CivRev1 4S Property 2017 PDF

DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: PROPERTY 4 S ((AY 2017-2018)
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
1. Ladera v. Hodges
G.R. No. 8027-R; September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of
278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a down
payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085
is paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell
due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled.
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment.
Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera.
The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights,
interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Ladera’s house was sold to
Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in
favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial
sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another,
should be regarded as movable or personal property.
ISSUE:
Is Ladera’s house an immovable property?
HELD:
YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following:
lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any
distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession
regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that
said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO, ANDE,
APA, BAACO, BULUSAN,, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING, EDILLOR, HUAB,
MABANGLO, MACALINO, MARAJAS, MINA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VIRAY ||
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2. Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor & Treasurer and Board of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. L-17870; September 29, 1962
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company questions the decision of the CTA holding that it is liable for the
payment of realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipments.
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. It is
also the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair
shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops where its TPU trucks are repaired in a condition to be serviceable.
Respondent alleged that subject properties are immovable by reason of their being intended or destined
for use in an industry in accordance with par. 5 of Art 415.
ISSUE:
Are the subject repair equipments immovable properties for the reason of their being intended or destined
for use in an industry?
HELD:
No. Art. 415 provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are immovable properties.
So that movable equipments to be immobilized, it must first be essential and principal elements of an
industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the
industrial purpose for which it was established. There’s a distinction between those movable which
become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry
from those which may not be so considered because they are merely incidental. The tools and
equipments in question are by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's
business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals —
acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without
such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on.
Aside from the element of essentiality, it is also required that the industry or works be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land. In this case, the equipments in question are destined only to repair or
service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of
land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.
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3. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.

G.R. No. L-58469; May 16, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. (Wearever) discounted and assigned several receivables with
petitioner Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation (Makati Leasing) in order to obtain financial
accommodations from the latter. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned, Wearever
executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory and a machinery described as an Artos
Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
Upon Wearever's default, Makati Leasing filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
mortgage to it. Due to failure to effect the seizure of the machinery, Makati Leasing filed a complaint for
judicial foreclosure with the CFI. Upon an application for replevin, the CFI issued a writ of seizure.
Eventually, the sheriff enforced the order, repaired to the premises of Wearever, and removed the main
drive motor of the subject machinery.
On petition of Wearever, the CA set aside the orders of CFI and ordered the return of the drive motor. It
ruled that the machinery cannot be the subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it
is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the NCC, the same being attached to the ground by means
of bolts and the only way to remove it from respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete
floor, the reason why all that the sheriff could do to enforce the writ was to take the main drive motor of
said machinery. It ruled that Wearever was not estopped from claiming that the machine is real property
by constituting a chattel mortgage thereon.
ISSUE:
Is the subject machinery a real or a personal property?
HELD:
The machinery is personal property.
The parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property, as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
Thus, if a house of strong materials (as held in a previous case) may be considered as personal property
for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and
no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which
is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise
treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence
of the chattel mortgage.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another. Private respondent Wearever could
not now therefore, be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited
therefrom.
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4. Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. L-11139; April 23, 1958
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Santos Evangelista sued Rivera for collection of sum of money on June 4, 1949. On the same
date, he obtained a writ of preliminary attachment, which was levied upon a house built by Rivera, a
lessee, on a land owned by respondent lessor Alto Surety. The levy was made pursuant to the rules
governing the levy of real properties.
In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951, bought the
house at the public auction made to satisfy the judgment. The corresponding deed of sale was issued to
him on October 22, 1952. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, he was told that
Alto Surety was now the owner of the house because the latter allegedly bought the house at an auction
sale on September 29, 1950. It turned out that Alto Surety likewise filed an action against Rivera and
likewise obtained a favorable judgment. The corresponding deed was issued to Alto Surety on May 10,
1952.
Subsequently, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Rivera for the purpose of
establishing his title over said house. The trial court ruled in favor of Evangelista. On appeal, however,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that Evangelista did not acquire
a preferential lien through the preliminary writ of attachment because the house was levied as if it were
an immovable property. The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the house should have been levied
pursuant to the rules governing the levy of personal property (apparently for the reason that the house
was constructed on a land belonging to another).
ISSUE:
Whether a house, constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for
purpose, of attachment, as immovable property, or as personal property
HELD:
The house is an immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera v. Hodges, a true building (not merely
superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land
or by usufructuary or lessee.
It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property
for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is
applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no contract
whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.
As held in Manarang v Ofilada, “Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation
governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for
each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the character, which the parties have given to it or
desire to give it. When the rules speak of personal property, property which is ordinarily so considered is
meant; and when real property is spoken of, it means property which is generally known as real property.
The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties may have privately given to the
property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or agreement
of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings. We therefore hold that the mere
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fact that a house was the subject of the chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by
the parties does not make said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale
of public auction.”
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5. Ruby L. Tsai v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Ever Textile Mills, Inc. and Mamerto R. Villaluz
G.R. No. 120098; October 2, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of
Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot and the chattels located thereinThe loan was secured by a Chattel
Mortgage. Upon the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various
machines and equipments.
However, due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings and its properties were sold
in a public auction including the machineries and equipments. PBCom won as highest bidder and
consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. Consequently, it leased and
subsequently sold the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai.
EVERTEX averred that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties,
which were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage nor in the Chattel Mortgage. Petitioners
contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on
the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable.
RTC found that the lease and sale of said personal properties were irregular. The CA held that the
machineries are not real properties deemed part of the mortgage?
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries which are cemented on a real property are considered immovable
properties?
HELD:
NO, the mere fact that that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged do not
make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code.
An immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as

security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real
and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar,
both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the
owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. The parties executed a contract
styled as "Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage," instead of just "Real Estate Mortgage" if indeed
their intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and attached to the said contract
a separate "LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT". These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion
that the parties' intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels.
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6. Serg’s Products, Inc. and Sergio T. Goquiolay v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
G.R. No. 137705; August 22, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed a complaint for a sum of money with an application of writ of
replevin. The judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machinery and
equipment to PCI.
Serg filed a motion for special protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer the
enforcement of the writ of replevin contending that the machines were not proper subjects of the writ
because they are in fact real property defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
xxx
PCI opposed the motion on the ground that Section 12.1 of their Lease Agreement clearly provided that
the machines were to be considered as personal property.
12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the
PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to
or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any
manner to what is permanent.
ISSUE:
Whether the machinery are considered a real or personal property
HELD:
The machinery are considered personal property.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any
material fact found therein.
Hence, Serg is estopped from denying the characterization of the machinery as personal property, which
are proper subjects of Writ of Seizure.
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7. Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano and J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. v. The
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Chief, Philippine Constabulary, The Chief
Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, The Judge Advocate General, et al.
G.R. No. L-64261; December 26, 1984
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Paño issued 2 search warrants where the premises of “Metropolitan Mail”
and “We Forum” newspapers were searched and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners questioned the warrants on the ground that the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the items (office and printing machines, etc.) seized by the military are real properties?
HELD:
NO, the items seized by the military are not real properties.
The Court ruled that there is no merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry
or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property
or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant (Rules of Court provides
that only personal properties are allowed to be seized under a search warrant).
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8. Enrique Lopez v. Vicente Orosa and Plaza Theatre, Inc.

G.R. No. L-10817-18; February 28, 1958
FELIX, J.:
FACTS:
Enrique Lopez is the proprietor of the Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Sometime in 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr.,
approached and invited Lopez to make an investment in the theatre business (Plaza Theatre) which
Orosa was then forming. Although Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest, he agreed to supply the
lumber necessary for the construction of the proposed theatre subject to the following terms: one, Orosa
would be personally liable for any account that the said construction would incur; two, payment would be
by demand and not by cash on delivery. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for the
construction. Lopez was only paid one-third of the total cost. The land on which the building has been
erected was previously owned by Orosa, which was later on purchased by the corporation. Due to the
incessant demands of Lopez, the corporation mortgaged its properties, and Orosa issued a deed of
assignment over his shares of stock in the corporation. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed
a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily
for the unpaid balance; and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in
public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance; or that the shares of stock be sold in public
auction.
The trial court decided that there was joint liability between defendants and that the lien was only confined
to the building.
ISSUE:
Does the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said
structure alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the building is adhered to?
HELD:
Yes, a lien executed in favor of the furnisher of materials used for the construction and repair of a building
attaches to said structure alone does not extended to land on which the building was constructed.
For while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could
only mean one thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in the absence of
any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not
said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.
Appelant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides—“With respect to determinate
real property and real rights of the debtor, the following are preferred: xxx Credits for reflection, not
entered or recorded, and only with respect to other credits different from those mentioned in four next
preceding paragraphs.” Close examination of the abovementioned provision reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the
refectionary or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so created
attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the
construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
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9. Julian Yap v. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada

G.R. No L-32917; July 18, 1988
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
Gold Pumps International filed a complaint against Julian Yap (Yap) and his wife seeking to recover the
balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter’s premises. The defendants did not
appear during the trial despite notices. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Golden Pump. Yap
appealed and was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Tañada. On the date of the pre-trial instead of
appearing Yap filed a motion for postponement. Yap was declared in default by failing to appear at the
schedule of pre-trial. A writ of execution was released and the same pump was levied by the sheriff. Yap
now contends that the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules
of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its
accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency.
ISSUE:
Whether the pump is immovable?
HELD:
The water pump installed in movable property. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among
others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. The pump does not fit this
description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering
deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than
the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
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10. Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Hon. Potenciano
Pecson, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., and Antonio
Villarama
G.R. No. L-7057; October 29, 1954
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Company Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. (MESI) filed a replevin for the recovery of
property delivered to Defendant Company Ipo Limestone Co. Inc. (Ipo). Said order was carried out by
two sheriffs.
Ipo’s manager, Pedro Torres, handed the sheriffs a letter protesting against the seizure of the properties.
Torres asserts that the machineries are not personal properties and could not possibly be dismantled
without causing damages or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them.
Nevertheless, MESI insisted in dismantling the equipment on his own. Thus, the machineries were taken.
Upon order of the court, the deputy sheriffs returned the properties by depositing them on the road,
without the benefit of inventory or reinstalling them from their former position which rendered their use
impracticable.
ISSUE:
Are the machineries subject of the case considered immovable?
HELD:
The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the
concrete foundation of a building, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated
from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove said
outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but to also cut some of its wooden supports. Said
machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said
immovable and tended "directly to meet the needs of said industry."
For these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Note: Because real property are not subject to replevin—it is well settled that, when the restitution of what
has been ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in substantially the same condition as when
taken. Inasmuch as the machinery and equipment involved in this case were duly installed and affixed in
the premises of respondent company when petitioner's representative caused said property to be
dismantled and then removed, it follows that petitioner must also do everything necessary to the
reinstallation of said property in conformity with its original condition.
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11. Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City
G.R. No. 166102; August 5, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
MERALCO received from the City Assessor of Lucena a copy of Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 covering
the following electric facilities, classified as capital investment, of the company: (a) transformer and
electric post; (b) transmission line; (c) insulator; and (d) electric meter. MERALCO appealed said Tax
Declaration claiming that its capital investment consisted only of its substation facilities and that
MERALCO was exempted from payment of real property tax on said substation facilities.
Deciding on MERALCO’s appeal, the LBAA declared that Sections 234 and 534(f) of the Local
Government Code repealed the provisions in the franchise of MERALCO and Presidential Decree No.
551 pertaining to the exemption of MERALCO from payment of real property tax on its poles, wires,
insulators, transformers, and meters. Hence, under the LGC, MERALCO must pay real property taxes
on these items which are to be considered as “machineries.”
ISSUE:
Are enumerated electric facilities ‘real properties’ which must be subjected to real property tax?
HELD:
YES. Under Section 199(o) of the LGC, machinery, to be deemed real property subject to real property
tax, need no longer be annexed to the land or building as these "may or may not be attached, permanently
or temporarily to the real property," and in fact, such machinery may even be "mobile." The same
provision though requires that to be machinery subject to real property tax, the physical facilities for
production, installations, and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-
propelled, or not permanently attached to the real property (a) must be actually, directly, and exclusively
used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business, or activity; and (2) by their very nature and
purpose, are designed for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or
agricultural purposes.
On the other hand, under Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code considers as immovables or real
properties "[machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works." The Civil Code does not define "machinery."
The properties under Article 415, (5) are immovables by destination, or "those which are essentially
movables, but by the purpose for which they have been placed in an immovable, partake of the nature
of the latter because of the added utility derived therefrom." These properties, including machinery,
become immobilized if the following requisites concur: (a) they are placed in the tenement by the owner
of such tenement; (b) they are destined for use in the industry or work in the tenement; and (c) they tend
to directly meet the needs of said industry or works. The first two requisites are not found anywhere in
the Local Government Code.
Nevertheless, The Local Government Code, being a special law, must prevail over the Civil Code, a
general law. Hence, while the electric facilities do not strictly count as real property under the Civil Code,
it still a real property for purposes of real estate tax under the Local Government Code.
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12. Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, The Provincial Assessor of
Batangas, The Municipal Treasurer and Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas
G.R. No. 180110; May 30, 2016
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Capitol Wireless (Capwire) is in the business of providing international telecommunications
services. As such provider, Capwire has signed agreements with other telecommunications companies
covering an international network of submarine cable systems. The agreements provide for co-ownership
and other rights among the parties over the network. Capwire claims that as co-owner, it does not own
any particular physical part of the cable system but it owns the right to use a certain capacity of the said
system. This property right is allegedly reported in its financial books as "Indefeasible Rights in Cable
Systems." However, Capwire claims that it was required to register the value of its right, hence, it engaged
an appraiser to assess the market value of the international submarine cable system and the cost to
Capwire. Thereafter, Capwire submitted a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties at the
Provincial Treasurer's Office for the West Segment of the system. The Provincial Assessor had
determined that the submarine cable systems described in Capwire's Sworn Statement of True Value of
Real Properties are taxable real property. Later, Capwire received a Warrant of Levy and a Notice of
Auction Sale from the respondent Provincial Treasurer.
ISSUE:
Is the submarine cable system, which Capwire claims lies in international waters, taxable as a real
property?
HELD:
YES. Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which may
qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. To the extent that
the equipment's location is determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no
reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communications and aerial or underground
wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a different
treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and communications cables are not
directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be classified
under the term "machinery" as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the simple reason
that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or
works that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters"
is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8) of the Code. A classic example is a boathouse which,
by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the shore and used as a
residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is considered real property. Besides, the
Court has already held that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property." Thus, absent
any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption for its lines and cables from real property
taxation, then Capwire's submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.
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PROPERTY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
13. Salvador H. Laurel v. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Raul Manglapus,
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as Executive Secretary
G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047; July 25, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Roppongi is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparation
Agreement entered into with Japan. The other 3 properties include Nampeidai Property (present site of
the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property (commercial lot being used as a
warehouse and parking lot for consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now
vacant). The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M would be payable in 20
years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into government sector and those for private parties
in projects -the latter shall be made available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities
in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government Sector” for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs.
However, the Roppongi property has remained under-developed since that time. Although there was a
proposal to lease the property with the provision to have buildings built at the expense of the lessee, the
same was not acted favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino issued EO No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch
pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been
set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been
postponed and later restrained by the SC.
Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code,
but rather by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which
is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to
a property.
ISSUE:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?
HELD:
NO. The property is of public dominion and the respondents failed to show that it has become patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State
and intended for some public service. The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does
not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion happens only if property is withdrawn
from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service
and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on c orrect
legal premises. The EO does not declare that the properties lost their public character, merely intending
the properties to be made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in case of sale, lease or other
disposition. Further, it is based on the wrong premise that the Japan properties can be sold to end-users,
when in fact it cannot. Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the properties into patrimonial properties,
merely stating that sources of funds for its implementation be sourced from proceeds of the disposition
14
of the Government in foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi property be withdrawn from being
classified as a property of public dominion.
15
14. Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. v. Hon. Antonio J. Villegas, et. al.
G.R. No. L-24916; February 28, 1974
TEEHANKEE, J.:
FACTS:
The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby the Congress
converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that are reserved as
communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. Such lands are to be placed under
the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not
exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants
thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the
Act. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.
ISSUE:
Is Republic Act No. 3120 constitutional?
HELD:
Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and
are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due
process and without just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the
government program of land for the landless and that they were not intended to expropriate the property
involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the
power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of
the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.
16
15. Levy D. Macasiano v. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno

G.R. No. 97764; August 10, 1992
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the Municipality of Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, which authorized the closure
of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Parañaque, and the establishment of a flea market thereon. On August 8, 1990, The Municipality of
Parañaque and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up
by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction
and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned
to respondent Palanyag. Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter
ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
The TC issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and
enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the
lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid
HELD:
No. The ordinance issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public
streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is not valid.
Based on Article 424, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality.
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for
the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances
show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit. It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed"
in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government
Code.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that it has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same
cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila
17
Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for
the approval of the ordinance.
However, at this point, We find it worthy to note that BP Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code, has
already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on
the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said
contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
18
16. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, Josefina
L. Morato, Spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
Province
G.R. No. 100709; November 14, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application on a parcel of land with
an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the
patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974
Original Certificate of Title. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not
be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections
118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had
encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it
was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under
water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on
October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co
and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00. The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another
portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a
warehouse was constructed.
On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses
Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and
reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato,
on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year
prohibitory period.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Should such property revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land?
HELD:
YES. Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore land:
Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject land was
invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square meters)
is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended
up to a portion of the questioned land.
While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water,
however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the
court-appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the
month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is
about a kilometer. Also, in 1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was covered with vegetation, but
it disappeared in 1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1; E-14). In fact, in its decision
19
dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the land was caused by natural
calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18).
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will be
deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for reasons not her
own doing.
The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a
free patent under the Public Land Act. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Cabagis explained the
rationale for this proscription:
Art. 339. Property of public ownership is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
* * ** * * * *
Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:
* * ** * * * *
3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the
tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where the tides are
not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms
or tempests.
In the case of Aragon v. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code
just quoted, this Court said: We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of
gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become
property of public ownership. as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to
all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of
the playa (shore of the sea), rada (roadstead), or the like. * * *
In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore
land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government v. Cabangis annulled
the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore
land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had
no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being
foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.
20
17. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440; March 28, 1968
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province. A law was passed approving the conversion of the Municipality
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act provided that —
Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon,
located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province. Subsequently, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
Another law was approved creating the municipality of Molave, making it the capital of Zamboanga
Province.
The Appraisal Committee fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. A law was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga
into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur, and the assets and obligations of the old
province were to be divided between the two new ones equitably.
Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties. This ruling revoked the previous
Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City when the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
However, Republic Act 3039 was approved providing that All buildings, properties and assets belonging
to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred,
free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, ordered
the CIR to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga
City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief
with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that Republic Act 3039
be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties consist of 50 lots are public or patrimonial property
HELD:
Applying the Civil Code, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the
capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for
they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has
been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use
by anyone. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
21
The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation)
in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has
no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation. The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it
is intended and devoted.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property
be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health,
etc.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site,
school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a
total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity
and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied
to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the remaining lots which are
patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Moreover,
the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.
On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the domains of the
Law of Municipal Corporations — State v. Province — than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court
is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category
as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be
levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in
the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "... without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal
Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted
for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
22
18. Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 133250; July 9, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands."
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificates in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands.
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA") with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development. President
Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
Petitioner Frank I. Chavez, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands
of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the
sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May
28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
ISSUE:
1. What is the classification of the subject reclaimed lands?
2. Whether or not the amended JVA is valid
HELD:
1. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
or concession to qualified parties. While the lands still submerged are inalienable.
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Under Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the
public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As
such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural
lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified
as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
23
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified." The President has the authority to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such.”
FREEDOM ISLANDS. PD No. 1085 (authorizing the issuance of special land patents), coupled with
President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an
official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that
the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
SUBMERGED AREAS. The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of
title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these
submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the
public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these
submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural
lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service.
Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
and within the commerce of man.
2. No. The amended JVA is null and void for the following reasons:
a. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
b. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
24
19. Teofilo C. Villarico v. Vivencio Sarmiento, et.al.

G.R. No. 136438; November 11, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a lot in Parañaque City which is separated from the Ninoy
Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was higher
than the adjoining areas, the DPWH constructed stairways to enable the people to have access to the
highway. Respondents had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In 1993, by
means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 m2 portion of the same area
owned by the government.
Petitioner filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents. He alleged inter alia that
respondents’ structures on the government land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue;
and encroached on a portion of his lot.
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in
question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the area.
According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of his "right of way" as he could use the Kapitan
Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villarico has a right of way over the subject property
HELD:
No. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or
leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the
State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easement.
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it
cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use
by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate
it for himself. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides: Only things and rights which
are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession."
Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it.
25
20. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179987; September 3, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the subject property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration in the RTC in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of
the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property may be registered in favor of Malabanan
HELD:
NO. Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on
his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are
considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition
is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
26
21. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos, III

G.R. No. 160453; November 12, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, Arcadio Ivan applied for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession
for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property
for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river
bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property
could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had
dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
The RTC granted the application for land registration. On Appeal, CA affirmed the RTC on the ground
that It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil
Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which
was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering
that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter
from his mother.
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code
was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead
the drying up of the Parañaque River.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein
HELD:
No. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit. Article 457 of
the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the
river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal
right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457
of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear
and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear
and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It
27
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person.
28
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN CLASSIFIED AS RESERVATIONS FOR PUBLIC OR QUASI-

PUBLIC USES ARE NON-ALIENABLE AND SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO DISPOSITION
22. Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI) v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 177168; August 3, 2015
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 "reserving for military
purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque,
province of Rizal, and Pasay City,"
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded
from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the municipalities of Taguig
and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City,” and declared the excluded area as "AFP Officers'
Village".
Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 478 "reserving
for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes" an area of 537,520 square
meters of the land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the Republic, through
former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner
NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in
NOVAI's name.
The Republic filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title on the following grounds: (a) the land covered by
NOVAI's title is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, which
became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB has no records of any
application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAI's alleged payment of
P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487,
claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer
and titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious.
ISSUE:
Is the subject parcel of land part of public domain?
HELD:
Yes. The subject parcel of land is part of the public domain.
Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable
and shall not be subject to disposition, although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of
C.A. No. 141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared open for disposition by
proclamation of the President. In the same way, lands of the public domain classified as reservations are
property of the public dominion; they remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from
the public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation
of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property.
In this case, while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September 1965, removed from the FBMR a certain
parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No. 478, issued in October 1965, in turn
29
segregated the property from the area made available for disposition under Proclamation No. 461, and
reserved it for the use of the VRMTC.
Hence, while Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made
the covered area available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently
withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. With
the issuance of Proclamation No. 478, the property was transferred back to that class of public domain
land reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose which, consistent with Article 420 of the Civil
Code, is property of the public dominion, not patrimonial property of the State
As the property remains a reserved public domain land, its sale and the title issued pursuant to the sale
are void.
30
23. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority

G.R. No. 184203; November 26, 2014
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
This case consists of 2 consolidated petitions. President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 66 in 1972, declaring as government policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic
locations in the Philippines. The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created and declared the
EPZA non-profit in character and exempt from all taxes. In 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1811, establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of
Republic Act No. 7916.
FIRST PETITION
In 1998 the City of Lapu-Lapu demanded from the PEZA 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the
period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone, which granted
the same. The MR was denied. The CA dismissed the appeal for the ground of wrong mode of appeal.
SECOND PETITION
After the City of Lapu-Lapu had demanded payment of real property taxes from the PEZA, the Province
of Bataan followed suit. PEZA filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
arguing that it is exempt from payment of real property taxes. The trial court denied the PEZA’s petition
for injunction. The PEZA filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari but the CA dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the PEZA exempt from payment of real property taxes?
HELD:
YES. The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character with all its revenues
devoted for its development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit character,
the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter. The Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of
real property taxes. Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of
its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is
unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of the EPZA under PD No. 66.
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic of the
Philippines are exempt from real property taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of
public dominion or patrimonial property. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates
property of public dominion. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbranc e, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale[.]
In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. These
economic zones are property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax properties located within the
Mactan Economic Zone, the site of which was reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No.
1811. Reserved lands are inalienable and outside the commerce of man, and remain property of the
Republic until withdrawn from public use either by law or presidential proclamation.
31
As for the Bataan Economic Zone, the law consistently characterized the property as a port. A port of
entry, where imported goods are unloaded then introduced in the market for public consumption, is
considered property for public use. Thus, Article 420 of the Civil Code classifies a port as property of
public dominion.
Properties of public dominion, even if titled in the name of an instrumentality as in this case, remain
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. All told, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national
government. Furthermore, the lands owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of
the Philippines. The City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan thus cannot collect real property taxes
from the PEZA. Petitions denied.
32
24. Republic of the Philippines v. Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz

G.R. No. 174626; October 23, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of land identified as Lot
11193 of the Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, before the RTC. In support of his application, Aboitiz attached
the original Tracing Cloth Plan with a blueprint copy, the technical description of the land, the certificate
of the geodetic engineer surveying the land, and the documents evidencing possession and ownership
of the land.
To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his witness, Sarah Benemerito (Sarah), his secretary, who testified
that he entrusted to her the subject property and appointed her as its caretaker; that he purchased the
subject property from Irenea Kapuno (Irenea) on September 5, 1994; that he had been in actual, open,
continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner; that as per
record of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, the subject
property had been classified as alienable and disposable since 1957; that per certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, the subject property was
not covered by any subsisting public land application; and that the subject property had been covered by
tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in Irenea’s name, and from 1994 to present, in his name.
The RTC granted Aboitiz’s application for registration of the subject property. The Republic appealed the
RTC ruling before the CA. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied Aboitiz’s application for
registration. The CA ruled that it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and
disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier would commence. Possession prior to the date of declaration of the lands alienability was not
included.
ISSUE:
Is Aboitiz entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, or, in the alternative,
pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529?
HELD:
No. Applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Anent the first requisite, to authoritatively establish the subject land’s alienable and disposable character,
it is incumbent upon the applicant to present a CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) Certification; and a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The Court cannot find any
evidence to show the subject land’s alienable and disposable character, except for a CENRO certification
submitted by Aboitiz. Clearly, his attempt to comply with the first requisite of Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 fell short due to his own omission. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of
the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands. Thus,
the CENRO Certification should be accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. For this reason, the application for registration of
Aboitiz should be denied.
33
Unfortunately, Aboitiz likewise failed to satisfy this third requisite. As the records and pleadings of this
case will reveal, the earliest that he and his predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and
occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1963. Evidently, his possession of the subject property
commenced roughly eighteen (18) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Here, he neglected to present any convincing and persuasive
evidence to manifest compliance with the requisite period of possession and occupation since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Accordingly, his application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
Public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
Under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the
State, the classification of ' land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must
be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a
law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued, by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains
to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.
34
25. Teofilo Alolino v. Fortonato Flores, et. al.

G.R. No. 198774; April 4, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-
type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari
sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's
house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building
permit. The structure is only about two to three inches away from the back of Alolino's house. The
respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. Thus, he
complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. He also
filed a complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan. Acting on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued
a Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents directing them to immediately stop further
construction. The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. Thus, Alolino
filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC.
In their answer, respondents admitted to them that they did not secure a building permit because the
property was constructed on a municipal/barrio road. They claimed, however, that on March 1, 2004, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig reclassified the property as a residential lot from its prior classification as
a barrio/municipal road.
The RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to remove their illegal structure obstructing
Alolino's right to light and view. But the same was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a barrio road can be converted into patrimonial property through an LGU Resolution
HELD:
NO, what the law requires is the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on government property. Properties
of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or patrimonial property.
Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications:
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use.
35
The Court finds no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local Government of Taguig had already
withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a residential lot. To convert a
barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference
between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution
is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body.
36
OWNERSHIP
26. Felicidad Javier v. Hon. Veridiano, Presiding Judge CFI Zambales, Reino Rosete
G.R. No. L- 48050; October 10, 1994
BELOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, who alleged as the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a certain parcel of
land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No.
1641, Ts-308 with the District Land Officer. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly
dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry
before the City Court of Olongapo City. The latter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the area in
question is outside the said lot of the plaintiff. The CFI affirmed.
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was
the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying,
including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner
demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to
comply with the demand.
About four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino
Rosete before the then CFI of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0, alleging
in pars. 2 and 3 therein that plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as
Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision.
Petitioner maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry,
which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for
quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land. Private respondent however submits
that there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant
in the first case after the commencement of the first action.
ISSUE:
Does res judicata apply between a complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and
executory, and a subsequent petition for quieting of title?
HELD:
NO. Res judicata does not apply between a complaint for forcible entry and a petition for quieting of title
for they allege different causes of action.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless
of who has lawful title over the disputed property. Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is
the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or
terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question
of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building.
37
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title
and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926,
which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Cas e No. 2203-0, plaintiff
therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from
the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the
allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion
publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area
without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly
alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of
the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful
(possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of land "covered
by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely
raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of
exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such
ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no
other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership
PETITION GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of
a quo and the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch.
38
27. Spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia Reyes-Bustos v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Venancio
Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray
G.R. No. 120784-85; January 24, 2001
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Paulino Fajardo’s children:
(1) Manuela;
(2) Trinidad [spouse: Francisco; son: Lucio];
(3) Beatriz [spouse: Moses]; and
(4) Marcial.
Paulino died intestate. His heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of his estate. Manuela sold her share
(subject land) to Moses. Trinidad, who was in actual possession of the subject land, refused to surrender
it to Moses despite several demands.
Moses filed with CFI Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the subject land which was sold to him.
During the pendency of the case, Trinidad died. Trinidad’s heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of his
estate. Lucio sold the subject land to Spouses Viray. The RTC rendered a decision in Moses’ favor.
Moses later sold the subject land to Spouses Bustos. In the meantime, Spouses Viray, buyers of Lucio’s
share of the property, filed with MCTC Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer
against Spouses Bustos, who were in actual possession as lessees of Franciso of the subject land. The
MCTC decided in Spouses Viray’s favor. The trial court issued writs of execution and demolition but these
were stayed when Spouses Bustos filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction.
The RTC later dismissed the case.
Spouses Bustos and Spouses Viray separately appealed the RTC decision to CA. The CA dismissed
their appeals and declared Moses as the owner.
ISSUE:
Can Spouses Bustos be ejected from what is now their own land?
HELD:
No. In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful
detainer case, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the
decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion
reinvindicatoria, the CA affirmed the ownership of Spouses Bustos over the subject land. Hence, the
court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the
court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana v. Development
Bank of Rizal, the SC reiterated the rule once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions
(1) cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579);
(2) whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or
(3) when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render
the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354).
39
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that Spouses Bustos are now legal
owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting Spouses
Bustos from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of
possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the Spouses Bustos by virtue
of a valid deed of sale.
Placing Spouses Bustos in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence
of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of
ownership is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, Spouses Bustos are entitled
to possession of the same. An owner who cannot exercise the 7 juses or attributes of ownership --
(1) right to possess;
(2) right to use and enjoy;
(3) right to abuse or consume;
(4) right to accessories;
(5) right to dispose or alienate;
(6) right to recover or vindicate; and
(7) right to the fruits -- is a crippled owner.
40
28. Heirs of Roman Soriano v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, Spouses Braulio Abalos and Aquilina
Abalos
G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The property involved in this case was originally owned by Adriano Soriano. When he died in 1947, it
passed on to his heirs, who leased the property to Spouses de Vera for 15 years. Roman Soriano, one
of Adriano’s children, acted as the caretaker of the property during the lease.
The property was subsequently divided into 2 lots – Lot 60052 and Lot 8459. Lot 60052 was adjudicated
to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia, while Lot 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada,
Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, all the heirs, except Roman, sold their respective shares to Spouses
Abalos.
In 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and appointed Isidro and Vidal Versoza as his
substitutes. However, Roman was reinstated upon his petition. Prior to the execution of the decision, the
parties entered into a post-decisional agreement where the Spouses de Vera allowed Roman to sub-
lease the property until 1982.
The Spouses Abalos’ application for registration of title over the property (LRC case) was approved by
the court and such decision became final and executory. After a series of proceedings, the heirs of Roman
filed a complaint with the DARAB for "Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary
Injunction" (DARAB Case). The CA annulled the decision in the LRC Case and instead ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the heirs of Roman.
ISSUE:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of
tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
HELD:
NO. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining
to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with
the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy
the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to
actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
There is no dispute that Spouses Abalos’ title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with
finality. As explained above, however, such declaration pertains only to ownership and does not
automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case where there is a third party occupying
the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. While the issue of ownership of
the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land registration court, the right of
possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure
case filed before the DARAB.
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject
land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The
Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they
have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established.
41
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The
exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
However, since petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB, the SC, in keeping
with judicial order, refrained from ruling on whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject
property.
42
29. Jose Ma. T. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Sps. Luisito & Ma. Luisa Magpayo, and Philippine Bank
of Communications
G.R. No. 133140; August 10, 1999
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Garcia filed a suit for recovery of realty and damages against the Spouses Magpayos (Mrs.
Magpayo is his sister) and PBCom.
The Spouses Magpayos mortgaged the subject land to PBCom. For failure to pay their loan, it was
thereafter extrajudicially foreclosed. Upon service of the writ of possession, petitioner, who was in
possession of the land, refused to honor it.
Petitioner contends that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother and that he was in
possession of the land when the sale from his parents to his sister Mrs. Magpayo was made, hence
making said sale invalid.
The RTC invalidated the foreclosure sale, but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the possession of petitioner of the subject land a hindrance to its transfer by way of sale?
HELD:
No. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner
not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Petitioner’s parents exercised their
right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally,
to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had
in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. "A possessor in
the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so." On the other hand, "one
who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was
merely tolerated by his parents. An owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does
not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no
moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses.
It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.
43
30. Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua Huay Soon
G.R. No. 129609; November 29, 2001
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) which
was "former alien property" now owned by the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of RA 477.
RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc et al., members of the Ides
O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).
Subsequently, BP 233 was enacted, authorizing the sale of "former alien properties," which included the
O'RACCA building. RODIL offered to purchase the property. The ASSOCIATION likewise offered to lease
the same building through the Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management
(DGSREPM). Meanwhile, pending RODIL's offer to purchase, RODIL's lease contract was renewed.
DGSREPM recommended that the lease contract with RODIL be suspended because the
ASSOCIATION's offer to lease was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC. Thus, the lease contract with
RODIL was disapproved. RODIL filed an action for specific performance. Pending this case, however,
RODIL signed a renewal contract with the Land Management Bureau and approved by the Secretary of
DENR. Thus, the case was eventually dismissed upon motion by RODIL itself and Solicitor General. The
ASSOCIATION appealed the dismissal to CA 2nd Division.
Meanwhile, RODIL filed actions for unlawful detainer against some members of the ASSOCIATION. The
MTCC upheld RODIL's right to eject the respondents from the O'RACCA building. The RTC affirmed the
decision. The ASSOCIATION appealed to CA 4th Division.
The CA 2nd Division (acting on the appeal from the specific performance case) promulgated its decision
declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void. Subsequently, the CA
4th Division (acting on the appeal from the unlawful detainer case) also dismissed the unlawful detainer
case. Hence the present petitions by RODIL.
ISSUE:
Is the renewal contract between RODIL and REPUBLIC valid?
HELD:
YES. The renewal contract was valid.
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and
this rule has no exception.
Thus, the REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a
lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the
right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action
for unlawful detainer are present.
As to the unlawful detainer case, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. Since the
occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter
44
remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for
respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of
lease entered into. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against
respondents as one from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.
45
31. Cornelio M. Isaguirre v. Felicitas De Lara

G.R. No. 138053; May 31, 2000
GONZALES- REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel
of land filed with the Bureau of Lands. Upon his death, he, was succeeded by his wife - respondent
Felicitas de Lara, as claimant. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this
lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes under TD 43927
in the name of respondent’s sons - Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.
Felicitas obtained a loan from PNB. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached
petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre. A "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" was
executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No.
502, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of
petitioner, for and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Subsequently, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of
ownership and possession of the two-story building but was dismissed. Isaguirre filed a sales application
over the subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved resulting in the
issuance of OCT No. P-11566. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000
square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion claimed by petitioner) was
also given due course, resulting in the issuance of OCT No. P-13038, in the name of respondent.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages with the RTC
of Davao City against respondent. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner declaring him to be
the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial c ourt’s
decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties was an equitable mortgage, not a sale.
As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared OCT No.P-11566 issued in favor of
petitioner to be null and void. In a case docketed as G. R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals and the petitioner’s MR was subsequently denied.
Petitioner contends that the CA has acted with grave abuse of discretion when it did not held that the
RTC erred in issuing a writ of possession as neither the CA decision nor the SC decision mentioned,
ordered immediate delivery of possession to the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting writ of possession against petitioner when the court found
that the respondent is the owner of said property
HELD:
No. As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without any other limitations than
those established by law. Corollary to such right, respondent also has the right to exclude from the
possession of her property any other person to whom she has not transmitted such property. The
issuance of the writ of possession is but a necessary consequence of this Court ruling in G.R. No 120832
affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-13038) in the name of respondent
Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the
name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre.
46
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back
to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property. Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the
issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of our
decision in G.R. No. 120832, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. It bears stressing that a
judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
47
32. Melchor Custodio v. Rosendo F. Corrado

G.R. No. 146082; July 30, 2004
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment case against petitioner Melchor Custodio.
Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of a subject residential lot. He claims that more than
a year prior to the institution of the complaint, petitioner under a dubious claim of tenancy relationship
with respondents father, Crisanto Corrado, and without his knowledge and consent, demolished his old
residential house on the said lot and constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family
now reside.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold tenant of Crisanto Corrado since
1961 up to the present. He further claimed that respondent’s father consented to the construction of the
bungalow when the lot was still owned by respondent’s father.
MTC finds that the petitioners continued stay on respondent’s property valid. RTC declared plaintiff as
the true and absolute owner of the residential lot in question which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a tenant of respondent’s father
HELD:
No. The issue of tenancy relationship was settled during the pre-trial.
The parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of respondent and that petitioner was
never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and respondent are bound by such stipulations which are
deemed settled and need not be proven during the trial.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that this is a factual issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of
the probative value of evidences presented. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law.
48
33. Pacencio Abejaron, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alejandro Abejaron v. Felix

Nabasa and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 84831; June 20, 2001
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor andclaimant of a 118-square meter
portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway General Santos City. Petitioner Abejaron and his
family occupied the 118-square meterland. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced
the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. Petitioner later improved
their abode to become a two-storey house.
This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining
Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter, Conchita. The small store was eventually
destroyed and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron built another store. He later planted five coconut trees on
the property. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house,
and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.
The last two declarations state that petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5. Petitioner stated
that respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot1. Nabasa built his
house about 4 meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house.
Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did not apply for title of the land on the
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his knowledge and
consent, Nabasa applied for and caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner
Abejaron's 118-square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a
Free Patent covering Lot 1. As the title included petitioner Abejaron’s portion of the lot, he filed a protest
with the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed for failure of
the petitioner to attend the hearings.
Petitioner Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa
before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its reconveyance case declaring the possession
and occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good faith and thereby declaring the inclusion
of said portion in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for reconveyance is actual
fraud which in this case was failed to be substantiated by Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither
in the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud intervened in the
issuance of the title, the title would become indefeasible. The petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.
HELD:
No. Petitioner did not acquire title over the disputed land.
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long
as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen
49
the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the
person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is
a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for
the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and
the fact of fraud.
As admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax
receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house
do not bolster his case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire
title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required
by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant m ust be "well-nigh
incontrovertible." As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy,
whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action
for reconveyance.
As petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the proper party to file an
action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion.
50
34. Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Susan G. Canencia v. Susan
Lumontad
G.R. No. 203760; December 3, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia (petitioner), filed
a complaint for forcible entry against Susan Lumontad (respondent) alleging that he is one of the sons of
the late Vicente Javier who was the owner of a 360 sq. m. parcel of land. Since his birth, petitioner’s
family has lived in the residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicente’s death, petitioner, together with
his mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into
the subject land and started to build a 2-storey building on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof, despite
petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests.
Respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in physical possession
of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the subject building
was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name. Hence, she took
possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.
MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction because it found that
Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot was given to petitioner, while the
second lot was given to one Anthony, son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was eventually
acquired by respondent from the latter through sale.
RTC reversed MTC ruling. On appeal, CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter
court for trial on the merits. CA still concluded that respondent had the subject building constructed in the
concept of being the owner. In this relation, it was observed that petitioner gave a misleading description
of TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, considering that said tax declaration only covered petitioner’s family house
and not the subject land where said improvement was built. In truth, the CA found that the subject land
is separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-9660, which was cancelled when the land was subdivided
into two (2) lots, namely: (a) one covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282536 given by Vicente to petitioner;
and (b) another covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282437 given by Vicente to Anthony, which the latter
sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-TY-002-1303138 in her name. Further, the CA
stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that respondent employed force and
intimidation in entering a portion of the subject land as he failed to demonstrate the factual circumstances
that occurred during his dispossession of said property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaint filed is one for forcible entry
2. Whether or not petitioner was able to justify his right to the de facto possession of the premises
HELD:
Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for forcible entry, petitioner’s case
nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
1. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry
51
Yes. As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines the nature
of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.
Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land
or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth.
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so as to
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said pleading alleges that
petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior physical possession
of the subject land but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007
by respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and, thereafter, erected a
building thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means by which petitioner’s dispossession was effected
cannot be said to have been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed by
the CA. Given that a forcible entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred
in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of possession
and ownership, otherwise known as an accion reivindicatoria pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court.
2. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint
Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint, nonetheless,
cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right to the de facto possession
(physical or material possession) of the disputed premises.
As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from which petitioner
hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only covers his house and not the entire
land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that he has the right to the de facto possession of the
172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of ownership of
respondent in view of TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her name.
Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing respondent's
right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint
must necessarily fail.
52
35. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Dante Ando, et al.

G.R. No. 195669; May 30, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against herein respondents Dante Ando, et al. in their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford
Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
Inc. (UCCPI).
In an Order, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its Complaint should not be dismissed for its
failure to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the present
status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land earlier filed before
the RTC by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI. The recovery of ownership cas e also involved Lot
3-F, the same parcel of land subject of the unlawful detainer case.
The RTC rendered its judgment in the recovery of ownership in favor of BUCCI. Meanwhile, the MTCC
issued an Order dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to comply with
the rule on certification against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Does the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the pendency of an action for recovery
of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer amount to
forum-shopping?
HELD:
No, the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the pendency of an action for recovery
of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does not
amount to forum-shopping.
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal
of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the land
ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two cases. The
issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or
physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); whereas the issue
in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful owner of
the disputed parcels of land.
Thus, in Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., this Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a
pending action involving ownership neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary action for
53
ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences in the reliefs prayed
for.
54
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP (ART. 429) AND STATE OF NECESSITY (ART. 432)
36. German Management & Services, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Ernesto Villeza
G.R. No. 76217; September 14, 1989
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of, the United States are the owners
of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. They executed a special power
of attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied
by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the
premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject
property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondent. Private respondents
filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of self-help is applicable in the case at bar
HELD:
NO. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of
actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already
been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article
536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.
55
37. Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey v. The People of the Philippines and the
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-28716; November 18, 1970
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag are tenants in Hacienda Palico. Felix Caisip, on
the other hand, is the overseer of the said hacienda. Since there were a series of misunderstandings
between the two parties, a case was filed for forcible entry, praying that Marcelino and Gloria to vacate
the lot.
The court ruled in favor of Caisip. Thus, the Spouses were given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within
which to leave the premises.
On June 17, 1959, Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the hacienda. Caisip approached her and bade
her to leave, but she refused. Gloria asserts that they had the right to stay there and that the crops
thereon belong to them. Having stuck to this attitude, Caisip called the local police. Gloria was forcibly
dragged to the municipal building.
Because of the incident, Gloria filed a case of grave coercion. Meanwhile, Caisip contends that his act
should be justified under art. 429 of the Civil Code – the principle of self-help.
ISSUE:
Does the principle of self-help apply to the case at bar?
HELD:
No. Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:" The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property."
Said principle does not apply because the spouses have been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within
which to vacate Lot 105-A. Thus, on June 17, 1959—or within said period— they did not invade or usurp
said lot. Gloria had merely remained in possession thereof. Caisip did not "repel or prevent in actual or
threatened x x x physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and
her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on May
17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to
June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959,
without a judicial order therefor.
It is accordingly clear that appellants had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor,
prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-
A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot) in
violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
56
38. The People of the Philippines v. Tito Pletcha, Jr.

No. 19029-CR; June 27, 1977
SISON, P.V., J.:
FACTS:
Tito Pletcha Jr. is a civic-conscious farmer accused of preventing the workers of Rodeo Corporation from
fencing four hectares of his property by scaring them away with a bolo.
Pletcha invokes the doctrine of self-help under Article 429 of the Civil Code. He claims that he was sure
that the portion of the land sought to be claimed is part of the land he inherited from his father and he
has been occupying it fir 19 years without interruption.
ISSUE:
Was the invocation of Pletcha of the Doctrine of self-help proper in this case?
HELD:
YES. Under Article 436 of the Civil Code, Pletcha enjoys the presumption of ownership. Hence, Pletcha
is justified to retaliate in self-defense, with force, if necessary.
The usurper’s possession is not yet complete and were only in the act of building a fence which act
constitutes force that which may give rise to the invocation of the doctrine of self-help.
Hence, Pletcha is justified in acting as he did in this case.
57
39. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Eliseo Emanel
Voltaire Lopez, Ruel Romero, Patricio Capricio, Ernesto Fatallo, Zosimo Gomez and 100 John
Does
G.R. No. 192999; July 18, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR. J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner owned 1,023.8574 hectares of land. A big portion of this land measuring 958.8574 hectares
(958-hectare land) was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thereafter,
698.8897 hectares of the 958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO). Petitioner, however, maintained management
and control of 277.44 hectares of land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-hectare
land). Later, petitioner’s certificates of title over the 109-hectare land were cancelled. The DAR identified
278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land, majority of whom are members of respondent Diamond
Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DFWMPC). Thereafter, the DAR issued six Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation against respondents. Petitioner alleged that it was the
holder of TCTs covering two parcels of land within the 109-hectare land. It alleged that DAR’s Order
distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not yet final on account of appeals, and
therefore petitioner remains the lawful possessor of the subject land (109-hectare land). Respondents,
on the other hand, claimed that petitioner conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy and cultivate
the 35-hectare land. Petitioner tried to allow alleged beneficiaries to occupy portions of the 74-hectare
land, but respondents guarded it to protect their own rights.
ISSUE:
Are respondents guilty of unlawful occupation?
HELD:
NO. Respondents guarded the 74-hectare land to protect their rights as farm workers and CARP
beneficiaries. They were compelled to do so when petitioner attempted to install other workers thereon,
after it conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy the 35-hectare land. The government cannot
condone petitioner’s act to thwart the CARP’s implementation. Installing workers on a CARP-covered
land when the DAR has already identified the CARP beneficiaries of the land and has already ordered
the distribution of the land to them serves no other purpose than to create an impermissible roadblock to
installing the legitimate beneficiaries on the land. The action taken by respondents to guard the land was
reasonable and necessary to protect their legitimate possession. Such course was justified under Article
429 of the Civil Code which reads: “The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property.” Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to protect
their possession, respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation.
58
40. Spouses Fuentes v. Roca

G.R. No. 178902; April 21, 2010
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza sold her lot to her son Tarciano Roca, but the latter did not have the registered title
transferred to his name. After 6 years, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to spouses Fuentes.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of ₱60,000.00 for the
transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within 6 months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and
occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with
these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional
₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house
standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would
become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
According to Atty. Plagata, whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale, he was able to see
Rosario during one of his trips and had her sign the affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the
other conditions, Spouses Fuentes paid the additional ₱140,000.00. A new title was issued to the
spouses, and they constructed a building on the lot.
8 years later, the heirs of Tarciano filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Spouses Fuentes alleging that the sale was void because Rosario did not consent to the sale,
her signature on the affidavit having been forged.
The RTC dismissed the case, holding that the action had already prescribed. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC and ruled that an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be
brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction and since the Fuentes
spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment
of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
ISSUE:
Are the spouses Fuentes possessors in good faith?
HELD:
YES. The Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building
improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the
transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses
had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of
knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was
already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. In fact, they paid the
balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that
the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526
of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
59
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the
property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled
under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of
retention until the reimbursement is made. The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article
546 of the Civil Code, of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying
the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
60
USE INJURING RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (ART. 431)
41. Natividad V. Andamo & Emmanuel R. Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.
G.R. No. 74761; November 6, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that
of Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc. (Missionaries) Within the land of Missionaries, water paths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
The Amado’s instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of Missionaries for destruction
by means of inundation, and a civil action against Missionaries for damages based on quasi-delict. The
trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of
the Rules of Court which provides that “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
beinstituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.” The Amado’s appealed from
that order to the IAC which affirmed the trial court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate
Court erred in dismissing civil case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
May an adjoining landowner use his own land without regard to the rights and interests of others?
HELD:
NO. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so
as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO ANDE,
APA, BAACO, BULUSAN, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING, EDILLOR, HUAB,
61
SURFACE RIGHTS (ART. 437)
42. 41. Natividad V. Andamo & Emmanuel R. Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.
G.R. No. 74761; November 6, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to
that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within
the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had the right to build such waterpaths, contrivances, and an artificial lake.
HELD:
Yes. Art. 437 of the Civil Code provides that “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.”
HOWEVER, it must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner
so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner
to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual
and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Here, the structures in the land of private respondent caused damage and injury to the petitioners.
62
43. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Irrigation Administration (nia) v. Rural
Bank of Kabacan, Inc., Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa, Leosa Nanette Agdeppa and Marcelino
Viernes, Margarita Taboada, Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, represented by Lina Erlinda A. Ortiz
and Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas
G. R. No. 185124; January 25, 2012
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on
22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. Its
charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552 on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17
July 1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power
of eminent domain.
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation
Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters. The
case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch 22. The affected
parcels of land were the following: (1) Lot No. 3080 registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan, (2) Lot
No. 455 registered under the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed Lao, (3) Lot No.
3039 registered under the name of Littie Sarah Agdeppa. NIA filed an Amended Complaint and prayed
that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine
National Bank the amount of ₱19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim; that NIA had
no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it
was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned government
property adjacent to theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned
by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate
because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at ₱5 million; and that NIA
never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent
and irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱250,000.
The RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the
expropriated properties to establish the just compensation to be paid to the owners. The committee was
composed of the Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson and two (2) members of the parties to
the case.
The RTC ruled for expropriation. The CA through its Twenty-First (21st) Division, promulgated a Decision
affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee tasked to determ ine the fair
market value of the properties and improvements for the purpose of arriving at the just compensation,
properly performed its function.
Finally, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that recognized defendants-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda
and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No. 3080 and held that they were thus entitled
to just compensation. The appellate court based its conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank
of Kabacan in the expropriation proceedings and the latter’s Manifestation that it no longer owned Lot
No. 3080.
63
On 11 September 2008, the NIA through the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 12 August
2008 Decision, but that motion was denied.
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Should the payment of just compensation for Lot No. 3080 be made to the respondents Taboada and
Ortiz?
HELD:
No. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the payment of just compensation
intended for Lot No. 3080 registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the defendants -
intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the rural bank in the proceedings and the latter’s
subsequent Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. The appellate court erred on this
matter.
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds. In this kind of
proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the just compensation to
be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property. Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to
rely on the Rural Bank of Kabacan’s mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the
expropriation proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment.
The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. It
should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order
for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document
and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated.
We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of conveyance or evidence
of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to
defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the said rural bank. It is not
disputed that the bank did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it
no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and the
defendants-intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance of the subject lot. The
court cannot rely on mere inference, considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be
awarded solely owner based on the latter’s proof of ownership.
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides
thus:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or
there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded
to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the
public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts Order to award payment of just compensation
to the defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that
the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan
manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-intervenors; however, it
64
presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to remand this case
to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be
entitled to receive the payment of just compensation.
65
ACCESSION DISCRETA
44. The Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., et. al.
G.R. No. 35223; September 17, 1931
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of
its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage
their land to the creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running
with their property under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, undertook to credit the owners of the
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of the debt secured according
to yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as
the central became free of its obligations to the aforesaid bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the
contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank
authority to make such payment.
A complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the
delivery of the amount P13,850 or promissory notes, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The
complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes
Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay the plaintiff a sum
sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano
Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
The PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson
Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus, because that would be civil
fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to, and by
virtue of a deed of assignment, and praying that said central be ordered to delivered directly to the
intervening bank said sum on account of the latter's credit against the aforesaid Mariano Lacson
Ledesma.
ISSUE:
Whether the bonus in question is considered as civil fruits for the rent due to which PNB is entitled to by
virtue of the deed of assignment
HELD:
No.
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the
proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar
sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras analogas"
refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun "rentas," as
do also the other adjectives "perpetuas"and "vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil
Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and
certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left to be
examined is that of "income."
66
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in question is
"income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived from the land
mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the benefit of the central; for it is not
obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's contention
is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the land
mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in
favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of
anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or income
from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is concerned, has nothing to do with it. Hence,
the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the
value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the
debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and
independent of the property referred to.
67
45. Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc.

G.R. No. 133879; November 21, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. ("Camelo" ) entered into two Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc.
("Mayfair"). Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the
subject properties. However, on July 30, 1978 — within the 20-year-lease term — the subject properties
were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. ("Equatorial) without their first being offered
to Mayfair. As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before
the RTC for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial. The Deed of
Absolute Sale between petitioners Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. and Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc.
is hereby deemed rescinded.
Equatorial filed with the RTC, an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair, claiming
payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for the defendant's use of the subject premises after its
lease contracts had expired.
RTC debunked the claim of petitioner for unpaid back rentals, holding that the rescission of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in the mother case did not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual proprietary rights,
even in expectancy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Equatorial is entitled to back rentals
HELD:
NO. Equitorial is not entitled to back rentals. We hold that under the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case at bar, no right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent
failure to deliver the property to the buyer.
Rental—a Civil Fruit of Ownership. To better understand the peculiarity of the instant case, let us begin
with some basic parameters. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by
right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection
of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property
during that period.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him
"in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear that petitioner never took actual control and possession of
the property sold, in view of respondent's timely objection to the sale and the continued actual possession
of the property. The objection took the form of a court action impugning the sale which, as we know, was
rescinded by a judgment rendered by this Court in the mother case. It has been held that the execution
of a contract of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal fiction. It holds true only when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the
vendee. When there is such impediment, "fiction yields to reality — the delivery has not been effected."
Hence, respondent's opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to Equatorial was a legally
sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the property into the latter's hands.
68
The fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean
either actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorial's title.The rental payments made by Mayfair
should not be construed as a recognition of Equatorial as the new owner. They were made merely to
avoid imminent eviction.
In short, the sale to Equatorial may have been valid from inception, but it was judicially rescinded before
it could be consummated. Petitioner never acquired ownership, not because the sale was void, as
erroneously claimed by the trial court, but because the sale was not consummated by a legally effective
delivery of the property sold.
However, the point may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil Code, Equatorial as buyer acquired
a right to the fruits of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to petitioner
arose.32 That time arose upon the perfection of the Contract of Sale on July 30, 1978, from which
moment the laws provide that the parties to a sale may reciprocally demand performance.33 Does this
mean that despite the judgment rescinding the sale, the right to the fruits34 belonged to, and remained
enforceable by, Equatorial?
Article 1385 of the Civil Code answers this question in the negative, because "[r]escission creates the
obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the
price with its interest; x x x" Not only the land and building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if any,
had to be returned by the buyer.
At bottom, it may be conceded that, theoretically, a rescissible contract is valid until rescinded. However,
this general principle is not decisive to the issue of whether Equatorial ever acquired the right to collect
rentals. What is decisive is the civil law rule that ownership is acquired, not by m ere agreement, but by
tradition or delivery. Under the factual environment of this controversy as found by this Court in the mother
case, Equatorial was never put in actual and effective control or possession of the property because of
Mayfair's timely objection.
Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that there was valid delivery, petitioner is not entitled to
any benefits from the "rescinded" Deed of Absolute Sale because of its bad faith. This being the law of
the mother case decided in 1996, it may no longer be changed because it has long become final and
executory. Petitioner's bad faith is set forth in the following pertinent portions of the mother case. In the
mother case, this Court categorically denied the payment of interest, a fruit of ownership. By the
same token, rentals, another fruit of ownership, cannot be granted without mocking this Court's
en banc Decision, which has long become final.
69
46. Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion

G.R. No. 219811; April 6, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land. As administrator, he leased portions of the
property to third persons. Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which was divided into
seven units or stalls.
Baytion leased one of the stalls to Antonio dela Cruz where the latter started a business. 10 or 15 years
later, a stone walling (riprap) was erected at the creek lying beside Baytion’s property, leaving a deep
down-sloping area. Antonio had the down-slope filled up until it was leveled with the leased portion.
Antonio paid for the right to possess the same. Antonio’s business was taken over by Leonida. After her
death, the business was taken over by Ernanie. In 2008, Daclison entered into a business venture with
Ernanie in the same leased property and he took over the management of the business. Upon Baytion’s
request, he and Ernanie vacated the leased area and transferred their business to the filled-up portion.
Despite the fact that they already vacated the leased portion of the property, Baytion filed complaint for
forcible entry and damages.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that Baytion, as co-owner of the subject property, had a better right to
possess. Since appellant have been possessing the subject property in his capacity as a mere sub-
lessee, he cannot own the subject property and its improvements through open, continuous and adverse
possession of the property. Hence, the present petition for review.
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the filled-up portion between
the riprap constructed by the government and the property of Baytion and therefore, outside of the land
co-owned by Baytion. Daclison insists that Antonio, from whom he derived his right over the contested
portion, made an open, continuous and adverse possession and use of the property when the latter
extended his place of business to the filled-up portion. Baytion basically posits that although the disputed
portion is outside the description of the property covered by TCT No. 221507, it forms an integral part of
the latter because it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law,
any accretion or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baytion has the better right of possession of the subject property
HELD:
No. Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. The following
requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin with, the land
came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit.1âwphi1The deposits were artificial
and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion
failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of
the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human
intervention.
70
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or accession. Article 445
of the Civil Code provides: Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land xxx.
Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the thing that has been mentioned."
In other words, the supposed improvement must be made, constructed or introduced within or on the
property and not outside so as to qualify as an improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would
just be very convenient for land owners to expand or widen their properties in the guise of improvements.
Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not have a better right to possess the same.
In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been in prior possession of this piece of
property. His claim of ownership is without basis. That being said, it is safe to conclude that he does not
have any cause of action to eject Daclison.
71
47. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lamberto C. Perez, Nestor C. Kun, Ma. Estelita P. Angeles-
Panlilio, and Napoleon O. Garcia
G.R. No. 166884; June 13, 2012
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines filed a complaint for estafa or violation of Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, against the the officers and representatives of Asian
Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) when the latter failed to return to LBP the proceeds
of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ACDC is obliged to return the construction material
HELD:
NO. LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that the materials that it sought to buy
under the letters of credit were to be used for the following projects: the Metro Rail Transit Project and
the Clark Centennial Exposition Project. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way they
could recover the buildings or constructions for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts
had been used.
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a construction site
of two government projects, as well as unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that LBP
intended to be the owner of those construction materials. As a government financial institution, LBP
should have been aware that the materials were to be used for the construction of an immovable property,
as well as a property of the public domain.
As an immovable property, the ownership of whatever was constructed with those materials would
presumably belong to the owner of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials, consisting of cement, bolts and reinforcing
steel bars, would be used for the construction of a movable property, the ownership of these properties
would still pertain to the government and not remain with the bank as they would be classified as property
of the public domain, which is defined by the Civil Code as:
Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
72
ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL
48. Damian Ignacio, Francisco Ignacio and Luis Ignacio v. Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres,
and Felipe Natividad, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan
G.R. No. L-175; April 30, 1946
Moran, C.J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case between the respondent (plaintiff) Elias Hilario and
petitioner Damian Ignacio (defendant) concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and
partly residential. After the trial of the case, the RTC rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal
owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries
built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with
article 361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same Court the plaintiff prayed for an order of execution alleging
that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot,
said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs
in the possession of said lot.
Defendant objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted.
The judgment rendered is founded on articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. The owner of the building
erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he
is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the
option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But
he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of court a quo compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from
the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings
not to sell the land, is null and void
HELD:
Yes. The order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the
land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings
not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and
is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
The rights of both parties are well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to
determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of time
within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars having been
left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This procedure is erroneous, for
after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith
except its execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much,
and within what time may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority is vested in him to settle
these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix
73
has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding,
matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.
For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside and the lower
court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings
and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which the plaintiffs -
respondents may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last
instance, the period of time within which the defendants-petitioners may pay for the land, all these periods
to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or inappealable. After such hearing, the
court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the parties.
74
ARTICLE 448 APPLICABLE BETWEEN CO-OWNERS AFTER PARTITION
49. Florencio Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Juan Ignao, substituted by his Legal Heirs,
and Isidro Ignao
G.R. No. 72876; January 18, 1991
FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-
owners of a parcel of land in Kawit, Cavite. Ignao successfully obtained an order of partition of the said
land, allotting 133.5 square meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents, and giving the remaining portion
with a total area of 266.5 square meters to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was ever
effected.
Ignao later instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against private respondents
alleging that the area occupied by the 2 houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 square
meters previously allotted to them. The lower court found that the houses of Juan and Isidro occupied a
portion of Florencio's property but they should be considered builders in good faith under Article 448 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is Article 448 applicable to a builder in good faith on a property held in common?
HELD:
Yes. Article 448 is applicable to a builder in good faith on a property held in common.
It has been previously held by the Supreme Court that Article 448 cannot apply where a co-owner builds,
plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that
exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under
the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile
co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.
75
50. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Maria Garcia Timbang, et al.

G.R. No. L-12812; September 29, 1959
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
This stemmed from a decision of the CA rendered in 2 cases appealed to it where spouses Timbang, the
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. (FCI), and Maria Gervacio Blas were the parties. FCI was declared to have
acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in and to lot No. 2-a and thus, FCI was ordered to pay the
spouses Timbang the amount of P15,807.90. Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school
building constructed on the lot hence FCI, purchaser of building, was ordered to deliver to Blas stock
certificates as payment. It was held that in case FCI failed to deposit the value of the land (P32,859,34),
the spouses Timbang would then become owners thereof. FCI failed to pay, hence, the spouses Timbang
made known to the court their decision that they had chosen not of appropriate the building but to compel
FCI for the payment of such sum. This motion was granted. In turn, appellee Blas filed a motion for
execution of her judgment of P8,200.00 representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to
FCI. During the execution, the sheriff sold the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang,
including some personal properties of FCI.
Motions were subsequently filed before the CFI Manila by Blas praying that the Timbang spouses be
ordered to pay and deliver to her the proceeds of the auction sale of the building of FCI. FCI also filed a
motion praying that because its properties, the house and some personal properties, have been
auctioned in favor of the Timbang spouses who applied the proceeds to the partial payment of the sum
of P32,859.34 FCI be declared part owner of Lot 2-a to the extent of such amount. The CFI declared FCI
as owner of an undivided interest in Lot 2-a and ordered the sale in public auction of the said interest to
satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against FCI. It also ordered the
spouses to pay appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made at the public auction.
Hence this petition. The spouses contended that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the
price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the
builder lost his right of retention provided in Article 546 and by operation of Article 445, the spouses-
appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto, the execution sale of the
house in their favor was superfluous. Consequently, they are not bound to make good their bid of
P5,750.00 as that would be to make goods to pay for their own property.
ISSUE:
Are the spouses obligated to pay such amount to Blas?
HELD:
YES. The spouses are obligated to pay the sum of P5,750.00 to Blas.
Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code defines the right of the parties in case a person in good faith builds,
sows or plants on the land of another. Under the terms of these articles, it is true that the owner of the
land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value
thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be
exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of
the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention
of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these
two article, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the
builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes
automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
76
The question is; what is the recourse or remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder
fails to pay the value of the land? While the Code is silent on this Court in the case of Miranda v. Fadullon,
et al. stated that: A builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. He has right to retain the land on
which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly he might
be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the improvement and
requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to pay the
land, and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and
should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount.
Should the parties not agree to leave things as they are and to assume the relation of lessor and lessee,
another remedy is suggested in the case of Ignacio v. Hilario, supra, wherein the court has ruled that the
owner of the land in entitled to have the improvement removed when after having chosen to sell his land
to the other party, i.e., the builder in good faith fails to pay for the same. A further remedy is indicated in
the case of Bernardo v. Bataclan, supra, where this Court approved the sale of the land and the
improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the
land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof.
The appellants herein, owners of the land, instead of electing any of the alternative above indicated chose
to seek recovery of the value of their land by asking for a writ of execution; levying on the house of the
builder; and selling the same in public auction. Because they are the highest bidder in their own auction
sale, they now claim they acquired title to the building without necessity of paying in cash on account of
their bid. In other words, they in effect pretend to retain their land and acquire the house without paying
a cent therefor.
This contention is without merit. This Court has already held in Matias v. The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva
Ecija (74 Phil., 326) that while it is the invariable practice, dictated by common sense, that where the
successful bidder is the execution creditor himself, he need not pay down the amount of the bid if it does
not exceed the amount of his judgement, nevertheless, when there is a claim by a third-party, to the
proceeds of the sale superior to his judgment credit, the execution creditor, as successful bidder, must
pay in cash the amount of his bid as a condition precedent to the issuance to him of the certificate of sale.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the
payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the
school building are concerned.
The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay in cash the
amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
77
51. Manotok Realty, Inc. v. The Honorable Jose H. Tecson, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and Nilo Madlangawa
G.R. No. L-47475; August 19, 1988
GUTIERRREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession and damages against the private
respondent, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring the defendant Nilo
Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good faith; and ordering the plaintiff to recognize the right of
said defendant to remain in Lot No. 345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall
have been reimbursed by the plaintiff the sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs.
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon
affirmance by the latter of the decision below, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court which
dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a motion for
the approval of petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue
an order: a) approving the exercise of petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements introduced by
the private respondent on the property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession
of the property in question to the petitioner.
After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus
alleging that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to exercise
option and for execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
the exercise of option belongs to the owner of the property, who is the petitioner herein, and that upon
finality of judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution which is only a
ministerial act on the part of the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Should the motion for the approval of the exercise of option be granted?
HELD:
Yes. When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the
respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis
for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of its option to appropriate the
improvements made on its property.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which he
builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that he be unaware 'that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The private respondent's good faith ceased after
the filing of the complaint below by the petitioner.
Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed
cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner's
exercise of option. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private
respondent's right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner,
there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to
herein petitioner.
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52. Vicente Bernardo v. Catalino Bataclan

G.R. No. L-44606; November 28, 1938
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Bernardo learned when he entered into the premises of the property purchased from Pastor Samonte
that the latter authorized Catalino Bataclan to make improvements thereon. In a civil case to secure
possession, the court ruled that Bataclan was a builder and possessor in good faith and was entitled to
reimbursement for the works and improvements.
Plaintiff was given by the court 30 days from the date when the decision became final within which to
exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him. Bernardo
decided to sell the land to the defendant but the latter informed the court that he is unable to pay the sum
required. Then Plaintiff was given by the court 30 days from the date when the decision became final
within which to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements
from him.
Thereafter the court, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the part of the defendant,
ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was sold to Toribio Teodoro, the
highest bidder, for P8,000. Teodoro moved that he be placed in possession of the land purchased by
him. The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which
he is entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in
accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bataclan lost his right to retain the property pending payment of indemnity
HELD:
No, Bataclan has lost his right of retention.
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of these is the
principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that
which is united to it either naturally or artificially (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land
of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land (Art. 358).
Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between
the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
coownership", the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent (Art. 361).
It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the acc essory thing. In the case before
us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to
pay for the land.
However, defendant lost his right to retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319,
the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The said
defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession
thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The
79
law, as we have already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between
indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to
pay for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.
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53. Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr., et al. v. Spouses Uy, et al.

G.R. No. 136456; October 24, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
This controversy involves a 128 hectare of land located in the barrios of Dunga and Cahumayhumayan,
Danao City. The late Congressman Ramon Durano Sr. together with his son Ramon Durano III, and the
latter’s wide Elizabeth Hotchkins-Durano, instituted an action for damages against spouses Angeles
Sepulveda Uy and Emigdio Beng Sing Uy, among others, before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Danao City.
Herein respondents are the possessors of the subject parcel of land which they are cultivating. This land
was used to be owned by CEPOC (Cebu Portland and Cement Company) who later sold the same to
Durano & Co. In 1990, Durano & Co sold the disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who
procured the registration of these lands in his name under TCT no. T-103 and T-104. The different parts
of the entire land were, however, bulldozed by the petitioner’s company resulting to the destruction of
plants and other products that were placed by the respondents. Hence, a claim for damages was lodged
against herein petitioner. The respondents presented tax declaration covering the different areas of the
parcel of land that is titled in each of them as proof that they are entitled to the said damages which also
includes the cost of improvement they made on the land.
The RTC found for respondents thinking that they are the absolute owners thereof. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision concluding that the issuance of TCTs in favor of petitioner Ramon Durano III was attended
by fraud, hence petitioner could not invoke the indefeasibility of title. The CA ordered the return of the
properties to respondents and the payment of the indemnity.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in ordering the return of properties to respondents and the payment of indemnity?
HELD:
NO. The CA was correct in ordering the return of the properties to respondents and the payment of
indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code.
The Civil Code in Art. 449, expressly provides that: “He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.” The related provisions in
the instant case provide:
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower.
In the instant case, since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by
the Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
Moreover, based on the aforementioned provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1)
to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that
81
the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. In any
case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, above-cited.
The right of the owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in
Article 451 of the Civil Code. Although said Article 451 does not elaborate on the basis for damages, the
Court perceives that it should reasonably correspond with the value of the properties lost or destroyed
as a result of the occupation in bad faith, as well as the fruits (natural, industrial or civil) from those
properties that the owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain.
We sustain the view of the lower courts that the disparity between respondents’ affidavits and their tax
declarations on the amount of damages claimed should not preclude or defeat respondents right to
damages, which is guaranteed by Article 451. Moreover, under Article 2224 of the Civil Code: Temperate
or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Petition is denied. Respondents were declared owners thereof by acquisitive prescription.
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54. Eden Ballatan and Spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling v. Court of Appeals, Gonzalo
Go, Winston Go, Li Ching Yao, Araneta Institute of Agriculture and Jose N. Quedding
G.R. No. 125683; March 2, 1999
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Lot Registered Owner
Lot 24 Eden Ballatan and Spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling [petitioners]
Lot 25 Gonzalo Go, Sr. (house of Winston [Gonzalo’s son] erected) [Go’s]
Lot 26 Gonzalo Go, Sr.
Lot 27 Li Ching Yao
During the construction of Ballatan’s house on Lot 24, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of Winston encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her
property. Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that described
in the title. Ballatan informed Winston of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Winston,
however, claimed that his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of
Gonzalo’s lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Quedding, the authorized surveyor of AIA, the owner-
developer of the subdivision project.
Ballatan called the attention of AIA to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area
received from them. Quedding made 3 relocation surveys of the lands as authorized by AIA. During the
third survey, Quedding found that Lots 25 to 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot 24. On
the basis of the survey, Ballatan made a written demand on Go to remove and dismantle their
improvements on Lot 24. Gonzalo and Winston refused.
The RTC Malabon decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered Go’s to vacate the subject portion of Lot 24,
demolish their improvements and pay petitioners damages. It dismissed the third-party complaint which
Go’s filed against (1) AIA after finding that the lots were in accordance with the technical description and
verification plain covered by their respective titles; (2) Quedding, there being no privity of relation between
him and Go’s and his erroneous survey having been made at the instance of AIA; and (3) Li Ching Yao
for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the subject encroachment.
Go’s appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint but reinstated the
complaint against Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Instead of ordering Go’s to demolish their improvements
on the subject land, it ordered them to pay petitioners, and Li Ching Yao to pay Go, a reasonable amount
for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking.
ISSUES:
1. Should Go’s demolish the improvements erected on the land of the petitioners?
2. Is the amount to be paid for an encroachment made in good faith on another’s lot fixed at the time of
taking?
HELD:
1. No. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The CA,
however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it
was this survey that Winston relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house
in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short, Go’s had no knowledge
that they encroached on petitioners' lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time Ballatan
informed them of their encroachment on her property.
83
Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. He constructed his house in
1982, Gos in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that Li Ching
Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on Go's adjoining
land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof.
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in
accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property [i.e., Article 448].
Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on
land belonging to the adjoining owner.
Petitioners, as owners of Lot 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by Gos on their land,
or sell to Gos the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's
house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot 24 on which their
improvement stands. If Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and,
until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the
value of the land is much more than Go's improvement, then Go’s must pay reasonable rent. If they do
not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the same.
2. No. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to Go’s the subject portion of their lot, the price must be
fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The CA erred in fixing the price at the time of
taking, which is the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of
just compensation in expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking
by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case
of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a
portion of this land for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment.
Article 448 and the same conditions above-stated also apply to Go’s as owners and possessors of their
land and Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on 37 square meters of Go's land.
84
55. Spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes v. Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal and Pilar Malcampo
G.R. No. 178902; April 21, 2010
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Tarciano Roca bought a lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot
to the petitioners Fuentes Spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata prepared the documents and
requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Sps. Fuentes there will be a
P60,000 down payment and P140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on
the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata
then claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at
Zamboanga. The sale was consummated in 1989 and a new title was issued in the name of the spouses
who immediately constructed a building on the lot. A year after the sale, Tarciano died, shortly followed
by Rosario.
Eight years later, the children and heirs of Tarciano and Rosario, respondents herein, filed a case to
annul the sale and for reconveyance of the land on the ground that the sale was void since the consent
of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Sps. Fuentes claim
that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from
discovery.
RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes Spouses. CA reversed RTC’s ruling stating that Rosario’s signature
was indeed a forgery. CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under
which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent (merely voidable contract
of sale). Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him
plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes
spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment
of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sps. Fuentes are builders in good faith and thus, entitled to payment of the value of the
improvements they introduced on the lot.
HELD:
YES, Spouse Fuentes were deemed builders in good faith.
First, it was established that Rosario’s signature in the document giving consent to the sale was a forgery
because of the variance between the signature in the said document and the sample specimen. And
although Tarciano and Rosario were married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after
the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to conjugal partnerships already established
at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent
of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of
the property to their heirs -the respondent Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article
429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
85
Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs,
the Rocas, the ₱200,000 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his
estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building
improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the
transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses
had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of
knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. Also, the notarized document
appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the
documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of
the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property and
built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it (Art. 526, Civil Code).
As possessors in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the
property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled
under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of
retention until the reimbursement is made.
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, of indemnifying the
Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property
may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
86
56. Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Spouses Arsenio (Deceased) and Angeles Nanol and anybody
claiming rights under them
G.R. No. 176791; November 14, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a contract to sell with petitioner whereby the latter
agreed to sell to them a house and lot. To obtain a loan to pay for the property, the parties simulated a
sale over the house and lot which facilitated the transfer of the title to Spouses’ names. The loan did not
push through hence the respondents availed of petitioner’s in-house financing. A few years thereafter,
Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a new one. When Arsenio died, Angeles was not
able to pay the amortizations thus respondent filed a complaint for cancellation of title, recovery of
possession, reconveyance, and damages.
The RTC declared the deed of absolute sale void and accordingly, the TCTs in the name of Spouses
Nanol are ordered cancelled. The respondents were directed to “turn-over the possession of the prop to
petitioner subject to the latter’s payment of their total monthly installments and the value of the new house
minus the cost of the original house”.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in ordering petitioner to pay to respondent the value of the new house minus the
cost of the original house?
HELD:
No. As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual
relation between the parties, such as in the instant case. But for failure of the parties to attach a copy of
the Contract to Sell, the Court is constrained to apply Article 448. Article 448 applies when the builder
believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at
least, he has a claim of title thereto which is not present in this case. The subject property is covered by
a Contract to Sell hence ownership still remains with petitioner being the seller. Nevertheless, there were
already instances where the Court applied Article 448 even if the builders do not have a claim of title over
the property such as in cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent or
approval of the owner.
Article 448 is also applicable in this case because, first, good faith is presumed on the part of the spouses.
Second, petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to show that
petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the spouses. Consequently, it can
validly be presumed that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed. This presumption
is bolstered by the fact that as the subdivision developer, petitioner must have given the spouses permits
to commence and undertake the construction.
Furthermore, petitioner (the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or
to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to
exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
**Case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
87
57. Pedro Angeles v. Estelita B. Pascual et al.

G.R. No. 157150; September 21, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of adjacent
parcels of land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2 (Lot 4) of the consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-951. Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-
subdivision plan. Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective
lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the
highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey
of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual's house had encroached on Lot 3. As a
consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.
In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles' house also
encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters,
leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the
encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles' house. Angeles refused the demand.
Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the RTC.
The RTC ruled that there was no dispute as to the ownership, but only as to the location of their respective
lots. Since Pascual was able to prove the encroachment, it ruled for Pascual. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC, but found Angeles a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the NCC. Angeles appealed,
arguing that the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of Angeles' house
or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary to its finding of good faith.
ISSUE:
Did the CA, in laying down the foregoing options for the parties, correctly apply Article 448 of the NCC?
HELD:
Yes. The CA's application of Article 448 was correct and proper.
Article 448 of the NCC contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned
by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons,
like here.
In the present case, The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We
cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles
insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.
With the unassailable finding that Angeles' house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built
his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the
owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being
the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to
make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the
value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the
finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, the options given by the CA are proper.
88
58. Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. and/or Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel E. Panlilio v. Nayong
Pilipino Foundation
G.R. No. 170923; January 20, 2009
PUNO, C. J.:
FACTS:
On June 1, 1975, respondent Nayong Pilipino Foundation leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino
Complex, consisting of 36,289 square meters, to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. for the construction and
operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel. The lease was for an initial
period of 21 years, or until May 1996. It is renewable for a period of 25 years under the same terms and
conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the intention to renew at least 6 months before its
expiration.
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental. Respondent
repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. Respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Respondent computed the arrears of petitioners in the amount of twenty-six million one hundred eighty-
three thousand two hundred twenty- five pesos and fourteen centavos (P26,183,225.14), as of July 31,
2001.
Petitioners contended that they were builders in good faith over substantial and valuable improvements
which they had introduced on the subject property, thus compelling the application of Article 448 in
relation to Article 546, instead of Article 1678 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were builders in good faith under Article 448 in relation to Article 546 of
the Civil Code
HELD:
No. The late Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, a leading expert in Civil Law, explains:
This article [Article 448] is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows
on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only interest of
the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as lessees, they recognize
that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements,
which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of
respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of
the property until reimbursement by respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does
not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in
good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily improve the lessor out of its
property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that
would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article
1678 of the Civil Code.
89
Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the improvements which
the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable for the use for which the lease is intended, and which
have not altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may remove the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
90
59. Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez v. Spouses Rose Ogas Alciso and
Antonio Alciso
G.R. No. 165907; July 27, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Rose Alciso entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land with Celso Bate. Celso subsequently
sold the property to Spouses Narvaez.
Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase
the property from the Spouses Narvaez. In compliance with Alciso’s demand, the Deed stated that, "The
SELLER (Bate) carries over the manifested intent of the original SELLER of the property (Alciso) to buy
back the same at a price under such conditions as the present BUYERS (Spouses Narvaez) may
impose." Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the
property.. Alciso and the Spouses Narvaez failed to reach an agreement on the repurchase price.
Alciso filed a complaint and prayed that the Spouses Narvaez be ordered to reconvey the property. Alciso
claimed that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of real estate mortgage and not a
contract of sale with right of repurchase. The Spouses Narvaez claimed that Alciso did not communicate
her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; thus, she could not repurchase the
property.
RTC declared that Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity
equivalent to one-half of its market value when constructed or sell the land to the Spouses Narvaez. The
CA ruled Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige
the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of
the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alciso could repurchase the property?
HELD:
YES, she could repurchase the property because she accepted the favor contained in the stipulation pour
autrui.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit
or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person.
All the requisites are present in the instant case: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of Alciso; (2) the
stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor to Alciso; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) Alciso
communicated her acceptance of the favor before its revocation — she demanded that a stipulation be
included in the Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the Spouses Narvaez,
and she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property; and (6) Bate and
the Spouses Narvaez did not represent, and were not authorized by, Alciso.
91
60. Department of Education v. Mariano Tuliao

G.R. No. 205664; June 9, 2014
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
In 2002, Mariano Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of structure with damages
against the Department of Education with MTCC-Tuguegarao City. He alleged that he was the registered
owner of the subject parcel of land and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his
predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an access road for the
schoolchildren in going to and from the school. In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was
being constructed on the land, he demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property.
The respondent, however, refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for reasonable rent, but his
demand was also ignored.
In its defense, the DepEd denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that it did not state
a cause of action. Even if there was, the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its
occupation of the subject land was adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for
more than fifty (50) years. It also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to
vacate. As owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value.
In 2010, the MTCC rendered its decision, ruling that Tuliao was the registered owner of the subject
property and, thus, had a right of action against the holder and possessor of the said property. Further, it
found that respondent’s possession of the subject property was merely tolerated by Tuliao. For said
reason, his right to recover it was never barred by laches.
As to the structures, the MTCC stated that it could not allow the immediate removal thereof in view of the
provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code and directed Tuliao to exercise his options under said
article.
The MTCC declared that the plaintiff’s prayer that the structures built on his lot be removed immediately
cannot be allowed in view of the provision of Article 448.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Tuliao is the owner of the disputed property
2. Whether DepEd can be compelled to remove the structure built
HELD:
1. Yes. Tuliao is the owner of the disputed property.
In this case, Tuliao, as the registered owner, filed a complaint for recovery of possession and removal of
structure.1âwphi1 To support his claim, he presented not only tax declarations and tax receipts, but also
a certificate of title. The Court agrees with the CA that the said pieces of evidence were sufficient to
resolve the issue of who had the better right of possession. That being the case, the burden was shifted
to the DepEd to prove otherwise. Unfortunately, the DepEd only presented testimonial evidence and
nothing more to prove its defense and refute Tuliao’s claim. Its lone witness was all that the DepEd had
to prove its right of possession. As between a certificate of title, which is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership, accompanied with a tax declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a testimony of a lone
witness who is a retired teacher on the other, the former prevails in establishing who has a better right of
possession over the property, following the rule that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over
documentary evidence.
92
As regards the DepEd 's defense of ]aches, it has no merit either. It avers that its possession of the
subject land was open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, notorious and in the concept of an owner for at
least thirty-two (32) years already at the time Tuliao filed the complaint. It must be noted, however, that
Tuliao's claim that the DepEd's possession of a portion of his land to be used as a passageway for the
students was mere tolerance was not refuted. Thus, the same is deemed admitted. This means that the
DepEd 's possession was not truly adverse.
2. No. DepEd cannot be compelled to remove the structure built.
At any rate, the MTCC was fair when it stated that it could not order the immediately removal of the
structures and directed Tuliao to exercise his option under Article 448, which reads:
“ Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and incase of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.”
If that would not be feasible or practical for DepEd, its remedy is to file an action for expropriation.
93
61. Department of Education v. Delfin C. Casibang

G.R. No. 192268; January 27, 2016
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
In 1965, respondent’s father allowed petitioner to construct a school in its property. On 2004, the
respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against the DepEd.
Respondents averred that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the land in 1965, he
consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the premises.
They claimed that they have been deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the portion of the land
occupied by the school, thus, they are entitled to just compensation and reasonable rent for the use of
property.
In its answer, petitioner insists that respondent’s right to recover said property is already barred by laches
considering that petitioner has already been occupying the said property in the concept of an owner for
almost 40 years already.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Likewise, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision that respondent’s right to recover said
property is not barred by laches
HELD:
NO, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC’s decision.
The Court ruled that as registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that the DepEd is a builder in good faith. To be deemed a builder in good
faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor
in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied
beyond the recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases wherein the builder has constructed
improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner.
Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith, since
Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property.
Hence, Article 448 may be applied in the case at bar.
In the case of Bernardo v. Bataclan, the Court explicated that Article 448 provides a just and equitable
solution to the impracticability of creating "forced co-ownership" by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. The owner of the land is allowed to exercise the
said options because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.
94
However, it is also provided under Article 448 that the builder cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings. If that is the case, the DepEd is not
duty-bound to pay the price of the land should the value of the same be considerably higher than the
value of the improvement introduced by the DepEd on the subject property. In which case, the law
provides that the parties shall agree on the terms of the lease and, in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled that the option of the landowner to appropriate after payment of
the indemnity representing the value of the improvements introduced and the necessary and useful
expenses defrayed on the subject lots is no longer feasible or convenient because it is now being used
as school premises. Considering that the appropriation of improvements upon payment of indemnity
pursuant to Article 546 by the respondents of the buildings being used by the school is no longer
practicable and feasible, the respondents are thus left with the second option of obliging the DepEd to
pay the price of the land or to require the DepEd to pay reasonable rent if the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the buildings and improvements.
Lastly, the RTC ruled that the basis of due compensation for the respondents should be the price or value
of the property at the time of the taking. In the case of Ballatan v. CA, the Court has settled that the time
of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings but not in a case where a
landowner has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years due to the encroachment of
another.
In such instances, the case of Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady's foundation, Inc. is instructive. The Court
elucidated therein that the computation of the value of the property should be fixed at the prevailing
market value. The reckoning period for valuing the property in case the landowner exercised his rights in
accordance with Article 448 shall be at the time the landowner elected his choice. Therefore, the basis
for the computation of the value of the subject property in the instant case should be its present or current
fair market value.
95
62. Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones v. Jose Macabagdal, Fe D. Macabagdal and Vergon Realty
Investments Corporation
G.R. No. 150666; August 3, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation
(Vergon) Lot No. 2-R. On the other hand, petitioner-spouses Luciano and Nelly Briones are the owners
of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon, petitioners
constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix
up, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the
property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an action
to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC.
Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which was consistently
pointed to them as theirs by Vergons agents over the 7-year period they were paying for the lot. They
interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon as third-party defendant
claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in
case the suit is decided against them.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or
to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTCs finding.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners builders in good faith?
HELD:
Yes, they are builders in good faith.
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was
done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said
article provides: “The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.”
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be
owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indem nity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
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around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove
the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his
land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the
improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may
have made on the subject property pursuant to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after
payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent.
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63. Spouses Ismael and Teresita Macasaet v. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
G.R. Nos. 154391-92; September 30, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael (son) and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
(parents) are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife. The parents
filed an ejectment suit against their children as owners of the parcel of land occupied by Ismael and
Teresita. Vicente and Rosario argue that the possession of said parcel of land was by virtue of a verbal
lease agreement. For their part Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of a verbal lease agreement.
They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject
lots. They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant
of inheritance in favor of their children.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that
Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of
Vicente and Rosario. As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand. The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts
that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and
Rosario. Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of
respondents' letter to vacate it. Ismael now invokes that he is a builder in good faith, so he should be
reimbursed on the improvements he introduced
ISSUE:
Whether Article 448 as to the rights of a builder in good faith is applicable to the case
HELD:
YES. Although as a general rule Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least to have a claim of title thereto and it does not
apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. However,
in some special cases, Article 448 recognized good faith beyond this limited definition. The established
facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners.
In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and
approved of the construction of the improvements introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed
to have been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
.
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64. Spouses Crispin Aquino and Teresa V. Aquino, herein represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
Amador D. Ledesma v. Spouses Eusebio Aguilar and Josefina V. Aguilar
G.R. No. 182754; June 29, 2015
SERENO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Teresa and Crispin Aquino are the owners of a house and lot in Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City.
In 1981, the property has been occupied by Spouses Eusebio and Josefina Aguilar, as the Spouses
Aquino were in the US. In 1983, Aquino wrote a letter to Aguilar not to construct on the premises as she
planned to sell the same when its value has increased.
While Spouses Aguilar were in possession of the property, the original house was demolished, and a
three-storey building was built in its place. Spouses Aguilar occupied this new building for 20 years rent-
free.
It was only in 2003 when Spouses Aquino asked them to vacate, as an immediate family member needs
to use the premises. The Spouses Aguilar refused to vacate, asserting they had contributed to the
improvement of the property in exchange for the exclusive use of a portion of a building. They contend
their status as builders in good faith.
ISSUE:
Can the Spouses Aguilar be considered as builders in good faith?
HELD:
No. The term “builder in good faith” as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one
who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware
of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or
mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
In the instant case, the Spouses Aguilar cannot be considered as builders in good faith on account of
their admission that the subject lot belonged to the Spouses Aquino when they constructed the building.
At the onset, petitioners were aware of a flaw in their title and a limit to their right to possess the property.
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that respondents in this case
are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not have the
right of retention over the premises.
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65. Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada

G.R. No. 152423; December 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla filed an ejectment case against
respondent Maria V. Coprada.
Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Majayjay, Laguna. In 1945,
respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the land
for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use
the same. When petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, the latter
refused. Petitioners then sent a written demand. However, the same also remained unheeded.
One of the contentions of the respondent is that since she was able to build a structure on the subject lot
with the prior permission from the owner, she is a builder in good faith and thus entitled to be reimbursed
the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. Without such
reimbursement, she has the right of retention over the property and she cannot just be ejected from the
premises.
ISSUE:
May respondent rightfully retain possession of the property?
HELD:
NO. respondent's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance. Hence, she has no right to
retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered
as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which
allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith.
At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession
was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners. Hence, she cannot be said to be a person who
builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof.
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ART. 448 and 447 APPLIED BY ANALOGY
66. Spouses Concepcion Fernandez Del Campo and Estanislao Del Canto v. Bernarda Fernandez
Abesia
G.R. No. L-49219; April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves a parcel of land, Lot No. 1161 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, with an area of only
about 45 square meters. An action for partition was filed by respondent Abesia in the CFI of Cebu.
Respondent and petitioner Spouses Del Campo are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of
and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the
agreement of the parties. The commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan, and submitted
a report to the trial court recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an
area of 30 square meters for respondent and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the
petitioners. The houses of respondent and petitioners were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The
house of petitioners occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of respondents.
The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and
adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that the rights of a builder in good faith under
Article 448 of the New Civil Code do not apply to a case where one co-owner has built, planted, or sown
on the land owned in common.
ISSUE:
Is the trial court correct in ruling that Article 448 is not applicable in this case?
HELD:
NO. Initially, the trial court correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner
builds, plants, or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land
that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when, as
in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of petitioners
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to respondent which the
petitioners obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code should apply.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the respondent have the right to appropriate said
portion of the house of petitioners upon payment of indemnity to petitioners as provided for in Article 546
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the respondent may oblige the petitioners to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the
portion of the house of petitioners built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The
petitioners shall then pay the reasonable rent to the respondent upon such terms and conditions that they
may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, petitioners may
demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
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67. Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Simplicio G. Esguerra and Carried Lumber Company
G.R. No. L-21783; November 29, 1969
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
On several occasions, respondent Carried Lumber Company (Company) sold and delivered lumber and
construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. (the plaintiff Pacific Farm Inc.’s predecessor-in-interest)
which the latter used in the construction of 6 buildings at its compound in Pangasinan. Of the total
procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid by the Insular Farms, Inc. The
Company instituted a civil case with the CIR of Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the
Insular Farms, Inc. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Company's claim. The corresponding
writ of execution was issued because there was no appeal instituted by Insular, Inc. The Pacific Farms,
Inc. filed a third-party claim asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the
Insular Farms, Inc. by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed about 7 months before the Company
filed the civil action. Shielded by an indemnity bond put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan
Insurance Company, Inc., the sheriff proceeded with the announced public auction and sold the levied
buildings to the Company.
Pacific Farms, Inc. then filed a complaint on against the Company and the sheriff-respondent Esguerra
praying that judgment be rendered declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the 6 buildings.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Company is entitled to the so-called “materialman’s lien” over the 6 buildings.
HELD:
YES, as an unpaid finisher of materials, respondent Company is entitled to a materialman’s lien.
It is undenied and undeniable that the Company furnished lumber and construction materials to the
Insular Farms, Inc. (the appellee's predecessor-in-interest) which the latter used in the construction of
the 6 buildings. Likewise unchallenged is the lower court's factual finding that out of the total procurement
price of P15,000, the amount of P4,710.18 remains outstanding and unpaid by the Insular Farms, Inc.
The appellant is therefore an unpaid furnisher of materials.
However, whether there exists a materialman's lien over the six buildings in favor of the appellant, is a
question the Court did not decide. Instead, it did find the application by analogy of the rules of accession
sufficient for a just adjudication.
Article 447 of the Civil Code provides: The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through
another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he
acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall
have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the
owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a right to be indemnified for damages.
The above-quoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered
the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in
good faith — whether personally or through another — makes constructions or works thereon, using
materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation
however of paying for their value. The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled to remove
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them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to
reimbursement for the value of his materials.
Although it does not appear from the records that the land upon which the 6 buildings were built is owned
by the petitioner Pacific Farms, nevertheless, that the petitioner claims that it owns the 6 buildings
constructed out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the Company, is indubitable.
Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, the Court considers the buildings as the principal and the
lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus Pacific Farms,
if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said materials; the
Company — which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do
so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding right to
recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Compensation should be borne by the person who has been benefited by the accession. No doubt,
petitioner benefited from the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the construction
of the six buildings. It should therefore shoulder the compensation due to the respondent as unpaid
furnisher of materials.
Of course, the character of a buyer in good faith and for value, if really possessed by the petitioner, could
possibly exonerate it from making compensation. However, it was not proven in this case that petitioner
Pacific Farms was a buyer in good faith.
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68. Pedro P. Pecson v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Nuguid
G.R. No. 115814; May 26, 1995
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built an apartment building. For his
failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction to spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-
Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale, but RTC dismissed the complaint. As to the
Nuguids’ claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was “not
a subject of the litigation.” Both parties then appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed in toto the
assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included in the
auction sale of the commercial lot.
Thereafter, the Nuguids filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the
apartment building, citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. Acting thereon, the trial court issued an order for
the issuance of writ of possession in favor of the Nuguids. When the trial court failed to act on his Motion
for Reconsideration, Pecson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA affirmed in
part the order of the trial court citing Article 448 of the Civil Code. Aggrieved, Pecson filed the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Does Art. 448 of the Civil Code apply to a case where one loses ownership of the land on which he built
a building?
HELD:
YES. The provision of Art. 448 on indemnity may be applied by analogy to a case where one loses the
ownership of the land on which he earlier built an apartment.
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties,
one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may
have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil
Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article
448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the
builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict
point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision
therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to
avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main
agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may
be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Art. 546 was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece
of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may
enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current
market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling
would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should
therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon
which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the
landowner.
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The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals
paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate
the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment
building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has
been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or
sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and,
necessarily, the income therefrom.
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GOOD FAITH
69. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo Uy

G.R. No. 108894; February 10, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Tecnogas, the plaintiff, is the registered owner of a parcel of 4531-A of Lot 4531, which was purchased
by plaintiff from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings and improvements including
the wall existing thereon. Eduardo Uy, the defendant, is the registered owner of Lot No. 4531-B of Lot
4531, which adjoins plaintiff’s land and was purchased by defendant from a certain Enrile Antonio also
in 1970. In 1971, defendant purchased another lot also adjoining plaintiff’s land from a certain Miguel
Rodriguez and the same was registered in defendant’s name.
The portions of the buildings and wall bought by plaintiff together with the land from Pariz Industries are
occupying a portion of defendant’s adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by
its buildings and wall of a portion of defendant’s land, plaintiff offered to buy from defendant that particular
portion of defendant’s land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but defendant, however, refused
the offer. In 1973, the parties entered into a private agreement wherein plaintiff agreed to demolish the
wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to defendant possession of a portion of his land previously
enclosed by plaintiff’s wall. Defendant later filed a complaint against plaintiff in connection with the
encroachment or occupation by plaintiff’s buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint
did not prosper.
Defendant dug or caused to be dug a canal along plaintiff’s wall, a portion of which collapsed in June,
1980, and led to the filing by plaintiff of the supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a
separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief against defendant and his wife which ultimately
resulted into the conviction in court of defendant’s wife for the crime of malicious mischief. While trial of
the case was in progress, plaintiff filed in Court a formal proposal for settlement of the case but said
proposal, however, was ignored by defendant.
The RTC rendered a decision on favor of petitioner. The CA reversed and set aside the decision holding
the petitioner a builder in bad faith because it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the benefit under Article 527 can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is not the
builder of the offending structures but possesses them as buyer
2. Whether or not the private respondent can insist on the removal of the encroaching structures as the
proper remedy
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith
by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good
faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law,
passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case.
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Further, where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And possession acquired
in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith
ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence
or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
2. No. In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent, their rights and obligations are
to be governed by Art. 448. The private respondent’s insistence on the removal of the encroaching
structures as the proper remedy, is thus legally flawed. This is not one of the remedies bestowed upon
him by law. It would be available only if and when he chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at
a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. This has not taken place. Hence, his options are
limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioners building after payment of proper
indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy
of his own liking.
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70. Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Wilson Kee, C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. and Eldred Jardinico
G.R. No. 79688; February 1, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1975, Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to Lot 9 in Pleasantville from Robillo. When he secured a TCT
in his name, he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by the respondent Wilson
Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that Kee bought Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI) in
1974. CTTEI, through its employee, Octaviano, accompanied Kee’s wife to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately,
the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence,
a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. Jardinico’s lawyer wrote Kee and asked
him to remove all the improvements and vacate Lot 9 but Kee refused. Thus, Jardinico filed a complaint
for ejectment against Kee.
The MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter's
failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. It concluded that Kee
had no right over the lot anymore and consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot
9 and cannot claim for reimbursement for the improvements he introduced.
The RTC found Kee to be a builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee
was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of
Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for
rental. However, the CA found Kee to be a builder in good faith, attributing the mix-up to CTTEI’s
negligence.
ISSUE:
Was Kee a builder in good faith?
HELD:
YES. The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it
pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot
would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself
and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon, not to
mention the social humiliation that would follow.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad
faith on the part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner.
He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to
prove otherwise.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment covering Lot
8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before the present action was instituted. This has no relevance
on the liability of petitioner, as such fact does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the
108
wrong lot. to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful
detainer against Kee.
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71. Federico Geminiano, Maria Geminiano, Ernesto Geminiano, Asuncion Geminiano, Larry
Geminiano and Marlyn Geminiano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120303; July 24, 1996
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
FACTS:
It appears that Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314 square meters was originally owned by the
petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood
the petitioner Geminiano’s unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold in November 1978 to the
private respondents, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the
house.
Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of
the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondent Nicolas for
P40.00 per month for a period of seven years commencing on 15 November 1978. The private
respondents then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. After the
expiration of the lease contract in November 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept
the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria
Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin
and Ester Dionisio.
Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners.
Petitioners sent, via registered mail, a letters addressed to private respondent Mary Nicolas demanding
that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears within twenty days from notice.
ISSUE:
Whether the possessors in good faith may recover the value of improvements and retain the premises
until reimbursed, being a builder in good faith
HELD:
NO. It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of 126 square-meter portion of
the said lot by virtue of contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private
respondents as lessees, is therefore well-established, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title.
The private respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease,
are then estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also
in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender
possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the
relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also
by those who succeed to his title.
Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue
only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson
v. Court of Appeals, because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application
of that provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced coownership" would not
be created between the petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the
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petitioners, the right of the private respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code
which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only
if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option,
the private respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents' sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon
the property leased than is necessary.
111
ALLUVIUM OR ALLUVION (ARTS. 457-458)
72. Eulogio Agustin, Heirs of Baldomero Langcay, Arturo Balisi & Juan Langcay v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, Pablo Binayug & Geronima Ubina
G.R. Nos. L-66075-76; July 5, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western
bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919
to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s Lot depositing
alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag. Macario Melad owns a land with an original area of 5
hectares but it was discovered that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. While Pablo Binayug’s land grew
from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River
gradually moved to the east.
In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it
to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern
side. To cultivate their lands they had to cross the river.
While the private respondents were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan
River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.
So Melad and Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions . The Trial
Court held ordered Agustin et. al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC
affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Who owns the land transferred on the eastern part after the flood?
HELD:
Private Respondents owns the land transferred on the eastern part after the flood.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents
who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots
by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That
finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 457. To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. All these requisites of accretion are
present in this case. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits
were. The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and
other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice
the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion.
112
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and
abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed,
and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459
and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in
1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the
current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.
113
73. Leonida Cureg, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio (All Surnamed
Carniyan) v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73465; September 7, 1989
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents (except Apostol) are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo
who was the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo. Private respondents claimed to be entitled to the
“subject land”, a 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their "motherland. When private respondents were
about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by
petitioners from continuing to do so. Hence, they filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners (all surnamed Carniyan). Their claim of ownership of their
alleged "motherland" is anchored mainly on 4 tax declarations
On the other hand, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which
is an accretion to the registered land. Petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their
Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest)
pursuant to a Free Patent, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan
River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered land was bought by the late
Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg,
The trial court held that respondent Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an
imperfect title to the subject land. The IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land are automatically considered part of petitioners’ registered land
HELD:
No. The alleged "motherland" claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an
alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the
New Civil Code: To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The increase in the area of petitioners' land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the
northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because
the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under
the operation of the Torrens System.
*The SC ruled that petitioners' OCT should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations
offered by private respondents in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo. Since petitioner's original certificate of title
clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private respondents" claim
over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed
barred and nullified.
114
74. Angelica Viajar and Celso Viajar v. Court of Appeals, Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido
Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido
G.R. No. 77294; December 12, 1988
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Angelica F. Viajar, the owner of the subject land, had found out that the property was relocated and was
now in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.
Viajar then instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned
therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land.
Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners, the private respondents
cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of Viajars is tenable
HELD:
NO. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.
The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and
erosion. In the case at bar, the Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a
gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague
River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had
been added to Lot No. 7511.
The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was the Suague River based
on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or
accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and
tobacco.
Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore, the
accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belongs to the defendants.
115
75. Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia v. The Court of Appeals, Mr. &
Mrs. Jose Salasalan, Mr. & Mrs. Leo Rabaya, Avelino Labis, Hon. Roberto G. Hilario, Rolleo I.
Ignacio, Alberto M. Gillera and Hon. Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., in their official and/or private
capacities
G.R. No. 98045; June 26, 1996
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-
up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Private respondent Jose Salasalan leased
the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest. Thereafter, private respondent allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno
and petitioner filed a case for ejectment with the MTC which was ruled against private respondent, which
decision was affirmed by the RTC
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands (BL) of the survey plan
with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved
survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before
the Bureau of Lands.
Respondent BL then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be
placed in possession thereof.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the
finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case,. However, they admit
that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled
property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code
HELD:
No. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence
of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials
was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current"
indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they
cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
116
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into consideration
petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and
Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.
117
ACCRETION ON A SEA BANK FORMS PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
76. Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court & Heirs of Sinforoso Pascual
G.R. No. 68166; February 12, 1997
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in
Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property. It is bounded on the eastern side
by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila
Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be
registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that
he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued
by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already
converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
ISSUE:
May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally ac crues in
favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
HELD:
The land should be considered as foreshore land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place
is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate
fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly
speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or
lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically
owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay.
Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers
whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. Petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the
disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the
action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on
either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion,
118
which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river
bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila
Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the
Manila Bay is – an arm of the sea.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
which provides that lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action
of the sea, form part of the public domain.
Therefore, the land is part of public domain.
119
77. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
G.R. No. 160453; November 12, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the
property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from
the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the
property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
RTC granted the application for land registration. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC and denied the MR. Hence, this appeal. The Republic
submits that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the
face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Parañaque River.
ISSUE:
Is Article 457 of the Civil Code applicable herein?
HELD:
NO. Article 457 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters." Respondents
as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish that the property was an
accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to
be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River and
became an orchard after it dried up.
Respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the
large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been
deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30
years. The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up
bed of the Parañaque River. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession
120
of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the
riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
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78. Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion

G.R. No. 219811; April 6, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint5 for Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer
for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon
City (MeTC) against petitioner Rex Daclison (Daclison).
In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land. As administrator, he leased
portions of the property to third persons. Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which
was divided into seven units or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela Cruz
(Leonida) who used it for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials.When
the lease of Nida expired, Daclison and other persons acting under her took possession of the portion
leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. Since then,
Daclison had been occupying the contested portion and using it for his business of selling marble and
other finishing materials without paying anything to Baytion.
Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property. Baytion demanded
that he vacate it. Despite oral and written demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted
Baytion to file the complaint for forcible entry and damages.
The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to include his siblings or his coowners,
as plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal, however, was without prejudice. Baytion appealed the case to the
RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because the allegations in the
complaint failed to constitute a case of forcible entry. The CA concluded that Baytion, as co-owner of the
subject property, had a better right to possess.
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the filled-up portion between
the riprap constructed by the government and the property of Baytion and therefore, outside of the land
co-owned by Baytion. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA should have dismissed the case because the
leased property was already surrendered to its owner, thereby, mooting the complaint.
ISSUE:
Who has a better right of possession over the property, Baytion or Daclison?
HELD:
Baytion does not have a better right over the contested portion. Baytion’s contention that he owns that
portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be
considered an accretion under Article 457 on the New Civil Code. To begin with, the land cam e about
not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the
attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the
river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or accession under Article
445 of the New Civil Code. It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply
defined as "on the thing that has been mentioned." In other words, the supposed improvement must be
made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an
122
improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for land owners to expand
or widen their properties in the guise of improvements.
Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not have a better right to possess the same.
In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been in prior possession of this piece of
property. His claim of ownership is without basis.
123
DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: PROPERTY 4 S (AY 2017-2018)
79. Heirs of Francisco Narvasa, Sr., et. al. v. Emiliana Imbornal, et. al.
G.R. No. 182908; August 6, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Basilia Imbornal (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo.
Francisco and Pedro were the children of Alejandra, while Petra was the daughter of Balbina. Petitioners
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other
hand, respondents Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all s urnamed
Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at San Fabian, Pangasinan (Sabangan
property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal
sisters) sometime in 1920. Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was
granted a homestead patent over riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San
Fabian, Pangasinan. He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent and an original certificate of title
(OCT) was issued in his name. Later, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of
Ciriaco’s heirs. Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while
respondents occupied the southern portion.
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion
of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano,
married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion. Decades later, or in 1971, the Second
Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern
portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents
covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., filed on February 27,1984 an Amended
Complaint for reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents. They anchored their claim
on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the
Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead
patent application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is
approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland – which now included both accretions – in
trust for the Imbornal sisters.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the
Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied
trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property – an
inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters – were used for the then-pending homestead
application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively,
coowners of the Motherland together with Ciriaco’s heirs.
Respondents contended among others that the action was barred by prescription.
ISSUE:
As to whom between the parties own the accretion?
HELD:
To the respondents. An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by
operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing
124
or downright fraud. The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence,
and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.
In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that
the Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it
cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the
benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs. A homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant
meets the stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which
includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed,
therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for
the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had
been acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied trust between the
Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause
of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A
further exposition is apropos.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim, the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well
as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the riparian owner over the
land formed by accretions, viz.: Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is
the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. Article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the
littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the riparian owners of
the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the
First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they
also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these
properties through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of them.
Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion
is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been
substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so
since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering
the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the
superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyance with respect to both
accretions must altogether fail.
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ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO MOVABLE PROPERTY
80. Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud

G.R. No. 187633; April 4, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Spouses Delfin and Maria Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of the Lot 3341
(lot in controversy) by virtue of a Free Patent. Later, the Spouses Tappa filed a complaint for quieting of
title against respondent Bacud, among others.
Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed
that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since
time immemorial. In their Answer, respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the
original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene.
Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of law; and they became
ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned 10,939 square meters
of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon
the death of Irene, her share in tum passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud.
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites for quieting of title are present in this case
HELD:
NO. The complaint for quieting of title of Spouses Tappa should fail for the lack of the 2 indispensable
requisites.
The rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, pursuant to
Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
In the case at bar, the Court agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No.
3341 had already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public
Land Act, which governs public patent applications. The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a
private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects.
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started
occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the same
on another portion of the lot in the 1970's. The complaint stated further that since 1963. the respondents
"continuously occupied portion of the subject land. In view of the foregoing circumstances that show
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had
been segregated from the public domain.
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The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an instrument
(the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to
be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses
Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated." The
CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to
prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving." Also, the 1963 Affidavit was
duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as
to its authenticity and due execution.
The SC affirmed the CA decision.
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81. Spouses Crispin and Carioad Galang v. Spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe De Kastro Reyes
G.R. No. 18476; August 8, 2012.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Reyes filed a case for annulment of OCT against Spouses Galang with RTC Antipolo, Rizal.
They alleged in their complaint, inter alia, that they have 2 properties (a subdivision project known as
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision [Property A] and an adjoining property [Property B]) separated by
Marigman Creek which later dried up when it changed its course and passed through Property A; and
that Spouses Galang, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over
the dried up creek bed from the PENRO.
Spouses Galang, in their answer, denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and
countered that the OCT was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of
the DENR, through the PENRO; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession,
occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that Property B belonged to
Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest; and that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the creek had
indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, Spouses Reyes had already claimed for
themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an erroneous remedy. The
title issued upon a patent may be annulled only on grounds of actual and intrinsic fraud. Spouses Reyes
presented no evidence of fraud despite their allegations that Spouses Galand were not in possession of
the property and that it was part of a dried creek.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision and held that Spouses Reyes had proven by preponderance of
evidence that the subject land was a portion of the creek bed that was abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the water, which had now traversed a portion of Property A.
ISSUE:
Does the dried creek belong to Spouses Galang?
RULING:
No. If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the
property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the
change of course was automatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached,
the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek
indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case
Spouses Reyes, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old
course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the
old location to the new location by natural occurrence.
In this regard, Spouses Reyes failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural
abandonment and the new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is
presumed to have been regularly issued, the evidence of Spouses Reyes was clearly wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of
the property to them.
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82. Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Victoria P. Cabral, et. al.

G.R. No. 175542; June 5, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Victoria Cabral was the owner of a parcel of land which was placed under the coverage of PD 27. In
1993, 3 emancipation patents were issued to Spouses Moraga. In 1994, Cabral filed a complaint before
the PARAD seeking the cancellation of the emancipation patents on the grounds that these were obtained
through fraud and that the land is not suitable for rice and corn production and has long been classified
as residential, commercial, industrial and nonagricultural land by the HLURB.
PARAD denied the petition so Cabral appealed to the DARAB. While the appeal was pending, Spouses
Moraga subdivided one of the lots into 3 smaller lots, which they sold to Filcon. Subsequently, Filcon sold
the 3 lots to Green Acres. Except for an already cancelled annotation of REM, the titles were free from
any annotations, liens, notices, claims or encumbrances. New titles were issued to Green Acres, which
constructed a warehouse building complex on the said lots.
In 2001, DARAB ordered the cancellation of the titles issued in the names of Spouses Moraga and Filcon
for having been illegally acquired. Green Acres filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, claiming that the
DARAB decision casts a cloud on its titles. The case was dismissed. On appeal, the CA also dismissed
the appeal, holding that he only issue in an action to quiet title is whether there is a cloud in a title to real
property because of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or a proceeding that has a prima facie
appearance of validity and the DARAB decision does not fall within said enumeration.
ISSUE:
Is the DARAB decision a source of cloud that is susceptible to an action for quieting of title?
HELD:
YES. A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which
is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable;
and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.
As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that, is both an "instrument" and
a "record." Black’s Law Dictionary defines an instrument as a document or writing which gives formal
expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying or terminating a
right. A record, on the other hand, is defined as a written account of some act, court proceeding,
transaction or instrument drawn up under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as
a memorial or permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates. It is likewise a "claim" which is
defined as a cause of action or a demand for money or property since Cabral is asserting her right over
the subject lots. More importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a regular and orderly progress
in form of law including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of
judgment and may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of
a larger action or special proceeding.
Also, the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final decision that has not been
reversed, vacated or nullified. It is likewise apparently effective and may be prejudicial to Green Acres’
titles since it orders the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon all from which Green
Acres derived its titles. However, as discussed above, it is ineffective and unenforceable against Green
Acres because Green Acres was not properly impleaded in the DARAB proceedings nor was there any
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notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green Acres that the subject
properties were under litigation. As such, Green Acres is an innocent purchaser for value.
Furthermore, in the case of Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the
occasion to rule that one of the proper remedies of a person who was not impleaded in the proceedings
declaring null and void the title from which his title to the property had been derived, is an action for
quieting title.
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83. Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua

G.R. No.199146; March 19, 2014
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Pacifico Pocdo, who was later substituted by his heirs upon his death, filed a complaint to quiet title over
a portion of a property which allegedly originally belonged to Pacifico’s father, Pocdo Pool. The disputed
property is allegedly different from the 1 hectare portion alloted to Polon Pocdo, the predecessor-in-
interest of the defendants Avila, in a partition made by the heirs of Pocdo Pool. Pacifico alleged that the
defendants unlawfully claimed the disputed property, which belonged to Pacifico.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that the DENR had already
declared the disputed property as public land, which the State, through the DENR, has the sole power to
dispose. Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the
disputed property. The trial court agreed with the DENR Secretary’s ruling that petitioner may participate
in the public bidding of the disputed property if qualified under applicable rules.
ISSUE:
Was the case for quieting of title properly dismissed in light of the DENR Secretary’s ruling that the
property was already declared public land?
HELD:
Yes. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for an adjudication that a claim of title or
interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist. Under
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are
unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents. However, the records reveal that
petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, a public land within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.
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RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER
84. Aurora Del Banco, et. al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72694; December 1, 1987
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
In 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr.
Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided that they will purchase lands comprising the
Island of Cagbalite, which shall be their common property. They agreed that the co-ownership includes
Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola
(Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase. They agreed that the benefits
will be shared equally among the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share;
Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed
under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
In 1866, the co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island. In 1859, they
entered into a new agreement providing for a new sharing:
a) 1/4 to Benedicto Pansacola;
b) 1/4 to Jose Pansacola;
c) 1/4 to the children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano
Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola; and
d) 1/4 to: (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5)
Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of
their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
In 1907, representative of the heirs of all the original owners of Cagbalite Island entered into an
agreement to partition the Island, supplemented by another agreement dated April 18, 1908.
One hundred years later (1968), private respondents brought a special action for partition in the CFI,
including the parties and successors of the co-owners. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
the Cagbalite Island has already been partitioned into 4 parts among the original co-owners. The IAC
reversed the lower court. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Is the Cagbalite Island still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest
of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola?
HELD:
Yes. Cagbalite Island is still undivided property.
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggest that actual or physical partition of the Island had
really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement
entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island.
The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common
property. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing
proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island. With the
distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the
whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the
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instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because
until physical division is effected such portion is merely an ideal share, not concretely determined.
Neither is the actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners
proof that the Island has actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without
the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned
in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners. No individual co-owner can claim
any definite portion thereof.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan
drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in
the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly. The mechanics of actual partition should follow
the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
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85. Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal

G.R. No. 179205; July 30,2014
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
The subject property consists of a 3, 750 square meter-portion of the 15,000 sq. m. parcel of land situated
in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated as Lot No. 1, and registered under TCT No. T-107449 4
under the names of Reynaldo, Eduardo, Araceli, and Zenaida, all surnamed Dela Rosa.
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal and
respondent Mario Batongbacal for ₱50.00 per square meter or for a total of ₱187,500.00. Pursuant to
the agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment of ₱31,500.00 leaving a balance of
₱156,000.00. As shown in the document denominated as Resibo and signed by Reynaldo on 18 February
1987, the parties agreed that the amount of ₱20,000.00 as part of the advance payment shall be paid
upon the delivery of the Special Power-of- Attorney (SPA), which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate
the subject property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The
balance thereon shall be paid in ₱10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase price is fully settled.
Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed
upon, but such demands all went unheeded. Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for
Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages before (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to enforce
their Contract to Sell, asserting that they have a better right over the subject property and alleged that
the subsequent sale thereof effected by Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith.
Reynaldo in his Answer countered that the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never gave his
consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to understand that the contract between him and
the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan to
him the amount of ₱31,500.00 payable once he receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land
registered under TCT No. T-107449.
The appellate court was notified of the death or Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be substituted as party
in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract entered into by parties was a Contract to Sell or an equitable mortgage.
HELD:
It was a contract to sell. The sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable. The subject of the Contract to Sell was limited only to the pro-indiviso share of Reynaldo
consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and not the entire 15,000-square meter parcel of land. As a co-
owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property
held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which
spells out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro- indiviso share in the co-owned property
even without the consent of his co- owners. 23 This right is absolute and in accordance with the well-
settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment. In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
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86. Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420; March 26, 2014
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Raul V. Arambulo along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings, including
respondent’s wife Iraida Arambulo, are co-owners of 2 parcels of land. When Iraida passed away, she
was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all of the co- owners, except for respondents, have
authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares; that only respondents are withholding their consent
to the sale of their shares; that the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article
491 of the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing
owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they
co-owned because they were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the
property.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent to the
sale of their shares in the co-owned properties
HELD:
NO. They cannot be compelled.
Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-owner
shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part
that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents
remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise
stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents.
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87. Vilma Quintos v. Pelagia I. Nicolas, et. al.

G.R. No. 210252; June 16, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away, leaving to their 10
children ownership over the subject property. An action for partition was subsequently brought before the
RTC. However, for failure of the parties and their counsels to appear despite due notice, the case was
dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of
the 10 siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds issued a new one. The
respondents subsequently sold their 7/10 undivided share in favor of the spouses Candelario.
The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the respondents.
Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime
in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point
out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition,
they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial
constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been
repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their share
in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of
the property.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings were entitled to their
respective shares and that the subsequent transfer of interest in favor of the respondent spouses
Candelario was upheld. Likewise, the court ordered the partition of the subject lots between the herein
plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses Candelarios.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata;
and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition
of the property
HELD:
The petition is meritorious in part.
1. Yes. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. In the case at
bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the
absence of the first requisite.
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Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied
by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Leas e with the Avico Lending
Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence
2. No. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner
to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right
of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.
In the case at bar, the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from
praying for the partition of the property through counterclaim.
3. No. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision.
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot
serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the
agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. It, therefore, lacked
the essential requisite of consent.
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88. Dominador M. Apique v. Evangeline Apique Fahnenstich

G.R. No. 205705; August 05, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Dominador and Evangeline are siblings. Evangeline left for Germany to work. She executed General and
Special Powers of Attorney constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for
her, and to manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines. She opened a joint savings
account with Dominador at the PCI Bank in Davao City, which later became EPCIB, and now Banco de
Oro.
On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account and,
thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank. It was only on February
23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB. She also discovered
that he has withrawn several amounts from such account. Evangeline demanded the return of the amount
withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail. Hence, she filed a complaint for sum of money claiming
to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account, and that Dominador has no authority
to withdraw the same.
Dominador asserted, among others, that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the subject account
to answer for the expenses of Evangeline's projects, considering: (a) that it was a joint account, and (b)
the general and special powers of attorney executed by Evangeline in his favor. During the trial,
Dominador claimed that the money withdrawn from the subject account belonged to him, explaining that
he had contributed an initial deposit and that Evangeline's common-law husban, Holgar, had also
deposited a total amount of P900,000.0019 pursuant to the latter's verbal promise to compensate him for
his services as administrator/manager of the couple's business and properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Evangeline is entitled to the return of the amount Dominador withdrew from their joint
savings account with EPCIB, plus legal interest thereon.
HELD:
A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical
persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account,
and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article
485 of the Civil Code.
The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each of the
named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may deposit and/or
withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other, during their lifetime.
Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other may depend on what they
have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.
While Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus,
validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between
him and Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed
by the purpose for which the subject account was opened. Dominador's right to obtain funds from the
subject account was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects. Admittedly,
at the time he withdrew the amount of there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline. Moreover,
his claim that the said amount belonged to him, as part of the compensation promised by Holgar for his
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services as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was correctly rejected considering the
dearth of competent evidence showing such promise. Having failed to justify his right over the amount
withdrawn, Dominador is liable for its return.
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89. Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron

G.R. No. 179011; April 15, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
After the death of the spouses Jesusa and Hilarion Castigador, their heirs agreed among themselves to
subdivide a lot and, pursuant to a consolidation subdivision plan, Lot No. 5 therein was to be apportioned
to the heirs of Lilia Castigador (Lilia) since the latter already died. Lilia was succeeded by her heirs,
namely: her husband Maximo Catedrilla and their children, one of whom is herein petitioner Rey
Castigador Catedrilla. Spouses Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia,
constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5. For failure to
vacate despite repeated demands, petitioner, as a co-owner of Lot No. 5, filed with MTC a Complaint for
ejectment against the Spouses Lauron.
The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and restore possession
to the plaintiff and to pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use of the lot from the date of demand.
The MTC found that petitioner as one of the heirs of Lilia, the owner of the subject lot, is a party who may
bring the suit in accordance with Article 487 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to
bring this action for ejectment under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the subject lot, is the proper party in interest
to prosecute against any intruder thereon.
The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment against respondents and ruled that the
other heirs should have been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1, Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court; that the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power; that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed
as without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment
and grant relief in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
May petitioner, a co-owner, file an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners. Article 487 of the New
Civil Code is explicit on this point: “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: “A co-
owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper.”
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In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner is not
even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence,
thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint
that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents.
Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose
of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner
recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
141
OBLIGATIONS OF EACH CO-OWNER
90. Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz vs. Gaspar Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz
G.R. No. L-4656; November 18, 1912
TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the
spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in
Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed
Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel
died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and
therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant
Matilde Ortiz.
Aside from some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed,
at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real properties. Among the properties, the
house in Escolta Street, Vigan is the main subject of this case.
Vicenta demanded the partition of the properties and to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together
with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said Matilde and her husband, the self-styled
administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the
extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might
be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000.
Trial court allowed the partition and absolved Matilde Ortiz from paying damages. The trial judge, in
absolving the defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the
plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that the
defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which was pro indiviso property
of joint ownership
ISSUE:
Whether or not Matilde Ortiz, as co-owner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband,
to reside therein, without paying to her co-owner, Vicenta Ortiz.
HELD:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
“Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their
object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from
utilizing them according to their rights.”
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from
utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor
were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
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Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every
one of the co-owners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Furthermore, Vicenta is not entitled to rental fees from Matilde. However, she is entitled to rental fees
from Matilde's husband Gaspar because the latter is not a co-owner. As co-owner of the house, Matilde
had every right to occupy the upper storey without having to pay rent to her sister. There is no evidence
that shows that she caused any detriment to the interest of the co-owned property. However, Gaspar
must pay rent (P16) to Vicenta because he used a room on the lower floor of the house as an office for
the justice of the peace, to the detriment of the latter's interest.
143
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CO-OWNERSHIP
91. Luz Caro v. Court of Appeals and Basilia Lahorra vda. De Benito
G.R. No. L-46001; March 25, 1982
PLANA, J:
FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of the two parcels of land
in Sorsogon. Mario died. His surviving wife, Basilio Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were
subsequently appointed as joint administrators of his estate.
One of the co-owners, Benjamin, executed a deed of absolute sale of his 1/3 undivided portion in favor
of Luz Caro. This was registered with the consent of Saturnino and Alfredo, as evidenced by their
affidavits. A subdivision title was then issued to Luz Caro.
However, nine months after, Basilia sent an offer to Caro to redeem the property. Basilia asserts such
right as joint administrator of Mario’s estate.
ISSUE:
Does co-ownership still exist, allowing Basilia to exercise legal redemption?
HELD:
No. As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro
and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and
representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property.
The subdivision plan and the affidavits of Alfredo and Saturnino prove that they agree to the segregation
of the land formerly owned in common. Thereafter, the co-owners took actual and exclusive possession
of the specific portions assigned to them.
Once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated
and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
144
92. Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 78178; April 15, 1988
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
The land in question is co-owned by Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all
surnamed Bailon, as co-owners. Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the land to Donato
Delgado. Rosalia then sold the remaining portion to Ponciana de Lanuza. De Lanuza later acquired the
whole lot which she later sold to private respondent Celestino Afable.
Upon learning of the sale, the other co-owners filed for the recovery of the property. Afable, in his defense,
claimed that he already acquired the land through prescription and contended that the petitioners were
guilty of laches.
ISSUE:
Is the action for the recovery of property proper in this case?
HELD:
NO. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share. A sale of the entire property of one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner
of the property were transferred by virtue of such sale. The proper action in such case is the division of
the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it.
Hence, the petitioners in this case should have filed an action for partition instead of an action for
recovery.
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93. Concepcion Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Ernesto Roque, et. al.
G.R. No. 75886; August 30, 1988
FELICIANO, J:
FACTS:
Co-owners Avendaño transferred their undivided 3/4 share in Lot No. 1549 to respondents Ernesto and
Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. The transactions
were embodied in 2 separate deeds of sale both duly notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized deed
of sale, respondents purportedly sold a 3/4 undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner
Concepcion Roque. Upon the instance of petitioner and allegedly of respondents, a Subdivision Plan was
drawn identifying and delineating a 1/4 portion of the property as belonging to respondents and a 3/4
portion of the same property as belonging to petitioner. Petitioner claimed that preparation of the
Subdivision Plan was a preliminary step leading eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, partition allegedly
having been previously agreed upon inter se by the co-owners. Respondents, however, refused to
acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide
the land.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Partition with Specific Performance, alleging that, as co-owner, she had a
right to seek partition of the property, and that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership.
In their answer, respondents impugned the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale on the
ground that the signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic signatures of the supposed
signatories. It was also alleged that petitioner occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance.
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) dismissed the case on the ground that after respondents denied
co-ownership and asserted that they are the exclusive and sole owners of the disputed land, the case
has become one of ownership thus the action that may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion
reivindicatoria.
ISSUES:
1. Is the IAC correct in ruling that partition is not the right remedy?
2. Should prescription run in favor of respondents, barring petitioner’s action for partition?
HELD:
1. NO. An action for partition presents simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that
the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. Should the trial
court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith
proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants assert in their Answer
exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for
partition but, on the contrary, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the
trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the
defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will
necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not because the wrong
action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-
ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition the property
at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the
parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in the same action.
2. NO. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." No matter how long the co-ownership
146
has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners
or co-heirs have expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set up as a defense
the prescription of the action for partition. But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted
title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiff’s right to
require recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot
issue an order requiring partition. In this case, petitioner has been and is presently in open and continuous
possession of a 3/4 portion of the property owned in common. Respondents do not dispute this finding
of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Moreover,
prior to filing of the complaint, neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of
absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-
owners. In other words, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners.
Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at
the time of institution by petitioner of the action.
147
94. Epitacio Delima, et al. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-46296; September 24, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on
installments from the government. After his death in 1921 he had his three brothers (Eulalio, Galileo and
Vicente) and a sister (Juanita) listed as his heirs. A new TCT was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs
of Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. On 1953, Galileo executed an affidavit of Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property excluding the other heirs. He declared
the lot to be of his own and paid for its taxes. On 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima,
filed with the CFI of Cebu an action for reconveyance and partition of property and for the annulment of
the certificate of title issued plus damages against their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also later
included as party defendant for his refusal to help in the action.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and void and declaring
Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be owners of the property,
each sharing a pro-indiviso share of ¼ of the whole. The respondents, Heirs of Galileo Delima, appealed
to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision in their favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that the
other brothers and sisters have already waived their rights to the property being that it was Galileo alone
that paid for the balance of the purchase price and the realty taxes for the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by
law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property
HELD:
YES. Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: “No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership.” By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be
adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was holding the property in
representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an administrator who took care of the
property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the property to his co-owners.
However this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute and
exclusive ownership, and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptibility of the action for
partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over the property. In
order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the
following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the unequivocal acts amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the
cestui que trust; and (3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the cancellation of
the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, he
thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares. From
this act, the statute of limitations started to run.
148
95. Virgilio B. Aguilar v. Court of Appeals and Senen B. Aguilar

G.R. No. 76351; October 29, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Virgilio and Senen Aguilar, sons of Maximiano, purchased a house and lot where their father could spend
and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio’s
share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum, Virgilio and Senen agreed that their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with
Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for
his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father. Since Virgilio was disqualified from
obtaining a loan from SSS, they agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered
in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father
and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After their father’s death, Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate the house and that the property be sold
and proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of the Senen’s refusal, Virgilio filed an action to
compel the sale. The trial court found the brothers to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares
on the basis of their written agreement; that Virgilio has been deprived of his participation in the property
by Senen’s continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals; that
Virgilio had a right to demand partition; that the property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties; and that Senen vacate the property and pay Virgilio rentals. Senen
appealed to the CA which set aside the trial court decision. Thus, Virgilio filed a petition for Certiorari with
the SC.
ISSUE:
Was the co-ownership termination upon the filing and the granting of the action to compel sale of the
property and ejectment of a co-owner?
HELD:
YES. Co-ownership is deemed terminated and the right to enjoy possession jointly also ceased upon
filing and the granting of action to compel the sale of the property and the ejectment of Senen.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil
Code.
However, being a co-owner, Senen has the right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to Virgilio, as he may use the property owned in common so long as it is in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-
owners. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
149
owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined
and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
When Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of Senen, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of Senen and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of Virgilio as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, Senen should be held liable for monthly rentals until he
and his family vacate.
150
96. Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124262; October 12, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the RTC of Morong, Rizal.
They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his
only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 3010 with an area of 2,269 square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without
their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made
possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.
It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided
share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the
property.
Petitioner alleges prescription and/or laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action, by a co-owner, to partition a property owned in common prescribes.
HELD:
No. On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro
indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the
property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only
the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession
of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property
if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such
partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
Petitioner’s defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article
494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. In
Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition
is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares:
No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
151
97. Lucio Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia Robles and Emilio Robles v. Court of Appeals, spouses
Virgilio Santos and Baby Ruth Cruz, Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., Hilario Robles, Alberto Palad
Jr. in his capacity as Director of Lands, and Jose Mauleon in his capacity as District Land
Officer of the Bureau Of Lands
G.R. No. 123509; March 14, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is originally owned by Leon Robles. When he died, it passed to his son
Silvino who declared the property in his name and paid the taxes thereon. Upon the latter’s death, his
widow and children inherited the property. Petitioners Lucio Robles, et al. were the children of Silvino,
and Hilario Robles is their half-brother. The task of cultivating was assigned to Lucio while the payment
of the land taxes was entrusted to Hilario. For unknown reason, the tax declaration of the parcel of land
in the name of Silvino was cancelled and transferred to Exequiel Ballena.
Ballena secured a loan from Antipolo Rural Bank using the tax declaration as security. Somehow the tax
declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later was transferred to the name of
respondent spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles. Andrea secured a loan from Cardona Rural Bank using
the tax declaration as security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, the property was foreclosed with
Cardona Rural Bank emerging as the highest bidder. The bank sold the property to spouses Vergel and
Ruth Santos. In Sept. 1987, petitioners discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property
but was unsuccessful.
In 1988, the spouses Santos took possession of the property and was able to secure a Free Patent.
Petitioners then filed an action for quieting of title. Respondents questioned their standing to sue for
quieting of title, contending that petitioners no longer have any interest to the property in question due to
the mortgage effected by Hilario and the consequent foreclosure thereof by the Bank. Respondents
argued that Hilario had become the absolute owner of the property at the time he mortgaged the same.
The CA ruled that the several transfers of the tax declaration of the
property in question from Silvino until to the spouses Santos had the effect of divesting petitioners of their
title by prescription to Hilario.
ISSUES:
1. Do the petitioners have appropriate title that will entitle them to the remedy of the quieting of title?
2. Did Hilario acquire the share of his co-owners in the disputed property by prescription?
HELD:
1. YES. An action to quiet title, under Art. 476, NCC, is a common-law remedy for the removal of any
cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that
is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid and efficacious is clear in the present
case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by
the tax declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Santos. Petitioners
anchor their claim on their open and continuous possession as owners. Spouses Santos, on the other
hand, trace their claims to Exequiel, and then to Hilario who mortgaged the same to the Bank as absolute
152
owner. It was from Exequiel that Hilario’s claim is rooted. However, in this case, there is a failure to show
Exequiel’s title to the property in question.
When Hilario, therefore, mortgaged the property, he did so in his capacity as mere co-owner thereof.
Consequently, the said transaction did not divest the petitioner of the title to the property at the time of
the institution of the complaint for quieting of title.
2. NO. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle
that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the coownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence
thereof is clear and convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise,
his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the
co-ownership.
As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in
fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed
property by the petitioners as owners.
153
CONCEPT OF POSSESSION
98. Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Consuelo C. Villareal, et. al.

G.R. No. L-30272; February 28, 1985
CUEVAS, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in December 1955, private respondents Gomez filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Pasig, an Application for Registration alleging, inter alia:
a.) That the said land consists of two agricultural lots bounded; b.) That Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of plan were
assessed for taxation purposes and declared; c.) That to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is
no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said parcels of land nor is there any
person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable in possession, remainder, reversion or
expectancy; d.) That the applicants have acquired said lands by purchase from the spouses
VICTORIANO CERVO and IGNACIA GUILLERMO as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the
latter in favor of the former; e.) That the said parcels of land are not occupied by anybody; and that f.)That
the said lots included in this application adjoins the National Road and the applicants do not claim any
part of the said National Road;
Petitioner Rizal Cement filed an OPPOSITION to said application alleging that it is the owner of
unregistered three (3) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4, located in Darangan, Binangonan
Rizal; and the land which is the subject of this petition for registration, full technical description of which
are found in Psu-147662 approved by the Director of Lands in October, 1955, covers portions of Lots 1
and 4.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance denying the application for registration
and ordering the issuance of a decree of registration after finality of said decision in the name of Rizal
Cement Company. Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents possess the property in the concept of an owner
HELD:
YES. Being an attribute of ownership, appellants' possession of the land in question goes far to tip the
scale in their favor. The right to possess flows from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession
by another of what belongs to him. Were the petitioner rightful owner of the land in question, it would not
have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the owner's share to appellants and/or their
predecessors. It would have opposed the survey for respondents' vendors but did not as shown in the
surveyor's certificate. If petitioner really bought Lot 2 from Maria Certeza as claimed, it has not been
explained how she could sell a portion thereof to Apolonia Francisco, married to Valentin Marquez, as
confirmed by the husband in his deposition who as employee of oppositor would have known of its
acquisition.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, respondents possess the property in the concept of an owner.
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not conclusive
and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of little value
as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled
154
is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes
sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other
effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the
party concerned be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving.
155
99. Ignacio Wong v. Hon. Lucas D. Carpio and Manuel Mercado

G.R. No. L-50264; October 21, 1991
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
Manuel Mercado acquired the land in litigation from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase. He only went periodically to the land to make copra.
However, Giger sold the land again, now to Ignacio Wong. They executed a Deed of Sale then Wong
asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession of the TCT in the name of William
Giger. After which, Wong started placing laborers on the, built a small farm house after making some
clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also placed signboards.
Mercado discovered that Wong is occupying the land, a matter which was brought to the attention of the
police. Thus, Mercado filed a complaint for forcible entry. Wong received a copy of plaintiff's complaint
for forcible entry with summons to answer.
Wong contends that a forcible entry case is not proper because, in possessing the land, he never acted
with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; that he entered the said land without issue after he
purchased the same from Giger.
The Municipal Court found that Wong had prior, actual and continuous physical possession of the
disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the counter-claim. On appeal, the then Court of
First Instance, ruled in favor of Mercado, finding him to have taken possession of the property earlier in
point of time and Wong as an intruder.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Mercado has the lawful possession of the land in dispute
2. Whether or not Mercado is entitled to payment of rentals
HELD:
1. YES. It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the
exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities for acquiring such right." and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
another, then delivery has not been effected.
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor
William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro and accordingly,
the later sale a retro in favor of Wong failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should
a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
As to the query that “Is the entry of Wong to the property characterized by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth?" The same is answered in the affirmative. The words “by force, intimidation, threat,
156
strategy, or stealth” include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter
upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. The action of forcible
entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser
other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and
excluding the other party.
2. YES. Wong's argument that there is no legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly rentals
because bad faith on the part of petitioner was never proved” deserves no merit.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the
cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his
title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interruption takes
place upon service of summons. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
posession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons.
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent’s complaint for
forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976. His good faith therefore ceased on November 29,
1976. Accordingly, the computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from December, 1976,
instead of August, 1976.
157
100. Nicanor Somodio v. Court of Appeals, Ebenecer Purisima and Felomino Ayco
G.R. No. 82680; August 15, 1994
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
In 1974, Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio bought a lot in General Santos City. They partitioned
the property into two portions, with Somodio taking the western part. Immediately after the partition,
Somodio took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other fruit-
bearing trees. He also began constructing a house on the said lot but because of his employment, he left
the unfinished structure to his uncle.
In 1983, respondent Purisima entered the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. Hence, Somodio
filed against Purisima a complaint for forcible entry.
Purisima averred that the lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for miscellaneous sales
patent with the Bureau of Lands. Purisima contended that his father had surveyed a parcel of land
including the subject lot and that his father's survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1960.
Both the MCT and the RTC held that Somodio was the actual possessor of the said lot. The CA set aside
the decisions of the two trial courts and ordered the dismissal of the two complaints filed by petitioner.
The CA held that Somodio had not "clearly and conclusively established physical, prior possession over
the subject lot.
ISSUE:
Who between the claimants had priority of possession of the subject property?
HELD:
Somodio had priority of possession over the subject lot. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides, “Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right.” Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Somodio was able to subject the property to the action of his will. He took possession of the property
sometime in 1974 when he planted on the property coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976,
he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished
and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Thus,
Somodio sufficiently proved that he had prior possession of the subject property.
158
101. Gavina Maglucot-Aw, Catalina Orcullo, Richard Estano, Nida Maglucot, Melania Maglucot-
Catubig, Emiliano Catubig, Ladislao Salma v. Leopoldo Maglucot, Severo Maglucot, Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo
G.R. No. 132518; March 28, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order subdividing a tract of lot into six (6) portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot
1639-F. Lot 1639-D was issued to Roberto Maglucot. Guillermo, Leopoldo and Severo, all surnamed
Maglucot, rented portions of Lot 1639-D and built houses on their corresponding leased lots. After
sometime, however, said lessees stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging
that there was no valid partition that took place in the absence of a confirmed subdivision plan.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Maglucots are holders of the land in the concept of an owner
HELD:
NO. The payment of rentals by respondent Maglucots reveals that they are mere lessees. As such, the
possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner.
One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondent Maglucots were
found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot
No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.
Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid
rent.
The parties did not object to the Order of Partition and manifested by their conduct that they have
assented thereto. Hence, they cannot thereafter question the decree. When respondents here have
occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, they cannot, after
acquiescing to the Order for more than 40 years, be allowed to question the binding effect thereof. The
payment of rentals by respondents revealed that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
respondents over Lot 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner.
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102. Fernanda Cequena v. Honorata Bolante

G.R. No. 137944; April 6, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of
[respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of
Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land. [Respondent]
and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the]
ownership of the land.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners]. Moreover, the CA reversed RTC
on the ground that the probative value of petitioners tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison
with respondents proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled with exclusive and
continuous possession of the land, which are evidence of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim
of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor.
HELD:
Yes. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover
such possession. However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.
Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The
records show that the petitioners father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by
Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. Based on Article 538 of the Civil
Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of
the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
NOTE: However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been
paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership.
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which
such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become
the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner --
public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted -- may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere
possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
160
103. Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla v. Marcielo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, Substituted by Her
Heirs
G.R. No. 177637; July 26, 2010
NACHURA. J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla alleged that he is the registered owner of the subject parcel of land
purportedly covered by a certificate of title as well as the residential building standing on said land
occupied by respondents Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes by mere tolerance of the previous
owners. He intended to use the property as his residence, thus, he sent a demand letter to vacate to the
respondents but the latter failed and refused to do so. This prompted him to file a complaint for ejectment
against respondents.
In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioner's allegation that they possessed the building
by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Instead, they asserted that they occupied the building as
owners, having inherited the same from their parents and grandparents. They maintained that they have
been in possession of the building since 1960, but it has not been declared for taxation purposes. As for
the subject land, respondents claimed that they inherited the same from their ascendants and that the
land had, in fact, been declared for taxation purposes.
ISSUE:
May the respondents be ejected from the land?
HELD:
No. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally
lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must
be established.
If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of
tolerance must be proved. Petitioner failed to prove that respondents' possession was based on his
alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that
they tolerated respondents' entry to and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of
tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's
permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to prove his claim that
petitioners' possession of the subject building was by mere tolerance as alleged in the complaint.
Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to be within the
purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with it "permission" and not merely silence
or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance.
In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the
very start of the possession — from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made
in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started.
Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
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LOSS OF POSSESSION
104. Juan N. Aragon v. The Insular Government

G.R. No. L-6019; March 25, 1911
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
In the year 1892, a possessory title to the land in question, located in Manila, was duly registered in favor
of Inocencio Aragon, one of the predecessors in interest of these applicants; that for a long period of
years the applicant and their predecessors in interest have been in possession of the parcel of land in
question, under and undisputed claim of ownership. The applicant filed a case for registration before the
Court of Land Registration, alleging that for many years a house stood upon this land, and was occupied
by some of the predecessors in interest of the applicants in these proceedings. The petitioner alleged
that there are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and
flow of the tide; and that only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of the
Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at high tide; though it does not
definitely appear whether this is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters in the bay, or to the
gradual sinking of the land along the coast.
The Court of Land Registration adjudicated the title in favor of the appellees and ordered its registry in
accordance with "The Land Registration Act. Hence, this petition. The Government of the Philippine
Islands objected to the application for registry on the ground that the land in question is a part of the
public domain.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioner conclusively establish his right of possession and ownership over the land?
HELD:
Yes. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, as alleged by the opponent, the land in
question, at the time when the trial was had in the court below, was so located that at high tide it was
completely covered by the waters of the Bay of Manila, though the receding waters left it completely bare
at low tide.
Article 460 of that code is as follows: “The possessor may lose his possession:
1. By the abandonment of the thing.
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new possession
has lasted more than one year."
Under these provisions of the code it seems quite clear that if the Government is justified in disturbing
the possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property,
or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by the erosive
action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never abandoned their possession under a claim
of ownership of this land. And we think the facts above stated fully sustain a finding that there has been
no such destructive or total loss of the property as would justify a holding that the owners have lost
possession. Moreover, keeping in mind its location and actual condition it cannot be said to have been
totally destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by them, so as to have become a part of the playa
(shore) of the Bay of Manila.
162
The facts proven and set out in the opinion do not establish the abandonment of possession of the land
in controversy, under a claim of ownership, nor its total deduction by the erosive action of the sea, so as
to establish the loss of possession thereof under the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the decree entered by the lower court was affirmed.
163
105. Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province v. Court of Appeals, Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano and Juan Valdez
G.R. No. 80294-95; September 21, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
The Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio Benguet an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu-194357,
situated at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church
building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls,
etc.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos.
2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto. After trial on the merits, the land registration
court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the decision of the land registration court and dismissing the
VICAR's application as to Lots 2 and 3, the lots claimed by the two sets of oppositors in the land
registration case (and two sets of plaintiffs in the two cases now at bar), the first lot being presently
occupied by the convent and the second by the women's dormitory and the sister's convent.
The plaintiffs arque that the defendant Vicar is barred from setting up the defense of ownership and/or
long and continuous possession of the two lots in question since this is barred by prior judgment of the
Court of Appeals under the principle of res judicata. Plaintiffs contend that the question of possession
and ownership have already been determined by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Defendant Vicar maintains that the principle of res judicata would not prevent them from litigating the
issues of long possession and ownership because the dispositive portion of the prior merely dismissed
their application for registration and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant Vicar contends that only the
dispositive portion of the decision, and not its body, is the controlling pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals
ISSUE:
May the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated a long time ago can properly be considered res
judicata by respondent Court of Appeals in the present two cases between petitioner and two private
respondents?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust
by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes. When petitioner applied for registration of
Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven years. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years, but always with just title. Extraordinary
acquisitive prescription requires 30 years.
Petitioner did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2
and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription
because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial court that
Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio
Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the
same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.
164
Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much less grave abuse of discretion,
when it held that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is governing, under the principle of res judicata,
hence the rule, in the present cases CA-G.R. No. 05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as supported
by evidence established in that decision may no longer be altered.
165
106. Esperanza Supapo v. Spouses Roberto and Susan De Jesus, et. al.
G.R. No. 198356; April 20, 2015
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Esperanza and Romeo Supapo (Spouses Supapo) filed a complaint for accion publiciana on March 7,
2008 with the MeTC against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo, and
persons claiming rights under them (collectively, respondents). The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land, which is covered by TCT registered and titled under the Spouses
Supapo’s names. The latter did not reside on the subject lot they only visit it at least twice a year. During
one of their visits in 1992, they saw 2 houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without their
consent. They learned that the Spouse de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot.
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana should be dismissed for being filed out
of time, that is, beyond the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states
that “A possessor may lose his possession: xxx (4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions
of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years. xxx” The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the
complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than 10 years after the certificate to file action
was issued in 1992.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property,
and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost the
right to recover possession because of laches.
ISSUE:
Whether the cause of action has already prescribed.
HELD:
NO, lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In along lines of cases, the Court have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. That a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Articl 496 (now,
Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529). The Court recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the
stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
Here, the Spouses Supapo, as holders of TCT, enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system.
The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 46 of P.D. No. 1529 which states
that “No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.” In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens
Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy a land is an
attribute of ownership. Corollary to this is the right of the holder of Torrens Title to eject any person
illegally occupying their property.
With respect to the defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by
mere allegations in the pleadings. Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground
to deny the Spouses Supapo’s petition.
166
THEORY OF IRREVINDICABILITY
107. EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Spouses Santos

G.R. No. 80298; April 26, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner
company for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered
the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65.
Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership
from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing
of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and
was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no
more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment
check. EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed his real
name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private
respondents. Police officers forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened
Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant
and loaded them in the van belonging to EDCA.
The private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by
EDCA. Ownership of the books was recognized in the private respondents by the MuTC, which was
sustained by the RTC, and later by the CA.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have
validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack
of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the
impostor in payment therefor was dishonored
HELD:
NO. Petitioner has not been unlawfully deprived of the books.
Art. 559 of the Civil code expressly provides that: “The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same x x x x.” In this regard, the Court
brushed aside the contention of the petitioners applying pertinent provisions of the Laws on Sales in
connection with Art. 559 which provides that ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The Court added that “[n]on-payment only creates a right
to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks
x x x x delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it
to another.”
In the case at bar, actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid
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for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private
respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be
interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a
movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner
who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding
the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even
the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. Leonor, indeed, bought the books in good faith.
While the Court sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the
private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all this trouble.
The decision of the CA was affirmed.
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108. Consuelo S. De Garcia and Anastacio Garcia v. Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. L-20264; January 30, 1971.
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Angelina, while talking to Consuelo, recognized her ring in the finger of the latter. She inquired where
Consuelo bought it, which the latter answered from her comadre. Angelina explained that the ring was
stolen from her house. Consuelo handed the ring to Angelina and it fit her finger. Despite repeated
demands, Consuelo did not return the ring to Angelina.
ISSUE:
May a possessor in good faith defeat the ownership of the real owner?
HELD:
No. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. Angelina, having been unlawfully deprived
of the diamond ring, was entitled to recover it from Consuelo who was found in possession of the same.
The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public
sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. The right of the
owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor
(Cruz v. Pahati). In Aznar v. Yapdiangco, the Court held: “[T]he right of the owner to recover personal
property acquired in good faith by another is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The
common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the
another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the
fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new
Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter
must prevail in this jurisdiction."
There is no merit to the contention that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat
Angelina’s claim. Even on that assumption the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal
deprivation.
Consuelo stresses Article 541 of the Civil Code. Even under the first clause, possession in good faith
does not really amount to title, for the reason that Article 1132 of the Code provides for a period of
acquisitive prescription for movables through ‘uninterrupted possession for 4 years in good faith’ (Article
1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of 3 years), so that many Spanish writers,
including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Article 464 of
the Spanish Code (Article 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor is not that of ownership,
but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive prescription (Tolentino;
Manresa). It is for the very reason that the title established by the first clause of Article 559 is only a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately
following provides that ‘one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.’ As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes of this Court in Sotto v. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: ‘Article 559 in fact assumes
that possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire
indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal
deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it under
any condition.’
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109. Dominador Dizon v. Lourdes G. Suntay

G.R. No. L-30817; September 29, 1972
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a diamond ring which was turned over to Clarita Sison for sale on
commission, along with her other pieces of jewelry. The ring was then pledged to Dominador Dizon, who
owns and operates a pawnshop.
Since Sison violated the terms of the agency, there was an attempt to recover possession thereof from
Dizon, who refused. Suntay filed an action for the recovery of the ring. Both the RTC and CA ruled in her
favor.
ISSUE:
Is Suntay entitled to the possession of her diamond ring notwithstanding the fact that it has already been
pledged?
HELD:
YES. There is a fairly recent restatement of the force and effect of the governing codal norm in De Gracia
v. Court of Appeals. Thus: "The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: 'The
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession
of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.' Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in
question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession
of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor
at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof
that there was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in
Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal
property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The
common law principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by
another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the
fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new
Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter
must prevail in this jurisdiction."
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110. Jaime Ledesma v. Court of Appeals and Citiwide Motors, Inc.

G.R. No. 86051; September 1, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Citiwide Motors sold 2 vehicles to a person who misrepresented himself to be Jojo Consunji,
the son of the purported buyer, who was later found out to be Armando Suarez. Suarez issued a
Manager’s Check, which was dishonored by the bank upon deposit because the amount has been altered
from P101 to P101, 000. One of the vehicles was transferred to Jaime Ledesma at the time Citiwide
instituted an action for replevin.
In his defense, Ledesma claims that he purchased and paid for the vehicle in good faith from its registered
owner, one Neyra, as evidenced by the LTO registration certificate.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ledesma but was reversed by the CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Was Citiwide unlawfully deprived of the cars when it sold the same to a buyer, through a person who
claimed to be Jojo Consunji, allegedly the latter’s son?
HELD:
No. A party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto
for under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are
three (3) requisites to make possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession
should be in good faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the
possession is in the concept of owner. Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been
unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the
justification for the exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559.
In this case there was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide and the original
vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a fictitious
name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to the vendee’s
alleged representative Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the vendee. The subsequent dishonor of
the check because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration which does not render
the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or
rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC.
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111. Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. v. Bernard C. Fernandez
G.R. No. 193426; September 29, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Subic Bay Legend Resorts And Casinos, Inc. operates the Legenda Hotel and Casino
(Legenda) located in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone in Zambales.
Respondent Bernard Fernandez (Fernandez) went to Legenda with his brothers Ludwin and Deoven. He
handed Legenda casino chips worth US$6,000.00, which belonged to him, to his brothers for the latter
to use at the casino. He claims that he got hold of the casino chips as payment for car services he
rendered to a Chinese individual. Petitioner then accosted his brothers and unduly and illegally
confiscated his casino chips equivalent to US$5,900.00. Petitioner refused and continues to refuse to
return the same to him despite demand. Fernandez thus filed a civil case with the RTC for recovery of
sum of money with damages against petitioner, demanding for the return of the casino chips.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that said chips were stolen from the casino and it is the lawful
owner of the same. It claims that Ludwin and Deoven were accosted after being closely watched through
the CCTV cameras of Legenda. The surveillance staff paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it
was “unusual” for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated chips. After playing a round of baccarat, the
siblings had their chips encashed at two separate windows. Since the cashiers were apprised of a
supposed irregularity, they “froze” the transaction. The brothers allegedly executed a joint statement
implicating a certain Michael Cabrera as the illegal source of the chips (which statement was later
recanted by the brothers).
The RTC ruled for Fernandez, and ordered petitioner to return the casino chips worth $5,900.00. It ruled
that the subject chips were in the possession of Fernandez, and the evidence by petitioner is not sufficient
to rebut the legal presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the
same (Art. 559 NCC). The CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
ISSUE:
Does the legal presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the
same apply in the present case?
HELD:
Yes. The legal presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner applies.
There should is no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin’s and Deoven’s possession
were stolen. Thus, petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis. Their Joint Affidavit
– which was later recanted – does not even bear such fact; it merely states that the chips came from
Cabrera. Unless the independent fact that Cabrera stole the chips can be proved, it cannot be said that
they must be confiscated when found to be in Ludwin’s and Deoven’s possession.
That Fernandez was paid by his Chinese client at the former’s car shop with the casino chips is not
unlawful. These chips are paid for anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their
corresponding representative equivalent – in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise – was not received by it
in return or exchange. Given this premise – that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged
with their corresponding representative value – it is with more reason that this Court should require
petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven
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were indeed stolen from it. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the
presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
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FRUITS
112. Azarcon and Abobo v. Eusebio

G.R. No. L-11977; April 29, 1959
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Victor Eusebio and petitioners Leonardo and Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Abobo had a
dispute over the possession of a certain parcel of public land in 1954. Victor Eusebio had filed a lease
application for a parcel of land known as lot No. 3807, containing an area of about 349 hectares. A portion
thereof was occupied by petitioners Azarcon and his companions, under a homestead application.
Before the dispute could be settled, Victor Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, alleging
that he had acquired a big parcel of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease from the Bureau of Lands; that
while he was in possession thereof defendants occupied a portion, containing an area of six hectares
more or less. He, therefore, prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the six hectares occupied by
them and pay damages. Defendant Azarcon answered the complaint alleging that he is in actual
possession of a portion of 24 hectares since 1941 by virtue of a homestead application; that the lease
application of plaintiff is subsequent to said homestead application of Leonardo Azarcon. The court
ordered defendants to restore possession of the land to plaintiff. Defendants appealed to CA.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, a writ for the execution of the judgment of the lower
court was issued on October 3, 1955. On October 8, 1955, defendants moved and the court on October
21 ordered that the said writ of execution be stayed upon defendants' depositing of a supersedeas bond
of P1,000. The defendants asked for the lifting of the writ of execution and was granted. Despite the
notice of writ of execution on October 3, 1955, defendants-appellants nevertheless entered the land to
gather palay which was then pending harvest.
ISSUE:
WON the Azarcons are allowed to gather palay during the pendency of the case.
HELD:
Yes. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the defendant-appellant to move out from the
premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the law a person
who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are
pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the
Civil Code.
As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from gathering the pending
fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the
defendants- appellants committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the
defendants-appellants had presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the
said order of execution, and this motion to stay execution was granted. Defendants furthermore
presented a bond in accordance with the order of the court and had it approved by the Court of First
Instance. It was perhaps in expectation of this resolution of the court setting aside the order of execution
that defendants-appellants may have felt justified in entering the land and harvesting the fruits existing
thereon.
Furthermore, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from
taking with him his own effects and possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. No
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such, prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to leave the land. There may have been
a technical violation of an order not to enter the premises, but not of one prohibiting them from removing
anything therefrom.
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113. Felipa Cordero (Deceased), Mauro Ocampo, Casimiro Ocampo and Elisea Ocampo v.
Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso, Dalmacio Montaos and Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-36789; July 25, 1983
ABAD-SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Felipa Cordero and her children were alleged the hheirs of Mr. Ocampo who left several
properties including the subject property which has improvements therein.
Allegedly after the death of the said Mr. Ocampo the plaintiffs took possession of the properties left by
him, among others is the parcel of land which is a riceland, but they found out that the southern portion
of the was possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio
Montaos; and that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while her co-
defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants.
The court concluded that the disputed land is included in title issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
predecessor of the plaintiffs. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated
by error or fraud. The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants should be considered possessors in bad faith
HELD:
YES. They are possessors in bad faith.
Although at first there is no evidence that defendants were possessors in bad faith. However, their good
faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith
from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received as provided by Art. 549 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, defendants shall vacate and surrender the land in question to the plaintiffs; and the defendants
shall also account for the fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the Civil Code from the service of the
summons.
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EXPENSES
114. Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez v. Manuel de Guzman and Max B. Solis
G.R. No. L-28721; October 5, 1928
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
A judgment on a previous case which was instituted in 1916 for recovery of a certain piece of land filed
by Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis was rendered in favour of Mendoza. Said case was
remanded to the court of origin which is the CFI at Sariaya, Tayabas and put Mendoza de facto in
possession of the property.
In the cadastral proceedings, the CFI adjudicated the above mentioned land in favour of petitioners pro
indivoso and de Guzman with the right to retention until the latter is indemnified for the improvements
already existing on the land. By virtue of the judgment, de Guzman moved for a writ of possession which
the court granted in 1924. From 1916 until 1924, Mendoza was in possession of the land, thereafter de
Guzman was in dominion of the land.
Being unable to agree as to the amount for the improvements of the land the petitioners requested the
CFI to:
a. fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by de Guzman in introducing the
improvements;
b. require the de Guzman to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value
of the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and
c. decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. In their answer, de Guzman asked for
₱6,000.00.
During the pendency of the case, Bernardo Solis a.k.a Max B. Solis intervened alleging that de Guzman
in consideration of ₱5,000.00 transferred all his rights in the improvements except for 200 coconut trees.
The CFI held

(1) that in accordance with the provisions of articles 435 and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil
Code, the value of the "indemnization" to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones en cuestion";
(2) that the plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the right to make their own "las plantaciones
hechas por el demandado" upon payment in the form indicated in No. 1, the defendant having the
right to retain the land until the expenditures have been refunded;
(3) that the defendant is obliged to render a detail and just account of the fruits and other profits received
by him from the property for their due application; and
(4) that the value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the payment of the
"indemnizacion," and in that it exceeds the value of the "indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned
to the plaintiffs.
September 23, 1927, the amount that the plaintiffs were required to pay to the respondents exceeded
the amount that the latter were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver
the land and its improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the excess of the indemnification should be returned to the petitioners
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HELD:
The Court goes into the discussion of what is necessary expenses. As described by Spanish
commentators, necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the thing; as those without
which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as those that augment the income of the things upon which
they are expanded. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation, production,
upkeep, etc. The Court resolved the issue which held that once the owner elects to appropriate the
improvements, the builder, planter, or sower cannot exactly be considered a possessor in good faith.
Hence, whatever fruits he receives during the pendency of retention must be deducted from whatever
indemnity is due to him; and in case it exceeds the value of the indemnity, the excess shall be returned
to the owner of the land.
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115. Robles and Martin v. Lizzaraga Hermanos, et.al.

G.R. No. L-16736; 22 December 1921
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Anastasia de la Rama died leaving six children, one of whom was Evarista Robles, and some
properties, among which was house No. 4. The heirs of Anastasia then entered into partnership
with Lizarraga Hermanos (“LH”) in liquidation and settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which
the court awarded to said partnership the properties left by the deceased, including the aforesaid
house No.4. Evarista, since before the death of her mother Anastasia, has been with her husband
occupying house No. 4, at the beginning, by permission of her mother, later on by the consent
of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership, LH, to whom it had been awarded,
having made some improvements on the house, paying to said partnership P40 monthly as rent of
the upper story. Sometime, LH notified Evarista that the rent would be raised to P60 a month.
Evarista refused to pay the new rate and to vacate the house. LH brought suit against her for
ejectment while Evarista sued LH to recover the value of the improvements she introduced in
house no.4. Evarista claims that LH agreed to sell her the said house, the deed of sale to be
executed later; that by virtue of this contract she remained in the occupation of the building and
made the improvements; that, as one of the stipulations in the c ontract of sale of the estate,
Evarista assumed the liability of several encumbrances on the estate all of which payments were
made through LH.
ISSUE:
Is Evarista Robles the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand payment
of their value?
RULING:
YES. Under Article 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith who
makes useful improvements on the estate possessed is entitled to demand payment of the value
thereof and to retain estate until the expenditures incurred therein are paid to him. Here, the
presumption of good faith in favor of Evarista Robles' possession at the time she made the
improvements on the property was neither disputed nor discussed, but on the contrary, there is
positive evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that when she made the improvements on
the aforesaid building she was possessing it in good faith. Moreover, the expenditures incurred
in these improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and bathroom
in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and
dwelling were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to stand
just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for
which it was intended, being used as a residence. If the improvements are useful and Evarista
Robles possession was in good faith, the conclusion set out in article 453 of the Civil Code,
supra, is inevitable; Evarista Robles is the owner of such improvements, and entitled to
reimbursement therefor, and to retain the building until the same is made.
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116. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals and City of Dagupan
G.R. No. L-54526; August 25, 1986
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
Dagupan City filed a complaint against Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. MWSS interposed R.A. 1383
as its defense which vested to MWSS the ownership, possession, and control of all waterworks system
throughout the Philippines. MWSS also filed a counterclaim for reimbursement of expenses it incurred
for necessary and useful improvements.
The trial court ruled that MWSS is a possessor in bad faith so it is not entitled to claim reimbursement.
MWSS appealed to the CA arguing that Dagupan City should be liable for payment of the balance of the
loan secured by MWSS for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System, however the CA
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
MWSS appealed to the SC for the removal of useful improvements. Dagupan City argues that MWSS is
a possessor in bad faith so it has absolutely no right to the useful improvements.
ISSUE:
Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful improvements?
HELD:
No. Under Article 499 of the Civil Code, “he who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity.” Additionally, under Article 546 of the Civil
Code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until
reimbursed. Finally, under Article 547 of the Civil Code, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers
the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right of a possessor
in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure,
provided the thing does not suffer any injury and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by
paying their value at the time of his possession.
In this case, MWSS is a builder in bad faith so it loses whatever useful improvements it made without
right to indemnity.
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CONCEPT OF USUFRUCT
117. Mary Mcdonald Bachrach v. Sophie Seifer and Elisa Elianoff

G.R. No. L-2659; October 12, 1950
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his
last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate
of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received
from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On
June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower
court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach,
to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is
fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa
Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in
question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary
but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a
stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a stock dividend is fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary
HELD:
The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and
the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits.
Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or
stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock
dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were
declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law. And the same shall belong to the
usufructuary by direct provision of law:
ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to
the time the usufruct may last.
ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or periodical revenue, either in
money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be
considered as the proceeds or fruits such right.
When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or commercial
enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have the same
consideration.lawphil.net
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in accordance with the rules
prescribed by the next preceding article.
181
118. Maxima Hemedes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107132; October 8, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Jose Hemedes executed a document in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin. The document was subject
to the following resolutory conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of
the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document
conveying the property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage
contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to
the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.
In lieu of this, Justa Kausapin executed on September 27, 1960 a Deed of Conveyance in favor of Maxima
Hemedes. The Deed contains a provision:
“I do hereby… convey, transfer, and deed unto my designee, Maxima Hemedes, … the ownership of
and title to the property… except the possession and enjoyment which shall remain vested in me during
my lifetime, or widowhood and which upon my death or remarriage shall also automatically revert to, and
be transferred to my designee, Maxima Hemedes.”
In 1964, Maxima constituted a real estate mortgage over the property in favor of R&B Insurance. Since
Maxima failed to pay, the land was awarded to R&B through public auction. A TCT was issued to the
company, bearing the annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa.
On May 27, 1971, Justa executed another Kasunduan whereby she transferred the same land to her
stepson Enrique Hemedes. Enrique then sold the property to Dominium, which later on leased it to Asia
Brewery. The latter constructed two warehouses on the lot. After seeing such es tablishment, R&B
asserted title to the property.
ISSUES:
1. Who is entitled to the property?
2. Will the owner be subject to usufruct?
HELD:
1. R&B Insurance. When Justa executed the second deed in favor of Enrique (1971), she no longer holds
title to the property. The fact that it was given to Maxima (1960), made all her transactions valid and
binding, while, those of Enrique were null and void.
2. Yes. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form
and substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural industrial and civil fruits of the property and
may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by a
gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct.
Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The owner
may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law provides that, in such a case,
182
the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and should the immovable be
attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for
whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
Wherefore, R&B’s ownership is upheld, subject to the usufructuary rights of Justa, as properly annotated
on the TCT.
183
RIGHTS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
119. Josefa Fabie v. Jose Gutierrez David

G.R. No. L-123; December 12, 1945
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses granted to her under the will if Rosario
Fabie y Grey. In a prior civil case, it was settled that the naked title shall belong to Juan Grey, but the
rights to all the rents thereof shall belong to Josefa Fabie during her lifetime. Juan Grey is also appointed
as the general administrator of the properties of Rosario Fabie y Grey.
Josefa filed an action for unlawful detainer against tenant Ngo Boo Soo. She claimed that the tenant
subleased the property to another Chinese without her consent in violation of the lease contract. She
also claimed that she needs the premises to use as her own dwelling house as her own house was
destroyed by war. Ngo Boo Soo claimed that Josefa had no right to institute the case for he is the tenant
of the owner, Juan Grey, and, as a mere usufructuary, her rights are limited to collecting rents.
ISSUE:
Does Josefa have the right to manage or administer the property which includes the power to select the
tenant and to fix the amount of rent?
HELD:
YES. The usufructuary has the right to administer and manage the property, to collect rents and to make
necessary repairs. Included in his right to administer the property is the right to select the tenant of the
premises.
While it is true that there was a general administrator of the estate of Rosario Fabie y Grey, insofar as
the particular property is concerned, Josefa should be considered as its administrator. This is because,
as a usufructuary, she is entitled not only to collect rent or income but also to lease the property in favor
of another. The right to lease carries with it the right to select and oust tenants for contractual violations.
To permit the owner of the naked title to arrogate unto himself the right to select tenants, dictate the
conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith would be to place the
usufructuary at his mercy.
Hence, Josefa has the right to file for the ejection of tenant Ngo Boo Soo.
184
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY (ART. 583-603)
120. Ramona B. Vda. de Aranas, et al, v. Vicente B. Aranas and Hon. Luis B. Manta
G.R. No. L-56249; May 29, 1987
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Before Fr. Aranas died, he had executed his Last Will and Testament stipulating, among others, that the
special administration of the remainder of his estate should be given to Vicente Aranas, a faithful and
serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after
deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic
Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Moreover, the stipulation provides that Vicente Aranas
should serve without bond, until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. In
such case, anyone of the sons of testator’s brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special
administrator, and none other than they. Carmelo shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold
the said office, but upon the death of Carmelo, his said sons will have power to select the one among
them ourselves. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for
his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor". The trial court ruled that the perpetual
inalienability and administration of the portion of the estate of the late Fr. Aranas, administered by Vicente
Aranas, is null and void after twenty years in accordance with Article 870 of the Civil Code. In a motion
for reconsideration, the trial court reversed its decision.
ISSUE:
Is the special administration perpetual?
HELD:
NO. Vicente Aranas is a usufructuary who has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the
benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation
to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of
Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation
namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited
by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon
by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other
benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties , the
usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership
without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas
as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward
him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or
bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act
as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly
disposed of.
185
EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT (ARTS. 603-612)
121. Ramona R. Locsin, et. al. v. Hon. Judge Vicente P. Valenzuela and Spouses Joseph and
Helen Schon
G.R. Nos. L-51333 and L-52289; February 19, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Locsin, Guanzon, Sibug, Perez Ylanan and Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of
agricultural land known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in Barrio Panubigan Canlaon City, Negros
Occidental. The tract of land was covered by TCT No. T494 containing an area of (3,033,048) square
meters, more or less. A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of
60.07464 hectares, was subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk
of this lot was cultivated by respondent lessees-tenants (Panaligan, Marquez, Pedros, etc.) who
customarily delivered the rentals to Helen Schon. After the onset of the martial law P.D. 27 was
promulgated decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by petitioners,
including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the
"Operation Land Transfer". Petitioners through counsel sought the opinion of the DAR as to who
(petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the rental payments which
continued to be made by the respondent-tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer rendered an
opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as
such should pertain to the landowners and not to the usufructuary.
ISSUES:
1. As between the naked owners and the usufructuary, who should be entitled to the amounts paid by
the tenants?
2. What is the legal character of the payments made by the tenants–payments on the price of the land
itself (amortization payments for the price of the land as such should belong to the landowners and
not to the usufructuary) or civil fruits of the land?
HELD:
1. The naked owners – herein petitioners. Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform
area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by
the private respondent tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that
they were required to pay under PD No. 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the
former landowners as part of the compensation for the dominion over land of which they were deprived
by operation of PD 27. Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals like those which had been
paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of PD 27 and prior to the effectivity of
Operation Land Transfer.
Rights retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary, after the effectivity of PD 27 – the usufruct which had
therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by PD No. 27.
To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but
rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat the very
purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27 was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage
of the soil" by giving to tenants-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the
assumption that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowner rather than
mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue enjoying, as
usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be to set at naught the major purpose
projected by PD 27 and maintained by E.O 228.
186
2. Amortization payments. Article 609 of the Civil Cod provides that “Should the thing in usufruct be
expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged either to replace it with another thing of the same
value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary the legal interest on the amount of the indemnity
for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security for
the payment of the interest.”
Article 609 should be applied in this case. So long as her rights as usufructuary persist under the
instrument which gave birth to such rights, respondent would be entitled to a replacement reasonably
equivalent to the land previously burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal interest. Thus, from the
monies that she actually received from private respondent tenant-farmers on and after 21 October 1972,
respondent Helen Schon is entitled to retain an amount equivalent to the legal interest on said amounts
for every year that the usufruct would by its own terms have continued to exist had it not been
extinguished by operation of PD No. 27; the balance of such amounts received by her shall be turned
over to petitioners. She is also entitled to the same right in respect of the balance of the price of the land
petitioners presumably received from the Land Bank. Private respondents are directed to deliver to
petitioners the amounts paid to them by private respondent tenants-farmers beginning on 21 October
1972, after deducting therefrom an amount equivalent to simple legal interest thereon computed at six
(6%) percent per annum on the amount received each year.
187
EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES
122. Nicolas Valisno v. Felipe Adriano

G.R. No. L-37409; May 23, 1988
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Nicolas Valisno is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land (planted with different fruit
crops adjoining that of Felipe’s on the bank of Pampanga River) after buying the same from Felipe’s
sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father, Eladio.
At the time of the sale of the land to Nicolas, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Felipe’s land.
Felipe levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the Nicolas was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his land. This prompted Nicolas to file a complaint for deprivation of water
rights with the Bureau of Public Works and Communications. Adriano was ordered to reconstruct the
irrigation canal, “otherwise judicial action shall be taken against him under the provisions of Section 47
of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act), as amended.” But instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Felipe asked
for a reinvestigation In the meantime, Nicolas rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his
need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent. He then filed a complaint for damages when
he failed to plant his fields for lack of irrigation water, for the reconstruction of the canal, and for attorney’s
fees and the costs of suit.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau’s decision holding that Eladio’s
water rights ceased to be enjoyed by him when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water
right since then for a period of more than 5 years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
Nicolas, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate did not acquire any water
rights with the land purchased.
In a decision dated April 21,1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass through the
defendant’s land to draw water from the Pampanga River. Nicolas, after denial of his motion for
reconsideration, appealed to the CA which certified the case to the SC on whether the provisions of the
Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case.
ISSUE:
Is the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates considered a title?
HELD:
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga
River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code: “Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order
that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of
the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.”
188
No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the idea of restrictions thereon, such as easements.
Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment of property requires
mutual service and forbearance among adjoining estates.
The deed of sale in favor of Nicolas included the “conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements” appurtenant to Honorata Adriano’s property, By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Honorata sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Nicolas all “rights, title, interest and participations
over the parcel of land including the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the
property subject of this sale. According to Nicolas, the water right was the primary consideration for his
purchase of Honorata’s property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant
may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property
right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the
appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference, such as the appellee’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water
from the Pampanga River.
189
123. Leogario Ronquillo, et. al. v. Jose Roco, as administrator of vicente, roco y. Dominguez, et.
al.
G.R. No. L-10619; February 28, 1958
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
The plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way, which
traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and
the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. The
defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said defendants have
long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs. Jose
Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with a
view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started
constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way construction actually impeded, obstructed and
disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way.
Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently
planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their
right of way in question against their protests and opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or
coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
Plaintiffs claim to have acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the
latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted
use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road in going to Igualdad Street and
the public market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and return.
ISSUE:
Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription.
HELD:
No. The dismissal of the court a quo was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though
it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements
may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those
used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old
and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discentinuous ones whether apparent or not, may
be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil
Codes, respectively).
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, it would appear that the easement of right of way
may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for
prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception
established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way.
Under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the
same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
190
124. Eduardo C. Tañedo v. Hon. Juanito A. Bernad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Branch XXI, Cebu City; Spouses Romeo Sim and Pacita S. Sim; and
Spouses Antonio Cardenas and Mae Linda Cardenas
G.R. No. L-66520; August 30, 1988
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated
in Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes Cardenas and more particularly known as Lot 7501-A,
with an area of 140 square meters and Lot 7501-B, with an area of 612 square meters. On Lot 7501-A is
constructed an apartment building, while the improvements on Lot 7501-B consist of one four-door
apartment of concrete and strong materials; one two-storey house of strong materials; a bodega of strong
materials; and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B. A small
portion of the apartment building on Lot 7501-A also stands on Lot 7501-B.
On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo.
Antonio Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Eduardo C. Tañedo as a security
for the payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00.
Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Eduardo Tañedo in case he should
decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B services Lot 7501-A and the apartment building on Lot
7501-A has a part standing on Lot 7501-B.
Antonio Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the herein respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Upon learning of the sale, Eduardo Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the
latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo
built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his
building encroaching on Lot 7501-B. As a result, Eduardo Tañedo, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622
of the Civil Code, filed an action for legal redemption and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, against the spouses Romeo and
Pacita Sim, Antonio Cardenas and his wife Mae Linda Cardenas, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City,
and Banco Cebuano, Cebu City Development Bank.
ISSUE:
Is the finding of the trial court correct in holding that petitioner Tañedo's right to continue to use the septic
tank, erected on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different
owners, who do not have the same interest?
HELD:
NO. Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. Said
article provides:
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:

(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By non-user for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed
from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the
day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it
shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use,
191
unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the conditions, if the easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates.
As can be seen from the above provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different
persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the
easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained
by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division
of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned
in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain
pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence,
the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita
Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.
192
125. Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80511; January 25, 1991
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
It is admitted that the petitioner Costabella owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122
and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre, situated at Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and
hotel. The private respondents Katipunan Lumber et al, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining
properties more particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and
from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed
the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began
the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the
private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Later, when it undertook the construction of
the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative
passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these closures, the private respondents filed an action for injunction with
damages against the petitioner before the then Court of First
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested
right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and
enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in so
closing the said passageway, had accordingly violated the private respondents' vested right. CA reversed
the decision. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one
which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription.
Thus the appellate court granted the private respondents the right to an easement of way on the
petitioner's property using the passageway in question, unless the petitioner should provide another
passageway equally accessible and convenient as the one it closed.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in accord with the
provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous15

and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the
foregoing precepts, it stood correct.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of
the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the
existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
193
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to
the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private
respondents) to the main road." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient,
the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement
or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of
the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be established over
its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property
was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents
failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is
at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach
resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises.
Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That
indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the claimed light of
way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business.
Hence, the Private respondents' properties cannot be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory
easement is demandable.
194
126. Tomas Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77628; March 11, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun
are the owners of two adjacent estates. Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which
is bounded on the north by the servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south
by a dried river and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.
Private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters
long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway.
Petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land, which later on flourished and with that, it became
difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the
use of pushcarts. So petitioner bought an owner-type jeep. However, that jeep could not pass through
the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him 1 1/2
meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. His
request was turned down.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right
of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. During the trial, the attention of the lower court was
called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only 80 meters away from the dominant estate.
The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint, ruling that, that plaintiff at present has two outlets to the
highway. In sustaining the trial court, the CA opined that the necessity interposed by petitioner was not
compelling enough to justify interference with the property rights of private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. While there is a
dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.
Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway,
and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present
case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from
the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters
up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be
used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage
difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which
is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time."
This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner started
out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the
plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means
of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become
195
extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway,
exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive
for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accomodate
his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will
reduce the servient estate to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed willingness
to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps,
it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously.5 But unless and until that option
is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including
Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several
years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent
nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code.
196
127. Edwin Case v. The Heirs of Tuason Y Santibañez

G.R. No. L-5044; December 1, 1909
TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Edwin Case filed a petition with the Court of Land Registration requesting that his property be
registered in accordance with the provisions of Land Registration Act. The heirs of late Pablo Tuason
and Leocadia Santibañez filed a written opposition thereto.
They claimed that they are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner on the
southwest. Petitioner in making the plan attached to his petition, extended his southwest boundary line
to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibañez. They further claimed that the true
dividing line between their respective properties is the walls (running from Calle Escolta to the River
Pasig) belonging to the heirs. About two years ago, when petitioner made alterations in the buildings
erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the heirs.
The court granted the registration of the property described in the application filed by Edwin Case, with
the exclusion of the wall claimed by the opponents.
On appeal, the trial court found that the wall in controversy belongs to the opponents for the reason,
among others, that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired in 1796, the
property now possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone wall.
This document, which was offered in evidence by the opponents, has not been impugned by the
applicant. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject wall belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title
or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the
common point of elevation.
The intermediate portion of the walls in question is the portion against which no other wall appears to
have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this it cannot be presumed that the
aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as
the latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when
one of their ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on
which the building was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the
wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.
The fact that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in question to support the edifice he
had constructed is a further indication that the neighboring wall is not a party one. He knew perfectly well
that he had no right to rest his building on the latter. That he built a terrace over the wall does not prove
that the whole of the wall, from the Escolta to the River Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show that he
usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice of the real owner.
Thus, the subject wall belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez considering that it is not a
party wall.
197
128. Severina and Flora Choco v. Isidro Santamaria

G.R. No. 6076; December 29, 1911
MAPA, J.:
FACTS:
Isidro Santamaria is in possession of a parcel of land on which he has erected a house thereon. Isidro
made several openings and windows in the walls of the said house on both sides, overlooking the
property of the plaintiff Chocos. Chocos as the owners of the land on both sides of Santamaria's house,
protested against the openings and windows made by Isidro in his house.
ISSUE:
Whether Isidro may be ordered to close the windows
HELD:
YES. The window 1 is next to Chocos' lot. To judge from the photographic views, Exhibits A and D, it
opens on the boundary line between the said lot and that of the appellee and is situated perpendicularly
above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of
the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of the window in
question is in front of Chocos' property, and a person approaching the window may clearly see the said
lot." And certainly if it is in front of this lot, it is unquestionable that it directly overlooks the same; but even
though it did not and only a side or oblique view of the lot could be obtained from it, it could not be kept
open, since between it and Chocos' property there does not intervene the distance required by law —
that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second. In reality, there is no distance at all
between the said window and Chocos' lot, because this window is perpendicular to the boundary line of
the said lot; therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows: "Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over
the estate of the neighbor, can not be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the
wall in which they are built and said estate. "Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said
property, unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters."
Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question must be closed.
198
129. Solid Manila Corp, v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 90596; April 8, 1991
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another
parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation. The private respondent's title came
from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way. The
petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of
the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep and over its protests, the private
respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
Thereafter, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates
removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The RTC rendered judgment against the private respondent. However, the CA held that the lower court
erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had
been extinguished. In addition, an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair
the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property,
"merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger.
HELD:
Yes. The Court is furthermore of the opinion that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the
sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can
be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that
is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit
of the general public. Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we
said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of
that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public
–– if that is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
NOTE: The Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a
mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence.
Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed
of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated from the
tenement, or mortgaged separately.
199
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation
on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
Albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley ––
as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
200
130. Floro v Llenado

G.R. No. 75723; June 2, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon Floro is the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision with its own egress and ingress to and from the
MacArthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. Orlando A. Llenado, on the
other hand, was the registered owner of 2 parcels of land, with the total area of 34, 573 sq. meters, more
or less, known as the Llenado Homes Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado from the owner
Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. Bounded on the South
by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the
west by ricelands known as the Ipapo property, the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or
passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of
Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision
which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Sometime in
February 1983, the Llenados sought, and were granted, permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and
5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as the passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. On April 7, 1983,
however, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby
preventing its use by the Llenados. Their request for the reopening of Road Lot 5 having been denied,
Orlando Llenado instituted a complaint against Simeon Floro for Easement of Right of Way with the
Prayer of the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Llenados claim entitlement to a right of way on the basis of a voluntary easement?
2. Are the Llenados entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way?
HELD:
1. No. The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the month of March was by mere tolerance
of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. This is evident from the
testimony of Wenifreda that "they said to us to go on while they are preparing for the papers" and that
"We can use that for a while, while they were making for the papers." Although such use was in
anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such contract was validly entered into by reason
of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, private respondents Llenados
cannot claim entitlement to a right of way through the Floro Park Subdivision on the basis of a voluntary
easement.
2. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the
preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are:
(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of proper indemnity; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
The burden of providing the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies
on the owner of the dominant estate. Private respondents have failed in this regard. First, there is a
proposed access road through the Ipapo property. Second, no proof was presented by Llenado that he
paid the required indemnity. And third, there was no reason for private respondent’s failure to develop
the right of way over the Ipapo property, which has already been previously acquired, except the
inconvenience and expenses it would cost him.
201
Thus, the Llenados are not entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way.
202
131. Anastacia Quimen v. Court of Appeals and Yolanda Q. Oliveros

G.R. No. 112331; May 29, 1996
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina
inherited a piece of property in Pandi, Bulacan. The shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutted the municipal road. Yolanda Oliveros, daughter of Sotero, purchased Antonio’s share of the
property (Lot No. 1448-B-6-A) in 1982, which was directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero.
Yolanda alleged that she was initially hesitant to buy it because it had no access to a public road but
Anastacia, as administratrix of the estate, assured her that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot using as her passageway to the public highway a
portion of Anastacia’s property. However, when Yolanda offered to pay for the use of the pathway,
Anastacia refused to accept the payment and she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing
through her property. In 1986, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B,
located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between
their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of
Sotero, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence. However, the pathway was not adequate for ingress and
egress, hence, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s
property.
The Trial court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she
was entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause
the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. Hence, this petition. Petitioner insists that passing
through the property of Yolanda’s parents (which would entail destroying the sari-sari store of her parents
made of strong materials) is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property
and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
ISSUE:
Is the right of way proposed by respondent Yolanda the least onerous to the parties?
HELD:
YES. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of
least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is
a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not
always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other
hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass
through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
This is the test.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right
of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner’s
property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through
203
the property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong
materials. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to
a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be
cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. Petition denied.
204
132. De Jesus, et al. v. Howmart Corp., et al.

12 CA REP 831
FACTS:
Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo, Manila. They brought an
action for damages against Howmart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing Corporation, owners of the
land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty-storey concrete building was constructed.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the
construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support, thereby causing it to
sink in some parts, its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places and by the careless manner
of handling the cement used, the roofings of the building of the plaintiffs were damaged with the
accumulated debris piled thereon.
ISSUE:
Were proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in question so
as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiffs?
HELD:
No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides, “No property shall make such excavations upon his land
as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support”. A reading of Article
684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution
made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins
the seven-storey concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches. The
sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and
to the weight of the seven-storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation made
necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiffs’ land. Defendants, having failed to provide the
plaintiffs’ land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent support, are liable for damages.
205
Version 2
Manuel De Jesus et al v. Howmart Corporation, et. al.

(CA) No. 44191-R; August 28, 1974
LEUTERIO, J.:
FACTS:
Manuel De Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus owned a lot which adjoined the lot owned by defendant
Howmart Corporation. Over the latter property, a six-storey reinforced concrete building was constructed.
A complaint for damages was filed by the plaintiffs De Jesus stating that defendant corporation failed to
observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of
sufficient lateral and subjacent support. As a result, the building of the plaintiffs sank in some places and
the roofing of the building was damaged with the accumulated debris piled thereon. Sketch marks show
that the buildings owned by the parties are so close to each other that they almost appeared to be
attached together.
Judgment was rendered in favour of the plaintiffs stating that it is incumbent upon Howmart Corporation
to exercise due care in making the excavation in a way that will not deprive the property of plaintiffs its
natural support to prevent it from sinking, sagging or crumbling. The position of the defendant is that they
took all the necessary preconstruction precautions so as not to damage the lateral and subjacent
support of the adjoining property.
ISSUE:
Did the fact that the defendant corporation took all necessary preconstruction precautions not to damage
the adjoining property relieve them of the duty not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support and thus relieve them of liability for damages?
HELD:
No, the taking of such pre-construction precautions is not sufficient. Article 684 of the New Civil Code
provides “No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.”
A reading of the provision would show that the duty of an adjacent owner notto deprive any adjacent land
or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend upon the
degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building in his land.
Otherwise, the article would have provided that the proprietor shall take the necessary precautions and
care. Even if that was the case, if the adjacent land or building is deprived of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support, as a result of which damage is caused, the adjacent owner shall be liable for such damage
caused.
Thus, in this case, the defense of taking necessary precautions is not sufficient. Howmart Corporation is
still liable for damages to the plaintiffs De Jesus.
206
133. La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 95252; September 5, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in QC abutting Katipunan Ave. on the west, The
controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of
the Ateneo de Manila University (AdMU) and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally
owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such
sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the
consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo
later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now
known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a
Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan road
(La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the Mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo
auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the
highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical
concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola
Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint against
AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public
highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUE:
Is there an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?
HELD:
YES, there was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Admu.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-
in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit,
both as dominant and servient estates. This is contained in their contractual stipulations in the deed of
sale between the Tuason Family and the PBC which were incorporated in the deed of assignment with
assumption of mortgage by the PBC in favor of Ateneo as well as in the deed of sale dated October 24,
1976 when the property was ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any other
contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary rescission of the contract
establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo
and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the
corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much so that –When the owner of
the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of
the dominant tenement may ask for the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to their
condition before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for damages suffered. An injunction may
also be obtained in order to restrain the owner of the servient tenement from obstructing or impairing in
any manner the lawful use of the servitude.
207
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is
likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only
legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
In sum, when the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made
provisions for its observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.
NOTE:
Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For, even an injunction
cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case, the
court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties.
208
134. Alcantara, et al. v. Reta, Jr.

G.R. No. 136996; December 14, 2001
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara, among others, filed with the RTC a complaint against Reta, Jr. for the exercise of
the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction,
attorney’s fees and nullity of amicable settlement.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao
City, owned by Reta and that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center. They assert
that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential
Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since
it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone. The RTC ruled in favor of the defendant
which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517
HELD:
NO. Petitioners have no right of first refusal.
The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, Alcantara et.
al. filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that the land they were occupying be
declared as an ULRZ. To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the
said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have
built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years.
Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and,
therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land
decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. In this case, petitioners did not
meet the requirements.
Discussion of SC in relation to easement:
Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo
Roble. Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present proof of a lease agreement other than his
testimony in court that he bought the house that he is occupying from his father-in-law. Respondent Reta
allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered
tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy
the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
One of the petitioners was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, the decision of the CA was affirmed by the Court.
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135. Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc.
G.R. No. 114170; January 15, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Prosperity gave a loan to Metropolitan secured by a real estate mortgage over a commercial compound
with Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road. Metropolitan defaulted. Prosperity foreclosed the
mortgage. It became the highest bidder and the purchaser of the 7 lots subject of the mortgage.
Metropolitan later negotiated with Prosperity for the redemption of 3 lots located on the southern and
middle portions of the compound. As the reacquisition of the lots by Metropolitan would leave the
remaining 4 lots on the northwestern side without access to Tandang Sora Avenue, Prosperity acceded
to Metropolitan’s request on the condition that Prosperity be given a right of way on the existing private
road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by Prosperity. The parties’ agreement was embodied
in a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU).
Prosperity later filed an injunctive suit in RTC QC. It alleged, inter alia, that, in violation of the terms of
the MOU, Metropolitan refused to allow Prosperity to make excavations on one side of the access road
for the installation of water pipes; that it banned entry of Prosperity’s trucks and those of its tenants at a
certain time; and that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary searches.
Metropolitan filed an answer, alleging that Prosperity’s right to undertake excavations on the access road
was not provided for in the MOU.
The pertinent provision of MOU reads: “[T]he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will
remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of [Prosperity] or its successors-
in-interest.”
ISSUE:
Does “whatever kind of passage” include Prosperity’s right to make excavations to install water pipes?
HELD:
No. The word passage does not, however, clearly and unmistakably convey a meaning that includes a
right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster’s
Dictionary, is that it is the act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to
another. Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, the act of
passing; transit; transition. To achieve a meaning such as that which Prosperity proposes requires the
consideration of evidence showing the parties’ intention in using the word which can only be done during
trial on the merits. Until such time, Prosperity cannot claim to have a clear and unmistakable right
justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case.
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136. Villanueva v. Velasco

G.R. No. 130845; November 27, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of land which he bought from Pacific Banking
Corporation, the mortgagee of the said property. The bank acquired it from spouses Gabriel at a public
auction. When Villanueva bought the land, there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It
occupied one meter of the 2-meter wide easement of right of way the spouses Gabriel granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, in a
Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
However, unknown to Villanueva, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the easement. He was also unaware that the private
respondents had filed a civil case against the spouses Gabriel to enforce the contract of easement.
The RTC ordered the spouses Gabriel to provide the right of way and demolish the small house which
encroached upon it. The CA upheld the decision. Later, Judge Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition,
pursuant to which the sheriff demolished the small house. Villanueva filed a Motion to Quash the said
writ, maintaining that the same could not apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case
and there was no annotation in the title regarding the easement.
ISSUE:
Does the easement on the property bind the petitioner?
HELD:
YES. At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted
by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2)
an easement by necessity or a legal easement.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes
a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it
belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to
be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared
the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on
this Court, hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding.
The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents’ cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the
needs of private respondents’ estate.
Petitioner’s second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was
not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was
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not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the
nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant
estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
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137. National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals and Dick Manglapus

G.R. No. 114348; September 20, 2000
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Dick Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA alleging that NIA's diggings and
fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its
taking.
It has been established that free patent over 3 hectares of land was issued in the name of respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title: “… and subject finally
to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law…”
Subsequently, when respondent already acquire the property by absolute sale, NIA entered a portion of
Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon.
The RTC awarded damages in favor of respondent and was affirmed in toto by the CA.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in awarding damages in favor of respondent in view of the proviso expressly stated
in the title of the land?
HELD:
No. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that easements are established either by law or by the will of
the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The TCT and
OCT covering the land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land
covered therein. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of
way.
Neither can Manglapus argue that he was a transferee or buyer in good faith. Under the Torrens system,
for one to be a buyer in good faith and for value, the vendee must see the transfer certificate of title and
rely upon the same. Here, the annotation on the transfer certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the
duty to refer to the conditions annotated on the back of the original certificate of title. This, he did not do.
The law cannot protect him. Manglapus is a transferee with notice of the liens annotated in the title.
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138. Teofilo Alolino v. Fortunato Flores

G.R. No. 198774; April 04, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Teofilo Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. He initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure.
He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors.
There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3)
on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari
sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's
house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building
permit. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and
ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through
the rear door of his house. Alolino demanded that the structure be removed but Flores refused, so Alolino
made a complaint to the Building Official.
In 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second floor to their structure, again without
securing a building permit. The construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint. Since no
settlement was reached, Alolino filed a complaint with RTC for: (1) the rmoval of the encroaching
structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and (3) the payment of damages.
The RTC ruled for Alolino and ordered the removal of the illegal structure obstructing Alolino's right to
light and view. It ruled that Alolino previously acquired an easement of light and view and that the
respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their construction. It held that the respondents'
illegal construction was a private nuisance which prevented Alolino from using the back portion of his
property and obstructed his free passage to the barrio/municipal road.
On appeal the CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view
because he never gave a formal prohibition against the respondents pursuant to Article 668 of the Civil
Code, and that the house was not a public nuisance because it did not endanger the safety of its
immediate surroundings.
ISSUES:
1. Has Alolino acquired an easement of light and view?
2. Is respondent's house a private nuisance?
HELD:
1. NO. Alolino has not acquired an easement of light and view.
In this case, we must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land
itself is public property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be burdened
with voluntary easements. On the other hand, the respondents' house is private property, albeit illegally
constructed on public property. It can be the object of prescription and can be burdened by any voluntary
easements.
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Here, it is indisputable that the respondents have not voluntarily burdened their property with an
easement in favor of Alolino. Neither was an easement of light and view acquired by Alolino by
prescription. An easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time
when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view
of a window located within the dominant estate. In this case, Alolino had not made (and could not have
made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not
have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription.
Thus, only easements created by law can burden the respondents' property. But none of the provisions
of NCC (Articles 667-673) actually create a legal easement of light and view which can only be acquired
through prescription or a by virtue of a voluntary title.
Therefore, Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on.
2. YES. Respondent's property is a private nuisance.
Article 694 of NCC provides that:

A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
x x x (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street x x x
Thus, even if Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or easement of right of way on the
barrio road, this does not mean, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road
and blocking the rear of Alolino's house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the
proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance.
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139. Castro v. Monsod

G.R. No. 183719; February 2, 2011
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Margarita Castro is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela
Homes, Pamplona, Las Pinas City with an area of sq.m. Respondent Napoleon Monsod, on the other
hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village,
Phase 2, Las Pinas City. There is a concrete fence, more or less 2 meters high, dividing Manuela Homes
from Moonwalk Village.
Respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 65 sq.m. of the property of petitioner.
The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely
asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to
prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of 15 feet, more
or less, above the level of petitioners property. Respondent also filed a complaint for malicious mischief
and malicious destruction before the office of the barangay chairman. Petitioner ordered the cancellation
of adverse claim in her title.
Prior to the filing of the case before the RTC, there were deposits of soil and rocks about 2 meters away
from the front door of the house of petitioner. As such, petitioner was not able to park her vehicle at the
dead-end portion of Garnet Street. When petitioner noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her
house to be slippery, she hired construction workers to see where the leak was coming from. The workers
had already started digging when police officers sent by respondent came and stopped the workers from
finishing their job.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent
easement of his property over the property of petitioner, in view of the latter’s manifest determination to
remove the embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties.
b. Whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.
HELD:
a. Yes. Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his
land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by
virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that
he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two
adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil
of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his
neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or
slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was
established that the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and
lot of respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioners
property. The embankment and the riprapped stones have been in existence even before petitioner
became the owner of the property. It was proven that petitioner has been making excavations and
diggings on the subject embankment and, unless restrained, the continued excavation of the
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embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent to collapse,
resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.
b. No. An annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists
whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same
already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise,
every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support
registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.
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140. Alicia B. Reyes v. Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos

G.R. No. 194488; February 11, 2015
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, filed a Complaint for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses
Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.
Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner parcel of land and said property was surrounded by
estates belonging to other persons. She stated that one of these surrounding properties was owned by
respondents, and that the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway is respondents’ property.
The easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents’ other lot.
Respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act. Also
the property chosen by petitioner as easement was the most burdensome for respondents. Likewise,
they pointed to an open space that connected petitioner’s property to another public road.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for easement of right way which was affirmed by tge CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents’ property
HELD:
NO. Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of law for the grant of easement rights.
The following requisites need to be established before a person becomes entitled to demand the
compulsory easement of right of way: an immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to
other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; payment of proper indemnity by the
owner of the surrounded immovable; the isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; and
that the proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
Petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed
easement was the least prejudicial to respondents’ estate. There is an adequate exit to a public highway.
In between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed
by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents’ property to serve petitioner’s needs. Another adequate
exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
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141. Teofilo Alolino v. Fortunato Flores

G.R. No. 198774; April 04, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling
of the RTC and dismissed petitioner Alolino’s complaint against the respondents for the removal of their
illegally constructed structure.
Petitioner, Teofilo Alolino, is the registered owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land in Taguig. He initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. He further added a second floor to the structure,
and even extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. In 1994, Respondent spouses
constructed their house/sari-sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of petitioner’s house. Such construction deprived petitioner of the light and ventilation he
previously enjoyed, and of the ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door he
previously used.
Despite repeated demands, complaints, letters and notices, respondent spouses refuse to remove the
structure they constructed. Eventually, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC, praying for: (1) the
removal of the encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and
(3) the payment of damages. In their answer, the respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of
action against them. They alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in
1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has
himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing
the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate
the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window. The RTC rendered a judgment
in favor of Alolino, but this was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit.
Petitioner insists (1) that he acquired an easement of light and view by virtue of a title because the
respondents constructed their house on a barrio road; (2) that the provision of Sec. 708 of the National
Building Code and Article 670 of the Civil Code prescribing the setbacks is inapplicable because the
property is adjacent to a barrio road; (3) that he has a right of way over the lot occupied by the
respondents because it is a barrio road; and (4) that the respondents' house/sari-sari store is a nuisance
per se. In its comment, the respondent counters (1) that Alolino has not acquired an easement of light
and view or an easement of right of way, by either prescription or title; (2) that Alolino is at fault for
constructing his house up to the edge of his property line without observing the setbacks required in
Article 670 of the Civil Code and Section 702 of the National Building Code; and (3) that their house/sari
sari store is not a nuisance because it is not a serious threat to public safety and the Sanggunian has
already reclassified the lot as residential.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s property, where the spouses built their house/sari-sari store, was validly
reclassified from a municipal/barrio road to a residential lot by the sanggunian
HELD:
No. There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-sari store on government property.
Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property. The barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted
to public use. The court found no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local Government of
Taguig had already withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a residential
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lot. The Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution as required in Section 21
of the Local Government Code. An ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment
or opinion of the legislative body. Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or
regulate the use of these properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with
Section 21 of the LGC.
In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations
prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its
reclassification of the barrio road. As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the
collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or
disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the
subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise
be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened
by any voluntary easements.
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the respondents'
property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not mean, however, that the respondents are entitled
to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking the rear of Alolino's house. Every building is subject
to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance. Under Article 694
of the Civil Code, the respondents' house is evidently a nuisance. A barrio road is designated for the use
of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions
on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and
convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use
constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se. The respondents have no right to maintain
their occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road. The interests of the few do not outweigh
the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general welfare.
PETITION GRANTED
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142. Helen Calimoso, Marilyn P. Calimoso and Liby P. Calimoso v. Axel D. Roullo
G.R. No. 198594; January 25, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
In his Complaint for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly alleged: that he is the owner of
Lot 1462-C-15; that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates, including Lot 1454-B-256 owned
by petitioners Helen, Marilyn, and Liby, all surnamed Calimoso; that he needs a right-of-way in order to
have access to a public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public
road, i.e., Fajardo Subdivision Road, passes through the petitioners’ lot.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial
damage to the 2 houses already standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has other
right-of-way alternatives, such as the existing wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the
respondent’s lot on the northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress or egress to
the Fajardo Subdivision Road.
RTC granted respondent’s complaint. CA affirmed ruling that all the requisites for the establishment of a
legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent’s case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment of a legal easement of right-of-
way on Lot 1454-B-25 owned by the petitioners.
RULING:
No.
To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be met:
"1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest."
The only question before this Court is whether the right-of- way passing through the petitioners’ lot
satisfies the fourth requirement of being established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the
tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would
be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement,
we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
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In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would cause the destruction
of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’ property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest
distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that
an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient
estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way."
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143. Liwayway Andres, et. al. v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.
G.R. No. 201405; August 24, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent Sta. Lucia Realty
and Development, Inc. before the RTC. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more
than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land. A few years back, however, respondent
acquired the lands surrounding the subject property, developed the same into a residential subdivision
known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that
petitioners and Liza were denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa.
They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to have access
to a public road.
In its Answer, respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision owned by
petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their
complaint the existence of the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favour of petitioners. It then ratiocinated that based on Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the subject property through extraordinary
prescription. Having real right over the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-
of-way under Article 649 of the Civil Code.
On appeal, the CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently establish
their asserted ownership and possession of the subject property.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent?
HELD:
No. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded by the owner of
an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is an unregistered public
agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition
thereof through prescription, must first be able to show that the State has - expressly declared through
either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject [property] is
no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject
property based on prescription necessarily crumbles. Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of
right-of-way from respondent for lack of personality.
223
144. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
G.R. No. 160453; November 12, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B. He amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous, and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property
for its flood control program for it was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank. Hence,
title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants because the property was previously
part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and had not resulted from
accretion.
The RTC granted the application for land registration. The Republic, through the Offic e of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed, contending that the CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code
to respondents’ benefit. Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the
waters." The RTC pronounced that respondents are the owners of the subject land. The CA upheld the
RTC’s pronouncement. The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of
Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in its face due to the fact that respondents’ evidence did not
establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
ISSUE:
Whether subject property is an accretion to their adjoining land that would entitle them to register it under
article 457 of the new civil code
HELD:
NO. The respondents could not claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Under the law,
accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water-
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river
is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to
the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. Respondents as the
applicants for land registration has the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence. However, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proof. They did
not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the
river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river
bed of the Parañaque River, thus the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River merely
became an orchard after it dried up.
224
NUISANCE (ARTS. 694-707)
145. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan, Anselma Anila and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna. Hidalgo
has two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound
was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers.
The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Through the wide gate entrance, which was continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons
buying said commodity passed, and anyone could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There
was no guard assigned on the gate.
Mario Balandan, 3, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age, entered the factory
premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having died of 'asphyxia secondary to
drowning.
Spouses Balandan then filed a case for damages for the death of their son Mario.
ISSUE:
Is a swimming pool or water tank an attractive nuisance?
HELD:
No. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
The reason is as follows: “Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in
their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger, children are early instructed so that
they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not
liable because of having created an attractive nuisance.”
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether Hidalgo
had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial.
225
146. Linda Rana v. Teresita Lee Wong, Spouses Shirley Lee Ong and Ruben Ang Ong,
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Wilson Uy, and Spouses Rosario and Wilson Uy
G.R. No. 192861; June 30, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Wong and Sps. Ong are co-owners pro-indiviso of a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision
abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road). On the opposite side of the subject road, across
the Wong-Ong property, are the adjacent lots of Sps. Uy and Sps. Rana. The said lots follow a rolling
terrain with the Rana property standing about two (2) meters higher than and overlooking the Uy property,
while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.
Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs between the Rana and Wong-
Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion with their gate. This affected the ingress
and egress of Wong and Sps. Ong to their lot.
Wong, Spouses Ong and Spouses Uy (Wong et al.) filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with
Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC. Wong, et al. filed a Motion for Leave to be Allowed to Bring
in Heavy Equipment for the intermediate development of the Wong-Ong property with a view to the use
of the subject road as access to their lot. The motion was granted by the RTC. However, Wong, et al.
proceeded to level the subject portion, which, in the process, hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress
to their residence, resulting too to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage.
ISSUE:
Was the levelling of the subject portion done by Wong, et al. legally permissible?
HELD:
NO. The elevated and cemented subject portion is not a nuisance per se which cannot be summarily
abated as Wong et al. did.
By its nature, the elevated and cemented subject portion is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which
was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong
properties. Hence, its summary abatement entitles the Sps. Rana to damages in theory. However, Since
Sps. Rana introduced the nuisance per accidens that transgressed the rights of Wong, et al. to the
unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road, the Court refused to award damages to
Spouses Rana.
226
147. Republic of the Philippines v. Andrea Tan

G.R. No. 199537; February 10, 2016
BRION, J:
FACTS:
Respondent Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080. She alleged that she is the
absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga
on September 17, 1992. The land registration court granted Tan's application and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed arguing that Tan failed to prove that she has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application. The CA observed that under the
Public Land Act, there are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed
the land since June 12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The
respondent's application fell under the second category. The CA noted that before land of the public
domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural
land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on September
1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already acquired
the subject lot by prescription.
ISSUE:
Does a declaration that government-owned land has become alienable and disposable sufficiently
converts it into patrimonial property of the State, making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription?
HELD:
NO. Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does not run against the
State in its sovereign capacity. However, when property of public dominion is no longer intended for
public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. When this
happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership,
albeit still owned by the State. The property is now brought within the commerce of man and becomes
susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan's application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that:
(1) the property was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in
open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over
thirty (30) years. While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is
sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not
suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. Before prescription can even begin to run
against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XII of the Constitution;
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for
public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.
In the instant case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this,
prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial
227
property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent's physical possession
and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never
acquired legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can
never ripen into ownership.
228
148. Natividad C. Cruz and Benjamin Dela Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., Represented by
its President, Priscila Ilao
G.R. No. 188213; January 11, 2016
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Natividad Cruz and Benjamin Dela Cruz are the Punong Barangay and Barangay Tanod,
respectively of one of the Barangays in Pandacan, Manila. One afternoon, Cruz allegedly confronted
persons playing basketball and spoke invectives against them. She also ordered Dela Cruz to destroy
the basketball ring, to which order, Dela Cruz immediately headed, thus rendering the basketball court
unusable.
Respondent Pandacan Hiker’s Club Inc. (PHC), claiming to be the owners of the basketball court,
represented by its Predient, Priscila Ilao, then filed a complaint for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority against the petitioners. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, finding tha the act of destroying the basketball ring was only
motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty as defined in the LGC. It found the act to
be a mere response to the clamor of constituents.
The CA, in turn, reversed the decision of the Ombudsman. It sustained the contentions of Ilao, et al. that
Cruz and Dela Cruz performed an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance but did the
same without following the proper legal procedure, thus making them liable for said acts. It held Cruz to
be without the power to declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se. It declared the subject
basketball ring as not such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary abatement. The court added
that even if the same was to be considered a nuisance per accidens, the only way to establish it as such
is after a hearing conducted for that purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners acted in accordance with their lawful duties, hence, are justified in
destroying the basketball ring
HELD:
NO. Although petitioners claim to have merely performed an abatement of a public nuisance, the same
was done summarily while failing to follow the proper procedure therefor and for which, petitioners must
be held administratively liable.
Unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be:
(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal";
or (b) a private nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" which, in jurisprudence,
is one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons."
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which
case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property,
which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
229
which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance”; it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and
may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
Here, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se
that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the records, it can be held,
at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of
persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se.
A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of
recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing.
But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without
posing any immediate harm or threat that required instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement
performed by petitioners failed to observe the proper procedure for such an action which puts the said
act into legal question.
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings, of a public
nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health
officer is also the official who shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is
the best remedy against a public nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of
the local government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine the
propriety of a summary abatement.
Further, petitioners do not claim to have acted in their private capacities but in their capacities as public
officials, thus, they are held administratively liable for their acts. And even in their capacities as private
individuals who may have abated a public nuisance, petitioners come up short of the legal requirements.
They do not claim to have complied with any of the requisites laid down in Article 704 of the Civil Code.
230
REGISTRY OF PROPERTY (ARTS. 708-711)
149. Teodoro Acap v. Court of Appeals and Edy De Los Reyes

G.R. No. 118114; December 7, 1995
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Cosme Pido acquired ownership over a specific lot through a Deed of Sale between him and Felixberto
Vasquez. When ownership was transferred, Teodoro Acap, tenant of a portion of the said land, continued
to be the registered tenant and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido’s
death, to his widow Laurenciana. Upon Pido’s death, his surviving heirs executed a Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights in favor of Edy de los Reyes. Edy filed a notice of an adverse claim against
the original certificate of title and personally informed Acap that he (Edy) had become the new owner of
the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Edy and Acap entered into an oral
lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. After the
lapse of 4 years, Edy filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap, alleging
that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to comply with their agreement. Acap averred that
he continues to recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the land and that upon Pido’s death, he continued
to pay rentals to his widow. He claimed that he had no knowledge about any transfer or sale of the lot
and that assuming the lot was indeed sold to Edy without his knowledge, R.A. 3844 grants him the right
to redeem the same at a reasonable price.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Edy. On Appeal, the CA brushed aside petitioner’s
argument that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit “D”), the document relied upon
by private respondent to prove his ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order dated
27 August 1990. The order indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido’s heirs and
was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According to respondent court,
however, since the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized,
no further proof of its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was also
convinced that the said document stands as prima facie proof of appellee’s (private respondent’s)
ownership of the land in dispute.
ISSUE:
1. Is a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” a recognized mode of acquiring ownership?
2. May a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” be considered a Deed of Sale?
HELD:
1. NO. a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court.
An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however
justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed
by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only
pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of
acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two
(2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
231
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration
of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the
same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of
and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when
filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the
decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
2. NO. There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights.
The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of
other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of
the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent’s ownership over
the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered
owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better than a
notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court.”
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence
whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent
transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent’s right
or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to
cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent’s name.
232
DONATION
150. Evelyn De Luna, et al. v. Hon. Sofronio F. Abrigo

G.R. No. L-57455; January 18, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square meters of Lot No. 3707 to the Luzonian Colleges,
Inc., (herein referred to as the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Inter vivos
was subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the
donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the
conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of
the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions
which among others required the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the
donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation. As in the original deed of
donation, the "Revival of Donation Intenrivos" also provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of
the donated area in case of violation of the conditions thereof.
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and
Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna,
filed a complaint with the RTC alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied
with by the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of
the donated land to the heirs.
Respondent foundation claimed that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions of the
donation and that the donor has granted the foundation an indefinite extension of time to complete the
construction of the chapel. It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of action and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Will the action prescribe in 4 years as per Article 764 or in 10 years based on Article 1144?
HELD:
Article 1144 will apply.
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden
requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property
within five years from execution of the deed of donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by
the law on donations but by the rules on contracts. On the matter of prescription of actions for the
revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies. The same rules
apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733.
True, Article 764 of the New Civil Code, provides that actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within 4 years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article
733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
233
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred by
prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous
donations. As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the terms and
conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint
which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to
enforce a written contract, counted from April 9, 1976.
234
151. Ruperto Reyes and Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his capacity as Special Administrator v. Hon.
Lorenzo R. Mosqueda, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and Ursula D. Pascual
G.R. No. L-45262; July 23, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar
issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by
his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes - Ruperto
Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes
Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual
Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong.
On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the then Court
of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of
Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by
Reynaldo San Juan.
On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of
Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime
or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are
included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should
be excluded from the inventory.
On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties
donated to Ursula, to wit:
Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15
of the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed
a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D.
Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift
and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20,
1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of title was
missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered
the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao.
She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M.
In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the
Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or
reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila.
235
ISSUE:
Is the Appellate Court correct in finding that the “Donatio Mortis Causa” executed by Emilio Pascual in
favor of his sister, Ursula Pascual, was actually a Donation Inter vivos?
HELD:
YES. It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which
makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44
Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis
causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in
such deed. This Court explained in Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) —
...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and
the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention
of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body,
however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past
services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services
rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable
consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature,
besides being partly motivated by affection.
We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis
causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De
Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a
donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did
the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation?
If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it
is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.'
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION
MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pas cual in favor of
his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services
rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee
was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of
properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms
the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the
execution of the deed of donation.
236
152. Conchita Liguez, v. Court of Appeals, Maria Ngo Vda. De Lopez, et. al.
G.R. No. L-11240; December 18, 1957
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant Conchita Liguez against the widow and heirs
of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares of land, situated in the municipality of
Mati, Province of Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said
land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez. The defense interposed was that the
donation was null and void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering
into marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been adjudicated
to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals found that the deed of donation was prepared by the Justice of the Peace of Mati,
Davao, before whom it was signed and ratified on the date aforesaid. At the time, the appellant Liguez
was a minor, only 16 years of age. Court of Appeals found that when the donation was made, Lopez had
been living with the parents of appellant for barely a month; that the donation was made in view of the
desire of Salvador P. Lopez, a man of mature years, to have sexual relations with appellant Conchita
Liguez; that Lopez had confessed to his love for appellant to the instrumental witnesses, with the remark
that her parents would not allow Lopez to live with her unless he first donated the land in question; that
after the donation, Conchita Liguez and Salvador P. Lopez lived together in the house that was built upon
the latter's orders, until Lopez was by some guerrillas who believed him to be pro-Japanese.
It was also ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and berated Conchita
for living maritally with her husband, sometime during June of 1943; that the widow and children of Lopez
were in possession of the land and made improvements thereon; that the land was assessed in the tax
rolls first in the name of Lopez and later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation was never
recorded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid notwithstanding its
illegal causa and does the plaintiff have a right to recover the land
adjudicated?
HELD:
YES. The situation of the children and forced heirs of Lopez approximates that of the widow. As privies
of their parent, they are barred from invoking the illegality of the donation. But their right to a legitime out
of his estate is not thereby affected, since the legitime is granted them by the law itself, over and above
the wishes of the deceased. Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far
as in officious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 654)
computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that "collationable gifts" under Article
818 should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of
strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902.
So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should
be considered part of the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite date to
determine whether the donation is inofficious or not.
237
With regard to the improvements in the land in question, the same should be governed by the rules of
accession and possession in good faith, it being undisputed that the widow and heirs of Lopez were
unaware of the donation in favor of the appellant when the improvements were made.
In view of the foregoing, the decisions appealed from are reversed and set aside, and the appellant
Conchita Liguez declared entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon proper
liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership with Salvador
P. Lopez or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter. The records are ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs against appellees. So ordered.
238
153. Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-35648; February 27, 1987
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Restituta Tacalinar Guanaco de Pombuena (Resituta) received the questioned lot either as a purported
donation or by way of purchase from her mother. The donation or sale was consummated while Resituta
was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena (Juan). Juan filed for himself and his supposed co-
owner Resituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land. Juan and Restituta was pronounced the
owner of the land (conjugal property).
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto (Tan Queto) and Restituta
(with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years. The lease contract expired which prompted
Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer
The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court; but on appeal in the Court
of First Instance, the entire case was dismissed because Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter
whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses Restituta and Juan in turn
became the owners of a parcel of land previously owned by Tan Queto
Later, Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals finds that the disputed lot is paraphernal and
that Tan Queto is a builder in bad faith.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the subject property is paraphernal property
2. Whether or not Tan Queto is a builder in bad faith
HELD:
1. No. The subject property is not paraphernal but conjugal.
The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. How was ownership transferred, if at all, from her mother to
Restituta? The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed
in a public instrument (Art. 7497 Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a
will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both Juan and Restituta by tradition (delivery) as a consequence
of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause
or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses
thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had
paraphernal funds of her own). The contention that the sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore
void) is bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that there had
indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said
stratagem (like petitioner herein).
2. No. He is not merely a builder in good faith because as owner of the land he is a builder-possessor
(jus possidendi).
239
Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who has been
adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the OWNER-
POSSESSOR of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase
presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder inbad faith, He is a builder-possessor (jus
possidendi) because he is the OWNER himself. Please note that the Chapter on Possession (jus
possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. Please
note further that the difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that
the former is NOT AWARE of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is AWARE
of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the case of Tan
Queto there is no such flaw or defect because it is he himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of
the property.
240
154. Eufemia Pajarillo, et.al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Salud Suterio and Pedro Matias
G.R. No. 72908; August 11, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Perfecta died without issue and left a tract of land. Juana and Felipe, siblings of Perfecta, executed an
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Perfecta in a public instrument. The said document contains a
provision donating the said land to Salud (Juana’s daughter). The only signatories in the first instrument
were Felipe and Juana.
Salud executed a public instrument accepting the said donation. However, these instruments were never
registered nor was title transferred in Salud's name because of the request of Juana that she be allowed
to possess the same and enjoy its fruits, until her death.
Juana allegedly executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio (Salud’s brother). Two
years later Claudio had the land registered in his name. After the death of Claudio and Juan, Salud filed
a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed of sale in favor of Claudio
was fictitious and its registration in his name was null and void.
The CFI upheld the donation to the plaintiff and annulled the deed of sale and the registration of the land
in favor of Claudio. On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto.
Petitioners assailed the donation to Salud as legally inefficacious and defective. They claimed that the
donation is defective in form because the acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," (extrajudicial
partition and the instrument of acceptance) as required by the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is the donation of the subject land to Salud valid?
HELD:
Yes. Under the circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law
might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the
acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during
her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard
the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument dated June
20,1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.
Thus, notwithstanding the defect in the form of the donation of the subject land to Salud, the Court upheld
its validity.
241
155. Eduvigis J. Cruz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-58671; November 22, 1985
PLANA, J.:
FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal and two-door
apartment created thereon to her grandnieces, private respondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all
surnamed De Leon. Cruz thereafter judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor. Cruz then
extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted.
Consequently, Cruz filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation invoking Article 760,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the annulment of the donation may prosper
HELD:
NO. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all
of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four
years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account
the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and
763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the
requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be
adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation
impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the
donor has another piece of land worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to litigation.
Moreover, the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the
effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion
of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.
242
156. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77425; June 19, 1991
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents as donor-plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission
of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners. In their complaint, private
respondents alleged the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a
deed of donation in favor of the defendant covering a parcel of land. The deed of donation allegedly
provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years
from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. On
alleged contravention of the condition, petitioner allegedly transferred, executed a deed of absolute sale
of the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao for a
consideration.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
On appeal, holding that the action has not yet prescribed.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already
prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at
the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former
imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance
with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's
heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 764 of the Civil Code applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property
donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary. The CA relied on the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions. It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even
without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is
absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason why
the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that
donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that
is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision
on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that
the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed
in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the
foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently justified.
243
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention
is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in
order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of
the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose,
is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is
sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act.
244
157. Sps. Romula and Sally Eduarte v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105944; February 9, 1996
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land with an area of 12,199 square
meters. He executed a deed entitled 'Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion Inter-Vivos)' ceding one-half portion
thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Pedro
Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land. Subsequently, Helen S. Doria
donated a portion of 157 square meters of the parcel of land to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church,
Inc. She also sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the remaining
part of the land save the portion of 700 square meters on which her house had been erected. Claiming
that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that she was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro
Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the
spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria, to declare
null and void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte.
Petitioners submit that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because
the acts of ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses committed by the donee against the person
or property of the donor. Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria —
falsification of a public document — is neither a crime against the person nor property of the donor but is
a crime against public interest under the Revised Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
ISSUE:
Should the act of ingratitude which revokes a donation be a crime against the person or the property of
the donor?
HELD:
No. As noted in Tolentino's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code on paragraph (1) of
Article 765 "all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation." Petitioners'
attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is
therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes
against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty
and security under the Revised Penal Code.
245
158. Ricky Q. Quilala v. Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes And Jose Reyes
G.R. No. 132681; December 3, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The document consisted of 2 pages.
The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala
as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public
and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-
hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the
right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness.
Upon the death of Catalina, respondents, as surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of her estate. In 1984, respondents instituted
against petitioner an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found
that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. However, since it appeared
that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement
cannot be registered. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification. The MR was
also denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public render the donation null and
void?
HELD:
No. We disagree with the RTC.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary instruments,
whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public
instruments shall be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by person or
persons executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon,
and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons executing the same
before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the
instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment
is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if
registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page
where the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument shall be signed on the left margin
thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed
with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment.
Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more
parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment." (italics supplied).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was
signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness
on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should
246
sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to
ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is
designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the
parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he
is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered
a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged
before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is
the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed
on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set
forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument. Petition is
granted.
247
159. Maxima Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation,
Enrique D. Hemedes, and R & B Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 107132; October 8, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
The instant controversy involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land, situated in
Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes
and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With
Resolutory Condition whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its
improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of
the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document
conveying the property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage
contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to
the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.
Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kausapin executed a Deed of Conveyance of
Unregistered Real Property by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property except
the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain vested in Justa Kausapin during
her lifetime, or widowhood and which upon her death or remarriage shall also automatically revert to, and
be transferred to Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained in the amount of P6,000.00., R &
B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even
after it became due. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder
and a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff in its favor. Since Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem
the property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. The
annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed
whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory
condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enriques D.
Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium). Dominium
leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the
signing of the contract of lease, constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about
P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia Brewerys constructions upon the subject property, R & B
Insurance sent it a letter informing the former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No.
41985 issued in its favor and of its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder
in bad faith.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Binan, Laguna
for the annulment of TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to
Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Dominium was the absolute
owner of the subject property by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn
obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced by the Kasunduan. The plaintiffs
248
asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D.
Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes, The Court of
Appeals affirmed the assailed decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Which of the two conveyances by Justa Kausapin, the first in favor of Maxima Hemedes and the second
in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, effectively transferred ownership over the subject land?
HELD:
Public respondents finding that the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By Reversion
executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is spurious is not supported by the factual
findings in this case. In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, we must
concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights
over the subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier
transferred to Maxima Hemedes the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition
stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D.
Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having
already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes
to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and
is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate
of title upon which it relied.
Whether or not R&B Insurance is a purchaser in good faith

R & B Insurance alleges that, contrary to public respondents ruling, the presence of an encumbrance on
the certificate of title is not reason for the purchaser or a prospective mortgagee to look beyond the face
of the certificate of title. We sustain petitioner R & B Insurances claim that it is entitled to the protection
of a mortgagee in good faith.
The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes OCT does not
impose upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagors title. Usufruct
gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance.
The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property and may personally
enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title,
but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the
usufruct.
Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The owner
of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even
destroy the same. This right is embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that the owner of property the
usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the propertys form or
substance, or do anything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.
There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law
provides that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and
should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable
to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
249
160. Maria Antonia Siguan v. Rosa Lim, et. al.

G.R. No. 134685; November 19, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On August 25 and 26, 1990, Rosa Lim (LIM) issued two Metrobank checks in the sums of P300,000 and
P241,668, respectively, payable to "cash." Upon presentment by petitioner with the drawee bank, the
checks were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Demands to make good the checks proved
futile. As a consequence, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed by Siguan,
petitioner against LIM. Meanwhile, on July 2, 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying the following parcels
of land and purportedly executed by LIM on August 10, 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and
Neil, was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
Petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the questioned Deed of
Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots covered
by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of
Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors,
including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in antedating the questioned Deed
of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent
conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned Deed of Donation was made in fraud of petitioner and, therefore, rescissible.
HELD:
NO, the Deed of Donation was executed prior to the alleged credit hence, it was not made in fraud of
petitioner.
Article 759 of the New Civil Code, second paragraph, states that the donation is always presumed to be
in fraud of creditors when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts
prior to the donation. For this presumption of fraud to apply, it must be established that the donor did not
leave adequate properties which creditors might have recourse for the collection of their credits existing
before the execution of the donation.
Here, petitioner's alleged credit existed only a year after the deed of donation was executed. She cannot,
therefore, be said to have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. Besides, the evidence
disclosed that as of August 10, 1989, when the deed of donation was executed, LIM had several
properties remaining in her name. It was not sufficiently established that the properties left behind by LIM
were not sufficient to cover her debts existing before the donation was made. Hence, the presumption of
fraud will not come into play.
Therefore, failing to prove that fraud existed in the execution of the Deed of Donation, the same cannot
be subject to rescission.
250
161. Rodolfo Noceda v. Court of Appeals and Aurora Arbizo Directo

G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On June 1, 1981, Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow,
respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of Lot 1121, which was said to
have an area of 66,530 square meters. On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her
share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina.
However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while Directo and Noceda
got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration over Lot
1121, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters.
Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced
the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed
thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the
3 huts and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to
vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession
and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda.
After a survey of Lot 1121 was conducted, Engr. Quejada reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the
extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121 which
is 127,298 square meters. Engr. Quejada subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third
persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot
1121 by the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17,
1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters was the share of
defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion
of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square meters, went to
Maria Arbizo.
Petitioner contends that granting revocation (of the donation) is proper, the right to enforce the same had
already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first
week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more
than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in
Lot 1121.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was ingratitude on the part of Noceda.
2) Whether or not the right to enforce the action for revocation has already prescribed.
HELD:
1) Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by
private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of part which belongs to
private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent
Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does
not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
251
2) No. The action by the donor here to revoke her donation has not yet prescribed.
Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the
donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said
action within the same period.
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present
action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the
occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and
not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to
prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff
Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time
(a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one
(1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was
adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
a mere allegation is not evidence.
Hence, the action has not yet prescribed.
252
162. Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126996; February 15, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate and were childless, leaving 6 parcels
of land. Leoncia was survived by her sisters, Anatalia and Tranquilina. In 1989, the Meneses (heirs of
Anatalia) filed a complaint for annulment, partition, and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez
(son of Tranquilina) for the latters’ refusal to partition the properties of Spouses Aquino. The complaint
alleged that before Leoncia’s death, she told that the documents of donation and partition which she and
her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the
properties to Cesario because Anatalia who is one of her sisters had several children to support; and that
Cesario and his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs 1/2
thereof. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all
the properties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs prayed
for the nullity of the documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine
signatures of Spouses Aquino, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants
in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that during the lifetime of Spouses Aquino, they
had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Cesario and
Camila de Guzman, and Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants’ late parents Cesario and Camila, by virtue
of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants’ late parents Cesario and Camila by virtue of a deed
of conveyance;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose and Anastacia by virtue of a deed of
conveyance (Donation Inter vivos);
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed by third parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving credibility to Santiago Meneses’ testimony; declaring
the Donation Inter vivos, the Deed of Sale, the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Sale to third parties over
the fourth and fifth parcels as null and void insofar as 1/2 of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately
belong to the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Did petitioners acquire absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question?
RULING:
Yes. Santiago failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Spouses Aquino in
favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario and Camila since he failed to adduce any
evidence to support his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity. On the other hand, petitioners
were able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of
the four parcels of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias, (b)
Deed of donation inter vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a P 500 consideration: (d) Deed of
Conveyance with a consideration of P 600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation
propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa.
253
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance
by the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated.
The donation of the first parcel made by Spouses Aquino to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez
who were then 19 and 10 years old, respectively, was accepted through their father Cesario, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed,
and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the
reasons provided in Articles 760, 764, and 765 of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor
of Cesario and Camila over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became
the properties of the Spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be
revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in Article 86 of the
Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that Spouses Aquino did not intend
to give away all their properties since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the grounds
for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance in
favor of Cesario and Camila over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the
deed of sale, the Spouses Aquino ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario and Camila
including the previous deeds of conveyance over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of
sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT in the names of Cesario and Camila.
254
163. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-37453; May 25, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of 2 parcels of agricultural land. The
petitioners are their successors-in-interest. On the other hand, the respondents are the farmers and
tenants of said spouses, who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II.
Marina died intestate in 1969 and appointed as her administratrix Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of
Marina’s estate, Ignacio executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the
property in favor of his grandchildren. However, the donation was not registered. Thus, when PD 27 took
effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings were placed under Operation Land Transfer. The private
respondents were issued the Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents.
Lilia filed an application for retention, requesting that the property be excluded from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. At first, it was denied, but upon reaching the DAR, the land was exempted from
Operation Land Transfer. The DAR Secretary cancelled the certificates issued in favor of the private
respondents, due to the donation that has already been perfected. Subsequently, the CA reversed the
DAR decision.
ISSUE:
Should the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when PD 27 took effect be
excluded from the Operation Land Transfer?
HELD:
NO. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that
"the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated
in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be
inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid
and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation
shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons
are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren,
although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason,
it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual
knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such
deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. As previously
enunciated by this Court, non-registration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties ignorant of a
previous transaction.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot
operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27,
which took effect on October 21, 1972.
255
164. Eloy Imperial v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Cesar Villalon, Jr.,
Teresa Villalon, Antonio Villalon, Augusto Villalon, Roberto Villalon, Ricardo Villalon and
Esther Villalon
G.R. No. 112483; October 8, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Eloy Imperial seeks to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the RTC, which rendered
inofficious the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner.
Leoncio sold a parcel of land to petitioner, his acknowledged natural son Eloy Imperial. However, it was
admitted by both parties that the sale was in fact a donation. Subsequently, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the sale alleging that his son deceived him. They entered into a compromise agreement
that Leoncio will recognize the validity and legality of the sale but Eloy has to sell a portion to Leoncio.
Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise
agreement. After 15 years, Victor died survived only by his natural father, Ricardo.
After 4 years, Ricardo died leaving respondents as his heirs who filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation 24 years from Lencio’s death on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. It was alleged
that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter's physical
weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired
the legitime of Victor, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
ISSUE:
1. May the respondents assail the donation on the ground of inofficiousness?
2. Did the action prescribe?
HELD:
1. No. Article 772 of the Civil Code provides that only those who at the time of the donor's death have a
right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious
donations.
When Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. The respondents cannot
ask the court for the reduction of the inofficious donation.
2. Yes. The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) 4
years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) 4 years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his
relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason resort must
be made to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144, actions upon an obligation created by
law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the 10-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771, to
the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The 10-year period should be reckoned from
the time of death of the donor-decedent.
256
165. Republic v. Leon Silim

G.R. No. 140487; April 2, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1971, Respondent-Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat donated a 5,600 square meter parcel
of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In
the Deed of Donation, they imposed the condition that the said property should be used exclusively and
forever for school purposes only. The donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, this building could not be released
because the government required that the school building be built on a 1 hectare parcel of land. Thus,
District Supervisor Buendia entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged
with a bigger lot owned by Teresita Palma. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were
constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was
dismantled and transferred to the new location.
Leon Silim was surprised when he saw the Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma constructing a house on the
donated land. When he inquired, the Vice-Mayor replied that he is already the owner of the property. He
sought to stop the construction but the Vice Mayor told him to just file a case in court.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, as it found that there was no breach or violation of the condition
imposed in the donation. It ruled that the exchange is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for school
purposes and for the expansion and improvement of the school facilities within the community. The Deed
of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, the instant petition. Respondents also raised for the
first time the issue of lack of acceptance in the Deed of Donation (there was a supposed affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation that was offered but have not been admitted).
ISSUE:
1. Was there a valid acceptance of the donation?
2. Is there a violation of the condition in the donation?
HELD:
1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide for the rules on acceptance of donation. In a previous
case, the Court held that the purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the
donation is duly communicated to the donor. The Court cannot in conscience declare the donation
ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That
would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed.
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot. The actual
knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
257
2. No, there was no violation of the condition in the donation.
The condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much
bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the
bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building
which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
Therefore, the condition was not violated.
258
166. GESTOPA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111904; October 5, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed
three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. Diego
Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering
the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels again in favor of private respondent Mercedes.
This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the
said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax
declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa.
The Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited
deed of donation inter vivos. Private respondent Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against
the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of land. She alleged that she
was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly
and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the
tax declarations to her name. Through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded
the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated January 16,
1973 was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence.
Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death
of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at
all.
ISSUE:
Whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
HELD:
Yes. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The
deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following:
“That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as an
act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation
unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land;
That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land
during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands
without the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime. Xxx
That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for
himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent
livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness
and generosity of the Donor."
259
The Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the
donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In
Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership
had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. The attending
circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor to
transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution of donation
inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed
by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If
they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis
causa.
260
167. Esperanza C. Carinan v. Spouses Gavino Cueto and Carmelita Cueto

G.R. No. 198636; October 8, 2014
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance with damages filed by respondents, Sps. Gavino C. Cueto and
Carmelita J. Cueto against Esperanza C. Carinan.
The respondents alleged Esperanza and her husband were to assume the payment of the applicable
monthly amortizations for the subject land to the GSIS. When the respondent failed to pay the monthly
amortization, she sought the help of respondent, Gavino. They alleged that Esperanz a undertook to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents which she failed to comply. They then paid
from their conjugal savings Esperanza’s total obligation of ₱785,680.37.
Petitioner argued that there was neither a written or verbal agreement for the transfer of the disputed
property to the respondents’ names, nor a promise for the repayment of the amounts that were paid by
the respondents. Esperanza believed that Gavino paid her outstanding balance with the GSIS out of
sheer generosity and pity upon her.. Furthermore, to require her to execute a deed of sale for the
property’s full conveyance would totally disregard the payments that she personally made for the
purchase.
The RTC ordered petitioners to pay respondents the amount that the latter paid to GSIS plus the costs
of improvements introduced to the property which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the money paid by respondents constitutes donation
HELD:
NO. There was no donation because it did not comply to the provision of the law.
Art. 748 provides that the donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral donation
requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated. If the
value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing.1âwphi1Otherwise, the donation shall be void. When the subject of donation is
purchase money, Article 748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its
acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal
requisites prescribed by law.
In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was ac tually a
donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such
agreement since the amount in involved exceeds 5,000.
261
168. Calanasan v. Spouses Dolorito

G.R. No. 171937; November 25, 2013
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Cerila J. Calanasan, took care of her orphan niece, respondent Evelyn C. Dolorita, since
childhood. In 1982, when Evelyn was already married to respondent Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner
donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been mortgaged for Pl5,000.00. The donation was
conditional: Evelyn must redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the
property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation and its terms in the same
deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property, had the title of the land transferred to her name,
and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights over the donated land. On August 15, 2002, the petitioner,
assisted by her sister Teodora J. Calanasan, complained with the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts
of ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be revoked under Art. 765
of the NCC which provides for the revocation of donation by reason of ingratitude.
In their answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of ingratitude. The petitioner died
while the case was pending with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores J. Calanasan, substituted
for her. After the petitioner had rested her case, the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may dissolve the donation
HELD:
No. Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the
value of the burden imposed."
The SC agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the
property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable cons ideration, it
partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of
the NCC finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists,
and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on
donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and
legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed
not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated
not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin
considerations place the case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.
262
169. Rosario Victoria and Elma Pidlaoan v. Normita Jacob Pidlaoan, et. al.
G.R. No. 196470; April 20, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario Victoria (Rosario) and Elma lived together since until Rosario left for Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Elma
bought a parcel of land. When Rosario came home, she caused the construction of a house on the lot
but she left again after the house was built. Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot to a certain Thi
Hong Villanueva in 1989. When the properties were about to be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for
help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan (Eufemia), to redeem the property. On her part, Eufemia
called her daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds.
Elma allegedly sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it to Eufemia
or her daughter. Elma executed a deed of sale entitled "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang
Bayad" transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita. The last provision in the deed of sale provides
that Elma shall eject the person who erected the house and deliver the lot to Normita. The document was
signed by Elma, Normita, and two witnesses but it was not notarized.
When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public advised them to
donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in
Normita's favor and had it notarized. Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over
the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house.
Rosario found out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two after the transaction.
The petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of TCT No. T-70990, and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against Eufemia, Normita, and Herminigilda Pidlaoan
(respondents).
The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned the lot because both of them contributed the money
used to purchase it; second, Elma and Normita entered into an equitable mortgage because they
intended to constitute a mortgage over the lot to secure Elma's loan but they executed a deed of sale
instead; and third, the deed of donation was simulated because Elma executed it upon the notary public's
advice to avoid capital gains tax.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rosario is a co-owner.
2. Whether the transaction between Elma and Normita was a sale, a donation, or an equitable mortgage.
RULING:
1. No.
In the present case, the records of the case show that Elma alone purchased the lot in 1984 from its
previous owners. Accordingly, TCT No. T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus, Normita bought
the lot relying on the face of the TCT that Elma and no other person owned it.
We acknowledge that registration under the Torrens system does not create or vest title. A certificate of
title merely serves as an evidence of ownership in the property. In the present case, however, the
petitioners failed to present proof of Rosario's contributions in purchasing the lot from its previous owners.
The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elma's name alone militate against their claim of co-
ownership. Thus, we find no merit in the petitioners' claim of co-ownership over the lot.
263
Also, mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the
Civil Code provides that co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to
different owners, as in this case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma.
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in good faith, the land
owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder
to pay the price of the land. The law does not force the parties into a co-ownership. A builder is in good
faith if he builds on a land believing himself to be its owner and is unaware of the defect in his title or
mode of acquisition.
2. The deed of donation was simulated and the parties' real intent was to enter into a sale.
We first dwell on the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two types of simulated documents
- absolute and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent to bind
themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true agreement. The
true nature of a contract is determined by the parties' intention, which can be ascertained from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
In the present case, Elma and Normita's contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were
about to have the contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of
donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of donation notarized.
Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the ownership of the subject
matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed
by them was only relatively simulated.
Considering that the deed of donation was relatively simulated, the parties are bound to their real
agreement. The records show that the parties intended to transfer the ownership of the property to
Normita by absolute sale. This intention is reflected in the unnotarized document entitled "Panananto ng
Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad."
An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality or other requisites demanded by
statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt,
and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Two requisites must concur for Articles 1602 and
1604 of the Civil Code to apply: one, the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of
sale; and two, their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
In the present case, the unnotarized contract of sale between Elma and Normita is denominated as
"Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad." Its contents show an unconditional sale of
property between Elma and Normita. The document shows no intention to secure a debt or to grant a
right to repurchase. Thus, there is no evidence that the parties agreed to mortgage the property as
contemplated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the contract is not one of equitable mortgage.
In sum, we rule that based on the records of the case, Elma and Normita entered in a sale contract, not
a donation.
264
170. Heirs of Rafael Gozo v. Philippine Union Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist Church,
et. al.
G.R. No. 195990; August 05, 2015
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their
death, were the original owners of a parcel of land. The respondents claim that they own a portion of the
property based on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation in favor of respondent Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the
subject property by introducing improvements thereon through the construction of a church building, and
later on, an elementary school. On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo
were not the registered owners of the property yet although they were the lawful possessors thereof. It
was only on 5 October 1953 that the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) covering the entire property was
issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to Concepcion Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953.
In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and their six children, namely, Abnera,
Benia, Castillo, Dilbert, Filipinas and Grace caused the extrajudicial partition of the property. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds issued a new certificate of title under the names of the heirs on 13 January 1954.
Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision of the entire property. It was at this point that
respondents brought to the attention of Concepcion that a portion of the property is already owned by
respondent PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of Donation in 1937. However, since the donation was not
annotated in the title, petitioners refused to recognize the donation.
Petitioners filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Recovery of Possession and Ownership
with Damages against PUMCO-SDA. Petitioners claimed that the possession of PUMCO-SDA on the
subject property was merely tolerated by petitioners and therefore could not ripen into ownership.
For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the donation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation of the subject property is null and void
HELD:
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, reveals a significant fact that at the time the Deed of Donation
was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the inalienable
public domain. It was only almost after two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its
right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing an original
certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to
dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land
or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
265
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an unclassified
land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain. As already
well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should
show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable.
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man.
It was only on 5 October 1953 that the ownership of the property was vested by the State to the Spouses
Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of
the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property which took place before
5 October 1953 is null and void from the very start.
266
PRESCRIPTION
171. James v. Eurem Realty Development Corp.

G.R. No. 190650; Oct 14, 2013
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On September 17, 2003, the heirs of Gorgonio James (Gorgonio),herein petitioners filed a case against
Eurem Realty Development Corporation (respondent). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they
are the registered owners and possessors of a property in Dipolog City; the respondent’s title is void ab
initio as its predecessor-in-interest derived his title from another person's void title. They argued that
respondent derived its title from Lopez who in turn derived his title from Primitivo who was Gorgonio's
brother becayse there is an annotation made on 1992 that the TCT in the name of Primitivo was null and
void.
Respondent, in its answer, argued that the complaint is barred by prior judgment (res judicata) and that
prescription has already set in. The respondent argued that since the petitioners filed the complaint in
Civil Case No. 5877 on September 17, 2003, or more than thirty (30) years after its predecessor-in-
interest Lopez bought the property from Primitivo way back in April 25, 1972. Hence, such action was
barred by prescription, which under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code provides for a 30-year period for
the filing of a real action involving an immovable property
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ action is barred by prescription
HELD:
NO. An action to quiet title is a real action over immovables, which prescribes after thirty years. Thus,
even assuming that the petitioners action is subject to extinctive prescription, it was error for the RTC to
reckon the date when prescription began to run solely on the date of the issuance of Lopez s title on
October 11 1972. The petitioners cannot be expected to file the action after the issuance of Lopez' title
since at that time, the appeal in Civil Case No. 1447, the case between their predecessor Gorgonio and
his siblings as against their other sibling Primitivo, was still pending and was only resolved with finality
by the CA only on November 7 1978. The appeal in Civil Case No. 2503 between Lopez and Gorgonio,
meanwhile, was dismissed by the CA with finality only on August 17, 1978. t should also be noted that
what is being· attacked is the respondent s TCT No. T-10713, which was issued on March .2 1992. Thus,
reckoning the prescriptive period from said date, the 30-year period clearly has not yet lapsed since the
complaint was filed only on September 17, 2003.
267

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DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: PROPERTY 4 S ((AY 2017-2018)

3. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.

4. Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.

An immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as

ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

8. Enrique Lopez v. Vicente Orosa and Plaza Theatre, Inc.

9. Julian Yap v. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada

PROPERTY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

15. Levy D. Macasiano v. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno

Art. 339. Property of public ownership is

In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:

17. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

19. Teofilo C. Villarico v. Vivencio Sarmiento, et.al.

Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it.

20. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines

21. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos, III

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN CLASSIFIED AS RESERVATIONS FOR PUBLIC OR QUASI-

23. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority

24. Republic of the Philippines v. Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz

25. Teofilo Alolino v. Fortonato Flores, et. al.

31. Cornelio M. Isaguirre v. Felicitas De Lara

32. Melchor Custodio v. Rosendo F. Corrado

33. Pacencio Abejaron, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alejandro Abejaron v. Felix

Hence, this petition.

1. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry

2. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint

35. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Dante Ando, et al.

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP (ART. 429) AND STATE OF NECESSITY (ART. 432)

38. The People of the Philippines v. Tito Pletcha, Jr.

Hence, Pletcha is justified in acting as he did in this case.

40. Spouses Fuentes v. Roca

USE INJURING RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (ART. 431)

SURFACE RIGHTS (ART. 437)

45. Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc.

46. Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion

Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

Defendant objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted.

ARTICLE 448 APPLICABLE BETWEEN CO-OWNERS AFTER PARTITION

50. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Maria Garcia Timbang, et al.

52. Vicente Bernardo v. Catalino Bataclan

53. Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr., et al. v. Spouses Uy, et al.

Petition is denied. Respondents were declared owners thereof by acquisitive prescription.

**Case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

57. Pedro Angeles v. Estelita B. Pascual et al.

Therefore, the options given by the CA are proper.

60. Department of Education v. Mariano Tuliao

2. No. DepEd cannot be compelled to remove the structure built.

61. Department of Education v. Delfin C. Casibang

65. Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada

ART. 448 and 447 APPLIED BY ANALOGY

69. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo Uy

ALLUVIUM OR ALLUVION (ARTS. 457-458)

ACCRETION ON A SEA BANK FORMS PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN

Therefore, the land is part of public domain.

78. Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion

ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO MOVABLE PROPERTY

80. Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud

The SC affirmed the CA decision.

82. Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Victoria P. Cabral, et. al.

83. Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua

RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER

84. Aurora Del Banco, et. al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court

85. Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal