Americans Came To Dominate Early TradE TO PDF

New Players at the Table: How Americans Came to Dominate Early Trade in the North
Pacific
Author(s): William J. Barger
Source: Southern California Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 227-257
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Historical Society of
Southern California
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41172430
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New Players
at the Table
How Americans Came to Dominate
Early Trade in the North Pacific

By William]. Borger
Abstract: After Captain James Cook's 1778-1779 discovery of the lucrative potential of the trade in sea otter pelts from the northern Pacific coast
of North America, Russia, Britain, France, and Spain converged on the

region. The United States joined the competition later. This paper compares the economic and territorial policies of the competing nations in the
context of world affairs to explain how the United States came to dominate
the sea otter trade and establish a presence in California.
Introduction
In late March 1778, Captain James Cook sailed into Nootka Sound,
couver Island, off the coast of what is today British Columbia. His
dition had been out since July 1776; the weather was cold, and his
needed warm clothing. They traded with the local Indians for furs o
ious kinds, including sea otter pelts. With little information about
otters' value, Cook and his crew traded principally for their own u
sometimes purchasing clothing off their sellers' backs.1 When the
dition reached Canton, China, in December 1779, they discovere
used pelts were worth $50 to $70 apiece and that particularly fine
mens could command as much as $120. Commenting on the comme
possibilities of the Northwest Coast, Lieutenant James King, o
Cook's officers, noted that "the advantages that might be served f
227
228
voyage
to
that
part
o
views,
appear
to
me
attention
of
the
Pub
began
between
the
N
at Canton and Macao.
In the 1 780s, Europe's major powers came to the Northwest Coast to

exploit this new trade link. By 1782, the Russians had moved south into
the waters explored by Cook. A British trading ship arrived at Nootka
Sound in 1785, and a French exploratory expedition followed in 1786.
Reacting to Russian activities after Vitus Bering's 1741 expedition, the
Spanish actually reached Nootka Sound prior to Cook and, by 1789, had
taken military action to protect their claims on the coast.
The nations' strategies, strengths, and weaknesses differed. The

British could exploit their naval resources in the Pacific and their established contacts with China. The Russians were skilled fur hunters and
had bases in Alaska and trade contacts with China. The Spanish controlled California and had easy access to commodities considered valu-
able as trade items to the natives. The French had been active fur traders
in Canada and had already mounted several expeditions to the Pacific. I

will explore the competitive efforts of each of these nations. My principal focus, however, will be on a fifth competitor: the United States of
America - a new player in the eighteenth-century world of commerce.
In 1787 a group of New England merchants sent two ships to explore
the commercial possibilities of the Northwest Coast.3 These traders had
no Pacific supply bases, no navy to call upon for help, and few contacts
with China. Remarkably, within fifteen years, their successors would
dominate the coass trade. My purpose is to understand why. Why did
Americans come to the North Pacific in the first place? Why were they
successful competitors, and how did the weaknesses of other nations facilitate their success? Mercantilism and historic imperatives will play a role.
America's ability to exploit the new ideas of free trade, unfettered by the
baggage of history, will also be a factor. Curiously, I will find that the price
of tea in Britain would have a major impact on America's success. Eighteenth-century global economic conditions affected the world much as
they do today.
Admittedly, the fur trade was never a very large market, even by eigh-
teenth-century standards. However, the United States' success placed it
ship
off
By
George
Courtesy
of
St.
Geor
Heinric
The
1963-002:
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the
nineteenth
ce
turned
south
into
they
violated
Span
not
particularly
b
disintegrate
after
perately
needed
m
its
independence
f
merchants
helped
lay
States
in
and
l
the
f
1846,
230
Rocky
By
beach
George
Courtesy
of
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Heinrich
The
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Bancroft
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The Sea Otter
The sea otter, Enhydra lutris, lives around the North Pacific littora
Japan to Baja California It is remarkable because it protects itself
the region's frigid waters with a dense fur coat (650,000 hairs per s
inch) rather than the layer of fat that protects other aquatic mamm
the region.4 To the eighteenth-century Chinese eye, this coat had
commercial value - wealthy Chinese used it primarily for clothing
ration.5 Moreover, since the otter needs the protection of its coat a
round, it does not molt as do other furbearing mammals and cons
grooms itself to maintain the coas insulating properties. Consequ
it possesses a commercially "prime coat" all year.6 Unfortunately fo
otter, these properties got it hunted almost to extinction by about
Russian Activities before Cook
In 1582 Sibr', the capital of the Western Siberian Khanate, fell, perm
ting virtually unfettered Russian expansion eastward for the next two hu
dred years,7 By 1639 the first band of Cossacks reached the North Pac
and by 1649 Russians established the first Pacific settlement at Okh
(on the sea of the same name). This rapid advance (a mere sixty-s
years to extend six thousand miles) was spearheaded by private adven

ers seeking furs-8 In Siberia the sable was king and formed the basis
Russian domination of the European fur trade during this period. By
1670S a prolonged crisis in the sable trade began because of rapacious h

ing methods,9 Many areas were declared closed to the promyshlenni
(hunters) because of exhaustion of the sable resource. Hunters began
seek other venues for employment and, after 1696, began to populate
Kamchatka peninsula. When a sea route between Kamchatka
Okhotsk was opened in 1714-1716, the stream of fur hunters increased
Once Russians reached Kamchatka, a new resource, the sea ott
became available to them.11 Both sables and otters are valuable furb
ers, but the otter's ecology is much more fragile.12 The sable is a noc
nal animal that bears up to five young a year. The otter, however, is a
primarily in the daytime and drops only one offspring per year. Moreove
the pelt of the female is more desirable than that of the male. Cons
quently, sea otters were depleted in a given area far more quickly th
equivalent population of sables, and the same problems that had occur
in the sable areas of Siberia occurred in the otter fisheries of the N
Pacific - only more quickly. This reality would ultimately push Rus
hunters out across the Aleutian Islands and down the Alaskan coast
ing new populations.
As the Russians crossed Siberia they encountered the Chinese, wi
whom they shared a long and ill-defined border, to the south.13 By the m
seventeenth century, contact began to beget trading opportunities,

the first direct trade between Russia and China occurred in 1656.14
were the principal Russian trading item. Trade remained sporadic un

1685, when a conflict between the Russians and the Chinese gave ri
a formal relationship. The problem arose when Russian trappers rea
the Amur River Valley and discovered that the Chinese had claimed
area as well. In 1685 Moscow dispatched its first ambassador to C
Fedor Alexseevich Golovin. Golovin's principal charge was to nego
a border with the Chinese along the Amur River. In doing so, he
232
instructed
to
retain,
if
river.
Defining
the
bo
ations.
This
effort
res
international
treaty
e
modern
times.15
provisions
The
vaguely
Russian caravans and hence established a formal outlet for Russian furs.
Over the next thirty-odd years, Russian-Chinese border trade developed. Both Russia and China made a variety of attempts to regulate their
traders with only limited success, and commercial disputes frequently arose.
In addition, border wars involving the various peoples inhabiting the vast
region also strained relations between the two powers. Even a gold rush in
the Tarim Basin in the second decade of the eighteenth century complicated Chinese-Russian relations.16 The problems finally reached a head in
1719, when the Peking court refused a Russian caravan entry into the capital. After prolonged negotiations, the Treaty of Kiakhta was signed in
1727.17
The treaty successfully delimited the border between the two nations
and established rules for passage, repatriation of military deserters, and

other matters. With respect to commerce, it established rules for direct
trade with Peking as well as border trade. The Russians could send one
caravan to Peking every three years. Additionally, two trading centers
were established on the Siberian-Chinese border. Ultimately, these centers would coalesce into the trading center at Kiakhta, where Russian and
Chinese merchants could participate in continuous trade. Kiakhta, south
of Lake Baikal, was remote; it was over 3,300 miles from Moscow and
about 2,400 miles from the Russian Pacific port at Okhotsk. It could take
over two years to transport an otter pelt from the Aleutians to the
Kiakhta market. However, the treaty gave the Russians a monopoly in the
sea otter trade with China - one that would not be threatened until
Cook's expedition established the Canton connection in 1779.

When did the Russians become aware of the otter's value to the Chinese? We know that Russian hunters reached the otter's domain by the
late seventeenth century. Since the Chinese were major fur buyers and
the sable was becoming depleted, it seems reasonable to assume that the
otter entered the Russian inventory at that time. Historian Lydia Black
asserts that "small-scale fur hunters had been active in fur procurement,
tr
def
especially
sea
ott
decades"
tion
was
before
B
forced
t
Islands
(now
call
members
of
the
on
their
return
Steller,
recorded
nal
In
particular,
hunting
efforts
w
sold
in
Kamchatk
at
the
Chinese
bo
rubles."20
He
fur
of
their
pelts
black
enough."21
color,
while
maro
had
to
have
know
Spanish Activities before Cook
The Spanish were aware of the sea otter by at least 1733. Miguel Venegas, in his 1759 History of California, recorded that in 1733 Padre Sigis-
mundo Taraval "found such numbers of them together [off Baja
California], that the seamen killed above twenty of them, following them
only with sticks."22 He further recorded that "some of the skins of these
creatures the father sent to Mexico."23 Unfortunately, he does not record
whether they were sent for commercial purposes or merely as curiosities.
Concerned about Russian activities in the far north (e.g., Bering's expe-
dition to Alaska in 1741), the Spanish dispatched expeditions to the

Northwest Coast in 1774, 1775, and 1779.24 Diaries from these expeditions record mariners trading shells, beads, knives, old clothes, and pieces
of iron with the Northwest Indians for otter skins.25 Aside from a record
of some sent to the king and some to the viceroy, there appears to be no
evidence as to what ultimately happened to these furs; but one may surmise that a few may have made their way into the holds of the Manila
galleons and hence to the Chinese market.

Adele Ogden records that, after 1780, a few otter skins did enter the
Manila galleon trade.26 Missionaries and soldiers acquired them from

local natives for prices as low as three to four reales each.27 Although this
234
was
a
very
low
acqui
Canton,
the
problem
hunting
skills
of
the
were
not
great,
Ogde
skins
were
shipped
f
Cook's Impact
If the Russians and Spanish knew of the sea otter by 1733, if the Spani
were aware of its presence off British Columbia's shores by 1774, and
the Russians knew of its value to the Chinese by 174 1 and had a distrib
ution system in place by 1727, what did the Cook expedition bring to t
party? Cook contributed two things. First, his expedition established
commercial link between the Northwest Coast and Canton that w
much more cost effective than its Russian or Spanish alternatives. Sec
ond, in many ways Cook was (in twenty-first-century parlance) a "supe
star" of the eighteenth century and, as such, focused European a

American attention on the North American fur trade and hence up
the value of the Pacific coast itself
In exploring the impact of Cook on the sea otter market, we must fir
understand what he knew about the otter and its value when he arriv
on the coast. After leaving Nootka Sound in April 1778, he proceed

north, seeking the Northwest Passage. As the expedition advanced, Coo
recorded that they traded for various items, including sea otter skins.29 On
June 5 the expedition made contact with local Indians in Cook Inle
Observing that they possessed iron knives and other European item
Cook noted,
It is probable that they may get them from some of their Neighbours with
whome [sic] the Russians may have a trade, for I will be bold to say that the
Russians were never amongst these people, nor carry on any commerce with
them, for if they did they would hardly be cloathed [sic] in such valuable
skins as those of the Sea Beaver; the Russians would find some means or
other to get them all from them.30
Consequently, I conclude that before Cook encountered the Russians, he

knew that the skins both had value and were vigorously pursued by them.
He also noted that the otter might be of commercial interest to the

British as well because he observed that "there is no doubt but a very beneficial fur trade might be carried on with the Inhabitants of this vast coast,
British
of
Asia,
of
but
chart
The
of
the
expeditions
Huntington
unless
norther
Britain
to
receive
of
Britain's
tradin
did
not
see
Canton
Ideas
about
that
Izmailov
at
the
Ru
Izmailov
provided
environs
but
his
e
told
Cook
that
th
Cook
was
suspicio
merely
trying
to
arrived
there.
In
236
spent
almost
two
dead
mer
by
then,
but
his
before.
They
sol
chants.33
Cook's
sus
happy
with
the
pri
recorded,
The furs sell at a high price, and the situation and habit of the natives call
for few articles in return. Our sailors brought a great number of furs with them
from the coast of America, and were not less astonished than delighted with
the quantity of silver the merchants paid them for them. . . .34
The expedition lamented their sales to the Russians when they reached
Canton and sold their remaining furs at prices considerably in excess of
those at Kamchatka. It was then that the expedition's members understood the potential of the Northwest Coast-Canton connection.
When Cook's ships returned to England in 1780, the nation was
enmeshed in the American Revolution and the associated wars with
France and Spain. The British government viewed Cook's discoveries as

a military secret and did not publish a record of his voyage until 1784. The
Admiralty also confiscated the private journals of the expedition's mem-
bers in a further attempt to ensure secrecy. Neither precaution worked.

Expedition publications became available in Europe in 178 1 (John Rick-
man, Heinrich Zimmermann); in 1782 (William Ellis); and the United

States in 1783 (John Ledyard).35 Although Britain and France were at
war, a French edition of Zimmermann was published in 1782. 36 Astoundingly, Cook was such a celebrity in France that Louis XVI had instructed
his warships to extend every courtesy to him during his third voyage - in
spite of the fact that England and France were at war.37 Both Western
Europe and America wanted to know what Cook had found in the remote
regions of the world.
Competition for the Otter Begins
The first trading vessel seeking furs for the Canton market reached
Northwest Coast in 1785 under the Englishman James Hanna. By
twenty-four British, seven American, and one Russian ship had visited
coast - several ventures led by veterans of Cook's third expedition (Ge
Dixon, Nathaniel Portlock, and John Meares) and one by an alumnus
the second voyage (Samuel Colnett).38 In the following four decades
Compilation of Trading Ships on the Northwest Coast
Year British American Russian French Portuguese Total

NUMBER OF SHIPS BY NATIONALITY
1785-1790
24
1791-1795
28
1796-1800
1801-1805
1806-1810
76
32
66
24
11
42
56
11
72
40
14
1816-1820
Total
1
6
1811-1815
1821-1825
33
4
1
27
41
50
278
56
44
53
62
11
66
427
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SHIPS BY NATIONALITY
1785-1790 75% 22% 3% 0% 0% 100%

1791-1795 42% 41% 9% 5% 3% 100%
1796-1800 17% 57% 26% 0% 0% 100%
1801-1805 7% 78% 15% 0% 0% 100%
1806-1810 4% 71% 25% 0% 0% 100%
1811-1815 11% 75% 14% 0% 0% 100%
1816-1820 8% 77% 11% 4% 0% 100%
1821-1825 2% 81% 18% 0% 0% 100%
Total
18%
65%
Note:
voyages
15%
Only
over
In
the
four
the
James
otter
Following
the
by
B.
100%
as
are
"uncert
itter
Skins,
commercially
ships
provide
lead
voyages
Gibson
Gibson,
trade
hundred
table,
0%
documented
designated
Source:
1825,
1%
of
from
at
leas
distributi
James
Gib
before him), I have excluded those

trading or hunting purposes (e.g.,
whose voyages were uncertain. The
ing vessels to the coast although t
trade - a point we shall discuss bel
trade was largely an Anglo-Americ
ages were by those two nations. Th
238
even
more
striking
w
table
were
largely
hu
below.
The
1780s
we
reached
parity
by
t
1800.
American
dom
that
the
increase
in
was
distorted
Napoleonic
18
15,
all
by
Wars.
were
in
th
Of
the
Russian Response to Competition
Since Cook's expedition had encountered the Russians at Unalaska
Kamchatka, they were aware of British encroachment on their mono

oly. While the British presence posed a threat, their activities did
have much immediate effect on Russian behavior - the Russians simp
proceeded as they had done since 1741 - i.e., dispatching expeditio
from Kamchatka, returning, and marketing their furs at Kiakhta. Th

was good reason for this. First, the better quality of sea otter skins ca
from the waters of the far north (mainly the Kuriles and Aleutians),
this had always been undisputed Russian territory.40 Second, the Russ
had a significant competitive advantage over other nations in the acq
sition of sea otter skins. Long before Cook's arrival, they had subjuga
the native Aleuts (of the Aleutian Islands), and the Aleuts were sk
otter hunters. Capable of prodigious voyages in their fragile bidar
(kayaks), they could live off the flesh of slain otters while providing f
to their Russian masters. To the Russians their costs were minimal, a
through a combination of tribute and employment, the Aleuts produ

prodigious numbers of skins for the Kiakhta market.41 Compared to
British and American acquisition method of barter with local Indi
the Russians and their Aleut allies were far more efficient produc
Moreover, Anglo-American traders had to take considerable risks wh
they brought their ships in close proximity to frequently hostile nati
They also had to face trading issues not confronted by the Russia
North American natives could be both shrewd traders and sensitive t

price, type, and quality of trade goods.
The Russians had another advantage over later arrivals: they h

both well established and profitable contacts with the Chinese. Mo
over,
since
the
ult
of
northern
Chin
tageously
placed.
thousand
miles
to
at Canton. Until it became obvious that the Northwest Coast-Canton
sea route was so efficient relative to the Russian Kamchatka-Kiakhta
route that a price differential resulted of sufficient magnitude to attract
northern Chinese merchants, there was no inducement for the Russians
to alter their market behavior. In sum, Cook was an aggravation but not
an immediate threat.
Russian hunting methods had problems, however. Just as with the
sable in Siberia in the seventeenth century, the expeditions annihilated
the otter populations in the Aleutian and northern Alaskan environments within a few decades, and hunters were forced south into Canadian waters.42 The problem with this was that the distance to Kamchatka
increased as hunters sought new production fields. That increased the

length of each expedition and hence the costs of ultimately providing
skins for the Chinese market.
As expeditions pursuing the otter became progressively longer,

increasing quantities of capital were needed to finance them. Consequently, the 1780S and 1790s saw a consolidation of the Russian fur industry because larger companies were needed to marshal that capital.43 As
part of that process Gregory Shelikof and Ivan Golikof founded the
American Northeastern Company in 178 1 - an enterprise that would
ultimately coalesce into the Russian American Fur Company in 1799.44
In 178 1 the Shelikof-Golikof firm was distinct from its competitors
because it was not founded for a single voyage but for a period often years,
with the intention "to establish settlements and forts on the coasts and
islands of America."45 Shelikof and Golikof hoped to cut the costs of trav-
eling between the fur-hunting areas and Kamchatka by residing longer in

Alaska. It was Gregory Shelikof who established a base on Kodiak Island
in 178 - the first permanent Russian settlement in North America.
Stretching their supply lines amplified a second problem facing the

Russian competitors - Russia did not possess a skilled merchant marine
in the Pacific as did the British and Americans. The Russians in the
North Pacific were men of the rivers and forests - not of the sea.46 As a
measure of this proposition consider that Russian trappers took about sev-
240
enty
years
to
cross
ninety
to
island
hop
only
twelve
hundred
Russian
naval
officer
It
appeared
to
me
by
no
trade
by
sea
with
China
want
of
people
capable
o
Ships
were
of
ply
supplying
poor
q
her
Al
Not
only
did
the
R
bases,
but
their
lack
otter
skins
back
to
years
This,
in
of
Alaskan
ware
course,
incre
the
enterprise.
The
posed
a
problem
beca
them;
they
were
rest
to
open
any
other
doo
all
otter
traders
for
and
British
traders
w
travention
gotiate
of
that
commerce.
the
Kia
treaty
That
eff
access
to
the
southern
sians
were
not
suited
ton
market
proceed
as
or
to
they
stop
had
French Attempts at Competition
By 1783 France had sent five expeditions into the South Pacific - som
were successful, and some were dismal failures. These expeditions, ho
ever, awakened French public awareness of Pacific opportunities both f
national aggrandizement and commercial gain.52 When Cook's expl
were published on the continent in the early 1780s, their contents w
eagerly consumed by the French public, including Louis XVI. The desi
for a "French Cook" led to the planning of a Pacific expedition in 178
King
Louis'
intere
mercial
proponen
involved
in
a
com
into
an
explorator
remained,
they
di
did,
however,
carr
plumed
dragoon's
h
many
other
items
Plans
under
La
came
the
to
fr
Comte
Perouse
was
in
Their
objective
wa
his
specific
instru
coast,
from
Monte
seeking
the
Northw
which
he
called
Po
La
Perouse
departed
acquired
did
Lituya
B
a
thousa
reached
Macao
in
l
furs
fetched.
In
a
Although
the
memo
you,
concerns
only
A
article
of
trade
on
t
concluded
in
China
out
in
Europe
would
hundred
of
them
wh
sand
tity
La
livres,
would
and
have
Perouse
at
th
prod
goes
on
pany
from
Bengal
year
and
had
drive
Russians
had
been
the
effects
of
Spa
on
French
prospect
because
his
expedi
wrecks
of
his
ship
242
Not
to
be
deterred
b
gave
the
coast
anothe
met
Nathaniel
Portlo
gave
Marchand
detail
the
importance
of
th
seilles
in
August
1789
local
merchants,
to
u
west
Coast.
Well
cap
was
scheduled
to
leav
between
Britain
and
the
brink
of
war.
Ca
resolution
and
did
no
Marchand
was
fo
reached
the
western
Marchand
found
the
traders
than
Cook
or
expected.
He
did,
how
weeks
and
sailed
sout
ing
another
trading
China
to
sell
his
carg
commerce
(and
his
lu
The
Chinese
showing
signal
up
at
were
Canton
violation
of
1
79
1,
they
banned
a
when
Marchand
arriv
firmed
the
situation,
his
furs
still
in
his
ho
a
circumnavigation
of
in
the
eighteenth
cen
over
his
truncated
m
would
still
bring
a
go
sale.
Unfortunately,
time
as
the
impounded
furs,
and,
and
when
After
the
Marchand
war
effectively
remo
French
ships
would
p
Spanish Attempts to Enforce Territorial Rights
In September 1784 Vicente Vasadre y Vega outlined a plan for the o

trade to the Viceroy of Mexico, Matas de Glvez.60 Recognizing a sh
age of quicksilver in the silver mines of New Spain and an abundanc
the same material in China, he argued that sea otter pelts for quicksi
would be an effective trade in Canton. Instead of the supply ships ret
ing to San Bias empty from California each year, they could bring
able pelts to be transshipped to China via the Manila Galleon. Moreo
Spanish activity in the new trade now attracting the English would b
effective way to protect Spanish territorial rights in California and p
north.
At first Vasadre's idea met a favorable reaction in Mexico City,

Madrid, and California. Soon, however, he encountered the strictures of
Spanish mercantilism. In 1785 the Royal Philippine Company had been

formed and had been granted a monopoly on the importation of quicksilver into Mexico. Along with the governor of the Philippines, the company took a dim view of Vasadre's plan since it would interfere with their
interests. Since the company had more effective representation in Mexico City and Madrid, Vasadre's plan died in its infancy.61
Other Spaniards also had ideas to exploit the otter resource. Ciriaco
Gonzlez de Carvajal, intendant of the Philippines, advanced one such
idea. Aside from a practical way to make money, he argued, Spanish
activity in the otter trade would be an important tool to stave off English
and Russian advances in the North Pacific. He argued that by getting

native peoples involved they would "be able to hold fast by their help a
rich and powerful commerce to which other strong nations now aspire."62
Alas, the plan of Gonzlez de Carvajal met the same fate as that of
Vasadre y Vega when he confronted the Royal Philippine Company in
the halls of Madrid.
Others advanced plans as well. Este van Jos Martinez, Alejandro

Malaspina, and Juan Bodega y Cuadra, all of whom had been to the
Northwest Coast, advanced ideas to prosecute the otter trade. All met the
same fate when encountering the Spanish bureaucracy - denial. Even the
Royal Philippine Company came up with an idea that died in its infancy.
Spanish politics, bureaucracy, and draconian mercantilist policies were

simply too much to overcome. Spaniards in the field had the right idea,
but their government simply would not support them. In 1792, Jos Mariano Mozio put it well:
244
View
of
the
entrance
in
British
Columbia.
By
Joh
Library
,
Universit
croft
We
have,
dant
in
copper
our
in
possessi
Michoac
places;
crude
hats
throug
so
forth.
Navigation
oug
departure
and
points
of
can
ily.
the
be
obtained
from
We
can
therefore
Chinese
more
th
pa
cheap
To
the
Spanish
gove
nomic
value
of
the
N
Moreover,
the
Bourb
before
them,
were
in
sively
expand
their
a
larly
inclined
to
ex
California
and
the
No
one
else
did.
They
we
would
find
as
yet
und
Northern Mexico.65
In this context, Spain's reaction to the British, Russian, and American efforts in the otter trade makes sense. Rather than compete com-
mercially,
Spain
d
her
prerogatives.
tinez,
arrived
at
Martinez
quickly
Since
his
orders
the
Americans
slip
with
the
American
captured
two
Brit
crews,
and
rededic
lished
the
fort
of
until 1795
It is not my purpose to reanalyze the Nootka Incident and its subsequent diplomatic negotiations. William Manning and others have covered the subject well.67 Here it suffices to note that the Spanish "blinked"
and decided to make peace with Britain. (The prospects of a war with
Britain and French instability on his borders were simply too much for
Carlos IV.) As a result of the Nootka Treaty, both Britain and Spain recognized each other's sovereign rights to be on the coast of North America. Moreover, Spain agreed to remove her forts and related structures
from the Pacific Northwest and withdraw into California waters. By 1795
she was gone. The British, for their part, agreed not to impinge on Spanish prerogatives in the south and basically adhered to that agreement.
246
Spain
that
would
will
be
agreement
never
relevant
and
ag
la
would
Americans Come to the Coast
From the earliest days, the American colonies' principal trading par
was Great Britain. British law, following mercantilist ideas, discoura
manufacturing in the colonies and encouraged the production of

materials - principally agricultural commodities. From the tim
Charles II, however, the Crown restricted agricultural imports
Britain and thus severely impacted the colonies' ability to obtain nee
imports. As a result of this dilemma, New England merchants devel
a thriving illicit trade with the British, French, and Spanish West In
where their products could be sold. Moreover, Boston ships frequent
stopped to trade in the southern colonies on both their outbound
return voyages - thus linking West Indian markets (and Boston m
chants) to the whole Atlantic coast.
When the American Revolution broke out, these markets we

abruptly closed. In fact, all American trade was severely restri
because British men-of-war sailed the Atlantic seaboard. American mer
chants expanded the smuggling skills they had developed in earlier t

ing with the French and Spanish in order to survive this period. In 1
the Treaty of Paris recognized the independence of the former Brit
colonies. However, since the United States was no longer part of

British Empire, Americans no longer had access to the West Indie
any other British possession, for that matter). To quote historian Ty
Dennett: "As a non-manufacturing people, shut up in a limited
which was not producing many essential articles of diet, and impove
ished by a costly war, the United States was as far as possible remov
from economic self-sufficiency. The first Americans went to Asia be
they had to go - they had to go everywhere."68
A group of American businessmen (including Robert Morris,
"financier" of the American Revolution) dispatched a ship, the Empr

of China, to Canton in 1783.69 The Empress's voyage was only a part
success. While Chinese goods could be marketed profitably in the Un
States, the Chinese had no particular interest in American produ
except for the herb ginseng, which was only available in limited qua
ties
in
the
United
wanted
specie
curre
States
had
very
lim
plague
the
country
John
Ledyard,
a
m
extolling
the
virtue
and
that
book
prov
send
American
man
for
otter
pelts,
tak
saleable
in
New
En
chants
dispatched
t
ington,
to
the
Nor
Sound
in
the
fall
of
the
otter
trade.
Referring
back
to
southern
otter
trad
three
percent
of
th
British
or
America
Russian,
and
Spanis
the
British,
follow
initially
dominated
the
Pacific,
trained
with
Cook),
and
a
c
over,
unlike
the
Sp
marketplace.
The
A
miles
from
home
w
selves.
And
yet
the
answer
to
why
tha
the
sea
otter
trade,
the
British
East
In
British and American Competition
In order to participate in the otter trade, a British trader technic

required two licenses. Under the British system of trade, he need
license from the East India Company to trade in Canton and a lice
from the South Seas Company to trade on the Northwest Coast.72 As
matter of practicality, the South Seas Company was little more than
248
shell
by
1784,
and
tha
Company's
requireme
Some
traders
obtaine
risked
confiscation
of
sailed
under
the
color
ular.73
East
Most,
India
however,
Company'
Canton,
and
the
factor
for
British
traders
re
Under
East
India
Com
the
Northwest
Coast
a
his
cargo
in
Canton,
b
not
permitted
to
bar
Britain
or
Europe.
Mor
East
India
Company
i
Great
Britain
in
twelv
of
East
India
Company
he
could
not
bring
Ch
Of
the
three
legs
of
Northwest
Coast
to
C
bore
any
significant
p
profitability
depended
the
Northwest
Coast
difficult
for
two
reas
sold
well
in
a
given
m
ond,
the
Americans
When
American
Cap
arrived
in
179
1,
he
f
goods
by
his
British
c
ments out of iron bars and convinced the natives to make a new fashion
statement. Even though they weighed five to seven pounds, the collars
were soon all the rage.76 Americans also were willing to change their trading methods to suit the market. The first British traders sailed along the
coast, stopping periodically and firing a gun to alert the natives to their
trading presence. Americans were willing to change that method to fit
changing conditions - stopping for extended periods when necessary and
even trading through the winter if it meant extra profits.77 The British
View
of
native
boat
e
the
southern
end
of
By
John
The
Sykes,
Bancroft
Berkeley
betw
Library
963
-002
were
slow
to
respon
or
sell
anything,
an
and
at
all
times,
any
equipment,
furs,
ves
isfactory
price/'78
American
aggressi
Northwest
Coast.
R
hand
arrived
at
Can
market,
cargo
and
with
Marcha
him.
Ca
250
decision
and
simply
of
barter
opportun
British
traders.
Tyl
American
traders
fr
tions.80
In
sum,
the
A
legs
of
their
venture
as
well,
that
an
Amer
on
the
Northwest
Co
sufficient
to
cover
t
Americans
were
in
a
Why
did
the
East
bother
with
a
limited
do
with
the
fur
trad
Great
Britain.
Prior
imposts,
subsidies,
impact
imply
a
tariff
was
consumed
in
Bri
it
as
did
the
American
government
was
tha
they
smuggle
the
o
British
merchants
di
ments
through
other
In
1783
(serendipito
the
government
of
W
ters.83
At
his
behest
which
reduced
the
ta
sumed
by
everyone
an
the
1830S
taxes
from
government's
revenu
The
East
India
Comp
rise
of
the
British
te
protection
of
that
in
textile
imports
from
ter
it
wasn't
grown
teenth
century
unrestricted
an
importa
The
East
India
Com
bottoms
to
ship
th
lem
was
even
wor
Britain
and
Contin
to
100
percent
of
monopoly
in
1834
British
Until
manufactu
the
market
the
early
nineteen
tity
of
tea
they
n
ply
in
Canton,
al
The
period
was
rif
ficulty,
including
nately
part
for
of
them,
the
Br
com
India
Company
did
sale
of
otter
skins
of
specie
currency
sailed
to
England
Americans
positive
were
support
imposed
a
charge
o
ican
shores
by
for
1789
added
anothe
United
States
by
f
tive
Thomas
Fitzsi
trade,
The merchants have gone largely into it, and it at present gives employment
to some thousand tons of American shipping and seamen; our success has
been so great, as to excite the jealousy of Europe, and nothing is left undone
to cramp or prevent our commercial operations in that quarter.89
This is a classic "infant industry" argument for a protective tariff.
Because she was a neutral nation (and bolstered by tariff protection),
the United States became the worls common carrier during the
Napoleonic Wars. While there is not much evidence of warfare in the
North Pacific, British ships had to be concerned when they brought their
252
cargoes
into
souther
Company
was
force
United
States,
of
co
which
led
to
the
War
lost
sailors,
officers,
costs
faced
by
Britis
by
1800
the
Americ
Coast.
Conclusion
Each of the competitors faced its own issues. The Spanish pos
opportunities provided by their lengthy presence on the Pacific co

their system of missions in California, and their ancient contacts w
Chinese via the Manila trade. Their problems arose because of their
conian form of mercantilism and a bureaucracy more concerne
preservation of their status than expanding Spain's commercial ve
They tried to defend their prerogatives by sending military units t
Northwest, but in the end European politics trumped that effo
Spain pulled back to a defensive position in California after the No
incident - never returning to the Northwest Coast.
The Russians faced their own bureaucracy and their mercan
views. In the end, however, it was a lack of maritime resources an

Chinese refusal to free them from their Kiakhta trading post tha
mately forced them back into Alaskan waters. The costs of haulin
four thousand miles to Kiakhta and supporting the bases that su
those furs simply became prohibitive. Even their foray into Calif
(Fort Ross) was unsuccessful because the Russians were never able
vide an agricultural surplus to support Russian America or es

meaningful trade links with the Spanish.91
France never really got started. La Prouse's visit made great re

for scholars, but after he disappeared in the South Pacific nothing
of his venture. Marchans attempt at the fur trade in 179 1 wa
founded both by relations with the Chinese and the turmoil of wa
revolution in Europe.
British traders had everything going for them - maritime resou

experience with China, and an entrepreneurial spirit. These merch
however,
would
the
problems
of
t
the
Americans.
T
Incident.
was
left
The
to
trad
the
Am
By
the
end
of
th
off
the
coast
of
C
den
Spanish
water
manded
by
Capta
Eliza,
under
Capta
intent
of
smuggl
decade
of
the
nin
were
smugglers,
otters
in
Californ
broke
from
the
m
nia's
citizens
effec
sailed
north
from
stances,
including
in
18
18.95
While
Lima,
Peru)
provi
there
was
plenty
cans.96
The
Spanis
ited
by
a
lack
of
r
When
Mexico
wo
supplies
of
all
kin
merce.
American
and
tallow
trade
o
helped
California
the
lonely
sea
ott
presence
and
estab
merce in the North Pacific.
Notes
I wish to thank the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California, for providing me with access
their rare materials, reference library, and staff, and professors Walter Bethel, California Polytechnic Uni-
versity, San Luis Obispo; James Reiss, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia; Andrew Rolle, Occi
dental College; Ms. Elisabeth Breckow; and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments an
criticisms.
254
J.
Beaglehole,
The
Journals
of
and
Discovery,
1776-1780
(Camb
J967),
3
(part
1),
296-302.
2
James
mand
Cadell,
3
The
Cook
of
his
(vols.
1784),
ships
and
Majesty,
for
2)
and
making
3:435.
would
not
reach
the
Boston
in
August
1790,
complet
ington
remained
in
the
Pacific
un
4
Briton
C.
Busch,
McGill-Queen's
5
6
James
Busch,
R.
The
Gibson,
War
War
Again
University
Against
"Sables
the
Pres
to
Seals,
7
See
Lydia
T.
Black,
Russians
prehensive
discussion
of
the
Sea
4.
in
Ru
8
Ibid.,
8.
See
also,
James
R.
Gib
Frederick
Starr,
ed.,
Russia's
Am
9
Svtlana
Fedorova,
The
Russian
P
The
Limestone
Press,
1973),
103
10 Ibid., 103.
11 T. A. Rickard, "The Sea Otter in History," British Columbia Historical Quarterly 11 (1947): 19.
12 Gibson, "Russian Expansion," 33.
13 Clifford M. Foust, Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's Trade with China and Its Setting, 1 727-1805 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 2.
14 Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1 550-1700 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1943), 222.
Marion O'Neil, "The Maritime Activities of the Northwest Company," The Journal of the Washington Historical Society 21 (October 1930): 247.
16 Foust, Muscovite and Mandarin, 16-17.
17Ibid.,24ff.
18 Black, Russians in Alaska, 59.
19 Georg W. Stellar, Journal of a Voyage with Bering, 1741-1742 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988),
145.
20 Ibid., 147.
21 Ibid., 146.
22 Miguel Venegas, A Natural and Civil History of California. 2 vols. (London: Printed for James Rivington and
lames Fletcher at the Oxford Theatre in Pater-Noster Row, 17^0). 18
23 Ibid.
24 Christian Archer, "The Political and Military Context of the Spanish Advance into the Pacific Northwest"
in Robin Inglis, ed., Spain and the North Pacific Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentennial of the
Malaspina Expedition 1791-1792 (Vancouver, : Vancouver Maritime Museum Society, 1992), 9-17. See
also Fedorova, Russian Population in Alaska, 107. Between 1774 and 1792 Spain dispatched twelve expeditions to the coasts of Washington, Canada, and Alaska.
25 Adele Ogden, "The Californias in Spain's Pacific Otter Trade, 17 75-1 795," Pacific Historical Review 1
(December 1932): 445.
26 Adele Ogden, The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 194 1 ), 2.
27 A Reale is worth an eighth of a peso or about an eighth of an ounce of silver.

28 Ogden, California Sea Otter Trade, 2.
29 Beaglehole, Voyage, 364-65.

30 Ibid., 371. Please note that eighteenth-century otter traders frequently referred to the otter as a "sea beaver."
31 Ibid.
32
Ibid.,
452-53.
See
also
Ba
icon
Neptune
38
(July
107
33
Cook
34
35
Ibid.
,3:367-68.
Beaglehole,
Voyage,
and
(p
36
Beaglehole,
(p
37
On
April
tection.
38
See
of
Galois,
UBC
J.
Press,
national
1780,
below.
Barkley),
data
Cf.,
als
Northwest
to
2004),
Otter
the
sailed
they
and
silver rubles worth of otter skins.
42 Rickard, "The Sea Otter in History," 24-25. See also Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, 1730-1885 (San
Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Company, 1886), 252 and James Gibson, Imperial Russia in Frontier America:
The Changing Supply of Geography of Russian America, 1784-1867 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1976), 4.
43 Kent G. Lightfoot, "Russian Colonization: The Implications of Mercantile Colonial Practices in the North
Pacific," Historical Archaeology 40 (2003): 16.
44 Gibson, Imperial Russia, 4
45 Svtlana G. Fedorova, Russian Population in Alaska, 106.

46 See Glynn Barratt, Russia in Pacific Waters, 17 15-1825: A Survey of the Origins of Russia's Naval Presence in
the North and South Pacific (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), 101, for a discussion
of Russian problems.
47 Gibson, "Russian Expansion," 32-33. Isker (the western-most Siberian Khanate) fell in 1581 as did Okhotsk
(on the Pacific in 1649), but Bering did not reach Alaska until 1741.
48 Quoted in Barratt, Russia in Pacific Waters, 109.
49 Ibid., 1 10.
50 Mary K. Wheeler, "Empires in Conflict and Cooperation: The 'Bostonians' and the Russian- American
Company," Pacific Historical Review 40 (1971): 425-26.
51 Barratt, Russia in Pacific Waters, no.
52 John Dunmore, French Explorers in the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 251-52.
53 John Dunmore, Pacific Explorer: The Life of Jean Francois de la Perouse, 1741-1788 (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1985), 190.
54 Dunmore, French Explorers, 259.
55 Ibid. ,262.
56John Dunmore, translator and editor, The Journal of Jean Francois de Galaup de la Perouse, 1785-1788. 2 vols.
(London: The Hakluvt Society, 1004), 2:402.
57 Ibid.
58 Dunmore, French Explorers, 343.
59 Dunmore, French Explorers in the Pacific, does not directly discuss the French Revolution's impact on the
Baux brothers. According to Dunmore, Marchand's ship, the Solide, was constructed after August 1789 on
the Baux brothers' instructions. For whatever reason, they didn't seem to be too concerned about the
unfolding events of the French Revolution. In fact, the Baux brothers seemed to be far more concerned
about the Nootka Incident than the Revolution. Dunmore says, with regard to Nootka, that the "Baux's
the
treated
filtered
41 Ibid., 13. Between 1743 and 1800, Russian hunters launched one hundred ventures and produced 8 million
but
under
are
No
2-3.
Skins,
affiliations,
Barkley)
Lt.
Beaglehole,
Voyage
Gibson,
that
40 Ibid. ,7.
C.
the
Voyage
Voyage,
12,
Table
Trade
39
King,
it
256
therefore
not
ish
until
cautiously
they
defeat
anchored
unrest."
that
that
at
In
"enabled
were
the
to
for
war
Marchand
Ile
addition,
him
waited
certain
left
France,
w
de
he
notes
return
th
safely
counter-revolutionary
activ
the
furs.
Dunmore,
French
Expl
60
Adele
Ogden,
"The
California
61
Adele
Ogden,
"The
California
62
Ibid.,
460.
63
Jos
M.
Mozio,
Iris
H.
Wilson
tle:
University
of
Washington
P
64
See
Warren
University
65
Ibid.,
66
See,
Cook,
Press,
Floodtide
1973)
for
an
ex
248-49.
William
R.
Manning,
torical
Association,
1904)
for
a
67
Cf.
Manning,
The
Nootka
Incid
68
e.g.,
Tyler
Dennett,
Japan,
and
Americans
Korea
in
the
in
East
igth
Cen
69
Magdalen
Coughlin,
"The
Ent
Quarterly
48
(1967):
333-42.
70
Kenneth
Latourette,
The
Histo
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Pre
dalwood:
The
Conundrum
of
th
71
Useful
discussions
of
this
ofjacksonian
Democracy
baum,
A
History
of
the
72
Busch,
73
See
the
a
74
Marion
ical
F.
ship
the
Seals
Remarkable
reminiscences
flying
Quarterly
W.
The
O'Neil,
Americas,
dition
75
Against
Hill,
delightful
British
the
"War
Beth
"The
24
(no.
791-1792
Ibid.,
35-36.
Ibid.,
37-38.
co
Maritime
4):
244.
in
Se
Spai
(Vancouver,
"Early
Days
4(i923):35ff.
77
of
Austrian
1763-1793,"
Howay,
76
topi
(Philade
Dollar
(N
78 Ibid., 39.
79 Ibid., 41.
80 Dennett, Americans in East Asia, 38.
81 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842 (New York: Monthly Review Press,
io5i),64.
82 Ibid. See also William J. Barger, "Furs, Hides, and a Little Larceny," Southern California Quarterly 85 (no.
4): 381-412.
83 Greenberg, British Trade, 64.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 6.
of
88
Gibson,
89
Otter
Thomas
Benton,
Skins,
37.
Fitzsimmons,
Abridgement
1857), 41-42.
90 H. Phillips, The East India Company, 1784-1834 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), 14,
87-88.
91 See, e.g., E. O. Essig, "Russian Settlement at Fort Ross," California Historical Society Quarterly 12 (no. 3):
198-99, and Clarence Du Four, "Russian Withdrawal from California," California Historical Society Quarterly 12 (no. 3): 240-45.
92 For a more complete discussion, see Barger, Furs, Hides, and a Little Larceny, 386-93.
93 Adele Ogden, California Sea Otter Trade, 32-33. See also Hubert H. Bancroft, History of California. 7 vols.
(San Francisco: The History Company, 1884-1800), 1:539-40.

94 Ibid., 33.
95 Bancroft, History of California, 2:282, 2:253, 2:261-62.

96 Robert Archibald, Economic Aspects of the California Missions (Washington DC: Academy of Franciscan His-
tory, 1978), 125.

97 For a detailed discussion of the hide and tallow period, see William ]. Barger, "The Merchants of Los Ange-
les: Economics and Commerce in Mexican California," Southern California Quarterly 82 (2000): 125-44.
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New Players at the Table: How Americans Came to Dominate Early Trade in the North

Historical Society of Southern California, University of California Press are collaborating

Early Trade in the North Pacific

of North America, Russia, Britain, France, and Spain converged on the

the sea otter trade and establish a presence in California.

possibilities of the Northwest Coast, Lieutenant James King, o

Cook's officers, noted that "the advantages that might be served f

In the 1 780s, Europe's major powers came to the Northwest Coast to

The nations' strategies, strengths, and weaknesses differed. The

in Canada and had already mounted several expeditions to the Pacific. I

teenth-century standards. However, the United States' success placed it

The Sea Otter

Russian Activities before Cook

years to extend six thousand miles) was spearheaded by private adven

1670S a prolonged crisis in the sable trade began because of rapacious h

Kamchatka peninsula. When a sea route between Kamchatka

Okhotsk was opened in 1714-1716, the stream of fur hunters increased

Once Russians reached Kamchatka, a new resource, the sea ott

As the Russians crossed Siberia they encountered the Chinese, wi

seventeenth century, contact began to beget trading opportunities,

were the principal Russian trading item. Trade remained sporadic un

and established rules for passage, repatriation of military deserters, and

Cook's expedition established the Canton connection in 1779.

mundo Taraval "found such numbers of them together [off Baja

dition to Alaska in 1741), the Spanish dispatched expeditions to the

galleons and hence to the Chinese market.

Manila galleon trade.26 Missionaries and soldiers acquired them from

commercial link between the Northwest Coast and Canton that w

star" of the eighteenth century and, as such, focused European a

the value of the Pacific coast itself

on the coast. After leaving Nootka Sound in April 1778, he proceed

Consequently, I conclude that before Cook encountered the Russians, he

He also noted that the otter might be of commercial interest to the

When Cook's ships returned to England in 1780, the nation was

enmeshed in the American Revolution and the associated wars with

France and Spain. The British government viewed Cook's discoveries as

bers in a further attempt to ensure secrecy. Neither precaution worked.

man, Heinrich Zimmermann); in 1782 (William Ellis); and the United

Compilation of Trading Ships on the Northwest Coast

Year British American Russian French Portuguese Total

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SHIPS BY NATIONALITY

1785-1790 75% 22% 3% 0% 0% 100%

before him), I have excluded those

Russian Response to Competition

Since Cook's expedition had encountered the Russians at Unalaska

Kamchatka, they were aware of British encroachment on their mono

proceeded as they had done since 1741 - i.e., dispatching expeditio

from Kamchatka, returning, and marketing their furs at Kiakhta. Th

otter hunters. Capable of prodigious voyages in their fragile bidar

through a combination of tribute and employment, the Aleuts produ

North American natives could be both shrewd traders and sensitive t

The Russians had another advantage over later arrivals: they h

increased as hunters sought new production fields. That increased the

skins for the Chinese market.

As expeditions pursuing the otter became progressively longer,

eling between the fur-hunting areas and Kamchatka by residing longer in

Stretching their supply lines amplified a second problem facing the

French Attempts at Competition

Spanish Attempts to Enforce Territorial Rights

In September 1784 Vicente Vasadre y Vega outlined a plan for the o

At first Vasadre's idea met a favorable reaction in Mexico City,

Spanish mercantilism. In 1785 the Royal Philippine Company had been

and Russian advances in the North Pacific. He argued that by getting