Arturo M. Tolentino vs.

The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995

Doctrine:
A license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application
to others, such as those selling goods is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups is
unconstitutional.

However, VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes.

Facts:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing the
petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law. Petitioner, Philippine Press Institute, Inc. contended that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any
rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.”

The Court cited in the assailed decision its ruling in American Bible Society v. City of Manila
which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of
general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American
Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate. Further, the Court relied on
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to
the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed
as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the
license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to
suppress their exercise."

Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of a sales tax (VAT) is violative of religious and press freedom.

Held:
No. It was held that the VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To
subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press
pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

In this case, the registration fee imposed in Section 107 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended by Sec. 7 of RA No. 7716, although fixe in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in Sec. 108 of the NIRC.

Wherefore, the motions of reconsideration are denied with finality.

Roel Ebralinag, Emily Ebralinag, represented by their parents Mr. & Mrs. Leonardo Ebralinag, et al,
vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Doctrine:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: 1) freedom to believe and 2) freedom to act on one’s belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

Facts:
Students, who were members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.

Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are “acts of worship” or “religious
devotion” which they “cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God.” They consider the
flag as an image or idol representing the State.

Petitioners, through their parents, filed special civil actions praying that their expulsion from their
schools violates their right to free public education, right to freedom of speech, religion, and worship. They
stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in a behavior
that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention to show their respect for those who
participate in the ceremony.

Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members of Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from
school for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony.

Held:
No. The Court believes that the time has come to re-examine its Gerona ruling* which received
legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987. The Court does not believe that
by exempting the Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting
the patriotic pledge, this religious group will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
“untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and
admiration for national heroes” as held in the Gerona case.

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah’s Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens to receive free education. The Court also cited its
warning in Non vs. Dames II that while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise
of their religion, “this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them”
if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities of other persons.

*NOTE: Gerona vs. Secretary of Education –

The Court in this case upheld the expulsion of the students. It was ruled that the flag is not an
image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines and is utterly devoid of any religious significance. In
requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State is not imposing a religion or religious
belief or a religious test in said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation
applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant, or Jehovah’s Witness.
Section 29 (2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

- Must be read with Article III, Section 5 (on freedom of religion) and Article II, Section 6 (on the
separation of Church and State)

- Purpose is to bolster the principle and to emphasize neutrality of the State in ecclesiastical
matters

- Any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was only incidental
to a legitimate secular objective, would not violate the prohibition [Aglipay v. Ruiz G.R. No.
45459]

- Purchase of a religious image by the barangay council with private funds raised from voluntary
contributions did not violate the Constitution [Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487]

- Does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of
such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public
in general
o Ex: public streets used in a religious procession

- Payment of public funds is prohibited to ecclesiastics only “as such”, which means that they may
be paid from public funds if they serve the government in a non-ecclesiastical capacity.