learned of such
transaction, she paid the water bills at the instant and requested that their water line be reconnected. However, despite such payment, Manager Gonzales failed to fulfil his obligation.
Complaint for damages were filed before the RTC by respondents against Ardiente and COWD.
The trial court ruled in favour of the spouses Pastorfide. On appeal, the CA affirmed said ruling.
Issue: Whether, despite the stipulation in the MOA between Petitioner Ardiente and Respondent
Spouses Pastorfide that the latter will undertake to have the water account to their names and
despite failure to do so, Ardiente may still be held liable for abuse of rights under Article 19 of
the New Civil Code.
Held: Yes. Ardiente may still be held liable.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to
cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner
when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply without warning
or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was
based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses
Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is
the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was
clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad
faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
On January 23, 2004, Petitioner Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Marinay in the
Philippines. However, the marriage did not go well with them because of petitioners parents.
Fujiki could not therefore bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. Eventually, the two lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese national, Maekara and in the same year, they got
married in Quezon City. Marinay went with Maekara to Japan. However, Marinay suffered
physical abuse in the hands of Maekara and so she left him and started to contact Fujiki again.
Marinay and Fujiki were able to establish their relationship again and through Fujikis help,
Marinay was able to obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared her
marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
of Quezon City fo the recognition of the said foreign judgment obtained in Japan.
The RTC dismissed the petition based on the ground that according to AM No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of absolute Nullity of Void Marriages) because according to said court, the
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. In this case, Fujiki was not considered to
be the husband being referred to in the law thus, he has no legal personality.
Issue: Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
Held: Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouses right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
July 3, 2013
2. the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one
that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack
of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G.,
4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the
provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage
to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and
Azucena.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
3. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys
Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x."
4. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove coownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favour of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on coownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties
acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be
governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by
the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that therein respondents
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as
it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. In the same light, the Court, in the case of
Pesca v. Pesca (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed,
both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as
to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the petitioner therein
had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;
that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been
proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."
The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1wphi1 Based on the evidence presented,
there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
August 7, 2013
shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject
properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name.
The RTC ruled that the subject transaction was an equitable mortgage, that the subject
properties were exclusive properties of Rosario, and that the action has already prescribed. The
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling except that it reversed its finding as to the nature of the properties.
The CA held that the properties were conjugal.
Issue: Whether the nature of the subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario thereby
allowing her to dispose of the same without any inhibitions or whether they pertain to the
conjugal properties of Rosario and her deceased husband thereby entitling the children to retain
their ownership therewith.
Held: The subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latters death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over
the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario
Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence
was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the
coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover,
Rosarios declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the
subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same.
Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTCs finding that the subject
properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
Rationale: Article 160 of the Civil Code xxx states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must,
however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held
in Go v. Yamane:
x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal
partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of
when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be
rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof
of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
3. Affinity denotes the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is
a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and
family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such
as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as in-laws,
or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.
Affinity may also be defined as the relation which one spouse because of marriage has
to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage
between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of
affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one.
The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wifes blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa. Indeed, there is no affinity between the blood relatives of
one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his
wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes brother. There is no affinity between the
husbands brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis.
4. In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity
in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of
Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a
relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to
the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not
related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the
aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas
aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not
disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
Issue: Who between the parties has a better right over the subject lots?
Held: The Court ruled in favor of Opinion.
xxx the Court recognizes "[t]he settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact
that the [properties] involved [were] duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the
fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land."
This Court also treats Opinion as a buyer in good faith. Admittedly, Opinion stated that prior to
the execution of the mortgage, he only went to Lots 20 and 21 once and saw that the properties
had occupants. He likewise admitted that he never talked to the spouses Vilbar and Guingon to
determine the nature of their possession of the properties, but merely relied on the
representation of Gorospe, Sr. that the occupants were mere tenants. He never bothered to
request for any kind of proof, documentary or otherwise, to confirm this claim. Nevertheless, this
Court agrees with the CA that Opinion is not required to go beyond the Torrens title, viz:
Contrary to the [Spouses Vilbars] claim, [Opinion] was never remiss in his duty of ensuring that
the Gorospes had clean title over the property. [Opinion] had even conducted an investigation.
He had, in this regard, no reason not to believe in the assurance of the Gorospes, more so that
the claimed right of [Spouses Vilbar] was never annotated on the certificate of title covering lot
20, because it is settled that a party dealing with a registered land does not have to inquire
beyond the Certificate of Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or
protecting his interest, for all that he has to look into and rely on are the entries in the Certificate
of Title.87
Inarguably, Opinion acted in good faith in dealing with the registered owners of the properties.
He relied on the titles presented to him, which were confirmed by the Registry of Deeds to be
authentic, issued in accordance with the law, and without any liens or encumbrances
G.R. No. 190106
Issue: When there is a clear showing that the land in question is owned by the third party
claimants (Spouses Garcia) while the building thereon is owned by the FGCI, does ownership
vests only upon one of them?
Held: No. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby,
or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially,32 such rule is not
without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the
principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the
presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of
cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and brushed aside
the rule that accessory follows the principal.
In Carbonilla v. Abiera, we denied the claim of petitioner that, as the owner of the land, he is
likewise the owner of the building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to buttress
his position:
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there
can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he
failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession
of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
(Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as
proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos
were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against
respondents proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioners evidence pales in
comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.34
xxx
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted
with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot,
it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are
factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are
owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as
the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
Issue: Whether Spouses Sarili, in building a house on the subject property of the case, having
knowledge of the fact of the irregularity in their Deed of Sale, may be considered as builders in
good faith within the contemplation of the New Civil Code?
Held: The Spouses are not builders in good faith.
The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built 59 on the
subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452,
and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code which respectively read as follows:
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the
proper rent.
ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from
the builder, planter or sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the
necessary expenses of preservation of the land.
xxxx
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. 60 Good faith is an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 61 As for
Sps. Sarili, they knew or at the very least, should have known from the very beginning that
they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property
considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPAs acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on
said document and without any further investigation on Ramoss capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still
chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing it
cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title
or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad
faith under legal contemplation. The case is therefore remanded to the court a quo for the
proper application of the above-cited Civil Code provisions.
MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights and interests under him, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known
as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The property has a total land
area of 156 hectares and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name of Carmel
Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and
(64007) 15807. The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by
the titles above-mentioned.
On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D.
293), which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the
members of the Malacaang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). On the basis of said
Decree, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied
Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On the other hand, respondent was
constrained to allow the members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village.
On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason,
Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice
and the National Treasurer (Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab
initio in all its parts.
By virtue of an affidavit executed by Pelagio Juan in favour of petitioner (but only after 7 years
from the time the Tuazon ruling was promulgated), petitioner built structures on the subject lot
and actually occupied the same. The respondent, after an unheeded demand, was constrained
to file a case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. The MTC ruled in favour of the
respondents and ordered the petitioner to vacate the property. On appeal, the RTC reversed
MTCs ruling. The CA, on further appeal, reversed the ruling of the RTC and reinstated that of
the MTC.
Issue: Whether Petitioner Millarosa is a builder in good faith .
Held: Negative.
Petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in good faith. Petitioner also argues that he is a
builder in good faith for want of knowledge of any infirmity in the promulgation of P.D. 293. Being
a builder in good faith, he believes that he is entitled to the reimbursement of his useful
expenses and that he has a right to retain possession of the premises, pending reimbursement
of the value of his improvements to be proven during trial, in accordance with Article 545 of the
Civil Code.
Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good faith. A
builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that
by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his
title. Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his
predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years after Tuason
was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all
judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be on one hand, x x x
matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia. legis non excusat. He thus loses
whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance with Article 449
of the Civil Code.
onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held
in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa L9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495."14 In the same case, we emphasized the retention of the
treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: "The same rules apply under the New Civil Code
as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed."15
We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming
the property forP15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable
consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will
govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous
portion of the donation.
2. No, the petitioner does not have the right to have the donation pertaining to the
gratuitous portion cancelled.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation
exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the
provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation.
She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the
ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them.
Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister
who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the
purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.
proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or
insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues. Relief under
said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or hat there is
no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the
controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such ruling. Therefore,
petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529.
August 5, 2013
Facts:
An unnotarized Deed of Sale was executed by Alberto Garcia in favour of Juanito Muertegui
over a parcel of unregistered land located in Biliran, Leyte del Norte in 1981. Juanito;s father
Domingo Muertegui, Sr. And brother Domingo Jr. Took actual possession of the lot and planted
thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on said lot. However,
in the year 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C.
Sabitsana, Jr., through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds and a new Certificate of Title was thereafter issued in the name of Atty.
Sabitsana. The heirs of Domingo Sr., when the latter passed away, applied for registration of the
lot under the Public Land Act. The same was opposed by Atty. Sabitsana.
Issue:
1. Whether the action to quiet title is lodged with first level courts considering the fact that
the assessed value of the land is only Php 1,230.00.
2. What law applies to the case at bar? Is it Article 1544 of the New civil Code or Act 3344?
3. Pursuant to the proper law applicable to the case at bar, who, then is the rightful owner
of the subject lot?
Held:
1.xxx an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed
value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title
to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners August 24,
1998 letter-opposition to respondents application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a
cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to
obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
2.What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that
any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
3.Respondent has a better right to the lot.
The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of
sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991,
or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while
the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia
was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale
between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public
document under the Civil Code, is only for convenience, and not for validity or
enforceability. And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no
longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.
Nor can petitioners registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanitos rights. The mere
registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was
no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier
sale was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null
and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
August 7, 2013
In this case, no less than the trial court in Civil Case No. C-169 declared that the petitioner not
only acted in bad faith, but also violated the Constitution:
And the Court cannot disregard the fact that despite persistent urging by the defendants for a
negotiated settlement of the properties taken by plaintiff before the present action was filed,
plaintiff failed to give even the remaining UNAWARDED lots for the benefit of herein defendants
who are still the registered owners. Instead, plaintiff opted to expropriate them after having
taken possession of said properties for almost fourteen (14) years.
xxx
Again, it was already established that the NHA acted in bad faith.The NHA also raised the same
issue in G.R. No. 143230. Having established that the NHA acted in bad faith, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the award of damages and attorneys fees to respondents.
The issue of reimbursement was also raised in G.R. No. 143230 where the NHA alleged that the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that it was a builder in bad faith and therefore, not
entitled to reimbursement of the improvement it introduced on the property. Article 449 of the
Civil Code applies in this case. It states:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Thus, under Article 449 of the Civil Code, the NHA is not entitled to be reimbursed of the
expenses incurred in the development of respondents property.
comparison of the technical description of the land covered by the title of petitioner and the
technical description of the land covered by the title of Baello shows that they are not the same.
TCT No. 285312 registered in the name of petitioner reads:
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan Psd-706, LRC x x x situated in
Balintawak, Caloocan, Rizal. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the
SE., along line 2-3 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of the subd. plan and on the SW., NW., along
line 3-4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6, Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 69 deg.
07E.,
1,306.21m. from BLLM No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46W., 25.16 m. to point 2; S 65 deg.
116.78 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 12W., 23.85 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 57E. 127.39 m. to the
point of beginning; containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
SQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,834.80) more or less. All pts. referred
to are indicated on plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. old points bearings true; date of
original survey, Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922.33
On the other hand, TCT No. (35788) 12754, registered in the name of respondent Dolores
Baello, states:
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, bounded and described as follows:
Un terreno (Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano
original Psu-2345 de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de
Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal. Linda por el NE, con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por
el SE, con el lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision; por el SO, con el Lote No. 7; y por el NO,
con propiedad de Ramos Dane (Lote No. 1). x x x midiendo una extension superficial de DOS
MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CUATRO METROS CUADRADOS CON OCHENTA
DECIMETROS (2,834.80) mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original, 8 al 27 de
Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911, y de la subdivision 29 de
Diciembre de 1924. (Full technical description appears on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
10300/T-42).34
From the foregoing, the title of petitioner covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706, while the title of respondent Baello covers a parcel of land
referred to as Lot No. 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706. It should be pointed out that the
verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A based on its technical description showed that Lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A is the lot being occupied by Uniwide. 35 Baello claims that her Lot No. 3-A is
the same as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. However, the claim cannot be given credence because of
the disparity of the lot description, and the technical description of the land covered by Baellos
title shows that it is not the same as the technical description of the land covered by petitioners
title. Moreover, the technical description of the land covered by Baellos title, or the boundaries
stated therein, are not the same as those indicated in the survey plans 36 which she adduced in
evidence. Since Baellos title covers a different property, she cannot claim a superior right over
the subject property on the ground that she registered her title ahead of petitioner.
As petitioner has proven that its title covers the property in dispute, it is entitled to recover the
possession thereof, the basis of which shall be discussed subsequently. The recovery of
possession of the subject property by petitioner is not dependent on first proving the allegation
that Baellos title is spurious and the annulment of Baellos title, since Baellos title does not
cover the subject property and petitioner has proven its title over the subject property and the
identity of the property.
On the second issue, Uniwide, being a lessor, is not entitled to reimbursement.
The Court holds that petitioner was able to establish through documentary and testimonial
evidence that the technical description of its Torrens title covers the property that is being
occupied by respondent Uniwide by virtue of a lease contract with respondent Baello. A
comparison of the technical description of the land covered by the title of petitioner and the
technical description of the land covered by the title of Baello shows that they are not the same.
TCT No. 285312 registered in the name of petitioner reads:
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan Psd-706, LRC x x x situated in
Balintawak, Caloocan, Rizal. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the
SE., along line 2-3 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of the subd. plan and on the SW., NW., along
line 3-4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6, Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 69 deg.
07E.,
1,306.21m. from BLLM No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46W., 25.16 m. to point 2; S 65 deg.
116.78 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 12W., 23.85 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 57E. 127.39 m. to the
point of beginning; containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
SQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,834.80) more or less. All pts. referred
to are indicated on plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. old points bearings true; date of
original survey, Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922.33
On the other hand, TCT No. (35788) 12754, registered in the name of respondent Dolores
Baello, states:
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, bounded and described as follows:
Un terreno (Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano
original Psu-2345 de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de
Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal. Linda por el NE, con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por
el SE, con el lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision; por el SO, con el Lote No. 7; y por el NO,
con propiedad de Ramos Dane (Lote No. 1). x x x midiendo una extension superficial de DOS
MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CUATRO METROS CUADRADOS CON OCHENTA
DECIMETROS (2,834.80) mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original, 8 al 27 de
Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911, y de la subdivision 29 de
Diciembre de 1924. (Full technical description appears on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
10300/T-42).34
From the foregoing, the title of petitioner covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706, while the title of respondent Baello covers a parcel of land
referred to as Lot No. 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706. It should be pointed out that the
verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A based on its technical description showed that Lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A is the lot being occupied by Uniwide. 35 Baello claims that her Lot No. 3-A is
the same as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. However, the claim cannot be given credence because of
the disparity of the lot description, and the technical description of the land covered by Baellos
title shows that it is not the same as the technical description of the land covered by petitioners
title. Moreover, the technical description of the land covered by Baellos title, or the boundaries
stated therein, are not the same as those indicated in the survey plans 36 which she adduced in
evidence. Since Baellos title covers a different property, she cannot claim a superior right over
the subject property on the ground that she registered her title ahead of petitioner.
As petitioner has proven that its title covers the property in dispute, it is entitled to recover the
possession thereof, the basis of which shall be discussed subsequently. The recovery of
possession of the subject property by petitioner is not dependent on first proving the allegation
that Baellos title is spurious and the annulment of Baellos title, since Baellos title does not
cover the subject property and petitioner has proven its title over the subject property and the
identity of the property.
December 4, 2013
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that Lucilas cession of half of the property
to Isabelo through waiver did not have the effect of making him part owner of the property with a
right to demand partition.
Held:
In partition, the court must first determine the existence of co-ownership. The action will not lie if
the plaintiff has no proprietary interest in the subject property. Indeed, the rules require him to
set forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title to the property. It would be premature
to order partition until the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.
xxx contrary to the position that the CA and the RTC had taken, Lucilas waiver was absolute
and contained no precondition. The pertinent portion of the affidavit of waiver reads:
That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and participation in
so far as it refer to the one half portion (120 SQ. M.) of the above-parcel of land, with and in
favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at Las
Pinas City, and the other half portion (120 SQ. M.) in favor of my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA
CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at Sto. Rosario Hagonoy, Bulacan; x x x x18
Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put everything in proper order, I hereby
waive" if her intent was to set a precondition to her waiver covering the property, half to
Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her intention, she could have stated, "subject to the
condition that everything is put in proper order, I hereby waive..." or something to that effect.
When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive my share,
interest and participation" in the two halves of the subject property in favor of Isabelo and
Emelinda, Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in ceding the property to them. She
wanted to put everything in proper order, thus she was driven to make the waiver in their favor.
Lucila did not say, "to put everything in proper order, I promise to waive my right" to the property,
which is a future undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything is put in proper
order. But she instead said, "to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase
"hereby waive" means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the
property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his coowner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject
property having the right to demand its partition.
June 1, 2013
The controversy arose when spouses Maranon petitioned the trial court that the rentals paid by
one Paterio Tolete (Tolete), who is one of the tenants who had built a structure on the subject
lot, be transferred to their account from that of the PNB. The RTC ruled in their favour to which,
on appeal by PNB, was affirmed by the CA except for the finding that PNB was a mortgagee in
good faith.
Issue: Considering the fact that Spouses Maranons ownership of the subject lot had long been
decided by the trial court in 2006, who between the said spouses and PNB is entitled to rentals
(an accession to the principal) paid by one of the tenants in the property?
Held: The spouses Maranon are the ones entitled to the rentals.
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession.
The rightful recipient of the disputed rent in this case should thus be the owner of the subject lot
at the time the rent accrued. It is beyond question that Spouses Maraon never lost ownership
over the subject lot. This is the precise consequence of the final and executory judgment in Civil
Case No. 7213 rendered by the RTC on June 3, 2006 whereby the title to the subject lot was
reconveyed to them and the cloud thereon consisting of Emilies fraudulently obtained title was
removed. Ideally, the present dispute can be simply resolved on the basis of such
pronouncement. However, the application of related legal principles ought to be clarified in order
to settle the intervening right of PNB as a mortgagee in good faith.
The protection afforded to PNB as a mortgagee in good faith refers to the right to have its
mortgage lien carried over and annotated on the new certificate of title issued to Spouses
Maraon as so adjudged by the RTC. Thereafter, to enforce such lien thru foreclosure
proceedings in case of non-payment of the secured debt, as PNB did so pursue. The principle,
however, is not the singular rule that governs real estate mortgages and foreclosures attended
by fraudulent transfers to the mortgagor.
Rent, as an accessory follow the principal. In fact, when the principal property is mortgaged, the
mortgage shall include all natural or civil fruits and improvements found thereon when the
secured obligation becomes due as provided in Article 2127 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits,
and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount
of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged,
or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications and limitations
established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor, or it passes
into the hands of a third person.
Consequently, in case of non-payment of the secured debt, foreclosure proceedings shall cover
not only the hypothecated property but all its accessions and accessories as well.
xxx absent an adverse claimant or any evidence to the contrary, all accessories and accessions
accruing or attached to the mortgaged property are included in the mortgage contract and may
thus also be foreclosed together with the principal property in case of non-payment of the debt
secured.
Corollary, any evidence sufficiently overthrowing the presumption that the mortgagor owns the
mortgaged property precludes the application of Article 2127. Otherwise stated, the provision is
irrelevant and inapplicable to mortgages and their resultant foreclosures if the mortgagor is later
on found or declared to be not the true owner of the property, as in the instant case.1wphi1
It is beyond question that PNBs mortgagors, Spouses Montealegre, are not the true owners of
the subject lot much less of the building which produced the disputed rent. The foreclosure
proceedings on August 16, 1991 caused by PNB could not have, thus, included the building
found on the subject lot and the rent it yields. PNBs lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains
to the subject lot alone because the rule that improvements shall follow the principal in a
mortgage under Article 2127 of the Civil Code does not apply under the premises. Accordingly,
since the building was not foreclosed, it remains a property of Spouses Maraon; it is not
affected by non-redemption and is excluded from any consolidation of title made by PNB over
the subject lot. Thus, PNBs claim for the rent paid by Tolete has no basis.
It must be remembered that there is technically no juridical tie created by a valid mortgage
contract that binds PNB to the subject lot because its mortgagor was not the true owner. But by
virtue of the mortgagee in good faith principle, the law allows PNB to enforce its lien. We
cannot, however, extend such principle so as to create a juridical tie between PNB and the
improvements attached to the subject lot despite clear and undeniable evidence showing that
no such juridical tie exists.
subject property as evidenced by her residence address while it has not been controverted that
Wilfredo has been occupying the land for many years.
Issue: Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the
property?
Held: Wilfredo is the one who has been in prior physical possession of the property
notwithstanding the fact that the nature of his possession is that of a usufructuary.
xxx possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not
legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. In a forcible entry case, prior physical
possession is the primary consideration[.] A party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him
to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. [T]he party in
peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.
xxx
In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and
that the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.