Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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**Link Blocks............................................................................................................ 27
AT: We Have Other Justifications...............................................................................28
AT: Death Bad/Life Good........................................................................................... 29
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Death K 1NC
Contention One: Thanataphobia
Our society is held in the grip of intense thanatophobia. Our fear of dying
is so prevalent in every aspect of our lives that it is constantly repressed
into the subconscious. Americans are fighting a new war on the western
front, one against death itself.
Steven I. Friedland, Professor of Law at Nova Souteastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Cleveland
State University Journal of Law and Health, 10 J.L. & Health 95, 1995/1996
The demise of the belief in the good death has prompted the adoption of a new form of heroism, one that
involves beating death, not accepting it with dignity. As a result, medicine has become side-tracked. n64 As
society strives for a health care system that works, it is distracted by the need to prolong and
delay dying, which is in part fueled by our obsession with health and our fear of death. This
obsession has two parts: one moral, the other medical. The moral part is the belief that we have an unlimited
obligation to combat death and lethal disease. That is essentially the mission of biomedical research, which,
with enormous public support, conducts unrelenting wars against death. The medical part is the potent
assumption that death is essentially an accident, correctable with enough money, will and scientific ingenuity: if
smallpox could be conquered, then so can heart disease. If typhoid fever was eliminated, someday Alzheimer's
fight against aging shows up in many different ways in our society. From infomercials hawking
return-to-youth products to antibiotics, transplants, chemotherapy, and the rise of cryogenics,
considerable energy and passion is dedicated to avoiding death and its creeping, inexorable grip.
Fighting it at all costs - never giving up - has become a rallying cry of the new heroism,
n67 which, if nothing else, has served to obfuscate and distort the narrative of death. n68
<CONTINUES>A narrative of avoidance characterizes modern American society's view of
death. This narrative has become dominant for several reasons. The promise of extended
longevity through the miracles of medicine, Americans' desire for immortality that is
propelled by continuous scientific discoveries, and the removal of death from the personal
realm have enhanced a fear of death that underlies much, if not all, of life's experiences .
This fear of death, in turn, has spurred its avoidance.
Survival on Planet Earth, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring 19 94
the spectacle of catastrophe and annihilation has been with us
from the beginning, and the seeming insignificance of individual life appears to be confirmed
by every earthquake or typhoon, by every pestilence or epidemic, by every war or
holocaust. Yet, each of us is unwilling to accept a fate that points not only to extinction, but
also to extinction with insignificance. Where do we turn? It is to promises of immortality. And
Humankind is different. Of course,
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from where do we hear such promises? From religion, to be sure, but also from States that have deigned to
and that cry out for "self-determination." How do these States
sustain the promise of immortality? One way is through the legitimization of the killing of
other human beings. And why is such killing the ostensible protection of one's own life? An answer is offered
represent God in his planetary political duties,
46
by Eugene Ionesco as follows: I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to take my life, to prevent
him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief, because I am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed
death. My enemy's death cannot be held against me, it is no longer a source of anguish, if I killed him with the
approval of society: that is the purpose of war. Killing is a way of relieving one's feelings, of warding off one's own
death. 47 There are two separate but interdependent ideas here. The first is the rather pragmatic and mundane
killing someone who would otherwise kill you is a life-supporting action. Why
assume that your intended victim would otherwise be your assassin? Because, of course,
your own government has [*17] clarified precisely who is friend and who is foe. The
second, far more complex idea, is that killing in general confers immunity from mortality.
observation that
This idea, of death as a zero-sum commodity, is captured by Ernest Becker's paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each
organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good." 48 Or, according to Otto
"The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing , the Sacrifice, of the other; through
the death of the other one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed." 49
Rank,
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Link- Obsession
The 1ac is obsessed with preserving life, avoiding death and emphasizing
destruction. This fear of death comes to encompass the entire politics of
the viewer, encompassing all thoughts within a frame of how to avoid their
own, individual, and our, collective, annihilation.
Robert Jay Lifton, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School University
Center, 1979, Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life
All this takes us to an evolving concept of obsessional states that relates them to
intolerance for and therefore preoccupation with "death, decay, destruction, violence,
anything dealing with unaccountable elements of human existence." 35 I would
emphasize in obsessive states the lifelong inner terror of disintegration.
Freud's patient as much as told him so when he remarked to his analyst, in the midst of an
exchange concerning conscious and unconscious aspects of his obsessive ideas: "Such an
occurrence, he continued, was thus only possible where a disintegration of the personality was
already present" (and it was Freud himself who underlined that phrase)." 36 Moreover, this case,
along with other writings of Freud, did much to develop the image-triad of obsession-fecesdeath,
remarked upon by a number of writers. That trinity has much to do, of course, with the tendency
for bowel training to become an arena of parent-child struggle. Keeping in mind the association
of feces and disintegration, we understand both the imagery and the struggle to have to do with
elements of life-power and "falling apart."
Freud dealt more with death imagery in this case than in most of his writings, and seemed to be
on the brink of elevating that imagery to some conceptual significance. But at a key point, he
drew back. In an important two-page sequence toward the end of the theoretical section he
notes the patient's "quite peculiar attitude towards the question of death," mentions his
nickname and its significance, and emphasizes (in passages we have already quoted) the
importance for the patient of the early death of his older sister and longstanding thoughts about
his father's death. 38 He recognizes that other obsessional neurotics behave similarly: "Their
thoughts are unceasingly occupied with other people's length of life and possibility of
death." These others need not have experienced family death at an early age as the
source of that death imagery. Instead, "these neurotics need the help of the possibility
of death chiefly in order that it may act as a solution of conflict they have left
unsolved." For Freud, death imagery must always be secondary--in this case to the
obsessive's inability to come to decisions, "especially in matters of love." Causation is
brought back to instinct: "For we must remember that in every neurosis we come upon
the same suppressed instincts behind the symptoms."
The primary significance of annihilation for obsessional neurosis becomes clear when
we turn to our third principle, that of meaning. Actual death imagery and death
equivalents come together around a troubled relationship with time. Fenichel writes:
"Orientation in time" is a typical reassuring measure. Many a fear of death means a
fear of a state where the usual conceptions of time are invalid. States in which the
orientation in time becomes more difficult--dusk or long evenings in winter or even
long days in summer--are feared by many compulsion neurotics. . . . 39
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ImpactDignity
As long as the Affirmative works within a framework that subscribes to the
fear of death, gross violations of human rights and dignity are inevitable.
The alternative alone is capable of placing an absolute value on human
rights.
Edward Callahan, Director of the Institute for Society, Ethics, and Life Sciences, The
Tyranny of Survival, 1973
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But
abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have
been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported
threat of communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for
ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World
War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention
camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States
(1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts othwerwise
blatantly unconstitutional. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official
legitimations of nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa
imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The
Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name
of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them.
For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a
tyranny of survival. There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing
to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not
ready to suppress. It is easy of course to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and
manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the
need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But
my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival,
when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy
other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is
that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become
an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive single-mindedness that will stop at
nothing.
We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically,
the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all
human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the right to life-then
how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process,
destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival? To put it
more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason
why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be a Pyrrhic victory to end all
Pyrrhic victories.
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Death K 1NC
Subpoint A- Kill to Save
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Death K 1NC
The process of securing life and developing means to destroy in order to save is part of a
broader system of neoliberal violence. The current death drive is not new as the gulag,
holocaust and genocide are all past examples of the lesson the United States federal
government has apparently missed; humanity cant be saved by destroying itself.
Boaventura de Santos, Prof at Univ of Coimbra, April 2003, Collective Suicide?, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63
According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion
that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it . This is a salvific and
sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the
possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to
have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples,
and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused
millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was under
Stalinism, with the Gulag, and under Nazism, with the Holocaust. And now today, this is how
it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the
semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether
what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It
is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the
ultimate perversion of the Western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of
saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion manifested in the belief that
there are no alternatives to the present-day reality, and that the problems and difficulties
confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to ultimate consequences. If
there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market
failures; instead, it is the outcome of market laws not having been fully applied. If there is
terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather,
to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists
and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and
knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it
aims to reproduce infinitely the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end
of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this
logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of
insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and
neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods
involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it
in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the state
and international institutions in their favor. I have described this situation as a
combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this
combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the
war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly
democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism,
predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the
massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the
other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide
becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market
radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a
number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of
the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept
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Death K 1NC
Subpoint B- Materialism
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Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens
the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more
dangerous than a nuclear war that might bring about the complete annihilation of humanity
and the destruction of the earth. This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian
teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose ones soul by losing ones relation to
God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war,
life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an
ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernitys
one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any being at all, the loss of
humanitys openness for being is already occurring. Modernitys background mood is horror
in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness for
everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy
in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernitys slow-motion destruction of nature:
unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear
war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a
state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise.
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Death K 1NC
Subpoint C- Biopolitics
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Death K 1NC
Contention Two: Hope
The repression of mortality is sustained in political reality by a series of
linguistic prohibitions and taboos concerning the subject of death. While
the Affirmative builds the walls of fear ever higher, the negative offers a
different approach:
The duty of those who judge is to relentlessly tear down the taboo
surrounding death at every turn a Negative ballot signifies an important
political stance, and begins the deconstruction of the deathwatch.
Louise Harmon, Professor of Law and Medical Ethics at the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center
at Touro College, 77 Minnesota Law Review 1, November 1992, gender paraphrased
There is also a direct relationship between our attitude toward death and its status as a
taboo subject. A taboo is something forbidden, and taboos come in many different
forms. They may be proscriptions against certain behaviors, n194 or against eating
certain foods, n195 or touching certain sacred or [*108] profane objects or persons.
n196 But taboos can also be what Levi-Strauss called "linguistic prohibitions." n197 In a
given culture, certain words or subjects may be forbidden to be spoken of in public
discourse. Someone with Victorian sensibilities, for example, may consider the
mention of sexual activity or birth to violate a taboo. n198 Geoffrey Gorer has theorized
that there has been a shift in prudery during the last century, with the subject of death
replacing the subject of sex as the forbidden topic on life's agenda. n199 His
explanation for the linguistic prohibition on the subject of death is the same as mine:
People no longer have a system of belief that includes spiritual immortality.
The reasoning goes something like this: If the predominant attitude toward death in a
culture is one of fear, then death becomes the subject of a linguistic prohibition -- a
taboo. n200 There are risks in violating a taboo. Much like a formal legal system, our
informal, traditional codes of conduct often [*110] carry sanctions for the breaking of
unwritten rules. n201 By referring to the subject of death, and in particular to one's
own death, one runs the risk of conjuring up death's appearance. n202 In breaking the
taboo, the speaker endangers himself [themselves] by making himself [them self]
vulnerable to the evil that prompted the taboo. If that risk is of no threat to the
speaker, then the subject can be openly spoken of. In this instance, if the appearance
of death does not rattle our bones, then there is no reason for silence on the subject .
Simply put, the less fear we have about something, the more likely we are to talk about
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it. The converse is true as well: the more fear we have about something, the less likely
we are to talk about it. Once again, this is not a very ambitious claim.
[Continues] If we could shatter the silence that surrounds the subject of death, we might be
able to confront the taboo. Confronting the taboo would make for better deaths, and making
for better deaths would help alleviate the horrors of the late twentieth-century-deathwatch.
It would be an improvement in the human condition; a benefit for us all, and something to
aspire to. But for the people in power, confronting the taboo must be more than just an
aspiration. Those people who orchestrate the deaths of others -- who have jurisdiction over
the human body, [*115] who judge death talk, who design death spaces -- have a duty to
confront the taboo. This duty runs not only to the dying person, but also to those who gather
around him.
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Death K 1NC
We must separate hope from solvency claims and calculability. We are
asking you to seek hope in an uncertain present rather than try to avoid
impending disaster.
Brian Massumi, Associate Professor of Communications at the Universit de Montral, and
Mary Zournazi, Philosopher and Ph.D in Cultural Theory, 2002, Hope: New Philosophies for
Change; New York: Routledge; p. 211-212
Yes - the idea of hope in the present is vital . Otherwise we endlessly look to the future
or toward some utopian dream of a better society or life, which can only leave us
disappointed, and if we see pessimism as the natural flow from this, we can only be
paralysed as you suggest. Yes, because in every situation there are any number of levels
of organisation and tendencies in play, in cooperation with each other or at cross-purposes.
The way all the elements interrelate is so complex that it isn't necessarily comprehensible
in one go. There's always a sort of vagueness surrounding the situation, an uncertainty
about where you might be able to go, and what you might be able to do once you exit
that particular context. This uncertainty can actually be empowering - once you realise
that it gives you a margin of manoeuvrability and you focus on that, rather than on
projecting success or failure. It gives you the feeling that there is always an opening to
experiment, to try and see. This brings a sense of potential to the situation. The present's
`boundary condition', to borrow a phrase from science, is never a closed door. It is an
open threshold - a threshold of potential. You are only ever in the present in passing. If
you look at it that way you dont have to feel boxed in by it, no matter what its horrors,
and no matter what, rationally, you expect will come. You may not reach the end of the
trail but at least there's a next step. The question of which next step to take is a lot less
intimidating than how to reach a far-off goal in a distant future where all our problems will
finally be solved. It's utopian thinking, for me, that's `hopeless'.
`event' may have many meanings - the one I retain emphasises the difference an event makes between the past, which made it
possible but which cannot explain it, and the future which, one way or another, takes it into account. Such a future may, and
often will, include telling the past in such a way that it seems to explain the event. The philosopher Henri Bergson is the one
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practices, and that there needs to be a certain tenderness in understanding diff erent traditions of thought (for instance, in
revisiting thinkers like Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud). / am wondering about that - the capacity to feel and what that
capacity enables, I mean it does enable a kind of hope, I think... For me, feeling and thinking are closely connected, but
their connection refers to experience as something which is not first `my' experience, but which is forced by encounters
which make me think and feel. It may be encounters with things or with people, or with ideas. When I read Whitehead I
do not just examine his ideas; they oblige me to feel and think in a new way. They induce `events'. Whitehead himself
made the distinction between dead ideas and ideas which are alive - at school many ideas we try to transmit are dead.
In the best case, students will learn them and then forget about them. They are devoid of any importance because they do not
You cannot have true thinking without feeling - and what that
means is that true thinking is about transforming yourself. But the very fact that we can
be transformed by what we encounter, or what we participate in, is a matter of hope. It
does not promise anything, but no-one has the right to say `I know how things are, they
are hopeless'. This hope is an unknown quality, right, because you cant predict the
outcome? Yes. I think so. And you cannot tell someone else that he or she should ~ have this experience, to think and feel.
force you to think and feel.
As a teacher I can only celebrate with a student the fact that I `felt' it was happening for him or her, and hope the one for whom what
I produced were dead ideas will encounter other opportunities. Again, the only thing which can be understood, explained and
hope is itself an event, and you must just be grateful as long as you
are able to hope or to think.
amply justified is despair. I think
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Death K 1NC
Embrace the current world, the status quo, for all its faults, to find the joy
in it. DO NOT link this joy of the present to a solution for future based on
our fear of death or all hope is lost.
Brian
Mary
an ethic of joy and the cultivation of joy is an affirmation of life . In the sense of what you
even a small thing can become amplified and can have a global effect which is
life-affi rming . What are your thoughts on this ethical relationship in everyday existence? And in intellectual
practice - which is where we are coming from - what are the affi rmations of joy and hope? Well, I think that joy is not
the same thing as happiness . Just like good for Nietzsche is not the opposite of evil, joy for Spinoza (or `gaiety' in
Nietzsche's vocabulary) is not the opposite of unhappy. It's on a diff erent axis. Joy can be very
disruptive , it can even be very painful. What I think Spinoza and Nietzsche are getting at is joy as
affirmation, an assuming by the body of its potentials, its assuming of a posture that
intensifies its powers of existence . The moment of joy is the co-presence of those potentials, in the context of
seriously,
are saying,
a bodily becoming. That can be an experience that overcomes you. Take Antonin Artaud, for example. His artistic practice was
all about intensifying bodily potential, trying to get outside or underneath the categories of language and affective
containment by those categories, trying to pack vast potentials for movement and meaning in a single gesture, or in words
potential can become unbearable and can actually destroy. Artaud himself was destroyed by it; he ended up mad, and so did
Nietzsche. So it is not just simple opposition between happy and unhappy or pleasant or unpleasant. I do think, though, that
the practice of joy does imply some form of belief. It can't be a total scepticism or nihilism or
cynicism, which are all mechanisms for holding oneself separate and being in a position to judge or
deride. But, on the other hand, it's not a belief in the sense of a set of propositions to adhere to
or a set of principles or moral dictates . There is a phrase of Deleuze's that I like very much, where he says that
what we need is to be able to find a way to `believe in the world' again . It's not at all a
theological statement - or an anti-theological statement, for that matter. It's an ethical statement . What it
is saying is that we have to live our immersion in the world, really experience our belonging to this world,
which is the same thing as our belonging to each other, and live that so intensely together that there is no
room to doubt the reality of it. The idea is that lived intensity is self-affirming. It doesn't need a
god or judge or head of state to tell it that it has value. What it means, I think, is accept the embeddedness, go with it, live it out,
and that's your reality, it's the only reality you have, and
The criticism calls into question the ideology that forms a basis for their
action. Their thought process not only constitutes reality, but is more
important than the action itself.
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differences, in a pure war situation the primary task is simply to sustain the dream of
psychic survival. The case of Joyce, who saw the first explosion at the World Trade Center as she rode down
Fifth Avenue in a bus after her session with me, exemplifies this task. [End Page 57]
Continues
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**Overviews
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2NC Overview
The 1AC represents the status quo as doomed to widespread death absent
plan action. Our Friedland and Beres evidence indicate that the motivation
for their desire to preserve life is a fantasy of immortality sustained by
the repression of deaths inevitability. The need to talk about saving lives
to cover up the silence and passivity of death that lurks beyond their
conscious thought contributes to the repression of death in society.
3 Impacts:
1. Kill to Save- Within both the framework of fiat and discursive
performance, fear of death drives individuals to absolute obedience
to the State they see as capable of protecting them. They demand
continuous destruction of the Other, in an externalization of the
weakness they perceive in themselves and to cover up death,
ensuring destruction of all life on Earth.
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2NR Overview
Well do our impact analysis here-
The conceded Foucault evidence means their case impact cant make any
sense. EVEN IF THEY WIN THEIR ARGUMENTS ABOUT REPRESENTATIONS
BEING GOOD, they cant assign an objective value to human life within
their ethical system based on survivability. That calculation makes humans
an object, a necessary step to genocide and nuclear annihilation, which
turns case.
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**Links
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Link- Hegemony
Hegemony IS the drive towards immortality- the 1acs presentation and
sustenance of a strong, forward deployment and coherent national
security presents a move towards totalism in which fear is conquered,
paving the way for a transcendence of mortality
Robert Jay Lifton, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School University
Center, 1979, Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life
And since the development of nuclear weapons, we may speak of a pervasive sense of
vulnerability to annihilation. This vulnerability was recognized very early by some of those
originally closely associated with making the first atomic bomb. Even as he in effect
rejected scientists' petitions against the dropping of the first atomic bomb without
warning on a populated city, Secretary of War Henry Stimson not only suggested that the
weapon brought about a new relationship of man to the universe but said: "It must be
controlled if possible to make it an assurance of future peace rather than a menace to
civilization." 21
The most constructive approach to that vulnerability would be to acknowledge it and
work universally to overcome it. But the more frequent national response resembles that
of an individual who fends off his imagery of threatened annihilation by means of
more aggressive and more total measures to assert his power , measures which
may in turn enable him to believe his illusion of invulnerability. Thus nations,
perhaps especially bomb-possessors, are likely to move toward totalism in both foreign
and domestic policies. Hans J. Morgenthau, for instance, describes a dangerous American
tendency toward globalism," which he sees as isolationism "turned inside out":
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LinkOpposition to Death
By contrast, the Affirmative defines and defends life in opposition to death death is the
absence of life, it is subtracted from the value of those who remain living this way of
understanding death as the end of consumptive utility underlies the value system of
postmodern capital.
Butterfield Department of English University of Wisconsin 2002, Postmodern Culture
13.1
The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge collectively through symbolic
exchanges with their dead and deities. Their belief in the sign's transparency, its symbolic singularity, can
be seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy's hair is thought to contain his or her spirit. If the
dead are only humans of a different nature, and if the sign is what it stands for, then a
symbolic sacrifice to a dead person is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person. The
obligation to return is placed upon the dead, and they reciprocate by somehow honoring or benefiting the
living. Most Christians believe in and employ this same mechanism when they pray to the resurrected Christ, but
even they do not believe that their symbolic gestures are anything but metaphors. We no longer believe in the one to
one correspondence of signifier and signified, and we know the loved one is not really contained in the lock of hair.
Americans will doubtless commemorate the deaths of those killed on 9/11 as long as our
nation exists, but we know that our gifts to the dead are only symbolic, which for us means
imaginary.
Baudrillard's postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand, aimed to obliterate the difference
in value between the imaginary and the real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the
metaphysical prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this would be done through aesthetic
violence and not real violence, but having erased the difference between the two, there was never any guarantee that
others wouldn't take such theoretical "violence" to its literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the
benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and initiation to their extremes. Literalists and
extremists, fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard's references to
the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9/11 was what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first
order, and they were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the living would somehow honor
and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they
employ the rule of prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths. But
Americans are not "primitives"--we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a
subtraction from life. Capitalism's implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy,
is that to consume is to live. We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if
through accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death that
haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other function than to
encourage consumption.
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LinkPanic
The Affirmative is the society of panic WMD are everywhere and coming
to get us this is the mode of symbolic exchange by which the
government creates a simulatenously passive docile citizenry to facilitate
violence
CAROLLO Assistant Professor of English 2003
Bad Subjects, Issue # 64, September 2003
Panic is our national pastime. In February 2003, Pulitzer Prize-winner Michael Chabon gave a lecture about
how childhood adventuring has been radically curtailed by the lack of "wilderness" to explore. People feel
uncomfortable leaving their children alone to explore their surroundings. Chabon spoke of his daughter learning to
ride a bicycle, followed by his realization that there's no place he feels comfortable having her ride it. In the course
of one generation, the wilderness of childhood has been planned, mapped, and regulated by the fears of adults. Paul
Feig's memoir, Kick Me: Adventures in Adolescence, describes how high school in America is defined by
the possibility of panic attacks lurking around every corner. Much of life centers on making
sure we avoid being attacked. The collective dimensions of panic disorder, an illness generally treated on an
individual basis, is the subject of this essay. Americans are strangely united by their isolation from
one another.
The much-heralded individualist spirit of American society relies on nurturing a fear of other people. Fear of public
spaces where anyone can hang out in turn supports the proliferation of private property and restricted access
locations. Fear of public transportation means more and more privately owned cars on the road. The rhetorical
necessity of slogans such as "United We Stand" are countered by the ongoing national
zeitgeist of "Leave Me and My Family Alone." The implication embodied in "United We Stand"
is that we have some (un-American) Other to be united against. A suggestive correlation between
the isolation of mental illness and political isolationism can be found in the rhetoric of "going it alone." The
individualization of panic disorder corresponds to the media-savvy militarization of American
politics. Panic inspires pre-emptive attacks on whatever violates the sanctity of private life.
As we regulate childhood, so we map out the appropriate parameters of adulthood. Television often plays on the
prevalent anxieties of adolescence, treating its viewers like children in need of constant rules and warnings. Local
Fox News promises the viewer "Stories that Affect You," but the news itself offers such in-depth detritus as exposs
on the dangers of car airbags and "that Duluth prostitution ring we've been keeping you informed about." I'm not
suggesting that danger doesn't exist, but local television news has largely become a venue
that creates a catalogue of fears for citizens everywhere. In addition, local formats adhere to
a national formula for what constitutes newsworthiness, and what should affect local
populations.
We locate panic at the extreme end of the anxiety spectrum, as the awful truth of a phobia,
the end result of what psychiatrist Robert L. DuPont refers to as the "what if?" of horrific
possibility. The possibility of panic, however, covers a much broader band of the spectrum. The
news media may not want panic attacks to actually occur, but they like us to routinely consider the
possibility that something awful might happen if we do not maintain a healthy level of
anxiety and keep watching the news for updates. Witness coverage of the scare of African killer bees
a few years ago, recently featured in Bowling for Columbine. Be alert. Get scared. This anxiety constitutes a sort of
pre-emptive strike, if you will, on the panic state. Awful things often do happen. A smoking gun does not need to be
fired; the suggestion of a gun's potential is enough. The very possibility of weapons of mass
destruction, for example, can inspire a state of panic. The weapons don't need to be there.
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Panic has dominion over the future. The past may inspire panic attacks, but only as the harbinger of what
may perhaps come again. As we get further away from cataclysmic events, their ability to inspire
terror becomes attenuated. This means government, the entertainment industry, or news
media need to regularly create new things to fear. Whether the hand that rocks the cradle is
the government wishing to sell a new military solution to the world's problems, or an entertainment
industry that wants us to believe that "a nation lost its innocence" after Pearl HarborTM, we find ourselves in
the business of selling and consuming panic of one sort or another.
Though post-9/11 panic no longer governs America in the same way it did in late 2001, the government still uses the
Trade Center bombings as a way to gain support for future military initiatives. Hence the pandemic of global
terrorism, a phenomenon that sees 9/11 as a significant event in a never-ending continuum
of potential danger. Just as we ritually lose our innocence, so we must honor our worst fears.
The current government encourages us to believe that no historical precursors exist to
muddy the squeaky-clean innocence of America, but it also must instill in us the sense that
America's illusory innocence could be our undoing. If we don't act now, then our worst fears
may well be realized.
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LinkBukimi
The Affirmative enacts bukimi the performance of an uncanny certainty that one has
been targeted for nuclear destruction this process creates an unassimilable trauma that
ultimately anesthetizes the subject, forcing us to constanty reenact our trauma on others
SAINT-AMOUR Assistant Professor of English Pomona College 2000
Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 59-82
The people of Hiroshima who experienced bukimi had detected the opening up of the
conditional space of catastropheconditional because, despite the signs that informed its citizens'
sense of uncanniness, Hiroshima might finally have been spared rather than razed if conditions had been
different on the day of the drop. 2 In certain respects, the kind of conditional traumatic space that
registered as bukimi was unique to human-made devastation, and particularly to early
nuclear weapons. The careful sparing of atomic bomb target cities from conventional bombing bespoke
American military commanders' confidence in the destructive potential of the bomb and their desire to demonstrate
that destructive power in the theater of relatively undamaged cities. Having noticed the passing-over of
Hiroshima, its citizens strove to read the intention of the enemy in the signs that constituted
that passing-over. Those signs, in a sense, had been returned from one of two futures: one culminating in the nonevent of preservation, the other in the
limit event of catastrophe. When that limit event occurred, its survivors underwent a historically specific,
unique traumatization. But in the period of eerie suspension before the explosion, those who
registered the nuclear uncanny in Hiroshima were also the first to experience a condition
that, in a far more explicit incarnation, would become familiar to everyone living in a
targeted city during the Cold War: the sense that the present survival and flourishing of the
city were simultaneously underwritten and radically threatened by its identity as a nuclear
target. To link the real devastation of Hiroshima to the potential devastation of Cold War [End
Page 60] target cities may seem to do a violence to the specificity of the former, to its status as event
rather than eventuality, and to the real suffering and annihilation of its victims. My claim, however, is not that
the inhabitants of Cold War cities exhibited post-traumatic symptoms akin to those of the
atomic bomb survivors, or hibakusha, but that they became accustomed to a more overt and
permanent variant of the uncanny frisson felt in Hiroshima before the bombing, as a
structuring condition of everyday life. In other words, what I have called the conditional space of catastrophe that gave rise to feelings of
bukimi in Hiroshima became a general characteristic of Cold War urban experience. In her 1965 essay "The Imagination of Disaster," Susan Sontag wrote
suggestively that "Science fiction films are not about science. They are about disaster, which
is one of the oldest subjects of art." In the course of discussing the "aesthetics of
destruction" in Cold War science fiction films, Sontag ventures a traumatic referent for that aesthetics:
"One gets the feeling, particularly in Japanese films but not only there, that a mass trauma exists over
the use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of future nuclear wars. Most of the science
fiction films bear witness to this trauma, and, in a way, attempt to exorcise it" [461-63]. Sontag's
formulation does not adequately distinguish among the intense trauma of hibakusha, the more attenuated national trauma experienced by non-hibakusha Japanese, and
the worldwide response to the looming specter of nuclear war. One
this, Sontag seems to have been among the first to posit what we
might call the hysteron proteron of the nuclear condition: the literally preposterous
phenomenon of traumatic symptomsdenial, dissociation, fragmentation, repression, the
compulsive repetition of extreme violencethat exist not in the wake of a past event, but in
the shadow of a future one. But one might want to stop short of claiming that the bukimi experienced by inhabitants of Hiroshima constituted a
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Our claim is not that we deserve to die but rather that we need to lay
claim to the logic of death and terror so that we can respond to it
Butterfield Department of English University of Wisconsin 2002, Postmodern Culture
13.1
Embedded in Jean Baudrillard's almost incomprehensible prose is the shocking assertion that terrorism is
justifiable, that the threat of globalization, as visualized by Baudrillard, justified the World Trade
Center attack. (Kelly et al. 4) Average Harper's readers may be spared blame for not comprehending Baudrillard's
theoretical prose, but the point of "L'Esprit" is not that 9/11 was justifiable in any moral sense,
but that, as Nietzsche held, true justice must end in its "self-overcoming" (Genealogy 73).
Baudrillard explicitly states that "if we hope to understand anything we will need to get beyond
Good and Evil" ("L'Esprit" 15). In light of his past writings, I suggest that his unspoken stand on the issue of
justice concerning 9/11 would have to be what Nietzsche's would have been: that there is no justice, only
forgiveness, and only the strong can forgive. But Baudrillard does not explicitly state this
claim, which I see as an implicit conclusion to his thought. Instead he plays the provocateur by laying
claim to the terrorists' logic, which was their greatest weapon. If, as Kellner would have it,
Baudrillard wants to seduce us into following his script, we must be sure to understand the script well so
we can decide how to act on it. The fact that 9/11 was arguably the most potent symbolic event since the crucifixion of Christ has inspired
Baudrillard to dress up his old ideas about the symbolic and symbolic exchange. To understand what he means by "symbolic dimension" and "strategic symbolism" in
the quotation from "L'Esprit" above, let us consult the origins and uses of the concept of the symbolic in his earlier work.
Baudrillard's Symbolic and Death
All
three, he claims, uphold the fetishization of the "law of value," a bifurcating, metaphysical
projection of the mind which allows us to measure the worth of things. The law of value
effectively produces "reality" in each system as both its effect and its alibi. For Marx this reality, this
metaphysical claim, was found in the concept of use value, for Freud it was the unconscious, and for Saussure it was
the signified (and ultimately the referent). According to Baudrillard, any critical theory in the name of
such projected "real" values ultimately reinforces the fetishized relations it criticizes. He
therefore relocates the law of value within his own Nietzsche-styled history of the "image"--a
term used as a stand-in for all that the words representation, reproduction, and simulation have
in common. In "How the 'True' World Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error," Nietzsche outlines in six concise steps the decline of western
Baudrillard's theory of the symbolic serves as a response to what he saw as the metaphysical underpinnings of the Marxist, Freudian and structuralist traditions.
metaphysics and its belief in a "True world" of essences, beyond the Imaginary world of appearances (Portable 485). Baudrillard's four-part history of the image
(commonly referred to as his four orders of simulation) closely mirrors Nietzsche's history of the "'True' World":
it [the image] is the reflection of a profound reality;
it masks and denatures a profound reality;
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Marx, Freud and Saussure were stuck in the second order, where the critique of appearances
was thought to yield a glimpse of a deeper reality. We have since turned from the critique of
appearances to the critique of meaning and of reality itself (the third order), and from here can only enter into the
fourth order, the hyperreal. This is because we live in profoundly mediated environments, wherein
coded images are produced and exchanged far more than material goods, and the more these codes are
exchanged throughout the culture, the more erratically their values fluctuate, until at last they can no longer be
traced to their origins. Hyperreality thus describes the extreme limit of fetishization, wherein representation eclipses reality. Here the spectacle continues to fascinate, but indifference is the attitude du jour (indifference having long been
associated with the postmodern). But Baudrillard's history, it seems, has one more step to take before it completes its circle. Baudrillard imagines that from within the
fourth order, where all metaphysical distinctions of value have disappeared, there will emerge a type of postmodern primitivism (I propose to call it), which he
outlines in his conceptions of the symbolic and symbolic exchange.
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ImpactNumbing
As the desire to represent death increases, so does awareness, right? Not
really- constant representations of death becomes piecemeal building
blocks in a larger construction of internal and external psychic numbing to
death
Robert Jay Lifton, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School University
Center, 1979, Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life
From this unitary perspective there are a number of ways of symbolizing death.
The first and most fundamental is the perception of death as the end of life, as a form of
organic and psychological destiny, part of the "natural history" of each of us. However
that basic perception is resisted, denied, distanced by means of psychic numbing, it
continues to underlie whatever additional constructs or gaps we call forth in our
symbolizing activity.
A second perception of death is mimetic, that of life imitating death: the idea of "death in
life," or loss of vitality, or being frozen in some form of death terror as mentioned earlier.
The reversal is perceived as "unnatural"--life becomes deathlike precisely because of the
numbed negation of death, and only the dead possess "vitality." But this seemingly
unnatural reversal is, in fact, a continuous (and therefore "natural") potential of the
organism, both necessary and highly dangerous.
A third meaning of death, that of challenge and even muse, equates (with Bll) the
artist's relationship to death with the priest's to his breviary. That symbolization depends
upon a heightened awareness of the natural function of death as a counterpoint to life,
and as an ever-present limitation that gives shape to existence and grounding to wisdom.
Death is rendered formative by its very naturalness. In real psychological ways one must
"know death" in order to live with free imagination.
A fourth meaning is that of death as inseparable from disaster, holocaust, absurdity.
One's individual death cannot be separated from the sense that (as Hiroshima survivors
put it) "the whole world is dying." This perception is truly unnatural. It is partly a product
of our holocaust-dominated age, discussed later in connection with imagery of extinction
that haunts contemporary man. It is also connected with early exposure to specific forms
of the kind of imagery (school children subjected to drills as preparation for nuclear war)
that brings about the equation of death and holocaust. But even in the absence of
holocaust, people can equate the end of the self with the end of everything. Where this
latter tendency is present, one's own death is anticipated, irrespective of age and
circumstances, as premature, absurd, unacceptable. Much of this book will concern this
relationship between holocaust and individual-psychological struggles.
All four meanings, and others as well, are probably present in much of our death imagery.
The relative importance of each of these meanings varies greatly, of course, especially
around the issue of death as natural or unnatural. But death, for the human imagination,
never ceases to be a many-sided, seemingly contradictory yet ultimately unitary
psychological form.
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ImpactConsumerism
The quest for immortality and the conquest of death is
inescapable from the drive towards material acquisition. While
the suffering and dying sit on the periphery of cultural integrity,
the white noise offered up by the affirmatives advs serve to
overcome the emptiness associated with mortality.
David Wendell Moller, Professor of sociology at School of Liberal Arts, 2000 Fear and
Denial of Death, ww.baywood.com
According to Becker, greed, power, and wealth have become the modern response to
vulnerability and insecurity inherent in the human condition. They provide for a base of
honor in our materialistic society, and generate an illusion of omnipotence and
immorality. Becker takes this argument to its logical extreme, and asserts that the dread
of death and emptiness of life in the twentieth century have been responsible for
cultivating unprecedented evil through the pursuit of greed, power, and the associated
development of destructive capabilities.
Thus, for Becker, the stupidity and inhumanity of humanity lies in the nature of our social
arrangements. In the modern context, new patterns of death denial have emerged and
have become dangerous and dehumanizing. Up to a point, traditional cultures creatively
designed rituals to "deny" death, and these rituals enriched the life of the community. In
the absence of meaning systems and rituals, modern society has exploded onto a
dangerous and irrational course; shallowness and emptiness have created a crisis of
legitimacy.
In this regard, the argument of Becker is remarkably similar to Moore and others who
have made the case that one of the great afflictions of modern life is spiritual emptiness
and soullessness. Narcissism, self-seeking materialism, and heroic use of science and
technology have become prominent forces that shape daily life. In this environment of
self-glorification, material gratification, and extraordinary technological achievement,
suffering, dying, and death are pushed to the periphery of cultural experience.
Individuals are seduced into believing the illusion that, in this cultural context of denial,
the facts of death and suffering are inconsequential to their daily, personal lives.
Materialism is a prominent value in American life. Becker makes the argument that the
evolution of capitalism as an economic and social system is a modern form of death
denial. That is to say, in capitalism it is through the thrill of acquisition and the pursuit
of wealth that human frailty is overcome. Power accrues as wealth and possessions
amass, and wealth endows immortality as it is passed on to one's heirs. Narcissism,
another prominent fact of American cultural life, is also related to the denial of death. In
an age of individualism, we become hopelessly absorbed with ourselves. Although we
know that death is an unavoidable reality, narcissism facilitates the self-delusion that
practically everyone else is expendable, except ourselves. In this era of individualism, the
death of oneself becomes increasingly inconceivable. When one matters more than
anything or anyone else, self-absorption does not allow for the possibility that one will no
longer exist. In this way, the deeper we plunge into narcissistic, self-admiration and
idolization, the more we become oblivious to our inevitable fate. As a culture, the more
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oblivious we become, the more unable we are to face up to the facts of death in our daily
activities. Death is accordingly hidden and denied.
Thus, the social organization of modern life precipitates widespread oblivion and denial:
Modern man is drinking and drugging himself out of awareness, or he spends his time
shopping (or admiring and entertaining himself), which is the same thing. As awareness
(of our common human condition) calls for types of heroic dedication that his culture no
longer provides for him, society continues to help him forget [E. Becker/ Escape From Evil,
The Free Press, New York, 1975, pp. 81-82].
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ImpactExtermination
The devaluation and rejection of the dead and death are merely the flipside of the fear of
our OWN deaths in devaluing the dead, we are devaluing ourselves. We become
fascinated with death and because our society cannot integrate the rupture and violence of
death by accepting the link between life and death, we must endlessly simulate death. This
is the role played by images of death they feed our covert need to give and receive death.
Butterfield Department of English University of Wisconsin 2002, Postmodern Culture
13.1
When it comes to actually dealing with death and the dead, even in public, we do so
in private. As Baudrillard points out, "This entails a considerable difference in enjoyment: we trade with our dead in a kind
of melancholy, while the primitives live with their dead under the auspices of the ritual and the feast" (134-35). Because
we devalue death and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of
unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately, however, it is
not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative doubles, that we insult by
denying their value. When we posit death as the negation of life, we bifurcate our
identities and begin a process of mourning over our own eventual deaths , a process
which lasts our whole lives. The more we devalue our death-imagoes, that is, the
greater they become, until they haunt our every moment, as in Don DeLillo's darkest comedy,
White Noise. This leads us, according to Baudrillard, to an obsession with death that can be felt in
the media fascination with catastrophes like 9/1 1. Death "becomes the object of a
perverse desire. Desire invests the very separation of life and death " (147). Political
economy's inability to absorb the rupturing energy of death is thus compensated by
the symbolic yield of the media catastrophe. In these events we experience an
artificial death which fascinates us, bored as we are by the routine order of the
system and the "natural" death it prescribes for us . Natural death represents an unnegotiable negation
of life and the tedious certainty of an unwanted end. It therefore inspires insurrection, until "reason itself is pursued by the hope
of a universal revolt against its own norms and privileges" (162). The terrorist spectacle is an example of such a revolt, in which
death gains symbolic distinction and becomes more than simply "natural." We
Violent, artificial death is a symbolic event witnessed collectively . "Technical, non natural and
therefore willed (ultimately by the victim him- or herself), death becomes interesting once again since willed death has a
meaning" (165). Was 9/11 willed by the victims? Obviously not, and yet, Baudrillard would
suggest, in our identification with both the killers and those who died, we ourselves
are not so innocent.
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Second, the threat of extinction does not exist as such but rather is a
distortion of the methods one represents with- it instills notions of
powerlessness and outrage at the Bomb itself, rather then the
bureaucratic apparatus responsible for its production
Marilyn S. Jacobs and M. Brewster Smith, 1989, American Psychology in the Quest for
Nuclear Peace, questia
Segal
with nuclear weapons on the minds of young people (e.g., Beardslee and Mack, 1982; Escalona, 1982; Schwebel, 1982; Boone,
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toward the relationship between the imminence of nuclear death and a "live for now"
attitude among children and adolescents. However, it is not entirely clear exactly what the nuclear threat actually
means to children and adolescents; there have not been enough reliable data to make definitive conclusions ( Mack and Snow,
1986).
Third, the problem with nuclear imagery is not so much death but the
meaningless rendered by a weapon without personality and a death
without valor
Robert Jay Lifton, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School University
Center, and Eric Olsen, Prof of Politics and Sociology, 1974, Living and Dying, questia
The ultimate threat posed by nuclear weapons is not only death but meaninglessness:
an unknown death by an unimaginable weapon. War with such weapons is no longer heroic;
death from such weapons is without valor. Meaninglessness has become almost a stereotyped characterization of
twentieth-century life, a central theme in modern art, theater, and politics. The roots of this meaninglessness are many. But
crucial, we believe, is the anxiety deriving from the sense that all forms of human associations
are perhaps pointless because subject to sudden irrational ends . Cultural life thus becomes still more
formless. No one form, no single meaning or style, appears to have any ultimate claim. The psychological
implications of this formlessness are not fully clear; while there seem to be more life choices available, fewer are inwardly
compelling.
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A) The problem with war and death is not so much the actions
themselves but the ideologies behind them. Through extending the
fear of death to grander and larger schemes ie. New advantages,
cases, etc., the affirmative seeks to replicate the logic of the Herd
mentality in which crises are viewed solely in terms of populations
rather then individuality, crushing the possibility for death to be
viewed in its mortality.
B) This proves our argument that they are the constant mobilization
for war. The idea that we should threaten death is the underside of
the attempt to ensure continued survival. Foucault and Santos say
this thinking produces a kill to save mentality which destroys all
humanity in the illusion of saving it.
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AT: Ketels
1. Not responsive- this evidence isnt offense against our criticism. The
kritik does not preclude plan action- were criticizing certain justifications
for action presented in the 1AC do NOT let the affirmative paint our kritik
as a generic statism or capitalism argument. Under the framework of the
alternative, the plan could still be advocated or passed, as long as the
justification didnt utilize the survivalist framework we critique.
2. Also KETTELS IS DUMB and possibly a nazi. I dare you to find me ONE
warrant in that article for any of the ridiculous claims she makes. Our
alternative is in no way the French philosophical nihilism that she
criticizes. We dont preclude action.
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2. The aff criminalizes the symptoms while they spread the disease- the fear of nuclear war
is what CAUSES nuclear war. Even if we prevent a nuclear war now, that constant fear will
only replicate when the next threat arises, and the next after that. Our alternative is the
only option for any long term solvency and to give life meaning.
plunged into a dimension in which the only meaning they acquire is that wrested from
time by a final revolution. That is the real bomb, the bomb that immobilizes things in
eerie retrogression.
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2. This argument assumes fear of death in terms of the fear of death from
nuclear war, not our fear of death rooted in our subconscious. Functionally
this argument is that we should stop nuclear war so we arent afraid of
dying from nuclear war. Dont let them spin this as stopping nuclear war
solves the entirety of our fear of death. Fear of death cant stop fear of
death, which makes no sense.
3. They cant solve this argument. The affirmative can never completely
eliminate the possibility of war. Theres only a chance our alternative can
solve.
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To demonstrate the impossibility of war just at the moment when it must take place, when the signs of its occurrence
are accumulating, is a stupid gamble. But it would have been even more stupid not to seize the opportunity.
(Baudrillard, The Gulf War 28)
In pursuing such a "fatal strategy," Baudrillard plays upon his own belief that writing should
be less a representation of reality than its transfiguration (Patton 6). He has subsequently suggested
that in time and with a little imagination, it may be possible to read The Gulf War Did Not Take Place as if it were a
science fiction novel (qtd. in Gane 203).
James Der Derian, by contrast, argues that such an approach may be more effective than that
presented by the modernist school of criticism. Der Derian states that theorists who attempted to
construct a critical and universal counter-memory were easily isolated as anti-American and
dismissed as utopian (177). Adopting a poststructuralist approach to such political encounters
may well bring with it the danger that no new pragmatic basis for justice and truth will
emerge. Nevertheless, he argues,
...better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by
cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (178)
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between people that is mediated by images" (12). Debord isn't so much taking on the prevalence of the
image itself as he is the particular form of mediation images constitute. For Debord, the spectacle is akin to
Adorno's concept of the culture industry or Jameson's culturalized horizon. The images (TV, film,
advertisements, etc.) are one-way identic communications that provide no possibility for a
dialectical engagement or response. Each individual subject is silenced, forced to absorb the
instrumental meanings of this totalizing system. As Debord puts this, "by means of the
spectacle, the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of
self-praise" (19). <26> If Debord had not so clearly formulated these concepts during the creation of Memoires,
they nonetheless animate the book, which is composed of fragments of the spectacle itself. As early as the Letterist
International, Debord was negatively gesturing at the spectacle in the concept of
dtournement. The critique that animates this concept is one of cooption. To produce new
works of art within the traditional categories means playing by the rules, being subsumed
under those spectacular discourses. On the other hand, to conduct terrorist raids on the particulars
of those discourses and liberate the particulars of those works holds the potential of creating
revolutionary sense and desire. The images that perfected separation and political
impotence could now assume nonidentic meanings, meanings that allowed one to both
construct a critique and imagine a reinvented world.
<27> To take Debord's project in terms of Adorno, Memoires is the creation of an autonomous artwork. The use of dtournement shifts the emphasis to the nonidentic possibilities of the given collage elements. As a history it must, as
Adorno would approve, fail, since the collaged particulars are always outstripping their function, never content to carry on a single, intelligible meaning. And yet, in Adorno's sense, it is also a unique example of enigmatic political
commitment within the horizon of postmodernism, for Memoires is a profoundly political work, though not in any readily instrumentalizable register. Though I don't have the space to execute a cover to cover reading of Memoires, I
would like to look closely at both its first and final pages. These pages are far more spar than many of the collages in the book, but they both highlight the tense relationships of form that animate the entire work.
<28> The first line of Memoires (reading right to left, top to bottom, a convention the book doesn't impose) is a fragment of two sentences: "A memory of you? Yes, I want." Though the reader knows, from the title page, that this
sentence has been ripped out of its original context, there is no indication of its original source. Thus it is not identical with any subject. Instead, this fragment invokes the concepts of memory and desire without specific objects. One
of Jorn's lines carries the eyes from this fragment to another, in the middle of the page, which reads "it is a subject profoundly soaked in alcohol." Jorn's line spreads out into a blob just above this fragment, creating a block that puts
the emphasis on this second fragment. Whatever the subject or object of this memory or desire, it is to be taken in terms intoxication, both literally and metaphorically.
Continues
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<32> In Adorno's sense, Memoires is political to the extent that it breaks up the monolithic
discourse of the spectacle and its powers of identic thought. However, this is not politics in
the activist sense we have come to value through our fear of anything that might be labeled,
however speciously, quietist. As Adorno explains in his essay "Commitment,"
it is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives, but to resist by its form alone the course of
the world, which permanently puts a pistol to men's heads. In fact, as soon as committed works
of art do instigate decisions at their own level, the decisions themselves become
interchangeable . . . the work of art becomes an appeal to subjects, because it is itself nothing other than a
deceleration by a subject of his own choice or failure to choose (304).
Like Adorno's committed work of art, Memoires resists an easy translation into a practical choice. Rather, its
form gestures at an alternative engagement with the materials of the spectacle. In this it
does rupture the discourse of the spectacle, but it does so by creating the sense of a future
that has not been realized, that, as Marcus points out, forces one to think from the perspective of
a Situationist world that does not exist. In short, this is a project that exists only as theory.
How, exactly, would one translate this sense into an activist practice? Neither Memoires nor later
Situationist writings or practices answer this question. However, this fact should not tempt us to label
this a quietist work. To push Adorno's metaphor, the space created by a book like Memoires
allows us to take the gun from our heads, if only for a moment. Yet, within that moment,
there is the chance to imagine a world otherwise, and that possibility surely plays a role in
developing the desire necessary to someday realize such a world, or, at the least, it creates
a critical difference which questions the one-dimensional sense that coordinates our
spectacular lives. The relative neglect of Memoires underscores the difficulty cultural critics
have when the concepts of a work cannot be readily aligned with a political project. If critics
invoke the Debord of 1968 as an example of heroic activism, they all but suppress the
moment of Memoires where theory is the only expression possible.
<33> The final page of Memoires is composed of one fragment and a simple series of Jorn's painted lines. The
fragment reads "I wanted to speak the beautiful language of my century." This fragment, rife with irony, marks an
alterian desire. The beautiful language of traditional art, the endless discourse of the spectacle, all that is certainly
invoked in this statement. But, more than that, to make it beautiful in Debord's sense requires
that this statement shudder at the spectacle. Underneath this fragment, in red, the color associated with
the most intense collages of the text, the curving lines invoke motions culminating in an amorphous shape, perhaps
the desires of the text itself centrifugally creating a kind of critical mass. If Memoires is more than a history,
it is less than a political program, and this is precisely its success. What is a practical
political program, even an oppositional program, but an intelligible choice already available
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to the extent that it is articulate? Memoires lives on because it is inarticulate, its power and
potential indexed by the silence of the critics.
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___________
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**Alternative
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The time has come to embrace our own mortality and break down the
drive for immortality- this itself changes the prospect of war
Louis Rene Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue, Self-Determination,
International Law and Survival on Planet Earth, Arizona Journal of International and
Comparative Law, Spring 1994
It is time, in the Spanish philosopher Unamuno's words, "to consider our mortal destiny
without flinching." 50 This, lamentably, is easier said than done because the human instinct
that clings to life flees from death as the very prototype of evil, and because each singular
individual is able to counter the observed fact of mortality with entire categories of
exceptions. Such solipsistic boasts have been identified by George Santayana as follows:
Continues
[*18] How, then, do we end these terrible wars? Most important, we must first understand
them as manifestations of humankind's unwillingness to accept personal death. Death
defines world politics because individuals wish to escape death. The ironies are staggering,
but the connections persist and remain unexamined.
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The notion of a proleptic traumatic symptom, of a repressed that returns from the future,
would appear to make nonsense, too, of the temporal and causal assumptions [End Page 61]
basic to current understandings of historical trauma. Working largely from the Freudian lexicon of repression, repetition, remembering,
and working through, the field of trauma studies has oriented itself around memory work that restores a conventional temporal sequence and hierarchy by seeking to reduce the domination of the
it, is "registered rather than experienced. It seems to have bypassed perception and consciousness, and falls directly into the psyche," where its "exceptional presence"
is bound up with the fact that it has not been fully or conventionally experienced [537]. As a result, the impact of the traumatic event is felt belatedly, after a period of
latency, through symptoms that often include the return of repressed memories and the compulsive repetition of behavior, gestures, dreams, and fantasies associated
with the traumatic event. As Cathy Caruth and others have noted, traumatic dreams and flashbacks that replay the repressed event or image differ from other dreams
and fantasies in their literalness, their seeming exemption from the distortive, encryptive operations of the dreamwork. In part because of its literal and insistent return,
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which will be realized in the Symbolic, or, more precisely, something which, thanks to the symbolic progress which takes place in the analysis, will have been" [Lacan
158, qtd. in Zizek 55].The orientation of analysis, then, is not fundamentally toward the recuperation of a past traumatic event but rather toward a future in which the
islanded traumatic symptom will have been encompassed within a retrospective sense. If working through has a tense, in other words, it is the future anterior, the "will
have been" that proleptically crystallizes a view of the past as seen from the vantage of the future. Zizek continues:
The Lacanian answer to the question: From where does the repressed return? is therefore,
paradoxically: From the future. Symptoms are meaningless traces, their meaning is not
discovered, excavated from the hidden depth of the past, but constructed retroactively the
analysis produces the truth; that is, the signifying frame which gives the symptoms their symbolic place and
meaning [...] the symptom as a "return of the repressed" is precisely such an effect which precedes its cause (its
hidden kernel, its meaning), and in working through the symptom we are precisely "bringing about
the past"we are producing the symbolic reality of the past, long-forgotten traumatic
events. [55-57]
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________________
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**Alternative Blocks
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2. The kritik does not preclude plan action were criticizing certain
justifications for action presented in the 1AC do NOT let the affirmative
paint our kritik as a generic statism or capitalism argument. Under the
framework of the alternative, the plan could still be advocated or passed,
as long as the justification didnt utilize the survivalist framework we
critique.
3. Massumi and Zournazi say that only by separating hope from our fear of
death and calculability of life can we empower ourselves. Uncertainty
about the future allows us to embrace maneuverability of our future and
bring a sense of potential to the situation. Looking at the world as door
that can close only boxes us in a world of horror and disempowerment.
They have conceded that our alternative embraces a different type of
politics, a politics of hope, rather than reject it.
4. Santos says the belief that there is no alternative forms the basis for
genocidal fascism. Cycles of violence and exploitation are perpetuated in
the name of their inevitability the ultimate conclusion to the
affirmatives logic is the suicidal destruction of the world.
probabilization buckle into prediction. A power word for prediction is deterrence. Deterrence
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is the perpetual co-functioning of the past and future of power: the empty present of
watching and weighing with an eye to avert. It is the avoidance of the accident on the basis
of its past occurrence. It is power turned toward the event: in other words, as it approaches
the subject-form, the virtual. Power under late capitalism is a two-sided coin. One side of it
faces the subject-form. On that side, it is deterrence. Deterrence by nature determines
nothing (but potential: the potential for the multiform disaster of human existence). On the
other side, power is determining. There, discipline, biopower, and testing give disaster a
face. They bring specificity to the general condition of possibility of deterrence by applying it
to a particular found body. They give a life-form content. A self is selected (produced and
consumed). The in-between of the subject-form and the self, of the generic identity and
specific identity--the come and go between deterrence and discipline/biopower/testing,
between the virtual and the actual--is the same intensive and extensive terrain saturated by
the capitalist relation. Power is coincident with capital as social selection and probabilistic
control (Deleuze 1990). Power is capitalization expressed as a destiny. But in this
postequilibrium world of deterrence in which the accident is always about to happen and
already has, disorder is the motor of control. And destiny in the final analysis is only the
necessity of chance: the inevitability of the event, the evanescence of consumptive
production, a life spent, death.
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same lack that utopian fantasy attempts to mask, it would be self-defeating, if not absurd, to engage
itself in utopian or quasi-utopian fantasy construction. Is it really possible and consistent to point to the lack in the Other and, at
the same time, to attempt to fill it in a quasi-utopian move? Such a question can also be posed in ethical or even strategic terms. It could be argued of
course that Homers vision of psychoanalytic politics does not foreclose the recognition of the impossibility of the social but that in his schema this
recognition and the promise to eliminate it (as part of a quasi-utopian regulative principle) go side by side, that in fact this political promise is legitimized
by the conclusions of psychoanalytic political theory. But this coexistence is nothing new. This recognition of the impossibility of society, of an
articulating Lacanian theory with fantasmatic politics is equivalent to affirming the irrelevance of lacanian theory for radical politics
since this articulation presupposes the repression of all the political insights implicit in Lacans reading and highlighted in this book. The alleged
irrelevance of Lacan for radical politics is also the argument put forward by Collier in a recent article in Radical Philosophy. Colliers argument is that since It is capitalism that shatters
our wholeness and disempowers us (as if without capitalism we would be on the road to utopia; obviously, capitalism occupies the structural position of the antichrist in this sort of leftist
preaching), then Lacans theory is, in fact, normalizing capitalist damage, precisely because alienation is so deep for Lacan that nothing can be done to eliminate it (Lacan is deeply
pessimistic, rejecting cure or happiness as possible goals, my emphasis). Thus Lacan has nothing to offer radical politics. Something not entirely surprising since, according to Collier,
psychological theory in general has no political implications whatsoever. The conclusion is predictable: ,Let us go to Freud and Klein for our psychotherapy [Lacan is of course excluded]
and to Marx and the environmental sciences for our politics, and not get out lines crossed (Collier, 1998 41-3). Surprisingly enough this is almost identical with Homers conclusion:
Lacanian theory is OK as an analytical tool but let us go back to Marx for our ideological seminar and our utopian catechism!
identification. Since utopian or quasi-utopian constructions function through identification it is legitimate, I think, to draw the analogies with the social field. If analysis resists the
reoccupation of the traditional strategy of identification although it recognizes its crucial, but alienating, role in the formation of subjectivity why should psychoanalytic politics, after
unmasking the crucial but alienating character of traditional, fantasmatic, identifactory politics, reoccupy their ground? This rationale underlying the Lacanian position is not far away
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from what Beardsworth articulates as a political reading of Derrida. For Beardsworth, deconstruction also refuses to implicate itself in traditional politics, in the local sense of politics in
Beardsworths terminology:
In its affirmative refusal to advocate a politics, deconstruction forms, firstly, an account of why all political projects fail. Since the projection of any decision has ethical
implications, deconstruction in fact generalizes what is meant by the political well beyond the local sense of politics. In this sense it becomes a radical critique of
institutions.
(Beardsworth, 1996: 19)
the radicality and political importance of the lacanian critique depends on its ability to keep its
distance from the fantasmatic politics, from politics in the traditional sense, which is not the same as saying that
psychoanalysis is apolitical: in fact, it becomes political precisely by being critical of traditional politics,
Similarly,
exactly because, as argued in the previous chapter, the political is located beyond the utopian or quasi-utopian
sedimentations of political reality.
Fourth, the perm severs, our alternative has the judge reject the
affirmative to shatter the silence surrounding death in order to tear down
the taboo. Advocating the alternative in any way stops them from
advocating their discourse, making the affirmative a moving target,
allowing them to spike out of links, which is a voting issue for fairness and
education. They will make the argument that they can kick advantages,
but thats only true if we make a defensive link argument, which we
didnt.
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Sixth, extend the 1NC Havel evidence, theyre conceding our distinction
and hierarchy between ideology and action which means they cant win
the permutation. The thanatophobic mode of thought they subscribe to
not only creates the reality we live in it is also independently more
important than the action taken itself.
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to technological free market more gradually and yet no less profoundly, increasingly force analysis outside the dichotomy of
present versus past tense, the dynamic versus the static. Ben Agger, for example, in elaborating his theory of "fast
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The Number Five- They conceded ALL of our reasons why the perm
cant solve
a. Friedland says the perm co-opts our alternative. It only feeds into the
Wests war on death. For them to win the perm they gotta win they dont
link.
b. Beres says the perm will collapse on it self. Their representations only
promote the herd mentality and state centric thought that is functionally a
concession to demands for immortality.
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although the non-realization of the universal principle it appears to hinge on contingent circumstances
In the paragraphs on civil society in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel demonstrates how the growing class of rabble [Pobel] in modern
civil society is not an accidental result of social mismanagement , inadequate government measures, or simple economic bad luck:
the inherent structural dynamic of civil society necessarily gives rise to a class which is excluded from its benefits (work, personal
dignity, etc.) a class deprived of elementary human rights, and therefore also exempt from the duties toward society, an element
within civil society that negates its universal principle, a kind of non-Reason inherent in Reason itself in short, its symptom. Do we
not witness the same phenomenon in todays growth of an underclass which is excluded, sometimes even for generations,f rom the
benefits of liberal-democratic affluent society? Todays exceptions (the homeless, the ghettoized, the permanent unemployed) are
the symptom of the late capitalist universal system, the permanent reminder of how the immanent logic of late capitalism works:
the proper capitalist utopia is that through appropriate measures (affirmative action and other forms of state intervention for
progressive liberals; the return to self-care and family values for conservatives), this exception could be in the long term and in
The necessary failure here is structural: it is not simply that, because of the empirical complexity of the situation, all
particular progressive fights will never be united, that wrong chains of equivalences will always occur (say, the enchainment of the
occurrences of
wrong enchainments are grounded in the very structuring principle if todays progressive
politics of establishing chains of equivalences: the very domain of the multitude of
particular struggles, with their continuously shifting displacements and condensations, is
sustained by the repression of the key role of economic struggle. The Leftist politics of the
chains of equivalences among the plurality of struggles is strictly correlative to the
abandonment of the analysis of capitalism as a global economic system that is, to the tacit
acceptance of capitalist economic relations and liberal-democratic politics as the
unquestioned framework of our social life.
fight for African-American ethnic identity with patriarchal and homophobic attitudes), but, rather, that
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**Framework Blocks
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Framework 2nc
They have conceded our last piece of evidence in the 1nc, our Havel
evidence, which damns them. The affirmatives method of thought process,
methodology and ideology is ripe with implications all its own.
Contemporary ideology has come to replace the power of the sword as
ideology provides power its legitimacy and coherence. In short, ideology
IS reality, more important then action itself.
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4. Education
A. They do not teach a THING about real policymaking. Congressional
bills arent 2 sentences long without funding recommendations.
5. Turn- Defending the Status Quo forces us to defend things like racism
and sexism- another predictable framework is necessary for negative
ground.
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The only argument they can go for is fairness but they concede that our
interpretation is more externally predictable because the word resolved is
on the left side of the colon, means debaters must stand resolved and the
reasons why are to be justified.
AND Our interpretation only forces you to defend your 1AC, solves
narratives and judge intervention arguments.
Additionally, we open equal ground for the affirmative and negative. They
concede affs can be run with impacts in our framework.
Heres our Offense1. The kritik proves that how we frame a policy proposal is as
important as the policy itself. The plan is useless without knowing
how to achieve it without destroying meaning.
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4. Santos says the drive to save traditional debate from the radicals
justifies WESTERN COLONIZATION and EXTERMINATION of the other.
This allows ethical claims to be ignored and negates the value to
life. Counterfeit existence outweighs fairness and ground.
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**Realism Blocks
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violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behavior of people, human action which may be
analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but
as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques,
has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the
it is
becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence.
Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive
product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act , implying in
pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking,
turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these
propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behavior by its
circumstances. (Compare the question, Does pornography cause violence?) The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of
the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful
place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient
practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by
whom)? Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search on the part of the tabloid press or the professionals of violence for
experiences of violence in the offenders own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in the scientific model of a cycle of violence.
That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, while a crucial factor in the present context is ignored,
namely the agents decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left
groups have tried to explain men s sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence
of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive
and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively
these explanations
ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses
violence, that is, that these circumstances do not cause violent behavior. They
overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision
was made in circumstances of limited choice.
contribute to it. Although such oppression is a very real part of an agents life context,
3. Prefer the specificity of our evidence. Our Beres, Santos and Foucault
evidence outline that wars can ONLY be waged based on the process we
are describing; all conflicts in the 20th century rely on this process. Our
kritik takes out the ability to engage in these wars. Consequently, the turn
has no impact.
4. Our alternative solves realism and restors the value to life. This cards
on fire.
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Louis Rene Beres, Prof of I. Law at Purdue, Intl Journal on World Peace, No. 3, Volume 16,
September 1st, 1999
How, then, do we end these terrible wars? Most important, we must first understand them as
manifestations of humankind's unwillingness to accept personal death. Death defines world
politics because individuals wish to escape death. The ironies are staggering, but the connections persist and
remain unexamined. Freed from their unwillingness to accept the finitude of life, individuals could finally agree upon
a descralization of states, upon a covenant with all other individuals to treat the political as a
secular realm of unalterably mundane limits. With such an agreement, the passion for "victory" would be
greatly abridged, and the rationale of war between states severely impaired. Over time, every polis
could become a cosmopolis, and the "realism" of power struggles between states could be
revealed for what it has always been, a "religious" myth. But we are back at the beginning. How
may we be instructed to accept our own personal mortality? Epicurus had an answer. In his letter to Menoeceus, he counsels:
Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us . For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is
with memory, nature has revealed to us a truth utterly unimaginable to the unreflective creation... the truth of mortality....The more we reflect, the more
we live in memory and idea, the more convinced and penetrated we shall be by the experience of death; yet, without our knowing it, perhaps, this very
conviction and experience will have raised us, in a way, above mortality. As it is memory that makes mortality an incontestable truth, says Santayana, so it
is also memory that opens to us all an ideal immortaliy, an "immortality in representation," an opportunity to accept the knowledge of natural death as an
By accepting death, then, each moment of life becomes vastly more rich in
joy, meaning and potentiality. Detached from the falsehood that existence can conquer temporality, each
occasion to "live in the spirit."
individual may experience an authentic notion of immortality, one that "quickens his numbered moments with a
vision of what never dies, the truth of those moments and their inalienable values."
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perpetuated
6. Theres no link- their argument assumes some kind of political or policy action in
order to merit and impact. Our alternative is not to abandon the state. In a world of our
alternative, states would still exist and would be able to pursue their own interests. They
just wont wage wars. If we win the framework debate it become a non-issue because it
is not a representation we employ ie it requires policy level action to have an impact.
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They concede our alternative doesnt abandon the state. States can still exist and would
be able to pursue their own interests, just not wage wars.
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_____________
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**Theory Blocks
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2. We only advocate ONE gateway argument off ONE link- we cant say that
the affs impact calculus is both death good and death bad and ctiticize
both. This answers their multiple contradictory worlds and strategic skew
arguments.
5. If you think it is a double turn, concede one of the two and see if you
win. If you grant us the disad, then the kritik links to both equally and
you vote negative on presumption. If you grant us the kritik, then the
judge rejects the disad along with the Aff case. Unfortunately for you,
rejecting the disad doesnt mean we lose, but rejecting the case means
you do lose.
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2. Even if they win that both teams link to the Weeks and Maurel evidence
equally, it isnt a reason to reject us.
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2. If you somehow let them pin us with this, PIKS are Sweet
A. Ground The aff gets the entirety of their defense of the 1AC
advantages as offense against us. You said preserving death was
good for a reason, right? Defend it!
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